

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron December 1986 (1)
Box: 19

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1986 (1/4)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 19

YARHI-MILO

1904

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8692	MEMO	MATLOCK TO KEEL RE NEXT STEPS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	3	12/2/1986	B1
8693	MEMO	KEEL TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH SOVIETS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	ND	B1
8694	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE STRATEGY FOR THE SOVIETS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	6	11/14/1986	B1
8695	MEMO	BRINGING THE SOVIETS TO CLOSURE ON START/INF: FOUR STRATEGIES R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	ND	B1
8696	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	4	ND	B1
8697	MEMO	NOTIONAL PLAN FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	ND	B1
8698	MEMO	LINHARD TO MATLOCK RE YOUR PAPER, DATED 25 NOVEMBER R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	12/2/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1986 (1/4)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 19

YARHI-MILO

1904

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8699	CABLE	260345Z NOV 86 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	11/26/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II

90777

12/2/86

RESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Dealing with the Soviets

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a memorandum, summarizing his recommendations for our strategy in dealing with the Soviets (Tab A). This is largely an unexceptional review of rather routine matters which are going forward, except that the Secretary makes some recommendations for possible fundamental modifications in our approach to the various nuclear and space issues. It is not clear what status these recommendations have, since they have not been vetted in the Arms Control Support Group. In my judgment, it is premature and counter-productive to alter the positions we took at Reykjavik, at least until we determine where the Soviets stand currently on those issues. We also need to see the results of the meetings in Geneva on 2-6 December between our negotiators and their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, I have provided a brief Memorandum to the President to transmit the Shultz memorandum, which reserves your own position regarding these suggestions for NST, and indicates to the President that you will shortly be making additional recommendations for a strategy (Tab I).

I believe we need a much more dynamic approach to U.S.-Soviet relations over the next few weeks and months than is implied in the State approach (although I agree with Secretary Shultz that we should not push for high-level meetings). In my view, it should include the following:

-- A letter from the President to Gorbachev, which makes clear the President's desire to proceed along the track initiated in Reykjavik and points out the retrograde nature of Gorbachev's action in linking the conclusion of arms reduction agreements with a settlement of defense and space weapons issues. (A first draft is attached at TAB II.)

-- High-profile activity in the public arena, stressing the various parts of our agenda will be required. In this connection, I would note that there are at least two possible opportunities for exposure of the President in Soviet media -- an

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File-114/5 #8682

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

activity which not only has a potential impact on the USSR, but also good potential for public feed-back here. They are:

a. A proposal by the Alerdinck Foundation in the Netherlands for a one-hour TV interview to be played on Soviet TV; they are also proposing a similar interview of Gorbachev, to be played here. Interviewers would be four journalists from the U.S., Soviet Union and Europe. (Although we may not want to sign on for an hour, the organizers will probably settle for whatever time we are willing to suggest and would probably fit the ground rules to our desires.)

b. A series of questions submitted by TASS in writing to the President just before Reykjavik could be answered -- and the answer would probably be carried in the Soviet press, and played back here. (A draft is now being worked at the staff level.)

-- So far as the U.S. and European media are concerned, we will need both Presidential activity stressing elements of our agenda other than arms control, along with carefully orchestrated explanations of our policy to a wide range of audiences. We still have considerable selling to do of concepts such as eliminating ballistic missiles within ten years. We must orchestrate the "sales pitch" effectively.

Looking ahead to possible activities early next year, we might want to consider having the President make a speech outlining the specific conditions under which we would be able eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The President has often talked about the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons -- and taken some criticism from the public and the Allies for being visionary and/or ignoring the difficulties. However, this is potentially a very popular theme, and if the proposal is properly devised, it can embrace all the elements of our agenda and make them relevant to the overall theme of peace. At the same time, it would provide a ready explanation of why some disingenuous Soviet proposals are premature.

I have attached, at TAB III, an illustrative scheme which I worked out several months ago. It obviously would have to be scrubbed carefully and brought up to date, if it is to be used, but it may convey an idea of what I have in mind. Note that everything is there in each phase: human rights, regional conflicts, conventional arms balance, openness and contacts. What it amounts to is a plan which would require the transformation of the Soviet system (without saying so) before nuclear weapons are eliminated. And, in fact, only such a transformation would make such a step feasible.

There are dangers in making such a dramatic proposal, and these should be weighed carefully before making a recommendation to the President. For example, if it were presented in such a way as to

4

take attention off the first phase (essentially our current agenda), it could undermine our efforts to achieve our current priority objectives. Also, if it were sprung on our Allies without discussion or consultation, this could have a divisive effect. There is also the danger that the proposal might be viewed as pure propaganda.

Nevertheless, I believe these dangers may be avoidable if there is appropriate planning and consultation in advance, and care in drafting the statement so as to make clear the difference in short-term and longer-term goals.

Bill Cockell ^{bc} concurs; Bob Linhard ^{RL} concurs with recommendations 1. and 2., but believes recommendation 3. should be disapproved. Peter Rodman has a copy of the memo, but has provided no reaction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I, unless the Shultz memorandum has already been sent to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

2. That you approve in principle the idea of recommending a Presidential letter to Gorbachev along the lines of the text at Tab II.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

3. That you authorize further consideration of the desirability of developing a proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons along the lines of the points set forth in Tab III.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

NSC Staff Only ___

OR Interagency (ACSG) ___

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Shultz Memorandum for the President of November 14, 1986

Tab II Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Tab III Notional Plan for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALTON G. KEEL

SUBJECT: Strategy for Dealing with the Soviets

George Shultz has sent you a memorandum with a number of recommendations for dealing with the Soviets over the coming months. Most of what George says is eminently sound and I think it is desirable to continue the activity he has outlined in the various non-arms control elements of our agenda.

He also makes some suggestions for alternate approaches to reach closure on START and INF and in regard to SDI. I believe that these options need careful consideration by our special interagency arms control support group before you give them serious consideration. In fact, at this point, I believe it is preferable to press the Soviets for a clarification of their position on the various issues discussed at Reykjavik, as our negotiators are doing in their special meetings on 2-6 December with their Soviet counterparts in Geneva, before we give them any hints regarding further modification of our positions.

I emphatically agree, however, that we need an activist policy toward the Soviets, including the broad range of human rights, regional, and bilateral issues, in order to keep the pressure on them to follow through with their commitments at Reykjavik. It might also be useful for you to write Gorbachev again in an effort to pin him down on his commitments to you, and to indicate your interest in moving ahead and working on the remaining issues between us.

I am working with my staff on a draft letter for you to send and on several other proposals for high profile activity, which I will submit to you shortly.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of November 14, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8693
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/07

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

1

A

TIME STAMP

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

03 NOV 17 P 2: 41

SYSTEM II
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90777

ACTION OFFICER: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: _____

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Keel
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt <input type="checkbox"/> Burns <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro <input type="checkbox"/> Childress <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky <input type="checkbox"/> Donley <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer <input type="checkbox"/> Laux | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Lavin <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski <input type="checkbox"/> Levine <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Linhard <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> May <input type="checkbox"/> Mingle <input type="checkbox"/> Morton <input type="checkbox"/> Murdock <input type="checkbox"/> North <input type="checkbox"/> Perry <input type="checkbox"/> Platt <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ross <input type="checkbox"/> Sable <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer <input type="checkbox"/> Soos <input type="checkbox"/> Stark <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
|--|---|--|

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - Cockell
 - Keel (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - _____

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By oss NARA, Date 6/25/02

~~SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90777

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Strategy for the Soviets

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI 7-114/5 #78694
BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

Where We Are After Vienna

The outcome of the Vienna meeting has at least temporarily changed the context of our dialogue with Moscow. Since mid-1985, that dialogue has evolved within the framework of preparations for successive high-level meetings, at your level and mine. The summit process forced bureaucracies on both sides -- but particularly the Soviets -- to make decisions which would otherwise have been put off. The results have been impressive.

- In a series of steps culminating in Reykjavik, the Soviets have accepted our conceptual framework for arms control: substantial, verifiable reductions in offensive forces to low, equal levels; and continued exploration of prospects for strategic defense. Vienna showed that the results of Reykjavik will be difficult to translate into concrete agreements, but that these results are irreversible in political terms.
- In bilateral relations, we have put in place a vigorous and expanding framework of agreements and progress which demonstrates our ability to work with the Soviets on the basis of genuinely mutual benefit and reciprocity.
- Progress on the human rights and regional fronts has been more ambiguous, but the Soviets have agreed as a matter of practice that these issues are an integral part of the dialogue. Especially on human rights, the Soviets are increasingly being forced to debate the issues on our terms.

Thus, we have not only brought the Soviets to accept the four-part agenda you outlined in January, 1984, we have given real content, on our terms, to our insistence that the U.S. - Soviet dialogue extend beyond arms control. These accomplishments validate your policy of active engagement with Moscow, and put us in a strong position to deal with the Soviets, even in the absence of a framework of high-level meetings.

10

It is not clear how long the Soviets' current intransigent approach will last. In Vienna, they were clearly more interested in engaging in propaganda games than serious negotiation -- an echo of 1983-1984, when they walked out of the Geneva talks and took over a year to come back. This time they are playing smarter. They are not only staying at the table in Geneva, but have asked for meetings between rounds, to which we have agreed.

This could mean that the Soviets will reengage fairly quickly, enabling us to resume serious discussion without much loss of momentum. But they could also simply be seeking to convey an image of reasonableness as they seek to build pressure on us through our allies and congressional/public opinion in this country.

What We Should Do

These are tactics we have seen before, and will no doubt see again. Our experience since 1984 suggests that a major reorientation of our own strategy is unnecessary. We do need to be clear on our overall objectives, and pay special attention to tactics.

Specifically, we should aim in the period ahead to:

- Force the Soviets to address seriously and build on the progress which was made in Reykjavik.
- As an integral part of this effort, deny them the opportunity to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and between the Administration and Congress.
- Sustain the momentum of our bilateral relations, forcing the Soviets to assume the blame for any slow-down.
- Give greater content to the regional and human rights elements of the agenda.

The Allied Dimension

Effective management of our relations with our closest allies will be particularly important to our success during this period. The Allies have for the most part avoided public expressions of concern over the implications for NATO and Europe of the discussion in Reykjavik. In private, however, and with the UK, France and the FRG in the lead, they have expressed deep reservations about moving dramatically on nuclear reductions without addressing the conventional balance. Mrs. Thatcher has been particularly adamant in this regard.

To prevent the Soviets from exploiting these concerns, or the Allies from exploring alternatives to the Transatlantic security relationship, we need to develop a program for alliance management over the months ahead. The thrust of such a program would be three-fold:

- To demonstrate that our follow-up to the Reykjavik meeting will not threaten nuclear deterrence or the Alliance's flexible response strategy, we should initiate a thorough discussion (by permreps, NATO committees, and the December NAC and DPC Ministerials) of our vision of deterrence in a world with fewer nuclear weapons. Such a discussion would also be an opportunity to emphasize conventional force improvements.
- To give the Allies something they can use with their publics, we should find means of highlighting the intensive consultations we have engaged in in the wake of the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings, and which will continue in the weeks ahead.
- To deny the Soviets the ability to exploit the issue across the board, we should resolve our differences in the Halifax Task Force over the forum for pursuing European conventional arms control negotiations.

These efforts should come together at the December NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers' meetings, where we will seek communique which send a strong signal of Allied solidarity on the full range of security issues.

Congress

The Soviets' other main target will be Congress, particularly the new Democratic majority in the Senate. To the extent we can, we should preempt this effort by taking the initiative to brief key leaders on Soviet behavior at Vienna and our analysis of their motives. As with the Allies, we can make the case that our policy of building our strength and negotiating with the Soviets is working, and must continue if the agreements outlined in Reykjavik are to be realized. We should also emphasize such areas as human rights, where we and the Hill will be able to make common cause.

Arms Control Next Steps

Both with the Soviets and the Allies, our ability to dominate the arms control agenda will be critical to our success. Reykjavik has put us in a strong position to keep the pressure on Moscow.

- We have the basic elements for initial agreements on START and INF. Remaining obstacles (sublimits, throw weight, verification, SRINF) should not be insuperable once the Soviets decide to close.
- Nuclear testing is not so far along, but our current objective -- to get talks started -- is less ambitious. We are agreed on the essential elements of an agenda, and the Soviets may be prepared to be flexible in order to cover withdrawal from their self-imposed moratorium.
- Defense/Space is the most open subject: while both sides propose a ten-year non-withdrawal period, differences remain over testing constraints during that period, as well as over the nature of offensive reductions in the second five years.

Our basic objective should be to complete and bring into force the 50% START and 0/100 INF agreements as soon as possible. We can identify four ways in which this objective might be achieved:

- Continue our effort to separate START and INF from other subjects, arguing that agreements in these areas are in our mutual interests and should be brought into force.
- Add a 10-year ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment, coupling such a commitment to 50% START and 0/100 INF reductions. Negotiations on further steps, including elimination of ballistic missiles, would continue.
- Execute START and INF reductions over ten years, and link non-withdrawal to the faithful implementation of these reductions.
- Agree to reduce from 6000 warheads in the second five years to a small residual strategic force. Such an agreement on the second five years would allow the entire package discussed at Reykjavik to come into force.

We should explore the pros and cons of these options thoroughly, and on a priority basis, so that we can engage quickly when the Soviets get serious. I have attached a paper which might serve as the basis for such a discussion. Once our review is complete, we may decide to take the initiative along one of these lines. In the meantime, our Geneva negotiators will have a chance during their early December rump session to press the Soviets once again for a serious post-Reykjavik follow-up.

The Full Agenda

While our Allies, Congress and the Soviets will be focusing on arms control, we will need to keep up the pressure on the rest of the agenda as well. Specifically:

- On the bilateral side, there is no indication that the Soviets are backing away from their commitments. The danger is that our bureaucracy will do their work for them, by lapsing into inaction in the absence of the stimulus provided by the summit process. We should lock the Soviets into negotiations on the text of a risk reduction center agreement, set dates for a second session of our proposed Bilateral Review Commission, and proceed with the fusion cooperation program. We should also accelerate interagency consideration of exploratory meetings with the Soviets on new agreements in the areas of transportation, energy and the basic sciences. A firm NSC lead will be necessary to keep the process moving.

- On human rights, we will continue in our bilateral contacts to press on emigration and specific cases. The Vienna CSCE Follow-on Meeting will give us another means to keep the spotlight on human rights and to press for improved compliance. Deeds -- emigration, specific cases -- are our bottom line, but we should also seek Soviet agreement to some form of post-Vienna activity. This could take the form of one or more of the following: the U.S. "Helsinki Observers" proposal; the Dutch consultative committee; the Danish human rights conference; or, under the right conditions, Shevardnadze's proposal for a Moscow CSCE "representative forum." Together with our Allies, we should probe the Soviet invitation, expressing our readiness to consider it if the Soviets meet our other CSCE objectives, agree to consider Western proposals, and agree to conditions that would make the Moscow meeting meaningful.

- We proposed in Vienna a new round of experts discussions on regional issues. This forum has been a useful one for laying down markers on issues of concern to us, and we will press Moscow if a response is not forthcoming soon. We hope to start the next round with discussion on Southern Africa. Geopolitical issues lie at the heart of the U.S. - Soviet competition. They have received relatively little attention in recent high-level exchanges, and we will press for a round of Under-secretary-level (Armacost-Vorontsov) talks early in the new year.

High Level Meetings

Pressing the Soviets now for further meetings at my level -- to say nothing of yours -- would convey an inaccurate sense of over-eagerness on our part. Too early a meeting could simply lock the Soviets into their current unconstructive approach. We can afford at this stage to be patient on high-level meetings, waiting for them to take the initiative once they have concluded there is nothing to gain by indirect pressure.

Attachment: Paper: "Bringing the Soviets to Closure on
START/INF: Four Strategies"

15

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Bringing the Soviets to Closure on START/INF:
Four Strategies

- I. Seek to separate START and INF from other subjects, arguing that agreements in these areas are in our mutual interest and should be brought into force.

While this is the most straightforward path to realization of START and INF agreements, we cannot assume the Soviets will agree to these reductions without something on defense; they certainly are not prepared to do this now. This leads to consideration of other packages.

- II. Add a ten-year ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment, coupling such a commitment to 50% START and 0/100 INF reductions. Negotiations would continue on further steps, including elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

Reduction of strategic forces by 50% and SS-20's by 90% would be dramatic steps, and would warrant something on defense. If the package permitted some flexibility for testing during this period, a 10-year non-withdrawal commitment would not damage the SDI program, and such an agreement would broaden support for SDI in the Congress.

- III. Execute the START and INF reductions over ten years; and link non-withdrawal to faithful implementation of these reductions.

The reductions to 6,000 strategic warheads and 100 INF warheads would be divided into 10 equal increments from 1987 through 1996. We would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty so long as these reductions were faithfully implemented. This would be similar to the first phase of our July 25 proposal, with the reductions deepened from 30% to 50%, and the time stretched from 5-7 years to 10 years. Other aspects, such as elimination of ballistic missiles and sharing the benefits of SDI would be addressed in subsequent negotiations.

- IV. Agree to reduce from 6000 warheads in the second five years to a small residual force.

We can consider such an approach if it becomes necessary to break the current impasse over the reductions in the second five years (elimination of ballistic missiles vs. elimination of strategic forces) in order to secure Soviet agreement to the entire package discussed in Reykjavik.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-714/5 #8695
BY Ci NARA DATE 11/29/07

14

11

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since our meetings in Reykjavik I have given considerable thought to the issues we discussed and to the future of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I think it is clear that we made substantial progress in bridging our positions on a number of important issues. I hope that you will agree with me that our task now is to proceed from the basis we reached in Reykjavik and press on to find solutions acceptable to both of us for the problems which remain.

What strikes me most, as I review our discussions in Iceland, is the way we succeeded in focusing on practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons radically and to move toward a world totally free of them. We, of course, had agreed previously on these objectives in general. But I have the feeling that our meetings in Hofdi House were qualitatively different from earlier discussions, in that, for the first time, we began to agree on concrete and practical steps to move us toward these goals.

Though details remain for our negotiators to work out, it seems to me that we now are essentially in agreement on the basic elements of a treaty to reduce longer-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles to an interim global ceiling of 100 warheads on each side, to be located outside of Europe. We also seem very close to agreeing on the basic elements of a treaty to reduce strategic weapons by fifty percent in five years. [In this instance, the question of sublimits remains an unresolved issue. However, since you have proposed deep cuts in your heavy missiles, and a 50% cut in each leg of the triad of nuclear forces -- both of which proposals imply the existence of sublimits -- our negotiators should be able to work out precise figures which are mutually acceptable if we authorize them to deal with the question in a constructive way.] We also have agreed on the approach to negotiations on nuclear testing. In sum, so far as three of the four key nuclear-related areas are concerned, we should be able to bridge the remaining differences rapidly if we approach the questions with the proper political will.

In the fourth area, that of defensive and space weapons, we also made substantial progress, in particular by agreeing that there could be, under appropriate circumstances, a mutual commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years. Still, some major points remain at issue, and we should lose no time in seeking to resolve them.

In this connection, I hope you recognize that my proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles by 1996 was made, among other reasons, to accommodate the concerns you expressed to me in

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8096

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

Geneva about the danger that strategic defenses could be used as part of an offensive, first-strike strategy. Obviously, if we eliminate our ballistic missiles before deploying advanced strategic defenses, such a strategy would be impossible. You are of course aware that my proposal has been questioned by some American Allies, and even by some of my own specialists, as too forthcoming. In fact, it would require the elimination of some of the most advanced weapon systems in the American arsenal. However, this is a step which I am prepared to take in the interest of genuine and radical arms reduction. Therefore, my proposal remains on the table, and I believe that you will see, after analysis and reflection, that acceptance of it would contribute to the security of both our countries.

As I told you at Reykjavik and earlier, I endorse the goal of ultimately eliminating all nuclear weapons. It is important for us not only to keep this goal in the public eye, but to develop a practical strategy for moving toward it. This is why I welcomed your comprehensive proposal in January. However, I believe we must recognize that our ability to eliminate nuclear weapons will depend not only on steps to reduce nuclear weapons as such, but also on creation of an overall international security environment which makes nuclear weapons unnecessary. A reasonable conventional arms balance, the absence of threatening international behavior (including, of course, the aggressive use of conventional arms), the existence of trust based on openness and demonstrated willingness to settle disputes peacefully, and the development of effective non-nuclear defenses will all be essential elements of a world in which nuclear weapons can be eliminated. This is why I have made so many proposals to deal with these matters -- and it is why I will continue to do so.

Nevertheless, we both must recognize that progress has been very slow, and in some important areas there has been none at all. For example, I see no sign that the Soviet Union is making any genuine practical moves to end its colonial war in Afghanistan.

In mentioning this, my purpose is not to revive at this time our debate on Afghanistan and other regional conflicts. Rather, it is to explain why I believe we must find ways to take the first steps toward nuclear arms reduction, without attempting to settle all the key issues between our countries at once. If we try to do everything at once, we will probably find that we are able to do nothing. As we both have noted, history expects and deserves better of us.

Of course, either of us can condition our proposals any way we wish. From the American point of view, it greatly complicates the conclusion of major arms reduction agreements while Soviet forces are still fighting in Afghanistan, while families remain divided despite commitments made in Helsinki as far back as 1975,

and while the Soviet Union is constructing a large phased-array radar forbidden by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, important as it is to resolve all these (and many other) issues eventually, the United States has tried to minimize rigid linkages in the arms reduction area, because of its commitment to rapid progress in reducing the levels of nuclear arms.

If the Soviet leadership approached these questions with the same constructive attitude, then I believe that we would have grounds for substantial optimism, since we seem so close to agreement on some of the most important nuclear weapons issues. Concluding agreements in these areas would unquestionably provide momentum for settling other issues. I assumed that this was precisely what you meant to do when you suggested, in your letter dated September 15, that we meet to work out instructions "for negotiation of two or three draft agreements."

Well, as I have mentioned, we did reach substantial agreement on three of the four topics we discussed most intensively. But what are we hearing now from the Soviet side? That everything discussed in Iceland has suddenly become an indivisible "package."

Mr. General Secretary, I do not dispute your right to change your position anytime you wish. Nor do I dispute that it is highly desirable to resolve as many contentious issues in U.S.-Soviet relations as we can. However, I must be frank to say that your apparent reversal of one of the achievements in our negotiations at Geneva -- when we agreed that some arms reduction steps would be possible on an interim basis before we had settled all the nuclear issues -- is not designed to hasten the day when we can begin the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons which we have promised our peoples.

In addition to this apparent change in your approach, I have also noted a disturbing tendency in recent weeks for some Soviet spokesmen to denigrate the importance of what we achieved in Iceland and to present aspects of our meeting in terms which an objective observer can only regard as bizarre. For example, I have been accused of coming with "empty pockets" to the meeting you proposed -- when the record shows that I made very substantial concessions in each of the negotiating areas. Frankly, this comment reminds me of someone who invites a friend to dinner and then complains that the friend brought no more than half the dinner with him!

The shifting approaches and distorted comments that we have been hearing from some Soviet officials are not encouraging, since they place in question the seriousness of the Soviet leadership's commitment to lowering the levels of arms and

improving relations with the United States on the basis of parity and reciprocity.

I hope that these discouraging signs are the result of transitory factors in the Soviet Union, and that you will soon be in a position to join me in efforts to bridge the remaining gaps in our respective positions. For nothing that has happened since our meetings in Reykjavik has shaken my judgment that we both can be proud of what we achieved, and that we should continue the process precisely from the point we reached in Iceland.

Whenever you are willing to join me in this effort, you will find me ready to press ahead. I look forward to any comment or further suggestions you may have on these matters.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

NOTIONAL PLAN FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Three phases, lasting minimum of 5 years each, but of a sufficient duration to achieve the objectives of each. (Second and third phases are likely to take longer than five years, since they will require basic changes in Soviet habits and practices.) Nevertheless, if plan is issued, public position is that it could be done by the Year 2000 if we start now and keep up momentum.

Phase One:

- 50% reduction of strategic nuclear weapons;
- INF reduced to 100 warheads world-wide (Reykjavik formula);
- Agreement to reduce SRINF, following conclusion of INF agreement;
- Verifiable CW ban;
- BW verification regime;
- Expanded CBM's;
- Compliance with all agreements to satisfaction of both parties;
- Reduction of superpower military involvement in regional conflicts, including withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan;
- Effective international actions against terrorism, including quarantine of states sponsoring terrorism and of groups committed to it, and ban on military supplies or military training to such countries and groups.
- Agreement on verification measures to limited nuclear testing; further limitations on testing as nuclear weapons are reduced.
- Tightened non-proliferation regime;
- Substantial improvements in citizen-to-citizen contacts and the flow of information across national boundaries; end to all radio jamming and increased facilities for sale of foreign publications.
- MBFR agreement to establish verification measures during time-limited freeze, or other significant agreements to reduce conventional forces in Europe.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8097

BY CW NARADATE 11/29/07

23

Phase Two:

- Further reductions on conventional weapons, world wide;
- Agreed, verifiable limits on use of military force outside national boundaries;
- Termination of direct or indirect superpower military involvement in regional conflicts; peaceful settlement of major regional conflicts;
- Establishment of free contacts and information flow across national borders, including:
 - a. No restrictions on travel of one's own citizens to foreign countries;
 - b. No restrictions on travel of foreigners in one's own country;
 - c. No restrictions, legal or administrative, on contact of one's citizens with foreigners;
 - d. Reserved access in the mass media for foreign opinion;
 - e. Right to establish cultural and information centers, and outlets for periodical, book and VCR sales, in the other country, at the sole discretion of the "sending" country;
 - f. Elimination of national legislation which makes the expression of divergent opinion a criminal act; effective guarantees of the freedom of speech.
- Substantial additional reduction of offensive weapons, particularly ballistic missiles.
- Negotiations on conditions for a CTB, to take effect in third stage.
- Reduction of strategic controls on trade when arms reduction agreements are consummated.
- Agreements on role to be played by defensive weaponry.

Phase Three:

- Fine-tune and extend various verification measures developed in previous stages;
- Establish in practice the habits of openness and restraint from use of military force negotiated earlier;
- Eliminate all strategic and political controls on trade;
- Negotiate a legal enforcement regime for a world free of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, and for the control of the level and use of conventional weapons;
- Deploy agreed systems of strategic defense;
- As these measures go into place and are proven in practice, proceed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in final stages.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Linhard

~~SECRET~~

Eyes Only

NON-LOG 12/2/86

Jack Matlock

Eyes Only

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS 6/25/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 7/14/5 #8698

~~SECRET~~

Non-log

24

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

December 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: BOB LINHARD *Bob*
SUBJECT: Your Paper, dated 25 November

First of all, let me apologise for taking so long to respond to this. All I can say is that it is a serious subject, your memorandum troubled me a bit, and it has taken me a bit of time to resolve in my own mind how best to help in the process through my response to you.

I have returned your package (next under) annotated to indicate the changes that I would recommend that you make.

I think that the letter to Gorbachev is about right, but that we may wish to wait until next week to allow the currently ongoing discussions in Geneva to be completed. We could then fold into the letter any developments and send it.

I also agree that it is premature to look at fundamental changes in our position right now. Now we need to quietly consolidate what we have and look to refinements over the next month which we can surface during the next negotiating round. In the process of doing this, we could have the ACSI very quietly vet the four alternatives included in the Shultz letter in an appropriately compartmented channel. In addition, we can use this same drill to get back to basics on where we are, where are priorities are, and where our priorities should be over the next 3-6 months in the negotiations. I have some additional thoughts on this which I will outline shortly.

My main problem is with the idea of a "dramatic new proposal" which focuses us on a plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I think that this would be very damaging at this time, especially since we have just put the flap over "zero nuclear weapons" in the context of Reykjavik behind us. This certainly would make news -- but it is clearly not the basis of any arms control agreement, and therefore would be immediately recognized as either propoganda or posturing by the US. It is not on the main line of the recent evolution of our policy and not in synch with the Reagan-Thatcher priorities. I believe it would: further exacerbate our allies (especially Thatcher); be difficult to get the US arms control community to work seriously (especially the Joint Chiefs); and, divert us from needed evolution on the main line of our policy. I really think that this is not the thing to do right now. It is for that reason that I would delete it from the package.

As to the issue of what we should do, I think that we need to be firm in our defense of the President's proposal of "0 ballistic missiles" but cast it as the price that we put on a US acceptance of the Soviet demand for a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We still need to consolidate

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

support for the validity of the President's making this proposal at Reykjavik both with certain quarters in the Administration and with Allies. The idea will give us a lot of needed leverage later when we face the problem of dealing with the huge Soviet advantage in SRINF/SNF ballistic missiles -- but to do so, we need to make it real now.

At the same time, we need to make it clear that our preferred priorities involve significant reductions in START and INF without any unnecessary linkage to the Defense and Space area. Let the Soviets come to us as demandeurs in the D&S area. They will -- since the SDI program is continuing each day and time is working for us on this score. In short, we need to reinforce that the US position (which does not walk away from the US Defense and Space counter-proposal made at Reykjavik) is consistent with long-standing US and NATO arms control strategy and the recent Reagan-Thatcher priorities.

With respect to refinements, I strongly believe that we should not look at any further steps (with respect to one exception) that carry us below the Reykjavik position in terms of force levels. A 50% reduction in strategic forces (1600/6000, with the right to adjust forces from ballistics to slow-flyers as needed) and an appropriate LRINF agreement are realistic and achievable goals which can be supported by our military and allies. The one exception that needs more work is the issue of SRINF/SNF missiles. We will work on that one in the next few weeks.

Jack, I wanted to get this to you soonest today. I can understand if you can't agree with the fixes that I have suggested. Against that contingency, I will provide by about 3pm today two paragraphs for your use: one that expresses my non-concurrence with the Tab III material and one that makes the points in the paragraph just above about "further refinements." I had hoped to have these with this memo, but I got diverted once again.

Give me a call once you have digested this and let's see how I can help you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1986

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Papers from Washington Institute Conference on
US-USSR Relations and on Central America

At Tab I is a letter from you to the Washington Institute thanking them for the papers they sent from their conference on US-Soviet relations and on Central America. Some of the papers, though by no means all, attack the Administration from the right. Tab B has a quick summary of the papers presented.

Ray Burghardt reports the Washington Institute is a Moonie organization.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I thanking the Washington Institute for the papers they sent.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Ray Burghardt, Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

Tab I Draft Letter to Washington Institute
 Tab A Letter from Washington Institute
 Tab B Summary of Papers from the Washington Institute
 Tab II Papers to be sent to the Washington Institute:
 Presidential Remarks: "Remarks by the President" (10/14/86), "Report on Reykjavik" (10/13/86), "Keeping America Strong" (9/23/86), "Why Democracy Matters in Central America" (6/24/86), "Central America and U.S. Security" (3/16/86), "Strengthening American Security" (2/26/86). White House Issue Brief: "The President's Iceland Meeting" (10/16/86). "U.S. Interim Restraint Policy" State Dept. Special Report 147 of 5/27/86. "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements" State Dept. Special Report 122 of 2/1/85. "Revolution Beyond Our Borders" State Dept. Special Report 132 of 9/85.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/25/02

29

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

Thank you and Dr. Kintner for the papers addressed to Admiral Poindexter from the Washington Institute's conference on "The Struggle Over 'Peace.'"

You may be interested in some Administration statements on the issues raised in your papers.

Thank you again.

Sincerely,

Robert O. Sullivan, Jr.
Deputy Director for Programs
The Washington Institute
1667 K St., NW; Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006

Staff
8094 30

T H E
WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE

NOV 5 1986

October 29, 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20506


Dear Admiral Poindexter:

Earlier this month, The Washington Institute was pleased to sponsor a special conference on 'The Struggle Over 'Peace' ' chaired by Dr. William R. Kintner.

At Dr. Kintner's request, we are sending you a selection of the draft papers presented during the conference. They are quite current. The authors are now in the process of revising them for publication.

The Institute is anticipating two volumes based on the conference: the first on various aspects of US-Soviet relations and the second on the regional issue of Central America. I hope you will find them useful.

Sincerely,



Robert O. Sullivan, Jr.
Deputy Director
for Programs

RS/rm

President Reagan

Current
Policy
No. 875

Report on Reykjavik

Oct 13, '86

President Reagan

Current
Policy
No. 869

Keeping America Strong

Sept 23 '86

President Reagan

Current
Policy
No. 850

Why Democracy Matters in Central America

June 24 '86

President Reagan

Current
Policy
No. 805

Central America and U.S. Security


March 16 '86

President Reagan

Current
Policy
No. 798

Strengthening American Security

Feb 26, '86



Special Report No. 132

United States Department of State

September 1985

“Revolution Beyond Our Borders”

Sandinista Intervention in Central America

Special Report No. 142

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

February 1, 1985

United States Department of State

Special Report No. 147

U.S. Interim Restraint Policy: Responding to Soviet Arms Control Violations

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 1986

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICERS
OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 16, 1986

WHITE HOUSE ISSUE BRIEF

THE PRESIDENT'S ICELAND MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

October 16, 1986

WHITE HOUSE ISSUE BRIEF

ARMS REDUCTION AT ICELAND -- HISTORIC PROGRESS

October 16, 1986

WHITE HOUSE ISSUE BRIEF

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

October 15, 1986

WHITE HOUSE ISSUE BRIEF

PUSHING SUPPORT FOR SDI

NEUTRALISM AND WORLD ORDER

David Gress

GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A NONNUCLEAR WORLD
BY THE YEAR 2000: VISION, PLOY OR WHAT?

James E. Dougherty

ADVOCATUS DIABOLI:

DETENTE II-SALT III; AMERICAN DREAM, OR NIGHTMARE?

Richard C. Thornton

A REPORT ON SPACE, SECURITY AND PEACE
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Robert C. Richardson III

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO:
HOW TO MEET A WIDENING THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

Daniel James

COPING WITH THE SOVIET "PEACE" WAR

Richard E. Bissell

COPING WITH DETENTE

Vladimir Bukovsky

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE DETERIORATION OF THE GLOBAL DETERRENT SYSTEM

John Norton Moore

CENTRAL AMERICA IN THE STRUGGLE OVER PEACE

Gordon Sumner, Jr.

THE WASHINGTON BATTLE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA:
THE UNMET CHALLENGE OF THE "RED CHORUS"

Curtin Winsor, Jr.

U.S. VULNERABILITY TO SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE

Max Singer

PROXIES AND PEACE

Paul Seabury

Summary of Papers
From Conference "The Struggle Over 'Peace'"

Richard Bissell (Exec. Editor The Washington Quarterly), Coping With The Soviet "Peace" War. Focuses more on policy than most papers presented. Gives a series of themes for U.S. public diplomacy: stress NATO's role in Western solidarity (rather than its war-fighting capabilities or the Soviet threat); reassure Allied publics we do understand their needs and take them into account (rather than beat a dead horse by attacking Soviet policies); support RFE/RL; publicly demand Soviet defense spending figures--in the long run we may actually get them (cf. Western progress on arms control inspection); stress the costs to other countries of Soviet actions (e.g. Afgan refugees); try to open a debate about Soviet methods of social control (the Soviet instinct to discipline, e.g., note that putting political dissidents in mental hospitals will not reduce unrest in the populace).

Dr. Vladimir Bukovsky (Soviet emigre, Stanford U, Cambridge U.), Coping With Detente. Blasts the West and the Administration for not taking stronger steps to confront the Soviet Union on human rights, exchanges, and across the board. Advocates sanctions, boycotts and many other steps against the Soviet Union.

Dr. James Dougherty (St. Joseph's U.), Gorbachev's Proposal For a Non-Nuclear World. Starts with a lengthy historical background. Gorbachev is not serious about negotiating total nuclear disarmament. Pres. Reagan may have reason to moderate SDI R&D once it has extracted unprecedented Moscow concessions for drastic, verifiable cuts in offensive missiles.

Dr. David Gress (Hoover Instit.), Neutralism and World Order. Reviews at length and opposes the philosophical roots of "neo-neutralism"--of peace as the highest good and the moral equivalency of the superpowers. Vaguely advocates "reform of the military and political decision-making system in the US" and more aggressive public diplomacy.

B.Gen. Robert Richardson, Ret. (High Frontier), Space, Security and Peace In the 21st Century. Advocates: 1) scrapping current laws and treaties that prevent private ownership/exploitation of space; 2) a US policy of occupying permanent bases on other planets before any other power can establish a claim, the US granting ownership to US developers/colonists and protecting the above, by force if necessary, from foreign takeover; 3) high priority to developing low-cost access to space.

Dr. Paul Seabury (U. of Cal.), Proxies and Peace. Asks whether the Soviets are using proxies as part of a wider plan concentrating efforts on more strategic regions.

Max Singer (Potomac Org., Inc.), US Vulnerability to Soviet Political Warfare. Argues that a main Western problem is a self-deception about Communism, and that "if we only woke up," we could defeat Soviet expansion "overnight."

Dr. Richard Thornton (GWU), Detente II-SALT III. Without advocating them, the paper lays out in a general outline for a "grand negotiation" the author calls "Detente II-SALT III": negotiated shift to strategic defense and arms reduction, US-Soviet trade agreements and regional agreements.

The rest of the papers deal with Latin America:

Dr. Daniel James, Central America and Mexico: How to Meet A Widening Threat to the US. Characterizes the President's perception of the conflict as "limited and unrealistic."

(Former Amb.) Dr. John Moore (U. of Va. Law School), The Struggle for Peace in Central America. Advocates stronger public diplomacy, particularly on the legal justification for our policy.

Lt. Gen Gordon Sumner, Ret. (La Mancha Co.), Central America in the Struggle Over Peace. Advocates more attention be paid to Latin America, politically and financially.

(Former Amb.) Dr. Curtin Winsor, The Washington Battle for Central America: The "Red Chorus". Lists US organizations that the author believes serve Communist purposes.

Prepared by:
R. Scott Dean

Matlock

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8608094

RECEIVED 07 NOV 86 15

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SULLIVAN, ROBERT

DOCDATE 29 OCT 86

*Scott -
Dad will
I never
answer?
this?*

KEYWORDS: USSR

CENTRAL AMERICA

KINTNER, WILLIAM

SUBJECT: LTR TO POINDEXTER FM WASHINGTON INSTITUTE RE DRAFT PAPERS ON STRUGGLE OVER PEACE

.....

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 12 NOV 86 STATUS S FILES WH

.....

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

→ MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

MANDEL

RODMAN

~~BURGHARDT~~

COCKELL

COMMENTS

*This institute is a Moscow front,
so I would recommend a very
bland response. Ray*

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

for chron 49
to attach to chron
of 8070 of
early Nov - late
Oct

S/S 8635503

Date December 4, 1986

For: Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr.
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: The President From: Frank J. Teipel

Date: Oct. 25, 86 Subject: Rev. Paul Teipel

WH Referral Dated: Nov. 15, 86 NSC ID# 8070

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- X Other. Copy of cable outlining consular assistance
on behalf of Father Teipel.

Remarks:

for
Walt Dulles
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(CLASSIFICATION)

Decl: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 STATE 368513
ORIGIN EUR-00

1107 EUR8877

STATE 368513

1107 EUR8877

ORIGIN OFFICE GC-02
INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 PMD-01 GE-01 CE-01 OCT-01 PA-02
PMS-01 PH-01 /017 A1 AS

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 VO-06 OCS-06
CA-02 /B23 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/CE: JLANE: JL
APPROVED BY: EUR: WBODDEJR.
EUR/CE: HILMORE EUR/CE: MHABIB
EUR/CE: WMERRY S/S: BLPASCOE
NSC: RMC DANIEL CA/VO/L/C: EHARRIS (SUBS)
S/S-O: RBISHOP

-----225631 260348Z /38

P 260345Z NOV 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY EMBERLIN PRIORITY

WJL
JL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 368513

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: CASC, SHUM, PREL, GC
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST: CONSULAR ASSISTANCE
-- FOR GDR RELATIVE OF U.S. CITIZEN

1. SUMMARY: THE WHITE HOUSE HAS REQUESTED THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN ACQUIRING GDR PERMISSION FOR FATHER PAUL TEIPEL OF ZAHNA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR) TO VISIT HIS BROTHER IN CALIFORNIA AND RETURN TO THE GDR. END SUMMARY.

2. MR. FRANK J. TEIPEL OF ENCINITAS CALIFORNIA WROTE PRESIDENT REAGAN OCTOBER 25 REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT'S HELP IN HAVING HIS BROTHER, REVEREND PAUL TEIPEL, RAHNSDORFERSTRASSE 4, 4608 ZAHNA GDR, OBTAIN PERMISSION FROM GDR AUTHORITIES TO VISIT HIM IN CALIFORNIA AND RETURN TO THE GDR. ORDAINED BY THE ARCHDIOCESE OF PADERBORN, FRG IN MAY OF 1956, PAUL TEIPEL ASKED ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE TO WORK FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. HE HAS WORKED THERE SINCE 1956. THE NSC HAS INFORMED US THAT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES MR. TEIPEL'S IS A PARTICULARLY DESERVING CASE AND HAS ASKED THAT THE DEPARTMENT DO WHAT IT CAN TO ASSIST FATHER TEIPEL.

3. EUR/CE TELEPHONED MR. FRANK TEIPEL NOVEMBER 20. MR. TEIPEL EXPLAINED THAT GDR AUTHORITIES HAVE OCCASIONALLY ALLOWED HIS BROTHER PAUL TO VISIT THEIR MOTHER IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BUT THAT, TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE, PAUL TEIPEL HAS NEVER REQUESTED PERMISSION TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. HE AGREED U.S. EMBASSY OFFICIALS, IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ASSIST HIS BROTHER, WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH FATHER TEIPEL WHEN TO APPLY FOR A GDR EXIT VISA. FRANK TEIPEL SUGGESTED A VISIT IN LATE SPRING/EARLY SUMMER; HOWEVER, HE ALLOWED HIS BROTHER'S CLERICAL RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD DETERMINE WHEN THE VISIT COULD BE MADE.

4. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT REVEREND TEIPEL AND DISCUSS HIS PLANS TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. IN EVENTUAL REMONSTRATIONS TO GDR AUTHORITIES ON MR. TEIPEL'S BEHALF, EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM GDR AUTHORITIES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST IN CASE.

5. TEXT OF FRANK TEIPEL'S OCTOBER 25 LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

MY FAMILY AND I ARE SO VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO WRITE TO YOU ON BEHALF OF MY BROTHER, THE REVEREND PAUL TEIPEL, A ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST, VOLUNTARILY LIVING BEHND THE IRON CURTAIN IN EAST GERMANY.

PAUL WAS ORDAINED BY THE ARCHDIOCESE OF PADERBORN, WEST GERMANY IN MAY OF 1956. THAT SAME YEAR HE ACTED ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, AND ASKED TO BE ASSIGNED TO WORK FOR THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHT IN EAST GERMANY. NO OTHER RELATIVES RESIDE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, AND PAUL HAS SPENT THE LAST 30 YEARS WITHOUT ANY FAMILY MEMBERS AT HIS SIDE. AFTER LONG AND DIFFICULT APPLICATIONS TO THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, RARE VISITS TO OUR MOTHER OF 87 YEARS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN MADE POSSIBLE.

MY BROTHER PAUL HAS BEEN UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND PUT ON OTHER DIFFICULT RESTRICTIONS DURING HIS YEARS IN THIS CRUEL AND OPPRESSIVE SOCIETY. THROUGH THESE TRYING TIMES HE CONTINUES TO ADHERE TO HIS PRINCIPLES, AND HAS NEVER LOST HIS COURAGE, DETERMINATION, OR DESIRE TO FIGHT FOR THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND FOR WHAT HE SO DEVOUTLY BELIEVES.

MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS OUR FAMILY'S WISHFUL PRAYER TO HAVE

PAUL SPEND A VACATION HERE WITH US IN CALIFORNIA. HE HAS DEVOTED HIS ENTIRE LIFE TO HIS PARISH, AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO THIS VISIT UNLESS HE BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO HIS LIFE'S WORK BY THE EAST GERMAN AUTHORITIES.

MY FAMILY AND I WOULD BE FOREVER GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ANY ASSISTANCE YOU COULD OFFER IN ENABLING THIS FINE AND TRULY DESERVING HUMAN BEING TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES.

WE TRUST IN YOU STRONG LEADERSHIP, AND PRAY FOR YOUR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH.

SINCERELY,
(SIGNATURE)
FRANK J. TEIPEL
SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/5 #86099
BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51

ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY TO:
S/S - S: SLOPEZ
*ADVANCE COPIES TO:

8070

8635503

NOV 17 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 15, 1986

S/S - 2
S/S - I SUPV.
PENDING

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

IST: SUBJECT: U.S. Representations on Behalf of Priest in
the German Democratic Republic

The President recently received a letter from Mr. Frank J. Teipel on behalf of his brother, the Reverend Paul Teipel, a Catholic priest who has worked for human rights in the German Democratic Republic for 30 years. Mr. Teipel would like his brother to be allowed to visit him in the U.S. However, he fears Father Teipel would not leave East Germany unless he was assured he could reenter East Germany to continue his work.

The President believes this is a particularly deserving case and asks that the State Department do what it can to assist Father Teipel in his efforts to obtain permission to visit the U.S. and return to East Germany.



Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A Letter from Frank J. Teipel to the President

NOV 17 1986

UR
A
S
/S-S
MC
L
F:rw

Revised
ACTION:EUR
Dist To:
;
)
)
)
/S
/S-S
MC
L
A
F/shm

October 25, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

52
Re: Paul Teipel
Rahnsdorferstrasse 4
D.D.R. 4608 Zahna
East Germany

Dear Mr. President:

My family and I are so very grateful for the opportunity to write to you on behalf of my brother, the Reverend Paul Teipel, a Roman Catholic priest, voluntarily living behind the Iron Curtain in East Germany.

Paul was ordained by the Archdiocese of Paderborn, West Germany in May of 1956. That same year he acted on his own initiative, and asked to be assigned to work for the Catholic Church and the cause of human rights in East Germany. No other relatives reside behind the Iron Curtain, and Paul has spent the last 30 years without any family members at his side. After long and difficult applications to the East German Government, rare visits to our mother of 87 years have recently been made possible.


My brother Paul has been under house arrest and put on other difficult restrictions during his years in this cruel and oppressive society. Through these trying times he continues to adhere to his principles, and has never lost his courage, determination, or desire to fight for the cause of human rights, and for what he so devoutly believes.

Mr. President, it is our family's wishful prayer to have Paul spend a vacation here with us in California. He has devoted his entire life to his parish, and would not agree to this visit unless he be allowed to return to his life's work by the East German authorities.

My family and I would be forever grateful to you for any assistance you could offer in enabling this fine and truly deserving human being to visit the United States.

We trust in your strong leadership, and pray for your continued good health.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of Frank J. Teipel in cursive script.

Frank J. Teipel

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Name: Frank Joseph Teipel
Address: 1740 Caliban Drive
Encinitas, California
Zip: 92024
Phone: (619) 753-2077
Born: December 3, 1926
Altenhundem, West Germany
Status: married; three children

**Immigrated to the United States in 1952, became
U.S. Citizen in 1957.**