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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/24/2005

**File Folder** USSR-ASIA [VIETNAM, LAOS, KAMPUCHEA] 4/4

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2104

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8855	CABLE	24 814Z FEB 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	3	2/24/1982	B1
8856	CABLE	240814Z FEB 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	2/24/1982	B1
8870	CABLE	VIETNAM/USSR/LAOS/KAMPUCHEA <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	2	2/25/1981	B1
8843	CABLE	140128Z MAR 81	2	3/14/1981	B1
8857	PAPER	THE USSR IN INDOCHINA <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	11	3/16/1981	B1
8871	CABLE	VIETNAM/USSR/CHINA/KAMPUCHEA <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	3	3/23/1981	B1
8872	CABLE	KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM/USSR <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	4	3/24/1981	B1
8858	CABLE	281628Z MAR 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	3	3/28/1981	B1
8873	CABLE	VIETNAM/USSR/INDIA <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	3	5/14/1981	B1
8859	CABLE	281423Z MAY 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	5/28/1981	B1

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8844	PAPER	ECONOMIC AID AS A SOURCE OF FRICTION IN SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	7	5/28/1981	B1
8845	COVER SHEET	USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE REVIEW <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	1	5/28/1984	B1
8860	CABLE	121226Z JUN 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	6/12/1981	B1
8861	CABLE	241416Z JUN 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	6/24/1981	B1
8874	CABLE	VIETNAM/USSR <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	4	6/30/1981	B1
8863	CABLE	080430Z JUL 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	7/8/1981	B1
8846	CABLE	052250Z AUG 81	2	8/5/1981	B1
8862	CABLE	080430Z JUL 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	7/8/1981	B1
8864	CABLE	140200Z JUL 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	7/14/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8875	CABLE	KAMPUCHEA/USSR/EASTERN EUROPE/CUBA <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	10	8/5/1981	B1
8865	CABLE	250840Z AUG 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	8/25/1981	B1
8847	CABLE	262339Z AUG 81	2	8/26/1981	B1
8866	CABLE	081648Z SEP 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	9/8/1981	B1
8848	CABLE	111847Z SEP 81	2	9/11/1981	B1
8849	CABLE	111905Z SEP 81	2	9/11/1981	B1
8876	CABLE	VIETNAM/USSR <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	6	ND	B1
8867	CABLE	270830Z OCT 81 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	10/27/1981	B1
8850	CABLE	051220Z DEC 81	1	12/5/1981	B1
8851	PAPER	SOVIET-VIETNAMESE STRAINS: OGARKOV TO THE RESCUE	1	2/15/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8852	PAPER	SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM UNDER REVIEW	1	2/17/1982	B1
8868	CABLE	121203Z MAR 82 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	3/12/1982	B1
8853	PAPER	VIETNAM: CONVERN ABOUT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS	1	10/21/1982	B1
8877	CABLE	VIETNAM/USSR/EAST EUROPE <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	3	11/29/1982	B1
8854	PAPER	VIETNAM: THE SOVIETS SETTLE IN AT CAM RAHN BAY	1	12/13/1982	B1
8869	CABLE	USSR/VIETNAM: PARALLEL INTEREST IN KAMPUCHEA <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	5/17/1983	B1

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PRIORITY  
STU5548  
DE RUMJMA #4233/01 0550817  
P 24 814Z FEB 81  
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3298

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0892  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1549  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5245  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0866  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 2078  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 7911  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 556  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 8206  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2157  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3195  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 3096

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 04233

EXDIS  
DEPT PLEASE PASS CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/24/01 (MURPHY, RICHARD W.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, ASEAN, CB, UR  
SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON  
KAMPUCHEA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FONMIN ROMULO PRESENTED AMBASSADOR FEB 24 WITH TEXT OF  
FEB 21 LETTER TO HIM FROM SOVIET AMBASSADOR URGING GOP  
SUPPORT FOR CONFERENCE BETWEEN STATES OF INDOCHINA AND  
ASEAN. TEXT AS FOLLOWS:  
BEGIN QUOTE:

- CONSISTENTLY SPEAKING IN FAVOUR OF PEACE AND RELAXATION  
OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION ON ALL THE CONTINENTS AND IN ALL  
REGIONS OF THE WORLD, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS MANI-  
FESTED ITS INTEREST IN SEARCH OF WAYS TOWARDS NORMALIZATION  
ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. IT IS ONLY NATURAL  
THAT NOT ONLY THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THEIR  
NEIGHBOURS SEEK TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS  
LARGE AND IMPORTANT REGION. THE QUESTION OF FUTURE

\*\*\*\*\*WHRS COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

EOB:ECON,EA,PRC,EURE

PSN:014717 PAGE 01 TOR:055/09:54Z DTG:240814Z FEB 81

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NLS F06-114/6 # 8855  
BY WJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA--TOWARDS CONFRONTATION OR TOWARDS COOPERATION--IS A MATTER OF CONCERN FOR MANY STATES INCLUDING THE USSR.

- THAT IS WHY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES OF ITS OPINION ON THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

- THE INITIATIVES PUT FORWARD AT A RECENT CONFERENCE IN HO CHI MINH CITY OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, LAOS PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY STUDIED IN THE SOVIET UNION.

- THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE CONFERENCE CIRCUMSTANTIALLY ANALYZED THE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND WORKED OUT CONCRETE MEASURES AIMED AT DEVELOPING GOODNEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AMONG ALL STATES OF THIS REGION, AT TURNING IT INTO A ZONE OF PEACE, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. THE SRV, LPDR AND PRK HAVE PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL TO CONVENE A REGIONAL CONFERENCE BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF STATES--THE STATES OF INDOCHINA AND THE STATES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA (ASEAN)--WITH THE AIM OF SECURING PEACE, STABILITY, AND FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, MUTUAL CONCENT, RESPECT OF INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF EACH COUNTRY, OF REFUSAL FROM ENFORCING WILL OF ONE GROUP OF STATES UPON THE OTHER, AS WELL AS FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE STATES OF INDOCHINA PROPOSED TO THE ASEAN MEMBER-STATES TO CONCLUDE AN APPROPRIATE TREATY. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO CONCLUDE BILATERAL TREATIES ON PEACEFUL COEXISTANCE WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

- THOSE, WHO ARE REALLY INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING THE CLIMATE OF PEACE AND GOODNEIGHBOURLINESS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, UNDERSTAND TOO WELL THE MOTIFS WHICH INDOCHINESE STATES ARE GUIDED BY IN KEEPING ON A TIRELESS STRUGGLE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN THIS REGION. FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA HAD BEEN VICTIMS OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION AND THEN OF THE FORCES OF HEGEMONISM, AND THIS BROUGHT INNUMERABLE SUFFERINGS TO THE PEOPLES OF THESE COUNTRIES. THE PRESENT ENEMIES OF PEACE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA RESORT TO RUDE MILITARY PRESSURE ON VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA TO CONTINUOUS PITTING ONE GROUP OF COUNTRIES OF THE SEA REGION AGAINST THE OTHER AND TO ATTEMPTS TO KNOCK TOGETHER A SORT OF "UNITED ANTI-VIETNAMESE FRONT" WHICH, ACCORDING TO ITS INSTIGATORS, SHOULD INCLUDE THE REMNANTS OF CRIMINAL POL-POT GANGS AND THEIR KIND. SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA MADE BY THE SRV, LPDR AND PRK, AND DECLARES HIS SUPPORT OF THEIR NEW CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES AIMED AT SOLUTION OF URGENT AND ACUTE PROBLEMS OF THIS REGION AT A NEGOTIATIONS TABLE. THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN

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\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

THE THREE STATES OF INDOCHINA AND THE MEMBER-STATES OF  
ASEAN, WHICH THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE HO CHI MINH CONFERENCE  
ET

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PRIORITY  
UTS2755  
DE RUMJMA #4233/02 0550825  
P 240814Z FEB 81  
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3299

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0893  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1550  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5246  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0867  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 2079  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 7912  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0557  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 82 7  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2158  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3196  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 3097

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 MANILA 4233

EXDIS  
CALLED FOR, CAN PROMOTE THE REMOVAL OF THE DIFFICULTIES IN  
RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM. IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE CLEAR-  
ING OF THE LAYERS OF ESTRANGEMENT AND MISTRUST ACCUMULATED  
AS A RESULT OF MANY YEARS OF INTRIGUES OF CERTAIN OUTSIDE  
FORCES CAN BE ACHIEVED ON THE PATH OF GRADUAL RAPPROCHEMENT  
OF POSITIONS. IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET SIDE, THE PRO-  
MOTION AND DEEPENDING OF THE DIALOGUE AMONG ALL COUNTRIES  
OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA SHOULD BECOME ONE OF THE IMPORTANT  
DIRECTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY OF THE INTERESTED  
STATES.

- WE IN THE SOVIET UNION, WELCOME THE IDEA OF CREATING  
A ZONE OF PEACE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND DECLARE OUR READI-  
NESS, IF SUCH READINESS IS EXPRESSED BY THE OTHER PERMANENT  
MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL--THE US, BRITAIN, FRANCE  
AND THE PRC--TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
WHICH, AS POINTED OUT IN THE STATEMENT OF THE SRV, LPDR,  
PRK, COULD BE CONVENED AFTER THE CONCLUSION BETWEEN THE  
COUNTRIES OF THE TWO GROUPINGS OF A TREATY OF PEACE AND  
STABILITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, WITH THE AIM TO RECOGNIZE AND  
GUARANTEE SUCH A TREATY.

- THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO APPEAL

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NLS FILE-114/6 #8856  
BY LSJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO SHOW POLITICAL REALISM AND TO APPRAISE THE TRUE WORTH OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE INDOCHINESE STATES. IN MOSCOW THE HOPE IS BEING EXPRESSED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE INITIATIVES THE CONVERSION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA INTO A ZONE OF PEACE WILL BECOME AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE OF SECURITY AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLES OF THIS REGION, AND WILL SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAUSE OF ENSURING PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND BEYOND.  
END QUOTE.

3. ROMULO SAID HE TOLD AMBASSADOR MIKHAILOV WHEN LATTER DELIVERED THE MESSAGE FEB 23 THAT THE CONCEPT OF THE CONFERENCE WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE "KAMPUCHEA IS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM NOT A REGIONAL ONE." WHEN I ASKED WHETHER ROMULO FORESAW ANY DIVISION OF OPINION DEVELOPING WITHIN ASEAN RANKS CONCERNING THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE, FONMIN REPLIED CATEGORICALLY THAT HE FORESAW NO SUCH DEVELOPMENT. MURPHY#  
BT

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BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS  
AND  
RESEARCH

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BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

00783 <sup>10</sup>

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*Pipes*

INDOCHINA

(U) THE USSR IN INDOCHINA

(S/NF) Summary

The most significant Soviet advance in the Far East in the past few years has been in Indochina, where the USSR has become the major supporter of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos. Soviet penetration of the region progressed rapidly after Vietnamese difficulties with China and the West left the USSR as the only nation willing to provide the massive support Vietnam needed to keep its economy afloat and continue its drive for dominance in Indochina.

The most tangible benefit of Moscow's largesse is the significant expansion of Soviet access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities, which has permitted the USSR to improve its military capabilities in Southeast Asia. The Soviets have assumed a larger role in formulating political strategy for the communist states of Indochina and seem reasonably satisfied that the communist diplomatic position on Kampuchea will eventually lead to international acceptance of the Vietnamese domination of that country.

The USSR's efforts to increase its role in Kampuchea and Laos will ultimately be resisted by Vietnam, which does not want to see Indochina permanently beholden to the Soviets. In the long run, the degree of Soviet influence in the region will depend primarily on the state of Hanoi's relations with Beijing and on Vietnam's ability to find alternate sources of external support.

\* \* \* \* \*

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1, 2 3/16/01 (multiple sources)

WARNING NOTICE  
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report 94-AR  
March 16, 1981

(C) Soviet Strategic Interests in Indochina

Moscow has been willing to pay heavy political and economic costs for a foothold in Indochina because Soviet leaders see the peninsula as a unique base from which to influence regional developments and gain increased acceptance as a dominant Asian power:

- A united Indochina forms a bulwark against Chinese expansionism, and a Soviet military presence there enables the USSR to confront Beijing with armed force on a second frontier.
- A military presence along the main sea route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans puts Japan and other Asian states who depend heavily on seaborne commerce on notice that the USSR intends to play a major role in determining security arrangements in Asia.
- The Indochina springboard permits the USSR to compete more effectively for influence in Southeast Asia, countering US military commitments and deployments in the region and offsetting Japanese and Western political and economic links with the ASEAN states.<sup>1/</sup> It also serves as a hedge against any future ASEAN collaboration with the West in regional defense efforts.

Expansion of Soviet-Vietnamese Relations

(C) The USSR did not expect to be able to cash in quickly on its wartime assistance to Vietnam once US forces were withdrawn from Indochina in the mid-1970s; and indeed, Hanoi acted to preserve its newly won independence. Vietnamese leaders attempted to diversify their sources of external aid, seeking support from the USSR, China, the US, Western Europe, Japan, and a number of international organizations. Hanoi also maintained its traditional equidistance in the Sino-Soviet dispute, aligning with neither party.

<sup>1/</sup> Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

(C) But Vietnam's unremitting efforts to expand its influence throughout Indochina soon led to an escalating conflict with the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, increased tensions with Beijing, and delayed any normalization of relations with the West. As a result, the USSR emerged by default as the only nation willing to provide the economic and military assistance Hanoi desperately needed to continue its drive for regional dominance. Overcoming its long reluctance, Hanoi finally joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in June 1978 and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and a series of aid agreements with the USSR in November 1978.

(S/NF) The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 and China's subsequent attack on Vietnam in February 1979 put a seal on the new alliance. In the wake of the Chinese invasion, the USSR publicly warned Beijing to cease and desist and acted quickly to bolster Hanoi's defense capabilities. Moscow also assembled a small naval task force off the Vietnamese coast to serve as an additional warning to Beijing and to monitor the fighting. Some of these ships eventually put into Danang harbor for brief stays, establishing a precedent for port calls that Moscow had long sought in the region. A month after the invasion, several hundred Soviet "volunteers" were in Vietnam working the ports and filling vacancies caused by forced mass departures of ethnic Chinese. In addition, Soviet advisers were brought in to train Vietnamese personnel on new military equipment. The invasion also provided Moscow with a propaganda windfall, adding substance to its assertions that China was the greatest threat to the security of Southeast Asia.

#### Soviet Economic Aid to Indochina

(C) The USSR has provided massive assistance to Indochina since the Chinese attack. In 1979, CEMA members supplied an estimated 70 percent of Vietnam's \$1.2 billion in imports, with 81 percent of the total coming from Moscow. According to a Hanoi press report, the USSR that year provided 94 percent of Vietnam's cotton, 90 percent of its fuel, iron and steel, and fertilizer, and 70 percent of its grain. Most of the foodgrain and petroleum products were supplied as grant aid or on a soft-currency basis. Although Soviet deliveries to Vietnam in 1980 did not keep pace with the previous year, they remained high enough to keep the Vietnamese economy afloat and to permit Hanoi to continue its entrenchment in Kampuchea and Laos. Soviet aid to Vietnam, including military support, amounts to about \$3 million per day, and there are now over 4,000 Soviet economic advisers in the country. CEMA members have received about 75 percent of Vietnam's

total exports in the past three years, with at least 50 percent going to the USSR.

(S/NF/NC/OC) Soviet economic assistance to Kampuchea and Laos is also substantial. While much of it is channeled through Vietnam, Moscow is providing an increasing amount directly to Vientiane and Phnom Penh. The USSR and Laos signed an economic agreement in September 1980 calling for trade between the two countries to increase two and a half times over the next five years. Moscow will provide economic aid equivalent to \$600 million during the same period, including delivery of 500 trucks per year and extensive development of the road network between Vietnam and Laos. The future Soviet package to Kampuchea is reportedly still in preparation, but an increase over previous years is anticipated.

(C) Moscow has incurred considerable cost in supporting the states of Indochina and faces the prospect of continual economic drain there for the foreseeable future. Soviet leaders will no doubt seek ways to reduce this cost and will encourage Hanoi to seek other sources of external aid--while they ensure that critical support is still provided by the USSR and its CEMA partners. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union will relinquish its position in Indochina because of economic considerations.

#### Soviet Military Aid to Indochina

(S) Since March 1979, when China withdrew its forces from Vietnam, the USSR has provided Hanoi with more than \$1 billion worth of military hardware and considerable logistic support. Soviet shipments of military equipment increased dramatically from 1978 to 1979. Deliveries in 1980 were somewhat less, but remained substantial.

(S) Included have been about 350 armored vehicles ranging from medium tanks to armored personnel carriers, over 500 artillery pieces, some 50 anti-aircraft guns, a few additional SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missile launchers, and a large number of trucks.

(S) The Vietnamese Air Force has received 165 late-model MiG-21s, 50 older models for training, plus its first 27 SA-22 ground attack fighters and 16 MI-24 assault helicopters. Thirty cargo helicopters and a like amount of small to medium passenger/cargo planes have also been delivered.

(S) The Vietnamese Navy has gained 16 patrol boats, at least four of them missile-armed; three tank landing ships; a dozen smaller landing craft; and a minesweeper. The delivery of at least

28 KA-25 helicopters have provided the Vietnamese Navy with its first airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. The STYX missiles on the OSA boats provided by the USSR have a 46-km range, providing Hanoi with an important standoff capability against hostile ships.

(S) In most cases, the Soviet-supplied equipment is either new or factory-refurbished. Although impressive in terms of additions to Vietnam's inventory, the amount is relatively small in relation to the USSR's total arms export program and thus is not especially burdensome on Moscow.

(S/NF) The Soviet Union has also provided direct assistance to Hanoi's military efforts in Kampuchea. Since the summer of 1979, a dozen AN-12 transport aircraft with Soviet crews have shuttled troops, ammunition, and food from Vietnam to Kampuchea, returning to Vietnam in some instances carrying wounded soldiers. We have no hard evidence that the USSR has military advisers with the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea; however, Soviets probably accompany some Vietnamese units as observers.

#### Soviet Military Facilities in Vietnam

(U) The most tangible benefit of Moscow's largesse to Vietnam over the past two years is the significant expansion of Soviet access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities.

(S/NF) Soviet aircraft and ships have had access to former US military facilities in Vietnam since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. The use of ports began in February 1979 when a Soviet LST visited Danang. A cruiser moved into Cam Ranh Bay in late March. TU-95 BEAR D naval reconnaissance aircraft began intelligence collection flights in the South China Sea in response to the Chinese invasion, initially from their home base in the USSR. Later in the year, they began deploying to Danang in pairs for short periods. In February 1980, a pair of TU-142 BEAR F anti-submarine patrol aircraft accompanied two BEAR Ds to Danang. Since then, Moscow has maintained two BEAR aircraft of each type continuously in Vietnam.

(S/NF) During 1980, the Soviet Navy shifted its operations in Vietnam from Danang to Cam Ranh Bay, a more secure facility without civilian traffic. Developments there have given the Soviet military presence in Vietnam a more substantial character:

--Soviet air and sea units have had continuous access to Cam Ranh Bay throughout the year.

- A regional command authority was established there in May, first aboard an AMUR-class repair ship, later on a Don-class submarine repair ship, and finally ashore, enhancing the USSR's ability to sustain its military presence in the South China Sea. Some of the naval units operating in the region are probably now under the direct control of Cam Ranh Bay rather than their former headquarters at Vladivostok.
- A transporter dock recently arrived, permitting limited maintenance and repair of Soviet destroyers and smaller craft, including some submarines.
- The Soviets established a FIX-24 intelligence collection site on Cam Ranh peninsula in 1979, enhancing surveillance capabilities against regional air and sea operations and providing navigational support to Soviet aircraft operating from Vietnam.
- Ground-control radar facilities recently installed at Cam Ranh Bay provide an all-weather, day/night capability for handling aircraft.
- A new POL storage area is under construction at the airfield. It will hold more than 1.5 million liters of fuel when completed.
- Cam Ranh facilities have access to a satellite communications network.

(S) The number of Soviet vessels in Vietnamese waters fluctuated during 1980, but the average was higher than in the previous year. In October, a total of 24 ships were in the area, some en route between the Indian Ocean and Vladivostok, some conducting general operations at Cam Ranh Bay, and several involved in efforts to recover two lost aircraft from the ASW carrier Minsk, which arrived in the area in early September for a two-month stay, putting into Cam Ranh Bay at least once.

(S/NF) As a result of this expanded access to Vietnamese facilities, Soviet air and naval capabilities in the region have improved considerably:

- The USSR can more easily maintain a large naval presence in the South China Sea, in the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and in the Indian Ocean. Ships operating in any of these waters can now put into Cam Ranh Bay for crew rest, replenishment, and minor repair, avoiding costly



and time-consuming returns to home ports in the USSR. Moscow can also deploy specific support ships like the Lama-class missile supply tender to Cam Ranh Bay, making it available for quick-reaction support to naval units in potential combat zones during crisis periods.

- The range, duration, and responsiveness of Soviet maritime surveillance patrols in Southeast Asia have improved considerably.
- The Soviet Navy now is in a better position to counter US naval units based in the Philippines and Guam, as well as Chinese naval units in the South China Sea.
- The USSR for the first time has access to an air base capable of supporting responsive air cover for Soviet naval operations in the South Pacific.
- Cam Ranh Bay provides a replenishment stop for Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines and surface units en route to or returning from Indian Ocean deployments.

(S/NF) Although Soviet military operations from Vietnam have expanded substantially in the past year, Hanoi insists it is inaccurate to speak of a Soviet base in the country. According to Vietnamese leaders, Moscow has been granted temporary access to Cam Ranh Bay primarily as a deterrent to another Chinese attack on Vietnam. Whatever the actual conditions of Soviet access, Moscow's use of Vietnamese facilities remains tenuous and could be restricted and even terminated if Hanoi eventually finds a way to dispense with exclusive dependence on Soviet economic and military support. The Soviets--perhaps recognizing this--have not made any capital improvements of the kind associated with a permanent naval or air station which would have to be left behind if they were forced to depart.

#### The Kampuchean Issue

(C) Soviet leaders share Hanoi's desire to see Beijing's supporters completely ousted from Kampuchea and realize that their access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities depends in large measure on continued support of Hanoi's Kampuchean activities. But they have differed on occasion with the Vietnam leadership on questions of strategy and timing.

(C) Soviet leaders believe a policy of military restraint near the border can gradually lessen the specter of future

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Vietnamese aggression beyond Indochina that haunts ASEAN; this in turn will enhance the possibility that noncommunist states of the region eventually will accept a Hanoi-controlled regime in Kampuchea. The Soviets also calculate it will reduce the chance of ASEAN forming a military block aligned with the West. Moscow, however, has not been in a position to dictate military strategy to the Vietnamese.

(S/NF) When Hanoi conducted military operations across the Thai border on June 23, 1980, instigating two days of fighting between Vietnamese and Thai forces, Moscow was no doubt surprised and displeased. Soviet spokesmen had been telling US and ASEAN officials for over a year that Vietnamese troops would not cross into Thailand, and the incursion severely damaged Soviet credibility and diminished any trust Moscow had been able to generate among the ASEAN states. In addition, the attack could not have occurred at a more inopportune moment, coming on the eve of an ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference at Kuala Lumpur attended by US Secretary of State Muskie.

(S/NF) The incident led to sharp ASEAN denunciation of Hanoi, pledges of additional support to Thailand, and renewed ASEAN opposition to any recognition of the Heng Samrin regime. The Soviet media dutifully endorsed Vietnam's version of the incident, blamed the US, China, and Thailand for increased tension on the border, and called for Thai-Kampuchean negotiations to settle the disputes. Privately, however, Moscow evidently called Hanoi on the carpet.

(S) In any event, 10 days after the clash, on July 3, Soviet and Vietnamese leaders met in Moscow for their first summit meeting since November 1978. Although economic issues took up a significant portion of the agenda, future military strategy probably was discussed fully. Moscow no doubt reiterated its concern over the political ramifications of armed clashes on the Thai-Kampuchean border and presumably called on Hanoi to consult with it before undertaking such operations. In an effort to regain the political initiative, the USSR and Vietnam may also have agreed on a set of proposals which were promulgated two weeks later at a conference of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers. The fact that Phnom Penh sent its Minister of Information, Press and Culture to the July 17-18 meeting in Vietnam because its Foreign Minister was on an official visit in Africa suggests that the conference was hurriedly arranged.

(U) In the conference communique, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos claimed that the situation within Kampuchea was irreversible and asserted that the root cause of regional instability was tension along the Thai-Kampuchean border. To correct this situation, they offered a four-point plan: creation of a demilitarized zone on

both sides of the border; resettlement of Khmer refugees currently in Thailand; Kampuchean cooperation with international relief organizations; and negotiations between Kampuchea and Thailand to resolve these issues.

(S) Although Moscow and Hanoi presumably did not expect ready acceptance of the proposals, they were interested in creating the impression of Indochinese reasonableness and willingness to negotiate, in the hope this would lead eventually to a regional dialogue. The Soviet media called on ASEAN to respond favorably to the Vientiane communique, and Soviet diplomats assured US and ASEAN representatives that these were serious proposals worthy of careful consideration.

(C) Despite these endeavors, the ASEAN states successfully sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in October which called for an international conference to discuss the need for a Vietnamese troop withdrawal and UN-supervised elections in Kampuchea. Not surprisingly, the USSR and Vietnam rejected the UN resolution, and both stated they would not attend a UN-sponsored conference. Soviet diplomats also privately warned US and ASEAN representatives that the situation on the Thai-Kampuchean border remained explosive, implying that Hanoi might be forced to retaliate if the military operations of Pol Pot forces along the border were not restrained.

(C) The latest communist attempt to regain the political initiative occurred in January 1981, when the Indochinese Foreign Ministers, following a two-day conference in Ho Chi Minh City, proposed that the states of ASEAN and Indochina meet to discuss regional problems. The statement called for a meeting of ASEAN and Indochinese representatives in Vientiane on March 18 to discuss regional security problems and declared that Vietnam would withdraw some of its forces from Kampuchea if Thailand would refuse sanctuary to Pol Pot forces. Since then, Soviet Ambassadors in ASEAN capitals have sought support for the Indochinese proposals. They have also relayed Moscow's willingness to participate in a subsequent conference to guarantee a regional treaty.

(S) Although ASEAN has not been receptive to these proposals Moscow probably feels reasonably satisfied with its progress on the Kampuchean issue.

--The USSR has now assumed a larger role in formulating political strategy in Southeast Asia. In addition, Hanoi has refrained-- at least for the time being--from military incursions into

Thailand which would adversely affect communist diplomatic initiatives.

--If they choose to do so, the USSR and Hanoi are positioned to take cosmetic steps in response to ASEAN's two basic demands without jeopardizing Vietnam's domination of Kampuchea. First, the Kampuchean "elections" scheduled for this spring will permit the Heng Samrin regime to claim that it does indeed represent the will of the Khmer people, thereby deflecting ASEAN criticism in this respect. Second, Vietnam has by now established a military and political infrastructure in Kampuchea that would permit it to ostensibly "withdraw" some units, while in fact it would leave behind thousands of ethnic Vietnamese troops in indigenous military and administrative organizations. Thus, it could afford to initiate a withdrawal as a step leading to a Thai promise to terminate Thai support for the Pol Pot forces.

--Soviet leaders know that a UN conference on Kampuchea without Soviet and Vietnamese participation would not alter the situation in that country. If it did indeed take place, and its ineffectiveness were demonstrated, ASEAN might then be forced to give more consideration to Indochinese proposals for a regional conference.

(S) Outlook

Having greatly increased its involvement in Indochina over the past two years, the USSR is making a major effort to consolidate its gains. The number of Soviet advisers and technicians in Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos is growing rapidly, and hundreds of students and officials from the three countries are in the Soviet Union for education and training. Moscow is also working to draw the Indochinese communist parties more closely to the Soviet bloc and to strengthen bilateral, diplomatic, and economic ties with each of the three states.

The USSR's efforts to stake out an independent role for itself in Kampuchea and Laos is generating increasing concern in Vietnam, which does not want to see the Soviets permanently entrenched in Indochina. Hanoi has at times resisted Soviet efforts in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, and Vietnamese officials on a number of occasions have expressed a desire to reduce their country's dependence on the USSR by moving toward a more balanced relationship with the United States and China--albeit on Vietnamese terms. In the long run, the degree of Soviet influence in Indochina will depend not only on

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Moscow's behavior but also on the evolution of Vietnam's relations with Beijing and the West.

Prepared by James Grant  
x28657

Approved by Martha Mautner  
x29536

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EXDIS  
EO 12065: RDS-1 03/28/2001 (ABRAMOWITZ, MORTON I.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR, XC, VM  
SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON INDOCHINA

1. (~~SECRET~~/EXDIS - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I HAD A RELATIVELY LONG CONVERSATION ON INDOCHINA SITUATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR KOUZNETSOV MARCH 28, AT HIS SUGGESTION. SUBJECTS COVERED FAMILIAR GROUND AND THERE IS NO NEED BORING EVERYBODY RECOUNTING TALK. HOWEVER, DISCUSSION WAS MARKED BY A PRONOUNCED EFFORT ON KOUZNETSOV'S PART TO INDICATE REAL POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON CAMBODIA AND FLEXIBILITY OF VIETNAMESE. SOVIET WAS VAGUE ABOUT FORUM, CLEARLY PREFERRED THE VIETNAMESE/RUSSIAN CHOICE OF "REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS", BUT NEVERTHELESS HAD DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT TONE THAN ANY CONVERSATION I PREVIOUSLY HAD WITH HIM ON SUBJECT.

3. MOST NOTEWORTHY WAS HIS RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION OF WHETHER HE SAW ANY VIETNAMESE FLEXIBILITY AND INTENTION TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES SERIOUSLY (THE ISSUES BEING THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN CAMBODIA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY ACCEPTABLE GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA.) THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR RESPONDED QUOTE I THINK THERE IS FLEXIBILITY AND A SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND. THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT WANT TO KEEP TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA INDEFINITELY AND THE SITUATION WHICH EXISTS THERE IS NOT THE FINAL SOLUTION (NO MENTION THROUGHOUT ~~SECRET~~ OF "IRREVERSIBILITY"). THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES AND

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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TALKS MUST BEGIN. THE VIETNAMESE FEEL THAT EVERYONE IN BANGKOK IS AGAINST THEM. THEY HOWEVER NEED TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS IN KAMPUCHEA AND THEIR NORTHERN BORDER WITH CHINA. THEY CANNOT WITHDRAW WITHOUT SOME RESOLUTION OF THE POL POT FORCES.  
UNQUOTE

4. I SAID THAT IN MY PERSONAL VIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED TOGETHER IF ANY PROGRESS WERE TO BE MADE. HE WONDERED WHETHER CHINA WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT THIS, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF THE POL POT FORCES. I INDICATED THAT I OBVIOUSLY COULDN'T SPEAK FOR THE CHINESE; MUCH DEPENDED ON HOW THE TALKING DEVELOPS BUT IN THE END THEY PROBABLY WOULD ENGAGE THEMSELVES. HE WAS SKEPTICAL SINCE HE FELT THE CHINESE WANT TO REINSTALL POL POT OR AT LEAST AN ANTI-VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. I SAID THERE IS A LOT OF EMOTION OF COURSE INVOLVED BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND THE CHINESE, BUT I CAN ONLY SAY THE CHINESE HAVE STATED THAT IT IS NOT THEIR INTENT TO RESTORE THE DK IN PHNOM PENH. THAT IS CERTAINLY NOT OUR INTENT.

5. OTHER POINTS OF INTEREST:

--- THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AGREED WITH MY AS-  
SERTIONS THAT THE VIETNAMESE CLEARLY WERE SUFFERING,  
THAT THEIR ECONOMIC SITUATION WAS BAD, AND THAT MUCH OF  
THIS WAS DUE TO THE WAR IN CAMBODIA.

--- I SAID THAT IF THE VIETNAMESE MAINTAIN THEIR  
PRESENT POLICY ON CAMBODIA, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ISOLATE  
THEM AND MAINTAIN ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURES ON THEM. HE  
SAID IT IS HIS EXPERIENCE OF 20 YEARS WORKING WITH  
VIETNAMESE THAT PRESSURE ONLY MAKES THEM MORE RIGID  
AND THAT SOME OTHER SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND.

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EXDIS

----- THE SOVIET NOTED THAT CAMBODIA WAS A SECONDARY PROBLEM AND THERE WERE OTHER MORE IMPORTANT PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

----- I SAID WE HAVE BEEN WATCHING THE INCREASE OF VIETNAMESE FORCES IN CAMBODIA AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE SECURITY OF THAILAND WAS A MAJOR CONCERN AND COMMITMENT OF THE U.S. HE SAID THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT MORE HOSTILITIES.

6. COMMENT: I FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER TO TAKE ALL THIS SERIOUSLY OR CONSIDER IT A PART OF THE SOVIET EFFORT TO FOSTER DISSENTION WITHIN ASEAN. FROM OTHER REMARKS ABOUT INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THAT FACTOR WAS CLEARLY ON HIS MIND. I REMINDED HIM THAT MY RECENT CONVERSATION WITH THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AND COUNTLESS OTHER DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH THEM PRIVATELY INDICATED NOT THE SLIGHTEST FLEXIBILITY ON THE VIETNAMESE PART. WHILE HE SHOOK HIS HEAD HE DID NOT TAKE IT AS VITIATING HIS ASSERTION ABOVE. HE NEVER INSISTED THAT DK FORCES MUST FIRST BE TAKEN CARE OF.

7. I WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS OR THOUGHTS ON ALL THIS. I AM SKEPTICAL. IT RAISES ISSUES WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WHEN I AM BACK IN WASHINGTON.  
ABRAMOWITZ  
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FAZ  
25 IV '81

# Nur nicht noch mehr sowjetische „Berater“

Vietnam

Wie das isolierte Vietnam sich Sympathien zu verschaffen versucht / Erhard Haubold berichtet

SAIGON, im April Vietnams dritter Fünfjahresplan (1981 bis 1985) ist in Kraft getreten, aber die Sowjetunion, wichtigster Verbündeter und größter Kreditgeber, scheint noch immer keine feste Verpflichtung unternommen zu haben (Hanoi rechnet mit sechs von insgesamt dreißig Milliarden Dollar). Das ist ein weiteres Indiz für die wachsenden Reibereien zwischen den beiden „Brudernationen“, die seit 1978, dem Beitritt Vietnams zum Comecon, durch einen Freundschafts- und Beistandspakt eng verbunden sind. Hanoi braucht zwar dringend die russische Hilfe, die amerikanische und thailändische Quellen auf zwischen drei und sechs Millionen Dollar am Tag schätzen, um die tiefe wirtschaftliche Krise im eigenen Land zu überwinden und das Kambodscha-Abenteuer zu finanzieren; gleichzeitig reagiert Vietnam aber höchst sensibel auf die sowjetischen Versuche, in Indochina verstärkt Fuß zu fassen.

Das gilt besonders für die kräftig wachsende russische Präsenz in Phnom Penh, wo gerade ein großes Appartement-Haus für die in Ministerien, Fabriken und Schulen tätigen sowjetischen Berater hergerichtet wird, während der wichtigste Hafen Kompong Som (früher Sihanoukville) längst weitgehend in den Händen sowjetischer Techniker ist. Nicht zuletzt ärgert sich Hanoi darüber, daß sowjetische Diplomaten in Südostasien immer wieder Gerüchte über die angebliche Kompromißbereitschaft Vietnams in der Kambodscha-Frage ausstreuen, etwa dahin

gehend, daß Hanoi seine Truppen auf eine Linie östlich des Mekong zurückzieht, sobald Thailand und China ihre Unterstützung der Roten Khmer einstellen.

Gegenüber ausländischen Besuchern erwähnen hohe Beamte in Saigon, daß Vietnam „nicht noch mehr“ sowjetische Berater wolle, deren Zahl in Indochina auf 6000 bis 8000 geschätzt wird. Ihre räumliche Bewegungs-Freiheit ebenso wie die der russischen Diplomaten in den neueröffneten Konsulaten in Ho-Tschi-Minh-Stadt, DaNang und Hai-phong bleibe beschränkt; in dieser Hinsicht würden die Genossen aus Moskau nicht anders behandelt als westliche Ausländer. Und in Kambodscha hätten die sowjetischen Berater keinerlei militärische Aufgaben; überdies habe man die Flüge von Aeroflot nach Phnom Penh auf eine Verbindung pro Woche beschränkt.

Solcherart wachsendes Mißtrauen läßt Vietnam vorsichtig nach „Gegengewichten“ Ausschau halten, wobei in jüngster Zeit vor allem Japan und Frankreich positive Signale empfangen. Das neue Fernsehsystem Kambodschas soll nicht von Russen, sondern von japanischen Firmen eingerichtet werden. Und ebenso bemerkenswert ist, daß japanische Journalisten sich neuerdings in Kambodscha und Vietnam sehr viel länger aufhalten und freizügiger bewegen dürfen als ihre Kollegen aus westlichen Ländern. Auch wenn Japan kaum aus der westlichen Einheitsfront in der Kambodscha-Frage herauszubre-

chen ist, wäre für Hanoi schon viel gewonnen, wenn es zur Zusammenarbeit mit privaten und halboffiziellen Organisationen käme, wobei diverse Freundschaftsklubs in Japan mit einer Spendenaktion für Angkor Watt nützliche Vorarbeit geleistet haben.

Man nehme Hilfe von jedermann, sozialistisches oder kapitalistisches Lager, solange sie zu akzeptablen Bedingungen gegeben werde, ist in Saigon immer wieder zu hören. Das erklärt, weshalb in letzter Zeit auffällig viele Gruppen aus westlichen Ländern — vietnamesische Freundschaftsvereinigungen, Kriegsdienst-Gegner, Umweltschützer, vor allem aber amerikanische Kirchen-gruppen — Visa für Vietnam und Kambodscha erhalten: Vietnam fühlt sich, eine Folge der Invasion in Kambodscha, isoliert und viel zu sehr auf die Sowjetunion und Osteuropa angewiesen. Mit den Gruppen-Einladungen versucht es, neue Sympathien im Westen zu gewinnen. Und manche der privaten Organisationen, die dem Boykott ihrer Regierungen nicht unterworfen sind, ist in der Lage, Spenden von einer oder zwei Millionen Dollar zur Verfügung zu stellen. Die Chancen, die in dieser Situation für die westliche, vor allem die amerikanische Außenpolitik stecken (diplomatische Beziehungen gegen Konzessionen in der Kambodscha-Frage), scheinen einer näheren Prüfung wert.

Frankreich wird die nach dem Abzug der Amerikaner aus Südvietnam erhoffte Sonderrolle auch in Zukunft kaum spielen. Aber es kann sich gute Chancen ausrechnen, daß sein General-

konsulat in Saigon, die einzige westliche Vertretung im Süden, spätestens im nächsten Jahr die volle Exequatur erhält. Darauf läßt nicht zuletzt die neuerliche Konzilianz Hanois in der Frage der Auswanderung von rund 500 Vietnamesen mit französischen Pässen sowie weiteren 500 ehemaligen Kolonialbeamten mit vietnamesischer Staatsbürgerschaft schließen. Air France fliegt als einzige westliche Fluggesellschaft einmal in der Woche Ho-Tschi-Minh-Stadt an, bringt rund hundert Tonnen Fracht und nimmt 200 bis 300 Auswanderer in den Westen — ein nicht unwichtiges innenpolitisches Ventil. „Wir sind nützlich“, meint ein Diplomat.

Mit knapp hundert Staatsbürgern bilden die Franzosen die stärkste westliche Kolonie in Saigon, sie sind „sichtbar“ und haben gute Beziehungen zu den örtlichen Behörden, während die Russen, zahlenmäßig viel stärker, aber nach mehreren Attentaten verschreckt, sich lieber an ihren Hotelbars trösten. „Wir sind“, sagt ein seit Jahrzehnten ansässiger Franzose über das Verhältnis zum Gastland, „wie alte Ehepartner — erst zwangsweise verheiratet, dann geschieden, treffen wir uns jetzt wieder. Dabei dominieren die Erinnerungen an die guten Zeiten.“ Neben Schweden ist Frankreich das einzige westliche Land, das sich für die in eine diplomatische „Eiszeit“ geratenen Vietnamesen interessiert. So empfindet man es jedenfalls in Saigon. Und selbst die aus dem Norden entsandten kommunistischen Kader sprechen französisch.

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# Russen in Vietnam - Amerikaner ohne Dollar

Der wachsende Einfluß der Sowjets in Indochina / Erhard Haubold berichtet aus Saigon

Wenn einem die Leute in Saigon (wie der Kern von Ho-Tschi-Minh-Stadt auch heute noch genannt wird) „Lian Xo“, „Lian Xo“, zurufen, was wie „Lenso, Lenso“ klingt, dann ist es Zeit, vor den Spiegel zu treten. Wie lange war man nicht mehr in Westeuropa? Wie alt sind Brille, Schuhe, Hemd und Armbanduhr? Solche Kleinigkeiten schauen sich die Vietnamesen (auch in Hanoi) nämlich genau an, bevor sie „Lenso, Lenso“ rufen. Denn „Lian Xo“ ist nicht nett gemeint und heißt „Russen, Russen“. Viel lieber würden die Leute „Amerikaner, Amerikaner“ rufen, die wie sie heute zugeben, so schlimm gar nicht waren.

Die hatten wenigstens Dollar, die mußte man nicht erst — wie die Russen — mit den grünen Scheinen ausstatten, um sie dann mit einer langen Einkaufsliste in den nur Ausländern zugänglichen „Intershop“ zu schicken. Die hatten Jeans und T-Shirts und nicht diese langweiligen weißen Netzhemden, hinter denen die „Lenso“ ihre Bäuche verbergen. Zwar waren die GIs laut und dünkten sich rassisch überlegen. Aber das ist bei ihren sozialistischen Nachfolgern noch schlimmer. Andere Ausländer meiden den Swimming-pool im Huu Nghi, dem alten Palace-Hotel Saigons, seitdem sowjetische Techniker dort lärmend, spuckend und betrunken ihr Unwesen treiben. Im „Tang Loy“ in Hanoi werfen sie regelmäßig Flaschen und Gläser aus dem zweiten Stock. Das werden die stolzen kleinen Kellner, die sich nach den Scherben bücken müssen, dem „Brudervolk“ aus Moskau so schnell nicht vergessen.

Während westliche Gäste in den vietnamesischen Restaurants ungefragt „Heineken“ vorgesetzt bekommen, tut es für die „Lenso“ am Ort gebräutes Bier Marke „33“. Sie zahlen ja in einheimischer Währung, sie sind „Amerikaner ohne Dollar“. Wie wenig die Sowjets beliebt sind, zeigt sich auch an den Schwarzmarktpreisen. Importierter Wodka bester Qualität kostet in Saigon 50 Dong, Johnnie Walker aber 200 Dong. Es zeigt sich außerdem an den Gerüchten: In der Provinz Hau Giang, 170 Kilometer südlich von Saigon im Mekong-Delta, sollen im letzten Jahr acht Russen einer Granate zum Opfer gefallen sein, die gegen ihren Bus geschleudert wurde; seitdem, so ist weiter zu hören, haben die Sowjets Anweisung, nur noch in Dreiergruppen spazierenzugehen. Weiter wird behauptet, daß die beiden „Lian Xo“, die vor kurzem auf der Straße von Phnom Penh nach Kompong Som getötet wurden, von vietnamesischen „Waffenbrüdern“ umgebracht worden seien.

Das alles darf freilich nicht den Blick verstellen für den wachsenden Einfluß Moskaus in Indochina, für seinen politisch-strategischen Vorstoß in den zentralen, militärisch stärksten Teil Südostasiens. Der Beitritt Hanois 1978 zum Comecon, seine eindeutige Entscheidung für Moskau — die den Konflikt mit Peking noch tiefer gräbt — und die verschiedenen Kooperationsverträge mit allen drei Ländern Indochinas geben der Sowjetunion einen wirksamen Hebel gegen China, das mehr Energien

nach Süden verlagern und seine für Rußland wichtige „Westfront“ entsprechend vernachlässigen muß. Einem alten Ziel, dem Mitspracherecht in Asien, ist Moskau (dessen Staatsgebiet zu drei Vierteln in Asien liegt) ein Stück nähergekommen.

Beobachter wie der Außenminister Singapurs, Dhanabalan, sind überzeugt, daß die Sowjets „alle Einrichtungen“ der von den Amerikanern hinterlassenen, hochmodernen Stützpunkte Da Nang und Cam Ranh Bay an der Küste Südvietnams benutzen können. Andere, wie der Amerikaner Douglas Pike, sprechen von einer „intimen Zusammenarbeit“, die ihrem Charakter nach längst eine militärische Allianz sei. Da Nang gehört elektronisches Gerät in Da Nang zur Überwachung der Region (mit Aufklärungslugzeugen vom Typ Tu-95) sowie ein Flughafen mit mehreren Landebahnen in der Nähe des Seehafens Cam Ranh Bay. Wenn auch von Verträgen nichts bekannt ist, so haben die Russen dort Zugang erhalten zu einem der besten natürlichen Häfen der Welt, dessen umfangreiche Dockeinrichtungen sie bereits intensiv nutzen. Im letzten Jahr haben sich die Besuche ihrer Kriegsschiffe in Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Haiphong und Saigon verdoppelt, von 75 auf 150. Von ihrem neuen Posten, der strategisch günstig zwischen dem Indischen Ozean und dem nächsten Stützpunkt Wladiwostok liegt, können die Sowjets eine größere Rolle im Südchinesischen Meer spielen, durch das die wichtigsten Transportrouten zwischen Europa und dem Nahen Osten einerseits, Fernost und Australasien andererseits verlaufen. „Wenn sich die Dinge entsprechend russischen Hoffnungen entwickeln“, sagt Singapurs Regierungschef Lee Kuan Yew, „wird Moskau auch die Straße von Malakka in seinen Einflußbereich bringen — und dadurch Pressionsmöglichkeiten gegen eine der größten kapitalistischen Volkswirtschaften erhalten: Japan.“

In Vietnam, Laos und Kambodscha sind heute zwischen 6000 und 8000 sowjetische Berater tätig, Militärs ebenso wie Brückenbauer und Hafenspezialisten (die etwa Kompong Som, den wichtigsten Hafen Kambodschas, unter ihre Kontrolle genommen haben). Daß es ein großer Akteur in Asien zu werden gedenkt, demonstrierte Moskau anläßlich der chinesischen „Strafaktion“ gegen Vietnam im Februar 1979. Im Südchinesischen und im Ostchinesischen Meer tauchten zehn sowjetische Kriegsschiffe auf, eine deutliche Warnung an die Adresse Pekings. Im letzten Herbst schließlich fuhren der Flugzeugträger „Minsk“ sowie drei weitere Schiffe in den Golf von Thailand und bis auf 150 Kilometer an die thailändische Küste heran, eine Demonstration militärischer Macht, die Regierungskreise in Bangkok als „schlechte Manieren“ verurteilten und die auch von

den übrigen nichtkommunistischen Nachbarländern aufmerksam registriert wurde. Der Ministerpräsident Singapurs sagt denn auch immer wieder, daß die größte Gefahr für die Region in den nächsten beiden Jahrzehnten nicht von China (das mit wirtschaftlichen und politischen Führungsproblemen vollauf beschäftigt sei), sondern von Moskau ausgehe. Führende Politiker in Thailand wie Thanat Koman werfen

die Verbindung mit der militärisch bei weitem stärksten Macht in der Region, die in der Vergangenheit beachtliche politische Dynamik bewiesen hat und überdies als — allerdings nicht unproblematischer — Transmissionsriemen für die sowjetischen Interessen in Kambodscha und Laos dienen kann. Der Preis dafür ist hoch: Während amerikanische Experten die russische Gesamthilfe (militärische und andere Lie-

Baumwollimporte. Nach westlichen Schätzungen betrug die sowjetische Wirtschaftshilfe 1,6 Milliarden Dollar in den zehn Jahren zwischen 1965 und 1975 und stieg zwischen 1976 und 1980 auf 2,5 Milliarden Dollar. Dazu ist Militärhilfe zu rechnen, die von 1965 bis 1975 fünf Milliarden Dollar betragen hat — eine insgesamt nicht sonderlich beeindruckende Leistung, wenn man daran denkt, daß China nach eigenen



Straßenszene in Saigon, heute Ho-Tschi-Minh-Stadt.

Foto Jean Claude Labbe / Gamma Studio X

den Russen „Expansionismus“ vor, der destabilisierend wirke, die Handelsrouten bedrohe und offenbar eine engere Zusammenarbeit zwischen Japan und China verhindern solle. Und noch ominöser klingen die Warnungen aus Peking, daß die drei Indochinaländer als „sowjetische Vorposten“ bezeichnet und Moskau beschuldigt, Südostasien mit Kriegsschiffen zu „überschwemmen“.

Zieht man die propagandistischen Übertreibungen ab, so bleibt für die Sowjets die Ausdehnung ihres Blocks durch ein „Kuba“ in Südostasien, eine wirkungsvolle Eindämmung Chinas und

Angaben zweimal soviel gegeben hat, mehr als 20 Milliarden Dollar zwischen 1950 und 1978. „Aber offenbar war die Unterstützung Moskaus ausreichend, um ein Abgleiten Hanois ins Lager Pekings zu verhindern.“

Eher Zufälligkeiten als ein genialer Plan Moskaus sind verantwortlich für seine Erfolge in Indochina: die rapide Verschlechterung des vietnamesisch-chinesischen Verhältnisses, das Peking 1978 zur Einstellung seiner Wirtschaftshilfe und zum Abzug seiner Ingenieure veranlaßte; die Verärgerung Hanois über das „Rapprochement“ zwischen Peking und Washington; schließlich die

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Tatsache, daß keine industrialisierte Nation des Westens sich 1975 nach dem Ende des zweiten Indochina-Kriegs zur Hilfe beim Wiederaufbau Vietnams bereit erklärte. Hanoi sah sich plötzlich — weitgehend aus eigenem Verschulden — nur noch von der Sowjetunion unterstützt, wobei nicht gering zu bewerten ist, daß die Revolutionäre Hanois ideologisch den Genossen in Moskau schon immer viel näher standen als den Nachbarn in Peking. Sie meldeten sehr frühzeitig Bedenken an gegen Maos Interpretation des Marxismus-Leninismus; sie haben Chinas Drei-Welten-Theorie (zwei Großmächte, Mittelmächte und dritte Welt) immer abgelehnt und außerdem ständig betont, daß Amerika, nicht die Sowjetunion, der Hauptfeind des internationalen revolutionären Kampfes sei. Ho Tschi Minh war Gründungsmitglied der KP Frankreichs, er und seine Kollegen standen der europäischen Arbeiterklasse sehr viel näher als die Chinesen, für ihn und seine Nachfolger spielt das städtische Proletariat die führende, die Bauernschaft nur eine „alliierte“ Rolle. Ganz anders bei den Chinesen, nach deren Theorie die ländlichen Gebiete die städtischen umzingeln und die, als unabhängiges Land, eine wichtige „koloniale“ Erfahrung, nämlich die Verbindung mit europäischen Intellektuellen, in weitaus geringerem Maße gemacht haben als die Vietnamesen.

So besehen, ist der im Dezember 1978 zwischen Vietnam und der Sowjetunion abgeschlossene Freundschafts- und Kooperationsvertrag, der auch eine militärische Beistandsverpflichtung enthält, nur die Formalisierung einer schon seit beinahe sechzig Jahren bestehenden engen Beziehung, die nicht nur wirtschaftlicher und militärischer, sondern auch ideologischer Kitt zusammenhält und sie um so fester macht. Das bedeutet freilich nicht, daß sie störungsfrei wäre, ganz im Gegenteil: In Gesprächen mit westlichen Besuchern werfen die Vietnamesen den Sowjets Kleinlichkeit in der Entwicklungshilfe vor und stellen den Wert der Expertenausbildung in Ostblockländern in Frage. Scharf kritisieren sie auch den Versuch Moskaus, den Erdölpreis für Vietnam um das Eineinhalbfache zu erhöhen, sowie die zähflüssigen Verhandlungen über den russischen Beitrag zum dritten Fünfjahresplan (1981 bis 1985) Hanois. Wenn Vietnam auch aufgrund seiner miserablen wirtschaftlichen Lage immer stärker auf die sowjetische Hilfe angewiesen ist und sich auf internationalen Konferenzen neuerdings auffällig eng an die Moskauer Linie hält — es hat nicht dreißig Jahre gekämpft, um seine Unabhängigkeit leichtfertig aufzugeben. Eine Aussöhnung mit Amerika — der Kredite der westlichen Welt folgen würden — oder mit China könnte die Lage schnell ändern: Hier liegt das große Risiko des russischen Engagements, mit dem Moskau überdies Gefahr läuft, Sympathien in den Asienländern zu verlieren und die nicht-kommunistische Staatengemeinschaft (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapur, Indonesien und die Philippinen) weiter in die Arme Chinas zu treiben.

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KAMPUCHEA  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 07347

E.O. 12065: GDS 5/28/87 (DJEREJIAN, EDWARD) OR-P  
TAGS: PEPR, UR, CB  
SUBJECT: PRAVDA EMPHASIZES SOVIET-KAMPUCHEAN TIES

1. ~~(C - ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. PRAVDA'S REPORT OF PEN SOVAN'S MAY 27 SPEECH IS STRIKING FOR ITS EMPHASIS ON THE CLOSENESS OF KAMPUCHEA TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET SUPPORT, AND THE ENTRY OF KAMPUCHEA FIRMLY INTO THE SOCIALIST FOLD. THE MAY 28 ARTICLE ENTITLED "UNDER THE BANNER OF MARXISM-LENINISM" EXTENSIVELY PARAPHRASES PEN SOVAN'S REMARKS, GIVING HIS TITLE AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA. THE MAIN THRUST IS THAT KAMPUCHEA IS DEVELOPING ALONG THE SOCIALIST PATH WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS ITS MOST IMPORTANT SUPPORTER. MOST NOTABLY, KAMPUCHEA'S SECURITY AGAINST OUTSIDERS IS TIED TO THE SOVIET UNION, NOT VIETNAM.
3. PRaise FOR SOVIET AID AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET EXPERIENCE FOR KAMPUCHEA ARE FEATURED IN THE PRAVDA PIECE, AND PEN SOVAN'S COMMENTS ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF KAMPUCHEAN AGRICULTURE AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY CLEARLY SHOW THAT KAMPUCHEA IS ON THE SOCIALIST PATH. HE ALSO PRAISES VIETNAM, LAOS, AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR THEIR SUPPORT, NOTING KAMPUCHEA'S PEACE, FRIENDSHIP, AND CO-OPERATION TREATIES WITH LAOS AND VIETNAM AND THAT THE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES FORM "ONE UNITED FAMILY IN THE GREAT COMMUNITY OF SOCIALIST NATIONS." HOWEVER, THE LION'S SHARE OF HIS PRAISE AND CREDIT FOR ASSISTANCE AS REPORTED BY PRAVDA GOES TO THE SOVIET UNION.
4. IN CONTRAST TO USUAL SOVIET REPORTING ON KAMPUCHEA, RELATIVELY LITTLE SPACE IS GIVEN IN THE PRAVDA ACCOUNT OF PEN SOVAN'S SPEECH TO CHINA, THE U.S., OR KAMPUCHEA'S RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. CHINA IS SAID TO WANT TO TURN KAMPUCHEA INTO A STAGING AREA AGAINST SOUTHEAST ASIA, WAR IS NOTED AS CONTINUING ON THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER, AND THE U.S., CHINA, AND OTHER REACTIONARIES ARE SAID TO BE

COLLUDING TO RESTORE THEIR FORMER POSITIONS. HOWEVER, THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES, "THE BULWARK OF WHICH IS THE SOVIET UNION," ARE SAID TO BE ABLE TO FOIL ANY SUCH PLANS. PEN SOVAN IS QUOTED AS CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF ASEAN AND CHARACTERIZING ASEAN'S EFFORTS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA AS INTERFERENCE IN KAMPUCHEA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

5. COMMENT: WE ARE NOT SURE HOW FAITHFULLY PRAVDA HAS REPORTED PEN SOVAN'S SPEECH OR IF THE ORIGINAL IN FACT PLACED SUCH EMPHASIS ON THE SOVIET UNION. PRAVDA'S READERS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT KAMPUCHEA IS NOW A FULL MEMBER OF THEIR CAMP AND KEEPING IT THERE IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. END COMMENT.  
MATLOCK

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BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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ECONOMIC AID AS A SOURCE OF FRICTION IN SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS\* [REDACTED]

There have been indicators over the past year of friction between the Soviet Union and Vietnam over economic aid. Moscow is unhappy about the Vietnamese economic performance and is not providing Hanoi all the aid it wants. The USSR, moreover, is reducing its economic assistance in those areas where the Vietnamese are particularly vulnerable. The Soviets may be withholding assistance in order to gain greater influence over the planning and management of the Vietnamese economy. [REDACTED]

Despite friction over economic aid, there is no evidence that the reduced level of Soviet military aid--almost half the military transfer rate of 1979--is at issue. This is because Vietnamese requirements generated by the Sino-Vietnamese border war of February 1979 had been met by earlier deliveries. Since military ties are the essential underpinning of the relationship, friction over economic aid--although likely to remain an irritant--is highly unlikely to lead to a split in Soviet-Vietnamese relations. [REDACTED]

Background

Following the abrupt departure of the Chinese from Vietnam in mid-1978, the Soviet Union assumed almost the entire burden of developmental and commodity aid to Vietnam. Although the Soviets had earlier pledged \$2.5 billion over five years for Vietnam's 1976-80 plan, in 1978 the USSR also had to assume 30 to 40 uncompleted Chinese projects. In addition, large amounts of heavily subsidized Soviet food and oil imports were apparently not initially anticipated by the USSR, and added to Moscow's burden. [REDACTED]

\*The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and the article has not been coordinated with other divisions or offices in OPA. [REDACTED]

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BY RW PARADISE 11/16/15

Successive agricultural failures have forced Vietnamese dependence on the USSR for 10 to 20 percent of total grain supplies. Since 1976 the Soviet Union has delivered upwards to 1.6 million tons of grain annually to Vietnam. In addition, the USSR has heavily subsidized the sale to Vietnam of some 1 million tons of petroleum products annually [redacted]

A major upsurge in economic assistance took place in 1979, following the Sino-Vietnamese border clash, but Moscow apparently changed its forthcoming attitude to Vietnam in early 1980. The Soviets apparently decided that a continued high level of economic assistance to the Vietnamese was now a lower priority. [redacted]

Soviet Food Cutbacks

In early 1980, a bad Soviet harvest, the added burden of Afghanistan, and the unexpected US grain embargo began to impinge on Soviet food exports. The tight world grain market caused uncertainty in Moscow as the USSR had to scramble to feed itself. The Soviet Union had the capability to finance purchases of grain for Vietnam, but apparently decided to impose some limits. [redacted]

The Soviets cut food exports to Vietnam by 30 percent in 1980 despite reports of critical food shortages. A Vietnamese representative [redacted] complained that, while the Soviet Union in 1979 delivered 1.2 million tons of food grains to Vietnam, in 1980 it cut shipments back to only 860,000 tons. The Soviets appear to be giving Vietnam only enough grain to sustain Hanoi's ability to maintain internal control and to ward off starvation. [redacted]

Oil

Moscow is refusing to increase its shipments of oil products to Vietnam and making its current deliveries more expensive. Nguyen Lam, chairman of Vietnam's State [redacted]

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Planning Commission, recently claimed that Hanoi had to pay the full world price for 400,000 tons of oil from the Middle East in 1980, and even then was left with only two-thirds of its needs for the year. The Vietnamese have also complained to the Japanese that although the USSR is selling petroleum products to Mongolia and Cuba at reduced prices, it recently raised the price of the oil it sells to Vietnam by 50 percent. The oil products that the Soviets provide to Vietnam, nevertheless, are heavily subsidized. [redacted]

Soviet Niggardliness and Hanoi's New Five-Year Plan

Despite a number of high-level meetings between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders, Hanoi's requests for increased economic help with its third five-year plan (1981-85) have so far been frustrated. This led to a public Vietnamese rebuke of Moscow, unprecedented since the 1978 upturn in relations. The friction over developmental aid began in June 1980 at the annual CEMA meeting where Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong failed to get additional economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc. The East Europeans see Vietnam as a further drain on their already overburdened resources and a competitor for Soviet economic favor. CEMA countries may also have been reluctant to extend additional credits to Vietnam as a result of Vietnam's inability in 1979 to make interest and loan payments on its CEMA debt. [redacted]

Soviet reservations about expanded assistance were suggested in a Pravda article on the CEMA meeting. Pravda indicated that Vietnam was not devoting sufficient efforts to its own internal development and noted that "resources for extensive growth and enlistment of additional manpower have not been exhausted." [redacted]

Possible differences over aid were also suggested by the Brezhnev - Le Duan summit in Moscow last July. Party Secretary Le Duan pressed Brezhnev for more help with the third five-year plan and quoted Brezhnev as pledging what seemed to be open-ended assistance to Vietnam. Brezhnev, on the other hand, made no specific commitments on economic aid and seemed cautious in his response. He noted Soviet economic difficulties and urged the Vietnamese to exploit their own resources. [redacted]

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In an interview with The Far Eastern Economic Review last winter, Nguyen Lam, Vietnam's chief economic planner, claimed that the Soviet Union still has not made any firm commitment to Vietnam's five-year plan which has already begun. Lam contends that the Soviets told Hanoi that they would provide 40 percent less aid during the third five-year plan than they gave during the previous one.

[redacted]

Soviet Criticism of Hanoi's Economic Performance

Moscow attributes much of Vietnam's economic ills to incompetent management and administration by Hanoi. The Soviets, for example, seem to think Vietnam's food shortage is partly the result of a shoddy distribution system, which is characterized by a shortage of trucks, poor roads, and inefficiency at Vietnamese ports. [redacted]

The Soviets also say that much of their developmental aid has been wasted. The Soviet Vice Minister of Transportation was reportedly so exasperated by what he termed "the mess" at the port of Haiphong that he threatened to stop all Soviet cargo deliveries until the port situation in Vietnam improved. [redacted]

The Soviets argue that millions of dollars' worth of Soviet equipment, machinery, and heavy construction vehicles have been misused by the Vietnamese. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet heavy construction equipment, which has been on the docks of Haiphong Harbor since 1975, was still there in late 1980, but rusted beyond use. [redacted]

This prompted a senior Soviet dock worker to go to Haiphong in March of 1981. He found the chaos worse than expected, with Soviet equipment abandoned since 1968. The Soviets are also convinced that the Vietnamese were responsible for a fire at Haiphong Harbor which burned down three Soviet warehouses. [redacted]

In an apparent effort to contain its losses and stretch out annual costs, Moscow is dragging its heels on existing developmental projects and is refusing to start any new ones. The Soviets are reportedly countering Vietnamese complaints about this by saying that they are reluctant to provide more aid unless they have

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more control over how the aid is used. If so, Vietnamese officials would resent such intrusive advice from their Soviet counterparts. [redacted]

Another reason for Moscow's tightfistedness is its dissatisfaction with Vietnamese economic planning. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets are telling Hanoi that it lacks management and technical skills necessary to operate the economy. Soviet officials in Hanoi reportedly argue that the key economic planning positions are run by old economists and military hacks. The Soviets claim these Vietnamese bureaucrats are unqualified to resolve current economic problems. As a result, Moscow is reportedly pressuring Hanoi to replace them with Moscow-trained Vietnamese economists. [redacted]

It is doubtful Moscow would have any great expectation that this would solve the economic mess in Vietnam. Privately, some of the Soviet officials in Hanoi reportedly even feel that Vietnam's economy is a hopeless case and a permanent drain on the Soviet Union. [redacted]

#### Soviet Military Aid

Regardless of their differences over economic aid, the Soviets are committed to providing the Vietnamese with sufficient military aid to resist the Chinese and dominate Indochina. For Moscow, such aid plays a strategic role in countering Chinese influence and presence in Southeast Asia--and compounds Beijing's politico-military policy vis-a-vis Moscow by creating a "southern front." [redacted]

The Soviets dramatically stepped up their support to Hanoi after the February 1979 invasion with assistance jumping to over \$1 billion from \$90 million the previous year. This aid has nearly doubled Vietnam's active combat air strength and the size of its coastal defense naval forces. [redacted]

Although Vietnam would probably like the USSR to provide more sophisticated weapons systems, Moscow appears to have drawn limits on its military aid. We have no evidence that the USSR has provided MIG-23s, MIG-25s, SCUD surface-to-surface missiles, or Whiskey

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class submarines to Vietnam, even though it has delivered these to such non-Warsaw Pact clients as Syria and Libya. Moscow may be reluctant to provide these weapons for fear that the Vietnamese will become embroiled in broader conflicts with the Chinese, which the USSR would prefer to avoid. Furthermore, unrestricted provisions of arms to Vietnam would antagonize ASEAN countries. Moscow apparently intends to give Vietnam enough to be self-sufficient, avoiding the need for direct Soviet intervention on its behalf, but not enough to encourage Vietnamese adventurism. [redacted]

#### Conclusions and Outlook

It seems unlikely that Moscow will expand its economic commitment to Vietnam to any great degree in the future. The Soviets feel that most of their economic aid has been wasted by the Vietnamese. Moscow is likely to be stingy on developmental aid in order to press Vietnam harder for more rational economic policies and for more Soviet influence over Vietnamese economic policies. [redacted]

Moscow will encourage Vietnamese efforts to diversify their sources of economic support, especially new supplies of food. Moscow is satisfied that Western sources of food will fail to wean Vietnam away from its influence. The Soviets are probably thinking that such a diversification would relieve the economic cost to the USSR, ease some of the strains over economic aid, while in no way endangering Soviet-Vietnamese security ties. [redacted]

It is possible that as a result of broader global developments Moscow will be somewhat more forthcoming in certain areas of economic assistance. The end of the US grain embargo, for example, will increase Soviet access to US and Western grain and could conceivably lead to some stepped-up Soviet purchases on Hanoi's behalf. If so, US grain could serve to decrease the cost to Vietnam of its occupation of Kampuchea and in turn increase the determination of Moscow and Hanoi to pursue a hardline on the Kampuchea issue. [redacted]

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On the other hand, an open-ended policy on food aid to Vietnam is not in Moscow's political interest vis-a-vis Vietnam. Moscow expects that Hanoi's economic needs will give it considerable leverage to extract concessions from Vietnam on key issues. According to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, for example, the Soviet projects will be stepped up only if Hanoi accepts more experts and advisors. Moscow is almost certain to use the aid relationship to bargain for additional access to Vietnamese military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere. It may also use its leverage to further its efforts to get Hanoi to adopt the image of a more forthcoming posture diplomatically toward ASEAN, even though Moscow is not likely to pressure Hanoi to surrender any of its major military gains in Indochina if and when serious negotiations on Kampuchea take place between Hanoi and the ASEAN countries. [redacted]

The Soviets expect the security relationship to remain their key source of influence. Vietnam has nowhere else to go for its military needs and the Soviets will maintain military aid at the level needed to enable Vietnam to resist China and to maintain a strong Soviet presence in Southeast Asia. [redacted]

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


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EXDIS  
E.O. 12065: XDS-4 06/12/93 (ABRAMOWITZ, MORTON I.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, UR, VM, TH  
SUBJ: SOVIET VIEWS ON INDOCHINA ISSUES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN THE COURSE OF AN OTHERWISE PREDICTABLE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE BETWEEN THE DCM AND HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, OLEG YERSHOV, THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF SOME INTEREST EMERGED:

- YERSHOV SAID THAT AS OF NOW THE SOVIETS HAD NO INTENTION OF ATTENDING THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. HE COULD NOT VISUALIZE ANYTHING WHICH COULD CHANGE MOSCOW'S MIND ON THIS.

- ON THE CONTROVERSIAL VO DONG GIANG BANGKOK PRESS CONFERENCE, YERSHOV SAID HE HAD GOTTEN THE FOLLOWING VERSION FROM THE VIETNAMESE. GIANG AND ARUN HAD RETURNED ON THE SAME PLANE FROM RANGOON. THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT IN RANGOON THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD PRESENT A POSITIVE VERSION OF THE TALKS TO THE PRESS. GIANG HAD ASSUMED THAT IN KEEPING WITH CUSTOMARY PRACTICE HE AND ARUN WOULD FACE THE PRESS TOGETHER WHEN THEY STEPPED OFF THE PLANE IN BANGKOK. INSTEAD, ARUN WAS WHISKED OFF TO THE VIP ROOM TO MEET THE PRESS ALONE AND GIANG WAS SHUNTED TO ANOTHER AREA AND KEPT AWAY FROM THE PRESS. THE VIETNAMESE

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

WERE VERY ANNOYED AT THIS TREATMENT AND DECIDED THE NEXT DAY TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN THEIR EMBASSY TO GIVE THEIR VERSION OF THE TALKS IN RANGOON. GIANG DID THIS IN SOME DETAIL, BUT HAD TO HANDLE A QUESTION ABOUT REPATRIATION. WHILE STRESSING THE DANGERS INVOLVED, HIS PRESENTATION WAS NOT INTENDED TO CONVEY A WARNING TO THE THAIS. THE VIETNAMESE WERE UPSET BY THE WAY THE THAIS HAD HANDLED THE MATTER.

- CITING THAI PRESS AND OFFICIAL REACTION TO GIANG'S PRESS CONFERENCE, YERSHOV POSTULATED A SCENARIO WHEREBY THE THAIS WERE DELIBERATELY TRYING TO HEIGHTEN TENSIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ASEAN MEETING.

SUCH A STRATEGY WAS PROMPTED BY THAI MEMORIES OF THE BENEFITS BROUGHT TO LAST YEAR'S ASEAN MEETING BY THE "INCIDENT ON THE BORDER." THE DCM STRONGLY CHALLENGED THIS, NOTING THE FORTUITOUS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE PRESS CONFERENCE AFFAIR AND RHETORICALLY WONDERING HOW THE FACT OF THE RANGOON DISCUSSIONS AND THE AGREEMENT TO TREAT THE TALKS IN A POSITIVE WAY FIT IN WITH THIS.

> - YERSHOV ADMITTED THERE WAS A "CERTAIN LEVEL OF FRICTION" BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE AND SOVIETS ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP WAS STILL AFFECTED BY A WARTIME MENTALITY. THEIR APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT WAS NOT SYSTEMATIC NOR WAS THERE MUCH SIGN OF COST CONSCIOUSNESS. THEY ALSO THOUGHT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY ITS OWN PROPAGANDA THAT MOSCOW CALLS THE TUNE IN HANOI.

ABRAMOWITZ

BT

UNCLASSIFIED  
Department of State

VIETNAM  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM 47

PAGE 01  
ACTION EUR-12

MOSCOW 08782 241417Z

3424

INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	AID-07	INR-10	SS-15	CIAE-00	EB-08
	EA-12	ICA-15	DODE-00	H-01	NSC-05	NSAE-00	COME-00
	L-03	DOE-10	TRSE-00	PM-09	INT-05	OPIC-07	CEA-01
	OMB-01	STR-11	SMS-01	OES-09	ACDA-12	SP-02	SPRS-02
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-----264020 241913Z /50

R 241416Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4212  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

UNCLAS MOSCOW 08782

E. O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: ENRG, ECIN, UR, VM

SUBJECT: SOVIET-VIETNAMESE COOPERATION  
- AGREEMENTS ON OFFSHORE OIL.

1. THE JUNE 23, 1981 ISSUE OF THE "TASS" ECONOMIC BULLETIN CARRIES THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SIGNING OF DOCUMENTS ON COOPERATION BY KONSTANTIN KATUSHEV, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, U. S. S. R. AND CHAN KOUIN' (PHON.), DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF VIETNAM. THEY INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON FORMING A JOINT SOVIET-VIETNAMESE ENTERPRISE FOR EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OFF SOUTHERN VIETNAM AND A PROTOCOL SPELLING OUT A PROGRAM FOR CARRYING OUT EXPLORATORY AND DEVELOPMENT WORKS DURING 1981-1985 AND PROVIDING FOR SOVIET CREDITS TO VIETNAM ON PREFERENTIAL TERMS.

2. THE LONG TERM COOPERATION WILL TAKE PLACE IN THREE STAGES: THE FIRST STAGE WILL INCLUDE GEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION AND TEST WELLS TO CONFIRM THE DEPOSITS (AT THE PRESENT TIME, THREE SOVIET EXPLORATION VESSELS AND NUMEROUS SOVIET SPECIALISTS ARE AT WORK AND MORE SPECIALISTS WILL BE SENT IN THE FUTURE). THE SECOND STAGE WILL BEGIN COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF OIL AND GAS. THE THIRD STAGE WILL BE TOTAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFSHORE FIELDS. MATLOCK

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F06-114/b#8861  
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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IN

OP IMMED /PRIORITY  
STU6913  
DE RUMJFS #0597/2 1890510  
O P 080430Z JUL 81  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1804

- INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 1210
- AMEMBASSY BIEIJING PRIORITY 834
- AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 069
- AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 055
- AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2315
- AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 5646
- USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 018
- AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 153
- AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 2425
- AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 1156
- AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3452
- AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2354
- AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8505
- AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 150
- AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 1786
- AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 024
- USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 976
- CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 VIENTIANE 0597

6. THE ABOVE SCENARIO COINCIDES WITH THE ATTITUDE THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY PICKED UP FROM THE SOVIETS HERE. IN CONTRAST TO OTHER "SOCIALIST" EMBASSIES HERE (SOME OF WHICH, LIKE THE CUBANS AND HUNGARIANS, HAD EVIDENTLY GOTTEN THE IMPRESSION FROM THE CAPITALS THAT

A MEETING WAS ON) THE RUSSIANS HERE HAVE, FROM THE BEGINNING, BEEN ADAMANT THAT THERE WAS NOT RPT NOT GOING TO BE SUCH A CONFERENCE. AT OUR JULY 4 RECEPTION, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO LAOS, VEKIMIR SOBTCHENKO, DISMISSED REPORTS OF THE POSSIBLE MEETING IN VIENTIANE AS HAVING BEEN "MERE RUMORS." WHEN PRESSED ON WHETHER THEY WERE RUMORS THAT AT ONE POINT MIGHT HAVE COME TRUE, HE STUCK WITH THE FORMULA: "JUST RUMORS."

7. THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR (PROTECT) TELLS ME THAT HE IS SURE

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SIT:  
FOE:  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 VIENTIANE 0597 DTG:080430Z JUL 81 PSN:018748  
TOR: 189/0548Z CSN:HCE348

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOI-114/6 #8863  
BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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THAT THE SOVIETS "VETOED THE SRV IDEA" BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFGHAN SITUATION. IN THE INDIAN'S VIEW, THE SOVIETS ARE QUITE WILLING TO HAVE WORLD OPINION FOCUSED ON THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA, CONSIDERING THAT THIS TAKES UN AND OTHER ATTENTION AWAY FROM AFGHANISTAN, WHICH IS VASTLY MORE IMPORTANT TO SOVIET INTERESTS. IN HIS VIEW (AND THAT OF THE INDIAN EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH), IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE IS NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND VIETNAMESE; THE SOVIETS ARE UNWILLING TO USE ALL OF THEIR POLITICAL CAPITAL AND THAT OF THEIR SATELLITES, IN ANY EFFORT THAT MIGHT TURN OUT TO INCREASE LINKAGE IN WORLD OPINION BETWEEN THE SITUATIONS IN KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN.

8. THIS HISTORY SHOWS HOW AT LEAST ONE VIETNAMESE EFFORT TO GET ITS "ALLIES" TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH ITS POSITION ON KAMPUCHEA DETERIORATED: IT BEGAN WITH AN EFFORT TO PRODUCE A MIGHTY TRUMPET BLAST FROM THE ENTIRE UNIFIED "SOCIALIST BLOC" AND ENDED WITH THE SMALL SQUEAK OF THE JULY 3 COMMUNIQUE (REF C). IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EVALUATE AT THIS POINT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO GO ALONG WITH THE VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL REFLECTS ONLY A DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE TACTICS IN PURSUIT OF A COMMON INTEREST OR REFLECTS SOVIET PERCEPTIONS THAT GETTING INVOLVED IN THIS SORT OF LINE-UP WITH THE SRV WOULD NOT BE IN ITS OWN, NARROWER, INTEREST. THE WAY THE SRV ADVANCED THE PROPOSAL MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN PART OF THE PROBLEM. FROM THE ABOVE IT APPEARS THAT INSTEAD OF CONTACTING THE SOVIETS FIRST THEY TRIED TO SET IT UP "ON THEIR OWN" BY GOING TO THE VARIOUS "SOCIALIST" CAPITALS DIRECTLY. SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE RESPONDED FAVORABLY AT FIRST, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE IDEA ALREADY HAD MOSCOW'S BLESSING.

MOSER  
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KAMPUCHEA  
Cambodia 54

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IN

GP IMMED /PRIORITY  
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DE RUMUFS #0597/1 1890459  
O P 080430Z JUL 81  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1803

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 1200  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 833  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 068  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 054  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2314  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 5645  
USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 017  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 152  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 2424  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 1155  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3451  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2353  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8504  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 149  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 1785  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 023  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 975  
CINCPAC HONOLULUQNO

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 0597

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07/09/11 (MOSER, LEO J.) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, VM, CB, XH, AF  
SUBJECT: SOVIET-SRV DIFFERENCES ON KAMPUCHEA TACTICS  
REF: (A) VIENTIANE 0497, (B) VIENTIANE 0505,  
(C) 067,7 .6(( 50817Z JUL 81, (D) BUCHAREST 5043

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. (SUMMARY) POLISH AMBASSADOR (PROTECT) HAS PARTIALLY CLARIFIED THE RATHER MYSTIFYING STORIES (REF A AND B) ABOUT A POSSIBLE MEETING OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" IN VIENTIANE. THE SRV HAD PUSHED FOR SUCH A MEETING, BUT THE IDEA WAS VETOED BY THE SOVIETS, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER SOVIET INTERESTS. (END SUMMARY).

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SIT:  
EOP: KEMP, GREGG, LILLEY, FONTAINE, PIPES, STEARMAN  
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

VIENTIANE 0597

DTG:080430Z JUL 81  
TOR: 189/0549Z

PSN:018751  
CSN:HCB349

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

3. ACCORDING TO THE POLISH AMBASSADOR AT VIENTIANE, THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE "SOCIALIST COUNTRIES" AT VIENTIANE HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY HANOI AS A USEFUL TACTIC PRIOR TO THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA. VIETNAMESE EMBASSIES THROUGHOUT THE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES HAD EVIDENTLY SOUGHT WIDE PARTICIPATION FOR SUCH A "SHOW OF SOLIDARITY." THE LAO HAD SUPPORTED THE SRV WITH WHAT AMOUNTED TO INVITATIONS FOR THE NECESSARY VISITS TO VIENTIANE. ACCORDING TO THE POLE, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION, AFTER SOME CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL, QUICKLY CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD NOT BE A USEFUL TACTIC."

4. ACCORDING TO THE POLISH AMBASSADOR, THE SOVIETS THEN ACTED TO TURN OFF THE SRV INITIATIVE BY APPROACHING OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITHIN ITS BLOC. THE VIETNAMESE, AFTER SOME ATTEMPTS AT A RECLAMA, ACCEPTED THE REALITY THAT THEY COULD NOT PULL OFF SUCH A CONFERENCE WITHOUT SOVIET ENTHUSIASM.

5. THE VIETNAMESE, HOWEVER, EVIDENTLY REMAINED CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO THEIR ADVANTAGE TO HAVE DONE SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES THEY PROPOSED AT VIENTIANE DURING THE PERIOD IN BETWEEN THE ASEAN MEETING IN MANILA AND THE NEW YORK CONFERENCE. THE VIETNAMESE CONSIDERED THAT, AT THE MINIMUM, THERE SHOULD BE SOME SORT OF AN ADDITIONAL JOINT STATEMENT; AND THEY STILL FELT THAT VIENTIANE WOULD BE THE BEST VENUE. AT FIRST, THERE WAS THOUGHT OF A MEETING OF THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE "INDOCHINA COUNTRIES" AT VIENTIANE. EVEN THIS EVIDENTLY BECAME SOMETHING OF A PROBLEM, WITH NGUYEN CO THACH HAVING DECIDED TO MAKE A TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE. AS A RESULT, THE "VIENTIANE DECLARATION OF JULY 3" (REF B) WAS ISSUED AFTER NOTHING MORE DRAMATIC THAN A MEETING BETWEEN THE LAO FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE AMBASSADORS OF VIETNAM AND THE PRK AT VIENTIANE. THE LATTER TWO AMBASSADORS WERE HOWEVER "ESPECIALLY COMMISSIONED" BY THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO "REPRESENT" THEM. THIS WAS APPARENTLY DONE IN ORDER TO GIVE SOME ADDITIONAL "CONFERENCE STATUS" TO THE JULY 3 STATEMENT. (SOME MEDIA REPORTS HAVE EVIDENTLY REFERRED TO THE VIENTIANE STATEMENT IN A WAY THAT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT ALL THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE PRESENT.) THE VISIT OF THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER TO ROMANIA AND A POSSIBLE VISIT TO ALBANIA (REF D) COULD FIT INTO AN SRV EFFORT TO LINE UP THOSE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT TAKE FOREIGN POLICY SIGNALS FROM MOSCOW.

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Department of State

LAOS  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01  
ACTION EA-12

VIENTI 00612 140222Z

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INFO	OCT-01	ADS-00	INR-10	EUR-12	SS-15	OIC-02	CIAE-00
	EB-08	ICA-11	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	<u>NSC-05</u>	NSAE-00
	COME-00	HA-06	DOE-10	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01	SMS-01
	SAL-01	OES-09	SP-02	SPRS-02	/133 W		

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R 140200Z JUL 81  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1813  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
AUSMISSION USNATO 114  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIENTIANE 0612

E. O. 12065: RDS-4 07/14/01 (LYDON, PETER) OR-M  
TAGS: ENRG, PEPR, UR, LA  
SUBJECT: SOVIETS SAID TO BE TAKING ON FULL COSTS OF LAO  
PETROLEUM

REF: VIENTIANE 0532 AND PRECEDING

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE REPORTED IN REFTEL THAT THE USSR WAS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO PAY THE SHELL CORPORATION IN LONDON IN DOLLARS FOR SHIPMENTS OF POL TO LAOS IN THE AMOUNT OF TWO THIRDS OF LAOS' S CUSTOMARY HARD CURRENCY IMPORTS FROM SHELL. CORRECTING OUR ESTIMATE GIVEN REFTEL, WE ARE INFORMED THAT THE EXPECTED ANNUAL VOLUME OF THESE PURCHASES ON BEHALF OF LAOS IS FORTY MILLION LITERS WITH A VALUE OF DOLLARS 15-16 MILLION.

3. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, WE ARE TOLD BY A WELL PLACED PETROLEUM SOURCE THAT THIS IS ONLY HALF THE DEAL. THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALSO AGREED TO PROVIDE LAOS A SIMILAR AMOUNT OF POL FROM SOVIET STOCKS VIA VIETNAM. IF TRUE, THIS MEANS THAT THE USSR, BY THE TWO METHODS WILL PAY FOR ALL OF LAOS' S POL NEEDS AMOUNTING TO ROUGHLY 60,000 TONS OF PRODUCT OR 30 MILLION DOLLARS IN VALUE.

4. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS AS NOW DRAFTED ARE SELF-RENEWING FROM YEAR TO YEAR UNLESS EITHER LAOS OR THE SOVIET UNION TAKES A DEFINITE STEP TO OPT OUT. THE DOCUMENTS FOR THE SUPPLY OF SOVIET OIL, MAINLY VIA DANANG AND ROUTE 9, MAY HAVE BEEN SIGNED ALREADY, AND MAJOR FLOW UNDER THIS AGREEMENT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEGUN. AS FAR AS WE KNOW, THE WESTERN DOLLAR-FINANCED ARRANGEMENTS WITH SHELL HAVE NOT RECEIVED FINAL SIGNATURES. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON WHAT FORM OF PRESENT OR FUTURE COMPENSATION, IF ANY, LAOS WILL MAKE TO THE USSR FOR THIS AID.  
LYDON

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F06-114/6#8864  
BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INDOCHINA

# Ganging up with exiles

**US officials meet Lao and Vietnamese resistance groups to tighten the screws on the Hanoi regime**

*By Nayan Chanda*

**Washington:** State Department sources here have confirmed that a group of Lao émigrés led by former defence minister Sisouk Na Champassak last week met the director of the department's Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia desk. The same officer is also scheduled to meet this week the former minister of justice of the defunct provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam, Truong Nhu Tang, who has been trying to organise a resistance movement against Hanoi in cooperation with Lao and Khmer resistance groups (REVIEW, July 24).

A senior State Department official, clearly uneasy about the disclosure that the Indochinese émigré groups are in town, told the REVIEW that officials would meet the Lao and Vietnamese exiles "but not at a policy level." That there is an anti-communist resistance in Laos, he said, is a fact of life, but the US has not encouraged it because Laos has diplomatic relations with Washington, though at a low level. State Department sources later confirmed that Sisouk and two former Lao diplomats, Khamphan Panya and Tianethone Chantharasy (who came from France and Australia respectively), had met L. De-saix Anderson, the director of the Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia desk.

During the meeting Sisouk, who is a leader of the newly formed United Lao National Liberation Front, outlined his objective of removing the Vietnamese presence from Laos and the current state of the resistance movement in Laos. Sources said that Anderson refused to discuss the resistance movement, pointing to existing diplomatic relations with Vientiane. Similar constraints would not, however, apply when Tang visits the State Department this week. Apart from being a country without diplomatic ties with the

US, Vietnam also tops the American list of "bad boys" in Asia.

The REVIEW also learned that the Vietnamese defector Tang had a meeting with Sen. John Tower, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and an influential conservative voice in the Republican Party. The meeting had been kept secret but, questioned about it, a member of Tower's staff told the REVIEW that it was a preliminary meeting basically for Tang to make himself known to the senator. Asked whether a Vietnamese united front led by Tang was discussed, the staffer simply said: "The senator is aware of it." He said Tang would be meeting Tower again for a more substantive discussion.

Whether by choice or under instruction from the US Government, the Indochinese exiles visiting the country have been so circumspect that it is difficult to know which other government agencies they are in touch with. A senior official of former US president Jimmy Carter's administration with good Republican Party connections would only say that compared with the previous administration President Ronald Reagan's government is "less averse to covert operations" in Southeast Asia. Under the Carter administration the only resistance leader whom the State Department was authorised to contact was Son Sann.

One Asia expert in the administration said that he has not yet seen any indication that the government is considering active backing for anti-Hanoi resistance movements, but added that he would perhaps not know if that was the case. "Here the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing," he admitted.

Another official analyst observed that while the bureaucracy, especially the

## Fancy meeting you here

**A cross-section of Indochinese exiles works behind the scenes in New York to cooperate against Hanoi**

**New York:** While diplomats of some 80 countries deliberated in the hall of the General Assembly of the United Nations on how best to bring peace and independence to Cambodia, a new effort was taking shape behind the scenes to bring together factions from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to generate armed resistance to Hanoi's army.

This effort was taking place in series of private meetings in New York and Washington. Participating in them was a cross-section of Indochinese leaders in exile. Many of them had not seen each other for years and their mood was almost euphoric, in sharp contrast to the frustration of the formal diplomatic session, which was boycotted by the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

The exiles clearly hoped the conservative administration of United States President Ronald Reagan would give them the sort of material support and political backing that had been unavailable from the administration of former president Jimmy Carter. Whether their hopes are well placed remains to be seen, but the prospect triggered a gathering of a dozen or more key leaders. Apart from the Democratic Kampuchea deputy premier, Ieng Sary, and former rightwing premiers in Tam and Son Sann, who were here for the formal conference itself, others present last week in New York included:

- ▶ Truong Nhu Tang, former minister of justice of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam.

Tang defected from Vietnam in 1979, but was refused entry to the US by the Carter administration. Recently, however, the US Embassy in Paris granted him a visa to enable him to be in New York at the time the US-sponsored conference was discussing Cambodia.

- ▶ Vang Pao, the famous Hmong general who led a mercenary army for the US Central Intelligence Agency against the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese army. He left Laos in 1975 to settle in the US. He flew to the secret meetings from his ranch in Montana.

- ▶ Phoumi Nosavan, former premier of the rightwing Lao government. A general in the Lao army, Phoumi became an exile in Thailand following his overthrow in a neutralist coup in the early 1960s. Late last year, Phoumi secretly met representatives of the Khmer Rouge and the tribal rebel group from Vietnam's Central Highlands, the Front Uni pour la Lutte de Races Opprimées (Fulro). The meeting, on the Thai-Cambodian border, sought to form a united front. For the latest talks, Phoumi flew in from Bangkok

to join other Lao exiles in New York.

- ▶ Sisouk na Champassak, former defence minister of the royal Lao government. Sisouk fled Laos in 1975, shortly before the Pathet Lao takeover, and has since been living in Paris.

The fact that these men were all in New York at the same time was no coincidence. Shortly before arriving here, the exiled Lao leaders had put their signatures to a pact setting up the United Lao National Liberation Front (ULNLF), aimed at driving the Vietnamese out of Laos, dissolving the present government in Vietnam and holding a general election supervised by the UN. Meanwhile, Tang had set up a Vietnam National Salvation Committee (VNSC) to overthrow the communist government in Vietnam. Both were using the Cambodia conference to make contact with senior Asean officials and to press their plan to step up military pressure on Hanoi.

A senior member of the ULNLF told the REVIEW that while they were satisfied with Singapore's firm position in supporting their movement and Malaysia's expression of understanding and sympathy, they felt other Asean countries were only lukewarm. "We are somewhat surprised," he said, "by the Thai reticence." He said he understood Thailand's domestic problems, but argued that driving out the Vietnamese from Laos was vital for Thai security. However, the ULNLF was confident of receiving at least some US support in meetings in Washington after the Cambodian conference in New York.

Some strange alliances are in the making here. Sisouk, a rightist who has remained politically inactive for five years, told the REVIEW he hoped to "attach the Lao wagon to the Khmer Rouge locomotive." He said that "the world almost forgot the Vietnamese occupation of Laos" until the Khmer Rouge resistance to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, which brought the issue into world focus, in his estimation. Moreover, he said, concern in the US that the Vietnamese might be using gas as a weapon against Hmong tribesmen in Laos has been useful in mobilising support for the anti-Vietnamese resistance.

**V**ang Pao, whose leadership is still recognised by a majority of Hmong refugees in camps in Thailand, has advised his refugee compatriots to stay put in Thailand and to wait for better days. In addition to the refugees, he says, he has some 20,000 supporters still left in Laos, with whom he keeps in touch through couriers. Vang Pao told the REVIEW that his sup-

porters have been helping the US to find evidence of Vietnamese chemical and gas warfare.

"Recently," he said, "my men succeeded in taking out samples of yellow powder that the Vietnamese sprayed. They also noted the numbers of Mi8 Soviet-made helicopters used in spraying chemicals." He said that because it takes 20 days for his men to trek to Thailand from Laos and two more weeks to bring the samples to US laboratories, it is often difficult to ascertain the chemical properties of the samples.

The former PRG minister, Tang, has been active in mobilising support for an anti-Hanoi front since late last year, when he spent six weeks in China. Tang told the REVIEW that while in China he met senior Chinese leaders, including Premier Zhao Ziyang, as well as another senior Vietnamese defector, Hoang Van Hoan, and former Cambodian head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who was a classmate of Tang's at Saigon's Lycée Chasseloup Laubat. In Peking, Tang also met a representative of Fulro. He made extended trips to meet Vietnamese refugees resettled in China's Yunnan and Guaxi provinces.

Tang said that while he was in China he recorded an appeal lasting six minutes urging his countrymen to rise up and urging soldiers to desert. That appeal was broadcast by Radio Peking repeatedly over a six-week period. Since then, Tang said, many of his countrymen have written to him asking to join his resistance movement. When, late last year, Tang set up the VNSC with the aim of establishing a non-communist government, he hoped for help from the US, China, Japan and Southeast Asian countries.

He is worried that some Asean countries may become tired of conflict and seek a compromise with Vietnam. He has told Asean officials attending the international conference here that it is unrealistic to attempt a compromise with Hanoi's leaders. Tang argues that they respect only the language of force. He says that peace and prosperity in the whole of Indochina can come only after the overthrow of the Hanoi regime, an event he contends can result only from a combination of internal rebellion and external military pressure.

As one immediate move, Tang plans to appeal to all the Khmer and Lao resistance groups to agree to an arrangement by which the safety of deserting Vietnamese soldiers can be assured.

In addition, after his meetings in New York and Washington, Tang plans to spend some time in the US meeting other Vietnamese exiles and then to visit Japan and Southeast Asia to secure support for the anti-Hanoi struggle. Tang says he has already established contact with dissident elements in Vietnam and would himself return clandestinely to Vietnam once in-

ternational public opinion has been roused and material support assured.

China has made no secret of its all-out support for the Khmer resistance. The exiles claim that Peking is now supporting Fulro and Lao resistance groups as well. Both Sisouk and Tang told the REVIEW that Peking is now operating military training centres for the Lu, Hmong, Yao, Nung and other minorities who inhabit the adjoining mountainous areas of China, Laos and Vietnam. Tang said arms from China move to Fulro along a route through northern Cambodia.

News of the breadth of the resistance to which China is funnelling arms puts a new perspective on the statements in Peking last month by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific John Holdridge. He told an American business group that appeasing the Vietnamese would not make them change their policy. Then he said: "We will seek, if we can, to find ways to increase the political, economic and, yes, military pressures on Vietnam, working with others and in ways which will bring about, we hope, some changes in Hanoi's attitude toward the situation." The key phrase appears to be "working with others," and the Peking government appears to be one of those with whom the US intends to work.

Tang believes this is part of a larger strategy of the Reagan administration. Tang would not disclose the origin of his claim, but he said he is convinced that the Reagan administration has decided upon a policy of trying to "roll back" Soviet-style communism in areas not covered by the 1945 Yalta pact between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union. "In its roll-back strategy in Asia, Washington wants to share responsibility with China," Tang said.

All the exiles interviewed by the REVIEW here expect that Washington will now join hands, tacitly if not openly, with Peking to give political and military support to what amounts to a pan-Indochinese resistance movement. And hints are heard here that Asean is not remaining entirely aloof from the struggle. For example, Singapore's Foreign Minister Suppiah Dhanabalan told a press conference at the UN that Asean would support economic, political and "on-the-ground" pressure on Vietnam.

At the end of the Cambodia conference in New York, Vang Pao, Sisouk, Tang and others were packing to travel to Washington. They said they expected to meet with senior officials. Such talks could prove important in shaping the emerging resistance to Hanoi and its army.

But it still remained an open question how successful even a strongly supported resistance might be. A rightwing resistance has been sputtering in Laos for the past five years without seriously threatening the Pathet Lao regime. Similarly, military activities by Fulro in central Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia have been troublesome to the government in Hanoi and its ally in Phnom Penh, but neither has so far resulted in any great strain on either regime. What is clear is that no matter how uncertain the outcome, the resistance leaders feel that the mood in Washington and Peking make it a propitious time to try. —NAYAN CHANDA

25-JULY-81

## Le Monde

● D'anciens dirigeants du Cambodge, du Vietnam et du Laos en exil ont récemment tenu une série de réunions à Washington et à New-York afin d'unifier les groupes indochinois qui combattent les forces vietnamiennes, révèle la *Far Eastern Economic Review* de Hongkong. Parmi eux se trouvaient le vice-premier ministre du Kampuchéa démocratique, M. Ieng Sary, deux anciens premiers ministres cambodgiens, MM. In Tam et Son Sann, l'ancien ministre de la justice du G.R.P. du Vietnam du Sud, M. Truong Nhu Tang, le général laotien Mong Vang Pao, l'ancien premier ministre de l'aile droite laotienne, M. Phoumi Nosavan, et l'ancien ministre du gouvernement royal laotien, M. Sisouk Na Champassak. — (A.F.P.)

FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1981

Truong Nhu Tang recently formed in Paris a front called the National Salvation Council to gather all Vietnamese to fight the current Communist regime in Vietnam. Truong Nhu Tang, one of the founders of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) and a former justice minister of the provisional revolutionary government, fled the country in a tiny boat in 1979. Truong Nhu Tang says he feels sorrow about his past naivete and wishes to continue to fight for the independence and freedom of his compatriots. D.K.T.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

# SIX YEARS LATER, EX-LEADERS OF VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS ASK THE U.S. FOR ARMS TO FIGHT HANOI

*The irony is painful. More than six years after the last American helicopter took off from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, the long-derided "domino theory" that was invoked to justify the war in Vietnam seems tragically prophetic. Within the last two years, Soviet-backed Vietnamese troops have seized power in Cambodia and taken effective control of Laos as well. Now some of the Indochinese who vehemently opposed the American presence in the region, who cheered when it ended—even some who fought American troops in the jungle—are asking the U.S. for help in that embattled corner of the world. Last week at*

*the United Nations, Secretary of State Alexander Haig addressed their concerns, pledging American influence to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia. But the three men on these pages—former leaders of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos who were against U.S. policies in their region not so long ago—want more than that: specifically, American money and arms. "Perhaps with President Reagan," as Laotian Prince Mangkra Souvanna Phouma puts it, "there is some chance that America will become concerned about us again." From their exile in Paris, they spoke to Daniel Burstein of PEOPLE.*

## A Vietcong leader: 'We thought we were fighting for freedom'

The highest-ranking defector to the West from Communist Vietnam is Truong Nhu Tang, now 58. He was a co-founder of the National Liberation Front, whose Vietcong army battled and finally brought down the U.S.-supported South Vietnamese government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Truong personally fought American soldiers, and he was jailed and tortured under Thieu. "They filled my stomach with water and kept pouring more and more water into me until my stomach seemed to burst," he says. Released in 1967 in a swap for American POWs, he joined the Vietcong in the jungle. "We suffered all the hardships," he says, "because we thought we were

fighting for the true freedom and independence of our country."

After Saigon fell, Truong took his place as Minister of Justice in the new government, but he was quickly disillusioned. He could find no justice even for his brother, who was sent for "re-education" to what Truong calls a "concentration camp." The government tried to keep Truong happy—and quiet—with a car, servants and extra food, and later offered him the job of Vice-Minister of Food. "Having been Minister of Justice in a country with no justice," he says, "how could I let myself become Vice-Minister of Food in a country with no food?" So, in 1979, he and his wife Rose joined 62 "boat people" on a tiny craft that fought through a pirate attack and a monsoon to make it to Indonesia.

Not long ago he and others formed the Committee for National Salvation to build an armed resistance movement in Vietnam. In talks last year, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang said Peking would support his efforts, and Truong hopes his once bitter enemy, the United States, will do the same. "The Communist dictatorship is worse than Thieu was," he says. "However bad it was then, things are worse now." □

**"The liberation** from the U.S. we fought for so hard was betrayed," says Truong Nhu Tang, in Paris. "I escaped in order to speak out."



JULIE O'CONNOR/IMPACT FEATURES

wealth of Pennsylvania are proud of Paul West. ●

### VIETNAM: WHO WILL SPEAK OUT NOW FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?

HON. JACK KEMP

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 5, 1981

● Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, last week-end some 25,000 demonstrators, protesting a wide variety of causes, marched on the Pentagon, promoting more than one commentator to draw parallels with anti-Vietnam marches in years gone by.

Doan Van Toai spend a good deal of time on America's campuses in the late 1960's and early 1970's, speaking on behalf of the Vietcong, championing their cause. And when it was over, and America pulled out, Doan Van Toai went home.

But Doan Van Toai was not a Communist. In a Communist controlled Vietnam, Doan Van Toai was put in a concentration camp. There he stayed nearly 4 years, giving him ample time to reflect upon what had happened in his country, and his own role in bringing those changes about.

Now he has returned to the United States, bringing a far different message about what Vietnam is today. Again, he is appealing to the liberals in the American political spectrum looking to them to denounce the brutality and repression that has been visited upon his country by the Communist aggressors. He wonders why they are silent in the face of such a massive violation of human rights.

What Doan Van Toai has to say needs to be heard. For in understanding what Vietnam has become, we begin to understand what America was fighting to prevent. The following article by Mr. Toai appeared in the Wall Street Journal.

#### VIETNAM: REFUGEES AND SILENCE

(By Doan Van Toai)

Six years ago this month, the United States ended its 20-year involvement in Vietnam by withdrawing its troops. Thus one might have assumed that the friends Vietnam seemed to have made throughout the world in those years would now be celebrating the sixth triumphant anniversary of their victory.

But this past February, while Hanoi was celebrating poor, humble Vietnam's sixth year of unification, the people continued to vote against the regime by fleeing the country.

The Sixth National Assembly of the Vietnamese Communists has recently approved a new constitution, which is only a copy of the Soviet constitution. They will create a new organ, the State Council, and its chairman will probably be Mr. Le Duan, who is now secretary general of the party. The new assembly is scheduled to be voted on this weekend, and it will form the new government. This will present the best opportunity for Le Duan and Le Duc Tho to strengthen their powers and tighten their ties with the Soviets.

Hoang Van Hoang, a close associate of Ho Chi Minh's and a former member of the party politburo who escaped to China in

1978, says that "Vietnam was so totally dependent on the Soviet Union that it had to do whatever Moscow asked." These words have been affirmed by Soviet leader Brezhnev, who has said, "Vietnam is now a solid outpost of our socialist camp."

#### STALIN IS REVERED

Vietnam regards Stalin as a figure of reverence. His writings are widely sold and his portrait appears in public places and in classrooms throughout the country. A poem by To Huu, a member of the politburo, is taught in high schools: "Vietnam has Uncle Ho, the world has Stalin/When Vietnam has peace, the world will have liberty."

It is all so different from the first days of victory six years ago, when the Vietnamese Communist leaders proudly declared, "We defeated the French colonialists, the Japanese invaders and then the American imperialists. We will successfully build our new country. We shall accomplish all obligations, overcome all difficulties and defeat all new enemies."

Le Duan, successor to Ho Chi Minh as party leader, also stated before the first meeting of the first Unified Assembly in June 1976: "We shall build our country ten times bigger and ten times more beautiful." He is partially truthful: He occupied Laos, invaded Cambodia and attacked Thailand.

Vietnam is not more beautiful. It is one of the 20 poorest countries in the world. It has 1.6 million soldiers in its active army, the fifth largest army in the world. On March 13, the government promulgated an order to draft into the army all able-bodied youths reaching 18 years of age for "the cause of building the country and defending the socialist fatherland."

Poverty in Vietnam today is as bad as it has ever been. The food shortages are the worst since 1945, when a famine killed two million people.

The country's first five-year plan predicted the production of 21 million tons of rice each year, but this country of 55 million people harvested only 10 million tons in 1980, two million less than in 1979. Rations of rice given to the cadres have fallen off. Some boat people who left Vietnam recently told me mockingly, "No one died of hunger in Saigon, but some have died of hunger in Ho Chi Minh City."

Vietnamese officials cite bad weather, bureaucratic muddling and corrupt officials as the reasons for the growing shortage of food. But the root cause of this problem is their own actions: depending on the Soviet Union, acting the role of Cuba in Southeast Asia, invading Cambodia and imposing Marxist-Leninist ideology over the whole country.

Vietnam's former revolutionaries have today come to be regarded by Western public opinion as invaders in their region. But the Northern Vietnamese Communists have been invaders for a long time. In the spring of 1975, the Northern Vietnamese Communist army conquered South Vietnam in a classic invasion with Soviet tanks, planes and weapons. They not only eliminated the South Vietnamese government but brutally eliminated the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, who had been called by the Communists and their Western supporters "the sole genuine representative organ of the South Vietnamese people."

One should recall that in the 1960s, many of the anti-war activists did not believe that any of this could possibly come to pass. Tom Hayden, husband of Jane Fonda, after returning from Hanoi in 1968, released a statement repeating the words of Pham Van Dong, prime minister of North Vietnam, that "the presence of the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam is a sheer fabrication of the U.S. government." And Tom Hayden instructed the American leftists with his comment, "We think that this denial has not previously been made in such absolute terms by the highest government

authorities."

May the author pose a question to Tom Hayden: Don't the highest government authorities of the Communists know how to lie and to deceive the West? Le Duc Tho, the man who negotiated with Dr. Kissinger on the Paris peace agreement, deceived the West in his Paris news conference of May 1972 by saying, "Since I have returned to Paris, this is the fifth time we have declared clearly that the DRG government (Hanoi) and the PRG (Viet Cong) have never wished to force a Communist government on South Vietnam."

Le Duc Tho is now one of the most powerful leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party. He has three brothers who are all members of the central committee of the party and hold important positions. One brother is secretary general of the trade union, another is mayor of Ho Chi Minh City and chief of security forces in South Vietnam and the last brother is a three-star general and minister of transportation.

In democratic countries, citizens use their votes to express their opposition to or their support for their government. In bogus democratic countries like South Korea, Chile, South Africa or South Vietnam before the Communists took over, the people often employed illegal demonstrations or strikes to protest against their dictatorial governments. But today there are only two ways for the Vietnamese to vote against the current regime: either be expelled to the New Economic Zones in the far jungle and be imprisoned in the giant gulag throughout the country, or risk their lives fleeing the country.

#### A VIET CONG FEELS SORRY

Truong Nhu Tang recently formed in Paris a front called the National Salvation Council to gather all Vietnamese to fight the current Communist regime in Vietnam. Truong Nhu Tang, one of the founders of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) and a former justice minister of the provisional revolutionary government, fled the country in a tiny boat in 1979. Truong Nhu Tang says he feels sorrow about his past naïveté and wishes to continue to fight for the independence and freedom of his compatriots.

Despite overwhelming evidence of the brutality of the Communist dictatorship in Vietnam, those who told us that such a dictatorship is what the Vietnamese people wanted are curiously silent. Some of the anti-war authors wrote many books and articles saying during the war years that the Viet Cong were really independent from the Hanoi Communists and that Hanoi did not want to impose Communism on South Vietnam.

I am not angry with these people about their past anti-war activity if they did it for the interests of the people and not for a small group of Vietnamese Communists. But do they feel sorrow today that the Communists deceived them? Why do they keep silent about the present tragedies in Indochina? This amnesia is criminal. Their silence damages the reputation of the left.

American linguist Noam Chomsky said categorically that there has been no bloodbath in Vietnam. But there are many ways to kill people without shedding a drop of blood. There is technically no bloodbath in Vietnam, but who can say how many silent deaths have occurred on the high seas? How many have died hidden in the Vietnamese gulag?

While former anti-war activist still protest war by America, they keep silent about Soviet invasions. While they raise their voices to denounce South Korea and El Salvador, they keep silent about the tragedies in Vietnam, where the people must support the insupportable and suffer the insufferable. ●



VIETNAM NATIONAL SALVATION COMMITTEE

file under  
VIETNAM

**WAR OR PEACE IN INDOCHINA**

POSITION PAPER

The Vietnam National Salvation Committee was founded on 27th december 1980 as a timely response to a most critical situation in Vietnam characterised by the total bankruptcy of the Hanoi communist regime.

The Committee regroups patriots from every political opinion except members of the Vietnamese Communist Party and seeks to realise the basic objectives as below :

- 1) To mobilise the population at home and abroad with a view to overthrowing the totalitarian communist regime and to replacing it with a new regime founded on Freedom, Justice and Human Dignity and a New Society consistent with Vietnamese traditions and aspirations.
- 2) To combat Hanoi's regional expansionism and to promote for Indochina a new structure of stability and peace based on the absolute respect of the fundamental national rights of the peoples of Cambodia and Laos, i.e. national independence and territorial integrity as recognised by Geneva. Agreements of 1954 on Indochina, of 1962 on Laos, and Paris Agreements of 1973 on Vietnam.
- 3) To mobilise support of world public opinion and of peace, freedom and justice loving governments in order to combat soviet expansionism in South East Asia.

The Committee stands for national independence in Vietnam and everywhere in the world.

At the present time, it is essentially an action committee, temporarily based abroad but as soon as conditions permit it will open a home front inside Vietnam to carry out both psywar and armed operations, combined with diplomatic and policital actions abroad.

The Committee maintains continued and close contacts with various Vietnamese organisations inside as well as outside. It will propose in due course a comprehensive political Programme with a view to creating a UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL SALVATION.



The current spokesman of the Committee is His Excellency TRUONG NHU TANG, former attorney general (Justice Minister) of the Ex. Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam brutally dissolved by the Hanoi Regime in 1976.

The Committee has friendly relations with various Khmer and Lao Resistance Movements.

September 1980, H.E. TRUONG NHU TANG was invited by the government of the People Republic of China to visit Peking where he met Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang and had several discussions with the Chinese leaders and Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

At the very moment where U.N. diplomatic activity is busy with the organisation of an international conference on Cambodia and in order to clarify the current debate on the Indochinese issue, the Vietnam National Salvation Committee deems it useful to make public its 10 points Position :

- 1) The Moscow-Hanoi axis is a constant threat to peace and security in South East Asia.
- 2) Hanoi's war communism is a permanent danger for peace in South East Asia.
- 3) Any compromise with Hanoi is illusory.
- 4) China has time on her side.
- 5) New options are open for the U.S. in South East Asia.
- 6) The ill of Indochina and South East Asia must be cured at its very source: Hanoi.
- 7) The internal situation is extremely critical for the Hanoi regime.
- 8) For a United Front of National Salvation for Vietnam.
- 9) For a large anti-Hanoi regional front.
- 10) For a new structure of Stability and Peace in Indochina.

After being for more than three decades, one of the most terrifying battlefields in the world, Indochina is again torn apart by a new cycle of conflicts. In every aspect the Indochinese crisis preoccupies the entire world. It is a serious threat to Peace, Security, Freedom of the nations and the Human Rights in South East Asia.

**1 - The Moscow-Hanoi axis is a permanent threat to Peace and Security in South East Asia :**

For a very long time, soviet hegemonistic objectives and Hanoi's regional ambitions have been converging in South East Asia. Hanoi and Moscow signed their « Friendship and Cooperation » Treaty in November 1978, preceding just one month Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia! This « Pact » represents a very important *strategic break-through* for Moscow in this area and may serve as a *springboard* for Moscow's future destabilisation actions in the area.

This push of Moscow in South East Asia together with its advance toward the Persian gulf amplify the soviet southward thrust, a pincer movement in the direction of the Indian ocean which is upsetting the global strategic balance of power. The soviet have now important naval bases in Indochina, completing thus the missing link of their naval strategy in the Asia pacific area. In the long run the traffic of western war and merchant fleets is in danger. In this new situation, Japan who depends desperately from the outside for 90% of her raw materials, is the vulnerable link of the West.

On the other hand, South East Asia and particularly Thailand is permanently threatened by Hanoi-soviet expansionism. Since a quite long time, the soviet has had at their disposal the local communist parties as instruments of their actions in this area. Recently, Moscow started using — through Libya — the moslem minorities in South East Asia with a view to undermining the very fragile equilibrium existing between the different nationalities in South East Asia. From now on, the soviet has, through Hanoi, a new «Cuba» in South East Asia for their strategy of «controlled advance through destabilisation».

## 2 - Hanoi's war communism is a permanent threat for Peace in South East Asia :

It is impossible to understand the current Indochina crisis and the preceding conflicts without referring to Hanoi's ideological and political options which are those of war communism. Vietnamese communism has maintained, through its historic affiliation to the Komintern, its original nature i.e. *Indo-chinese and internationalist*.

On the regional level, Vietnamese communism is a full participant to the world revolution and particularly to the expansion of the soviet system. Under the influence of surviving Komintern ideology, Hanoi's leaders remain hard believers in war communism dialectics. And from its long clandestine resistance experience the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) has become a military society more at home in war time than in peace.

The realisation of Ho Chi Minh Grand Design i.e. the unification of Indochina under communism was only possible through and by warfare. Thus, the VCP's regional strategy from 1945 on aimed spreading the revolution alongside the Mekong river through, first the reunification of Vietnam under communist regime, next the absorption of Laos and Cambodia.

Hanoi's task is certainly not completed after the invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Moscow has charged the VCP with the mission of training local communists in Thailand, Malaysia and surely other countries in South East Asia. Proof: Brejnev and Le Duan agree that Indochina represents nowadays a *solid outpost base of communism in South East Asia*.

Since its entry into the Comecon in June 1978, communist Vietnam has become an integral part of the expanding soviet system in South East Asia, both on the military and economic planes. The friendship and assistance treaties imposed by Hanoi on Laos and Cambodia under the pressure of war tie these two countries to Vietnam in the same way as the Warsaw Pact has done to East European satellites of the Soviet Union.

At the present time, Hanoi receives manifold aid from the soviet camp and operates as an instrument of the soviet's world hegemony system.

**3 - Any compromise with Hanoi is illuoriy.**

South East Asian current diplomacy is dominated by the initiatives taken by the governments of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) group to organise an international conference on Cambodia, in accordance with the october 22, 1980 U.N. resolution. However, are the conditions sufficient for such a conference? and is a compromise possible with Hanoi ?

The latter's position remains unchanged despite some adroit manoeuvres and dressings. This position confirms Hanoi's determination to make «irreversible» the situation in Cambodia and to obtain international recognition for the puppet regime of Heng Samrin. Kurt Waldheim's good offices, his special envoy's mediation mission and the initiatives of the moderate members of ASEAN such as Indonesia have all failed face to the bad faith of Hanoi who are supported in their stubbornness by their soviet bloc allies.

On the other hand, it is unrealistic and inoportune to seek a compromise with Hanoi's fanatic leaders, particularly in the current balance of power in Indochina. However serious may be Hanoi's difficulties in Cambodia, the VCP leaders still feel strong enough to dictate their law to the populations of Indochina. They only know and respect the language of the armed force. And they are encouraged in this attitude by Moscow for whom *the war in Cambodia is a chain with which the soviet union intends to tie enslaved Vietnam to the soviet galley.*

**4 - China has adopted a protracted strategy**

When ASEAN governments make initiatives towards a modus vivendi with Hanoi, they underestimate the influence of China who actually has quasi veto power on any solution of the Indochinese conflict. And China never hides her determination to counter soviet-Hanoi's grip on Indochina. After the «armed lesson» of february 1979, Pekin has adopted a strategy much more costly for Hanoi but less risky vis-à-vis Moscow. China now has chosen to destabilise pro-soviet Indochina by arming all anti-Hanoi resistance movements, communist and anticommunist alike, and also separatist ethnic minority groups.

Time is thus on China's side and the latter has chosen to exploit Hanoi's difficulties in Cambodia to warn world public opinion against the threat of the Moscow-Hanoi axis. She does not want to operate alone and unilaterally and insists on *the need for a concerted response.* China expects much from the converging interests between the countries of the Asia Pacific area face to Russian expansionism, China's most dangerous enemy: she seeks a strategic entente with the United States and Japan and a lasting rapprochement with the countries members of the ASEAN group.

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Thus, China has drastically modified her policy regarding these countries. She has promised to respect, the Zone of Peace, Neutrality and Freedom, as promoted by the ASEAN group. China is doubtless willing *to tolerate the emergence of non-communist regime in Indochina*, provided these maintain good neighbourhood relations with her and keep out of soviet sphere of influence.

#### 5 - New options are open for the United States.

From 1975 to 1978, despite numerous difficulties, the United States government was tempted to normalise relations with Hanoi, believing wrongly that this would help transform communist Vietnam into an asiatic Yugoslavia. However, the American government realised soon that the reality was that Hanoi was not in any case tempted by Titism and preferred on the contrary unconditional alignment with the soviet camp in order to complete her own regional ambitions. The invasion of Cambodia by Hanoi's troops happened at an opportune time to cause a *salutary impact* on American diplomacy. The current Indochinese crisis open new options for the U.S.

Indeed, with the Sino-American rapprochement, the traditional policy of containment is under going a real strategic change. In this respect, Thailand, because of her forefront situation, is found to play a more important role in the Sino-American concerted policy of containment of soviet-Hanoi expansionism. Concretely, following beefed up military aid to Thailand, the Reagan Administration decided in may 1981 to support the effort deployed by China and the ASEAN countries with a view to encouraging the creation of an anti-Hanoi United Khmer Front.

This decision aimes primarily at the presence of Hanoi's troops in Cambodia. But it may as well concern the whole pro-soviet Indochina, because Washington desires that the independence of Cambodia and Laos should be respected and the influence of the Soviet Union on the peninsula should be reduced. It is no more the traditional policy of containment, but rather, *in the long range, the strategy of roll-back*. It is, in accordance with these new options, that President Reagan decided last february 1981 to send arms to the Afghanistan resistance.

It is obvious that the United States can no longer stick to the traditional policy of containment, whereas the frontline now passes in Latin America, in Salvador i.e. at the doorsteps of the United States. Washington has chosen *a resolutely offensive strategy in order to solve the dilemmas of the policy of containment*. The roll-back strategy applies above all to the areas which are not covered by the Yalta Pact.

#### 6 - The ill of Indochina and South East Asia must be cured at its very source : the Hanoi regime.

The unification of the Khmer resistance movement represents surely the first step toward *the creation of the new balance of power in Indochina*.

Nevertheless, the settlement of the Indochinese crisis could not in any case be concluded at an international conference on Cambodia, because the existing balance of power is such that it is illusive to expect Hanoi to withdraw her troops from Cambodia. As long as war-communism continues its role as tool of soviet world hegemony ambitions, there could be no settlement in Indochina.

Therefore, the solution must be founded at its very source, i.e. the Hanoi regime. *The mecanism of war communism must be broken*, and in order to do this all of Hanoi's weaknesses and internal difficulties must be exploited. The large potential resistance forces inside Vietnam should be mobilised in any action against Hanoi regional hegemony, otherwise this would not be efficient and successfull. Only a collapse of the Vietnamese communist system by implosion or a popular uprising is susceptible to bring about a final solution to the Indochina crisis.

The VCP is the «*enfant terrible*» of Asia and as long as its forces remain intact, its revolutionary and expansionist course continues. Therefore, should be exploited all internal, regional and international factors to cause continued pressure on the Hanoi regime till the collapse from inside of war communism. In other words, the popular uprising inside Vietnam should be organised carefully.

#### **7 - The internal situation is extremely critical for the Hanoi regime.**

The conditions for a complete change in Indochina do exist, and do not depend only on the international situation and Hanoi diplomatic isolation. The agressiveness of the Hanoi regime outside Vietnam frontiers should not hide from us the regimes's weaknesses. War communism is leading the Hanoi regime to mortal stalemate while the party is exhausted and *the system itself incurable*, if not hopeless.

The party itself has lost its unity and its aura of infallibility. Every level in the party structure is sick with corruption and the party has now become a refuge for degenerated members whose sole interest is now gold. The revolution is decomposed. For the last six years, the national economy has not been able to satisfy the people's need in food. And the population is now facing disette. Military expenses swallow up 60 % of the budget and ruin the economy. The current reshuffle at the head of the party indicates the political and economic failures of the regime. This change has caused a series of purges within the party, the unity of which is being seriously damaged.

The situation in South Vietnam is more critical for the party and its mainly northern officials find it almost impossible to control the administrative apparatus, the economy and the party-controlled mass organisations. Face to *the degeneration of revolutionary process* and the systematic elimination of South Vietnam's true representatives, the majority of the population reject any cooperation with the regime. However no legally organised opposition as such exists in the country because of the totalitarian character of the communist system. But does exist a deep rooted popular resistance, imaginative, manifold and adapted to the local conditions.

A certain number of armed resistance groups operate in many areas throughout the country, and the freedom fighters look forward to receiving outside aid and to the unification of the political leadership. In the final analysis, the factor which undermines the Hanoi regime down to its grass roots is the generalised opposition of the Southern population to the oppressive tyranny that the collectivist north has tried to impose. Thus, *South Vietnam is now Hanoi's soft belly*. The bulk of the population in the north are also morally divorced from the communist regime which does not keep its wartime promises for peace, higher standard of living and freedom. They refuse to participate indefinitely to the war efforts.

#### 8 - For a United Front of National Salvation.

Confronted with an endless war and an unprecedented disaster which may lead the country to a mortal impasse, a Committee for National Salvation was created on the december 27th 1980. This Committee aims at regrouping within a broad front patriots of all political opinions with a view to mobilising the Vietnamese population inside and outside the country for a common goal, i.e. the overthrow of Hanoi tyranny. The Committee operate in *a fundamentally new approach*, towards the total collapse of the communist regime which has entirely failed. It intends to promote the edification of a new society in Vietnam, i.e. peaceful, pluralistic and free. It rejects the goulag system, because this is alien to Vietnamese civilisation.

The Committee is convinced that *the Vietnamese communist party has now lost its historical legitimacy for good*. The population in the south as well as in the north has had a very bitter experience of communism. *For the first time in its history, the Vietnamese communist party is no longer identified with nationalism from which it has always drawn its force*. This is an unprecedented situation.

The Committee for National Salvation intends to mobilise the entire population against the Hanoi regime on the basis of a new popular and national legitimacy. Vast popular forces are in moral secession and passive resistance against the communist rule. Many freedom fighters inside and overseas are ready to join an United Resistance Front. All of the potential forces are waiting for an unified political leadership. The Committee is determined to satisfy this population will. It will propose in due time a *most comprehensive political platform in order to unify all the resistance forces*.

#### 9 - For a large regional front against Hanoi's hegemony.

A regional concerted strategy is most necessary face to soviet-Hanoi expansionism in South East Asia and the Committee views its action as part of this global strategy. This is the reason why it is seeking first and above all moral support, political and material help from all the countries in the Asia Pacific area concerned with the Hanoi-soviet hegemonistic threat.



First of all, the Committee supports the legitimate struggle of the peoples of Cambodia and Laos with a view to driving out of their fatherlands Hanoi's occupation forces and to reestablishing the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their countries.

The Committee is willing to establish a continued concertation with the Khmer and Laos resistance movements in order to define a common programme of action against the Hanoi regime on the diplomatic, political and military fronts.

The Committee proposes *a tripartite alliance Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam for peace, independence and freedom*. This alliance, upon its creation, will lay the foundations of a lasting regional cooperation on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence: self determination, absolute respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country of the peninsula.

The Committee also seeks the moral support and manifold aid of the ASEAN countries whose stability and security are threatened by soviet-Hanoi expansionism.

The Committee is willing to contribute to their current efforts to arrive at a lasting peace in Indochina. At the present time, the main question is to isolate Hanoi on the diplomatic front.

The Committee looks forward naturally to moral support and material assistance from the great powers of the Asia Pacific area namely China, the U.S., Japan and the ASEAN group, who are all directly concerned with the threat of soviet hegemony. It is convinced that *a solid sino-amirican entente in Asia constitutes a decisive strategic factor to undo soviet-Hanoi grip on Indochina*.

#### 10 - For a new structure of stability and peace in Indochina.

It is of utmost urgency that the Indochinese situation must be fundamentally revised. It is essential for the peoples of this peninsula and of South East Asia, to have a right view of the changing balance of power in this area and to understand the factors which determine international politics vis-à-vis this region. Because of the will and drive for power of the Hanoi regime, the Indochinese crisis has created an inextricable knot of national, regional and international contradictions.

It is imperative that the nations of Indochina adopt a strict policy of national independence. And it is urgent that Vietnam should renounce to her role of an «outpost for socialism in South East Asia» and the three countries of Indochina should seek with the ASEAN group a new formula of integrated regional cooperation.

On the intra-Indochinese level, what goes wrong between Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is no so much their disparity but basically Hanoi's hegemonistic policy which has caused war and destruction. Therefore, Vietnam's place and role in Indochina should be fundamentally revised, Laos and Cambodia should cease to be considered as just buffer zones for Vietnamese colonisation.

Finally, lasting peace in Indochina requires that the internal policy of each of the three countries of the peninsula should be founded on a vast popular consensus. National concorde must rest on the active coexistence of all the components of the nation and should not result from civil war which, as has been demonstrated throughout history, can only cause the unavoidable disintegration of the vital forces of the Indochinese peoples. The elimination of any important section of the population could but create favourable conditions for foreign intervention, directly or indirectly. Non alignment is above all alignment on the entire people and supreme national interests.

Peace and war being indivisible in Indochina, it is most imperative that a global plan should be proposed in order to arrive at a final and lasting solution to the current crisis. The 1954 Geneva Agreements have fixed the fundamental principles for peace and stability in Indochina. These very principles have been reiterated in the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos and the 1973 Paris Agreements on Vietnam. Every effort should now be deployed in order to create the propitious conditions for the strict respect of these principles.

After the overthrow of the Hanoi regime, in order to establish and consolidate peace in Indochina, the futur leaders of the governments of the three countries should make their choice of the following alternatives :

- 1) On the international level, independence or bloc politics.
- 2) On the regional level, good neighbourhood policy or hegemonistic ambitions.
- 3) On the national level, national concorde or permanent civil war.

In other words, they should decide on these two ways: power politics in the service of expansionism or active cooperation to serve the cause of the freedom of the nations.

The second way is the only one that <sup>will work</sup> ~~is susceptible~~ to break off the cycle of confrontation and war.

Paris c/o Thai quay Trung  
20 - ~~13~~ Rue le Dantec  
Paris 13<sup>e</sup>  
581.5266.

Doan van Toai  
The Fletcher school  
Medford, MA. 02155  
JULY 1981

V.N.N.S.C.  
17 Webster st.  
Medford, MA 02155 - USA  
617-396-6939

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VIETNAM  
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ACTION EUR-12

3888

MOSCOW 10476 281645Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 DIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-08  
EA-12 ICA-15 DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NSC-05 NSAE-00  
COME-00 HA-06 L-03 DOE-10 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-02  
ED-04 HHS-06 AGRE-00 ANAE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /140 W

-----342132 281739Z /41

-- EDUCATION: SOVIETS WILL HELP SET UP FIVE PROFESSIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOLS TO TRAIN WORKERS IN CHEMICAL AND OIL PRODUCTION AND IN CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING, AND HELP ORGANIZE TWO INDUSTRIAL-PEDAGOGICAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTES. IN ADDITION, 5000 VIETNAMESE WILL STUDY IN SOVIET TECHNICAL INSTITUTES DURING THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. MCCALL

P 281626Z JUL 81  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5353  
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
USMISSION USNATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS MOSCOW 10476

E.O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: ETRD, UR, VM

SUBJECT: SOVIET-VIETNAMESE AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION 1981-1985

REF: MOSCOW 8782 (NOTAL)

TASS ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR JULY 27 CARRIES NOTICE THAT SOVIET-VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT FOR 1981-1985 WAS SIGNED ON JULY 24 BY SOVIET CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS SEMEN SKACHKOV AND THE VIETNAMESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN TRADE LE KHAC. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE AGREEMENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE TASS RELEASE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING PLANS FOR THE COMING FIVE-YEAR PERIOD:

-- PLANT CONSTRUCTION: SOVIET TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WORK WILL BEGIN ON 40 NEW FACTORIES, POWER STATIONS, MINES AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND CONTINUE ON ANOTHER 60.

-- ELECTRICITY: WORK WILL BEGIN OR CONTINUE ON FIVE POWER PLANTS INCLUDING WHAT WILL BE VIETNAM'S LARGEST HYDROELECTRIC PLANT (920,000 KILOWATTS) ON THE BLACK RIVER.

-- COAL: SOVIETS WILL ASSIST IN RAISING FROM 2 TO 3 MILLION TONS THE ANNUAL OUTPUT OF THE "KAOSHON" COAL FIELD, AND IN EXPANDING THE PRODUCTION OF THE "VANGZAN" (PHONETIC) COAL FIELDS FROM 6000 TO 1.8 MILLION TONS OF COAL PER YEAR.

-- MACHINES: SOVIETS WILL DELIVER EQUIPMENT FOR A DIESEL ENGINE FACTORY. (PRODUCTION LEVEL - 100,000 HORSEPOWER ANNUALLY, NUMBER OF MOTORS NOT SPECIFIED.)

-- AGRICULTURE: SOVIET SPECIALISTS WILL ASSIST STATE FARMS DEVELOP FOR COTTON FARMING 25,000 HECTARES AND ANOTHER 20,000 HECTARES FOR COFFEE BEAN PRODUCTION.

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LAOS

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 CIAE-00 ICA-11  
DODE-00 H-01 IO-15 NSC-05 ARA-16 NSAE-00 SY-05  
HA-06 L-03 PM-09 PA-01 MCT-02 SMS-01 ANAE-00  
SP-02 SPRS-02 /129 W

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R 250840Z AUG 81  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1934  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY RANGOON  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TOTALLING SOME 60 PERSONS. A VIETNAMESE SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT ALL SOVIET DEPENDENTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OUT OF XIANGKHOUANG PROVINCE (PLAIN OF JARS AREA) AND RELOCATED AT VIENTIANE. WE HAVE HEARD THAT ALL SOVIET DEPENDENTS LIVING OUTSIDE OF VIENTIANE HAVE EITHER BEEN SENT HOME OR RELOCATED AT VIENTIANE.

5. CONFIRMATION OF THESE ACCOUNTS IS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN FROM EITHER OFFICIAL LAO OR SOVIET EMBASSY SOURCES. HOWEVER, WE GAIN A CONTINUING IMPRESSION THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEANS ARE CAREFULLY RESTRICTING THE TRAVEL OF THEIR PEOPLE TO THE VERY SAFEST PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AND THAT THEY ARE TAKING PRECAUTIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO LAO THAT THEY ARE NOT THEMSELVES SOVIETS. THE HUNGARIAN EMBASSY HAS RECENTLY PLACED ARMED LAO GUARDS IN FRONT OF ITS CHANCERY. THE GDR EMBASSY SEEMS PARTICULARLY INVOLVED IN PROVIDING SECURITY TRAINING TO LAO FORCES AND IS PROBABLY BETTER EQUIPPED, BY THE VERY NATURE AND BACKGROUND OF ITS ADVISORS HERE, TO PROTECT ITSELF AS WELL. IN SHARP CONTRAST, THE POLISH AMBASSADOR (PROTECT), MENTIONED TO US THAT MANY EUROPEANS IN HANOI WEAR T-SHIRTS STATING IN VIETNAMESE, "I AM NOT A RUSSIAN;" AND LAMENTED THAT "UNFORTUNATELY"

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 0782

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 08/25/01 (MOSE, LEO J.) OR-M  
TAGS: PINS, ASEC, MILI, LA, UR, PTER  
SUBJECT: HARASSMENT OF SOVIETS IN LAOS: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

REF: (A) VIENTIANE 0097 (NOTAL), (B) VIENTIANE 0529 (NOTAL),  
(C) VIENTIANE 0539 (NOTAL), (D) VIENTIANE 0551 (NOTAL);  
(E) VIENTIANE 0778 (NOTAL)

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. (SUMMARY) HARASSMENT OF SOVIET ADVISORS BY THE LAO POPULATION HAS BECOME AN INCREASING PROBLEM. UNSUBSTANTIATED STORIES ARE CIRCULATING IN VIENTIANE IN RESPECT TO THE SOVIET DRAWDOWN OF ADVISORS AT VARIOUS POINTS WITHIN LAOS, IN THE WAKE OF INSURGENCY AND ANTI-SOVIET TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THIS TREND TOWARDS HOSTILITY TOWARD FOREIGNERS, NOT GENERALLY TYPICAL OF THE LAO, HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL DIPLOMATIC AND UN MISSIONS HERE. (END SUMMARY)

3. HARASSMENT OF SOVIET ADVISORS HAS BEEN REPORTED AS INCREASING IN VIETNAM (REF E AND MANY OTHER SOURCES), AND WE HAVE BEEN WITNESSING A SIMILAR DEVELOPMENT IN LAOS. ANTI-SOVIET ATTITUDES TAKE MANY FORMS HERE, RANGING FROM OUTRIGHT ARMED ATTACKS (REFS A AND D) TO SNIGGERING WISECRACKS BY ORDINARY LAO. QUESTION: "HOW CAN YOU TELL IF A FALANG (NON-ASIAN FOREIGNER) IS A RUSSIAN?" ANSWER: "RUSSIANS TRAVEL ONLY IN GROUPS, DON'T SMILE, HAVE NO MONEY, AND NEVER BATHE."

4. STORIES THAT DESCRIBE SOVIET DRAWDOWN OF ADVISORS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF LAOS ARE NOT NEW (REF D). MORE RECENT ACCOUNTS, HOWEVER, INVOLVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET DEPENDENTS FROM KHAMMOUAN PROVINCE AND STORIES THAT TIN MINING ACTIVITY NEAR THAKHEK HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY SHUT DOWN BECAUSE OF THE PERCEIVED NECESSITY TO PULL OUT MOST SOVIET ADVISORS FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY. A RECENT LAO VISITOR TO SAVANNAKHET IN SOUTHERN LAOS REPORTS THAT IN ADDITION TO THE SOME 30 SOVIET EXPERTS REMOVED FROM THAKHEK IN THE WAKE OF AN ANTI-SOVIET TERRORIST INCIDENT IN JUNE, ALL SOVIET DEPENDENTS AND MOST MARRIED MEN HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM SAVANNAKHET;

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NLS F06-114/16 # 8865  
BY HOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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	DODE-00	H-01	IO-15	<u>NSC-05</u>	ARA-16	NSAE-00	SY-05
	HA-06	L-03	PM-09	PA-01	MCT-02	SMS-01	ANAE-00
	SP-02	SPRS-02	/129 W				

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R 250840Z AUG 81  
 FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1935  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
 AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
 CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
 AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
 AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
 AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON  
 AMEMBASSY MANILA  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
 AMEMBQY OTTAWA  
 AMEMBASSY RANGOON  
 AMEMBASSY PARIS  
 AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
 AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
 AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
 AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 VIENTIANE 0782

IT WOULD BE AWKWARD FOR HIS STAFF TO WEAR EQUIVALENT SHIRTS  
DECLARING THE SAME THING IN LAO.

6. UN RELATED AGENCIES ARE OBSERVING GREATER CAUTION IN THEIR TRAVELS IN LAOS, LARGELY AS THE RESULT OF THE KILLING OF A DANISH TECHNICIAN UNDER WORLD BANK CONTRACT (REF B) BY INSURGENTS WHO APPARENTLY THOUGHT HE WAS A SOVIET. UN OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED BY THE TENDENCY OF THEIR LAO COUNTERPARTS, PARTICULARLY IN INSURGENT-RIFE CHAMPASSAK PROVINCE, TO USE UNSUPPLIED VEHICLES (SOME WITH UN MARKINGS) WITH WHICH TO FERRY VISITING SOVIET ADVISORS AROUND, APPARENTLY FOR THE ADDED SECURITY INVOLVED. THE SWEDISH EMBASSY HAS TAKEN TO FLYING ITS GOLD AND BLUE FLAG ON VEHICLES IT USES TO TRAVEL BETWEEN VIENTIANE AND ITS FORESTRY PROJECT NEAR PAKSANE, PROBABLY THE MOSE ACTIVE AREA FOR RESISTANCE FIGHTERS IN ALL OF LAOS. SWEDISH FORESTRY PERSONNEL RECENTLY DISTRIBUTED SEVERAL HUNDRED SMALL SWEDISH FLAGS IN PAKSANE TO ADVERTISE THE FACT THAT THEIR FORESTRY PERSONNEL ARE NOT RUSSIAN.

7. WESTERNERS IN VIENTIANE NOW GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO TAKE MEASURES TO ADVERTISE THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT SOVIETS. VARIOUS LAO HAVE COMMENTED TO US THAT THEY RARELY SEE RUSSIANS OUTSIDE AFTER DARK NOW. THEY SURMISE THAT IT IS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF ATTACK. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED STORIES THAT CUBANS, CONFRONTED BY UNFRIENDLY LAO HAVE SUCCESSFULLY SOLVED THE PROBLEM BY ASSERTING THAT THEY TOO WERE "AMERICANS." AS THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDOCHINA CONTINUES TO INCREASE, AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS DETERIORATE IN THE SRV AND LAOS, SOVIET NATIONALS CAN PROBABLY EXPECT TO REMAIN UNLOVED AND UNWANTED BY THE GENERAL POPULACE. THE SECURITY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY STAFF AT VIENTIANE IS ENHANCED BY THE FACT THAT LAO ARE NORMALLY QUITE GOOD AT SPOTTING AMERICANS.  
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MOSCOW 12582 081650Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-00  
EA-10 DODE-00 H-01 NEA-06 NSC-05 NSAE-00 COME-00  
HA-06 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OMB-01 SMS-01  
SAL-01 AGRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 SPRS-02 /113 W  
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P 081648Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6686  
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD  
USICA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

MEETING AND IN THE SPEECHES AT THE BANQUET STRUCK US AS CONSIDERABLY WARMER THAN DURING THE LE DUAN VISITS IN JULY 1980 AND IN MARCH THIS YEAR. THE EMPHASIS WAS ON THE INCREASED VOLUME OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION -- SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AND VIETNAMESE DELIVERY OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLES --AS WELL AS SOVIET MILITARY AID. THE STRONG IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE GOING TO BE PAYING EVEN MORE FOR VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP IN THE FUTURE AND THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THE PRICE IS WORTH IT. BREZHNEV DID INDICATE THERE WERE LIMITS TO SOVIET AID WHEN HE NOTED THE NECESSITY FOR THE SOVIETS TO "PRACTICE RIGID ECONOMY EVERYWHERE AND IN EVERYTHING," BUT HE DID NOT REPEAT HIS RATHER DEFENSIVE MARCH FORMULATION THAT SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM WAS "FULLY SUPPORTED IN THE SOVIET UNION."

5. IN SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE VISIT, CHINA IS PREDICTABLY CAST AS THE PRIME VILLAIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INDIA IS PRAISED FOR ITS SUPPORTIVE ROLE AND GROWING INFLUENCE. IN LINE WITH RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO DIFFERENTIATE INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA FROM THE REST OF ASEAN, THESE TWO RECEIVE SPECIAL MENTION AS COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE USSR AND SRV "EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH AND STRENGTHEN RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION." MATLOCK

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 12582

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/8/87 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, UR, UN  
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV EMPHASIZES NEGOTIATIONS WITH U.S.  
- AND INCREASED SOVIET AID TO VIETNAM DURING  
- LE DUAN VISIT

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS HAVE USED LE DUAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW TO GET ACROSS TWO BASIC POINTS: 1) THE U.S. SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES RATHER THAN TALK OF "RESTRAINT AND RECIPROCITY" WHILE PURSUING A "PROVOCATIVE POLICY OF CHALLENGE," AND 2) SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS ARE DEVELOPING FOR THE LONG-TERM, DESPITE THE HIGH COSTS TO THE SOVIETS. END SUMMARY.

3. AS HE HAS ON SEVERAL OTHER OCCASIONS IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, BREZHNEV DEALT ONLY BRIEFLY WITH BILATERAL RELATIONS IN HIS SEPTEMBER 7 TOAST FOR LE DUAN IN ORDER TO MAKE AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS. CLEARLY LOOKING TOWARD THE HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING IN NEW YORK, BREZHNEV APPEALED FOR SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS AND A "PRACTICAL READINESS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF OTHER STATES." HE CHIDED THE ADMINISTRATION THAT TO TALK ABOUT "RESTRAINT AND RECIPROCITY" WHILE PURSUING A "PROVOCATIVE POLICY OF CHALLENGES, INCLUDING IN THE FIELD OF ARMAMENTS" WOULD "INCREASE MISTRUST" AND "CHIP AWAY AT THE FOUNDATION OF PEACE." HE AGAIN ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS "NEVER SOUGHT, AND IS NOT SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY," ADDING THAT WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WAS FOR GIVING UP NEW KINDS OF WEAPONS, IT "WOULD NOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THE APPEARANCE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN THE ARSENALS OF THE U.S.A. AND OTHER NATO MEMBERS."

4. THE TONE OF THE BILATERAL, SOVIET-VIETNAMESE PASSAGES IN THE TASS REPORT OF THE BREZHNEV-LE DUAN

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BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-05 EUR-08 SS-14 CIAE-00 NSC-05  
NSAE-00 PM-03 SP-02 /044 W  
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R 270830Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2099  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMCONSUL UDORN  
USMISSION USNATO  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
DIA WASHDC  
PACAF HICKAM AFB HI

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 1026

LINDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 10/27/11 (MOSER, LEO J.) OR-M  
TAGS: MARR, PEPR, LA, UR, TH, PINR  
SUBJECT: SOVIET AIR BASE IN LAOS

REF: (A) VIENTIANE 0285, (B) STATE 096410, (C) CANBERRA 3201,  
(D) FBIS BK 041041 AUG 81, (E) 80 VIENTIANE 1059,  
(F) VIENTIANE 0197, (G) VIENTIANE 0387

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. (BEGIN SUMMARY) THE SOVIET UNION IS REPORTEDLY ENGAGED  
IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN THE PLAIN OF JARS AREA  
OF LAOS, FOCUSING ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET-MANNED AIR  
BASE IN XIANGKHOANG PROVINCE. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THESE  
ACTIVITIES INVOLVE SUPPORT FOR LPDR ARMED FORMCES OR CONSTITUTE  
A DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN LAOS. (END SUMMARY)

3. LPDR CIVIL AND MILITARY AVIATION PERSONNEL (STRICTLY  
PROTECT) BASED IN XIANGKHOANG AND VIENTIANE, WHO HAVE  
PROVIDED US WITH RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST,  
REPORT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS EXPANDING THE AIRFIELD  
AT PHONESAVAN (UG1452) TO ACCOMMODATE PERMANENT BASING  
OF MIG-21 FIGHTERS AND TO PERMIT EXPANDED CARGO TRAFFIC  
BY AN-12, AN-24 AND 26, AND TU-154 AIRCRAFT. CONSTRUCTION  
BEGAN AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR WHEN SCORES OF  
SOVIET MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL CARRIED OUT  
SURVEYS AND BROKE GROUND FOR A NEW RUNWAY. AFTER INITIAL  
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER, THESE PERSONNEL WERE  
DRAWN DOWN TO ABOUT 20 PERSONS, ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES.  
THEY SAY THAT LPLA ENGINEERS AND WORK BRIGADES ARE NOW  
CARRYING OUT CONSTRUCTION OF EXPANDED RUNWAY AREA AND  
BARRACKS/HOUSING, REPORTEDLY FOR SOVIET PERSONNEL UNDER  
THE SUPERVISION OF SOVIET ADVISORS. OTHER SOVIET ADVISORS  
FREQUENTLY VISIT PHONESAVAN FOR DAYS/WEEKS AT A TIME.  
SOURCES DO NOT KNOW TECHNICAL DETAILS SUCH AS LENGTH OF MAJOR  
RUNWAY. A FEW SOVIET WIVES BUT NO CHILDREN ARE WITH SOME  
ADVISORS.

4. XIANGKHOANG-BASED LPDR AVIATION OFFICIAL REPORTS THAT  
LPLA PERSONNEL HAVE TOLD HIM THAT TWELVE MIG-21'S  
CURRENTLY BASED AT VIENTIANE'S WATTAY AIRPORT WILL BE  
TRANSFERRED TO PHONESAVAN WHEN THE NEW BASE IS FINISHED  
"SOMETIME IN 1982." LPLA MILITARY PERSONNEL CITE AS THE PRIMARY  
MOTIVATION FOR REBASING THE VULNERABILITY OF THESE AIRCRAFT  
AT THEIR PRESENT LOCATION SO NEAR THAILAND. THE XIANGKHOANG  
OFFICIAL TOLD US THAT AT PRESENT ONLY ONE OR TWO MIG-21'S MAY LAND

AT PHONESAVAN, USUALLY FOR LESS THAN A DAY. HANGAR/SERVICING  
FACILITIES ARE NONEXISTENT FOR MIG'S; PHONESAVAN CAN CURRENTLY  
HANDLE ONLY LIMITED INCOMING CARGO FLIGHTS. SMALL AN-2 BIPLANES  
MAKE REGULAR RUNS TO PHONESAVAN FROM VIENTIANE, AS DO  
MI-6 AND MI-8 HELICOPTERS. HE ADDED THAT PLAIN OF JARS (THONG  
HAIHIN) AIRFIELD (UG0551) IS NOW VIRTUALLY SHUT DOWN, THAT  
IT IS TO BE USED "ONLY WHEN THERE IS AN EMERGENCY." XIANGKHOANG  
CONTACT STATED THAT LPLA PERSONNEL REPORT THAT "MANY DOZENS"  
OF SOVIET GROUND CREW AND "RED ARMY" PERSONNEL WILL EVENTUALLY BE  
BASED AT PHONESAVAN IN THE NEW BARRACKS AND HOUSES.

5. VIENTIANE-BASED LPDR AVIATION PERSONNEL REPORT THAT  
THERE ARE ABOUT TWELVE LAO MIG-21 PILOTS, ALL OF WHOM ARE  
PARTY MEMBERS. (OTHERS ARE UNDERGOING TRAINING IN THE  
SOVIET UNION -- (REF D.) THEY ALSO REPORT THAT IN  
ADDITION TO SOVIET GROUND PERSONNEL, THERE ARE TWELVE SOVIET  
MIG-21 "PILOTS." THEY REPORT NO RPT NO SRV PILOTS STATIONED  
AT WATTAY.

6. XIANGKHOANG OFFICIAL REPORTS THAT IN ADDITION TO  
SOVIET-SUPERVISED CONSTRUCTION AT PHONESAVAN AIRFIELD, UP TO

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6# 8867

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

SECRET



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~~SECRET~~  
Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01      VIENTI 01026 02 OF 02 270941Z  
ACTION EA-06

8719

VIENTI 01026 02 OF 02 270941Z

INFO OCT-01    ADS-00    INR-05    EUR-08    SS-14    CIAE-00    NSC-05  
NSAE-00    PM-03    SP-02    /044 W  
-----314005 271340Z /50

CIVILIAN PRESENCE -- REFS E, F, G). IMPLICATIONS FOR THE  
REGION -- PARTICULARLY THE REAL AND PERCEIVED SECURITY OF  
THAILAND -- CAN BE NOTHING BUT DESTABILIZING.  
MOSER

R 270830Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2100  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMCONSUL UDORN  
USMISSION USNATO  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
DIA WASHDC  
PACAF HICKAM AFB HI

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 VIENTIANE 1026

LIMDIS

A HUNDRED SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE BUILDING A MILITARY ACADEMY AT BAN PEN (NCA). HE STATED THAT HE HAS TALKED WITH SOVIET OFFICER IDENTIFYING HIMSELF IN RANK AS A "GENERAL" WHO OVERSEES CONSTRUCTION AT BAN PEN. IN ADDITION, SOVIET CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE SETTING UP A STATE FARM NEAR LAT SENG (NCA).

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN LAO RESIDENTS AND SOVIETS AT THE PLAIN OF JARS ARE NOT GOOD, REPORTS THE XIANGKHOUANG OFFICIAL. SOVIETS HAVE A REPUTATION FOR COLDNESS, ARROGANCE AND CRUDENESS, HE SAID. LOCAL RESIDENTS REGARD THEM AS "BARBARIC" BECAUSE OF THEIR FREQUENT PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS, ROWDINESS, AND POOR TABLE MANNERS. INCIDENTS OF RAPE OF LAO GIRLS BY SOVIET MALES IS FREQUENT, SOMETIMES RESULTING IN SURGERY FOR THE BATTERED VICTIM. THERE IS NO REDRESS FOR THE VICTIM OR HER FAMILY, HE NOTED. HE ADDED THAT THE NUMEROUS PAVN TROOPS ARE ALSO REVEILED BY LOCAL LAO -- CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ALIKE. PAVN SOLDIERS FREQUENTLY KILL, ROB AND RAPE. THEIR OFFICERS USUALLY ARREST THE PERPETRATORS, ONLY TO RELEASE THEM TO ANOTHER UNIT ELSEWHERE. THE OFFICIAL STATED THAT SRV TROOPS LIVE IN EXTREMELY POOR CONDITIONS; THEY GROW MOST OF THEIR OWN FOOD. MOST LPLA LOWER-LEVEL PERSONNEL SHUN CONTACT WITH PAVN.

8. SECURITY PROBLEMS POSE CERTAIN DANGERS AROUND PHONESAVAN, ACCORDING TO THE XIANGKHOUANG OFFICIAL. HMONG "CHAO FA" GUERRILLAS OCCASIONALLY ENGAGE LPLA AND PAVN IN FIRE FIGHTS. DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF OCTOBER, FOR EXAMPLE, EIGHT LPLA SOLDIERS ON GUARD DUTY NEAR THE AIRPORT WERE REPORTEDLY GUNNED DOWN BY CHAO FA INSURGENTS IN DAYLIGHT. THEY LEFT BEHIND A NOTE WHICH WARNED: "DON'T FOLLOW US." THE OFFICIAL STATED THAT ALL LAO GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AT PHONESAVAN FEAR CHAO FA ATTACKS. HE KNEW OF NO INCIDENTS INVOLVING KILLINGS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL, WHO, HE SAID, ALWAYS REMAIN UNDER TIGHT SECURITY GUARD.

9. COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR FROM THE INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION HAS AN "AGREEMENT" WITH THE LPDR TO ESTABLISH AN ACTUAL "SOVIET" AIR BASE IN LAOS (REFS A, B, C) OR WHETHER THERE IS A PLAN SIMPLY TO MOVE LPLA AIR FORCE UNITS (AND ACCOMPANYING RUSSIAN ADVISORS) CURRENTLY BASED AT VIENTIANE TO THE PLAIN OF JARS. SIMILARLY, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER EXPANDED CONSTRUCTION AT PHONESAVAN AIRPORT AND ELSEWHERE MAY BE A FORM OF SOVIET "AID" TO LAOS OR CONSTITUTES A DIRECT SOVIET BUILD-UP IN LAOS. WHAT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, IS THAT MOSCOW IS INVOLVING ITSELF TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT IN THE MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE LPDR. IN ANY CASE, THE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN LAOS APPEARS TO BE EXPANDING (ALONG WITH THE

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VIETNAM

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BANGKOK 15976

EXDIS  
ROME FOR FODAG  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/11/02 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M  
TAGS: SHUM, SREF, PINS, VM, UR  
SUBJ: VIETNAMESE WORKERS IN USSR  
REF: (A) STATE 61923 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 54433 (NOTAL),  
- (C) SINGAPORE 2243 (NOTAL), (D) BANGKOK 13039 (NOTAL),  
- (E) ROME 2027 (NOTAL)

1. (~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH VISITING DASD ARMITAGE FEBRUARY 25, UN SYG SPECIAL REP FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS AHMED RECOUNTED WFP LINNER'S VERSION OF NGUYEN CO THACH'S JANUARY REMARKS ON VIETNAMESE WORKERS IN THE USSR, WITH THE BASIC POINTS AS SINGAPORE REPORTED (PARA 4, REF C). THE SUBJECT CAME UP WHEN AHMED NOTED TO ARMITAGE THAT HE (AHMED) MIGHT SUGGEST TO THE VIETNAMESE THAT THEY SHOULD CONSIDER RESOLVING THE MIA ISSUE TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR SOME FUTURE DAY OF NORMALIZATION WITH THE US. IN THIS CONNECTION, AHMED NOTED THE DESIRABILITY OF LESSENING VIETNAMESE TIES WITH THE USSR. HE SAW THE VIETNAMESE AS NOW INTERESTED IN REDUCING THOSE TIES AND CITED FOREIGN MINISTER THACH'S STATEMENT TO LINNER IN JANUARY THAT HANOI WANTED TO "DIVERSIFY" ITS RELATIONS.

3. IN SO MANY WORDS, ACCORDING TO AHMED, THACH TOLD LINNER THAT VIETNAM WANTED TO "GET OUT" OF DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR. THACH ILLUSTRATED BY NOTING THAT WHEN THE CHINESE ATTACKED (1979), THE SOVIETS DID NOT REPEAT NOT HELP. HE ADDED THAT THE 250,000 VIETNAMESE WORKERS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE 60 PERCENT OF THEIR WAGES WITHHELD BY THE RUSSIANS TO

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REPAY LOANS TO VIETNAM. IN ADDITION THE SOVIETS BUILT A PHARMACEUTICAL PLANT IN VIETNAM WHICH EXPORTS ITS ENTIRE DRUG PRODUCTION. AHMED NOTED THAT LINNER CONCLUDED THACH WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THESE POINTS UNLESS HE WANTED THEM CONVEYED TO THE UNITED STATES. LINNER DID SO IN ROME (REF E) AND IN BANGKOK BUT DID NOT HIGHLIGHT LABOR EXPORT TO THE USSR.

4. COMMENT: LINNER MAY NOT BE AN OBJECTIVE OBSERVER OF VIETNAM (REF E), BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD HAVE MADE UP THE NUMBERS THACH GAVE HIM. HE MAY NOT HAVE ACCURATELY CONVEYED THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THACH USED THE NUMBERS; FOR EXAMPLE, THACH MIGHT HAVE BEEN GIVING A CUMULATIVE TOTAL. WE HAVE NO INDEPENDENT INFORMATION TO REFUTE THEM.  
DEAN  
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FOR RELEASE 11 P.M. EST

WASHINGTON (AP) -- DEFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERGER EXPRESSED CONCERN MONDAY OVER WHAT HE CALLED "THE GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA," INCLUDING JOINT AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES WITH VIETNAM THIS MONTH.

IN A PREPARED SPEECH FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN SAN FRANCISCO, WEINBERGER CONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS LAST WEEK THAT SOVIET TROOPS HAD STAGED AMPHIBIOUS LANDING MANEUVERS ON THE VIETNAMESE COAST FOR THE FIRST TIME. AN ESTIMATED 400 TO 500 SOVIET MARINES LANDED 90 TO 100 MILES SOUTH OF HAIPHONG FROM A SOVIET NAVAL TASK FORCE.

WEINBERGER'S REFERENCE TO THE LANDING AS A JOINT EXERCISE DISCLOSED THAT VIETNAMESE FORCES ALSO TOOK PART.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN MONITORING A GROWING SOVIET PRESENCE IN VIETNAM, CENTERED ON THE FORMER U.S.-BUILT BASE AT CAM RANH BAY. FROM THAT BASE, U.S. AUTHORITIES SAY, THE SOVIET NAVY AND LAND-BASED RECONNAISSANCE BOMBERS HAVE BEEN OPERATING VIRTUALLY CONSTANTLY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

WEINBERGER SAID THE PROSPERITY AND SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS "IS THREATENED...BY A HOSTILE NEIGHBOR, VIETNAM."

THEREFORE, HE SAID, THE UNITED STATES IS HELPING THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS -- THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND AND INDONESIA -- TO ASSURE THEIR SECURITY.

PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED APRIL 13 THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS SELLING 40 MORE TANKS TO THAILAND, WHICH HAS BEEN WORRIED BY VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS IN NEIGHBORING CAMBODIA THAT OCCASIONALLY HAVE SPILLED OVER INTO THAI BORDER AREAS.

REAGAN ALSO PROMISED SUPPORT FOR THAILAND'S NEED FOR ADVANCED JET WARPLANES TO BOLSTER ITS DEFENSES AGAINST THREATS FROM VIETNAMESE FORCES.

WEINBERGER ALSO SAID THAT "WE WELCOME WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN EMERGING JAPANESE CONSENSUS FOR A STRONGER DEFENSE."

HE REPEATED HIS CALL FOR GREATER EFFORTS BY JAPAN TO DEVELOP WAYS TO DEFEND ITS PERIMETER AND THE MAJOR SEA LANES EXTENDING 1,000 MILES FROM THE JAPANESE ISLANDS.

"WE HOPE THAT JAPAN WILL MOVE TO ACHIEVE, WITHIN THIS DECADE, THE FORCE LEVELS AND THE ASSETS TO ACHIEVE HER OWN SELF-DEFENSE GOALS," WEINBERGER SAID.

HE SOUGHT TO QUIET UNEASINESS AMONG ASIAN COUNTRIES WHO RECALL PAST JAPANESE CONQUESTS. "IT IS CLEAR THAT JAPAN DOES NOT INTEND TO BECOME AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY POWER," WEINBERGER SAID.

AS FOR KOREA, WEINBERGER SAID THE UNITED STATES MUST DETER POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK BY MAINTAINING STRONG U.S. AND SOUTH KOREAN FORCES ON THE PENINSULA.

WEINBERGER PLANS TO VISIT KOREA NEXT MONTH FOR AN ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON SECURITY ISSUES. HE ALSO IS EXPECTED TO STOP BRIEFLY IN JAPAN.

AP-WX-04-23-84 1608EST

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 17, 1981

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1. USSR/VIETNAM: PARALLEL INTEREST IN KAMPUCHEA

Moscow's relationship with Hanoi remains strong, despite a degree of friction stemming from the Sino-Soviet dialogue. It is unlikely the USSR intends to pressure the Vietnamese seriously, on Kampuchea. A recent suggestion by a Chinese diplomat concerning a possible Sino-Soviet agreement on this subject appears intended to influence Sino-Soviet relations.

In keeping with its broader policy of muting public criticism of Beijing, Moscow refrained from voicing direct support for Vietnam during its recent border flare-up with China. But the Vietnamese version of events was prominently replayed in the Soviet media. Furthermore, the USSR had so heavily armed Vietnam since the 1979 incursion that the Chinese threat was substantially less credible.

Soviet interests would be served by a better armed and trained Kampuchean military force, permitting the Vietnamese military presence to be less conspicuous. Moscow welcomed the limited Vietnamese troop withdrawal which began early this month. The subsequent visit of the Kampuchean Defense Minister to Moscow highlighted Soviet military cooperation with Kampuchea. The withdrawal, however, was almost certainly Hanoi's initiative. Vietnam's regional interests, particularly with respect to ASEAN, are served by steps that appear to offer the prospect of a reduced Vietnamese military presence. Likewise, decisions concerning the extent of the dry season offensive in Kampuchea were probably determined by Hanoi's perception of its own political and military interests. We have seen no signs of friction with the Soviets on this issue.

In dealings with China, Moscow presumably will seek credit for its public "restraint," vis-a-vis Chinese actions against Vietnam, and for the limited Vietnamese withdrawals. The Soviets may also try to depict their ties with the Heng Samrin regime as direct, and not dependent on the Vietnamese. But, while Moscow might indeed want to develop its own influence base in Phnom Penh, it will not risk its ties with Hanoi to do so, since Vietnam's importance to the USSR has grown with increasing Soviet concern about the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific.

The Chinese continue to cite Soviet support for Vietnamese activities in Kampuchea as the most serious obstacle to improved Sino-Soviet relations. General Secretary Hu Yaobang recently told Yugoslav journalists that Soviet activities in Vietnam could lead to a direct Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, a recent Chinese statement to a US official about a possible agreement was probably calculated to encourage US concessions to China and also perhaps concern in Hanoi.

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