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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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Archivist: loj/loj
 FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
 Date: 7/29/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	101405Z Feb 84, 3p <i>K 6/21/06 NLS F00-009/1, #34</i>	2/10/84	B1
2. memo (8401205)	John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane, re Andropov's funeral and US-Soviet relations, 5p <i>R " " #35</i>	2/10/84	B1
3. memo (8490160)	Matlock to McFarlane, re US representation at Andropov funeral, 2p <i>R " " #36</i>	2/10/84	B1
4. memo (8490142)	Matlock to McFarlane, re What If...?, 1p <i>R " " #37</i>	2/6/84	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 1675
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 01675

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR ANDROPOV FUNERAL
- AND SUCCESSION

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

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NLS F00-009/1 #34

BY CW NARA, DATE 6/21/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 1675

DTG: 101405Z FEB 84 PSN: 040507

2. IF THE SAME SCENARIO IS FOLLOWED AS IN NOVEMBER 1982 FOLLOWING BREZHNEV'S DEATH, WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN CONNECTION WITH ANDROPOV'S FUNERAL AND THE SUCCESSION:

- (1) ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FUNERAL COMMISSION, TO COME POSSIBLY LATE THIS AFTERNOON (MOSCOW TIME). WHOEVER IS NAMED CHAIRMAN OF THE FUNERAL COMMISSION WILL BE THE ODDS-ON FAVORITE TO SUCCEED ANDROPOV AS GENERAL SECRETARY.

- (2) ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FUNERAL DATE AND MOURNING PERIOD, TO COME POSSIBLY AROUND NOON FEBRUARY 11 AFTER THE FUNERAL COMMISSION HAS MET. IN BREZHNEV'S CASE, THE MOURNING PERIOD LASTED FIVE DAYS, FROM NOVEMBER 11 THROUGH 15.

- (3) CONVOCAION OF A SPECIAL CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM TO ELECT A SUCCESSOR TO ANDROPOV AS GENERAL SECRETARY. IF THE BREZHNEV MODEL IS FOLLOWED, WE CAN EXPECT THE PLENUM TO BE HELD ON FEBRUARY 11 AND THE RESULT ANNOUNCED THAT AFTERNOON.

- (4) LYING IN STATE IN THE DOM SOYUZOV NEAR RED SQUARE, PROBABLY FEBRUARY 12 THROUGH 14, WITH VIEWING BY OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS AFTERNOON AND EVENING OF THE 13TH.

- (5) FUNERAL AT NOON IN RED SQUARE, PROBABLY ON FEBRUARY 14.

3. WE KNOW IN RETROSPECT THAT THE SUCCESSION TO BREZHNEV WAS ARRANGED WELL IN ADVANCE OF HIS DEATH,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 101405Z FEB 84 PSN: 040507

WHICH PERMITTED THE SEQUENCE OF FUNERAL AND SUCCESSION EVENTS TO BE PLAYED OUT IN A PROMPT AND ORDERLY FASHION. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS THAT THE SUCCESSION HAS ONCE AGAIN BEEN MANAGED IN ADVANCE, IT IS QUITE CONCEIVABLE THAT MANEUVERING MAY STILL BE GOING ON AMONG THE CONTENDERS AND THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN REACHED. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MAY IN THAT EVENT NOT FOLLOW THE BREZHNEV MODEL EXACTLY; IN PARTICULAR, THE SPECIAL CC PLENUM MIGHT POSSIBLY BE HELD AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE FUNERAL. FAILURE OF THE SCENARIO TO UNFOLD AS SMOOTHLY AS IT DID IN THE BREZHNEV CASE WOULD PROBABLY BE AN INDICATION OF DISARRAY WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP.

4. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A TASS STAFFER THAT HIS AGENCY IS STANDING BY FOR FURTHER OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS "AT ANY MOMENT."

HARTMAN

BT

C O N T I N G E N C Y

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Secretary
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: USG Response to Andropov Death

With the Soviet announcement today that Andropov has died, we need to take immediate decisions on the level of USG representation at the funeral, the makeup of our delegation, condolence messages from you and the President, and public statements. As was the case when Brezhnev died in November 1982, we believe that the appropriate level to lead the funeral delegation is the Vice President. In addition to you and Arthur Hartman, we also suggest that Majority Leader Baker and House Speaker O'Neill be made members of the delegation to provide political balance in an election year. The following items are included in this package for your approval:

- Tab A - Presidential Message to Soviet Head of State
- Tab B - Your Message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
- Tab C - White House Statement
- Tab D - Funeral Delegation
- Tab E - Vice President's Andrews AFB Departure Statement
- Tab F - Vice President's Moscow Arrival Statement
- Tab G - Vice President's Moscow Departure Statement

Drafted:EUR/SOV:SMann/BLPascoe
#5876B
Cleared:EUR/SOV:TWSimons, Jr.
EUR:MPalmer

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~~DECL:OADR~~

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Department of State Executive Order 11652, 1987

By WJS - NAGA, Date 3/7/01

SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTER GROMYKO

Tab B

Please accept my condolences on the death of Chairman Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov. His loss will, I am sure, be felt greatly by you and all of the Soviet leadership. In this period ~~of sorrow~~ I want to reaffirm our desire for peaceful and cooperative relations between our two countries. Please be assured that the development of such relations will continue to be a matter of the highest priority for my country. I look forward to working with you toward this end.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

Tab C

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. A delegation led by Vice President Bush and including Secretary Shultz, Senator Baker, Speaker O'Neill, Ambassador Hartman, and Assistant Secretary Burt will represent the United States at the memorial services in Moscow.

The influence of Chairman Andropov on the Soviet state was considerable. As Ambassador, Chairman of the Committee on State Security, and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, he played a role in his country's affairs and in international affairs equaled by few other Soviet citizens.

The President has emphasized to the people and government of the USSR his desire for cooperation between the two countries in the search to make this a better and more peaceful world. The United States hopes that the new Soviet leadership will work with us to that end. We hope as well that the leadership will join us in taking advantage of every opportunity to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

:

FUNERAL DELEGATION

Tab D

Vice President George Bush, Head of Delegation

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

US Ambassador to the USSR Arthur A. Hartman

Senator Howard Baker, Senate Majority Leader

Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker of the House

Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs

Statement by

Secretary of State ~~Message~~

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. I am sending a similar message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

At this time of transition in Moscow, let me reaffirm that our policy toward the Soviet Union continues to be based on the pursuit of a constructive and realistic dialogue aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. As the President has stressed, we seek not merely to improve the atmosphere of our relations, but to find solutions to real problems. This applies in particular to the task of reaching equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and reducing the risk of war.

The President has emphasized to the people and government of the Soviet Union his desire for constructive cooperation between our two countries in the search for a more peaceful world. The United States hopes that the Soviet leadership will work with us to that end. We hope as well that the new leadership will join us in taking advantage of every opportunity to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

Secretary of State's Message

The President is expressing his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the death of Chairman Andropov. I am sending a similar message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

At this time of transition in Moscow, let me reaffirm that our policy toward the Soviet Union continues to be based on the pursuit of a constructive and realistic dialogue aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. As the President has stressed, we seek not merely to improve the atmosphere of our relations, but to find solutions to real problems. This applies in particular to the task of reaching equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and reducing the risk of war.

The President has emphasized to the people and government of the Soviet Union his desire for constructive cooperation between our two countries in the search for a more peaceful world. The United States hopes that the Soviet leadership will work with us to that end. We hope as well that the new leadership will join us in taking advantage of every opportunity to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

White House Statement

The President has sent a message expressing his condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, the Acting Soviet Chief of State, on the death of Chairman Andropov. In his message, the President emphasized to the people and government of the USSR his desire for cooperation between the two countries in the search for a more peaceful world.

As the President reaffirmed in his address of January 16, the United States has sought and will continue to seek a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. Our objective is not dialogue for its own sake, but a dialogue that produces real solutions to the many concrete problems that divide us.

There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between the American and Soviet systems and our respective political beliefs. But the American and Soviet peoples have a common interest in the avoidance of war and the reduction of arms. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. policy.

The President's policy toward the Soviet Union seeks to achieve progress in three broad areas: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international relations; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with Moscow characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect.

At this time of transition in the Soviet Union, our two nations should look to the future in order to find ways to realize these goals. In the nuclear age, there is no alternative to dialogue.

The United States hopes that the Soviet leader will work with us in this spirit, and take advantage of the opportunities at hand to find common ground and establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SOVIET ACTING HEAD OF STATE

~~SECRET~~

Please accept my condolences on the death of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov. ~~Mr. Andropov served the Soviet state faithfully in his long career and his departure will be a serious loss to the Soviet people. I ask you to convey my deep sympathies to the Andropov family and the Soviet people.~~

At this solemn time, I wish to emphasize the deep and heartfelt desire of the American people for world peace. ~~There are well-known differences between our two countries, but I am confident that we can and will remain at peace.~~ We want genuine cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to make the world a better and more peaceful place for all mankind. At this moment in history, I invite the Soviet people and the new Soviet leadership to join with us in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

While our
perspectives may
differ both the
US & USSR have
a vital interest
in avoiding war.
~~to each other~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 10 9:38

IV

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

RECEIVED

FEB 10 11:06

MESSAGE NO. 1646 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASS No. Pages 4

FROM JOCK COVEY S/S
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION USG STATEMENTS ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER ANDROPOV

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	MR. KIMMETT		
	<u>MATLOCK - (Dobrianski) - Leniczowski</u>		
	<u>MARTIN</u>		

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS REPORTEDLY DICTATED BY BOB SYMMS TO LYNN PASCOE AT STATE, and cleared at NSC

Clearance please by ASAF.

S/S Officer: *gc* ^{ITA} *Quinn*

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

ANDROPOV.

no correct message
(Protocol)

- > - obviously not surprise
- no comment
- > - too early to predicate policies
- >(1) - message / address →
constructive dialogue.
- > - no mtg. has been arranged.

DEPA UNCLASSIFIED

EUR/SOV: LJGOODRICH
02/10/84 EXT. 26442 {04808}
EUR: RBURT

EUR/SOV: TWSIMONS, JR
PA: ASTOCKMAN

S/S: BMCKINLEY
EUR/SOV: BLPASCOE

IMMEDIATE ALDAC

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, UR, US

SUBJECT: USG STATEMENTS ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER
ANDROPOV

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF USG STATEMENTS ISSUED FEBRUARY 10 ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER ANDROPOV:
2. CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO SOVIET ACTING HEAD OF STATE.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY SYMPATHIES TO THE ANDROPOV FAMILY.

AT THIS SOLEMN TIME, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE DEEP AND HEARTFELT DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR WORLD PEACE. WHILE OUR PERSPECTIVES MAY DIFFER, BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN AVOIDING CONFLICT. WE WANT GENUINE COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER AND MORE PEACEFUL PLACE FOR ALL MANKIND. AT THIS MOMENT IN HISTORY, I INVITE THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO JOIN WITH US IN THIS

RB
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BLP
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ENDEAVOR.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.

3. CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF CHAIRMAN YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. HIS LOSS WILL, I AM SURE, BE FELT GREATLY BY YOU AND ALL OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IN THIS PERIOD OF MOURNING, I WANT TO REAFFIRM OUR DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR MY COUNTRY. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARD THIS END.

SINCERELY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT.

4. STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

BEGIN TEXT. AS THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED IN HIS JANUARY 16 ADDRESS, THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE PRODUCTIVE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP. OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT A DIALOGUE FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT A DIALOGUE WHICH PRODUCES REAL SOLUTIONS TO THE MANY CONCRETE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US. THERE ARE TO BE SURE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET SYSTEMS AND OUR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL BELIEFS. BUT THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR AND THE REDUCTION OF ARMS. IT IS THIS NEED TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE PEACE THAT IS AT THE HEART OF U.S. POLICY.

THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THREE BROAD AREAS: DEVELOPING WAYS TO ELIMINATE THE USE AND THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE VAST ARMED STOCKPILES IN THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND FINALLY ESTABLISHING A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING AND BASED ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND RESPECT. AT THIS TIME OF TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION OUR TWO NATIONS SHOULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS TO REALIZE THESE GOALS. IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO DIALOGUE.

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THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL WORK WITH US IN THIS SPIRIT AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND TO FIND COMMON GROUND AND ESTABLISH A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. END TEXT.

5. STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ.

BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESIDENT HAS EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL CONDOLENCES TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE DEATH OF CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV, AND I HAVE SENT A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

AT THIS TIME OF TRANSITION IN MOSCOW, LET ME REAFFIRM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE REMAIN READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, THE UNITED STATES WILL WORK TO BUILD A MORE STABLE AND MORE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STRESSED, WE SEEK TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO REAL PROBLEMS, NOT JUST TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR RELATIONS. THIS APPLIES, IN PARTICULAR, TO THE TASK OF REACHING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS FOR ARMS REDUCTION, AND REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR.

THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION HIS DESIRE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. WE INVITE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO WORK WITH US TO THAT END. THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND. LET US FIND COMMON GROUND AND LET US MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE. END TEXT.

6. STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

BEGIN TEXT. THE PRESIDENT TODAY HAS ASKED VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE FUNERAL OF SOVIET CHAIRMAN YURIY ANDROPOV. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT, WHEN IN MOSCOW, TO EXTEND CONDOLENCES AND GOOD WISHES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND TO EXPRESS TO THEM OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE.

THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS REQUESTED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY TO THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR HOPE FOR AN IMPROVED DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WHICH CAN LEAD TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

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7. POST MAY SHARE ABOVE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AS
APPROPRIATE. 44

UNCLASSIFIED

February 10, 1984

IMMEDIATE

FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY, BONN, FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. BURNS,
CRAIG DAVIDSON, AND
BILL BASS (ADVANCEMAN FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT)

FROM: SUSAN PORTER ROSE, CHIEF OF STAFF TO MRS. BUSH

SUBJECT: Mrs. Bush's Schedule in Bonn

Mrs. Bush will not now be accompanying the Vice President to Bonn. She will return to the United States at the conclusion of their stop in Luxembourg. We greatly appreciate everything you did regarding preparations for her and we all regret that her previously scheduled commitments on Tuesday necessitate her early return.

Thanks again.

cc: Admiral Murphy
Donald Gregg
Dan Sullivan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 10, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Andropov's Funeral and U.S.-Soviet Relations

In case the President is receiving a variety of recommendations that he should attend Andropov's funeral, he should be fully aware of the deleterious consequences of such a move.

Presumably the principal argument in favor of the President's attendance is that it will send a powerful signal that he is ready and anxious to improve relations with the Kremlin, and that therefore he is really a man of peace. This would be therefore yet another way that the President could underscore that America has regained its strength under his Administration and that we can now negotiate with the Soviets from our new position of strength more securely than before.

There are several major problems with this line of thinking which, if ignored, could yield political results that could inflict severe damage to everything the President has done so far to make the world a safer place.

Confusion About the Nature of Renewed American Strength

The principal problem here is that this argument does not reflect a proper understanding of how and why the U.S. is stronger today than in 1980 -- and that a misunderstanding of this nature could work to undo the real sources of renewed American strength. The unspoken assumption is that we have revived our military power and that as a result we can face the Soviets more confidently and negotiate with them now that we have some chips to play with. This attitude is not only prevalent within the Administration -- especially in the State Department -- but is widespread even in conservative Republican circles on the Hill, where there is talk about cutting the Defense budget now that we have allegedly done so much to redress military imbalances.

The problem is that our military buildup consists mostly of promissory notes -- and in real terms manifests itself today mostly in increased readiness and morale. Secretary Weinberger stated a few days ago to Congress that the Soviets have widened their margin of superiority over us in most categories even further.

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QJ NARA, DATE 6/21/06

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Declassify on: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The real source of our new national strength is in the moral-spiritual-political sphere -- a measure of strength to which the Soviets pay very close attention. As a matter of fact, they see our moral-political strength as the key criterion in their measurement of the correlation of forces; for this is what constitutes our national will -- our will to use force if necessary to defend our interests, our will to believe that our system has a future and is worth defending, and our will to recognize the realities of the world as they are and not as we would wish them to be.

Coddling Illusions and Wishful Thinking

If the President were to decide to attend Andropov's funeral, he would send the Soviets a major signal that this real strength was severely eroding. By going to Moscow and inevitably meeting with some Soviet officials, the President would be saying that he does not feel that he can ensure his reelection without coddling the illusions and wishful thinking of large portions of the electorate. Those illusions are that peace is achieved by better atmospherics and by such direct dialogue with the Soviets as is sufficient to clear up those "misunderstandings" which allegedly are the source of the U.S.-Soviet adversarial relationship. These illusions are bolstered further by the wishful thinking that a reduction of the President's allegedly hostile rhetoric will "improve relations."

The reason, of course, why these notions are illusions is that they rest on the assumptions that the Soviets are not truly a communist power with communist objectives, and that therefore there are no fundamental political reasons why U.S.-Soviet relations should necessarily be adversarial. That this is an extreme form of wishful thinking with no basis in fact needs no explanation. It derives from that pervasive Western penchant, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick recently explained, to disbelieve the horrible. Large chunks of the American people simply do not want to believe:

- That the Soviets are communists;
- That they must therefore have unlimited international objectives;
- That the destruction of American democracy is one of those objectives;
- That the Soviets do not share the same concept of peace that we strive for;
- That the Soviets continue to have an enormous Gulag with millions of slave laborers;
- That the mass murders of innocent Afghans are actually going on today, right now;

- That visiting Soviet trade representatives, academicians, "journalists," UN employees and Embassy personnel might actually be engaged in subversive actions that might conceivably do harm to our country;
- That the Soviets have actually broken various arms control agreements;
- That maybe the Soviets do not find it in their self interest to reach mutual, verifiable arms control treaties and comply with them;
- Etc.

An Improvement of Relations?

Some people may think that the question here is whether the President is more or less likely to get reelected by trying to win over the "wishful thinking" constituency by catering to their illusions. Indeed, the President can try such a strategy. Then, maybe his picture will appear on Time's cover shaking hands with Ustinov, presaging a new improvement of relations, a new "generation of peace." But would this represent a real improvement of relations, or would it be a deception of the world public that would merely reinforce the illusions of the wishful thinking constituency?

The fact is that it would not be a true improvement of relations -- at least not as we would define those terms. A real improvement of relations could take place only: a) if it were conducted on our terms -- i.e., by the Soviets exercising greater international restraint, withdrawing from Afghanistan, complying with arms agreements, stopping their military buildup, improving their human rights situation, etc.; or b) if it were conducted on Soviet terms -- i.e., by the U.S. silencing itself about Soviet aggression, silencing itself about Soviet human rights violations, letting bygones be bygones after 61 Americans are shot out of the air, by negotiating, signing and complying with arms control agreements that the Soviets will violate or at least circumvent (thus permitting further shifts in the military balance in their favor), by doing absolutely nothing when we catch them violating such agreements, by desensitizing the public and the Congress about the necessity of further defense spending through such silence about Soviet behavior, etc. So long as the Soviets remain communists and so long as we are committed to democracy, there can be no other formula to "improve relations." The best relations we can hope for are those where stability prevails, where the American people are under no illusions about the adversarial nature of the relationship, and where we are so strong that the Soviets will make no miscalculations.

A Message of Weakness to the Soviets

The fact is that an atmospheric "improvement of relations" would be a deception; and as such it would send a great signal of weakness to the Soviets. Before, Ronald Reagan showed the world that the Presidency could be won by telling the people the unadulterated truth. This was the real sign of American strength -- because the people as a whole were increasingly willing to face the ugly realities of the world, to reject disbelief in the horrible, and to tackle these realities with resolution and determination. Now, if reelection can only be won by coddling wishful thinking and calming public fears, the President will be telling the Soviets:

- That America is unwilling to face the truth and to hear the President tell the truth;
- That the electorate has thus forced the President to "tone down the rhetoric" -- which in practice means, stop reminding the country about the nature of the powerful empire we face;
- That therefore the American people are really ostriches at heart;
- That Soviet disinformation efforts to convince the American people that the USSR is not truly a communist power any more have been successful;
- That Soviet propaganda to intimidate the American people has been successful; and
- That Soviet power is so great that America has been forced to meet the Soviets increasingly on their terms.

Acknowledging the Flaws of Past Policy

The President's presence in Moscow now would also signal that his entire previous policy was flawed. It would acknowledge that before, he was not really a man of peace and that peace is not achieved by facing the truth, warning the people of dangers and building up the body, the spiritual strength and thus the credibility of our deterrent forces.

Peace on Whose Terms

In his January 16 speech, the President already extended an olive branch to the Soviets. He asked them to improve relations on our terms -- which is the only acceptable path. The ball is in the Soviets' court and it is their turn to respond. For the President to make an atmospheric gesture of the order of attending Andropov's funeral would be to play the role of a supplicant. It could even be perceived as an effort to compete with Walter Mondale for Kremlin support in the election. Instead the greatest move the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President could make toward achieving peace on our terms would be to show the Soviets he can get reelected without their help at all. The window of vulnerability is open today. The Soviets must be considering what they can do to demand American respect for all that power they have accumulated. Any sign of weakness now may encourage them that they can demand more respect than they have won thus far.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share this memorandum with the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 10 P1:08 *BAK*

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

Andropov
84 FEB 10 P1:41

MESSAGE NO 1614 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages 1

FROM CHILL S/S 22540
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SHULTZ STATEMENT RE DEATH OF ANDROPOV
2/10/84

<u>TO (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>BUD MCFARLANE</u> <i>Mcfarlane</i>	<u>456-2224</u>	

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS FYI.

S/S Officer: *BMC* *Jaw*

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

The President has expressed his personal condolences to the Soviet leadership on the death of Chairman Andropov, and I have sent a similar message to Foreign Minister Gromyko.

At this time of transition in Moscow, let me reaffirm the basic principles of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We remain ready for a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union. In this nuclear age, the United States will work to build a more stable and more positive relationship. As the President has stressed, we seek to find solutions to real problems, not just to improve the atmosphere of our relations. This applies, in particular, to the task of reaching equitable and verifiable agreements for arms reduction, and reducing the risk of war.

The President has made clear to the people and government of the Soviet Union his desire for constructive cooperation in the search for peace. We invite the Soviet leadership to work with us to that end. There are opportunities at hand. Let us find common ground, and let us make the world a safer place.

(February 10, 1984)

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
February 10, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: U.S. Representation at Andropov Funeral

Now that the Soviets have announced that the Andropov funeral will be held Tuesday, February 14, it would seem that the U.S. delegation will have to depart on Sunday, February 12 in order to arrive in Moscow on the 13th.

I understand from State that the President expressed reluctance to attend in a conversation with Secretary Shultz, since he did not want to seem to "pay homage" to a man of Andropov's character. The President's instinct is unquestionably right on the question of seeming to honor Andropov, but there are other factors which he probably should weigh before making a final decision. They are the following:

--Attending for the primary purpose of having a meeting with Chernenko (assuming he gets the nod over the weekend as the new General Secretary) would be consistent with his policy of dialogue;

--It would diminish domestic and Allied criticism that the President has never talked to the Soviet leader and reduce future pressure to go into an unprepared summit--while not pre-empting a real summit if developments should unexpectedly make one desirable;

--It would avoid seeming out of synch with those Western leaders who are going to the funeral (as of now, Kohl and Trudeau for sure, Thatcher probable, and Mitterand still a question mark).

--It would indicate clearly to the Soviet leadership that we are seriously interested in dealing with them.

It seems to me that these considerations somewhat outweigh the negative aspects, such as the implicit honor to Andropov's memory, and the risk of charges that he is playing politics. However, I think it would be well for him to wait until tomorrow morning, when more of the relevant facts will be clear, before making a final decision.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-009/1 #316

at CW NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Recommendation:

That, unless Secretary Shultz is strongly opposed, you discuss the question with the President and suggest that he think over and sleep on the question, with an eye to making a final decision tomorrow morning.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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And: open

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ODIP, UR, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO SOVIET ACTING HEAD OF
STATE

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE.

2. BEGIN QUOTE: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE
DEATH OF CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY
SYMPATHIES TO THE ANDROPOV FAMILY.

AT THIS SOLEMN TIME. I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE DEEP AND
HEARTFELT DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR WORLD
PEACE. WHILE OUR PERSPECTIVES MAY DIFFER. BOTH THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE U. S. HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN
AVOIDING CONFLICT. WE WANT GENUINE COOPERATION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER AND MORE
PEACEFUL PLACE FOR ALL MANKIND. AT THIS MOMENT IN
HISTORY, I INVITE THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE NEW SOVIET
LEADERSHIP TO JOIN WITH US IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN SHULTZ
BT

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EUR/SOV: LJGOODRICH
02/10/84 EXT. 26442 (04808)
EUR: RBURT

EUR/SOV: TMSIMONS, JR
PA: ASTOCKMAN

S/S: BMCKINLEY
EUR/SOV: BLPASCOE

IMMEDIATE ALDAC

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PGOV, UR, US

SUBJECT: USG STATEMENTS ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER
ANDROPOV

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF USG STATEMENTS ISSUED
FEBRUARY 10 ON DEATH OF SOVIET LEADER ANDROPOV:
2. CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO SOVIET ACTING
HEAD OF STATE.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH
OF CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MY
SYMPATHIES TO THE ANDROPOV FAMILY.

AT THIS SOLEMN TIME, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE DEEP AND
HEARTFELT DESIRE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR WORLD
PEACE. WHILE OUR PERSPECTIVES MAY DIFFER, BOTH THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VITAL
INTEREST IN AVOIDING COMPILICT. WE WANT GENUINE
COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE THE WORLD A
BETTER AND MORE PEACEFUL PLACE FOR ALL MANKIND. AT
THIS MOMENT IN HISTORY, I INVITE THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND
THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO JOIN WITH US IN THIS

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LJG
TMS
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ENDEAVOR.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.

3. CONDOLENCE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

BEGIN TEXT: PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF CHAIRMAN YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV. HIS LOSS WILL, I AM SURE, BE FELT GREATLY BY YOU AND ALL OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IN THIS PERIOD OF MOURNING, I WANT TO REAFFIRM OUR DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH RELATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR MY COUNTRY. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU TOWARD THIS END.

SINCERELY, GEORGE P. SHULTZ. END TEXT.

4. STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

BEGIN TEXT. AS THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED IN HIS JANUARY 16 ADDRESS, THE UNITED STATES HAS SOUGHT AND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE PRODUCTIVE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP. OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT A DIALOGUE FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT A DIALOGUE WHICH PRODUCES REAL SOLUTIONS TO THE MANY CONCRETE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US. THERE ARE TO BE SURE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET SYSTEMS AND OUR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL BELIEFS. BUT THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR AND THE REDUCTION OF ARMS. IT IS THIS NEED TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE PEACE THAT IS AT THE HEART OF U.S. POLICY.

THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THREE BROAD AREAS: DEVELOPING WAYS TO ELIMINATE THE USE AND THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE VAST ARMED STOCKPILES IN THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND FINALLY ESTABLISHING A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING AND BASED ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND RESPECT. AT THIS TIME OF TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION OUR TWO NATIONS SHOULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO FIND WAYS TO REALIZE THESE GOALS. IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO DIALOGUE.

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THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL WORK WITH US IN THIS SPIRIT AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND TO FIND COMMON GROUND AND ESTABLISH A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. END TEXT.

5. STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ.

BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESIDENT HAS EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL CONDOLENCES TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE DEATH OF CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV, AND I HAVE SENT A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

AT THIS TIME OF TRANSITION IN MOSCOW, LET ME REAFFIRM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE REMAIN READY FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, THE UNITED STATES WILL WORK TO BUILD A MORE STABLE AND MORE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STRESSED, WE SEEK TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO REAL PROBLEMS, NOT JUST TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR RELATIONS. THIS APPLIES, IN PARTICULAR, TO THE TASK OF REACHING EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS FOR ARMS REDUCTION, AND REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR.

THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION HIS DESIRE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. WE INVITE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO WORK WITH US TO THAT END. THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES AT HAND. LET US FIND COMMON GROUND AND LET US MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE. END TEXT.

6. STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

BEGIN TEXT. THE PRESIDENT TODAY HAS ASKED VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO BE HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE FUNERAL OF SOVIET CHAIRMAN YURIY ANDROPOV. THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT, WHEN IN MOSCOW, TO EXTEND CONDOLENCES AND GOOD WISHES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND TO EXPRESS TO THEM OUR STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE.

THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS REQUESTED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY TO THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP OUR HOPE FOR AN IMPROVED DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION WHICH CAN LEAD TO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

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7. POST MAY SHARE ABOVE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AS
APPROPRIATE. 44

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February 10, 1984

IMMEDIATE

FOR AMERICAN EMBASSY, BONN, FOR AMBASSADOR AND MRS. BURNS,
CRAIG DAVIDSON, AND
BILL BASS (ADVANCEMAN FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT)

FROM: SUSAN PORTER ROSE, CHIEF OF STAFF TO MRS. BUSH
SUBJECT: Mrs. Bush's Schedule in Bonn

Mrs. Bush will not now be accompanying the Vice President to Bonn. She will return to the United States at the conclusion of their stop in Luxembourg. We greatly appreciate everything you did regarding preparations for her and we all regret that her previously scheduled commitments on Tuesday necessitate her early return.

Thanks again.

cc: Admiral Murphy
Donald Gregg
Dan Sullivan

MEMORANDUM

Matlock

Andropov
SYSTEM II
90142

File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jew*

SUBJECT: What If Andropov Dies?

The sudden cancellation of Ustinov's visit to India suggests some major development on the Soviet internal scene, and the possibility which comes most readily to mind is that Andropov's condition has taken a turn for the worse. Without trying to make a prediction regarding what may in fact be happening, I believe we should give some preliminary thought to how we would react to Andropov's demise.

I believe that Andropov's passing should not be used as an argument for changing our basic policy: it is sound and should be pursued regardless of the identity of the Soviet leader. However, the President will have to make a quick decision as to whether to attend the funeral, and the decision could have an effect both on our public diplomacy and on our dialogue with Andropov's successor.

Most of the pros and cons regarding Presidential attendance at the funeral are readily apparent. On the "pro" side, it would relieve pressures for unplanned summitry and strengthen our stance in favor of dialogue. Among the "cons" are that it would be paying homage to a man even more inimical to U.S.-Soviet relations than Brezhnev, who was a secret policeman to boot, and in an election year it might smack of grandstanding.

My initial view is that the "pros" would slightly outweigh the "cons" if a successor has been named as General Secretary, since pressures for premature summitry could be relieved by a 30-minute meeting, and direct understandings reached regarding channels of communication. On the other hand, I would see no point in the President's going if a successor has not been named.

You may wish to ask George Shultz to give some thought to this question when he returns Wednesday. I have asked Rick Burt to have his people put together the relevant material on a very close-hold basis. I don't believe we need interagency tasking, which would risk press leaks, although Weinberger and Casey should presumably be consulted before a recommendation is made to the President.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOO-009/1 #37
CAS NARA, DATE 6/21/06

~~to the President~~
Andropov

January 25, 1984

ANDROPOV'S PRAVDA INTERVIEW

Q: What is your reaction to Andropov's Pravda interview?

A: -- We welcome Chairman Andropov's assertion that the Soviets also believe in dialogue, and we agree wholeheartedly that our common objective should be concrete agreements on the issues that divide our two countries.

-- As the President said, we think our policies over the the past three years have made the world a safer place, but that does not mean we think it is safe enough, and we are ready to redouble our efforts to work with the Soviets to reduce tensions and arms and make it safer still.

-- Steady American strength and prupose are essential if that effort is to be successful, and neither the Soviets nor anyone else have any reason to be afraid or to refuse to negotiate.

-- Some of the familiar Soviet proposals he mentioned do not seem very concrete to us. For our part, we have on the table a whole range of specific proposals that try to take into account some of the concerns he described.

-- We want a joint effort to get down to the business of solving these problems, and we are ready if the Soviets are. We are ready to sit down at any time to discuss solutions that deal realistically and equitably with both sides' interests and concerns.

-- Regarding intermediate-range missiles, it was Soviet deployments prior to the December 1979 NATO decision which upset the military balance, not the recent NATO deployments. At the UN, the President proposed a flexible framework for negotiations which could be the basis for agreement. In Geneva, the US had placed new proposals on the negotiating table just one week before the Soviets walked out.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 25, 1984

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AT LUNCHEON FOR NETWORK ANCHORS

The Roosevelt Room

Q Does the Andropov interview published today mean any fine-tuning of phrase here and there?

THE PRESIDENT: I think -- I welcome it and am willing to join them if they're -- want to talk. That's what -- that's all we've been waiting for and wanting. So I welcome that and I think that it is a reply to all this feeling that we have no communications with them. We do have and --

Q Do you see it as a conciliatory message from Andropov or not -- do you see it as a conciliatory response?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I saw it as that he, himself, expressed what we have. That he believes there should be a dialogue on some of the problems confronting us. So do I.

#