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F06-114/6

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9016	CABLE	NORTH KOREA/AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH KOREA <i>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	2	4/22/1981	B1
9017	CABLE	NORTH KOREA/USSR/CHINA	3	9/2/1981	B1
9009	CABLE	141715Z OCT 81 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	10/14/1981	B1
9006	PAPER	SOUTH KOREA ESCALATES UNIFICATION CAMPAIGN	1	1/28/1982	B1
9010	PAPER	SOUTH KOREA: CONTACTS WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION <i>P 12/1/2009 F06-114/6</i>	1	2/17/1982	B1
9011	PAPER	IMPLICATIONS OF A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	5	12/23/1982	B1
9018	CABLE	USSR <i>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	2	2/9/1983	B1
9012	PAPER	USSR-JAPAN: SECURITY CONCERNS PREEMINENT <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	2/11/1983	B1

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9007	CABLE	172330Z JUN 83	1	6/17/1983	B1
9008	PAPER	MOSCOW'S VIEW OF THE DIALOGUE WITH BEIJING	1	10/7/1983	B1
9014	CABLE	231330Z DEC 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	6	12/23/1983	B1
9015	REPORT	US/CHINA RISING CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET THREAT	1	4/22/1984	B1

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 14482

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/14/01 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, KS
SUBJECT: SOVIET INITIATIVE TOWARD ROKG
REFS: (A) STATE 273554/SEOUL 12513, (B) MOSCOW 07608

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE REPORTED SOVIET APPROACH TO THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH KOIVISTO SOUNDS QUITE PLAUSIBLE. THE SOVIETS HAVE FOR SOME TIME APPEARED FRUSTRATED THAT THEIR POLICY TOWARD SOUTH KOREA IS HOSTAGE TO PYONGYANG'S WHIMS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE KREMLIN MAY BE LOOKING FOR A WAY TO DEVELOP INITIATIVES IN PURSUIT OF AN ACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN NORTHEAST ASIA -- THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP SOME ROOM FOR MANEUVER AGAINST THE CHINESE, THE U.S., AND THE JAPANESE. THEY MAY WELL HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH ARE SUFFICIENTLY INERT TO TRY SOME GAMBIT WITH THE SOUTH. WITH OUR LONG-STANDING AIM OF ADVANCING NORMALIZATION ON THE PENINSULA IN MIND, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE CAUTIOUSLY TAKEN UP ON THEIR INITIATIVE, AND THE SUGGESTED SOUTH KOREAN RESPONSES STRIKE US AS APPROPRIATE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR DESIRE TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA AT SOME POINT. THEY HAVE BEEN READY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH EMBOFFS AND VISITING U.S. ACADEMICS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ADVANTAGES OF CROSS-RECOGNITION, TO NOTE THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATION BY ROC CONSTRUCTION FIRMS IN SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT, AND TO DISCUSS A VARIETY OF SCHEMES DESIGNED TO MOVE THE PENINSULA TO A MORE STABLE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF THE POWERS IN THE REGION. THE PROBLEM THEY HAVE CITED IS PYONGYANG'S OPPOSITION. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN OPEN ABOUT THEIR CONCERN THAT MOVES TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOUTH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE ALWAYS FICKLE KIM IL-SUNG TO SIDE MORE OPENLY WITH CHINA ON CRITICAL ISSUES. THEY HAVE SEEMED TO FIND THE CURRENT BALANCE IN SOVIET-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS VALUABLE FOR THEIR PURPOSES AND HAVE ALWAYS, IN THE PAST, CONCLUDED IT WAS NOT WORTH IT TO ROCK THE BOAT.

4. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH DO NOT AT PRESENT APPEAR VERY GOOD. WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NO AFFECTION FOR THE NORTH KOREANS IN MOSCOW AND WE NOTE THAT FBIS ANALYSTS FOUND THE ANNIVERSARY MESSAGES EXCHANGED IN JULY AND AUGUST PARTICULARLY FROSTY. OUR GUESS IS THAT ANY HOPE THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE EARLIER HAD THAT INCREASED SUPPLIES OF U.S. WEAPONS TO THE SOUTH WOULD INDUCE PYONGYANG TO BE FRIENDLIER TO THE USSR HAS NOT WORKED OUT. A SOVIET GESTURE TO THE SOUTH AT PRESENT COULD SUGGEST EITHER THAT MOSCOW-PYONGYANG RELATIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY FROZEN NOW TO BE LESS OF A HINDRANCE OR THAT MOSCOW THINKS THE THREAT OF SOME RELATIONSHIP WITH SEOUL MIGHT BRING THE NORTH KOREANS CLOSER TO REALITY. WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ACTING IN ANY WAY AS A STALKING HORSE FOR PYONGYANG ON THIS ISSUE.

5. ~~MOSCOW'S LIKELY MOTIVATIONS ARE FAIRLY EASY TO FATHOM:~~

-- SOVIET POLICY IN THE FAR EAST IS STAGNANT OR WORSE. THE ONLY INITIATIVE THE SOVIETS CAN TAKE THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS BY BEIJING OR TOKYO IS A GESTURE TO AN EAGER SEOUL. AN OPENING TO SOUTH KOREANS COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS SOME BADLY NEEDED ROOM FOR DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER IN A PART OF THE WORLD CRITICAL FOR THEM, BUT WHERE THE U.S. SEEMS NOW TO HAVE A FREE REIN FOR INITIATIVES.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE AFRAID THE CHINESE ARE OUTFLANKING THEM WITH SEOUL. THE CHINESE SEEM TO BE ABLE TO TRADE ON A SIZEABLE SCALE WITH THE SOUTH, AND EVEN MUTE DEMANDS FOR U.S. MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NORTH. TASS ARTICLES POINTING OUT CHINESE INFIDELITIES HAVE NO EFFECT AND THE CHINESE APPEAR TO BE POSITIONING THEMSELVES FOR RELATIONS WITH BT

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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BOTH KOREAS. THE JAPANESE ALSO APPEAR TO BE MOVING TOWARD MORE RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH. ALL THIS IN SOVIET EYES COULD WELL LOOK LIKE POSITIONING MOVES FOR A U. S. -PRC-JAPAN DEAL ON KOREA THAT WOULD FREEZE THE SOVIETS OUT COMPLETELY.

~~-- SEOUL HAS TALENTS AND EXPERTISE THAT WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL IN SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT. IN A TIME OF STRAINED RESOURCES, THE SOVIETS CAN ILL AFFORD TO CONTINUE FOREVER TO IGNORE THE DYNAMIC SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY AND ITS POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO SOVIET DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN PRIVATE, MENTIONED THE KOREAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THIS CONTEXT.~~

6. THIS SAID, WE BELIEVE THE KOREANS ARE QUITE RIGHT TO LOOK ON THIS SOVIET APPROACH WITH CONSIDERABLE CAUTION. WE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND GOING VERY FAR AT THE MOMENT. THEY MIGHT BE INTENDING PRIMARILY TO EXPLORE THEIR OPTIONS. THEY MAY HOPE THAT THEY COULD DEVELOP SOME LEVERAGE ON U. S. -CHINA-KOREAN RELATIONS, IF NOT TO WEDGE THEM APART, THEN AT LEAST TO AVOID BEING SHUT OUT THEMSELVES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS AND WE HAVE SOMETHING TO GAIN BY TAKING THE SOVIETS UP ON THE APPROACH. IF IT SHOULD TURN OUT TO BE THE FIRST MODEST SOVIET STEPS -- FOLLOWING THOSE ALREADY TAKEN BY THE CHINESE -- TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA, THIS WOULD FIT CLOSELY WITH OUR LONG-STANDING POLICY IN THE AREA. IF NOTHING COMES OF IT, NEITHER WE NOR THE SOUTH KOREANS WOULD HAVE LOST ANYTHING, AND WE COULD NOT BE ACCUSED OF BLOCKING SEOUL'S INTERNATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OR OF DISCOURAGING MOSCOW FROM CONTRIBUTING TO A PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION IN THE AREA. ZIMMERMANN
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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - FEBRUARY 17, 1982

1. SOUTH KOREA: CONTACTS WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Both of Pyongyang's primary allies appear increasingly amenable to developing a de facto relationship with Seoul--South Korea trades with the PRC and has some private contacts with Soviet officials. But North Korean opposition to PRC and USSR relations with South Korea makes the development of formal ties unlikely for the foreseeable future.

* * *

South Korean trade with the PRC, largely through intermediaries, increased dramatically from only \$400,000 in 1978 to an estimated \$400 million in 1980. Moreover, a growing volume of this trade (including crude oil) in recent months has been direct. In addition, approximately 120 Chinese fishing vessels sought refuge in South Korean waters last year, the first time Chinese vessels have done so, and a small number of the 1.9 million Korean expatriates in China were permitted to return to the ROK for family visits after prolonged ROK-PRC quasi-official negotiations.

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Strong North Korean opposition will continue to inhibit overt political initiatives by either Beijing or Moscow. Both fear the other would exploit any strains in their relations with Pyongyang. South Korea's successful bids to host the 1988 Olympics and the 1986 Asia Games, however, provide both the PRC and the USSR a pretext for developing a modest modus vivendi with South Korea.

Continuing North Korean opposition notwithstanding, we believe Beijing will increase contacts with Seoul both for economic benefits and in expectation that the ROK will sacrifice diplomatic ties with Taiwan in return for formal relations with the PRC. China's strong recent public support of North Korea's reunification proposal may be partly to assuage Pyongyang's concerns over China's intentions. For its part, Moscow appears less inclined to alienate Pyongyang, but may judge that the possibility of increased contacts with Seoul would induce Pyongyang toward a more pro-Soviet position.

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IMPLICATIONS OF A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT
IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Summary

If China and the USSR manage to move their detente process forward over the next two years, both countries would gain leverage with the US. There is little likelihood that any new strategic alignments would result, however, or even that the two countries could solve the regional problems of Kampuchea, Afghanistan, or the huge troop concentrations along their borders. But by extending bilateral cooperation over a broad range and adopting some cosmetic measures of detente, the two countries could achieve a widespread perception that major realignments were possible, leading a number of affected countries to want to reinsure against such an eventuality.

Provided American responses were based on appreciation of underlying power relationships as well as more transient developments, however, the adverse impact would not be great. China might use its improved ties with Moscow to raise the price of strategic cooperation with the US aimed at the USSR, but the interest in an American counter to Moscow's military might would still be there. The Soviets would gain some confidence from a reduced sense of encirclement and a demonstrable policy success, but relations with the US would remain Moscow's central foreign policy concern.

* * * * *

Setting

Initiatives by Beijing and Moscow have given considerable momentum over the past year to improved Sino-Soviet relations. Several developments, including pressing domestic problems in both countries, increasing friction in their relations

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with the US, and, paradoxically, the US determination to strengthen its military position have moved this process along faster than anticipated a year ago. Both Andropov and Deng's chosen successor, Hu Yaobang, support it.

This process could continue over the next two years or so. Nonetheless, China's independence of the USSR, as well as the global and regional considerations that have impelled China to seek security in a balance between Washington and Moscow, precludes a Sino-Soviet strategic alliance against the West. Even the hypothesis that China and the USSR will be able to keep the accent on the positive for two years and will avoid a relapse into sterile polemics is probably too optimistic in light of the tough political issues and deep hostilities that separate the two countries. But both sides may want to exploit the benefits of what will be seen as an important change in the dynamics of international relations. If so, their respective interests may be strong enough to preserve a sense of forward movement despite major unresolved differences.

Outlook

If Sino-Soviet relations continue to show improvement, the state of play in early 1985 could be as follows:

Political Relations. The two countries will emphasize their common socialist heritage and their position as neighbors with some historical ties of friendship. Beijing will be receptive to Moscow's desire for a statement of principles governing their relations that implicitly negates earlier "anti-hegemonist" Sino-Western, particularly Sino-Japanese, clauses aimed at the USSR. The Chinese, however, will reject Soviet efforts to imply Sino-Soviet collusion against the West.

High-level government contacts will be common and party-to-party contacts will have resumed. Exchanges in culture, sports, and economic planning will proceed apace. The two sides will have agreed to develop a new treaty delineating their border, but negotiations will be incomplete. Cosmetic measures, perhaps a limited troop pullback from disputed territories along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers or a declaration on non-use of force, including a mutual renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, will preserve momentum. Discussions on larger force reductions, including Soviet forces in Mongolia, will be under way. Moscow, however, will put Beijing off, arguing that a significant draw-down is possible only if the US and Japan also participate.

Ideology and Rhetoric. The two sides will benefit from the weakening of many of the old ideological antagonisms, e.g., over

Mao's leftist domestic policies and Moscow's claim to primacy in the "socialist community." Beijing will continue to move toward what Moscow regards as Leninist orthodoxy in internal affairs and will be generally accepted as a member of the socialist community. But China will not join such major Soviet-led institutions as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact and will continue to behave as a nonaligned country, championing the cause of the Third World, thus sustaining friction. Nevertheless, Soviet and Chinese positions on Third World issues will move closer together.

Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Progress will be difficult, and each side will continue to support its proteges while it advises caution and compromise. In Southeast Asia, the Soviets may scale back their support for Vietnam while they continue to encourage Vietnamese acceptance of a coalition government of all forces in Kampuchea. In exchange, the Chinese may agree to negotiations with Hanoi aimed at improving relations and reducing troop levels along their border. On Afghanistan, Moscow might enlist Beijing's help in persuading Pakistan to restrict outside aid to the insurgents, in exchange for lowering troop levels as the guerrilla opposition diminishes.

Economic Relations. Sino-Soviet trade will increase at dramatic percentage rates (perhaps approaching \$1 billion dollars compared with an annual average of \$500 million in the late 1970s), but it will not be significant in absolute terms for either country. More important for international perceptions, Beijing will give even higher priority to the modernization of existing plant and equipment, much of which was designed and equipped by the USSR. Western imports will play an important role in this upgrading but it may also involve a considerable commitment to future trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Moscow will offer technical and material cooperation. Although Beijing will be cautious about accepting Soviet "assistance," the exchange of planning and technical teams will be brisk.

Impact

The major effect of such improved Sino-Soviet relations will be on perceptions; the military postures, trade patterns, treaties, and other commitments of the two countries will be essentially unchanged. The effect will be no less real for being intangible.

Global Effects. Although China will continue to set its course independently of Moscow, the disunity of the communist camp will be less evident. The Soviet fear of encirclement will be somewhat diminished. Western morale will be correspondingly lowered.

Moscow will have fewer grounds to fear strategic collaboration between China and the US, and Western Europe will have somewhat less assurance of a hostile China on the USSR's eastern border in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. The nuclear balance would not be affected, but Moscow would find any arms control agreement with Beijing--even a nonverifiable declaration of non-use of force and non-first-use of nuclear weapons--useful to stimulate pressure for arms control measures in the West and Japan.

Relations With the US. The primacy for Moscow of relations with the US will not be altered by the improvement in ties with Beijing. The Soviets will try to use their enhanced leverage in the triangular relationship to encourage the US to adopt a more "balanced" stance between China and the USSR. Moscow will seek to erode China's ties with Washington by emphasizing Soviet support for Beijing on the Taiwan issue.

Nor will the reduction in tensions lessen the Chinese interest in cooperation with the US, including some degree of military and intelligence cooperation, to offset Soviet strength. But better ties with Moscow will reinforce Chinese insistence on clear-cut evidence of US willingness to reduce support for Taiwan and to transfer high-level technology to the PRC as a condition. Beijing will also step up efforts to diversify ties in all fields as a guarantee against an unravelling of Sino-US relations.

Regional Effects. In Northeast Asia the prospect of Sino-Soviet rapprochement will intensify Japanese interest in defense cooperation with the US, while efforts by Moscow to use its revived relationship with the PRC to undermine China's relationship with Japan will give Tokyo a strong motivation to improve ties with Beijing. In the absence of a backing down by Japan on defense cooperation with the US, Moscow will continue to take a hard line toward Tokyo on political issues to intimidate Japanese governments by heightening fear of regional isolation. This effort is unlikely to succeed, but a firm reassertion of the US defense commitment will be an important factor in the Japanese reaction.

The Korean Peninsula is likely to be an area of continuing Sino-Soviet competition, but the overall atmosphere of greater amity between North Korea's two major patrons could escalate pressures from Seoul on Tokyo and Washington for support and could cause Pyongyang to become more skittish. The impact on Taipei and Hong Kong probably would be unsettling. Both would perceive that Beijing might be more assertive on sovereignty issues.

A continuing thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, together with ongoing Sino-Indian efforts to resolve outstanding differences,

14

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- 5 -

probably will encourage a reevaluation of foreign policies by most countries on the South Asian subcontinent. India's relations with its smaller neighbors--Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan--would almost certainly improve, as might New Delhi's much stickier relations with Pakistan. A general detente in the region would reduce the influence of both superpowers. Insofar as it reduced Indian dependence on the USSR, it would favor the US. But it could also incline the Pakistanis toward an accommodation with the Soviets on Afghanistan. Much will depend on Soviet moves in Afghanistan and the level of US military supply to Pakistan.

Moscow's closest East European allies will welcome increased party, trade, and cultural ties with a communist state whose independence from Moscow is undeniable. Beijing's support for independent communist regimes, however, will not extend to endorsement of freedom to reject communism. There could be an adverse impact on European views of US reliability if the Sino-Soviet rapprochement were seen as a consequence of American ineptness in its relations with China.

Prepared by Frank Crump
x28657

Approved by Robert H. Baraz
x29194

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - FEBRUARY 11, 1983

1. USSR-JAPAN: SECURITY CONCERNS PREMINENT

Soviet strategy toward Japan is primarily a product of the USSR's security concerns in the Far East. Currently the Soviets are alternating threats with blandishments in order to discourage closer US-Japanese military cooperation and to draw Japan into discussions of regional security issues. Moscow will regard any indications of Japanese interest in confidence-building measures as a potentially important breakthrough.

* * *

Soviet policy-makers apparently have concluded that under present circumstances their only significant bargaining chip--concessions on the disputed Northern Territories--would yield only marginal gains. They have focused instead on a series of tension-raising tactics to compel Japan to pay more attention to Soviet security concerns.

--Last year Moscow increased its forces in the Northern Territories and significantly strengthened Far Eastern Backfire bomber deployments. Backfires engaged in exercises close to the Japanese mainland for the first time last autumn.

--In November 1982, Moscow described US plans to deploy F-16's in Japan beginning in 1985 as an "immediate threat" to Soviet security.

--Soviet media have propogandized vigorously against all Japanese plans to improve their own forces.

Against this background, Moscow is pushing a variety of "peace" initiatives designed to generate popular pressures within Japan for security negotiations. In letters to two Japanese opposition parties delivered during Nakasone's January visit to the US, Soviet officials offered unspecified security guarantees in return for Japan's agreement to adhere strictly to its non-nuclear principles. Moscow also is emphasizing the applicability to Japan of its Asian confidence-building proposals while raising the INF issue as a looming problem for Japan. Gromyko's statement in Bonn last month that some Soviet SS-20s would be moved beyond the Urals seemed deliberately designed to stimulate Japanese concern on this score.

The Soviets also evidently hope to put additional pressure on Tokyo by eroding Beijing's tacit support for Japanese military cooperation with the US. A senior Soviet official recently told Chinese diplomats in Moscow that any bilateral Chinese-Soviet border reductions would have to take into account the Japanese military buildup and the presence of US forces in South Korea.

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OF SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT CHINESE POLICY.

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SUBJECT: IZVESTIYA ARTICLE CRITICIZES CHINA
REFS: A) MOSCOW 543, B) MOSCOW 14165, C) MOSCOW 917

1. ~~0~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A CRITICAL IZVESTIYA ARTICLE ON APRIL 19
PROBABLY DOES NOT REFLECT A MAJOR CHANGE IN SOVIET
POLICY TOWARD THE CHINESE. IT IS, HOWEVER, THE HARSH
EST ATTACK ON THE PRC SINCE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS BEGAN
LAST FALL AND REFLECTS SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH
CONTINUED ANTI-SOVIET ARTICLES IN THE CHINESE PRESS. IT
MAY ALSO INDICATE GROWING HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET
DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE SLOW PACE OF NORMALIZATION IN
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS TO DATE. END SUMMARY.
A RARE BLAST

3. A LONG ARTICLE IN IZVESTIYA APRIL 19 BY N. SERGEYEV
(APPARENTLY A PSEUDONYM) DIRECTLY ATTACKS CHINESE POLICY
TOWARD MOSCOW FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE SECOND ROUND
OF BILATERAL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS. THE ARTICLE,
ENTITLED "DOES THIS PROMOTE NORMALIZATION?", IS THE MOST
AUTHORITATIVE AND SWEEPING TREATMENT OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL
AND SECURITY ISSUES IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNIST GIANTS BEGAN LAST
OCTOBER. THE LAST MAJOR ARTICLE, A NEW TIMES PIECE
(REF A) WHICH ATTACKED CHINA'S ALLEGED CLAIMS TO SOVIET
TERRITORY, APPEARED LAST JANUARY. SERGEYEV'S ARTICLE
RAISES THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE AS BUT ONE OF A WHOLE LITANY

4. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NOTHING IN SERGEYEV'S ARTICLE
THAT DIPLOMATS HERE (AND CERTAINLY THE CHINESE) HAVE NOT
ALREADY HEARD. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PIECE IS THAT IT
SETS OUT FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION THE SOVIET
POSITION TAKEN AT THE CONSULTATIONS, AND GIVES NO SIGN OF
SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON ANY OF THE ISSUES WHICH THE CHINESE
HAVE SINGLED OUT AS REQUIRING RESOLUTION BEFORE THERE CAN
BE A MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.
QUOTING ANDROPOV

5. SERGEYEV'S ARTICLE IS ALSO INTERESTING IN THAT IT
FOR THE FIRST TIME ASSOCIATES ANDROPOV PERSONALLY WITH A
TOUGHER LINE ON CHINA. SERGEYEV RECALLS ANDROPOV'S
NOVEMBER 22 PLENUM STATEMENT (REF B) INCLUDING CHINA
AMONG THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH WHOM "COMMON INTERESTS"
SHOULD LEAD TO "CORRECT DECISIONS" IN AREAS WHERE "FOR
VARIOUS REASONS" THERE IS NOT YET THE "NECESSARY TRUST
AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING." MORE OMINOUSLY, AND STRONGLY
HINTING AT HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET FRUSTRATION, SERGEYEV APPLIES
TO CHINA A WARNING IN THE SAME ADDRESS THAT HAD ORIGINALLY
BEEN DIRECTED AT THE U.S.: THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT "PAY
FOR (NORMALIZATION) WITH SOME SORT OF PRIOR CONCESSIONS."
SOVIET COMPLAINTS

6. SERGEYEV INSISTS THAT NORMALIZATION OF SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
CREATED BY THE "ORIENTATION" OF THE MASS MEDIA AND
STATEMENTS BY THE LEADERSHIP. HE LISTS A NUMBER OF
EXAMPLES OF THE CHINESE "CULTIVATION OF UNFRIENDLY VIEWS":
-- 120-140 ARTICLES EACH MONTH IN THE CHINESE PARTY
- NEWSPAPER RENMIN RIBAO WHICH "DISTORT" SOVIET POLICY;
-- FREQUENT QUOTATIONS OF STATEMENTS BY REAGAN
- ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WHICH TRY TO "IMPOSE
- UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS" ON THE SOVIET UNION;
BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 04878

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, UR, US
SUBJECT: IZVESTIYA ARTICLE CRITICIZES CHINA
-- CHINESE PRESS REPORTS AND STATEMENTS ABOUT THE
- "SOVIET MILITARY THREAT," "SOVIET HEGEMONISM,"
- SOVIET EFFORTS TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY,
- AND THE WESTERN "ARMS GAP";
-- TEXTBOOKS, MAPS AND SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES AND MONOLOGUES
- TARGETED AT THE "YOUNGER GENERATION" WHICH TEACH
- CHINESE YOUTH "MISTRUST AND UNFRIENDLY FEELINGS"
- VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.

7. ALL OF THESE CHINESE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, ACCORDING TO SERGEYEV, HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON NORMALIZATION. WHILE HE EXPRESSES SATISFACTION WITH THE "ATMOSPHERE OF NORMALCY" AT THE CONSULTATIONS AND WITH THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE, HE NOTES THAT THE TALKS HAVE NOT YET PROGRESSED TO THE POINT OF CONCRETE RESOLUTION OF THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THE RELATIONSHIP.
CHINA'S "CONDITIONS"

8. SERGEYEV REITERATES MOSCOW'S REFUSAL TO SERVE AS A GO-BETWEEN IN KAMPUCHEA, MONGOLIA OR AFGHANISTAN. REFERRING OBLIQUELY TO CHINESE STATEMENTS THAT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM'S PRESENCE IN KAMPUCHEA, AND SOVIET TROOPS IN MONGOLIA AND AFGHANISTAN ARE OBSTACLES TO NORMALIZATION, SERGEYEV ACCUSES CHINA OF TRYING TO "LINK" SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ISSUES INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRIES. HE THEN EXPRESSES SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THESE

COUNTRIES' STRUGGLE AGAINST "IMPERIALISM" (COMMENT: THE U.S.) AND "HEGEMONISM" (COMMENT: CHINA) AND FOR THEIR SEARCH FOR A "MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA." IN THIS WAY, SERGEYEV IMPLICITLY BOTH ATTACKS CHINA'S "HEGEMONIST" POLICY IN INDOCHINA (I.E. BORDER INCIDENTS AND CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER ROUGE) AND SUGGESTS THAT CHINA DEAL DIRECTLY WITH VIETNAM IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE.

9. COMMENT: SERGEYEV'S ARTICLE IS BETTER INTERPRETED AS A SHOT ACROSS THE PRC'S BOWS THAN AS FORESHADOWING A MAJOR SHIFT IN CHINA POLICY. ALONG WITH ITS HARSH TREATMENT OF PRC POLITICAL DEMANDS AND MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE USSR, THE IZVESTIYA PIECE MORE THAN ONCE REITERATES THE THEMES WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED MOSCOW'S APPROACH TO SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE THE BREZHNEV TASHKENT SPEECH. IT ALSO RECOGNIZES THOSE AREAS -- TRADE AND BILATERAL CONTACTS -- IN WHICH RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED TO THE SOVIETS' APPARENT SATISFACTION.

10. AS IN THE CASE OF LAST JANUARY'S NEW TIMES ARTICLE, THE IMMEDIATE IMPETUS BEHIND THE SERGEYEV PIECE SEEMS TO BE SOVIET FRUSTRATION WITH CONTINUING PRESS SNIPING AT THE USSR IN CHINA. WE NOTE THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPITSA TOLD AMBASSADOR HARTMAN SHORTLY AFTER THE NEW TIMES AFFAIR THAT MOSCOW RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RESPOND TO CHINESE PRESS CRITICISM AND "NO DOUBT WOULD FROM TIME TO TIME." (REF C). WHILE IZVESTIYA INFORMS US SERGEYEV IS IN FACT A MEMBER OF THE PAPER'S STAFF, NO ONE HERE HAS HEARD OF HIM. THE CHINESE AND BRITISH THINK THEY HAVE SEEN HIS BYLINE BEFORE, BUT DO NOT KNOW WHETHER IT IS A PSEUDONYM.

11. ON A MORE GENERAL LEVEL, HOWEVER, SERGEYEV MAY REFLECT GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT ON THE PART OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT AND LEADERSHIP WITH THE PACE OF IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET

RELATIONS. THE REINSERTION OF "HEGEMONISM" INTO THIS YEAR'S MAY DAY SLOGANS CAN BE READ AS ANOTHER REFLECTION OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, AS CAN GROMYKO'S CAREFULLY WORDED, SOBER ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 04878

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, UR, US
SUBJECT: IZVESTIYA ARTICLE CRITICIZES CHINA
IN HIS APRIL 2 PRESS CONFERENCE. WE HAVE IN OUR RECENT
CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS ON CHINA DETECTED A SLACKENING OF
EXPECTATIONS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE OPTIMISM BEING
EXPRESSED LAST FALL. ALL OUR CONTACTS CLAIM SATISFACTION
WITH PROGRESS ACHIEVED TO DATE, AND SEEM TO BELIEVE THE
RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP, BUT THE PASSION OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS HAS VISIBLY WANED. SERGEYEV'S ARTICLE
MAY WELL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AS A MEANS OF VENTILATING SUCH
SENTIMENTS AT A TIME WHEN SIGNS OF A DOWNTURN IN U. S. -PRC
RELATIONS CAN BE COUNTED ON TO CONSTRAIN BEIJING'S
RESPONSE. HARTMAN
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Korea - Far East
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SUPER URGENT !!

The Soviet Foreign Minister has sent a message to Secretary Shultz in reply to our demand of earlier today for an explanation of the shooting down of a Korean Airlines 747 by Soviet aircraft. The message which was delivered by the Soviet Embassy here to the Department of State is an almost verbatim repetition of the TASS item issued from Moscow today which reads as follows:

An unidentified plane entered the air space of the Soviet Union over the Kamchatka Peninsula from the direction of the Pacific Ocean and then for the second time violated the air space of the USSR over Sakhalin Island on the night from August 31 to September 1. The plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the dispatcher service.

Fighters of the anti-aircraft defence, which were sent aloft towards the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan.

In addition Mr. Gromyko's message includes a statement that in connection with the US request, the Soviets have taken measures to search for the aircraft and indicates that as a result of the search signs of a possible crash have been found in the area of Morenon Island. The search, ^{the message} ~~Mr. Gromyko~~ says, continues in the area.

The Soviet Charge has been informed that the United States Government finds this reply totally inadequate and reiterates its demand for a satisfactory explanation.

September 1, 1983

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 15870

E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/23/93

TAGS: PREL, UR CH

SUBJECT: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983 -- AN END TO
-- EUPHORIA

REFS: (A) 82 MOSCOW 14165, (B) MOSCOW 1390,
-- (C) MOSCOW 10897, (D) MOSCOW 14070, (E) MOSCOW 13801,
-- (F) MOSCOW 11685, (G) MOSCOW 12937, (H) MOSCOW 15467

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE FAILED TO DEVELOP DURING 1983 AT THE PACE FORESHADOWED IN THE LAST MONTHS OF THE BREZHNEV REGIME. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR THIS ARE THREEFOLD: A GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE CONCEPT OF "EQUIDISTANCE" AS PRACTICED BY BEIJING; PERCEPTIONS OF AN EXPANDING MILITARY THREAT TO THE USSR FROM THE EAST AS A RESULT OF MORE EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED US/JAPANESE/SOUTH KOREAN DEFENSE POLICIES; AND AN APPARENTLY MORE SKEPTICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEW OF CHINA ON THE PART OF ANDROPOV AND HIS CLOSEST POLICY ADVISORS.

3. THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE NOT PREVENTED FURTHER "SMALL STEPS" TOWARD NORMALIZATION BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF WHICH SEEMS WELL UNDERWAY AND MAY HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. THUS FAR, HOWEVER, SUCH STEPS HAVE HAD NO RESONANCE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. EFFORTS BY "PRAGMATISTS" AT THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY LAST SUMMER TO ORCHESTRATE A MORE VISIBLE SOVIET-PRC POLITICAL DIALOGUE HAVE EITHER BEEN

FRUSTRATED OR OVERSHADOWED BY THIS FALL'S DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS IN US-PRC RELATIONS.

4. EVEN BEFORE THESE REVERSES, HOWEVER, THERE WAS ACCUMULATING EVIDENCE OF A BACKLASH HERE AGAINST PERCEIVED CHINESE UNRESPONSIVENESS TO MOSCOW'S OVERTURES. PRIVATE HINTS AT AN END OF THE "EUPHORIA" OF THE FALL OF 1982 AMONG SOVIET ASIA EXPERTS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY SUCH MANIFESTATIONS OF HARDENING SOVIET ATTITUDES AS THE RESUMPTION OF MEDIA AND MORE AUTHORITATIVE SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF PRC FOREIGN POLICY AND THE REAPPEARANCE OF REFERENCES TO "HEGEMONISM" IN OFFICIAL SLOGANS. ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS THAT THOSE IN THE SOVIET PARTY AND SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY TRADITIONALLY OPPOSED TO A CONCILIATORY STANCE TOWARD CHINA HAVE GAINED GROUND IN THE LAST YEAR.

5. SUCH TRENDS POINT TO A SOVIET CHINA POLICY IN THE PERIOD AHEAD WHICH, WHILE CONTINUING TO SEEK EXPANDED AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH THE PRC WHERE IT SERVES SOVIET INTERESTS, WILL FEATURE A GREATER WILLINGNESS THAN A YEAR AGO TO CRITICIZE CHINESE POLICIES OR ACTIONS NOT TO MOSCOW'S LIKING. A CONTINUING DESIRE TO REAP ADVANTAGES VIS-A-VIS THE US AND ASIA FROM THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WILL LIMIT THE INTENSITY OF SOVIET ATTACKS. IN THE MORE SKEPTICAL ATMOSPHERE CURRENTLY PREVAILING IN MOSCOW, HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER SOVIET "GOODWILL" INITIATIVES OF THE TYPE UNDERTAKEN BY BREZHNEV IN 1982 UNLIKELY, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS ON THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ISSUES ON THE SINO-SOVIET AGENDA MORE REMOTE THAN EVER. END SUMMARY.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1983 -- A LOSS OF MOMENTUM

6. ON OCTOBER 27, 1982, LEONID BREZHNEV IN ONE OF HIS LAST MAJOR PUBLIC ADDRESSES SUGGESTED TO SENIOR SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS THAT RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS GAVE MOSCOW A POTENTIALLY USEFUL "CARD" IN THE CONTEXT OF DETERIORATING EAST-WEST TIES. JUST WEEKS BEFORE, HIGH LEVEL SOVIET-CHINESE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS HAD RESUMED FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN -- THE FIRST FRUITS OF BREZHNEV'S MARCH 1982 TASHKENT SPEECH RECOGNIZING CHINA AS A "SOCIALIST" COUNTRY. AMONG SOVIET ASIA SPECIALISTS THERE PREVAILED AT THE TIME A SPIRIT OF WHAT ONE OF THEM SUBSEQUENTLY

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 15870

DESCRIBED AS "EUPHORIA."

7. THE SENSE OF HISTORIC MOMENTUM CAPTURED IN BREZHNEV'S BOASTS HAS LARGELY DISSIPATED IN THE INTERVENING FOURTEEN MONTHS. IN ITS PLACE HAVE APPEARED INCREASING SIGNS OF A HARDENING OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE PRC, AND OF SKEPTICISM AS TO THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF OVERTURES SUCH AS THOSE TAKEN BY BREZHNEV IN 1982. THIS MESSAGE LOOKS AT SOME OF THE REASONS BEHIND THAT TREND, AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS.

THE UNDERLYING FACTORS

0. SEEN FROM HERE, THREE MAIN SETS OF FACTORS EXPLAIN THE SLOW-DOWN IN SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT DURING 1983: GROWING SKEPTICISM IN MOSCOW OVER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA'S POLICY OF EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS; CHANGES IN SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN ASIA; AND CHANGES IN HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE PRC ITSELF. WE EXAMINE EACH OF THESE IN GREATER DETAIL BELOW.

A. EQUIDISTANCE AND ITS LIMITS

9. CHINA'S FORMAL ADOPTION OF A POLICY OF EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN THE US AND USSR AT ITS SEPTEMBER 1982 PARTY

CONGRESS WAS GENERALLY INTERPRETED, BY SOVIET SINOLOGISTS AS A SIGNIFICANT STEP WHICH BOTH OPENED UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ACCELERATION OF BILATERAL NORMALIZATION WITH THE PRC AND GREATLY REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD US-PRC STRATEGIC COOPERATION. INFORMED INTERLOCUTORS AT THE TIME WERE CAREFUL TO SPEAK IN TERMS OF THE GROWTH OF SINO-SOVIET TIES THROUGH "SMALL STEPS." BUT THERE WAS CLEARLY A HOPE, AND AMONG MANY AN EXPECTATION, THAT SUCH STEPS WOULD IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME DRAW CHINA INTO A COMPLEX OF COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES AND DIALOGUE WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY OBSCURE DIFFERENCES ON OUTSTANDING GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW COUNTED ON US-PRC DIFFERENCES OVER TAIWAN AND CERTAIN REGIONAL ISSUES TO FORESTALL ANY SERIOUS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND TO OPEN UP AREAS OF LIMITED SINO-SOVIET INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

10. EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR HAVE PROVED THESE EXPECTATIONS UNWARRANTED. THE CHINESE HAVE DETERMINEDLY PUNCTURED SOVIET EFFORTS TO INFLATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BILATERAL STEPS TAKEN TO DATE. THERE HAS BEEN NO APPRECIABLE REDUCTION IN PRC CRITICISM OF SOVIET POLICIES ON WHAT A SOVIET SCHOLAR RECENTLY TERMED THE "WATERSHED" ISSUES OF KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN. CHINA'S WESTERN TILT ON INF AND EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS, CLEARLY MOSCOW'S TOP PRIORITY OVER THE PAST YEAR, HAS OUTWEIGHED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THOSE ISSUES (E.G., GRENADA, LEBANON) ON WHICH SOVIET AND PRC VIEWS HAVE TENDED TO COINCIDE. MOST IMPORTANT, THE SUCCESS OF HIGH-LEVEL US DIPLOMACY IN SETTING US-PRC RELATIONS ON A MORE POSITIVE COURSE HAS SOBERED SOVIET ASIA WATCHERS AND FUELED DISENCHANTMENT IN MOSCOW WITH THE NOTION OF "EQUIDISTANCE" AS PRACTICED IN BEIJING.

B. THE THREAT FROM ASIA

11. WE NOTED IN OUR LAST MAJOR ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS THAT THERE WAS OPPOSITION IN INFLUENTIAL PARTY AND MILITARY CIRCLES TO ANY CONCESSIONS TO CHINA ON MATTERS AFFECTING SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN ASIA EVEN WHEN SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE POTENTIAL

27

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BENEFITS OF CHINESE EQUIDISTANCE WERE MORE FAVORABLE (MOSCOW 1390). WE HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THE MORE SOBER VIEW OF CHINA WHICH HAS SINCE BECOME ESTABLISHED HERE HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ANY SENSE OF AN INCREASED MILITARY THREAT FROM CHINA ITSELF. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT TRADITIONAL SOVIET PARANOIA OVER POSSIBLE THREATS FROM THE EAST HAS INCREASED OVER THE PAST YEAR.

12. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR BEHIND THIS PHENOMENON HAS BEEN THE GROWTH OF CLOSER, MORE EFFECTIVE MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S., JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA. THE SOVIETS PORTRAY SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS EXPANDED JOINT MILITARY MANEUVERS IN NORTH ASIA, JAPAN'S GREATER WILLINGNESS UNDER NAKASONE TO SHOULDER MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES COMMENSURATE WITH ITS ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES, AND THE STEADY UPGRADING OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE REGION AS A SERIOUS AND EXPANDING MILITARY CHALLENGE TO SOVIET INTERESTS. THEY SEE FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS IN THE REGION OF U.S. NUCLEAR TIPPED SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES AS COMPOUNDING THAT CHALLENGE. MUCH OF MOSCOW'S PUBLIC RHETORIC ON THESE POINTS IS SELF-SERVING, BUT EVEN IN NON-POLEMICAL PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET ASIA SPECIALISTS, WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED APPARENTLY GENUINE CONCERN OVER THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND UNANIMITY ON THE NEED FOR A SOVIET RESPONSE.

13. THE IMPACT OF SUCH PERCEPTIONS HAS BEEN TO

LIMIT MOSCOW'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THE SECURITY CONCERNS CHINA HAS IN THE PAST DEMANDED BE SATISFIED AS THE PRICE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. MOSCOW'S MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM HAS INEVITABLY ASSUMED GREATER STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, AS RECENT SOVIET STEPS TO BOLSTER ITS LONG-RANGE AVIATION AND NAVAL PRESENCE THERE MAKE CLEAR. THIS HAS IN TURN REDUCED THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE USSR WILL BE PREPARED TO PRESSURE VIETNAM IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA. AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET PROPAGANDA OVER THE INCREASED THREAT TO ASIA HAS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY EVEN TOKEN DRAW-DOWNS OF FORCES ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. MOSCOW'S CONTINUING DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20'S IN ASIA -- OSTENSIBLY, TO MEET THE INCREASED THREAT FROM THE EAST -- HAS MEANWHILE INTRODUCED A NEW IRRITANT INTO THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

14. SOVIET ASIA SPECIALISTS NO DOUBT REALIZE THAT SOVIET STEPS TO REINFORCE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST HAVE EXACERBATED LONG-STANDING SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS. WE SEE NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT MOSCOW IS PREPARED TO ALLOW ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA TO BECOME THE PRINCIPAL OR EVEN A MAJOR DETERMINANT OF ITS DEFENSE POLICIES IN THE REGION. KNOWING THAT BEIJING IS UNLIKELY TO BE SATISFIED WITH EXPLANATIONS THAT SOVIET FORCES IN ASIA AND VIETNAM ARE DIRECTED ONLY AGAINST THE US AND ITS ALLIES MUST LIMIT MOSCOW'S EXPECTATIONS THAT CHINA WILL BE WILLING TO MOVE TOWARD A MORE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP IN OTHER SPHERES.

C. NEW LEADERSHIP

15. AS IMPORTANT AS THE FACTORS NOTED ABOVE, IF LESS TANGIBLE, HAS BEEN A CLEAR SHIFT OF EMPHASIS AND INTEREST AT THE TOP LEVELS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. PERHAPS REFLECTING HIS EXPERIENCE AS CHIEF OF THE CPSU RULING PARTIES DEPARTMENT AT THE HEIGHT OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT, ANDROPOV HAS NOT FLAUNTED THE CHINA CONNECTION IN THE MANNER OF HIS PREDECESSOR.
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28

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 MOSCOW 15870

HIS STATEMENTS ON CHINA HAVE BEEN RARE (A FEW LINES IN HIS NOVEMBER 1982 PLENUM ADDRESS AND IN AN AUGUST 27 PRAVDA INTERVIEW THIS YEAR) AND GUARDED. FROM THE START, (82 MOSCOW 14165) HIS REMARKS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT, WHILE BREZHNEV'S NORMALIZATION OVERTURE REMAINED IN FORCE, MOSCOW WAS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS. SHORTLY AFTER ANDROPOV'S SUCCESSION, IN FACT, CHINA'S ELEVATION TO THE "SOCIALIST" PANTHEON BY BREZHNEV WAS PUBLICLY RESCINDED WHEN PRC MESSAGES ON THE 69TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE USSR WERE PUBLISHED WITH THOSE OF NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. TO THIS DAY, ANDROPOV HAS NEVER REFERRED TO CHINA AS "SOCIALIST"; NOR HAS ANY OTHER AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET SOURCE.

10. THE EXPLANATION FOR THIS SHIFT IN EMPHASIS MAY LIE SIMPLY IN THE FACT THAT ANDROPOV HAS HAD OTHER PRIORITIES. INTERNAL MATTERS HAVE CLEARLY BEEN HIS TOP CONCERN, AND TO THE EXTENT HIS HEALTH HAS ALLOWED HIM TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS HE HAS FOCUSED ON THE INF DEBATE (MOSCOW 14070). SOVIET CHINA SCHOLARS ARGUE AGAINST EXAGGERATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ABSENCE OF REFERENCES TO CHINA AS "SOCIALIST" UNDER ANDROPOV, SUGGESTING THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION AMONG SOVIET AUTHORITIES THAT THE PRC IS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY, AND THAT THERE IS THEREFORE NO NEED TO BELABOR THE POINT. THIS EXPLANATION IS UNCONVINCING TO US, AND PRC EMBASSY COLLEAGUES HERE AGREE THAT THE SHIFT IN TERMINOLOGY IS MORE THAN SIMPLE OVERSIGHT. ALONG WITH OTHER PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF A

HARDENED APPROACH TO CHINA OVER THE PAST YEAR (SEE BELOW), IT POINTS TO A MORE SKEPTICAL, MORE IDEOLOGICAL PERCEPTION AT THE TOP OF CHINA THAN PREVAILED DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF BREZHNEV'S LEADERSHIP.

SMALL STEPS AND THEIR IMPACT

17. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CONCLUDE FROM ALL THIS THAT THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP SLIPPED BACKWARD IN 1983. IT DID NOT.

-- THERE HAS UNDENIABLY BEEN SOME EROSION IN MOSCOW'S SELF-IMPOSED BAN ON MEDIA CRITICISM OF THE PRC. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, PRESS COVERAGE OF CHINA REMAINS ESSENTIALLY BENIGN, AND FAR MORE POSITIVE THAN DURING THE LATE SEVENTIES. OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON CHINA HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY CORDIAL, IF NOT WARM. NOWHERE IN SOVIET PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON CHINA HAS THERE BEEN ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE PRC POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO THE USSR

-- REGULAR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AT THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL HAVE CONTINUED AND LOOK TO BE A PERMANENT FIXTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. A SECOND CHANNEL, OSTENSIBLY FOR DISCUSSION OF "INTERNATIONAL ISSUES," WAS ESTABLISHED DURING DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPITSA'S VISIT TO BEIJING LAST FALL, BUT HAS YET TO BE ACTIVATED. THUS FAR, NO SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGHS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE CONSULTATIONS, BUT BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO SEE ADVANTAGE IN CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE.

-- TRADE, WHILE STILL MODEST COMPARED TO U.S.-PRC COMMERCE, HAS JUMPED SIGNIFICANTLY. AGREEMENTS REACHED

LAST SPRING PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER GROWTH.

-- STUDENT AND EXPERT EXCHANGES CONTINUE TO EXPAND AND SYMBOLIC STEPS SUCH AS THE RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL TOURISM ARE IMPORTANT TOKENS OF EARNEST BY BOTH SIDES.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 MOSCOW 15870

18. THE IMPACT OF THESE STEPS HAS NOT BEEN NEGLIGIBLE. MOST IMPORTANT, THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS APPEARS TO BE TAKING ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN AS IT ENGAGES A BROADER CIRCLE OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS ON BOTH SIDES. OVER THE LONG RUN THIS PHENOMENON MAY CREATE WITHIN THE PRC VESTED INTERESTS IN PRESERVING AND WIDENING TIES TO THE USSR, WHICH WILL WORK AGAINST ANY DRAMATIC REVERSALS OF THE PROCESS. THE SOVIETS DOUBTLESS HOPE IT WILL ALSO GENERATE MOMENTUM OVER TIME FOR COOPERATION IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE.

POLITICAL RELATIONS-- ERUSTRATED INITIATIVES

19. THUS FAR, THAT LATTER HOPE HAS BEEN IN VAIN. THIS HAS NOT, HOWEVER, BEEN FOR WANT OF TRYING ON THE SOVIET SIDE. A NUMBER OF EVENTS THIS SUMMER AND FALL (GROMYKO'S REPORTED JULY OVERTURE TO THE PRC ON STRATEGIC COLLABORATION AGAINST THE US; KAPITSA'S SELF INVITATION TO BEIJING IN SEPTEMBER; THE ABORTIVE GROMYKO-WU BILATERAL AT THE UNGA; ANDROPOV'S UNEXPECTED AUGUST REMARKS ON CHINA) SUGGEST AT LEAST SOME CIRCLES IN MOSCOW WERE TRYING HARD TO COME UP WITH SOMETHING TO SHOW IN POLITICAL TERMS IN RETURN FOR A YEAR OF SOVIET PUBLIC RESTRAINT TOWARD CHINA.

20. THE FACT THAT VIRTUALLY ALL THESE STEPS INVOLVED THE MFA SUGGESTS THAT THE MINISTRY'S CHINA HANDS, AND SPECIFICALLY SENIOR ASIATOLOGIST KAPITSA, WERE BEHIND THE INITIATIVES. IT MAY ALSO SUGGEST THAT KAPITSA ET. AL.

HAD INITIALLY OVERSOLD THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A MORE CONCILIATORY APPROACH TOWARD THE PRC AND WERE COMING UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO DELIVER. IF SO, GROMYKO'S BOYCOTT OF THE UNGA IN THE WAKE OF KAL, CHINA'S LUKEWARM RESPONSE TO ANDROPOV'S REMARKS AND UNRESPONSIVENESS IN THE OCTOBER POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, AND THE DRAMATIC OUTCOME OF SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT MUST HAVE BEEN MAJOR REVERSALS FOR SUCH "PRAGMATISTS."

AN END TO EUPHORIA

21. OUR SENSE, HOWEVER, IS THAT A CREEPING BACKLASH AGAINST CHINESE UNRESPONSIVENESS WAS SETTING IN AMONG SOVIET SINOLOGISTS AND DECISIONMAKERS WELL BEFORE THESE REVERSES. OUR SOVIET CONTACTS HERE GENERALLY REMAIN TRUE TO THE PARTY LINE THAT SINO-SOVIET PROGRESS WILL BE SLOW BUT SURE AND THAT CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH WILL ULTIMATELY DRIVE CHINA TOWARD A MORE GENUINELY INDEPENDENT POSITION. SINCE THIS SUMMER, HOWEVER, SUCH VIEWS HAVE BEEN STATED WITH APPRECIABLY LESS ENTHUSIASM THAN A YEAR AGO. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN FAR MORE OVERTLY NEGATIVE COMMENTS ABOUT CHINA: SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS HAVE CHARACTERIZED CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY TO US AS "ANTI-SOVIET;" ANDROPOV INTIMATE FEDOR BURLATSKIY HAS TOLD US HE NEVER HAD GREAT HOPES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND ACKNOWLEDGED US-PRC PROSPECTS ARE VIRTUALLY OPEN-ENDED; SIMILAR VIEWS HAVE CROPPED UP MORE THAN ONCE ON THE LECTURE CIRCUIT. A SINOLOGIST AT THE USA INSTITUTE, HOWEVER, PERHAPS BEST CAPTURED THE MOOD IN A RECENT DISCUSSION. "WE HAVE," HE SAID, "GOTTEN OVER THE EUPHORIA" OF THE FALL OF '82.

22. SUCH SENTIMENTS HAVE INEVITABLY FOUND PUBLIC EXPRESSION. SINCE LAST JANUARY, AS NOTED ABOVE, THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY -- IF STILL LIMITED -- EROSION OF SOVIET RESTRAINT IN PRESS CRITICISM OF CHINA. A RECENT TREND HAS BEEN MOVEMENT AWAY FROM SECONDARY SOURCE MATERIALS (E.G., REPRINTS OF VIETNAMESE WIRE SERVICE CRITICISM) TO DIRECT ATTACKS ON CHINESE POLICIES OR (AS IN THE CASE OF WU'S REMARKS IN JAPAN ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES) AGAINST BT

30

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 MOSCOW 15870

CHINESE LEADERS THEMSELVES.

23. MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN SUCH ISOLATED MEDIA BLASTS HAS BEEN THE REAPPEARANCE SINCE LATE SUMMER OF AUTHORITATIVE, SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE PRC (MOSCOW 11685, 12937, AND 15467). COMMON TO SUCH ATTACKS HAS BEEN THE VIEW THAT CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY HAS PLACED IT SQUARELY IN THE "IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY" CAMP, DESPITE ITS PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A POLICY OF EQUIDISTANCE. THIS SHIFT UNQUESTIONABLY REFLECTS A DECISION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO ADOPT A LESS CONCILIATORY STANCE TOWARD CHINA. HIGH-LEVEL INPUT IS ALSO UNMISTAKABLE IN THE REAPPEARANCE OF THE TERM "HEGEMONISM" IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET OFFICIAL SLOGANS FOR MAJOR HOLIDAYS AND WITH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS SUCH AS THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOR ALIYEV'S FALL VISIT TO THE SRV (MOSCOW 13801).

SUMMING UP AND LOOKING AHEAD

24. OUR CONCLUSION FROM ALL OF THE ABOVE IS THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION OVER THE PAST YEAR IN SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE PRC AND OF THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. AT THE RISK OF OVERSIMPLIFICATION, OUR SENSE IS THAT THOSE IN THE PARTY AND SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY IN FAVOR OF A MORE FORTHCOMING APPROACH TO BEIJING HAVE LOST GROUND SINCE ANDROPOV TOOK OFFICE TO THOSE TRADITIONALLY OPPOSED TO "LEGITIMIZING" THE PRC.

25. WE DOUBT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS AS YET BEEN REFLECTED IN ANY FORMAL DECISIONS TO CHANGE THE BASIC DIRECTION OF BREZHNEV'S APPROACH (WHICH, AS WE POINTED OUT LAST SPRING WAS LARGELY COST-FREE FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT (MOSCOW 1390)). WE SUSPECT WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEE FURTHER ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIETS TO IDENTIFY AND EXPAND AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH CHINA WHERE IT SUITS MOSCOW'S INTEREST. THE SOVIETS CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE PRC WHENEVER POSSIBLE AGAINST THE US ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT KAPITSA IS PREPARED TO THROW IN THE TOWEL ON THE POLITICAL FRONT.

26. WHAT DOES SEEM LIKELY TO CHANGE FURTHER IN THE YEAR AHEAD IS SOVIET PUBLIC TREATMENT ON CHINA. CONCERN TO REAP THE BENEFITS OF THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE PRC WILL TO SOME DEGREE LIMIT THE INTENSITY OF SOVIET CRITICISM. WITHIN SUCH LIMITS, HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT MOSCOW TO CONTINUE THE TREND TOWARD LESS RESTRAINT IN RESPONDING TO CHINESE CRITICISM OR ACTIONS AFFECTING SOVIET INTERESTS IN SUCH SENSITIVE AREAS AS AFGHANISTAN, VIETNAM, OR THE ASIAN MILITARY BALANCE. THE FORTHCOMING VISITS OF THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER ZHAO ZIYANG TO THE US AND OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE PRC WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO GAUGE THE NEW PARAMETERS OF SOVIET PUBLIC RESTRAINT.

27. THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT OF SUCH CHANGES OF SOVIET PERCEPTIONS AS HAVE OCCURRED TOWARD CHINA OVER THE PAST YEAR WILL BE LESS OBVIOUS, BUT IN THE LONG RUN, MORE SIGNIFICANT. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL THUS FAR TO

BURN NO BRIDGES THEY MIGHT HAVE TO RE-CROSS IN RESPONDING TO AN OVERTURE TO BEIJING. THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO DO SO. OUR SENSE, HOWEVER, IS THAT THEY ARE INCREASINGLY DUBIOUS SUCH AN OVERTURE WILL BE FORTHCOMING, AND THAT THEY ARE LESS PREPARED THAN EVER TO PAY EVEN A SMALL SUBSTANTIVE PRICE FOR WHAT LOOKS LIKE A HIGHLY UNCERTAIN REWARD.

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