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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files  
**OA/Box:** 20  
**File Folder:** USRR Arms Control (4)

**Archivist:** loj/loj  
**FOIA ID:** F00-009, Skinner  
**Date:** 7/30/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Draft to the President, 5p D 6/21/06 NLSFOW-009/1 #126	3/25/83	B1, B3
2. memo	Kent Stansberry to the START Working Group, re US and Soviet Strategic Force Tables, 1 page partial Part. 7/30/04 F00-009/1 #127; Upheld 10/3/12 F00-009/1 #127	6/6/83	B3
3. table	"US Strategic Forces", 1p	7/1/83	B1
4. table	<del>"USSR Strategic Forces", 2p R 10/3/2012 F00-009/1 #129</del>	<del>Mid-83</del>	<del>B1</del>
5. table	"Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles", 1p	Mid-83	B1
6. table	"Strategic Forces", 1p	Mid-83	B1
7. cable	260150Z Apr 83, 1p Part 6/21/06 NLSFOW-009/1 #132	4/26/83	<del>B1</del> B2, B3
8. memo (8302080)	Paula Dobriansky to William Clark, re President's 3/31 speech, 2p R " " " #133	3/29/83	B1
9. cable	102310Z Jan 83, 9p D " " " #134	1/10/83	B1, B3
10. cable	081842Z Feb 83, 4p R " " " #135	2/8/83	B1

### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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*File  
arms control*

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY

6 JUN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE START WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: US and Soviet Strategic Force Tables

(U) Attached are the coordinated force tables for US and Soviet strategic systems estimated for mid-1983. Two of the tables, the SECRET-level ones showing US and Soviet inventory and accountable values for launchers, weapons and throw-weight, are for the Working Group use. It is important to note that "accountable" only has precise meaning when associated with launchers, where the counting rules of SALT II have been used. The "accountable" warhead and throw-weight values are imputed from the corresponding launcher assessments and from some obvious counting rules for evaluating loadings.

(U) The other two tables are intended for public release and are unclassified.

Kent Stansberry  
Strategic Arms Control Policy

Attachments  
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

- Mr. MacDonald, State
- Dr. Alessi, ACDA
- [REDACTED] CIA
- Mr. Fry, OVP
- Col Linhard, NSC
- Mr. Sell, ACDA
- Col Toye, JCS

Classified by: Dir., StrategicArmsCont.Pol.  
Declassify on: OADR

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3/8/01*



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USSR STRATEGIC FORCES

Mid-1983

	<u>Launchers</u>		<u>Weapons</u>		<u>Throw Wt. (Mkg)</u>	
	<u>Inv</u>	<u>Acc</u>	<u>Inv</u>	<u>Acc</u>	<u>Inv</u>	<u>Acc</u>
<u>ICBMs</u>						
SS-9	18	0	18	0	.074	.000
SS-11(a)	550	520	550	520	.547	.547
SS-13	60	60	60	60	.033	.033
SS-17	150	150	570	600	.374	.390
SS-18	308	308	3016	3080	2.494	2.526
SS-19(a)	330	360	1930	2160	1.154	1.260
Subtotal	1416	1398	6144	6420	4.676	4.756
<u>SLBMs</u>						
HII/N-5	3/9	3/9	9	9	.011	.011
YI/N-6	23/368	23/368	368	368	.191	.191
GIII/N-8	1/6	1/6	6	6	.007	.007
HIII/N-8	1/6	1/6	6	6	.007	.007
DI/N-8	18/216	18/216	216	216	.238	.238
DII/N-8	4/64	4/64	64	64	.070	.070
YII/N-17	1/12	1/12	12	12	.015	.015
DIII/N-18	14/224	14/224	784	1568	.346	.384
Typh/NX-20(b)	2/40	2/40	320	320	.092	.092
Subtotal	67/945	67/945	1785	2569	.977	1.015
<u>Total</u>	2361	2343	7929	8989	5.653	5.771
<u>Missiles</u>						
<u>Bombers</u>						
Bear(c)	100	100	205	--	--	--
Bison(c)	50	50	200	--	--	--
Backfire(d)	220	220	450	--	--	--
Subtotal	370	370	855	--	--	--
<u>TOTAL</u>	2731	2713	8784	8989	5.653	5.771

Inv = inventory systems; Acc = accountable for arms control purposes, not necessarily deployed

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-009/11 #129

BY RW NARA DATE 10/3/12

Soviet Force Table Footnotes

- (a) 20 SS-19 type silos are believed to have SS-11s installed in them and in addition 10 are currently undergoing modification for deployment of the SS-19. All 30 are shown for accountability purposes as having SS-19s.
- (b) The SS-NX-20 missile is undergoing flight testing and probably will not be deployed until 1983.
- (c) The Soviets have about 115 other Bear aircraft assigned to Naval Aviation and approximately 30 other Bison aircraft configured as tankers. These aircraft are not accountable under SALT. In addition, the Soviets have produced 7 new Bear variants that likely will be long-range ALCM carriers beginning probably in 1984.
- (d) Only about 115 Backfire are assigned to the Soviet Air Force and 105 to Naval Aviation. Additionally, approximately 90 others are believed to have been produced.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

Arms CONTROL  
ACE →

ROUTINE  
R 260150Z APR 83  
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC  
TO DIACURINTEL  
AIG 7046  
AIG 7034

ZYUW RUEKJCS8617 1160246

B2  
AIG 7011  
AIG 7032

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SERIAL: DIADIN 115-11A  
SUBJ: USSR-NATO: INF. (U)  
DOI: 25 APR 83 (AS OF 1950 EDT)

TEXT: 1. ~~(C)~~ RECENT STATEMENTS BY GENERAL SECRETARY YURIY ANDROPOV IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A WEST GERMAN JOURNALIST INDICATE THE SOVIETS' BASIC POSITION ON ARMS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WEST REMAINS UNCHANGED.

2. ~~(C)~~ ANDROPOV'S REMARKS TO A "DER SPIEGEL" INTERVIEWER ON 19 APRIL COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND AS PREVIOUS COMMENTARIES BY OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS. IN THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE RESPONSE YET, ANDROPOV REITERATED FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S REJECTION OF THE "INTERIM-ZERO" VARIANT BECAUSE ITS INTENT WOULD BE TO DISARM THE SOVIETS WHILE ARMING NATO EVEN MORE. HE ALSO STATED IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO ADDRESS ONLY REDUCTIONS IN LAND-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, LEAVING SEA-BASED MISSILES ASIDE, AS THE US HAD SUGGESTED, BECAUSE THE US IS A SEA POWER AND THE SOVIETS A LAND POWER, WITH MOST OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED ON LAND.

3. ~~(C)~~ FURTHERMORE, ANDROPOV COMMENTED ON THE ISSUE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES, ALLOWING THEY COULD BE TERMED A FORCE OF DETERRENCE, BUT THOSE COUNTRIES SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE MOSCOW'S RIGHT TO ITS OWN DETERRENT FORCE. ADDITIONALLY, ANDROPOV INTIMATED THAT FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT COULD BE MADE ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

4. ~~(C)~~ HE ALSO ADDRESSED ANALOGOUS RESPONSE, REPEATING THE THREAT THAT IF MISSILES WERE DEPLOYED IN WEST GERMANY, IT WOULD MEAN GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THAT COUNTRY. MOREOVER, ANDROPOV CASTIGATED THE US FOR ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE WITH DEPLOYMENT AND MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN SOVIET ASIA. HE ADDED THAT DESPITE AMERICAN CRITICISM OF THIS DEPLOYMENT, THERE WERE WESTERN PRESS REPORTS OF WASHINGTON'S INTENTIONS TO STATION MISSILES IN ALASKA -- AN EVENT THAT WOULD NOT GO UNNOTICED BY THE SOVIETS.

5. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: THERE IS LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE IN THIS INTERVIEW THAT HAS NOT BEEN SAID BEFORE EXCEPT THAT THESE ARE ANDROPOV'S WORDS. IN TERMS OF ANALOGOUS RESPONSE TO US DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II'S AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM'S), HIS REFUSAL TO SPECIFY WHERE AND HOW IS CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS SOVIET COMMENTARY.

6. ~~(C)~~ MORE IMPORTANT, THIS IS THE FIRST PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE HIGHEST SOVIET AUTHORITY SUGGESTING THAT THE BOUNDARIES OF AN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) AGREEMENT COULD BE SET BELOW 300 "MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS" ON EACH SIDE. HIS REMARKS ON SEA-BASED MISSILES WERE ALSO SIGNIFICANT SINCE THIS WAS THE FIRST ASSERTION SINCE ANDROPOV ASSUMED POWER THAT THE KREMLIN STILL ENDORSES THE PRIMACY OF LAND-BASED MILITARY POWER IN SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY.

7. ~~(C)~~ FURTHERMORE, ANDROPOV INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD RESPOND TO A POSTULATED DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II'S IN ALASKA. THIS SUGGESTS THE KREMLIN IS CONSIDERING, AS PART OF ITS REACTION TO NATO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II'S AND GLCM'S, A COUNTERDEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE ARCTIC.

PREP:  
DECL:

[REDACTED]

B2/B6

ACTION  
INFO

[REDACTED]

72

B2

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NLS EOD 009/1 #132

By As, NARA, Date 4/21/06

MCN=83116/00401

TOR=83116/0246Z

TAD=83116/0252Z

CDSN=MAJ505

PAGE 1 OF 1  
260150Z APR 83

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CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION

MODE

DACOM #

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PAGES 21

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39

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. *[Signature]* RADM JOHN POINDEXTER / SANTA BARBARA / 010330Z APR 83

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

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574

**National Security Council  
The White House**

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

MAR 29 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JP</u>	<u>1</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>1</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Sit Room	<u>3</u>		<u>DACom to JP</u>
<u>Flanery</u>	<u>4</u>		

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

**DISTRIBUTION**

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

*Judge*  
 I don't think we need  
 my name on anything anymore  
 right now.  
 All have seen & no action.



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 29, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: President's March 31 Speech

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FCO-009/1 #133ON NARA, DATE 6/2/06

The President's defense speech of March 23 has generated some adverse publicity. Domestically, the proposal to accelerate ABM research is in serious danger of becoming entangled in a partisan political battle as a number of key Democratic Senators have spoken out against it. Media reaction also has not been positive. Charges have been hurled that defensive deployments would only stimulate a spiraling arms race in both defensive and offensive systems.

The Soviet reaction has been extremely negative. This in particular has affected the Allies' perspective for they seem to be concerned that the President's proposal would contribute to a further worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations and complicate on-going arms control negotiations (INF and START). Moreover, the Europeans appear to hold some deep-seated reservations about the impact of missile defenses on global security. Specifically, they are concerned that a heavy deployment of defensive systems by both superpowers would turn the U.S. and the USSR into nuclear sanctuaries and increase the likelihood of a nuclear war being fought on European soil. Heavy Soviet defensive deployments would also obviate the viability of modest sized British and French offensive nuclear forces.

The President's proposal to invest in strategic defenses is in serious danger of generating long-term adverse responses both domestically and internationally. It is essential that this potentially damaging situation be averted. We should not underestimate the importance of public relations in winning popular acceptance of our defense proposals. Current problems with devising a politically palatable MX basing mode is vivid testimony that "bad press" can severely complicate defense planning. Therefore, in order to dispel erroneous criticism of the strategic defense proposal, I suggest that the President briefly present several additional points on this subject in his upcoming March 31 speech before the World Affairs Council. Specifically, the following themes should be introduced:

-- Defensive deployments would not promote an arms race.

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- Defensive deployments would eventually facilitate even deeper offensive reductions.
- Defensive deployments would not threaten Soviet security. We hope the Soviet Union will also move toward a defense dominated environment.
- In the past, the Soviets were very enthusiastic about strategic defense; as the late Soviet Premier Kosygin stated during the Glasboro Summit (1968), defensive systems are stabilizing and nonthreatening and arms control should be dedicated to the elimination of offensive systems.
- Defensive deployments would enhance the security of our Allies.

I recommend that the above themes be incorporated into the President's speech. Attached at Tab I is a suggested insert. If we are to succeed in reversing the emerging adverse reactions to the President's proposal, we have to move quickly. The March 31 speech provides us with the only near term opportunity to adequately address this subject.

RECOMMENDATION

That the paragraphs at Tab I be inserted in and after the first paragraph of the draft speech.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Proposed insert

cc: Sven Kraemer  
Aram Bakshian, Jr. (Speechwriter)

Insert

What I have proposed is that man should turn his best energies to moving away from the nuclear nightmare. That is, our plans are not directed at creating a first strike threat or eliminating the legitimate Soviet margin of security. We must not be content with the current situation where security on both sides depends on threatening the lives of millions of innocent men, women and children.

An offensive-dominated nuclear environment has preserved peace, but is fragile and dangerous peace. While seeking deep reductions in offensive forces envisioned in our START and INF proposals, I hope that the Soviet Union will also move toward deterrence involving defensive systems. Such an environment would not provoke an open-ended offensive arms race. Rather, as both the U.S. and the USSR reduce their offensive inventories to very low levels, the security of our allies would commensurately increase. For many years, Soviet leaders took the position that defensive systems were stabilizing and nonthreatening and that arms control should be dedicated to the elimination of offensive systems. In fact, this view was explicitly stated by the late Soviet Premier Kosygin during the Glasboro Summit in 1968.

~~SECRET~~

(State/NSC/Bakshian Edit)

March 28, 1983

1:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA  
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 1983

Last week I spoke to the American people on radio and television about our plans for safeguarding this Nation's security and that of our allies. And I announced the long-term effort that this country will undertake in scientific research to counter, some day, the menace of offensive nuclear missiles. What I have proposed is that man should turn his best energies to moving away from the nuclear nightmare. <sup>INSERT</sup> We must not be content with the current situation where security on both sides depends on threatening the lives of millions of innocent men, women, and children.

Today I would like to discuss with you the broader context of national security. National defense is one part -- certainly a fundamental part -- of any nation's policy for ensuring its safety. Arms control - the effort to limit or reduce the danger of modern weaponry -- is another crucial part of our national security policy. Both of these go hand-in-hand with our diplomacy which strives to advance the cause of freedom and to create the conditions in which conflicts and disagreements, when they occur, can be settled by peaceful means.

Throughout history, rivalries between nations have often led to war. The emergence of a new major power with global ambitions has usually produced a coalition of nations against it, often ending in a test of strength.



Today, the problem of peace is one of unprecedented complexity. We live in a world of thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, a world in which a total war would mean catastrophe. We also live in a world torn by a great moral struggle -- between democracy and its enemies, between the spirit of freedom and those who fear it. In the last 20 years the Soviet Union has engaged in a relentless military buildup, overtaking and surpassing the United States in several categories of military power, and acquiring what can only be considered an offensive military capability. All the moral values which this country cherishes -- freedom; democracy; the right of peoples and nations to determine their own destiny, to speak and write and live and worship as they choose -- all these basic rights are fundamentally challenged by a powerful nation and system which do not wish these values to survive.

So this is our dilemma, and it is a profound one: We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must protect and advance our values -- stand true to our principles and our friends -- without inviting holocaust.

There is no escape from this dual responsibility of avoiding war and defending freedom. We cannot conduct ourselves in the world as if the special danger of nuclear weapons did not exist. But we must not allow ourselves to be paralyzed by the problem -- to abdicate our moral duty.

This is the dilemma history has bequeathed to us. We of the 20th Century, who so pride ourselves on mastering the forces of nature, are forced, almost as punishment for the sin of pride, to



wrestle with one of the most complex moral challenges ever faced by any generation.

You know my views about the Soviet Union and what it represents. You know my program for maintaining, strengthening, and modernizing our national defense. Let me tell you, today, something about what we are doing to reduce the danger of nuclear war by reducing or eliminating the nuclear arsenals which threaten it.

#### The American Record

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the leader in the international effort to negotiate nuclear arms limitations. In 1946, when the United States was still the only country in the world possessing these awesome weapons, we did not blackmail others with threats to use them; we did not use our enormous power to conquer territory, to advance our position or to seek domination. Instead we submitted a proposal -- the Baruch plan -- for international control of all nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. This was rejected by the Soviet Union. In 1955, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, according to which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and permitted aerial reconnaissance to ensure against the danger of surprise attack. This, too, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

Since then, some agreements have been reached -- largely at American initiative. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under

water. The creation of the "Hot Line" in 1963, upgraded in 1971, provides direct communication between Washington and Moscow to avoid miscalculation during a crisis. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty of 1968 sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1971, we reached an agreement on communication procedures to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and the seabed arms control treaty of 1971 prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed or the ocean floor. The strategic arms limitation agreements of 1972 imposed limits on anti-ballistic missile systems and on numbers of strategic offensive missiles. And the 1972 biological warfare convention bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.

Throughout this period, the United States took many initiatives to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to reduce the dangers of war. While many agreements were reached, we have also suffered many disappointments. The American people had hoped, by these measures, to reduce tensions and start to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. But we have seen Soviet military arsenals continue to grow in every category. We have seen the Soviet Union project its power with an unprecedented global reach. We have seen resistance, on the Soviet Union's part, to significant reductions and measures of effective verification. And, I am sorry to say, we have seen increasingly serious grounds for questioning the Soviet Union's compliance with the arms control agreements that have already

been signed. I will have more to say on this issue in the near future.

When I came into office, I promised the American people two things: to restore our neglected defenses, in order to strengthen and preserve the peace, and to pursue, with all my energy, the essential goal of negotiating reliable agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Both these promises have been kept.

Today, not only the peace but also the chances for real arms control depend on restoring the military balance. Soviet ideology does not permit Soviet leaders to leave any Western weakness unprobed, any vacuum of power unfilled. And, in negotiating with them, we have long since learned that Soviet leaders see negotiation only as another form of struggle. They will never volunteer a compromise. Yes, I believe they can be persuaded to reduce their arsenals -- but only if they see it as absolutely necessary. Only if they see the West determined to modernize its own military forces will they see an incentive to negotiate a verifiable agreement establishing equal, lower levels.

That is why we have begun to rebuild our defensive strength, and that is why one of our first priorities on assuming office was to take a fresh look at the entire arms control agenda. Since then, in coordination with our allies, we have launched the most comprehensive program of arms control initiatives ever undertaken. Never before in our history has this Nation been engaged in so many simultaneous efforts to limit and reduce the instruments of war:



- We have proposed a total ban on chemical weapons -- including toxin weapons of the kind being used by the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia.
- Together with our allies, we have offered a comprehensive new proposal for mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.
- We have recently proposed to the Soviet Union a series of measures to reduce the risk of war from accident or miscalculation. And we will soon propose significant new measures resulting in part from consultations with several distinguished Senators.
- We are also committed to a Western-proposed conference on disarmament in Europe that will discuss new ways to enhance stability and security in that area.
- We are committed to strengthening the institutions and treaties which ban the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities and which safeguard the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In the days ahead, I will be talking to other world leaders about the urgent need for comprehensive safeguards on nuclear exports.
- We have proposed to the Soviet Union improving the verification provisions of two agreements to limit underground nuclear testing.
- And we have made far-reaching proposals, which I will discuss further in a moment, for deep reductions in



strategic weapons and for elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range weapons.

I am determined to achieve real arms control -- reliable agreements that will stand the test of time, not cosmetic agreements that raise expectations only to have hopes cruelly dashed.

In all these negotiations certain basic principles guide our policy:

- First, arms control should seek significant reductions on both sides.
- Second, we insist that arms control agreements be equal and balanced.
- Third, we recognize that arms control is not an end in itself but a vital part of a broad policy designed to strengthen peace and stability.
- Fourth, arms control agreements must be effectively verifiable. We must never gamble with the safety of our people and the people of the world.

It is with these firm principles in mind that this Administration has approached the negotiation on the most powerful weapons in the American and Soviet arsenals -- strategic nuclear weapons.

#### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

In June of 1982, American and Soviet negotiators convened in Geneva to begin what we call the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START. We have sought to work out an agreement reducing the

levels of strategic weapons on both sides. I proposed to the Soviets that we reduce the number of ballistic missiles by one-half and their warheads by one-third. No more than half the remaining warheads could be on land-based missiles. Both sides would be left with greater security at equal and lower levels of forces.

This proposal would not only reduce numbers; it would also put specific limits on precisely those types of nuclear weapons that pose the most danger.

The Soviets have made a counter proposal. There are many problems with it, and they have not yet responded adequately to serious concerns we have raised about it. But -- and this is an important plus -- they have now accepted the concept of reductions. In the current round of negotiations, we have presented the Soviets with the basic elements of a treaty for comprehensive reductions in strategic arsenals.

This negotiation is proceeding in a serious manner, under the able leadership of Ambassador Edward Rowny on the American side. I am confident that a successful outcome is possible, and I pledge to you every effort to bring it about.

#### Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

We are also negotiating with the Soviet Union in Geneva to eliminate an entire class of new weapons from the face of the Earth.

Since the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union has been deploying at the average rate of one a week the SS-20 nuclear missile. The

Soviets now have 351 of these missiles, each with three highly accurate warheads capable of destroying cities and military bases in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This makes a total of over 1,050 nuclear warheads on the SS-20's in addition to about 250 more on older Soviet missiles.

NATO has no comparable weapon. Nor did NATO in any way provoke this new, unprecedented escalation. Indeed, while the Soviets have been deploying their SS-20's, we have withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe.

This major shift in the European military balance prompted our West European allies themselves to propose that NATO find a means of righting the balance. In December 1979, all the members of the Alliance announced a collective decision which had two tracks:

- First, the Alliance decided to deploy in Western Europe 572 land-based cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The purpose was to offset and deter the Soviet SS-20's. The first NATO weapons will be ready for deployment later this year.
- Secondly, we decided in 1979 to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union for the mutual limitation of these intermediate-range missiles.

In November 1981, we made a sweeping proposal: a total ban on such weapons. NATO would cancel its own deployment if the Soviets eliminated theirs. But the Soviet Union refused. Instead, it has launched a massive propaganda offensive to



generate public pressures in the West to block the NATO deployment, which is still in the future, even while the Soviet weapons continue to grow in number.

We have made it clear that our proposal was not made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have been willing to consider any Soviet proposal that meets five standards of fairness.

These are:

- An agreement must establish equal numbers for both Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear forces.
- Third-country nuclear forces, such as the British and French, are independent and are not part of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations.
- The Soviet Union may not shift SS-20's from Europe to Asia. Limitations must be global and we will not try to improve European security at the expense of our allies and friends in Asia.
- An agreement must be effectively verifiable.
- And an agreement must not undermine NATO's ability to defend itself with conventional forces.

Over the last several months, we have been consulting closely with our Atlantic allies. They strongly endorse these principles. We are agreed that it is time to make clear to the world that we are willing to go the extra mile -- even though the Soviets have not been forthcoming. So, earlier this week I authorized my negotiator in Geneva, Ambassador Paul Nitze, to inform the Soviet delegation of a new American proposal.



[INSERT]

The Western Alliance has not abandoned its goal of eliminating all these weapons from Europe. But unless we convince the Soviet Union we are serious and ready to begin restoring the balance by our own deployments, they have no incentive to negotiate seriously. Therefore, we must be prepared to proceed, if necessary, because this offers the best chance for a good agreement. The United States will continue to listen to any serious proposal and will be ready at any time -- even after deployment begins -- to negotiate an equitable agreement.

#### The Nuclear Freeze

That is the arms control agenda this Administration has been vigorously pursuing. Our proposals are fair, far-reaching, and comprehensive. We have made progress, but the road ahead is long.

We Americans are sometimes an impatient people. I guess it's a symptom of our traditional optimism, energy, and spirit. Often this is a source of strength. In a negotiation, however, it can be a real handicap. Any of you who have been involved in labor-management negotiations, or any kind of bargaining, know that patience is a sign of determination. It strengthens your bargaining position. If one side seems too eager or desperate, the other side has no reason to offer a compromise and every reason to hold back, expecting that the more eager side will cave in first.

This is a basic fact of life, as we all know from our own experience. It is most certainly true when dealing with the Soviet Union. Generosity in negotiation has never been a characteristic of Soviet leaders; it runs counter to the basic militancy of their Marxist-Leninist ideology.

So, it is vital that we show patience, determination, and above all, national unity. If we appear to be a divided people -- if the Soviets know that pressures against the United States Government may force changes in our position -- then the Soviets will dig in their heels. And that result can only delay an agreement.

This is why I have been so concerned about the so-called nuclear freeze proposals, one of which is being considered at this time by the House of Representatives. Most of those who support the freeze are well-intentioned, honest citizens concerned about the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. No one shares their concern more than I do. But these freeze proposals, however well-intentioned they are, would do more harm than good.

They may look attractive on the surface. They may seem to offer a simple solution. But experience teaches us that there are no simple solutions to complex problems. As H. L. Mencken once wryly remarked, for every complex problem, there exists a solution that is simple, appealing and wrong.

-- The freeze would preserve today's high, unequal, and unstable levels of nuclear forces, and, by so doing,

reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate for real reductions.

- It would pull the rug out from under our negotiators in Geneva, as they have testified, and could undo the progress we have made in convincing the Soviets of the need for reductions.
- Although some think a freeze would be easy to agree on, it raises enormously complicated problems of deciding what is to be frozen, and how it is to be achieved and verified. Attempting to negotiate these vital details would only divert us from the goal of negotiating reductions, for who knows how long.
- The freeze proposal would also make a lot more sense if a similar grassroots popular movement against nuclear weapons were putting similar pressures on Soviet leaders at home. As Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense in the previous administration, put it in a Washington Post article criticizing the freeze proposal: "Its effect is to put pressure on the United States, but not on the Soviet Union."
- Finally, the freeze would reward the Soviets for their 15-year build-up while locking us into our existing equipment, which in many cases is obsolete and badly in need of modernization. Three-quarters of Soviet strategic warheads are on delivery systems 5 years old or less; three-quarters of the American strategic warheads are on launchers 15 years old or older.



I have followed the debate on the freeze in the House of Representatives very closely. It has been a long and animated discussion, but one moment stood out that I'd like to share with you today. It was a letter, read during the debate, that was written by a father in North Carolina to a U.S. Senator. In that letter, the father told of how his only two sons were killed in separate Air Force plane crashes, and how he wanted to see more defense spending so that American soldiers, sailors, and airmen would no longer have to serve their country with aging and obsolete equipment. His two sons, an Air Force captain and an Air Force lt. colonel, were killed in two separate plane crashes:

"Dear Senator:

". . . My wife and I . . . have had two recent tragedies in our family which might not have occurred. We feel that replacements are now needed for the old and outdated equipment. . . .

"On January 4, 1981, our youngest son, [an Air Force] Captain . . . was killed in the crash of his F-4 fighter plane near Madrid, Spain. He left a wife, a 1-year-old daughter and a 3-year-old son. On December 7, 1982, our remaining son, [a] Lieutenant Colonel . . . was killed in the crash of his F-111F fighter plane. He left a wife, a daughter 10, and a son 6.

"This is in no way to say that the maintenance is less than first class in the Air Force. Our sons had nothing but the highest praise for the maintenance personnel on their



aircraft. But, as everything else, planes deteriorate with age. . . .

"It is because of the loss of these two young men, not only to their families, but also to the Air Force, that we respectfully urge you to pass a strong defense budget so that our well-trained and heroic young men may have the best equipment available."

My heart goes out to the family of these two brave pilots. I'll do everything I can to see that no other father ever has to write such a letter.

What is true of fighter planes could also be true of strategic bombers and any other advanced weapon. Our B-52 strategic bombers are older than many of the pilots who fly them; automobiles as old as some B-52's would qualify as antiques. And that's what's wrong with a freeze that could lock us into obsolescence. We have 2 million young Americans in the armed services; they deserve the best and most modern equipment to protect them -- and us.

My goal -- and I consider it no less than a sacred trust -- is to make progress during my term of office toward arms reductions in every category of weaponry and in every one of the several negotiations now under way. Every President has dreamt of leaving the world a safer place than he found it. It's my dream, too.

So I call upon all Americans, of both parties and all branches of government, to join us in this effort. If we stand together behind the proposals now on the negotiating table, there

is great hope for progress. We must not let our disagreements, or partisan politics, become impediments to strengthening the peace and reducing armaments. For my part, I pledge to you that I will pursue this noble goal with all my energy and determination.

To our allies in the great democracies of the Atlantic Community and Japan, I want to say this: We will continue to consult closely with you at every stage. We are conscious of our responsibility when we negotiate with our adversaries on issues of such direct concern to you, your safety and your well-being. We will not sacrifice your interests or miss opportunities to ensure greater security through arms control.

And to the leaders and people of the Soviet Union, I say: Join us on the noble path to a more peaceful, secure world. Let us vie in the realm of ideas, on the field of peaceful competition. Let history record that we tested our theories through human experience, not that we destroyed ourselves in the name of vindicating our way of life. And let us practice restraint in our international conduct, so that the present climate of mistrust can some day give way to some mutual confidence and a secure peace.

This is the goal, my fellow Americans, of all the democratic nations. If the Soviet Union responds in the same spirit, we are ready. And we can pass on to our posterity the gift of peace -- the greatest gift that one generation can bequeath to another.

Thank you and God bless you.

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10  
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21

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TAGS: NATO, INF, PARM  
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY  
REFERENCE: A) STATE 27312, B) BONN 448

1. THIS MESSAGE, RESPONDING TO REF A, SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH REF B WHICH HAD ALREADY OUTLINED IN SOME DETAIL THE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY ON INF.

2. UPDATING AND AMPLIFYING OUR PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT, WE NOTE THE FOLLOWING:

- A. INF AND ARMS CONTROL HAVE INDEED BECOME ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR ISSUES IN THE CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN. IT MUST THEREFORE BE TREATED BY US WITH UTMOST SENSITIVITY.
- B. INF AND ARMS CONTROL CONTINUE TO BE A SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBILITY PROBLEM FOR THE U.S. WE ARE REPEATEDLY TOLD BY RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE THAT THEY SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. WANTS AN INF AGREEMENT. SOME DISBELIEVE OUR SINCERITY AS THEY DISBELIEVE THE SOVIETS'. (WE HEAR WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ONLY REASON THE U.S. AGREED TO PROPOSE THE ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION IN THE FIRST PLACE IS BECAUSE WE TOOK IT FOR GRANTED THAT IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE USSR AND THEREFORE WOULD PRECLUDE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT. THAT IS WHY WE CONTINUE TO STICK WITH ZERO-ZERO NOW. THE ONLY WAY WE CAN "PROVE" OUR SINCERITY, THIS ARGUMENT GOES, IS BY PROPOSING A CONCILIATORY INTERIM SOLUTION ABOVE THE ZERO-ZERO LEVEL.)
- C. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S BERLIN SPEECH WAS GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED; SO WAS THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO EUROPEANS, AS AN EARNEST OF OUR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE

- REAL INF CONTROL AND ELIMINATION. BUT THE ASSERTION THAT THE LETTER WAS PRIMARILY A RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET VAST PROPAGANDA EFFORT (REPORTED IN HEADLINES IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT GERMAN PAPERS) REDUCED ITS CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS.
- D. WE REPEAT OUR PREVIOUS POINT (WHICH HOLDS TRUE NOT ONLY NOW BUT ALSO AFTER THE MARCH 6 ELECTION) THAT NO ONE CAN CONVINCE THE GERMAN PUBLIC OF THE RIGHTNESS OF THE NATO DOUBLE TRACK DECISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES EXCEPT THE GERMANS THEMSELVES. WHETHER AND HOW EFFECTIVELY THEY WILL DO THIS DEPENDS TO A MAJOR DEGREE FIRST, ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION AND SECOND, ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATION DEVELOPMENTS. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE DISASTROUS FOR OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES IF THOSE OPPOSING INF COULD FIND EVIDENCE THAT THE U.S. IS PRESSURING THE FRG TO PROMOTE INF OR THAT THE FRG IS MERELY DOING U.S. BIDDING. WE CAN ASSIST THE GERMANS IN THEIR TASK BY KEEPING IN MIND THAT WHATEVER U.S. SPOKESMEN SAY ON THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY FOREIGN AUDIENCES AND SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THEIR SENSITIVITIES, THEIR INTERESTS AND PREOCCUPATIONS SO AS TO BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY EFFECTIVE. EVEN IF USG SPOKESMEN ADDRESS PRIMARILY DOMESTIC AUDIENCES, THEY SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT FOREIGN AUDIENCES WILL BE HEARING WHAT THEY SAY AS INSTANTANEOUSLY AS AUDIENCES IN THE U.S.

3. OUR EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS THE GERMAN PUBLIC TO PROMOTE NATO POLICY ON INF MUST NOT BE CONSTRUED AS DESIGNED TO PERSUADE GERMANS OVER THE HEADS OF THEIR OWN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP -- I.E. THAT WE DON'T BELIEVE THEY CAN CONVINCE THEIR OWN POPULATION SO WE HAD BETTER DO IT DIRECTLY. WE WOULD THEREFORE COUNSEL AGAINST PUBLIC AFFAIRS TECHNIQUES WHICH COULD CREATE THIS IMPRESSION (SUCH AS U.S.-ORIGINATED SATELLITE TV PRODUCTIONS WITH THE PURPOSE OF HAVING THEM AIRED ON LOCAL NETWORKS). WE FAVOR INSTEAD TV INITIATIVES LIKE THOSE OUTLINED IN PARA 5 A, C, AND E BELOW.

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4. IN DEVELOPING A PERSUASIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE TOWARD GERMAN AUDIENCES WE SHOULD BE AWARE OF QUESTIONS WHICH ARE REPEATEDLY POSED. THERE ARE LOGICAL ANSWERS BUT WE NEED TO COUCH THEM IN LANGUAGE THAT IS NOT TECHNICAL AND IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND BY A CONCERNED PUBLIC. THE QUESTIONS ARE:

- WHY DO WE EXCLUDE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH INF FROM THE EQUATION? WHY NOT INCLUDE THEM IN OUR CONSIDERATION AS AN ELEMENT IN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE? IF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH HAVE INF, WHY SHOULD NOT THE SOVIETS BE CONCERNED ABOUT A DEFENSE AGAINST THEM BY STATIONING A COMPARABLE INF?

5. FOLLOWING ARE A NUMBER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE EFFECTIVE IN SUPPORTING U.S. INF POLICY:

- A. MAKE HIGH-LEVEL, KNOWLEDGEABLE OFFICIALS AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON FOR INTERVIEWS BY GERMAN JOURNALISTS STATIONED IN THE U.S. (PRINT, TV AND RADIO) FOR ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS. THIS IS AN EXCELLENT TECHNIQUE AND THE MORE THE BETTER. JOURNALISTS LIKE EXCLUSIVES, AND WHAT GERMAN JOURNALISTS REPORT FROM WASHINGTON IS PROMINENTLY FEATURED ON THE FRONT PAGES OF NEWSPAPERS AND IN MAJOR NATIONAL TV NEWS PROGRAMS. REPORTS WRITTEN BY GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS UNDER THEIR BYLINE HAVE FAR MORE PERSUASIVE POWER THAN ANY HANDOUTS COMING FROM A "FOREIGN" EMBASSY. (WE WOULD SUGGEST SELECTIVITY IN CHOOSING JOURNALISTS FOR SUCH INTERVIEWS AND FAVOR SELECTION OF THOSE REPRESENTING MAJOR, RESPONSIBLE MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS.)
- B. WHEN ONE-ON-ONE INTERVIEWS ARE NOT PRACTICABLE, ORGANIZE PRESS CONFERENCES OR BACKGROUNDBYERS BY HIGH-LEVEL, KNOWLEDGEABLE ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN (INCLUDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE) FOR EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS AT THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN

- PRESS CENTER.
- C. ORGANIZE INVITATIONAL TOURS TO WASHINGTON AND OTHER U.S. CITIES FOR GERMAN JOURNALISTS TO EXPOSE THEM TO THE THINKING OF ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN, CONGRESS AND RESPONSIBLE AMERICANS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (ACADEMIA, THINK TANKS, JOURNALISTS AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN SOCIETY).
- D. SCHEDULE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL VISITORS (IVS) FOR EXPOSURE TO THE SAME PEOPLE AS SUGGESTED IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH. (WE WILL FLAG THOSE FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION).
- E. ARRANGE FOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN, PERTINENT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER PROMINENT AND KNOWLEDGEABLE AMERICANS TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA AND SEMINARS ARRANGED BY RESPONSIBLE GERMAN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH INVITE US TO PARTICIPATE. WE WOULD FAVOR PARTICIPATION NOT ONLY IN PROGRAMS ARRANGED BY SPONSORS FAVORABLE TO THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW BUT ALSO IN ACTIVITIES ARRANGED BY THOSE WHO ARE CRITICAL -- AS LONG AS THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE AND THERE IS ASSURANCE THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE HEARD. WE SHOULD ALSO BE RECEPTIVE TO ACCEPTING INVITATIONS FOR TV APPEARANCES HERE BY U.S. SPOKESMEN TRAVELING IN GERMANY WHO SHOULD MAKE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE.
- F. WE WILL CONTINUE TO ARRANGE PROGRAMS, CO-SPONSORED WITH APPROPRIATE GERMAN ORGANIZATIONS, WHERE WE WILL BE ABLE TO PRESENT U.S. VIEWS TO IMPORTANT AUDIENCES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND UPON USIA, STATE AND ACDA TO MAKE AVAILABLE KNOWLEDGEABLE EXPERTS FROM GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIA AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE PROGRAMS. (THOSE WITH GERMAN-LANGUAGE CAPABILITY ARE PARTICULARLY USEFUL.)
- G. THE AMBASSADOR HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN MEETING WITH IMPORTANT JOURNALISTS AND OTHER MULTIPLIER GROUPS TO EXPLAIN U.S. POLICIES. OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY ENGAGED. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY GOOD

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 03401

- OPPORTUNITY.
- H. WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ALL OF THESE PROGRAMS WITH OTHER MATERIALS AVAILABLE IN OUR LIBRARIES OR PREPARED BY USIS FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE WILL REQUEST FROM USIA SPECIAL MATERIALS IF AND WHEN WE NEED THEM. (IN THAT CONNECTION, NOTE PARA 2 B AND 4 ABOVE.)
- I. EMBASSY PUBLICATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE USIS-PRODUCED "WIRELESS BULLETIN FROM WASHINGTON" AND "AMERIKA DIENST," WHICH ARE WIDELY READ AND USED BY POLICY MAKERS AND MULTIPLIERS, WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAJOR VEHICLES OF CONVEYING
- U.S. POLICY AND
- VIEWS ON INF. (IT IS RARE THAT "BULLETIN" AND "AMERIKA DIENST" ITEMS ARE PUBLISHED VERBATIM IN GERMAN PUBLICATIONS, EXCEPT FOR MAJOR SPEECHES, AS THOSE BY THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND AMBASSADOR BURNS. BUT THESE TWO PUBLICATIONS ARE INDISPENSABLE, WE ARE REPEATEDLY TOLD BY RECIPIENTS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPLYING ACCURATE AND FULL INFORMATION AND REFLECTING GUIDANCE AND VIEWS ON U.S. POLICY NEEDED BY EDITORIAL WRITERS OR COMMENTATORS.)
- FROM TIME TO TIME WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL PUBLICATION (A PAMPHLET OR BROCHURE) WHICH WE WILL PRINT AND DISTRIBUTE SELECTIVELY. WE COMMUNICATE WITH USIA TO OBTAIN MATERIALS AS THE NEED ARISES.
- J. WIRELESS FJLE MATERIALS MOST USEFUL TO US ARE FULL TEXTS, COUPLED WITH BRIEF SUMMARIES, OF SPEECHES, DOCUMENTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS. BYLINERS BY WELL KNOWN SPOKESMEN OR EXPERTS AND A CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES ARE USEFUL. WE WOULD SUGGEST MINIMIZING THE USE OF STATISTICS AND NUMBERS (THEY CHANGE OFTEN AND CONFUSE THE LAYMAN) BUT RATHER CONCENTRATE ON CONCEPTS AND

- GENERAL EQUATIONS. THE FOCUS SHOULD NOT BE ON TECHNICAL DETAILS OR DETERRENCE THEOLOGY BUT ON THE BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF OUR POLICIES.
- INVOLVE AFN RADIO AND TV AS WELL AS THE MILITARY COMMUNITY LIAISON APPARATUS SINCE GERMANS LISTEN TO AND LOOK AT AFN AND THE U.S. MILITARY COMMUNICATES WITH LOCAL MULTIPLIERS.
- L. DE-MYSTIFY THE PERSHING II AND GLCM. PERMIT RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISTS TO SEE THEM AND NOTE THAT THEY ARE NOT MYSTERY WEAPONS.
- M. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR NATO TO ISSUE PERIODIC STATUS REPORTS ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS (SAY AFTER SCG MEETINGS) TO KEEP THE PUBLIC INFORMED AND LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND TO KEEP THE FOCUS ON NATO RATHER THAN ON THE U.S.?

7. IN SUMMARY, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE WORTH MAKING OVER AND OVER AGAIN:

- A. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY GERMANS ARE AFRAID OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; EVERYONE IS. BUT WE WOULD THINK THAT THE POPULATION WOULD BE MORE AFRAID OF THE NUCLEAR MISSILES THAT ARE AIMED AT THEM THAN THOSE THAT NATO AIMS AT THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARY. WOULD THE GERMANS NOT WANT TO HAVE WEAPONS ON THEIR SIDE THAT WOULD DETER THE SHOOTING OF MISSILES DIRECTED AT THEM?
- B. THE IDEA OF STATIONING NATO INF IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS NOT AN AMERICAN IDEA, NOR WAS IT IMPOSED BY THE U.S. ON EUROPE. IT WAS A NATO DECISION, PROMPTED BY WARNINGS FROM EUROPE IN 1977 (SCHMIDT) OF SOVIET MODERNIZED INF DEPLOYMENT DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE.
- C. REASON FOR STATIONING INF IS:
  - DETERRENCE
  - INCENTIVE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
- D. BEFORE DECISION TO DEPLOY INF WAS MADE, SOVIETS REFUSED EVEN TO DISCUSS CONTROL OF INF. LOGICAL,

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24

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- SINCE THEY HAD AN ADVANTAGE IN INF AND NO
- INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE FOR REDUCTION. ONLY AFTER
- DEPLOYMENT DECISION WAS MADE, DID SOVIETS AGREE
- TO NEGOTIATE.
- E. SOVIETS HAVE INSISTED THAT INF PARITY EXISTED
- IN 1979, IN 1980, IN 1981 AND IN 1982. DURING
- THAT TIME THE U. S. HAD NO INF AND THE SOVIETS
- BUILT THEIRS UP STEADILY FROM 140 TO OVER 330.
- BY THEIR WILLINGNESS NOW TO REDUCE THEIR INF TO
- 162, THEY FINALLY ADMIT BY IMPLICATION FOR THE
- FIRST TIME THAT EQUALITY HAS NOT EXISTED AND
- DOES NOT EXIST. THIS IS A WELCOME ADMISSION.
- F. PRESIDENT REAGAN IS WILLING TO MEET GENERAL
- SECRETARY ANDROPOV WHEREVER AND WHENEVER HE WANTS
- IN ORDER TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT BANNING U. S. AND
- SOVIET INF WEAPONS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.
- HE MAKES THIS OFFER OUT OF THE CONVICTION THAT
- SUCH A MOVE IS MORALLY RIGHT AND THAT THE
- PEOPLE OF EUROPE DEEPLY DESIRE IT. (WERE SUCH
- A MEETING TO TAKE PLACE, IT WOULD BE EVIDENT
- TO THE WORLD THAT THE TWO LEADERS WOULD BE
- DISCUSSING OTHER SUBJECTS BESIDES SIGNING THE
- AGREEMENT.) BURNS

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