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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	210138Z Oct 83, 2p <i>R 11/21/07 F00-009 #120</i>	10/21/83	B1
2. memo	George Shultz to the President, re Andropov's proposal, 2p <i>R 6/21/06 DLSF00-009/1 #121</i>	8/29/83	B1
3. translation	Of letter from Andropov to the President (in English), 2p <i>R u l #122</i>	8/27/83	B1
4. letter	Andropov to the President (in Russian), 2p <i>R u #123</i>	8/27/83	B1
5. translation	Of Soviet response to questions (in English), 3p <i>R u #124</i>	ND	B1
6. paper	Soviet response to questions (in Russian), 4p <i>R ~ ~ #125</i>	ND	B1

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ARMS CONTROL

BY MOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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SUBJ ACDA STUDY OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN

POST WILL BE RECEIVING SHORTLY, VIA OFFICIAL MEANS, COPIES OF A NEW STUDY BY THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION ON INF DEPLOYMENT AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE STUDY, ENTITLED SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO, WHICH INCLUDES QUOTES FROM SOVIET STATEMENTS FROM 1979 THROUGH RECENT EXAMPLES, ANALYZES SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN THEMES.

THE STUDY PROVIDES A UNIQUE COMPILATION OF MATERIAL ON THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST NATO AND INF DEPLOYMENT, ORGANIZED BY CATEGORY OF ISSUE AND CONTAINING QUOTATIONS WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BRING OUT THE CONSISTENCY OF MANY OF THE SOVIET LINES OVER THE YEARS. IN FACT, ONE IMPORTANT CON-

TRIBUTION OF THIS BOOKLET IS TO STRESS THAT SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION AGAINST NATO HAVE NOT ALTERED FUNDAMENTALLY SINCE THE DECISION TO DEPLOY COUNTERPART SYSTEMS.

DISTRIBUTION TO ADDRESSEE POSTS WILL BE IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO INSURE THAT ALL MISSION ELEMENTS CAN DIS-

TRIBUTE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTACTS. PARCELS WILL BE ADDRESSED TO USIS, WHICH SHOULD HANDLE DISTRIBUTION TO OTHER SECTIONS. PAOS ANDIOS, IN PARTICULAR, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FIND THIS BOOKLET A VALUABLE ITEM FOR DISTRIBUTION TO MEDIA CONTACTS, AS WELL AS TO MODERATES AMONG YOUR AUDIENCES, WHO MAY NOT BE AWARE OF THE CONSISTENCY AND SINGLE-MINDEDNESS OF THE SOVIET ANTI-NATO CAMPAIGN. - -

THE STUDY COVERS THE FOLLOWING SOVIET THEMES:

-- A BALANCE CURRENTLY EXISTS IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. - - -

-- THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE INF BALANCE.

-- THE SOVIET UNION, IN CONTRAST TO NATO, PLEDGES NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- THE UNITED STATES SEEKS SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF THE INF MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. --

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE DOCTRINE, AND U.S. INF MISSILES WILL HAVE A SHORT-WARNING, FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY AGAINST SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, THEREBY PERFORMING A STRATEGIC ROLE.

-- THE UNITED STATES' MOTIVE FOR DEPLOYING INF MISSILES IS TO "EUROPEANIZE" OR LIMIT NUCLEAR WAR TO EUROPE, LEAVING U.S. TERRITORY AS A SANCTUARY.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS NOT INTERESTED IN ARMS CONTROL.

-- NATO'S PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENT WILL STIMULATE A NEW ROUND IN THE ARMS RACE. - - -

-- NATO'S PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENT WILL PROMPT SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS.

-- NATO HOST COUNTRIES FOR U.S. INF MISSILES WILL BECOME TARGETS FOR A SOVIET STRIKE.

-- NATO'S DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES WILL INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT.

-- NATO'S PURSUIT OF PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENT WILL JEOPARDIZE DETENTE AND RENEW THE COLD WAR.

-- NATO'S PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENT WILL REDUCE WESTERN EUROPE'S FUTURE TRADE POTENTIAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

TO'S DECISION APPROVING DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILES WILL MAKE IMPOSSIBLE OR COMPLICATE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS DISARMAMENT/AN "END TO THE ARMS RACE".

-- CLAIMED UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20S IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE U.S.S.R.

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IN ADDITION, THE STUDY PROVIDES EXAMPLES OF SOVIET THEMES AND TACTICS THAT HAVE BEEN USED IN PREVIOUS SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS AGAINST NATO, FROM ITS INCEPTION IN 1949. AN APPENDIX TO THE STUDY PROVIDES INFORMATION ON THE RELATED SOVIET "ACTIVE-MEASURES" AGAINST NATO'S INF DECISION, INCLUDING FORGERIES AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.

-- AS POSTS MAKE USE OF THIS BOOKLET, DEPARTMENT AND USIA WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS AND EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS ADDRESSEE POSTS MAY CARE TO PROVIDE.

-- PLEASE SLUG RESPONSES FOR ACDA/SORRELS AND USIA/P FOR WILLIAMS. SHULTZ  
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7038

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Arms control and U.S. Policy Toward the USSR

Senator Malcolm Wallop has written a brilliant article (Tab A) on arms control which is so important that I feel the President should read it in its entirety. I have underlined portions that deserve special notice.

*on p. 15* *ref SC*  
Ken deGraffenreid and Sven Kraemer concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding the Wallop article.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Article by Senator Wallop (Strategic Review, Summer 1983)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By LOS NARA, Date 3/8/01

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Arms Control and U.S. Policy Toward the USSR

At Tab A is an extraordinary article from the highly respected journal, Strategic Review. Written by Senator Malcolm Wallop, this article examines some of the most basic problems of arms control. Among the issues examined are:

- What Soviet treaty circumventions and violations tell us about the possibilities and limitations of arms control.
- How the Soviets have succeeded in using the political climate created by the arms control process to change the strategic balance dramatically -- all within the framework of agreements.
- How the arms control negotiating process forces us to think in terms of technicalities which obscure much broader and more important strategic developments.
- How the theory of arms control is no different from the theory of domestic gun control in that it ignores and obscures the human motivations and intentions underlying the use of any weapons.
- How compliance questions necessarily raise the issue of intentions, and how any consideration of the other side's intentions is regarded by arms controllers as disruptive of the perceived higher imperative of achieving an agreement.
- How the arms control process compels us to conduct self-contradictory policies which serve to deceive our own people.

Although key portions of the article have been underlined, I strongly recommend that you read the entire piece.

RECOMMENDATIONSOK    No

—    —    That you read the article at Tab A.

Prepared by:  
John Lenczowski

Attachment: Tab A    Strategic Review article~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

White House Collection, August 28, 1997  
By LOS NARA, Date 3/8/01

# FEATURES/COLUMNISTS

STRATEGIC REVIEW SUMMER 1983 (14 AUGUST) PAGES 11-20

## SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: SO WHAT?

MALCOLM WALLOP



**THE AUTHOR:** Senator Wallop (R.-Wyoming) was first elected to the U.S. Senate in 1976. His committee assignments include the Select Committee on Intelligence, and he is Chairman of its Budget Authorization Subcommittee. Senator Wallop was a Congressional Adviser to the SALT negotiations. A graduate of Yale University, he served as a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army Artillery, 1955-1957.

### IN BRIEF

*The debate over Soviet violations of arms control agreements and treaties (particularly SALT) is featuring a great deal of quibbling over technical and legalistic trivia, thus both missing and distracting from the fundamental issue for debate: namely, the state of the U.S. military posture after two decades of arms control efforts. Beyond reflecting on Moscow's cynical approach, the violations and our reactions to them are symptomatic of a basic phenomenon in Western democracies well documented by history: a mind-cast that, once entrapped on the rails of hopes and fears, comes to regard the arms control "process" as more important than both the actual results achieved and the other side's compliance with them — and more important even than the adversary's displayed intentions, which the continuing process is supposed to shift in the direction of peaceful and faithful behavior. The issue of violations is baring the kind of self-contradictory policies that public opinion in a democracy cannot long support.*

**A** debate is unfolding in the United States over the facts and implications of violations by the Soviet Union of existing arms control agreements. Thus far the debate has swirled around specific cases of such violations: the arguments have been draped in technicalities and legalisms. It is the contention here that, in focusing on such narrow parameters, the debate not only fails to shed any real light on the difficult military and political choices that the United States now faces, but, indeed, holds the danger of further distorting and trivializing the fundamental questions relevant to our country's

security.

Almost a generation ago many prominent Americans in and out of government, investing hopes and reputations in arms control, shaped this country's military and intelligence plans accordingly, and convinced public opinion that all of this would make the world safer. Today public opinion in the West rightly fears war more than ever. It anxiously looks for expedients to lift the incubus, and for people to blame. Whereas in the mid-1960s Soviet strategic forces were vulnerable to superior

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

American ones, today numerically inferior American forces are in the deepening shadow of a relentlessly growing Soviet arsenal. And beneath this shadow, the Soviet global offensive has gained a momentum that would have been considered unimaginable two decades ago.

In short, any objective analyst in the West now must realize that a generation's labors on behalf of arms control have not borne the anticipated fruit. Nonetheless, all we have done in the name of arms control — the very depth of our involvement with it — renders us unable to confront our strategic problems directly. Although no one in public life today will argue that any specific arms control scheme would be accepted and adhered to by the Soviets — and would make us all safer — we still discuss our hopes and fears in terms of arms control, anticipating that today's realities will not again be reflected in the results of tomorrow's agreements.

Lately that discussion has come to turn upon one question: Do certain Soviet activities violate arms control agreements or do they not? Yet, that question obscures another, much more important one: What do the Soviet activities in question tell us about the possibilities and limitations of arms control? Our task here is to answer this question. Once that is done, only then can we consider Soviet strategic plans — and our own — in terms of their intrinsic merits.

*The Debate Over "New" Missiles*

Two fellow members of the Senate, James McClure of Idaho and Joseph Biden of Delaware, have drawn together respectively the case for the proposition that the Soviets are violating SALT agreements, and the case against it. Senator McClure contends that the Soviets are violating the most important provision of the SALT II Treaty — Article IV, Paragraph 9 — by flight-testing two new-type ICBMs. Senator Biden argues that Senator McClure is "simply and flatly inaccurate."

The SALT II Treaty indeed allows only one new-type ICBM to be developed by either side. The two Soviet missiles that have been tested are sufficiently different from all other missiles to be new types. Yet, the Treaty also stipulates that the differences that determine a new-type missile — discrepancies of more than 5 per cent

in length, diameter, launch-weight and throw-weight between the missile tested and all other missiles — may not be counted as violations until after the twelfth test.

Inasmuch as the Soviets have only conducted thus far three tests. Biden has a technical point. But McClure has a substantive one. The second new Soviet missile, known as the PL-5, differs in throw-weight by more than 200 per cent and in length by more than 2 meters from any other Soviet missile remotely like it. No matter how many times it is tested, these characteristics will not change. Moreover, modern test programs may not require more than twelve launches before a weapon becomes operational. Neither set of arguments, however, touches the crucial point: while the United States has produced one new missile (the Trident I) and is planning two (MX and Trident II), the Soviets have produced four fourth-generation missiles and have begun a fifth generation likely to include six new missiles.

*Soviet Missile Numbers and "Reloads"*

Senator McClure charges that the Soviets have exceeded the SALT II ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed missile launchers and bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Senator Biden cites the CIA's count of 788 Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and claims that the total of MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles does not go above 1,320. The legal issue turns on whether one counts the "Fencer," the Soviet equivalent of the American FB-111 bomber. Once again, however, the legal issue is of scarce practical relevance. Even if one chose to agree with Senator Biden, one would not thereby skirt the issue of the threat which the Soviet Union's nearly 6,000 counterforce warheads carried by the Soviet MIRVed systems pose to the United States, or change the fact that our most potent MIRV, the Mark 12-A, is considered to have only about one chance in three against Soviet silos.

Senator McClure contends that the Soviets have violated SALT II by testing the "rapid reload of ICBM launchers" and by stockpiling at least 1,000-2,000 missiles which could be refired from standard silos. These missiles could also be fired by "soft" launchers from

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covert sites. Senator Biden considers this point to be "succinctly rebutted" by the U.S. Defense Department's volume, *Soviet Military Power*, which states (on page 21): "The Soviets probably cannot refurbish and reload silo launchers in a period less than a few days." Biden concludes: "Although the Soviet Union might have a limited capability to reconstitute its strategic forces after an initial firing, there is no real indication of a rapid reload capability." McClure concedes that a legal grey area exists because "the Soviets never agreed on a definition of 'rapid'." All parties refer to the same data: during the summer of 1980 the United States observed that the Soviet Union routinely practiced reloading its principal missile silos many times during war games. This procedure takes a few days.

However, all the parties concentrate on the Treaty so fixedly that they miss the point. Whether the Soviet practice of reloading missiles is legally "rapid" or not is quite irrelevant to American security. Ever since the beginning of the arms-control process in the mid-1960s the United States has based its entire strategic policy on the notion that each side would only have about as many missiles as it has launchers. The Soviets never formally agreed to this; nevertheless, informally, in a thousand ways, they led us to believe that they did. Now we know that, probably from the beginning, the Soviets held a wholly different view of the matter. Thus, not only is it a virtual certainty that they have available for use many more missiles than overtly deployed launchers, but the implication is much larger: namely, that the Soviets do not share the Western view that nuclear war, if it ever comes, will be a mutually annihilating spasm. While American planning stops in effect at the edge of the contingency of a nuclear exchange, the Soviets are planning and practicing what to do after the first round. If this is not strategically significant, nothing is. Yet, as we can see, the arms control perspective is capable of trivializing even this fundamental factor in the nuclear equation.

*Other Soviet Violations*

Senator McClure says that the Soviets since 1976 have conducted at least 15 underground nuclear tests whose yield was probably above

the ceiling of 150 kilotons specified by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Senator Biden cites an article by two geophysicists in *Scientific American*, in which they claim that charges like McClure's "are based on a miscalibration of one of the curves that relates measured seismic magnitude to explosive yield."

Some background is needed to understand this aspect of the debate. In 1977 some of the U.S. geophysicists involved in evaluating the yields of Soviet tests from seismic data became apparently distressed at the fact that they were consistently providing judgments on the basis of which the Soviet Union and, more important, arms control itself were being impeached. Therefore, they successfully lobbied for a change in the yardstick. Even then, the new and more liberal geophysical yardstick still shows a few Soviet tests to have been above 150 kilotons. Although there is really not much reason to prefer one yardstick over the other, the fact that one was abandoned because it gave unpleasant answers should give no one, least of all scientists, cause to rejoice.

*Technicalities versus Strategic Substance*

I could go on with such comparisons, but my basic point already should have become clear: by thinking and arguing about Soviet activities in terms of the relationship of these activities to treaties — instead of relating them to security substance — both Senators are quibbling with trivialities while the strategic position of the United States crumbles apace. Moreover, those who argue in these terms inevitably cast themselves in the role of either the Soviet Union's prosecutors or defenders. Senator Biden has strongly expressed the wish, no doubt sincere, that he not be taken as the Soviet Union's defender. But how else can one characterize the invitation not to be alarmed by activities which are clearly threatening but which might possibly be shielded by some technicality as a contravention of agreements?

In one instance Senator Biden, like the geophysicists, has to resort to redefining the terms of the Treaty. He notes that the Soviets have encrypted just about all the telemetry in their tests of the fifth generation of missiles. Article 15 of SALT II prohibits encryption that

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

impedes verification of the Treaty. Senator Biden notes that Soviet practices in this respect "raise questions" about whether the Soviets have violated the Treaty. Questions? These activities are not questions; they are answers!

Senator Biden says that "Soviet activities in regard to . . . the ban on the [mobile] SS-16 . . . can only make one wonder about the depth of Soviet interest in maintaining the SALT framework." In thus "wondering," he was no doubt inspired by the CIA's version of said Soviet activities. According to this version (reported by the *Washington Post* on April 9, 1982), the Soviets have some mobile SS-16 missiles (prohibited by the SALT II Treaty) at Plesetsk. They are ready to be fired. But because they are not being handled in a way that fits the CIA's definition of deployment, they are not "deployed." The point, again, is: Why cast for artificial definitions and technicalities that might becloud the issue of whether a given Soviet activity is or is not in contravention of SALT? Why not think — first, last and foremost — in terms of the strategic implications of the threatening activity itself?

Finally, Senator Biden, searching for a definition of what a violation of SALT II might be, has posited that if the Soviets were to have more than 830 MIRVed ICBMs, *that* would be a violation. A little later he noted in passing that by not having dismantled 95 strategic nuclear delivery systems as new ones have joined their forces, the Soviets now have more than the 2,400 permitted by SALT. Yet, he does not come out and say that the Soviets are in violation. Why not?

On a more fundamental level, Senator Biden has conceded that the Soviets have violated the Biological Warfare Convention of 1972. At the same time, he describes himself as "a strong supporter of the unratified SALT II agreement and of worthwhile future arms control agreements." Clearly these are contradictions that cannot be bridged with technicalities regarding Soviet compliance.

Senator McClure's position is more direct, but contains an anomaly. He so strongly hammers on the fact that the Soviets are cheating on the treaties that he leads his audience to infer that our strategic difficulties would vanish if only the Soviets could somehow be held to the letter of the treaties. Yet, not even

the most enthusiastic advocates of arms control have claimed — at least not since the mid-1970s — that the treaties are so well conceived or drawn up that abidance by them will solve the future of mankind.

In short, even while the strategic position of the United States continues to erode, men of goodwill find themselves saying things about arms control which cannot halt that erosion, and that cast them in roles that they sincerely reject for themselves: apologists for the Soviet Union and/or apologists for the SALT process.

*Hope and Historical Logic*

We should not be surprised at the fact that assumptions based strictly or even predominantly on arms control often lead to sterile arguments. After all, the entire premise of arms control — that safety can be gained by mutual limitations on weapons — abstracts from the most fundamental fact that weapons are tools in the hands of men, not vice-versa. The propensities of men to kill or respect one another have never been basically affected by the existence of particular kinds of weapons. Genocide was routine in the ancient world. In our day, the greatest slaughters have been perpetrated by simple tools: barbed wire, starvation and hand-held weapons. Whether or not a weapon is dangerous depends on the direction in which it is pointed and on the intention of the person wielding it. Where nations are friends, there is no talk of the need to negotiate arms control. Where they are enemies, even total disarmament could only make the world safe for hand-to-hand combat.

In practical and historical terms, it is difficult to prove the proposition that arms control by itself leads either to peace or security. History affords no example whatever of nations possessed of serious reasons to fight one another who disabused themselves of those reasons by agreeing to limit the means by which they could fight. Nevertheless, the desire for peace is so natural and strong that it has always made attractive the claim that perhaps, just perhaps, all men are sane and all sane men want peace — which is in everyone's interest — and that the danger of war issues from the weapons themselves. If all sides can slowly rid themselves of the burdens of their worst weapons, they will simultan-

SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

ously learn to value peace and to trust one another. But this appealing promise discounts the ever-present possibility that one side in the arms control process may be determined not only to pursue its goals as vigorously as ever, but also to use agreements as a means of achieving the other side's moral and material disarmament.

The stark record of our century is that arms control has been embraced by democracies as a means of exorcising the specter of war with dictatorial enemies — and that it has been exploited by dictatorships as a means of increasing their capacity for waging war against democracies. At various points along this historical road some within the democracies have asked whether there was any proof that the dictatorships really meant to keep their agreements in good faith. Others have answered that although there could be no real proof, democracies must take the lead and show good faith, because no one could afford the alternative.

In the normal flow of international negotiations, a determination of the other side's intentions is a prerequisite to the process that culminates in agreements. In the case of arms control, any issue of the other side's intentions tends to be considered *a priori* as disruptive to the perceived imperative of reaching an agreement. Instead, we as democracies invest in the agreements themselves the hope of favorable omens of the opponent's intentions. Questions regarding a dictatorship's *compliance* with arms control agreements go to the heart of the question: What are the dictatorship's *intentions*? But since the arms control process itself is based on at least a suspension of questions about intentions, the issue of compliance must thus be suspended as well, lest the process be disrupted.

Patterns of Democratic Behavior

Some of the generic difficulties in the path of rational discussion of compliance with arms control agreements were outlined by Fred Iklé in his classic article, "After Detection — What?" in the January 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. They are well worth reformulating after nearly a generation's experience.

First, unless the violator acknowledges that

his activities constitute a violation, politicians in a democracy are likely to feel that the evidence in their possession might be insufficient to convince public opinion that a violation has occurred — or at least that trying to persuade the public would be a thankless task. Moreover, many politicians, having staked their reputations on the agreements, will fear being damaged in the public's esteem if the agreements were perceived as failures.

Second, a political leader who declares that arms control agreements which are a fundamental part of national policy have been violated, thereby faces the obligation to propose a new, redressive policy — one that will make up for the other side's violations and assure his nation's safety in an environment more perilous than had previously been imagined. Inevitably such a policy looms as more expensive and frightening than continuing on the arms control track. Few politicians are willing to take this step of personal and political valor — especially if they can rationalize away the observed violation as "insignificant." Iklé in his article cites Stanley Baldwin's admission that fear of losing an election had prevented him from admitting that Germany was violating the Treaty of Versailles. This remains a rare example of honesty, albeit after the fact of dishonesty.

Third, politicians can always hope — more or less in good conscience — that continuing negotiations will eventually reach the goal of a stable and mutually accepted peace and that therefore "this is not a good time" to accuse the other side of bad faith and risk driving it from the bargaining table. But when is it a "good time"? Moreover, as time passes and the dictatorship's arsenal rises in relative terms (abetted by the violations), the premium on finding a *modus vivendi* with it rises apace. The net result is that the brave declarations that accompany the signing of arms control treaties, according to which this or that action by the dictatorship (usually some form of interference with verification) would cause withdrawal from the treaty, become dead letters.

Finally, these inhibitions are compounded when they are involved in alliance diplomacy among democratic nations. Each alliance partner is likely to find in the other a confirming reason for not pressing the issue of violations.

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued*The Contemporary Mind-Set*

These historically documented attitudes — which ushered in the tragedy of World War II — have been strengthened in contemporary times by the seductive premises of the nuclear age. The primary such premise is that the only alternative to arms control is an arms race that is certain to lead to the nuclear holocaust and the end of the world; therefore, there is no alternative to continuing arms control negotiations and making the best of them. In this view the “process” of negotiations is more important than the tangible results achieved — and, by extension, more important than the other side’s adherence to solemnly agreed-upon results.

The second premise relates to the fashionable notion of “overkill”: since each side already possesses enough weapons theoretically to obliterate the adversary, any advantages wrested by the other side are “marginal” at best. It deserves mention that this “marginality” tends to be applied only to Soviet strategic programs: by contrast, American counter-programs, like the MX missile, are deemed “provocative.”

This latter premise illuminates the cavalier attitude of so many U.S. officials toward Soviet forces superior in numbers and quality to the American ones. The State Department, for example, has long opposed even *proposing* to the Soviets an equality in throw-weight of missile forces, on the assumption that the Soviet advantage is so overwhelming (the SS-18 force alone carries more megatonnage than the entire U.S. strategic force) that the Soviets would never agree to surrender it. In the interagency controversy over U.S. policy, the State Department’s line, only partly tongue-in-cheek, has been in effect that “real men do not need throw-weight.” This of course begs the question: What *do* we need? The only answer consistent with the State Department’s position would be: If we had a small force able to deliver a few warheads to major Soviet cities, it would not matter how big, powerful or accurate Soviet forces were, because the deterrent effect would be the same.

This variant of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which goes by the name “minimum deterrence,” has been gaining inchoate acceptance in the Congress as weapon after American weapon has been delayed or can-

celed — in part because of hopes for arms control. As the SALT debate of 1979–1980 proved, neither the Congress nor American public opinion will accept MAD in any form when it is presented explicitly. Nonetheless, “minimum deterrence” survives as the theology of many.

An instructive example of this came in the testimony of a CIA official who in 1980 briefed the Senate about the newly discovered Soviet practice of reloading ICBM launchers. This practice had invalidated a basic premise underlying U.S. strategic planning and procurement for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, the official was nonchalant. What would be the implications of a possible doubling or tripling of the Soviet SS-18 force? There was no need for concern, he answered: the extra Soviet missiles could not be fired because, after an initial exchange, nothing could be fired. Only a little pressing elicited that neither he nor his Agency had really determined what would be required to prevent the Soviets from reloading their SS-18 launchers. Indeed, the facts show that we would be in no position to prevent it.

As far as the alleged irrelevance of all military assets after an initial nuclear exchange is concerned, it is noteworthy that the entire thrust of Soviet military strategy is to reduce the size, efficacy and significance of any American strike — to protect Soviet society and to win the war. The Soviets do not merely wish this: they also work at it. Hence, while the sizes and shapes of opposing nuclear arsenals seem to be of secondary importance to many American officials, for the Soviets they are clearly matters of life and death.

*The Artificial World of SALT I*

American advocates of arms control sought to create a situation unprecedented in history: two rivals for primacy in the world would agree for all time to stop trying to gain the edge over one another in the most important category of weapons, thus ending military history at the highest achieved level. Moreover, each would cede to the other in perpetuity the right to deliver nuclear weapons onto its soil and would refrain from efforts to protect itself. Thus, spurred by the fear of annihilation, both sides would enter into a kind of perpetual Hobbesian social contract. The

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

Soviets did not seem enticed by this contract, but it was one of the prevalent assumptions in the 1960s that in time they would be "educated" by our negotiators to the realization that their own interests lay there as well.

Yet, from the very first the Soviets' refusal to see their own interests through the eyes of American arms control theorists led the U.S. Government to construct an elaborate, highly ambiguous intellectual framework — one which has given American arms control enthusiasts warrant to pursue their utopia with respect to U.S. forces, but within which the Soviets have continued to pursue the orthodox military goals of self-protection and victory in the event of a conflict.

From the outset Americans recognized that verifying an equality in missileery and restraint in research and development would require the presence of inspectors in production facilities and laboratories. But also from the outset the Soviets' clear refusal of such on-site inspection placed American arms controllers before a fateful choice: If arms control agreements constrained production and research, or the number of warheads or their accuracy, they would stand a chance of bringing about the desired arms stability in the world. But the agreements could not possibly be verified beyond the limited scope of technical means of detection, and thus could not be presented to American public opinion as prudent arrangements.

The answer to the dilemma was to construct agreements that could define the weapons and practices to be limited in terms that were more or less verifiable by technical means. The agreements could thus be sold to the U.S. public and the Congress, but — as it turned out — they were inherently weak agreements that failed to cover the significant parts of the strategic equation and whose real restraining power was questionable at best.

Thus, from the very first American arms controllers chose to negotiate treaties which were verifiable at least in part, and therefore ratifiable, but which were intellectual constructs well removed from reality. The SALT I Interim Agreement set limits on numbers of missile launchers because American satellites could take pictures of Soviet missile fields and submarines. Silos and tubes could be counted. The controversies of

the 1970s over the Soviets' failure to dismantle older launchers as new ones were built and over their operational use of silos that were nominally for tests and command and control — straightforward issues of compliance — were basically unrelated to that decade's strategic revolution: the replacement by the Soviets of the SS-9 with the SS-18 in the "heavy launchers" and the replacement of the majority of single-warhead SS-11s with MIRVed SS-17s and SS-19s. The latter replacement was not a direct violation: rather, it stretched the definition of a "light" missile under the Agreement. In any event, these replacements precisely brought about the situation (a mounting Soviet threat to American strategic forces) which American negotiators had sought to prevent by entering the talks in the first place.

There was little question within the American establishment about what was transpiring. Nevertheless, official anger was muted. After all, advances in technology sooner or later would have been able to turn even light missiles into multiple-killers like the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, but American arms controllers had simply assumed that the Soviets would not thus escalate the weapons competition. American officialdom has not yet mustered the humility to admit that it has been deceived — not because it was deceived primarily by the Soviets, but because it was deceived by its own fancies. Indeed, there is evidence that, on the eve of the signing of SALT I, Henry Kissinger learned about the development of the SS-19 but apparently did not deem the reported development significant enough to derail the process.

*The SALT II Trail*

The negotiations for SALT II dragged on for six years largely because of American concerns over definitions. Having been "burned" in SALT I, American negotiators were now going to be more rigorous. As regards launchers, however, they could not be rigorous without declaring the treaty unverifiable. In fact, if one defines a launcher merely as that which is necessary to launch a missile — and one acknowledges that ICBMs can be launched by very little equipment (Minutemen have been erected and launched by equipment carried on the back of a jeep) — one must admit that

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

limits on launchers cannot be verified. Of course, because *some* kinds of launchers can be monitored, the tendency is to think of the "launcher problem" solely in terms of that small part of it that is controllable.

American negotiators in SALT II did insist on a complex definition of new missiles in order to prevent the wholesale substitution by the Soviets of a fifth generation of missiles for the fourth generation, even as the fourth had substituted for the third generation under SALT I. The four cornerstones of that definition are the requirements that a modified missile not exceed the original by more than 5 per cent in launch-weight and throw-weight, that the number of warheads on any modified missile not exceed the number on the original, that on any single-warhead missile the ratio of the weight of any warhead to the weight of the total reentry package not be inferior to 1 to 2, and that each side be allowed only one new missile.

Opponents of SALT II, including myself, pointed out that under this definition the Soviets could develop and deploy a generation of missiles that were new in every way but still not "new" in terms of SALT. The new missiles could be made of wholly new materials and according to wholly new designs. They could be vastly more reliable and accurate. They could thus pose wholly new military problems — all without ever violating the treaty in the slightest. Circumventions would be profitable and difficult to prove, especially if — as is now happening — Soviet missile tests are almost totally encrypted. Post-boost vehicles can be tested with fewer reentry vehicles than they can carry. Single-warhead missiles can be MIRVed, and the number of warheads carried by MIRVed missiles can be increased. Thus, a new, more numerous, more powerful Soviet missile force can emerge more or less within the "constraints" of SALT II.

Our negotiators could have devised a tighter definition of newness. But that definition would have been unacceptable to the Soviets, or wholly unverifiable. They had to choose between reality and the SALT process.

*Legacies of the ABM Treaty*

Many consider the ABM Treaty of 1972 the jewel in the crown of arms control

achievements. More than anything else it is supposed to symbolize the superpowers' mutual commitment to MAD. But the closer one looks at the Treaty's unrealistic requirements, the more one realizes that questions of the Soviets' compliance with them are of secondary importance.

A nationwide ABM system must be served by a nationwide network of battle-management radars. The Treaty allows such radars only at one ABM site in each country. The Soviets have built five huge radars that are inherently capable of performing that function. Are these radars intended to perform it? We will probably never have absolute proof short of their performance in actual battle.

The ABM Treaty forbids the rapid reload of ABM launchers at the one ABM site available. But when these launchers are underground, how does one know how rapidly they can be reloaded? Given the range of modern ABM missiles and radars, how much of a country can a "site" protect?

The Treaty forbids the testing of mobile ABM systems. Yet, the components of the Soviets' fully tested ABMX-3 system — the Flat Twin radar and the SH-04 and the SH-08 missiles — are merely "transportable," not "mobile." The Treaty does not limit mass production or storage of these components. If they are ever deployed *en masse* after a sudden denunciation of the Treaty, the United States would have no legal complaint.

The Treaty forbids testing — much less using — air defense systems "in an ABM mode." Yet, advancing technology has deprived that concept of whatever meaning it may once have had. Today the technology available for the American Patriot and Soviet SA-12 air-defense systems allows them to be used both against aircraft *and* against reentry vehicles. Still, the ABM Treaty is not being violated so much as it is being left behind by evolving reality.

Perhaps the best example of the ABM Treaty's decreasing relevance is the controversy surrounding the question of whether it would permit or prohibit space-based anti-ballistic missile lasers. Many American champions of arms control aver that Article I of the Treaty prohibits all anti-ballistic missile systems forever, except for the two ground-based sites specifically allowed. The Treaty deals with ABM launchers, missiles and

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

radars because at the time it was drafted no other means for anti-missile defense were known. Some argue that the Treaty was meant automatically to ban any other devices which might be invented, so long as they were capable of destroying ballistic missiles, but of course the Treaty says no such thing, and in fact it is an axiom of international law that nations are bound only by the commitments they specifically undertake.

The ABM Treaty does not mention lasers at all: indeed, it could hardly have done so in 1972, when laser technology was in its infancy. The only possible reference to lasers is in Agreed Interpretation "D," which states that in the event components based on "other physical principles" and capable of substituting for ABM launchers, missiles and radars "are created," the two parties would discuss how they might be limited. That is to say, the two parties would develop definitions.

A moment's reflection is enough to realize that, in the case of space lasers, to distill reality into legal terms verifiable by national technical means would be much more difficult than it has been in the case of ballistic missiles. Unlike missiles, the characteristics which make lasers fit or unfit for strategic warfare are not discernible through mere observation. Observation will yield information on gross size, power plant and, possibly, wavelength. But the laser's power, the quality of its beam, its pointing accuracy, its jitter, the time it needs to retarget and the number of times it can fire can be learned only from direct access to test data.

Hence, once again we see a demonstration of the folly, and dangers, of approaching a strategic question with the mind-cast of arms control. Suppose for a moment that the Soviet Union placed a number of laser weapons in orbit. Discussion of the strategic significance of this event would instantly be distracted by questions of whether a violation of the ABM Treaty had occurred. But on what basis could the Soviet Union be accused of having violated the Treaty? There could be little in the way of determining — much less hard proof — that the lasers' mission was ballistic missile defense. Yet, against this background of legal murkiness and ominous strategic implications, many devotees of arms control, while they question the efficacy of American lasers

against ballistic missiles, still object to placing such lasers in orbit, on the grounds that doing so would violate the ABM Treaty. When will they learn that unilateralism is not the road to arms control, let alone to national security?

In short, the difficulty of reducing the reality of modern weapons to legal terms, the pressures on American negotiators to make those terms both negotiable and arguably verifiable, and the political impediments to deciding that any given Soviet activity warrants abandoning a fundamental foreign policy — all these have produced an intellectual tangle of our own making, within which we thrash about even as the Soviets widen their margin of military superiority. Since the question of Soviet violations of arms control treaties refers to a framework removed from reality, dwelling on the question is only to compound the unreality.

*The Political Predicament*

The issue of past Soviet violations played a minor role in the SALT debate of 1979-1980. To be sure, the earlier debate did turn on the right question: Has arms control with the Soviet Union enhanced our security in the past, and can it be expected to do so in the future?

The proponents of SALT II conceded that the United States' strategic position in relation to that of the Soviet Union had deteriorated, and that mistakes had been made in the conception of SALT I and in the management of U.S. forces under it. But they argued that SALT II was necessary to keep U.S.-Soviet relations headed in the direction of peace. When confronted with criticism of specific provisions of the treaty, they often conceded the treaty's weaknesses, but argued that only ratification would make possible the continuation of negotiations, wherein lay the ultimate solution to those weaknesses. The U.S. Senate rejected these arguments, and in the election of 1980 the American people clearly rebuffed SALT.

Nevertheless, an army of bureaucrats simply could not recast their thinking beyond a framework within which they had operated so long. Since 1980, however, the principal argument in favor of arms control has been quite different from previous ones. It reads basically

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F.Y.E.O. (FOR YOUR EYES ONLY) 25 JULY 1983 (14 AUGUST) PAGES 1,2

**SOVIETS REORGANIZE AIR FORCE:** In the most sweeping reorganization of Soviet military power since 1941, the Soviets have completely revamped the organization of their air forces. The 16 air armies and dozens of PVO (air defense) districts have been reduced to five numbered Air Forces and five PVO commands.

Each of the new formations corresponds to one of the five main military areas: Central Europe, Southwest Europe, South, Far East, and North. The commanders of each of these theaters (TVD's) now have a deputy commander for air defense (PVO) and a deputy commander for aviation (FA). The PVO deputy commands all air defense forces, including fighters, SAM's, and the anti-aircraft troops of the army divisions. The FA deputy has his forces organized into three branches: ground support (Su-7/17, MiG-21/27), interdiction (Su-17, MiG-21), and helicopters.

The strategic defense forces (ABM's) remain under a separate command within PVO. The strategic aviation forces have been combined under Aviation Armies of the Soviet Union (AASU), including the Badger, Backfire, Fencer, and Blinder aircraft. AASU includes not only intercontinental aviation, but the deep strike interdiction forces of the ground armies.--IDP, June 83

**SOVIET NAVY IN AFRICA:** The USSR is using its government-owned fishing fleet, which is an auxiliary of the Soviet Navy, to extend its presence, influence, and experience in African waters. Most fishing boat captains are reserve naval officers.

The Soviets have signed fishing treaties with Algeria, Angola, Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Tunisia.

Fishing activity is also seen as an excuse to establish bases. Main fishing bases are in Lagos, Nigeria, and Conakry, Guinea; a repair yard has been established at Luba, Equatorial Guinea. The fishing trawlers that operate in these areas all have long-range radios and are controlled by a headquarters in Kiev. A major base is being built at Nacala, Mozambique, and the Soviets are pressuring for base rights at Diego Suarez, Madagascar, to control the key Madagascar Channel.--IDWR, 29 June 83

### SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

as follows: However harmful arms control might have been in the past, however unlikely might be Soviet acceptance of anything which enhances the West's security, nevertheless we must pursue the arms control process in order to convince our own fellow citizens that we are not warmongers but peace-loving people. When the question is raised why we should pursue negotiations with an adversary who, by one means or another, has used them as a screen for overturning the strategic balance and is apt to use further negotiations for the same purpose, the general answer is that we, too, must practice cynicism. We, too, must negotiate in order to legitimize our own military buildup.

This argument ignores the fact that in a democracy public opinion cannot support self-contradictory policies. If the U.S. Government declares that the Soviet leaders are the sort of people from whom one can reasonably expect a fair deal on arms control — and that arms control is so important that it is essential that a deal be reached — then public opinion will reasonably blame the Government for doing anything which seems to put obstacles in the way of agreements. The Soviets, having received from the U.S. Government the credentials of men of goodwill, will persuasively point to our military programs and our own proposals as obstacles.

On the other hand, when our Government replies with figures showing how the Soviets have seized military advantages — along with suggestions that the Soviets might have circumvented or violated treaties — public opinion rightly questions the Government's motives. If the Soviets really had tipped the strategic balance using arms control as a

screen — if there were reasonable evidence that they regarded arms control far differently than we, and circumvented or violated whenever they could — why would we be negotiating with them at all? To evade such questions is to be too clever by half.

Some American officials regard the publication of evidence regarding the Soviet Union's violation of the Biological Warfare Convention and other arms control treaties as embarrassments to their own policy preferences rather than as occasions for reexamining their own approach to arms control. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger recently declared that, in light of all that happened, it is clear we must "do a better job" of arms control. But what can he mean by "a better job?" Can anyone really believe that there exists a formula which, if discovered and presented to the Soviets, would lead them to agree to unmake the military gains they achieved as a result of their strategic buildup? Does a set of words exist which would induce them no longer to regard arms control as a means of thwarting our countermoves to their strategic programs? I doubt it.

The proposition that it is possible to do "a better job" deserves a definitive test. President Reagan's Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, has expressed the view that the foremost criterion by which arms control proposals should be judged is their effect on national security. Only proposals that meet this criterion warrant examination from the standpoint of verifiability and acceptability to the Soviets. This sensible approach would draw the dialogue on arms control closer to the real world and help remove the blinders that have prevented us from seeing it.

☆☆☆☆



Bob -

Sven Kraemer feels that we shouldn't schedule an NSPG meeting on this subject until the interagency work on compliance has been prepared. Nevertheless, I still would like to send this forward to let the Judge know how important I think this article is. Also I believe my summary points in the memo to the President as well as my underlinings may be useful.

- John L.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 6, 1983

USSR - Army Control  
~~Matlock~~  
File

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RON LEHMAN *Ron*

SUBJECT: Scowcroft Commission Member in Moscow

Dr. William J. Perry, former Undersecretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, has been a member of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) Strategic Balance Study Group which has been meeting periodically with the usual Soviet group from the institute for the U.S. and Canada (i.e., Arbatov, et al). The next meeting has been scheduled in Moscow next month.

For business and personal reasons Bill Perry has been inclined not to go to Moscow for this round of the discussions, but FPRI (which is pretty conservative) is pressing him to go.

If he goes, it might be useful for him to explain the Scowcroft Commission's report and support for the President's new initiative. This would show the strength of bipartisan support behind the President and the soundness of the proposals. Perry would not be a representative of the Administration in any sense and would not be acting on any instructions from us at all. Nevertheless, for us to say at some future time that a member of the Scowcroft Commission had been in Moscow in an unofficial capacity and had explained to Soviets why there is strong support for our proposals and had reported back to us, might be beneficial.

RECOMMENDATION

That I call Bill Perry and tell him that if he does go to Moscow we would be very much interested in hearing Soviet reaction to our proposals.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Jack Matlock *SK* and Sven Kraemer concur.

830

National Security Council  
The White House

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83 OCT 7 P 1: 17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Arms control and U.S. Policy Toward the USSR

Senator Malcolm Wallop has written a brilliant article (Tab A) on arms control which is so important that I feel the President should read it in its entirety, and there should be an NSPG meeting to discuss its implications. I have underlined portions that deserve special notice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding the Wallop article.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize me to prepare copies of the article to be sent by you to Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Counsellor Meese, Chief of Staff Baker, Director Casey, General Vessey, Director Wick and Director Adelman, all of whom would be invited, should the President so decide, to discuss the article at an NSPG meeting.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
 Tab A Article by Senator Wallop (Strategic Review, Summer 1983)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
 By LOS NARA, Date 3/8/01

MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Arms Control and U.S. Policy Toward the USSR

At Tab A is an extraordinary article from the highly respected journal, Strategic Review. Written by Senator Malcolm Wallop, this article examines some of the most basic problems of arms control. Among the issues examined are:

- What Soviet treaty circumventions and violations tell us about the possibilities and limitations of arms control.
- How the Soviets have succeeded in using the political climate created by the arms control process to change the strategic balance dramatically -- all within the framework of agreements.
- How the arms control negotiating process forces us to think in terms of technicalities which obscure much broader and more important strategic developments.
- How the theory of arms control is no different from the theory of domestic gun control in that it ignores and obscures the human motivations and intentions underlying the use of any weapons.
- How compliance questions necessarily raise the issue of intentions, and how any consideration of the other side's intentions is regarded by arms controllers as disruptive of the perceived higher imperative of achieving an agreement.
- How the arms control process compels us to conduct self-contradictory policies which serve to deceive our own people.

Although key portions of the article have been underlined, I strongly recommend that you read the entire piece and that we conduct a high-level discussion of its implications.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OK No

— — That you read the article at Tab A.

— — That we schedule an NSPG meeting to discuss the implications of this article.

Attachment: Tab A Strategic Review articlePrepared by:  
John Lenczowski~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# FEATURES/COLUMNISTS

STRATEGIC REVIEW SUMMER 1983 (14 AUGUST) PAGES 11-20

## SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: SO WHAT?

MALCOLM WALLOP



**THE AUTHOR:** Senator Wallop (R.-Wyoming) was first elected to the U.S. Senate in 1976. His committee assignments include the Select Committee on Intelligence, and he is Chairman of its Budget Authorization Subcommittee. Senator Wallop was a Congressional Adviser to the SALT negotiations. A graduate of Yale University, he served as a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army Artillery, 1955-1957.

### IN BRIEF

*The debate over Soviet violations of arms control agreements and treaties (particularly SALT) is featuring a great deal of quibbling over technical and legalistic trivia, thus both missing and distracting from the fundamental issue for debate: namely, the state of the U.S. military posture after two decades of arms control efforts. Beyond reflecting on Moscow's cynical approach, the violations and our reactions to them are symptomatic of a basic phenomenon in Western democracies well documented by history: a mind-cast that, once entrapped on the rails of hopes and fears, comes to regard the arms control "process" as more important than both the actual results achieved and the other side's compliance with them — and more important even than the adversary's displayed intentions, which the continuing process is supposed to shift in the direction of peaceful and faithful behavior. The issue of violations is baring the kind of self-contradictory policies that public opinion in a democracy cannot long support.*

**A** debate is unfolding in the United States over the facts and implications of violations by the Soviet Union of existing arms control agreements. Thus far the debate has swirled around specific cases of such violations: the arguments have been draped in technicalities and legalisms. It is the contention here that, in focusing on such narrow parameters, the debate not only fails to shed any real light on the difficult military and political choices that the United States now faces, but, indeed, holds the danger of further distorting and trivializing the fundamental questions relevant to our country's

security.

Almost a generation ago many prominent Americans in and out of government, investing hopes and reputations in arms control, shaped this country's military and intelligence plans accordingly, and convinced public opinion that all of this would make the world safer. Today public opinion in the West rightly fears war more than ever. It anxiously looks for expedients to lift the incubus, and for people to blame. Whereas in the mid-1960s Soviet strategic forces were vulnerable to superior

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

American ones, today numerically inferior American forces are in the deepening shadow of a relentlessly growing Soviet arsenal. And beneath this shadow, the Soviet global offensive has gained a momentum that would have been considered unimaginable two decades ago.

In short, any objective analyst in the West now must realize that a generation's labors on behalf of arms control have not borne the anticipated fruit. Nonetheless, all we have done in the name of arms control — the very depth of our involvement with it — renders us unable to confront our strategic problems directly. Although no one in public life today will argue that any specific arms control scheme would be accepted and adhered to by the Soviets — and would make us all safer — we still discuss our hopes and fears in terms of arms control, anticipating that today's realities will not again be reflected in the results of tomorrow's agreements.

Lately that discussion has come to turn upon one question: Do certain Soviet activities violate arms control agreements or do they not? Yet, that question obscures another, much more important one: What do the Soviet activities in question tell us about the possibilities and limitations of arms control? Our task here is to answer this question. Once that is done, only then can we consider Soviet strategic plans — and our own — in terms of their intrinsic merits.

*The Debate Over "New" Missiles*

Two fellow members of the Senate, James McClure of Idaho and Joseph Biden of Delaware, have drawn together respectively the case for the proposition that the Soviets are violating SALT agreements, and the case against it. Senator McClure contends that the Soviets are violating the most important provision of the SALT II Treaty — Article IV, Paragraph 9 — by flight-testing *two* new-type ICBMs. Senator Biden argues that Senator McClure is "simply and flatly inaccurate."

The SALT II Treaty indeed allows only one new-type ICBM to be developed by either side. The two Soviet missiles that have been tested are sufficiently different from all other missiles to be new types. Yet, the Treaty also stipulates that the differences that determine a new-type missile — discrepancies of more than 5 per cent

in length, diameter, launch-weight and throw-weight between the missile tested and all other missiles — may not be counted as violations until after the twelfth test.

Inasmuch as the Soviets have only conducted thus far three tests. Biden has a technical point. But McClure has a substantive one. The second new Soviet missile, known as the PL-5, differs in throw-weight by more than 200 per cent and in length by more than 2 meters from any other Soviet missile remotely like it. No matter how many times it is tested, these characteristics will not change. Moreover, modern test programs may not require more than twelve launches before a weapon becomes operational. Neither set of arguments, however, touches the crucial point: while the United States has produced one new missile (the Trident I) and is planning two (MX and Trident II), the Soviets have produced four fourth-generation missiles and have begun a fifth generation likely to include six new missiles.

*Soviet Missile Numbers and "Reloads"*

Senator McClure charges that the Soviets have exceeded the SALT II ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed missile launchers and bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Senator Biden cites the CIA's count of 788 Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and claims that the total of MIRVed ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles does not go above 1,320. The legal issue turns on whether one counts the "Fencer," the Soviet equivalent of the American FB-111 bomber. Once again, however, the legal issue is of scarce practical relevance. Even if one chose to agree with Senator Biden, one would not thereby skirt the issue of the threat which the Soviet Union's nearly 6,000 counterforce warheads carried by the Soviet MIRVed systems pose to the United States, or change the fact that our most potent MIRV, the Mark 12-A, is considered to have only about one chance in three against Soviet silos.

Senator McClure contends that the Soviets have violated SALT II by testing the "rapid reload of ICBM launchers" and by stockpiling at least 1,000-2,000 missiles which could be refired from standard silos. These missiles could also be fired by "soft" launchers from

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued

covert sites. Senator Biden considers this point to be "succinctly rebutted" by the U.S. Defense Department's volume, *Soviet Military Power*, which states (on page 21): "The Soviets probably cannot refurbish and reload silo launchers in a period less than a few days." Biden concludes: "Although the Soviet Union might have a limited capability to reconstitute its strategic forces after an initial firing, there is no real indication of a rapid reload capability." McClure concedes that a legal grey area exists because "the Soviets never agreed on a definition of 'rapid'." All parties refer to the same data: during the summer of 1980 the United States observed that the Soviet Union routinely practiced reloading its principal missile silos many times during war games. This procedure takes a few days.

However, all the parties concentrate on the Treaty so fixedly that they miss the point. Whether the Soviet practice of reloading missiles is legally "rapid" or not is quite irrelevant to American security. Ever since the beginning of the arms-control process in the mid-1960s the United States has based its entire strategic policy on the notion that each side would only have about as many missiles as it has launchers. The Soviets never formally agreed to this; nevertheless, informally, in a thousand ways, they led us to believe that they did. Now we know that, probably from the beginning, the Soviets held a wholly different view of the matter. Thus, not only is it a virtual certainty that they have available for use many more missiles than overtly deployed launchers, but the implication is much larger: namely, that the Soviets do not share the Western view that nuclear war, if it ever comes, will be a mutually annihilating spasm. While American planning stops in effect at the edge of the contingency of a nuclear exchange, the Soviets are planning and practicing what to do after the first round. If this is not strategically significant, nothing is. Yet, as we can see, the arms control perspective is capable of trivializing even this fundamental factor in the nuclear equation.

*Other Soviet Violations*

Senator McClure says that the Soviets since 1976 have conducted at least 15 underground nuclear tests whose yield was probably above

the ceiling of 150 kilotons specified by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Senator Biden cites an article by two geophysicists in *Scientific American*, in which they claim that charges like McClure's "are based on a miscalibration of one of the curves that relates measured seismic magnitude to explosive yield."

Some background is needed to understand this aspect of the debate. In 1977 some of the U.S. geophysicists involved in evaluating the yields of Soviet tests from seismic data became apparently distressed at the fact that they were consistently providing judgments on the basis of which the Soviet Union and, more important, arms control itself were being impeached. Therefore, they successfully lobbied for a change in the yardstick. Even then, the new and more liberal geophysical yardstick still shows a few Soviet tests to have been above 150 kilotons. Although there is really not much reason to prefer one yardstick over the other, the fact that one was abandoned because it gave unpleasant answers should give no one, least of all scientists, cause to rejoice.

*Technicalities versus Strategic Substance*

I could go on with such comparisons, but my basic point already should have become clear: by thinking and arguing about Soviet activities in terms of the relationship of these activities to treaties — instead of relating them to security substance — both Senators are quibbling with trivialities while the strategic position of the United States crumbles apart. Moreover, those who argue in these terms inevitably cast themselves in the role of either the Soviet Union's prosecutors or defenders. Senator Biden has strongly expressed the wish, no doubt sincere, that he not be taken as the Soviet Union's defender. But how else can one characterize the invitation not to be alarmed by activities which are clearly threatening but which might possibly be shielded by some technicality as a contravention of agreements?

In one instance Senator Biden, like the geophysicists, has to resort to redefining the terms of the Treaty. He notes that the Soviets have encrypted just about all the telemetry in their tests of the fifth generation of missiles. Article 15 of SALT II prohibits encryption that

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impedes verification of the Treaty. Senator Biden notes that Soviet practices in this respect "raise questions" about whether the Soviets have violated the Treaty. Questions? These activities are not questions; they are answers!

Senator Biden says that "Soviet activities in regard to... the ban on the [mobile] SS-16... can only make one wonder about the depth of Soviet interest in maintaining the SALT framework." In thus "wondering," he was no doubt inspired by the CIA's version of said Soviet activities. According to this version (reported by the *Washington Post* on April 9, 1982), the Soviets have some mobile SS-16 missiles (prohibited by the SALT II Treaty) at Plesetsk. They are ready to be fired. But because they are not being handled in a way that fits the CIA's definition of deployment, they are not "deployed." The point, again, is: Why cast for artificial definitions and technicalities that might becloud the issue of whether a given Soviet activity is or is not in contravention of SALT? Why not think — first, last and foremost — in terms of the strategic implications of the threatening activity itself?

Finally, Senator Biden, searching for a definition of what a violation of SALT II might be, has posited that if the Soviets were to have more than 830 MIRVed ICBMs, *that* would be a violation. A little later he noted in passing that by not having dismantled 95 strategic nuclear delivery systems as new ones have joined their forces, the Soviets now have more than the 2,400 permitted by SALT. Yet, he does not come out and say that the Soviets are in violation. Why not?

On a more fundamental level, Senator Biden has conceded that the Soviets have violated the Biological Warfare Convention of 1972. At the same time, he describes himself as "a strong supporter of the unratified SALT II agreement and of worthwhile future arms control agreements." Clearly these are contradictions that cannot be bridged with technicalities regarding Soviet compliance.

Senator McClure's position is more direct, but contains an anomaly. He so strongly hammers on the fact that the Soviets are cheating on the treaties that he leads his audience to infer that our strategic difficulties would vanish if only the Soviets could somehow be held to the letter of the treaties. Yet, not even

the most enthusiastic advocates of arms control have claimed — at least not since the mid-1970s — that the treaties are so well conceived or drawn up that abidance by them will solve the future of mankind.

In short, even while the strategic position of the United States continues to erode, men of goodwill find themselves saying things about arms control which cannot halt that erosion, and that cast them in roles that they sincerely reject for themselves: apologists for the Soviet Union and/or apologists for the SALT process.

*Hope and Historical Logic*

We should not be surprised at the fact that assumptions based strictly or even predominantly on arms control often lead to sterile arguments. After all, the entire premise of arms control — that safety can be gained by mutual limitations on weapons — abstracts from the most fundamental fact that weapons are tools in the hands of men, not vice-versa. The propensities of men to kill or respect one another have never been basically affected by the existence of particular kinds of weapons. Genocide was routine in the ancient world. In our day, the greatest slaughters have been perpetrated by simple tools: barbed wire, starvation and hand-held weapons. Whether or not a weapon is dangerous depends on the direction in which it is pointed and on the intention of the person wielding it. Where nations are friends, there is no talk of the need to negotiate arms control. Where they are enemies, even total disarmament could only make the world safe for hand-to-hand combat.

In practical and historical terms, it is difficult to prove the proposition that arms control by itself leads either to peace or security. History affords no example whatever of nations possessed of serious reasons to fight one another who disabused themselves of those reasons by agreeing to limit the means by which they could fight. Nevertheless, the desire for peace is so natural and strong that it has always made attractive the claim that perhaps, just perhaps, all men are sane and all sane men want peace — which is in everyone's interest — and that the danger of war issues from the weapons themselves. If all sides can slowly rid themselves of the burdens of their worst weapons, they will simultan-

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ously learn to value peace and to trust one another. But this appealing promise discounts the ever-present possibility that one side in the arms control process may be determined not only to pursue its goals as vigorously as ever, but also to use agreements as a means of achieving the other side's moral and material disarmament.

The stark record of our century is that arms control has been embraced by democracies as a means of exorcising the specter of war with dictatorial enemies — and that it has been exploited by dictatorships as a means of increasing their capacity for waging war against democracies. At various points along this historical road some within the democracies have asked whether there was any proof that the dictatorships really meant to keep their agreements in good faith. Others have answered that although there could be no real proof, democracies must take the lead and show good faith, because no one could afford the alternative.

In the normal flow of international negotiations, a determination of the other side's intentions is a prerequisite to the process that culminates in agreements. In the case of arms control, any issue of the other side's intentions tends to be considered a priori as disruptive to the perceived imperative of reaching an agreement. Instead, we as democracies invest in the agreements themselves the hope of favorable omens of the opponent's intentions. Questions regarding a dictatorship's compliance with arms control agreements go to the heart of the question: What are the dictatorship's intentions? But since the arms control process itself is based on at least a suspension of questions about intentions, the issue of compliance must thus be suspended as well, lest the process be disrupted.

*Patterns of Democratic Behavior*

Some of the generic difficulties in the path of rational discussion of compliance with arms control agreements were outlined by Fred Iklé in his classic article, "After Detection — What?" in the January 1961 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. They are well worth reformulating after nearly a generation's experience.

First, unless the violator acknowledges that

his activities constitute a violation, politicians in a democracy are likely to feel that the evidence in their possession might be insufficient to convince public opinion that a violation has occurred — or at least that trying to persuade the public would be a thankless task. Moreover, many politicians, having staked their reputations on the agreements, will fear being damaged in the public's esteem if the agreements were perceived as failures.

Second, a political leader who declares that arms control agreements which are a fundamental part of national policy have been violated, thereby faces the obligation to propose a new, redressive policy — one that will make up for the other side's violations and assure his nation's safety in an environment more perilous than had previously been imagined. Inevitably such a policy looms as more expensive and frightening than continuing on the arms control track. Few politicians are willing to take this step of personal and political valor — especially if they can rationalize away the observed violation as "insignificant." Iklé in his article cites Stanley Baldwin's admission that fear of losing an election had prevented him from admitting that Germany was violating the Treaty of Versailles. This remains a rare example of honesty, albeit after the fact of dishonesty.

Third, politicians can always hope — more or less in good conscience — that continuing negotiations will eventually reach the goal of a stable and mutually accepted peace and that therefore "this is not a good time" to accuse the other side of bad faith and risk driving it from the bargaining table. But when is it a "good time"? Moreover, as time passes and the dictatorship's arsenal rises in relative terms (abetted by the violations), the premium on finding a *modus vivendi* with it rises apace. The net result is that the brave declarations that accompany the signing of arms control treaties, according to which this or that action by the dictatorship (usually some form of interference with verification) would cause withdrawal from the treaty, become dead letters.

Finally, these inhibitions are compounded when they are involved in alliance diplomacy among democratic nations. Each alliance partner is likely to find in the other a confirming reason for not pressing the issue of violations.

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SOVIET VIOLATIONS...Continued*The Contemporary Mind-Set*

These historically documented attitudes — which ushered in the tragedy of World War II — have been strengthened in contemporary times by the seductive premises of the nuclear age. The primary such premise is that the only alternative to arms control is an arms race that is certain to lead to the nuclear holocaust and the end of the world; therefore, there is no alternative to continuing arms control negotiations and making the best of them. In this view the "process" of negotiations is more important than the tangible results achieved — and, by extension, more important than the other side's adherence to solemnly agreed-upon results.

The second premise relates to the fashionable notion of "overkill": since each side already possesses enough weapons theoretically to obliterate the adversary, any advantages wrested by the other side are "marginal" at best. It deserves mention that this "marginality" tends to be applied only to Soviet strategic programs: by contrast, American counter-programs, like the MX missile, are deemed "provocative."

This latter premise illuminates the cavalier attitude of so many U.S. officials toward Soviet forces superior in numbers and quality to the American ones. The State Department, for example, has long opposed even *proposing* to the Soviets an equality in throw-weight of missile forces, on the assumption that the Soviet advantage is so overwhelming (the SS-18 force alone carries more megatonnage than the entire U.S. strategic force) that the Soviets would never agree to surrender it. In the interagency controversy over U.S. policy, the State Department's line, only partly tongue-in-cheek, has been in effect that "real men do not need throw-weight." This of course begs the question: What *do* we need? The only answer consistent with the State Department's position would be: If we had a small force able to deliver a few warheads to major Soviet cities, it would not matter how big, powerful or accurate Soviet forces were, because the deterrent effect would be the same.

This variant of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which goes by the name "minimum deterrence," has been gaining inchoate acceptance in the Congress as weapon after American weapon has been delayed or can-

celed — in part because of hopes for arms control. As the SALT debate of 1979–1980 proved, neither the Congress nor American public opinion will accept MAD in any form when it is presented explicitly. Nonetheless, "minimum deterrence" survives as the theology of many.

An instructive example of this came in the testimony of a CIA official who in 1980 briefed the Senate about the newly discovered Soviet practice of reloading ICBM launchers. This practice had invalidated a basic premise underlying U.S. strategic planning and procurement for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, the official was nonchalant. What would be the implications of a possible doubling or tripling of the Soviet SS-18 force? There was no need for concern, he answered: the extra Soviet missiles could not be fired because, after an initial exchange, nothing could be fired. Only a little pressing elicited that neither he nor his Agency had really determined what would be required to prevent the Soviets from reloading their SS-18 launchers. Indeed, the facts show that we would be in no position to prevent it.

As far as the alleged irrelevance of all military assets after an initial nuclear exchange is concerned, it is noteworthy that the entire thrust of Soviet military strategy is to reduce the size, efficacy and significance of any American strike — to protect Soviet society and to win the war. The Soviets do not merely wish this: they also work at it. Hence, while the sizes and shapes of opposing nuclear arsenals seem to be of secondary importance to many American officials, for the Soviets they are clearly matters of life and death.

*The Artificial World of SALT I*

American advocates of arms control sought to create a situation unprecedented in history: two rivals for primacy in the world would agree for all time to stop trying to gain the edge over one another in the most important category of weapons, thus ending military history at the highest achieved level. Moreover, each would cede to the other in perpetuity the right to deliver nuclear weapons onto its soil and would refrain from efforts to protect itself. Thus, spurred by the fear of annihilation, both sides would enter into a kind of perpetual Hobbesian social contract. The

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Soviets did not seem enticed by this contract, but it was one of the prevalent assumptions in the 1960s that in time they would be "educated" by our negotiators to the realization that their own interests lay there as well.

Yet, from the very first the Soviets' refusal to see their own interests through the eyes of American arms control theorists led the U.S. Government to construct an elaborate, highly ambiguous intellectual framework — one which has given American arms control enthusiasts warrant to pursue their utopia with respect to U.S. forces, but within which the Soviets have continued to pursue the orthodox military goals of self-protection and victory in the event of a conflict.

From the outset Americans recognized that verifying an equality in missilery and restraint in research and development would require the presence of inspectors in production facilities and laboratories. But also from the outset the Soviets' clear refusal of such on-site inspection placed American arms controllers before a fateful choice: If arms control agreements constrained production and research, or the number of warheads or their accuracy, they would stand a chance of bringing about the desired arms stability in the world. But the agreements could not possibly be verified beyond the limited scope of technical means of detection, and thus could not be presented to American public opinion as prudent arrangements.

The answer to the dilemma was to construct agreements that could define the weapons and practices to be limited in terms that were more or less verifiable by technical means. The agreements could thus be sold to the U.S. public and the Congress, but — as it turned out — they were inherently weak agreements that failed to cover the significant parts of the strategic equation and whose real restraining power was questionable at best.

Thus, from the very first American arms controllers chose to negotiate treaties which were verifiable at least in part, and therefore ratifiable, but which were intellectual constructs well removed from reality. The SALT I Interim Agreement set limits on numbers of missile launchers because American satellites could take pictures of Soviet missile fields and submarines. Silos and tubes could be counted. The controversies of

the 1970s over the Soviets' failure to dismantle older launchers as new ones were built and over their operational use of silos that were nominally for tests and command and control — straightforward issues of compliance — were basically unrelated to that decade's strategic revolution: the replacement by the Soviets of the SS-9 with the SS-18 in the "heavy launchers" and the replacement of the majority of single-warhead SS-11s with MIRVed SS-17s and SS-19s. The latter replacement was not a direct violation: rather, it stretched the definition of a "light" missile under the Agreement. In any event, these replacements precisely brought about the situation (a mounting Soviet threat to American strategic forces) which American negotiators had sought to prevent by entering the talks in the first place.

There was little question within the American establishment about what was transpiring. Nevertheless, official anger was muted. After all, advances in technology sooner or later would have been able to turn even light missiles into multiple-killers like the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, but American arms controllers had simply assumed that the Soviets would not thus escalate the weapons competition. American officialdom has not yet mustered the humility to admit that it has been deceived — not because it was deceived primarily by the Soviets, but because it was deceived by its own fancies. Indeed, there is evidence that, on the eve of the signing of SALT I, Henry Kissinger learned about the development of the SS-19 but apparently did not deem the reported development significant enough to derail the process.

*The SALT II Trail*

The negotiations for SALT II dragged on for six years largely because of American concerns over definitions. Having been "burned" in SALT I, American negotiators were now going to be more rigorous. As regards launchers, however, they could not be rigorous without declaring the treaty unverifiable. In fact, if one defines a launcher merely as that which is necessary to launch a missile — and one acknowledges that ICBMs can be launched by very little equipment (Minutemen have been erected and launched by equipment carried on the back of a jeep) — one must admit that

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limits on launchers cannot be verified. Of course, because *some* kinds of launchers can be monitored, the tendency is to think of the "launcher problem" solely in terms of that small part of it that is controllable.

American negotiators in SALT II did insist on a complex definition of new missiles in order to prevent the wholesale substitution by the Soviets of a fifth generation of missiles for the fourth generation, even as the fourth had substituted for the third generation under SALT I. The four cornerstones of that definition are the requirements that a modified missile not exceed the original by more than 5 per cent in launch-weight and throw-weight, that the number of warheads on any modified missile not exceed the number on the original, that on any single-warhead missile the ratio of the weight of any warhead to the weight of the total reentry package not be inferior to 1 to 2, and that each side be allowed only one new missile.

Opponents of SALT II, including myself, pointed out that under this definition the Soviets could develop and deploy a generation of missiles that were new in every way but still not "new" in terms of SALT. The new missiles could be made of wholly new materials and according to wholly new designs. They could be vastly more reliable and accurate. They could thus pose wholly new military problems — all without ever violating the treaty in the slightest. Circumventions would be profitable and difficult to prove, especially if — as is now happening — Soviet missile tests are almost totally encrypted. Post-boost vehicles can be tested with fewer reentry vehicles than they can carry. Single-warhead missiles can be MIRVed, and the number of warheads carried by MIRVed missiles can be increased. Thus, a new, more numerous, more powerful Soviet missile force can emerge more or less within the "constraints" of SALT II.

Our negotiators could have devised a tighter definition of newness. But that definition would have been unacceptable to the Soviets, or wholly unverifiable. They had to choose between reality and the SALT process.

*Legacies of the ABM Treaty*

Many consider the ABM Treaty of 1972 the jewel in the crown of arms control

achievements. More than anything else it is supposed to symbolize the superpowers' mutual commitment to MAD. But the closer one looks at the Treaty's unrealistic requirements, the more one realizes that questions of the Soviets' compliance with them are of secondary importance.

A nationwide ABM system must be served by a nationwide network of battle-management radars. The Treaty allows such radars only at one ABM site in each country. The Soviets have built five huge radars that are inherently capable of performing that function. Are these radars intended to perform it? We will probably never have absolute proof short of their performance in actual battle.

The ABM Treaty forbids the rapid reload of ABM launchers at the one ABM site available. But when these launchers are underground, how does one know how rapidly they can be reloaded? Given the range of modern ABM missiles and radars, how much of a country can a "site" protect?

The Treaty forbids the testing of mobile ABM systems. Yet, the components of the Soviets' fully tested ABMX-3 system — the Flat Twin radar and the SH-04 and the SH-08 missiles — are merely "transportable," not "mobile." The Treaty does not limit mass production or storage of these components. If they are ever deployed *en masse* after a sudden denunciation of the Treaty, the United States would have no legal complaint.

The Treaty forbids testing — much less using — air defense systems "in an ABM mode." Yet, advancing technology has deprived that concept of whatever meaning it may once have had. Today the technology available for the American Patriot and Soviet SA-12 air-defense systems allows them to be used both against aircraft *and* against reentry vehicles. Still, the ABM Treaty is not being violated so much as it is being left behind by evolving reality.

Perhaps the best example of the ABM Treaty's decreasing relevance is the controversy surrounding the question of whether it would permit or prohibit space-based anti-ballistic missile lasers. Many American champions of arms control aver that Article I of the Treaty prohibits all anti-ballistic missile systems forever, except for the two ground-based sites specifically allowed. The Treaty deals with ABM launchers, missiles and

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radars because at the time it was drafted no other means for anti-missile defense were known. Some argue that the Treaty was meant automatically to ban any other devices which might be invented, so long as they were capable of destroying ballistic missiles, but of course the Treaty says no such thing, and in fact it is an axiom of international law that nations are bound only by the commitments they specifically undertake.

The ABM Treaty does not mention lasers at all: indeed, it could hardly have done so in 1972, when laser technology was in its infancy. The only possible reference to lasers is in Agreed Interpretation "D," which states that in the event components based on "other physical principles" and capable of substituting for ABM launchers, missiles and radars "are created," the two parties would discuss how they might be limited. That is to say, the two parties would develop definitions.

A moment's reflection is enough to realize that, in the case of space lasers, to distill reality into legal terms verifiable by national technical means would be much more difficult than it has been in the case of ballistic missiles. Unlike missiles, the characteristics which make lasers fit or unfit for strategic warfare are not discernible through mere observation. Observation will yield information on gross size, power plant and, possibly, wavelength. But the laser's power, the quality of its beam, its pointing accuracy, its jitter, the time it needs to retarget and the number of times it can fire can be learned only from direct access to test data.

Hence, once again we see a demonstration of the folly, and dangers, of approaching a strategic question with the mind-cast of arms control. Suppose for a moment that the Soviet Union placed a number of laser weapons in orbit. Discussion of the strategic significance of this event would instantly be distracted by questions of whether a violation of the ABM Treaty had occurred. But on what basis could the Soviet Union be accused of having violated the Treaty? There could be little in the way of determining — much less hard proof — that the lasers' mission was ballistic missile defense. Yet, against this background of legal murkiness and ominous strategic implications, many devotees of arms control, while they question the efficacy of American lasers

against ballistic missiles, still object to placing such lasers in orbit, on the grounds that doing so would violate the ABM Treaty. When will they learn that unilateralism is not the road to arms control, let alone to national security?

In short, the difficulty of reducing the reality of modern weapons to legal terms, the pressures on American negotiators to make those terms both negotiable and arguably verifiable, and the political impediments to deciding that any given Soviet activity warrants abandoning a fundamental foreign policy — all these have produced an intellectual tangle of our own making, within which we thrash about even as the Soviets widen their margin of military superiority. Since the question of Soviet violations of arms control treaties refers to a framework removed from reality, dwelling on the question is only to compound the unreality.

*The Political Predicament*

The issue of past Soviet violations played a minor role in the SALT debate of 1979-1980. To be sure, the earlier debate did turn on the right question: Has arms control with the Soviet Union enhanced our security in the past, and can it be expected to do so in the future?

The proponents of SALT II conceded that the United States' strategic position in relation to that of the Soviet Union had deteriorated, and that mistakes had been made in the conception of SALT I and in the management of U.S. forces under it. But they argued that SALT II was necessary to keep U.S.-Soviet relations headed in the direction of peace. When confronted with criticism of specific provisions of the treaty, they often conceded the treaty's weaknesses, but argued that only ratification would make possible the continuation of negotiations, wherein lay the ultimate solution to those weaknesses. The U.S. Senate rejected these arguments, and in the election of 1980 the American people clearly rebuffed SALT.

Nevertheless, an army of bureaucrats simply could not recast their thinking beyond a framework within which they had operated so long. Since 1980, however, the principal argument in favor of arms control has been quite different from previous ones. It reads basically

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F.Y.E.O. (FOR YOUR EYES ONLY) 25 JULY 1983 (14 AUGUST) PAGES 1,2

**SOVIETS REORGANIZE AIR FORCE:** In the most sweeping reorganization of Soviet military power since 1941, the Soviets have completely revamped the organization of their air forces. The 16 air armies and dozens of PVO (air defense) districts have been reduced to five numbered Air Forces and five PVO commands.

Each of the new formations corresponds to one of the five main military areas: Central Europe, Southwest Europe, South, Far East, and North. The commanders of each of these theaters (TVD's) now have a deputy commander for air defense (PVO) and a deputy commander for aviation (FA). The PVO deputy commands all air defense forces, including fighters, SAM's, and the anti-aircraft troops of the army divisions. The FA deputy has his forces organized into three branches: ground support (Su-7/17, MiG-21/27), interdiction (Su-17, MiG-21), and helicopters.

The strategic defense forces (ARM's) remain under a separate command within PVO. The strategic aviation forces have been combined under Aviation Armies of the Soviet Union (AASU), including the Badger, Backfire, Fencer, and Blinder aircraft. AASU includes not only intercontinental aviation, but the deep strike interdiction forces of the ground armies.--IDR, June 83

**SOVIET NAVY IN AFRICA:** The USSR is using its government-owned fishing fleet, which is an auxiliary of the Soviet Navy, to extend its presence, influence, and experience in African waters. Most fishing boat captains are reserve naval officers.

The Soviets have signed fishing treaties with Algeria, Angola, Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Tunisia.

Fishing activity is also seen as an excuse to establish bases. Main fishing bases are in Lagos, Nigeria, and Conakry, Guinea; a repair yard has been established at Luba, Equatorial Guinea. The fishing trawlers that operate in these areas all have long-range radios and are controlled by a headquarters in Kiev. A major base is being built at Nacala, Mozambique, and the Soviets are pressuring for base rights at Diego Suarez, Madagascar, to control the key Madagascar Channel.--IDWR, 29 June 83

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as follows: However harmful arms control might have been in the past, however unlikely might be Soviet acceptance of anything which enhances the West's security, nevertheless we must pursue the arms control process in order to convince our own fellow citizens that we are not warmongers but peace-loving people. When the question is raised why we should pursue negotiations with an adversary who, by one means or another, has used them as a screen for overturning the strategic balance and is apt to use further negotiations for the same purpose, the general answer is that we, too, must practice cynicism. We, too, must negotiate in order to legitimize our own military buildup.

This argument ignores the fact that in a democracy public opinion cannot support self-contradictory policies. If the U.S. Government declares that the Soviet leaders are the sort of people from whom one can reasonably expect a fair deal on arms control -- and that arms control is so important that it is essential that a deal be reached -- then public opinion will reasonably blame the Government for doing anything which seems to put obstacles in the way of agreements. The Soviets, having received from the U.S. Government the credentials of men of goodwill, will persuasively point to our military programs and our own proposals as obstacles.

On the other hand, when our Government replies with figures showing how the Soviets have seized military advantages -- along with suggestions that the Soviets might have circumvented or violated treaties -- public opinion rightly questions the Government's motives. If the Soviets really had tipped the strategic balance using arms control as a

screen -- if there were reasonable evidence that they regarded arms control far differently than we, and circumvented or violated whenever they could -- why would we be negotiating with them at all? To evade such questions is to be too clever by half.

Some American officials regard the publication of evidence regarding the Soviet Union's violation of the Biological Warfare Convention and other arms control treaties as embarrassments to their own policy preferences rather than as occasions for reexamining their own approach to arms control. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger recently declared that, in light of all that happened, it is clear we must "do a better job" of arms control. But what can he mean by "a better job?" Can anyone really believe that there exists a formula which, if discovered and presented to the Soviets, would lead them to agree to unmake the military gains they achieved as a result of their strategic buildup? Does a set of words exist which would induce them no longer to regard arms control as a means of thwarting our countermoves to their strategic programs? I doubt it.

The proposition that it is possible to do "a better job" deserves a definitive test. President Reagan's Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, has expressed the view that the foremost criterion by which arms control proposals should be judged is their effect on national security. Only proposals that meet this criterion warrant examination from the standpoint of verifiability and acceptability to the Soviets. This sensible approach would draw the dialogue on arms control closer to the real world and help remove the blinders that have prevented us from seeing it.

☆☆☆☆

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TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 29 AUG 83

*File USSR  
arms control*

KEYWORDS USSR INF  
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SUBJECT ANDROPOV OFFERS TO DESTROY MISSILES IN PRAVDA INTERVIEW

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 01 SEP 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK	LENZOWSKI FORTIER	ROBINSON SOMMER KIMMITT POINDEXTER
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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August 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GB*  
SUBJECT: Andropov's Proposal to Destroy Missiles

In an August 27 Pravda "interview," Andropov offered to destroy all missiles to be reduced under the Soviet proposal to limit SS-20s "in Europe" (probably referring to those missiles deployed west of their proposed 80-degree line) to the level they attribute to British and French missiles. He has now sent you a letter (Tab 1), formally conveying that offer.

In the letter, Andropov portrays this move as "a serious step" toward a mutually acceptable agreement and states that the USSR expects a comparable reciprocal step from the US that would make such an agreement possible. He states that Moscow believes that agreement is still "possible and achievable," and that the Soviet Delegation will have instructions to "exert additional efforts" toward agreement in the next round.

Under their previous position, the Soviets maintained that the primary method of reduction would be destruction, although a certain percentage of systems could be withdrawn from Europe. We have pressed the Soviets in Geneva for some time as to whether or not any SS-20s to be reduced under their proposal would be destroyed, or merely relocated to the eastern USSR. Thus, the Soviet move is, at a minimum, a welcome clarification of their position. It is, however, also significant in that the Soviets have offered, for the first time, to destroy a number of new systems (i.e., 80-100 SS-20s). Of course, the basic problems in the Soviet position -- inclusion of British and French forces, a ban on any US INF missile deployments, and no limits on new SS-20 deployments in the Far East -- remain.

The Soviet move is of course primarily directed toward European public opinion. It would not directly affect the options now before you with regard to possible new elements in our own INF position (i.e., inclusion of aircraft, regional subceilings, a proportional reduction of Pershing II). However, we can expect the Soviet move to find some resonance here and in Europe; it will likely generate additional pressures -- both from publics and from some of the Allies -- for movement on our part when the INF negotiations resume on September 6.

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We will be in a better position to develop your response to Andropov's letter as a result of decisions to be taken on our INF position. In your letter we would then be able to outline the substance of any new elements of our position. My meeting with Gromyko in Madrid on September 8 would provide an opportunity to convey your response. These steps, properly presented to the Western public, will allow us to maintain the initiative and sustain Allied support for our deployments.

The NATO Special Consultative Group meeting scheduled for September 2 offers an opportunity to inform the Allies of Andropov's letter. Andropov may be sending similar letters to Allied leaders; if so, we can use this SCG to coordinate our replies.

Attachment: As stated

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Translation from the Russian

Dear Mr. President:

I found it necessary to draw your attention once again to a question, the importance of which would seem to be beyond doubt. I have in mind the problem of limiting nuclear weapons in Europe, on which the next round of Soviet-American talks will begin in about a week in Geneva. A decisive breakthrough at those negotiations could be of fundamental importance from the viewpoint of how matters will develop in Europe and throughout the world, and consequently - and not least - between the Soviet Union and the United States as well.

The Soviet Union has just taken another major step which, if properly evaluated by the United States, will in many respects facilitate reaching agreement in Geneva. We have declared our willingness to liquidate in the European part of the USSR those of our medium-range missiles which would be subject to reductions. Among them there would be a considerable portion of SS-20 missiles as well, namely, that portion of those missiles which would be in excess of the aggregate number of medium-range missiles of Britain and France. It goes without saying that this can be done only if mutually acceptable agreement is reached as a whole on the problem of limiting medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, including renunciation of the deployment of new American missiles there.

The question of redeployment of SS-20 missiles to be reduced would thereby be removed, too. Indeed, American representatives have repeatedly emphasized the great importance for the progress of the negotiations in Geneva of what would happen to the Soviet missiles to be reduced in Europe.

Having taken this serious step for the sake of reaching agreement, we expect that the reciprocal step of the American side will be such as to make a mutually acceptable agreement possible.

As you understand, Mr. President, a great deal depends on what the forthcoming round of the negotiations will result in; we believe that an agreement is still possible and achievable. The Soviet delegation in Geneva will have instructions to exert additional efforts to work out an agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security. For success to be achieved, however, it is necessary for the U.S. delegation also to have corresponding instructions to work in the same direction.

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The Soviet leadership is deeply convinced that the situation truly dictates the need for a broad, considered approach and for taking bold political decisions looking to the future. For its part, the Soviet leadership is acting in this manner. I would like to hope that your government and you personally will approach the resolution of the task we face with a sense of high responsibility for the fate of peace and international security.

With respect,

Yu. Andropov

August 27, 1983

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Уважаемый господин Президент,

Счел необходимым вновь привлечь Ваше внимание к вопросу, важность которого, думается, не вызывает сомнения. Я имею в виду проблему ограничения ядерных вооружений в Европе, очередно раунд советско-американских переговоров по которой начнется примерно через неделю в Женеве. Решающий сдвиг на этих переговорах мог бы иметь принципиальное значение с точки зрения того, как будут складываться дела в Европе и в мире, а следовательно и не в последнюю очередь - между Советским Союзом и Соединенными Штатами Америки.

Советский Союз только что предпринял еще один крупный шаг, который, если он будет должным образом оценен Соединенными Штатами, во многом облегчит достижение договоренности в Женеве. Нами заявлено о готовности ликвидировать в европейской части СССР те наши ракеты средней дальности, которые подлежали бы сокращению. В их число вошла бы и значительная часть ракет СС-20 а именно та их часть, которая была бы сверх суммарного количества ракет средней дальности у Англии и Франции. Само собой разумеется что это может быть осуществлено только в случае достижения взаимоприемлемой договоренности в целом по проблеме ограничения ядерных средств средней дальности в Европе, включая отказ от размещения там новых американских ракет.

Тем самым был бы снят и вопрос о перебазировании сокращаемых ракет СС-20. А ведь американские представители не раз подчеркивали важное значение того, что произойдет с сокращаемыми в Европе советскими ракетами, для развития переговоров в Женеве.

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Пойдя на этот серьезный шаг во имя достижения договоренности мы ожидаем, что ответный шаг американской стороны будет таким, который сделал бы взаимоприемлемое соглашение возможным.

Как Вы понимаете, господин Президент, от того, чем кончится предстоящий раунд переговоров, зависит очень многое, мы считаем, что соглашение пока еще возможно и достижимо. Советская делегация в Женеве будет иметь указания предпринять дополнительные усилия для выработки соглашения, основывающегося на принципе равенства и одинаковой безопасности. Для успеха надо, однако, чтобы и делегация США располагала соответствующими инструкциями действовать в том же направлении.

Советское руководство глубоко убеждено в том, что обстановка настоятельно диктует необходимость широкого, взвешенного подхода и принятия смелых политических решений, рассчитанных на перспективу. Со своей стороны оно так и поступает. Хотелось бы надеяться что Ваше правительство и Вы лично подойдете к решению стоящей перед нами задачи с чувством высокой ответственности за судьбы мира и международной безопасности.

С уважением,

Ю.АНДРОПОВ

27 августа 1983 года

filed 6/21/83 File Arms Control

Relationship Between INF and START

I. History

- Soviets have traditionally considered any systems that threaten their homeland as "strategic," and accordingly raised INF systems (called "Forward Based Systems" FBS) in SALT I & II.
- Soviets dropped insistence on inclusion of FBS in return for exclusive right to heavy missiles (SALT I, Vladivostok).
- SALT II criticized for deficiencies in "grey area systems," i.e., exclusion of Backfire and SS-20 but inclusion (albeit in three-year protocol) of cruise missile limitations to 600 km and non-circumvention of technology to NATO Allies.
- These treaty deficiencies -- along with (a) loss of US strategic superiority, (b) growing Soviet conventional and tactical nuclear superiority in Europe, (c) greater capability of SS-20s over the SS-4s and SS-5s, and (d) neutron bomb episode -- gave impetus to new prominence of a "Eurostrategic balance" concept. This in turn led to December 1979 "dual track" decision.
- "Dual track" decision put in the context of SALT III, in part because NATO deployments of 572 designed as visible coupling of NATO defense to US strategic nuclear force.
- Since SALT II then in trouble, with no near-term prospect of SALT III, it was thought best for INF deployments to launch INF negotiations. Began symbolically in October 1980 and began seriously thirteen months later (November 1981).

II. Soviet Links Between INF and START

- Soviet START proposal of reductions down to aggregate of 1800 missile launchers and heavy bombers explicitly tied to no US INF deployments. If there are US deployments, 1800 total may increase.
- Soviets have, in INF talks, refused to acknowledge US deployments.
- Soviet threats of "countermeasures" to US deployments may include their own GLCMs, more SS-20s or possibly SLCMs (close to US homeland). Hence, both intermediate-range and strategic systems may be included, possibly making both negotiations more difficult still.
- Soviets probably will use FBS (INF systems) as technique to protect exclusive rights to heavy ICBMs.
- If Soviets realize their primary arms control goal for 1983 -- and stop US deployments in INF -- they will feel in a stronger negotiating posture for START.

III. US Links Between INF and START

- Goals same: (a) deep reductions below Soviet levels, (b) focus reductions on missiles first, with aircraft and cruise missiles later, (c) use of warheads as a key unit of account, (d) equal

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US, Soviet limits (i.e., no compensation for UK, French, or Chinese forces), (e) global limits (not just regional), and (f) strong verification provisions, probably based on more than NTM.

- Note: Verification can be a problem, since any INF accord will probably come before START yet be less verifiable; we must assure that this does not set a "low confidence" verification precedent for START.

#### IV. Advantages of Keeping INF and START Separate

- Important to INF deployments this year to hold out prospect of separate INF accord, either interim or "zero option." Combining INF and START before deployments would downplay chances of INF accord.
- Since number of strategic systems on both sides is so high, 572 US systems seem less significant militarily. Again, combining INF and START would undercut European/US support for deployments, by raising questions of importance of a "Eurostrategic balance" to deterrence.
- Since European/American public understanding of INF position is increasing and of START position remains low, combining the two would lessen overall understanding of US policy towards arms control.
- Combining INF and START invariably downplays importance of "grey area" systems (ala SALT II) which leads to increased problems with Europeans.
- Retaining INF and START separate avoids greater overall complexity since there can be some rational division of weapons systems.

#### V. Advantages of Combining INF and START

- Avoids problems of where to put weapons systems. At present, Soviets put Backfire in INF and US places it in START. Soviets now ban cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km in both INF and START, while US places ALCMs (SLCMs ?) in START and GLCMs in INF. As stated, Soviets now place ban on US GLCMs and P-IIIs in START (as well as in INF).
- Conceivably, combining INF and START could induce Soviets to accept principles of US-USSR equality for global limits across-the-board. (Note: US supports principles in both INF and START, whereas USSR accepts principles only in START.)
- Combining INF and START at some point may "shake up" the negotiations, and possibly energize them, at least in public perception, by doing something different. This could be an advantage if both negotiations seem dormant and a new element is needed.
- In particular, if we get an interim INF accord or no INF accord by the time of deployments, we can try for the "zero option" or for an interim agreement, respectively, thereafter in a combined negotiation.

Additional, Quasi-Related Discussion Topic: "Taking Into Account" Factors

- a. British, French (Chinese?) forces
- b. ~~Conventional~~ balance in Europe
- c. fac nuclear/chemical weapons balance in Europe, globally
- d. Air defense/civil defense systems
- e. Geography, nature of Alliances (standardization factors, etc.)

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II  
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May 2, 1983

*File -  
arms control*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Department's Translation of Soviet Response

Enclosed for your information is the Department's translation of the Soviet response to our questions on START, as given by Ambassador Dobrynin to Acting Secretary Dam April 28.

*Charles Hill*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Dept.'s translation of  
Soviet response to  
questions on START

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Department of State Classification, July 21, 1997

By LOS NARA, Date 3/8/01

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Our conversation with the U.S. side on April 14 touched upon questions related to the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks.

We had already presented our evaluation of the status of the negotiations to the U.S. side earlier and had outlined our approach. The questions raised by the U.S. side in connection with the conversation have been discussed repeatedly and in detail by the U.S.S.R. and U.S. delegations during the three rounds of negotiations in Geneva.

The sum total of the Soviet proposals makes it possible to ensure a truly fair and effective solution to the problem of limiting and reducing strategic arms. We are convinced that it is only by strictly complying with the principle of equality and equal security, which prevents anyone from acquiring unilateral advantage, that the nuclear arms race can be halted and real reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation between our countries can be achieved; in this connection it is necessary that military-strategic parity between them be maintained.

The Soviet Union is in favor of moving ahead based on a continuing process of stage-by-stage reduction of nuclear confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. to the lowest possible level.

How far and how fast we can proceed on this path depends upon the United States.

It is well known that the United States has at its disposal numerous forward-based nuclear systems near the Soviet Union; these systems have a very important impact on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the strategic relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. It goes without saying that the U.S. nuclear systems which have been moved up to our borders are of strategic significance for the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union has no such systems near U.S. territory.

In view of the presence of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems, the Soviet Union needs to have no fewer than 1800 strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems in order to reliably ensure its own security under the present conditions. And this is on the understanding that the U.S. will at least refrain from building up its forward-based nuclear systems.

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It cannot be denied that as the sides reduce their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the relative importance and significance of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems would become increasingly greater.

Nonetheless, even in light of this circumstance, which is unfavorable for the U.S.S.R., we have put forward far-reaching proposals which provide for major reductions -- by one-fourth -- in the sides' strategic arsenals. If the U.S. is truly prepared to agree, not in word but in deed, on an even more significant reduction of strategic arms, it must also create the necessary conditions for this.

In this connection we would ask the following question: since the U.S. Government is interested in the possibilities for lowering the level of strategic arms we have proposed, is it prepared to seriously consider how the strategic situation will develop in the future and to examine the question of an appropriate solution regarding the U.S. forward-based nuclear systems?

Furthermore, it is important that the levels of strategic arms of the sides reflect the whole complex of these systems, including not only ballistic missiles but heavy bombers as well. Moreover, within the composition of these arms it is precisely strategic arms which must be considered and limited, and not some totally unrelated systems. Is the U.S. side prepared for such solutions? Is it also prepared to withdraw the totally contrived question of the Soviet Backfire medium bomber?

Let us take the question of cruise missiles. Here the Soviet Union is proposing a serious, fundamental solution. But the U.S. takes a different position. The U.S. proposals in this regard permit the deployment of 8,000 to 11,000 long-range cruise missiles on 400 bombers, not to mention the fact that the U.S. approach does not provide for any limitations on long-range sea and ground-launched cruise missiles. Thus, this involves a buildup in strategic arms, and a large-scale one at that. Is this really consistent with the objectives of the current negotiations?

The Soviet side continues to be convinced that the best solution to the problem of long-range cruise missiles would be to ban these missiles, regardless of basing mode. At the same time, in an effort to create possibilities for progress at the negotiations, we would also be prepared, depending on the course of the discussion of other questions, to consider the possibility of limiting rather than banning air-launched cruise

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missiles, of course on the understanding that long-range sea and ground-launched cruise missiles would be prohibited. Of course, the nuclear warheads on deployed cruise missiles would be included in the overall maximum level for nuclear warheads on strategic arms.

Mr. Secretary, you asked what would happen to Soviet ICBMs if the sides reduced their strategic arms. If one takes into account the composition of Soviet strategic forces, it is clear that during reductions to the 1800 level, missiles will also be dismantled. Moreover, we could say that the principal portion of the reductions provided for under the Soviet proposals would involve land-based ICBMs. Each side could determine specifically which missiles or other delivery vehicles would be destroyed, within the framework of the additional limitations provided for in the agreement, of course.

We would like to repeat: progress at the negotiations on these and other questions depends upon the United States.

We expect a positive response from the U.S. side to the questions we have raised.

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В беседе 14 апреля с американской стороны были затронуты вопросы, связанные с переговорами об ограничении и сокращении стратегических вооружений (ОССВ).

Американской стороне ранее уже высказывались наши оценки состояния дел на переговорах и был очерчен наш подход. Вопросы, поставленные американской стороной в связи с состоявшейся беседой, неоднократно и детально обсуждались между делегациями СССР и США в ходе трех раундов переговоров в Женеве.

Вся сумма советских предложений дает возможность обеспечить действительно справедливое и эффективное решение проблемы ОССВ. Мы убеждены, что лишь при строгом соблюдении принципа равенства и одинаковой безопасности, исключающего приобретение кем-либо односторонних преимуществ, можно прекратить гонку ядерных вооружений, добиться реального снижения уровня ядерного противостояния между нашими странами при обязательном поддержании паритета между ними в военно-стратегической области.

Советский Союз за то, чтобы продвигаться вперед на основе непрерывного процесса поэтапного снижения ядерного противостояния между СССР и США до самого низкого возможного уровня.

Как далеко и как быстро можно идти по этому пути, зависит от Соединенных Штатов.

Хорошо известно, что Соединенные Штаты располагают вблизи Советского Союза многочисленными ядерными средствами передового базирования, которые весьма существенно влияют на количественную и качественную стороны стратегического взаимоотношения между СССР и США. Выдвинутые к нашим границам американские ядерные средства,

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безусловно, имеют для СССР стратегическое значение. Аналогичными средствами вблизи американской территории Советский Союз не располагает.

С учетом наличия американских ядерных средств передового базирования Советскому Союзу для надежного обеспечения своей безопасности в существующих сейчас условиях необходимо иметь не менее 1800 стратегических средств доставки ядерного оружия. И это при том понимании, что США по крайней мере не будут наращивать свои ядерные средства передового базирования.

Невозможно отрицать, что по мере сокращения сторонами своих МБР, БРПЛ и тяжелых бомбардировщиков удельный вес и значение американских ядерных средств передового базирования все более возрастали бы.

Тем не менее, даже в свете указанного неблагоприятного для СССР обстоятельства мы выдвинули далеко идущие предложения, предусматривающие крупные, на четверть, сокращения стратегических арсеналов сторон. Если США действительно готовы не на словах, а на деле договариваться о еще более значительном сокращении стратегических вооружений, они должны и обеспечить для этого необходимые условия.

В этой связи мы спрашиваем: коль скоро правительство США интересуется возможностями снижения предлагаемого нами уровня стратегических вооружений, готово ли оно со всей серьезностью взглянуть на перспективы развития стратегической ситуации и рассмотреть вопрос о соответствующем решении относительно американских ядерных средств передового базирования?

Далее. Важно, чтобы уровни стратегических вооружений сторон отразили всю совокупность таких средств, включая не только баллистические ракеты, но и тяжелые бомбардировщики. Причем в составе этих



вооружений должны рассматриваться и ограничиваться именно стратегические вооружения, а не такие средства, которые к ним никакого отношения не имеют. Готова ли американская сторона к таким решениям? Готова ли она снять и целиком надуманный вопрос о советском среднем бомбардировщике "Бэкфайер"?

Возьмем вопрос о крылатых ракетах. Здесь Советский Союз предлагает серьезное, кардинальное решение. А вот позиция США иная. Предложения США в этой области допускают развертывание на 400 бомбардировщиках от 8 до 11 тыс. крылатых ракет большой дальности, не говоря уже об отсутствии в американском подходе каких-либо ограничений на крылатые ракеты морского и наземного базирования большой дальности. Таким образом, речь идет о наращивании стратегических вооружений, притом широкомасштабном. Разве это согласуется с целями ведущихся переговоров?

Советская сторона по-прежнему убеждена, что наилучшим решением вопроса о крылатых ракетах большой дальности было бы запрещение таких ракет всех видов базирования. Вместе с тем, стремясь обеспечить возможности продвижения на переговорах, мы были бы готовы в зависимости от хода обсуждения других вопросов рассмотреть и возможность ограничения, а не запрещения крылатых ракет воздушного базирования при том, естественно, понимании, что крылатые ракеты большой дальности морского и наземного базирования подлежали бы запрету. Разумеется, ядерные заряды размещенных крылатых ракет включались бы в предельный общий уровень для ядерных зарядов стратегических вооружений.

Вы, государственный секретарь, спрашивали о том, что будет с советскими МБР в случае сокращения сторонами стратегических

вооружений. Если учесть состав советских стратегических сил, то ясно, что при сокращении до уровня 1800 единиц будет произведен и демонтаж баллистических ракет. Более того, мы могли бы сказать, что основная часть сокращений, предусматриваемых советскими предложениями, осуществлялась бы нами за счет МБР наземного базирования. Какие конкретно ракеты или другие носители уничтожались бы, могла определять каждая сторона, конечно, в рамках дополнительных ограничений, предусмотренных в соглашении.

Хотели бы повторить: продвижение на переговорах, в том числе и по затронутым вопросам, зависит от Соединенных Штатов.

Мы ожидаем от американской стороны позитивного ответа на поставленные нами вопросы.

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*File arms control*  
*A*

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GENEVA FOR START/INF DELEGATION . INFORM CONSUL  
E. O. 12356: N/A  
TGS: PARM  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S JUNE 8 START STATEMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT DELIVERED  
AT 11:00 AM, JUNE 8, BY THE PRESIDENT ON START.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS, OR START, OFFICIALLY

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RESUMED TODAY IN GENEVA. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK FOR A MOMENT ABOUT MY HOPES FOR THESE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS AND ABOUT CHANGES WHICH I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE IN OUR START PROPOSAL. SUCH CHANGES REFLECT CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION, THE CONGRESS, AND OTHERS. THEY OFFER THE PROSPECT OF NEW PROGRESS TOWARD A START AGREEMENT.

NEW CONSENSUS AND NEW PROGRESS

BEFORE DISCUSSING THESE SPECIFICS, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON WHAT I SEE AS VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE BOTH HERE AND ABROAD. I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT TODAY THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS. I JUST MET IN WILLIAMSBURG WITH THE LEADERS OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS, AND I WAS STRUCK THERE NOT ONLY BY THE FACTS AND FIGURES POINTING TOWARD ECONOMIC RECOVERY, BUT ALSO BY A SPIRIT OF OPTIMISM AND COOPERATION WHICH WAS REMARKABLE. THIS SAME SPIRIT IS VISIBLE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OF SECURITY ISSUES. IN NATO, AS IN OUR OTHER ALLIANCES, THERE IS A NEW FEELING OF PARTNERSHIP. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS ALIVE AND WELL, AND ITS CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ARE A SOURCE OF STRENGTH AND PARTICIPATION FOR EACH OF ITS MEMBERS.

THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION

AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT, AND VERY GRATIFYING TO ME, IS THE NEW SPIRIT OF BIPARTISANSHIP ON NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES WHICH IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT IN BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS. WHEN I ESTABLISHED THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION I COULD NOT THEN FORESEE THE IMPACT THAT THIS OUTSTANDING PANEL WOULD HAVE. CLEARLY, THE COMMISSION'S WORK, WHICH WENT BEYOND MX TO ADDRESS CRITICAL ISSUES OF DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL, HAS BECOME A MAJOR STIMULUS TO THE RE-THINKING OF NATIONAL POLICY. THE COMMISSION'S REPORT

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CHALLENGED SOME FAVORITE ASSUMPTIONS, AND CALLED FOR CHANGES IN OUR STRATEGIC PLANNING. AT THE SAME TIME, IT EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR MY ADMINISTRATION'S MOST HEARTFELT OBJECTIVES IN ARMS CONTROL: DEEP REDUCTIONS, MODERNIZATION FOR STABILITY'S SAKE, AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE FIRST-STRIKE THREAT.

I HAVE PLEDGED TO CONGRESS MY FULL SUPPORT FOR THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND MY INTENTION TO INCORPORATE THEM IN OUR START PROPOSAL. SO THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO BENEFIT FROM THE WISDOM OF ITS COUNSEL, I INTEND TO ASK THE COMMISSION TO CONTINUE TO SERVE. ITS BIPARTISAN MEMBERSHIP WILL THUS BE ABLE TO PROVIDE TIMELY ADVICE TO ME BOTH WITH RESPECT TO THE ADOPTION OF ITS PROPOSALS INTO OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM AND OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICIES.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS

IN RECENT WEEKS, I AND OFFICIALS OF MY ADMINISTRATION HAVE HAD AN EXTENSIVE SERIES OF PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. WE HAVE REVIEWED IMPLICATIONS FOR THE START NEGOTIATIONS OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND ALSO OF THE "MUTUAL GUARANTEED BUILD-DOWN" ADVOCATED BY A NUMBER OF DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

THE REVIEW OF OUR START POSITION WAS CAPPED BY FOUR RECENT MEETINGS: THREE YESTERDAY, AND ONE TODAY. YESTERDAY MORNING, AT A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MY SENIOR ADVISORS AND I REVIEWED MAJOR IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS. WE ALSO CONSIDERED A RANGE OF CONGRESSIONAL VIEWPOINTS. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, I MET

WITH GROUPS OF SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN WHOSE INTEREST AND EXPERTISE IN ARMS CONTROL I VALUE HIGHLY. I DIS-

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CUSSED WITH THEM THE MAJOR ISSUES BEFORE US. THIS MORNING I MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS. AND THROUGHOUT THE START NEGOTIATIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CONSULTED WITH OUR ALLIES.

START

THREE FULL ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON START ARE NOW BEHIND US. IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT THESE ROUNDS HAVE BEEN USEFUL AND HAVE PERMITTED US TO COVER NECESSARY GROUND. HOWEVER, DUE LARGELY TO SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE, WE HAVE NOT YET MADE MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES. I REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF REAL, SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS -- AND IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. ABOVE ALL, OUR GOAL IS TO MAINTAIN A STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR. OUR EFFORTS IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE GUIDED BY THAT OBJECTIVE.

THE REPORT OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION OFFERS US A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS. IT HAS PROVIDED A CONSISTENT AND COHERENT FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE OUR THINKING ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY -- DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL. BUT, MORE THAN THAT, IT HAS PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR RENEWED, BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR THAT POLICY.

TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS CRITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND ON THE BASIS OF THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF ADVICE, I HAVE DIRECTED NEW STEPS TOWARD PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING REAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AT THE START NEGOTIATIONS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE, PROVIDED TO AMBASSADOR ED ROWNY, OUR CHIEF START NEGOTIATOR, IS TO ADJUST THE U.S. START POSITTON TO BRING IT INTO LINE WITH THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION'S RECOM-

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MENDATIONS AND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO OUR NEGOTIATORS IN PURSUING OUR BASIC GOALS.

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE PUT FORTH A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL ON LIMITING STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS, OUR PRIMARY AIM IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE, TO REDUCE THE THREAT POSED BY THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS, NAMELY BALLISTIC MISSILES. TO ACHIEVE THAT AIM, MEASURES THAT CONSTRAIN THE NUMBER AND DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS ARE ESSENTIAL. OUR PROPOSED LIMIT OF 5,000 TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS -- A REDUCTION BY ONE-THIRD OF

THE CURRENT LEVEL -- REMAINS THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE U. S. START POSITION.

THE U. S. START POSITION TABLED IN PREVIOUS NEGOTIATING ROUNDS INCLUDES ANOTHER CONSTRAINT. IT WOULD HAVE LIMITED EACH SIDE TO NO MORE THAN 850 DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES. THIS MEASURE WAS NEVER VIEWED AS BEING AS USEFUL OR IMPORTANT A CONSTRAINT AS THE LIMIT ON TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

WARHEADS. THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT SPECIFICALLY SUGGESTED THAT IT SHOULD BE REASSESSED SINCE IT COULD CONSTRAIN THE EVOLUTION WE SEEK TOWARD SMALL, SINGLE WARHEAD ICBM'S.

ACTING UPON THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION, I HAVE NOW DIRECTED OUR NEGOTIATORS TO ADJUST OUR POSITION ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES BY RELAXING OUR CURRENT PROPOSAL FOR AN 850 DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILE LIMIT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U. S. REMAINS FIRM ON THE POINT THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL OF BALLISTIC MISSILES MUST BE ADDRESSED IN START. OUR CURRENT POSITION INCLUDES A NETWORK OF CONSTRAINTS DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE AT REDUCED FORCE LEVELS -- WHILE ADDRESSING THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF MISSILES. THE SOVIETS

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AND OTHERS HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THESE CONSTRAINTS ARE DESIGNED TO DICTATE SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE ACCORDING TO U.S. STANDARDS. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. WE BELIEVE, AS DOES THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION, THAT STABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY LIMITATIONS ON THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY AND POTENTIAL OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROPOSE SUCH CONSTRAINTS WHICH INDIRECTLY GET TO THE THROW WEIGHT PROBLEM WHILE MAKING CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR READINESS TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE CORRESPONDING DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY IF THEY PREFER.

THERE MAY BE MORE THAN ONE WAY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE OF GREATER STABILITY AT REDUCED LEVELS OF ARMS. SO I HAVE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR ROWNY TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES, BUT I HAVE ALSO GIVEN HIM THE FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLORE ALL APPROPRIATE AVENUES FOR MEETING OUR GOALS. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL RESPOND WITH CORRESPONDING FLEXIBILITY.

FINALLY, HIGH-PRIORITY WORK IS CONTINUING ON HOW THE MUTUAL AND GUARANTEED BUILD-DOWN CONCEPT PROPOSED BY SEVERAL UNITED STATES SENATORS CAN BE APPLIED IN OUR QUEST FOR SIGNIFICANT AND STABILIZING STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.  
CONCLUSION

THESE ACTIONS REFLECT A BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS ON ARMS CONTROL, AND NEW FLEXIBILITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS -- STEPS TO BE VIEWED SERIOUSLY BY THE SOVIETS AND ALL OTHERS WHO HAVE A STAKE IN WORLD PEACE. TO THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION, I URGE THAT THIS NEW OPPORTUNITY NOT BE LOST. TO AMERICA'S FRIENDS AND ALLIES AROUND THE WORLD, I SAY THAT YOUR STEADFAST SUPPORT FOR THE GOALS OF BOTH DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL IS ESSENTIAL IN THE FUTURE. TO CONGRESS AND TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I SAY LET US CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER IN A BIPARTISAN SPIRIT SO THAT THESE DAYS WILL BE SPOKEN OF IN

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THE FUTURE AS THE TIME WHEN AMERICA TURNED THE CORNER. LET  
US PUT OUR DIFFERENCES BEHIND US. LET US DEMONSTRATE  
MEASURED FLEXIBILITY IN OUR APPROACH, WHILE REMAINING  
STRONG IN OUR DETERMINATION TO REACH OUR OBJECTIVES OF ARMS  
REDUCTIONS, STABILITY, AND SECURITY. LET US BE LEADERS IN  
THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

DAM  
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