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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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Archivist: loj/loj
 FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
 Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	Pages 10-13 only, 4p Part 6/21/06 NIS F00-009/1, 7/71	12/20/82	B1, 133
2. paper	Soviet Central Committee and Supreme Soviet Meetings, 2p	ND	B1
3. report	K " " # 72 R " " # 73	11/25/82	B1
4. memo (8208099)	Richard Pipes to William Clark, Andropov's speech (with WPC initials), 1p R " " # 74	11/24/82	B1
5. memo (8208099)	Same as item #4 (with RR initials), 1p R " " # 75	11/24/82	B1
6. memo	L. Paul Bremer to Clark, re speech, 2p R " " # 76	11/23/82	B1
7. memo (8208099)	Pipes to Clark, re Andropov's speech, 1p R " " # 77	11/23/82	B1
8. report	Re Soviet Weekly, 2p PART " " # 78	11/24/82	B1
9. report	Re USSR: Andropov calls for action..., 1p R " " # 79	11/24/82	B1
10. report	Re Andropov Speech, 16p PART " " # 80	11/22/82	B3
11. memo (8290926)	Clark to the President, re Vice President's meeting with Andropov, 1p R " " # 81	11/22/82	B1
12. routing slip	FOR #90926 (partial 1p)	n.d.	B1/63

RESTRICTIONS

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B1, B3

Special Analysis

USSR: Andropov's Authority

Events since Yuriy Andropov's appointment as General Secretary suggest he has been given broad operational authority and a mandate to undertake major changes in personnel and possibly in policy. His power, however, is contingent on maintaining the support of the coalition that put him in office. At least for now, the Politburo can require collective approval of all key decisions. [redacted]

Andropov has emerged as the chief spokesman in foreign policy, and a few officials have referred to him as "head of the Politburo"--a position Brezhnev won only after several years in office. These indicators of status suggest Andropov enjoys more support than Brezhnev did at the outset of his tenure. [redacted]

New Faces

Although personnel changes since Brezhnev's death may have served a variety of political interests, Andropov probably approved them. The appointment of Azerbaydzhan party boss Aliyev to first deputy premier and full Politburo membership is likely to strengthen Andropov's hand in dealing with the government. Aliyev has been in the forefront of the campaign against corruption. [redacted]


The appointment to the Secretariat of former planning official Ryzhkov also may make it easier for Andropov to enforce compliance with party directives. Ryzhkov, like Andropov, has emphasized the need for greater executive discipline. [redacted]

Andropov probably approved of the recent dismissal of the Minister of Railways. The General Secretary earlier had criticized the Ministry's performance. [redacted]

Changes late last week in the leadership of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have given Andropov increased control over the entire security apparatus. Both Vitaliy Fedorchuk, now head of the MVD, and Viktor Chebrikov, who replaced him as KGB chief, have career ties to Andropov. [redacted]

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20 December 1982

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By CU, NARA, Date 6/21/06

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The promotion of Viktor Mishin to head the Komsomol also is likely to have been made at Andropov's behest. Mishin evidently has been responsible for screening entrants into the KGB Border Guards, and this work may have brought him to Andropov's attention when he was chief of the KGB.

[REDACTED] Andropov was responsible for appointing Boris Stukhalin to head the Central Committee's Propaganda Department.

[REDACTED] There also are rumors Chernenko has relinquished his post as head of the General Department, which plays an important role as the Politburo's central staff.

Sources of Strength

Andropov's leadership ability may be his primary political asset. Other Politburo members may regard him as the leader best qualified to deal with the problems that accumulated during Brezhnev's last years-

[REDACTED] Concern that these problems have become acute may incline Andropov's peers to let him take the lead in many areas, especially in foreign policy.

In his competition with Chernenko, Andropov reportedly had the backing of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov. They probably are confident Andropov's basic orientation on national security issues is sound.

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Many younger officials whose careers were stalled by the slow rate of promotions under Brezhnev may have welcomed Andropov's victory over Chernenko, who has been

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[Redacted]

closely associated with Brezhnev's personnel policies. Andropov's knowledge of derogatory information about his colleagues, which he acquired when he headed the KGB, is another political asset. [Redacted]

Limitations on Power

Andropov, however, is politically indebted to those leaders who supported him in his competition with Chernenko. The General Secretary's freedom of action is constrained by the need to pay close heed to the personal and institutional interests of his backers, especially Ustinov. [Redacted]

As a group, Andropov's colleagues on the Politburo have an interest in seeing that collective decisionmaking procedures are maintained. They may see Andropov's ties to the KGB as an implicit threat to the hegemony of party institutions. [Redacted]

The new policy of publicizing the holding of Politburo meetings may represent a collective effort to ensure that Andropov seeks Politburo approval for policy initiatives. On the Politburo only one man, Aliyev, has enjoyed Andropov's patronage. [Redacted]

Andropov's lack of experience in economic management may hamper his ability to make changes in this area.

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It is not clear whether Andropov has succeeded in wresting control over appointments to middle-level party jobs from Chernenko. [Redacted] a number of regional party officials looked to Chernenko for support against Andropov after Brezhnev's death but lacked time to organize effective opposition. [Redacted]

Andropov currently does not have a large clientele outside of the foreign policy, security, and ideology areas. His drive to build a political machine will be impeded by the degree of influence Chernenko can wield over personnel changes. [Redacted]

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20 December 1982


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In the government, Andropov still has to deal with Premier Tikhonov and an unchanged group of deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The Politburo's failure to name a replacement to Brezhnev as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet suggests Andropov was able to block the appointment of a leader he did not favor. It also indicates, however, that he lacked enough power to claim the job for himself or for one of his backers.



Andropov thus appears likely to increase his power in the Politburo only gradually. He probably will do so through policy-based alliances and through the replacement of Tikhonov and other elderly members.



This does not necessarily mean that substantial changes in policy and in personnel will not occur in the weeks and months ahead. Such changes occurred under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev as they moved to consolidate their holds on power. It does mean, however, that whatever major changes Andropov initiates will continue to depend on the approval of his peers in the Politburo.



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FILE

individual
Pipes

445 (ANDROPOV)

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8150

30 P 2: 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>#2</u>		<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION:

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Dated

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT:

State Analysis of Soviet Internal Policies

Attached for your information (Tab I) is a State Department analysis of the results of the recent Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings.

Attachments:

Tab I State's memorandum of November 24, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines August 23, 1997
By *MS* NARA, Date *3/7/01*



S/S 8236302

8150

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet Central Committee and Supreme Soviet
Meetings

We attach a recent analysis of these two meetings
prepared by the State Department.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Analysis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: QADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 23, 1997

By LOS NARA, Date 3/7/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Central Committee and Supreme Soviet Meetings --
Domestic Aspects

Leadership Developments

The Central Committee met in plenary session on November 22, and three changes in the leadership were announced. As expected, Andrey Kirilenko was dropped from the Politburo, ostensibly for reasons of health. Geydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's party chief, was named to full membership in the Politburo. Aliyev has long been considered a supporter of Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov's primary rival in the succession struggle. However, the intelligence community now believes that Aliyev's associations with Andropov may be even closer, since Aliyev was a KGB man before he gained the top Party spot in Azerbaijan in 1969. Aliyev may thus represent a compromise choice suitable to both Chernenko and Andropov supporters.

Central Committee member Nikolay Ryzhkov was named to replace Kirilenko as one of the Central Committee Secretaries. It is not known what responsibilities Ryzhkov will assume, although his background is in heavy industry. It should be noted also that 83-year-old Politburo member Arvid Pel'she did show up at the plenum, thus scotching reports he had died during Brezhnev's funeral. The total voting membership of the Politburo now stands at twelve, which is a little low, historically. If Andropov already has a working majority, keeping the Politburo small may suit his interests, at least until he can move his own men up through the ranks and into the Politburo. It may also indicate, however, that there is still disagreement within the Politburo over who to promote to bring the voting membership up to its more normal level of 13-14 persons.

At the November 23 meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Andropov was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Gromyko and Chernenko had been mentioned by many sources as possible alternatives to Andropov as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. However, since neither of them is on the Presidium of that body, the odds are very strong now that Andropov will be elected to the Chairmanship on November 24. If this occurs, it will mean that Andropov will have done in the space of only a few days what it took his predecessor, Leonid Brezhnev, nearly thirteen years to accomplish: he will simultaneously hold both the head of Party and head of State positions.

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NLS FOU-0091, #72

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DECL: OADR

29 CIS NARA, DATE 6/27/06

Economic Policy

Contrary to press accounts, we read Andropov's November 22 Plenum speech on the economy as offering only slight, though possibly revealing, shifts in nuances from recent Brezhnev pronouncements. The new Soviet leader set out an agenda of the USSR's mounting economic problems, but offered only tentative glimpses of his own preferences for dealing with them. Andropov did suggest that he will favor the stick, rather than the carrot, as an economic stimulus. He carefully refrained from promising miracles, confessing "I do not have any ready recipes for solution" of the "many tasks" facing the ailing economy. Andropov's remarks offered a rhetorical valedictory to the Brezhnev years, but shed only the dimmest of light on the nation's future path. Specifically, Andropov:

-- Admitted that the economic news was bad, "emphatically" noting that production plans had not been fulfilled over the past two years and acknowledging the looming constraints on Soviet labor, raw material and energy supplies;

-- Acknowledged the importance of material incentives, but placed more emphasis than his predecessor on the need for discipline in the economy, declaring that "shoddy work, inactivity and irresponsibility should have an immediate and unavoidable effect on the earnings, official status and moral prestige of workers;"

-- Pledged to continue Brezhnev's commitment to improving the living conditions of Soviet consumers, while distancing himself personally by referring to it as this "question which Leonid Ilich thought particularly important;" and

-- Called for more independence for Soviet industrial managers, particularly those who "boldly introduce new technology," and for importing successful managerial techniques from abroad. However, Andropov did not embrace the cause of economic reform too tightly, noting "it is necessary to act with caution here."

Following Brezhnev's practice, Andropov also included a ritual pledge to "provide the army and the navy with everything necessary." Unlike his predecessor, Andropov associated his leadership colleagues with this policy which, he averred, "the Politburo considers compulsory."

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Morning Summary

11/25/82

Andropov

2. KADAR AND ANDROPOV A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Hungary is counting on Andropov's continued support for its reform policies. Party chief Kadar, who over the years has deftly used his close ties with Andropov to promote economic reforms, has recently announced the institution of electoral reforms requiring multiple candidacies for most seats in the National Assembly and local councils.

* * *

Kadar was probably elated over Andropov's succession. Andropov served as ambassador to Budapest during the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 and the imposition of the Kadar regime. The two have maintained good relations since Andropov's stint as party secretary in charge of relations with other East European parties. Their close relationship was evidenced most recently during Andropov's visit to Budapest last December.

Insiders in the Hungarian party describe Andropov as a "special friend." Indeed, with some prescience about future political changes in the USSR, Kadar implicitly paid respect to his special relationship with Andropov last June when he appointed Sandor Rajnai, a long-time friend of the new Soviet leader and former Hungarian ambassador to Romania, as ambassador to Moscow.

Ever since Brezhnev's praise of Hungary's agricultural experience at the 1981 CPSU congress, the Soviet media have spoken approvingly of Hungary's economic reforms and have hinted at their applicability to the USSR. Andropov indicated his support for Kadar's policies in his November 22 speech before the plenum in which he stressed the need for industrial enterprises and farms to demonstrate greater independence--a key element in Hungary's economic reforms.

Kadar appears confident that the new Soviet leader will not oppose electoral reforms. The Soviets, who previously were said to have "spit at the reform," have apparently temporized. Hungarian party leaders recently described these reforms to visiting US officials as a further "democratization of the political system." Although this does not signal a return to a multiparty system, it is likely to raise the hackles of some of Hungary's Warsaw Pact neighbors.

Kadar's close ties to Andropov may also be invoked on such issues as improving the conditions for the more than 2 million ethnic Hungarians in Romania. While Kadar has sought to keep the problem under wraps, other officials, the media, and dissidents as well no longer regard the discussion of the ethnic issue as taboo. A recent appeal to Prime Minister Lazar by more than 70 Hungarian intellectuals protesting the treatment of Hungarians in Romania suggests that there may be an attempt to exploit the Kadar-Andropov connection on this issue.

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
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National Security Council The White House

Package # 8099

NOV 24 10:44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>_____</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>_____</u>
Judge Clark	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
John Poindexter	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>_____</u>	<u>N</u>
Sit Room	<u>4</u>	<u>11/24/77</u>	<u>DACOM TO JUDGE</u>



I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 24, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

INFO HAS BEEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Analysis of Andropov's Speech of November 22, 1982

The Department of State has sent the attached analysis (Tab I) of Andropov's address of November 22. The turgid document concludes that "the speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in Moscow's overall approach to East-West relations". This is true as far as it goes except that there are in the speech some interesting nuances which deserve notice:

- The emphasis is on the need for economic reform, with strong hints it should follow the Hungarian model.
- The emphasis on Soviet relations with Asian countries (China and India, above all) which suggests a possible drive to attain detente in Asia in order to be better able to face the American "threat".

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum of November 23, 1982.

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NLS FOI-009/1, #74a CW NARA, DATE 6/21/06

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

November 24, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

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Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum of November 23, 1982.

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NLS FOUO-009/1 # 75a: OV NARA, DATE 6/21/06



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Andropov's Plenum Speech - Foreign Policy Aspects

Andropov's speech at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee November 22 is a shrewd effort to capitalize on the positive atmosphere and rising international expectations surrounding the succession. The speech also provided him an opportunity to put his own personal stamp on the tone, if not yet the substance, of post-Brezhnev Soviet foreign policy.

The essence of this new tone is to convey a greater sense of Soviet flexibility and reasonableness through verbal moderation, without making any concessions on substantive issues. By so doing, Andropov intends to reassure his domestic constituencies of the continuity of Soviet foreign policy; provide further momentum to an improvement in Moscow's relations with the Third World, China and Western Europe; and place the U.S. on the defensive, thus maneuvering Washington closer to an arms control-centered relationship similar to detente.

Andropov begins his speech by reassuring the CPSU, the Soviet military, and the USSR's allies and friends that Soviet foreign policy will continue to pursue the line set out by his predecessor; that the Soviet armed forces will continue to receive "everything necessary;" and that Moscow will vigorously pursue development of relations with like-minded Socialist nations. Following up on the fence-mending begun during the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov then makes a direct appeal for improvement of Soviet relations with "our great neighbor" China, the Third World (with special mention of India), and Western Europe.

The most striking element of the speech, however, is an explicit call for return to the detente relationship of the 1970s, centering on arms control negotiations with the United States and Western Europe. Declaring that "the future belongs to this policy," Andropov calls for a relationship based on "reciprocity and equality," explicitly rejecting linkage between normal U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and "some sort of preliminary concessions in different fields." By avoiding direct criticism of the U.S. by name or direct mention of regional issues such as Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea, Andropov conveys moderation to West European ears and relegates Soviet international behavior to a category beyond serious mention.

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In this way, he sets the stage to emphasize the issue which he wishes to be the litmus test of East-West relations: arms control. On this issue, he takes care to strike a measured and moderate tone, asserting that the Soviets want neither "the dispute of ideas to grow into a confrontation of states" nor "arms. . . to become a gauge of the potentials of social systems." He stresses a desire for both nuclear and conventional arms negotiations and implicitly criticizes the U.S. position by condemning "talks for the sake of talks" and mere restatements of existing differences. He refrains, however, from the sort of explicit criticism of U.S. motives and proposals that other Soviet spokesmen have advanced in recent weeks. Several times he says that any agreement must reflect "the interests of both sides," but quickly qualifies this with the warning that no one should expect unilateral disarmament from the USSR. He concludes by repeating Brezhnev's call for a freeze on strategic arsenals as a first step to a START agreement.

The speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in Moscow's overall approach to East-West relations. It does, however, represent a tactical refinement in the way the new leadership intends to pursue familiar objectives. Many of these tactical adjustments were evident during the last year of the Brezhnev period -- and may indeed have been inspired by the Andropov ascendancy then taking place -- but we can expect them to be accelerated now that Andropov has taken over in his own right. Thus, the playing up of potential U.S.-European differences on East-West relations and the encouragement of the Western nuclear freeze movement may now be reinforced by a more direct appeal to the nostalgia for detente. This may be supported by an attempt to subordinate regional issues, and thus linkage, by muting the rhetorical battle over these issues. The Soviets also may hope to dissipate international resistance to their goals in Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea by talking compromise and openly courting the nations (China, Pakistan, the West Europeans) whose support we need to maintain pressure for Soviet concessions. The new leadership probably hopes, in turn, that all these developments will increase pressures on Washington to reduce its demands for an overall bilateral improvement and to acquiesce in Moscow's desire to place arms control at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations.



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 23, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES ^{MS}

SUBJECT: Andropov's Speech

I have no desire to blow my own trumpet, but Andropov's speech yesterday seems to confirm my long-held conviction that the post-Brezhnev Soviet leadership will have no choice but to undertake serious economic reforms. Especially noteworthy is his reference to "extending the independence" of Soviet economic institutions and "taking into account the experience of fraternal countries". These are code words for adopting the Hungarian model of economic decentralization and business-like management of enterprises. The fact that, according to Andropov, the Politburo has ordered the Council of Ministers and Gosplan (State Planning Commission) to take effective steps in this direction indicates that he is in earnest. Such moves, if implemented, could have the most momentous consequences for Soviet foreign and military policies.

cc: Norman Bailey
William Martin
Roger Robinson

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NLS F00-009/1 #77BY CN NARA DATE 6/21/06

Andropov



Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Current Analysis Series

November 24, 1982

SOVIET WEEKLY

Andropov at the Helm

Since taking over as General Secretary, Andropov has sought to play up two themes:

Continuity of policy: By emphasizing continuity, Andropov apparently has sought to reassure Soviet officialdom and the populace, as well as to underscore the legitimacy of the successor regime as the inheritor of an unbroken tradition.

his own role as national leader: Andropov has projected an image of himself as the man in charge of domestic affairs and as the spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs. This line is designed to enhance his prestige at home and to scotch speculation abroad that the succession has hamstrung Soviet policy.

On domestic policy, Andropov, in his November 22 speech to the Central Committee, was more candid than Brezhnev on the shortcomings of the Soviet economy, but he stopped short of offering quick fixes. On foreign policy, he again underscored Moscow's abiding interest in detente, but he dismissed the contention that it was up to Moscow to alter its behavior. The USSR was prepared to negotiate with the US, he said, but would not make concessions in advance. (C)

Personnel Changes Reflect Compromises

Andropov was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and can be designated to act on its behalf when required. But no one has been elected chairman of the Presidium, and it appears that a touchy decision was put off.

Azərbayaydşhan Party Chief Aliyev moved up from candidate to full member of the Politburo and became First Deputy Premier. Aliyev was in the KGB from 1941 to 1969 and has some common background with Andropov. In recent years, however, he has made a point of publicly identifying himself with Brezhnev and Chernenko. His promotion may be more of a gesture to the Brezhnevites than a clear victory for Andropov.

Kirilenko retired with honor as expected. Despite rumors of his death, 88-year-old Pelshe, who had missed Brezhnev's funeral, appeared at the Supreme Soviet meeting yesterday.

A relative unknown--Ryzhkov of Gosplan--moved into the party Secretariat to work in Kirilenko's field of industrial management.

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By CIA, NARA, Date 6/2/01

He doubtless will be beholden to Andropov for promotion, but it will be some time before he can be a serious candidate for Politburo rank. ~~ACT~~

Appointment to Suslov's old position as chairman of the foreign affairs commission of the upper house may be a sign that Chernenko has taken Suslov's portfolio in the party secretariat for ideology. If so, he has probably lost his rumored role in senior personnel appointments.

MX Decision Attacked

Moscow appears to have anticipated the President's speech. Both Andropov's rejection of advance concessions and Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko's article for Newsweek deploring US failure to ratify SALT II seem to have been intended to get the contrasting Soviet view into the Western press at the same time.

Media reaction labelled the MX decision a dangerous new step in the arms race, charged the President with using falsified data in his depiction of the balance, and played up critical statements by American opponents of MX deployment. The media have said nothing about the President's proposals for confidence-building measures. (C)

Better Relations with China

Andropov's ~~plan~~ speech reaffirmed Soviet interest in normalizing relations with China. Echoing a theme Brezhnev used on October 27, he expressed readiness to pay great attention to positive moves by China.

B1

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Drafted: INR/SEE analysts:kmw
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Approved: INR/CA - Mr. Stoddard
x22402

11/24/82

3. USSR: ANDROPOV CALLS FOR ACTION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Andropov's plenum speech on November 22 eschewed the optimism and scapegoating which marked Brezhnev's rhetoric on such occasions. The new Soviet leader urged a reappraisal of economic policy and encouraged the granting of more rights to local managers. At the same time, Andropov bowed to the necessity of acting with caution.

* * *

Andropov's candid admission of economic shortfalls was the most striking element of his speech. Brezhnev's repeated calls for action had lost credibility. Andropov may be readier to demonstrate his authority. He threatened officials who are unable to change their ways; in particular, he warned that the railroad management faces a shaking up for its inability to move the nation's freight.

Andropov admitted that he did not have "ready recipes" for the major problems, but he promised action in specific areas:

- The Politburo has instructed the government and Gosplan to study ways to loosen controls over economic management, taking account of bloc experience. Hungarian models may get a green light.
- Incentives should be created for the introduction of new technology into production. Slogans alone are insufficient.
- Energy conservation must be pressed; new standing commissions on energy are being created in the Supreme Soviet.
- Personnel with organizing ability and a sense of new techniques must be assigned to key sectors.
- The workers must be indoctrinated with an understanding of the link between better work discipline and better living conditions.

Andropov's plenum statement that the armed forces received "everything needed" preceded the Tuesday announcement of the 1983 published defense budget as a declining share of the national budget (17.05 billion rubles or 4.8 percent of the total, compared to 17.05 billion rubles or 5.3 percent of the total in 1982).

Andropov said that Brezhnev's Food Program was still the official policy and will get a large share of the budget. But he avoided any commitment to the controversial plan for local administration, and his aloofness suggests that the program may be revamped. He admitted continuing food shortages and referred to this year's grain harvest only to say that it was better than last year's.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-009/1 #79CIV NARA. DATE 6/21/06

*per request
of L Andropov
27
Richard Pipes*

FBI 60'''' (SEE 56)

TASS: 'TEXT' OF ANDROPOV SPEECH

██████████ MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1348 GMT 22 NOV 82

B3

TAKE 1--TEXT OF ANDROPOV SPEECH

(TEXT) MOSCOW NOVEMBER 22 TASS -- YURIY ANDROPOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MADE A SPEECH TODAY AT A PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. FOLLOWS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH:

"WE ARE CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT PLAN AND DRAFT BUDGET FOR THE NEXT YEAR OF THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIAL REMARKS WHICH WERE MADE AT THE POLITICAL BUREAU HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO US. I THINK THAT DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALSO THE PROPOSALS WHICH WE ARE EXPRESSING TODAY, COMRADES.

JUDGING BY WHAT WAS SAID BY COMRADES WHO SPOKE AT THE PLENARY MEETING, OUR GENERAL OPINION IS THIS: THE DRAFT PLAN AND DRAFT BUDGET ON THE WHOLE ACCORD WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU AND THEY SHOULD BE APPROVED.

WHAT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE DRAFT PLAN? IT IS INTENDED TO ACCELERATE THE RATES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TO INCREASE THE ABSOLUTE AMOUNTS OF INCREMENT IN NATIONAL INCOME, INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AND IN THE VOLUME OF RETAIL GOODS TURNOVER. PROVISION IS MADE FOR A CONTINUATION OF WORK TO RAISE THE EFFECIENCY OF THE ECONOMY -- STRENUOUS ASSIGNMENTS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED WITH A COMPARATIVELY LESSER INCREASE IN MATERIAL EXPENDITURE AND LABOUR RESOURCES.

FBIS 61

TAKE 2--60 (TEXT OF ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///PARTY'S PRIORITY GOAL.

B3

(TEXT) DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS AS USUAL HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE POLITICAL BUREAU HAS CONSIDERED AND CONSIDERS IT COMPULSORY, PARTICULARLY IN THE PRESENT-DAY INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, TO PROVIDE THE ARMY AND THE NAVY WITH EVERYTHING NECESSARY.

THE DRAFT BUDGET ENSURES THE FINANCING OF THE ECONOMY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.

COMRADES, THIS PLENARY MEETING OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS TAKING PLACE AT AN IMPORTANT STAGE OF EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE PLANS OF THE ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PERIOD -- ON THE EVE OF ITS THIRD, CORE-LIKE, SO TO SAY, YEAR. WE HAVE DONE A GOOD DEAL. BUT DIFFICULT AND STRENUOUS WORK LIES AHEAD.

I WOULD LIKE EMPHATICALLY TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT BY A NUMBER OF KEY INDICATORS THE PLANNED TARGETS OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD TURNED OUT TO BE UNFULFILLED. THIS, NATURALLY, ALSO TELLS ON THE DRAFT PLAN WHICH WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS REMEMBER THE LAST SPEECHES BY LEONID ILICH BREZHNEV AND HIS NOTES TO THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MATTERS. THE QUESTION WAS PUT THUS: AT PARTY CONGRESSES AND AT PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WE HAVE WORKED OUT A SCIENTIFICALLY SUBSTANTIATED ECONOMIC POLICY AND HAVE TAKEN A COURSE TOWARDS RAISING THE EFFECIENCY OF PRODUCTION AND TOWARDS ITS INTENSIFICATION. BUT THE SWITCHING OF OUR ECONOMY TO THESE LINES, THE TURN TOWARDS EFFECIENCY ARE BEING CARRIED OUT STILL SLOWLY.

30

THE CHIEF INDICATOR OF THE ECONOMY'S EFFICIENCY -- LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY -- GROWS AT A RATE WHICH CANNOT SATISFY US. THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAW-MATERIAL AND PROCESSING BRANCHES STILL REMAINS. THE MATERIALS INTENSIVENESS OF OUTPUT DOES NOT PRACTICALLY DIMINISH.

PLAN TARGETS CONTINUE TO BE MET AT THE PRICE OF LARGE OUTLAYS AND PRODUCTION COSTS. THERE STILL ARE QUITE A FEW ECONOMIC MANAGERS WHO, WHILE READILY QUOTING LEONID ILICH'S FAMOUS WORDS THAT THE ECONOMY SHOULD BE ECONOMICAL, ARE DOING LITTLE IN PRACTICE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK.

APPARENTLY, THE STRENGTH OF INERTIA AND ADHERENCE TO OLD WAYS ARE STILL AT WORK. MOREOVER, SOME PEOPLE, PERHAPS, JUST DO NOT KNOW HOW TO SET ABOUT DOING THE JOB. THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE HELP THAT MUST BE ACCORDED SUCH COMRADES. THE MAIN THING, HOWEVER, IS TO SPEED UP WORK TO IMPROVE THE ENTIRE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING ADMINISTRATION, PLANNING AND THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM.

CONDITIONS, BOTH ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL, SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENCOURAGE QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVE WORK, INITIATIVE AND ENTERPRISE. CONVERSELY, SHODDY WORK, INACTIVITY AND IRRESPONSIBILITY SHOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND UNAVOIDABLE EFFECT ON THE EARNINGS, OFFICIAL STATUS AND MORAL PRESTIGE OF WORKERS.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR OBSERVING THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE STATE AND THE WHOLE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ENHANCED AND DEPARTMENTALISM AND PAROCHIALISM SHOULD BE RESOLUTELY UPROOTED. IT SHOULD BECOME LAW THAT ANY NEW DECISION ON THE SAME QUESTION BE TAKEN ONLY AFTER PAST DECISIONS HAVE BEEN FULFILLED OR AFTER ANY NEW CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE EMERGED. ANY BREACHES OF PARTY, STATE AND LABOUR DISCIPLINE SHOULD BE CONTRATTED MORE RESOLUTELY. I AM CERTAIN THAT WE WILL BE GIVEN HERE UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT BY THE PARTY AND TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS, SUPPORT BY ALL THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

(MORE)

22 NOV 1956Z [REDACTED]

B3

TAKE 3 -- 60 (TEXT OF ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

B3

(TEXT) A GOOD DEAL HAS BEEN SAID LATELY ABOUT THE NEED TO EXTEND THE INDEPENDENCE OF AMALGAMATIONS, ENTERPRISES AND COLLECTIVE AND STATE FARMS. THE TIME SEEMS TO HAVE COME TO TACKLE THIS PROBLEM IN PRACTICE. THE POLITBUREAU HAS INSTRUCTED THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE STATE PLANNING COMMITTEE ON THIS SCORE. IT IS NECESSARY TO ACT WITH CAUTION HERE, TO CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS IF NEED BE, TO MAKE APPRAISALS AND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EXPERIENCE OF FRATERNAL COUNTRIES. THE EXTENSION OF INDEPENDENCE SHOULD IN EVERY CASE BE COMBINED WITH THE ENHANCEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND WITH CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE.

WE HAVE LARGE RESERVES IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. THIS WAS POINTED OUT, IN PARTICULAR, IN TODAY'S SPEECHES. THESE RESERVES SHOULD BE SOUGHT IN SPEEDING UP SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND IN THE LARGE-SCALE AND SPEEDY INTRODUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND ADVANCED EXPERIENCE IN PRODUCTION. THIS QUESTION IS NOT NEW, OF COURSE. IT HAS BEEN RAISED MORE THAN ONCE AT THE PARTY'S CONGRESSES AND AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S PLENARY MEETINGS. NEVERTHELESS, PROGRESS IS SLOW. WHY SO? THE ANSWER, TOO, IS LONG KNOWN: TO INTRODUCE A NEW METHOD OR NEW TECHNOLOGY, PRODUCTION HAS TO BE REORGANIZED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, AND THIS AFFECTS FULFILMENT OF PLAN TARGETS. MOREOVER, YOU MAY BE TAKEN TO TASK FOR FAILING PRODUCTION PLANS BUT ONLY SCOLDED AT THE MOST FOR POOR INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY.

IF WE REALLY WANT TO ADVANCE THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NEW WORK METHODS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE CENTRAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT BODIES, THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE MINISTRIES SHOULD NOT MERELY POPULARISE THEM BUT SHOULD IDENTIFY AND REMOVE THE ACTUAL DIFFICULTIES HAMPERING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS. THE ALLIANCE OF SCIENCE AND PRODUCTION SHOULD BE PROMOTED BY PLANNING METHODS AND BY THE SYSTEM OF MATERIAL INCENTIVES. IT IS NECESSARY TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THOSE WHO BOLDLY INTRODUCE NEW TECHNOLOGY DO NOT FIND THEMSELVES AT A DISADVANTAGE.

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ANOTHER MAJOR RESERVE IS THE RATIONAL USE OF MATERIAL AND LABOUR RESOURCES. THE PLAN FOR 1983 FIXES HIGHER TARGETS FOR SAVING THESE RESOURCES. I SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF CONRADES TO THE FACT THAT NOW THE QUESTION OF SAVING MATERIAL RESOURCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN A NEW LIGHT AND NOT LIKE "I HAVE SAVED -- GOOD; I HAVE NOT SAVED -- NOT SO BAD EITHER".

TODAY SAVING, A THRIFTY ATTITUDE TO THE PEOPLE'S WEAL AMOUNT TO THE QUESTION OF OUR PLAN TARGETS BEING REALISTIC. (SENTENCE AS RECEIVED) THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE ENSURED BY A WHOLE SYSTEM OF PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN PRIMARILY BY THE STATE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE USSR, THE STATE COMMITTEE OF THE USSR FOR MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPLY, MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS. A GOOD DEAL IS TO BE DONE BY ALL THE PARTY COMMITTEES, BY ALL THE PARTY ORGANISATIONS.

WE HAVE QUITE A FEW EXAMPLES OF CREATIVE WORK AND OF A TRULY THRIFTY ATTITUDE TO THE PEOPLE'S WEAL. THIS EXPERIENCE, REGRETTABLY, IS NOT PROPERLY DISSEMINATED. MEANWHILE, AS A RULE, NO PARTICULAR EXPENDITURES ARE NEEDED HERE. THIS MEANS THAT ANOTHER THING IS LACKING, NAMELY, INITIATIVE AND RESOLUTE STRUGGLE AGAINST MISMANAGEMENT AND WASTEFULNESS.

NATURALLY, THIS TASK CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF EVERY WORKER, EVERYONE WORKING AT OUR ENTERPRISES AND COLLECTIVE AND STATE FARMS. WE SHOULD STRIVE TO ENSURE THAT THEY PERCEIVE THIS TASK AS THEIR OWN CAUSE.

TO SUM IT UP, CONRADES, THERE ARE MANY RIPE TASKS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. OF COURSE, I DO NOT HAVE READY RECIPES FOR THEIR SOLUTION. BUT IT IS ALL OF US, THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WHO ARE TO FIND ANSWERS TO THEM THROUGH DRAWING GENERAL CONCLUSIONS FROM DOMESTIC AND WORLD EXPERIENCE AND THROUGH ACCUMULATING THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE BEST PRACTICAL WORKERS AND SCIENTISTS. IN SHORT, YOU CANNOT GET THINGS MOVING BY SLOGANS ALONE. IT TAKES LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATIONAL WORK OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, ECONOMIC MANAGERS AND ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FOR EACH OF THESE VAST AND IMPORTANT TASKS TO BE ANALYSED NOT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF EVERY ECONOMIC SECTOR BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF EVERY PLANT, WORKSHOP, PRODUCTION SECTION AND, IF YOU WISH, EVERY WORKPLACE.

(MORE)

///WISH, EVERY WORKPLACE.

B3

(TEXT) I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THESE QUESTIONS ARE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE AND VITAL TO THE COUNTRY. IF WE RESOLVE THEM SUCCESSFULLY, THE ECONOMY WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE POPULATION WILL RISE.

THE MEASURES RELATED TO THE FULFILMENT OF THE FOOD PROGRAM ARE CENTRAL TO OUR PLANS.

THE INITIAL STEPS TO FULFIL THE DECISIONS OF THE MAY 1982 PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD TO BE TAKEN IN A RATHER DIFFICULT SITUATION. THE WEATHER DID NOT SMILE ON US THIS YEAR EITHER. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO COMMEND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS ON THEIR DEDICATED EFFORTS. THANKS TO THIS AND THANKS TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURE, A NUMBER OF REGIONS, TERRITORIES AND REPUBLICS HAVE ACHIEVED GOOD RESULTS. THE GRAIN HARVEST HAS PERCEPTIBLY GROWN OVER LAST YEAR'S AND GOOD HARVESTS OF COTTON, VEGETABLES AND GRAPES HAVE BEEN GROWN. THE PRODUCTION OF MILK AND EGGS HAS INCREASED. THE SUBSIDIARY FARMS OF INDUSTRIAL PLANTS ARE GAINING STRENGTH. CONCERN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL SUBSIDIARY PLOTS IS JUSTIFYING ITSELF AS WELL. AT THE SAME TIME INTERRUPTIONS IN THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN FOOD PRODUCTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN REMOVED.

EVERYONE UNDERSTANDS, OF COURSE, THAT THE COUNTRY'S FOOD PROGRAM CANNOT BE FULFILLED ONE YEAR. THIS IS SO. BUT WE SHOULD FORTHRIGHTLY SAY, TOO, THAT THE FULFILMENT OF THE FOOD PROGRAM MUST NOT BE DRAGGED OUT. WORKERS OF THE AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX SHOULD INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS FROM DAY TO DAY AND WORK SO THAT THE HUGE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK SHOULD PAY BACK ALREADY TODAY AND YIELD EVEN A HIGHER PAYBACK TOMORROW.

THE POLITBUREAU BELIEVES THAT THE FORTHCOMING PLENARY MEETINGS AND MEETINGS OF ACTIVISTS OF PARTY COMMITTEES AND THE SESSIONS OF THE SOVIETS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES WHICH WILL REVIEW PLANS FOR NEXT YEAR SHOULD DISCUSS PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS OF THE MAY 1982 PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. IT IS NECESSARY THAT ALL PRACTICAL ACTIONS IN THIS IMPORTANT SECTION OF THE ECONOMY SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN THE CONTEXT

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I WILL NOT DWELL AT LENGTH ON THE NEED TO COMPLETE THE AGRICULTURAL YEAR SUCCESSFULLY, TO PRESERVE THE GATHERED HARVEST, TO DO THE GROUNDWORK FOR NEXT YEAR'S HARVEST AND TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL LIVESTOCK WINTERING. ALL THIS GOES WITHOUT SAYING. IT IS NECESSARY TO PASS ON PROMPTLY TO THE SOLUTION OF NEW PROBLEMS AND TO CONSIDER THEM IN CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BASIC DIRECTIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGROINDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WITH DUE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HERE A COMPLEX IN WHICH THERE ARE NO SECONDARY TASKS.

THE PLAN FOR 1983 ATTACHES MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE GROWTH OF PRODUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT OF QUALITY OF CONSUMER GOODS, A QUESTION WHICH LEONID ILICH THOUGHT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. THE TASK HERE IS NOT ONLY TO INCREASE THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS BUT ALSO TO CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THEIR QUALITY. THIS APPLIES NOT ONLY TO LIGHT AND LOCAL INDUSTRIES BUT ALSO TO PLANTS IN THE HEAVY AND DEFENCE INDUSTRIES.

AS COMRADE BAYBAKOV RIGHTLY STATED HERE, LOCAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BODIES SHOULD CONCERN THEMSELVES DIRECTLY WITH THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS. INDEED, WE CANNOT CONSIDER IT NORMAL WHEN QUESTIONS OF THE PRODUCTION OF A NUMBER OF ORDINARY GOODS ARE DECIDED ALMOST BY THE STATE PLANNING COMMITTEE OF THE USSR. IT IS NECESSARY THAT LOCAL BODIES CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH THESE MATTERS AND ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TACKLING THEM.

NOW PERMIT ME TO ADDRESS CERTAIN KEY PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC INDUSTRIES, TO BEGIN WITH, THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX. AN INCREMENT OF ABOUT 41 MILLION TONS OF REFERENCE FUEL IN THE PRIMARY ENERGY RESOURCES PLANNED FOR 1983 IS QUITE REALISTIC. IT MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ENSURE THE UNINTERRUPTED AND SMOOTH WORK OF ALL THE ENERGY SYSTEMS.

IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO USE THRIFTILY COAL, NATURAL GAS, OIL, PETROPRODUCTS, HEAT AND ELECTRIC ENERGY.

(MORE)

22 NOV 21422 [REDACTED]

B3

3
FBIS 69

TAKE 5 -- 60 (TEXT OF ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///AND ELECTRIC ENERGY.

B3

(TEXT) OF COURSE, THIS CALLS FOR CERTAIN REORGANIZATION IN ALL THE SECTORS, FIRST AND FOREMOST FOR THE LARGE-SCALE INTRODUCTION OF ENERGY-SAVING TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION PROCESSES, FOR IMPROVED RATES AND QUOTAS, FOR USING MATERIAL AND MORAL INCENTIVES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THRIFTINESS, AND FOR A STRICTER ATTITUDE TO EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURES, TO EXCEEDING RATES AND LIMITS.

IT IS PLANNED TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL AT THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET TO ORGANIZE AT THE SOVIET OF THE UNION AND AT THE SOVIET OF NATIONALITIES STANDING COMMISSIONS ON ENERGY WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO SUPERVISE THE WORK OF MINISTRIES AND TO CALL TO TASK ECONOMIC MANAGERS OF ANY RANK FOR WASTEFUL USE OF RESOURCES.

THE WORK OF THE COMMISSIONS SET UP IN TERRITORIES, REGIONS AND REPUBLICS TO SUPERVISE THE ORGANIZATION OF SUCH CONTROL AT ENTERPRISES SHOULD BE REVITALIZED.

THE POLITBUREAU IS CONCERNED OVER THE SITUATION IN TRANSPORT. THE MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS STILL DOES NOT MEET THE NEEDS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF FUEL, TIMBER AND OTHER CARGOES. MANY SIGNALS TO THIS EFFECT ARE COMING TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT BODIES. THIS WAS MENTIONED ALSO AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM TODAY.

THE PERFORMANCE OF RAILROADS, REGRETTABLY, IS DETERIORATING FROM ONE YEAR TO THE NEXT DESPITE THE SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE VOLUME OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS SET ASIDE FOR THIS MINISTRY HAS GROWN BY 43 PER CENT AS COMPARED WITH 1975 AND THE FLEET OF TRUNK DIESEL AND ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES HAS INCREASED BY 23 PER CENT

THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF DECISIONS ON IMPROVING SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR RAILWAY WORKERS AND PERFECTING THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM OF TRANSPORT. HOWEVER, THE MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN HAVE NOT YET PAID BACK PROPERLY.

THE ORGANIZATION OF REPAIRS AND USE OF LOCOMOTIVES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF TRAFFIC ARE AT A LOW LEVEL AT THE MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS. APPARENTLY, NOT ONLY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY BUT ALSO THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL HAVE TO DRAW SERIOUS CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CRITICISM WHICH WAS EXPRESSED AT THE PLENUM HERE.

SETBACKS IN FERROUS METALLURGY HAVE BECOME MORE FREQUENT. LAST YEAR THE INDUSTRY DID NOT MEET ITS PLAN TARGETS AND THE SITUATION IS THE SAME THIS YEAR. THE NATIONAL ECONOMY HAS NOT RECEIVED SEVERAL MILLION TONS OF ROLLED STOCK. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION IN THE INDUSTRY SHOULD BE BORNE PRIMARILY BY THE MINISTRY OF FERROUS METALLURGY. OF COURSE, THERE ARE OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES AS WELL. A LARGE PORTION OF THE FIXED ASSETS REQUIRES RECONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION. THE MINISTRY NEEDS SERIOUS AID FROM THE STATE PLANNING COMMITTEE, THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPLY AND THE ENGINEERING MINISTRIES.

WE SET ASIDE VAST RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW PRODUCTION CAPACITIES AND FOR BUILDING HOUSING AND CULTURAL AND COMMUNAL PROJECTS. IT IS A TASK OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO USE THEM EFFECTIVELY. AT THE SAME TIME QUITE A FEW PROBLEMS ARE PERSISTING IN CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION. THE SCATTERING OF FORCES AND RESOURCES BETWEEN A HOST OF PROJECTS SHOULD BE COMBATED EVEN MORE RESOLUTELY. THE SHARE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND MODERNISATION SHOULD BE INCREASED AND THE NUMBER OF NEW CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REDUCED. WE ARE NOT PLEASED IN MANY WAYS WITH THE ORGANISATION OF CONSTRUCTION AS SUCH EITHER. THE SHORTCOMINGS HERE RESULT YEAR AFTER YEAR IN FAILURE TO MEET PLAN TARGETS FOR PUTTING NEW PRODUCTION CAPACITIES INTO OPERATION. A NUMBER OF MINISTRIES CONCERNED WITH CONSTRUCTION ARE REDUCING THE VOLUME OF CONSTRUCTION AND ASSEMBLY WORK, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT SETS ASIDE CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL RESOURCES, MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT TO STRENGTHEN THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL BASIS OF THOSE MINISTRIES. THE QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION AND ASSEMBLY WORK REMAINS POOR IN MANY CASES. BUILDING ORGANISATIONS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY MOBILE.

(MORE)

FBIS 70

TAKE 6 ---60 (TEXT OF ANDROPOV SPEECH)

//NOT SUFFICIENTLY MOBILE.



BB

(TEXT) NO NEW DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO REMOVE THESE SHORTCOMINGS AND THESE SHOULD BE UNDEVIATINGLY CARRIED OUT. PUTTING CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION IN BETTER ORDER IS ONE OF THE CENTRAL TASKS IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

I SHALL NOT DWELL TODAY ON OTHER SPHERES AND BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY. ALL OF THEM ARE IMPORTANT TO OUR SOCIETY, OUR PEOPLE, AND EVERY MINISTRY AND EVERY DEPARTMENT SHOULD THOROUGHLY ANALYZE AGAIN AND AGAIN THE STATE OF AFFAIRS, TO PLAN AND CARRY OUT MEASURES TO SOLVE THE EXISTING PROBLEMS. THE MAIN CRITERIUM BY WHICH THEY SHOULD ASSESS THEIR WORK IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE BRANCH IN QUESTION SATISFIES THE EVER-GROWING REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIETY.

A STEADY RISE OF THE ECONOMY AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE ARE BOTH OUR DUTY TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND OUR INTERNATIONALIST DUTY. IN POSING THE QUESTION IN THIS WAY THE PARTY IS GUIDED BY LENIN'S FAR-SIGHTED INJUNCTION THAT WE ARE EXERCISING OUR MAIN INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS THROUGH OUR ECONOMIC POLICY.

COMRADES,

THE DEATH OF LEONID ILICH BREZHNEV CAUSED ABROAD A LOT OF CONJECTURE CONCERNING THE FUTURE POLICY OF THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET STATE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. JUST THINK HOW MANY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS TO ASCRIBE TO THE SOVIET UNION ALL KIND OF SINISTER INTENTIONS, TO PORTRAY OUR POLICY AS AN AGGRESSIVE ONE, JEOPARDIZING THE SECURITY OF NOW ONE STATE, NOW ANOTHER. BUT NOW IT TURNS OUT THAT THEY WORRY LEST THIS POLICY MIGHT BE CHANGED. THE CONTINUATION OF THIS POLICY IS SEEN AS AN IMPORTANT PRECONDITION FOR PEACE AND TRANQUILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.

3^c

I MUST SAY WITH A FULL SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY THAT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE DECISIONS OF THE 24TH, 25TH AND 26TH CONGRESSES OF OUR PARTY. THE INVARIABLE AIMS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY ARE TO ENSURE A LASTING PEACE AND TO DEFEND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES TO INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THESE AIMS THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE WILL BE ACTING CONSISTENTLY AND THOUGHTFULLY IN LINE WITH ITS PRINCIPLES.

WE THINK THAT THE DIFFICULTIES AND TENSION CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CAN AND MUST BE OVERCOME. HANKIND CANNOT ENDLESSLY PUT UP WITH THE ARMS RACE AND WITH WARS UNLESS IT WANTS TO PUT ITS FUTURE AT STAKE. THE CPSU DOES NOT WANT THE DISPUTE OF IDEAS TO GROW INTO A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN STATES AND PEOPLES; IT DOES NOT WANT ARMS AND THE READINESS TO USE THEM TO BECOME A GAUGE OF THE POTENTIALS OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

THE AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS OF IMPERIALISM COMPELS US, TOGETHER WITH THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST STATES, TO SHOW CONCERN, AND IN EARNEST AT THAT, FOR MAINTAINING OUR DEFENCE CAPABILITY AT A PROPER LEVEL. BUT, AS WAS STRESSED BY LEONID ILICH MORE THAN ONCE, MILITARY RIVALRY IS NOT OUR CHOICE. THE IDEAL OF SOCIALISM IS A WORLD WITHOUT ARMS.

THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF OUR PARTY WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. IN UNITY LIES OUR STRENGTH, AN EARNEST OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS EVEN IN MOST SERIOUS TRIALS.

(MORE)


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TAKE 7 -- (TEXT OF ANDROPOV SPEECH)

///MOST SERIOUS TRIALS.



B3

(TEXT) ALL THE PLANS OF THE COMMUNITY OF SOCIALIST STATES ARE PLANS OF PEACE AND CONSTRUCTION. WE WANT COMRADELY COOPERATION AND SOCIALIST MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AMONG THE FRATERNAL COUNTRIES TO GROW DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE, SPECIFICALLY IN THE JOINT SOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL, PRODUCTION, TRANSPORT, ENERGY AND OTHER PROBLEMS. FURTHER JOINT STEPS ARE NOW BEING PLANNED TOWARD THIS END.

THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET STATE SINCERELY WISH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. MUTUAL GOODWILL, RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND COMMON CONCERN FOR THE INTERESTS OF SOCIALISM AND PEACE SHOULD PROMPT CORRECT SOLUTIONS ALSO THERE, WHERE APPROPRIATE TRUST AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ARE STILL LACKING FOR VARIOUS REASONS.

THIS ALSO REFERS TO OUR GREAT NEIGHBOUR, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. THE IDEAS FORMULATED BY LEONID ILICH BREZHNEV IN HIS SPEECHES IN TASHKENT AND BAKU, THE EMPHASIS HE PUT ON COMMON SENSE, ON THE NEED TO OVERCOME THE INERTIA OF PREJUDICES EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION OF ALL OUR PARTY, ITS DESIRE TO LOOK AHEAD. WE PAY GREAT ATTENTION TO EVERY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS FROM THE CHINESE SIDE.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP OF STATES WHICH CREATED THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IS GROWING IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE. WITH MANY OF THEM THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALL-ROUND FRIENDLY TIES WHICH BENEFIT BOTH SIDES AND MAKE FOR GREATER STABILITY IN THE WORLD. ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA. SOLIDARITY WITH THE STATES WHICH HAVE GAINED FREEDOM FROM COLONIAL OPPRESSION, WITH THE PEOPLES WHO ARE UPHOLDING THEIR INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN AND REMAINS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET

SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF SOVIET POWER OUR STATE HAS BEEN INVARIABLY EXPRESSING READINESS FOR OPEN, HONEST COOPERATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES WHICH RECIPROCATE THESE SENTIMENTS. DIFFERENCES IN THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS MUST BE NO OBSTACLE TO THIS, AND THEY ARE NO OBSTACLE WHERE THERE IS GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES. THIS IS BORNE OUT CONVINCINGLY BY THE MARKED PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S PEACEFUL COOPERATION WITH MANY WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

WE ARE DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT THE SEVENTIES, CHARACTERISED BY DETENTE, WERE NOT -- AS IS ASSERTED TODAY BY CERTAIN IMPERIALIST LEADERS -- A CHANCE EPISODE IN THE DIFFICULT HISTORY OF MANKIND. NO, THE POLICY OF DETENTE IS BY NO MEANS A PAST STAGE. THE FUTURE BELONGS TO THIS POLICY.

ALL ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN PRESERVING PEACE AND DETENTE. THEREFORE, STATEMENTS IN WHICH THE READINESS FOR NORMALISING RELATIONS IS LINKED WITH THE DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION PAY FOR THIS WITH PRELIMINARY CONCESSIONS IN DIFFERENT FIELDS, DO NOT SOUND SERIOUS, TO SAY THE LEAST. WE SHALL NOT AGREE TO THIS AND, PROPERLY SPEAKING, WE HAVE NOTHING TO CANCEL; WE DID NOT INTRODUCE SANCTIONS AGAINST ANYONE, WE DID NOT DENOUNCE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS THAT WERE SIGNED AND WE DID NOT INTERRUPT TALKS THAT WERE STARTED. I SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS ONCE MORE THAT THE SOVIET UNION STANDS FOR ACCORD BUT THIS SHOULD BE SOUGHT ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND EQUALITY.

IN OUR OPINION THE POINT OF TALKS WITH THE USA AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES, PRIMARILY ON QUESTIONS OF RESTRAINING THE ARMS RACE, DOES NOT LIE IN THE STATEMENT OF DIFFERENCES. FOR US TALKS ARE A WAY OF JOINING EFFORTS BY DIFFERENT STATES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE RESULTS USEFUL TO ALL SIDES. THE PROBLEMS WILL NOT DISAPPEAR BY THEMSELVES IF THE TALKS ARE HELD FOR THE SAKE OF TALKS, AS IT UNFORTUNATELY HAPPENS NOT INFREQUENTLY. WE ARE FOR THE SEARCH OF A HEALTHY BASIS, ACCEPTABLE TO THE SIDES CONCERNED, FOR A SETTLEMENT OF MOST COMPLICATED PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY, OF COURSE, THE PROBLEMS OF CURBING THE ARMS RACE, INVOLVING BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS. BUT LET NO ONE EXPECT A UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT FROM US. WE ARE NOT NAIVE PEOPLE.

(MORE)

22 NOV 2231Z [REDACTED]

B3

B3

(TEXT) WE DO NOT DEMAND UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT FROM THE WEST. WE ARE FOR EQUALITY, FOR CONSIDERATION FOR THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES, FOR HONEST AGREEMENT. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

AS TO THE NUCLEAR STRATEGIC ARMS POSSESSED BY THE USSR AND THE USA, THE SOVIET UNION, AS IS KNOWN, AGREES THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD, AS THE FIRST STEP ON THE WAY TO A FUTURE AGREEMENT, FREEZE THEIR ARSENALS, AND THUS CREATE MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF TALKS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS THE VIEWPOINT OF THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO IMPRESS ON PEOPLE THE IDEA THAT FORCE, ARMS DECIDE AND WILL ALWAYS DECIDE EVERYTHING. TODAY, AS NEVER BEFORE, THE PEOPLES COME TO THE FOREFRONT OF HISTORY. THEY HAVE GAINED THE RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR SAY AND THEIR VOICE WILL NOT BE HUFFLED BY ANYONE. THEY ARE CAPABLE OF REMOVING, BY VIGOROUS AND PURPOSEFUL ACTIONS, THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, SAFEGUARDING PEACE AND HENCE LIFE ON THIS PLANET. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIET STATE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE THAT THIS SHOULD BE SO.

THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU CONCRETIZED THE PARTY'S LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR THE ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PERIOD AND FOR THE EIGHTIES AS A WHOLE. THIS STRATEGY IS AIMED AT SECURING THAT SOVIET PEOPLE LIVE BETTER FROM YEAR TO YEAR AND THAT THEIR WORK YIELD MORE AND MORE TANGIBLE RESULTS AND THAT OUR SOCIALIST SYSTEM REVEAL MORE AND MORE FULLY ITS HUMANE ESSENCE AND ITS CREATIVE POSSIBILITIES.

BIG AND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT NEW TASKS HAVE BEEN SET IN ALL FIELDS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. SUCCESS, OF COURSE, IS DEPENDENT ON MANY FACTORS AND FIRST OF ALL ON THE PURPOSEFUL COLLECTIVE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ON OUR ABILITY TO CONCENTRATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTY, STATE AND ECONOMIC BODIES, AND OF ALL WORKING COLLECTIVES ON KEY DIRECTIONS.

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MOBILIZE ALL MEANS WHICH ARE AT OUR DISPOSAL AND TO START POPULARISING WIDELY AND EXPLAINING THE TARGETS OF THE 1983 PLAN. THEY MUST BE CONCRETIZED IN REFERENCE TO THE TASKS OF EACH ENTERPRISE, EACH WORK COLLECTIVE. THIS IS FIRST.

SECONDLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO PLACE PERSONNEL CORRECTLY SO THAT IN THE DECISIVE SECTORS WE WOULD HAVE POLITICALLY MATURE, COMPETENT AND RESOURCEFUL PEOPLE, WITH ORGANIZING ABILITY AND A SENSE OF THE NEW, WITHOUT WHICH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MANAGE

OF THE MASSES OF WORKING PEOPLE THEMSELVES. TODAY THIS IS A KEY TASK OF THE PARTY COMMITTEES, THE SOVIETS, TRADE-UNION AND KOMSOMOL BODIES. THE PARTY'S IDEAS, PLANS AND CALLS BECOME A MATERIAL FORCE WHEN THEY GET HOLD OF THE MASSES. AT PRESENT, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY THAT EACH WORKER UNDERSTAND THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN DEPENDS ON HIS LABOUR CONTRIBUTION, TOO, AND THAT EVERYONE UNDERSTAND WELL THE SIMPLE TRUTH THAT THE BETTER WE SHALL WORK THE BETTER WE SHALL LIVE. AS LENIN EMPHASIZED, THE GREATER THE SCOPE OF OUR PLANS AND OUR PRODUCTION TASKS "THE LARGER MUST BE THE NUMBER OF THOSE ENLISTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAKING AN INDEPENDENT PART IN SOLVING THEM."

AND THIS MEANS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FURTHER TO DEVELOP SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE, I.E. TO SECURE A STILL MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE MASSES OF WORKING PEOPLE IN MANAGING STATE AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS. AND, OF COURSE, IT IS NEEDLESS TO PROVE HERE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO SHOW CARE FOR THE NEEDS OF THE WORKERS AND FOR THEIR WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS.

WE SHALL ALWAYS AND INVARIABLY BE TRUE TO THE LENINIST NORMS AND PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE BECOME FIRMLY ESTABLISHED IN THE LIFE OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE.

COMRADES, THE TASKS LYING AHEAD ARE IMMENSE AND COMPLEX BUT IT IS WITHIN THE PARTY'S POWER TO ACCOMPLISH THEM.

THE DAYS WHEN WE BADE LAST FAREWELL TO LEONID ILICH BREZHNEV HAVE SHOWN TO THE WHOLE WORLD AGAIN THAT OUR COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE ARE INSEPARABLE AND THAT THEIR STRIVING IS COMMON -- FIRMLY AND UNDEVIATINGLY TO PROCEED ALONG THE LENINIST ROAD.

SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE AGAIN SHOWN THEIR UTTER DEVOTION TO THE IDEAS OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THEIR DEEPEST RESPECT AND LOVE FOR THEIR OWN PARTY, A HIGH DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION, SELF-CONTROL, AND CONFIDENCE IN THEIR STRENGTH.

WE ARE ON THE EVE OF AN IMPORTANT EVENT IN THE HISTORY OF OUR MULTINATIONAL SOCIALIST STATE -- THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. THESE DAYS SOVIET PEOPLE TURN THEIR BEST THOUGHTS TO OUR LENINIST PARTY WHICH STOOD AT THE BEGINNINGS OF THE FORMATION OF THE USSR AND WISELY LEADS THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRY ALONG THE ROAD OF BUILDING COMMUNISM.

TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITY OF THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE AND FIRMLY TO FOLLOW THE BEHESTS OF GREAT LENIN -- HEREIN LIES THE EARNEST OF ALL OUR FUTURE TRIUMPHS!

(ENDALL)

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PIPES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 22, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: The Vice President's Meeting with Andropov

Attached (Tab A) is a memorandum of conversation of George Bush's meeting with Andropov last Monday, November 15.

Discussion: The tone of Andropov's remarks was courteous but firm. He said that

- the United States had caused the accumulated "stock of stability" between the two countries to be "squandered";
- it was urgent to reverse this process because if it continued the consequences could be catastrophic;
- this calls for a broadening of contacts and negotiations, especially in the field of arms control;
- whatever their stance toward each other in public, in their private negotiations the two parties should act in a businesslike fashion and refrain from making unrealistic demands;
- the United States must not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union or try to "dictate" to it what to do.

There was no hint either of a willingness to compromise or a readiness to cajole. The thrust of the argument was that since it is the Soviet Union that is the injured party, it is Washington's turn to start acting in a responsible fashion and to come up with reasonable proposals, especially in Geneva.

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

Attachment:

Tab A Memcon of the Vice President's meeting with Andropov (forwarded by Secretary Shultz)

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National Security Council The White House

Package # 27926

Aug: 24


	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Sit Room	<u>6</u>		<u>POT WITH</u> <u>TUES</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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 FOIA(b) (3)

