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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/21/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1986 (3/5)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 19

YARHI-MILO

1901

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8670	MEMO	MATLOCK/DEAN TO MCDANIEL RE SENDING DIRECTIVE TO HUD ON TDY TRAVEL TO THE USSR <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	11/13/1986	B1
8671	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO TURNER RE TDY TRAVEL TO THE USSR <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1
8672	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE TDY TRAVEL TO THE USSR <i>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	4	11/7/1986	B3
8674	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE CLEARING TDY VISITORS TO EMBASSY MOSCOW <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	10/25/1986	B1
8675	LETTER	SUGGESTED DRAFT RE EMBASSY MOSCOW <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1
8673	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE CLEARING ALL TDY TRAVEL TO US EMBASSY MOSCOW THROUGH STATE <i>R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	1	11/3/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


November 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR THEODORE R. BRITTON, JR.
Assistant to the Secretary for International
Affairs
Department of Housing and Urban Development

SUBJECT: Clearance of Travel to the Soviet Union by
Assistant Secretary Koch

On November 10 you requested NSC clearance under the President's Memorandum of February 22, 1982 on Foreign Travel by US Officials for the visit to the Soviet Union of the Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research of Housing and Urban Development. You noted that Assistant Secretary Koch is to travel on November 14-23 to participate in a trade mission under the US-USSR Agreement on Housing and Other Construction. You noted this trip has been coordinated with the Department of State.

Pursuant to the President's Directive of February 22, 1982, the President's National Security Advisor approves Assistant Secretary Koch's trip to the Soviet Union, as described.


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A My Memorandum of November 7 on TDY Travel to the USSR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 12, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Clearance for HUD Secretary Pierce and Assistant Secretary Koch to Travel to the USSR

At Tabs I and II are memos from you to HUD approving the visits to the Soviet Union of HUD Secretary Pierce and the HUD Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, Dr. June Q. Koch. These visits have both been coordinated with and approved by State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memos at Tabs I and II to HUD approving the visits to the USSR.

Approve *JFM 11-12* Disapprove _____
JFM *JSD*

Judy Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to HUD Approving Sec. Pierce's Trip (8155)
- Tab A HUD Memo Asking Poindexter Approve Pierce Trip
- Tab II Memo to HUD Approving Asst. Sec. Koch's Trip (8156)
- Tab B HUD Memo Asking Poindexter Approve Koch Trip



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20410-0001

November 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

FROM: *Susanne*
Ambassador Theodore R. Britton, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary for International Affairs, SF

SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel by HUD Presidential Appointee Official, November 14-23, 1986

REF: The President's Memorandum on Foreign Travel by U.S. Officials, February 22, 1982

HUD Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, Dr. June Q. Koch, will be travelling to Moscow, USSR to participate in a trade mission under the US-USSR Agreement on Housing and Other Construction. This event is preparatory to U.S. participation in the International Construction Industry Exhibition in Moscow in May 1987. This trip has been coordinated with the Department of State.

Dr. Koch's itinerary follows:

FRIDAY	11/14/86	LV Washington-Dulles airport via Trans World Airlines flight 890 at 5:45 PM
SATURDAY	11/15/86	AR Paris-DeGaulle airport at 7:25 AM LV Paris-DeGaulle airport via Air France flight 720 at 9:00 AM AR Moscow-Sheremetyevo airport at 2:40 PM
SATURDAY	11/22/86	LV Moscow-Sheremetyevo airport via Air France flight 721 at 3:55 PM AR Paris-DeGaulle airport at 5:45 PM
SUNDAY	11/23/86	LV Paris-DeGaulle airport via Trans World Airlines flight 891 at 1:00 PM AR Washington-Dulles airport at 3:55 PM

I will be grateful if you would expedite a clearance for this travel.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

NOV 11 11:22 AM '66 382

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

8156

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 12 NOV

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Keel
- Prepare Memo MCDANIEL
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan
- to BRITTON

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|--|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Lavin | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input type="checkbox"/> Small |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mandel | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> May | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> Mingle | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> Morton | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Murdock | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> North | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - Cockell
 - Keel (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - _____


COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP



SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 8155

66 NOV 12 410 32

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER:

DUE: 12 NOV

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Keel

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

Prepare Memo MCDANIEL

to BRITTON

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- FYI
- Brooks
 - Burghardt
 - Burns
 - Cannistraro
 - Childress
 - Cobb
 - Danzansky
 - deGraffenreid
 - Dobriansky
 - Donley
 - Douglass
 - Farrar
 - Grimes
 - Hanley
 - Kelly
 - Kissell
 - Kraemer
 - Laux

- FYI
- Lavin
 - Lenczowski
 - Levine
 - Linhard
 - Mahley
 - Major
 - Mandel
 - Matlock
 - May
 - Mingle
 - Morton
 - Murdock
 - North
 - Perry
 - Platt
 - Pugliaresi
 - Raymond
 - Reger

- FYI
- Ross
 - Sable
 - Sachs
 - Saunders
 - Sestanovich
 - Small
 - Sommer
 - Soos
 - Stark
 - Steiner
 - St Martin
 - Tahir-Kheli
 - Teicher
 - Thompson
 - Tillman
 - _____
 - _____
 - _____

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)

- Pearson
- Cockell
- Keel (advance)

- Secretariat
- _____
- _____

COMMENTS



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20410-0001

November 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

FROM: *Insulting*
Ambassador Theodore R. Britton, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary for International Affairs, SF

SUBJECT: Notification of Foreign Travel by HUD Presidential Appointee Official, November 13-23, 1986

REF: The President's Memorandum on Foreign Travel by U.S. Officials, February 22, 1982

HUD Secretary, The Honorable Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., will be travelling to Moscow, USSR to lead a 32-member U.S. Delegation to the US-USSR Technical Seminar and Catalogue Exhibition under the US-USSR Agreement on Housing and Other Construction. This event is preparatory to U.S. participation in the International Construction Industry Exhibition in Moscow in late May 1987. This trip has been coordinated with the Department of State.

Secretary Pierce's itinerary follows:

THURSDAY	11/13/86	LV Washington-Dulles airport via Trans World Airlines flight 890 at 5:45 PM
FRIDAY	11/14/86	AR Paris-DeGaulle airport at 7:25 AM
SATURDAY	11/15/86	LV Paris-DeGaulle airport via Air France flight 720 at 9:00 AM AR Moscow-Sheremetyevo airport at 2:40 PM

SATURDAY 11/22/86

LV Moscow-Sheremetyevo airport via
Air France flight 721 at 3:55 PM

AR Paris-DeGaulle airport at 5:45 PM

SUNDAY 11/23/86

LV Paris-DeGaulle airport via Pan Am
flight 115 at 11:30 AM

AR New York-JFK airport at 1:30 PM

LV New York-LaGuardia airport via
Eastern Shuttle (OPEN)

AR Washington-National airport

I will be grateful if you would expedite a clearance for this travel.

Matlock
7990
8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN HILBOLDT

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Bob for*
SUBJECT: Clearance of Thank You Letter to Gorbachev

The NSC has reviewed the draft thank-you letter at Tab A from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev. We concur on the letter with the changes noted.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Thank-You Letter to Gorbachev with handwritten NSC changes. Attached is complete packet as received.

October 27, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

It was a pleasure to meet with you in Reykjavik to address the important issues *in relation, between our countries.*
~~Of human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.~~ To move forward to a world at peace will be of benefit not only to our peoples but also of all mankind.

Nancy and I want ^{to} thank you for the kind gifts ~~that~~ you presented for us. The samovar with serving pieces, the lacquered plaque, and the caviar are certainly appreciated as tokens of your thoughtfulness.

With our best wishes to you and to Mrs. Gorbachev as we pursue the goal of a safer and more peaceful future,

Sincerely,
 RR

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
 General Secretary of the Central Committee
 of the Communist Party of the
 Soviet Union
 Moscow

RR:CMF:JEH:AVH

DISPATCH THRU STATE.

JH

DECLASSIFIED (R/AS) 12/1/87
 White House Guidelines, August 25, 1997
 By CS NARA, Date 6/25/02

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

G1002

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) / /

Name of Correspondent: MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: *Thank you for gifts (samovars, sewing pieces, plaques, and caviar) during meeting in Iceland.*

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<i>GU HILB</i>	<i>ORIGINATOR</i>	<i>86/10/27</i>		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>
<i>NS MCDA</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>86/10/28</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>80/10/31</i>
		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>
		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>
		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>		<i> </i> / <i> </i> / <i> </i>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

ID 8600904 A INITIALS CMF

LOGGED 861023 ARRIVAL 861014 PRESENT 861010
ARRIVAL FORM S STAFF OTHER THAN CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY
NAME MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

TITLE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ORG OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

ADDR THE KREMLIN

CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SALUT DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND P PRESIDENT
CATEGORY 0905
HOUSEHOLD - TABLEWARE (GLASSES, DISHES, SILVERWARE)

DESCRIP ELECTRIC SAMOVAR, DEPICTING VARICOLORED FLORAL DESIGN PAINTED OVER METAL; INCL. IS A SET OF TWO GLASSES, SMALL TEAPOT, COVERED SUGAR BOWL, AND AN ELECTRIC CORD; SAMOVAR IS 17" H. X 14" DIAM; ALSO, A MATCHING SERVING TRAY, 20" DIAM.

VALUE 000275
APPR SIAMESE IMPORTS, MANHASSET, N.Y.; SAMOVAR: \$200; TRAY: \$75.

DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT THRU KATHY OSBORNE TO GU, FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MTG. W/ GEN. SEC. GORBACHEV, IN REYKJAVIK, ICELAND.

TOTVALU 0004475 GIFTS C

12
WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

ID 8600904 B INITIALS CMF

LOGGED 861023 ARRIVAL 861014 PRESENT 861010
ARRIVAL FORM S STAFF OTHER THAN CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY
NAME MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

TITLE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ORG OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

ADDR THE KREMLIN

CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SALUT DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND F FIRST LADY
CATEGORY 0105
ARTWORK - (EXC. PERSONAL LIKENESS) - PLAQUE

DESCRIP LACQUERED OVAL PLAQUE, DEPICTING A CIRCLE OF EIGHT RUSSIAN WOMEN,
IN NATIVE DRESS, HOLDING HANDS, TITLED "A ROUND DANCE"; 11 1/2"
X 16 1/2".

VALUE 003000
APPR SIAMESE IMPORTS, MANHASSET, N.Y.

DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT THRU KATHY OSBORNE TO GU, FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MTG. W/ GEN.
SEC. GORBACHEV, IN REYKJAVIK, ICELAND.

TOTVALU 0004475 GIFTS C

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

13

ID 8600904 C INITIALS CMF

LOGGED 861023 ARRIVAL 861014 PRESENT 861010
ARRIVAL FORM S STAFF OTHER THAN CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY
NAME MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

TITLE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ORG OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

ADDR THE KREMLIN

CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SALUT DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY
CATEGORY 0703
CONSUMABLES - FOOD

DESCRIP CAVIAR, BLACK RUSSIAN, CONTAINED IN WOOD CASK, 8" H. X 6" DIAM.;
ESTIMATED AMOUNT APPROX. 3 LBS.

VALUE 001200
APPR BASED ON SUTTON GOURMET'S ESTIMATE OF \$25. PER OZ.

DISP OO OTHER; FOR OFFICIAL USE/DISPLAY
REMARK RON JACKSON.

COMMENT THRU KATHY OSBORNE TO GU, FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MTG. W/ GEN.
SEC. GORBACHEV, IN REYKJAVIK, ICELAND.

TOTVALU 0004475 GIFTS C

October 14, 1986

14

100007

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN HILBOLDT
FROM: KATHY OSBORNE
SUBJECT: ICELAND GIFTS

The following is a list of gifts received in Iceland which need acknowledging:

- ✓1) From S.G. Gorbachev -- you have the gifts
- ✓2) Prime Minister of Iceland -- you have the gifts
- ✓3) Big Book, Historic Documents in Nordic from the P.M. of Iceland -- you have.
- ✓4) President of Iceland's gifts -- you have
- ✓5) IDF Hat -- Keflavik Naval Air Station -- no thank you needed
- ✓6) Johnathan Miller's father-in-law sent Icelandic vodka -- 2 bottles. needs a thank you note. - *card attached.*
- 7) Ambassador Nick Ruwe gave RR 2 books, one on the Soviet Union and one on Iceland -- Needs a thank you note but should be coordinated with a thank you letter with NSC for giving up his home to the President while in Iceland.

King of Kings? (Johnathan)

RR - Samovar, electric, 10" x 14" h. - \$20
+ matching tray. - 20" diam. (\$75)
K. Linnell & myrtle + sewing press.

RR - 7 acquired card depicting a circle of 8 Russian women in a circle
center holding hands, 16 1/2" x 11 1/2"

RR/NR - Key of 16 Russian women - 3 lines

15

7990

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

November 10, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Thank you Letter to Gorbachev

At Tab I is a memo from you to John Hilboldt of the Gift Unit returning and clearing a draft thank-you letter for Gorbachev. We have made minor changes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Hilboldt at Tab I.

Approve *WMP* Disapprove _____

RSD/JM Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur. *RSD/SS*

Attachments

- Tab I McDaniel Memo to Hilboldt
- Tab A Draft Thank-You Letter to Gorbachev with handwritten NSC changes. Attached is complete packet as received.

THE SCHEDULE OF
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

14



Thursday, October 9, 1986

9:25 am

Departure Remarks
(Poindexter)

Diplomatic
Entrance

9:30 am

Depart for Iceland
(Poindexter)

South Lawn

Friday, October 10, 1986

Iceland

Saturday, October 11, 1986

Iceland

Sunday, October 12, 1986

Iceland

Approx.
6:05 pm

Arrive back at the White House

South Lawn

Monday, October 13, 1986

Personal Time

8:00 pm
(20 min)

Address to the Nation
(Poindexter)

Oval Office

10/08/86
4:00 pm

17
THE SCHEDULE OF
PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

Saturday, October 11, 1986

Iceland

Sunday, October 12, 1986

Iceland

Approx.
6:05 pm

Arrive back at the White House

South Lawn

Monday, October 13, 1986

Personal Time

8:00 pm
(20 min)

Address to the Nation
(Poindexter)

Oval Office

10/10/86
4:00 pm

dhafi was planning new terrorist operations and that we were going to hit him again—or we might hit him again—full well knowing that this was not true. Now, if that's the case, then the press is being used, and we will in the future not know—when we're being told information from the White House—whether it's true or it's not.

The President. Well, any time you get any of those leaks, call me. [Laughter] I'll be happy to tell you which ones are honest or not. But no, this was wrong and false. Our position has been one of which—after we took the action we felt we had to take and I still believe was the correct thing to do—our position has been one in which we would just as soon have Mr. Qadhafi go to bed every night wondering what we might do. And I think that's the best position for anyone like that to be in.

Certainly, we did not intend any program in which we were going to suggest or encourage him to do more things, or conduct more terrorist attacks. We would hope that the one thing that we have done will have turned him off on that for good.

Q. Yes, can I go back to a question a minute ago. You've left the impression, I think, that you think it is all right to put out false information to the press in order to make Qadhafi nervous.

The President. Oh, no. No.

Q. Is that not accurate?

The President. Oh, no. No.

Q. Well, was the information that was put out false or was it accurate?

The President. I used this same term once when there used to be arguments—and I wasn't in this office at the time—in another office—there used to be arguments about nuclear weapons in Vietnam during that conflict. And I said at the time that, while we knew that we were never going to use nuclear weapons there, we should never say that. We should just let them go to bed every night wondering whether we might use those weapons. Well, the same thing is true with someone like Qadhafi and with all the speculation that was going on in the media throughout the world about whether our action would tempt him into further acts or not. And constantly there were questions—aimed at me as to were we plan-

ning anything else. I wouldn't answer those questions. My feeling was just the same thing: He should go to bed every night wondering what we might do.

Q. But in this case, apparently there were memos which said there was a deliberate attempt to mislead the press and the American people.

The President. Those I challenge. They were not a part of any meeting I've ever attended.

*Mr. Buchanan.*³ Last question.

Q. That was my question, Mr. President. This Woodward⁴ story is based on an alleged memorandum from your national security adviser with lengthy quotes. Are those quotes accurate, and does this memorandum exist?

The President. Not things of that kind that you just asked about, no. This was not any plan of ours. But I've come to the conclusion that Mr. Woodward is probably Deep Throat.⁵

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Note: The exchange began at 11:12 a.m. in the Family Theater at the White House.

As printed above, the exchange follows the White House press release.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland

Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President. October 3, 1986

The United States approaches the Iceland meetings with a deep sense of serious purpose. Our goal in Iceland is to narrow the differences that separate the United States

³ Patrick J. Buchanan is Assistant to the President and Director of Communications.

⁴ Bob Woodward is a reporter for the Washington Post.

⁵ The President referred to the anonymous informant in the Washington Post's Watergate investigation.

and the Soviet Union. The President believes that face-to-face private discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev are the best way to seek progress at this critical juncture in our relationship. The President's goal is that both sides will gain a better understanding of each other's position at this time and move forward toward a summit in the United States. We will be satisfied with the Iceland meetings if we accomplish better understanding.

Arms control is important to both nations, indeed, to the world. We will be diligent in our efforts to seek a common ground that can provide the basis for progress at Geneva, but our agenda is broader than arms control. On regional issues—the tensions in Afghanistan, Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia contribute to tensions between the two superpowers and build mistrust that makes an arms buildup a dangerous fact of life in today's world. Elimination of regional tensions will go to the cause of mistrust between the United States and Soviet Union.

On human rights—as Americans we share with freedom-loving people everywhere a deep concern over human rights on a worldwide basis, and human rights in the Soviet Union is a major cause of concern to the President.

Bilateral relations—improving government-to-government and people-to-people exchanges in the fields of arts, education, and science can improve understanding among the citizens and contribute to the cause of peace.

The President believes that this is not the time for public rhetoric, but, instead, for private talk. The President goes to Iceland with a continuing commitment to seeking understanding that hopefully can lead to agreements that will benefit both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Note: Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, read the statement to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House during his daily press briefing, which began at 9:38 a.m.

Jewish High Holy Days

Message of the President. October 3, 1986

The Jewish New Year begins with the High Holy Days, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. These are days of judgment, not by man, but by God, the one eternal God who revealed Himself to the People of Israel. For Jews, these are the Days of Awe, a time for reflection and repentance—for rededication to the service of God and to His ethical code. This is symbolized most dramatically by the sounding of the Shofar which according to Maimonides says: "Awake, awake, O sleepers from your sleep; O slumberers; arouse ye from your slumbers; and examine your deeds, return in repentance and remember your Creator."

While Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur have special meaning for Jews, they are not special days for Jews alone. At this time of year, all of us should rejoice in the knowledge that ours is a country which has always welcomed Jews and repudiated anti-Semitism. As George Washington wrote to the Jewish congregation in Newport, Rhode Island in 1790, the American government is one "which gives to bigotry no sanctions, to persecution no assistance."

All Americans can take pride in this, and in our unwavering support for the state of Israel, which was born out of the ashes of the Holocaust and which to this day is a refuge from persecution and a beacon of hope for Jewish people throughout the world. Our deep commitment to Israel's security is one with our commitment to freedom of religion in our own country. Underlying both are the unchanging moral and spiritual values to which Jews and Judaism continue to make an incalculable contribution.

It is therefore a great pleasure for Nancy and me to extend our warmest greetings for the New Year of 5747 to Jews here and throughout the world. May your names be written in the Book of Life, and may the Lord bless you with health and happiness from generation to generation.

Ronald Reagan

Week Ending Friday, October 10, 1986

Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense

Nomination of Five Members.
October 3, 1986

The President today announced his intention to nominate the following individuals to be members of the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense. These are new positions:

Edward Elmer Carlson, of Washington. Mr. Carlson is currently chairman emeritus, UAL, Inc. He attended the University of Washington (1928-1932). Mr. Carlson was born June 4, 1911, in Tacoma, WA.

William E. Haggett, of Maine. Mr. Haggett is president and CEO, Bath Iron Works Corp. He graduated from Colby College (B.A., 1956) and Harvard University (M.B.A., 1967). Mr. Haggett was born July 3, 1934, in Bath, ME.

Adm. James L. Holloway III, U.S. Navy, Ret., of Maryland. Admiral Holloway is currently president, Council of American-Flag Ship Operators, in Washington, DC. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S., 1942). Admiral Holloway was born February 23, 1922, in Charleston, SC.

Joseph Sewall, of Maine. Mr. Sewall is president of James W. Sewall Co., a consulting forester and engineering firm, in Old Town, ME. He was born December 17, 1921, in Old Town, ME.

Shannon J. Wall, of New Jersey. Mr. Wall is president, National Maritime Union of America in New York City. He attended the University of Washington. Mr. Wall was born March 4, 1919, in Portland, OR.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland

Radio Address to the Nation.
October 4, 1986

My fellow Americans:

I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I'll

be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: We'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now, as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled, but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those who I think are equally important participants in the summit process—you, the people.

Now, I know it's true that some here in the Capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. And that's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So, today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the meeting in Iceland and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by partisan divisions here at home, so I do think it's a problem you can help me solve.

Perhaps you remember, Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned, again, the truth of the statement: Nations don't mistrust each other because they're armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and

candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely related areas: respect for human rights, arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, and expanded bilateral contacts between our nations.

And to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe personal meetings between our leaders can be very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions—to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. Our experts thought the scheduling of any future meetings was a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after our first meeting, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him, and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he'd like me to see the Soviet Union. So, he invited me, and I said, "I accept." And there it was, as simple as that.

So, face-to-face talks can be helpful. And when the Soviet Foreign Minister met with me 2 weeks ago, he carried a letter from Mr. Gorbachev. Part of the letter was the suggestion that we meet in a third country, like Iceland, for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States. I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we'll make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we'll make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, princi-

ples, or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

Well, this now has changed. Just last month—after a Soviet spy at the United Nations was arrested—the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage, but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us, nor could their actions derail our long-term commitments or initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We wanted Daniloff freed, with no deals. We had to make clear to them the consequences of their actions. We had to be direct, candid, and forceful. And we were. And that's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States.

Later, we swapped Zakharov, the spy, for two noted Russian dissidents, Yuri and Irina Orlov. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations, there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: As each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

Now, that's the bottom line to this briefing: In order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic and firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past this has been one of the Nation's noblest traditions. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge. Americans stood together and the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

As I mentioned when I returned last year from Geneva, rarely have the expressions of public and congressional support been more gratifying than during our negotiations with the Soviets. And so today, with a new round of negotiations underway, I'm appealing again for that support.

And I'm asking the Congress to be especially alert about sending the Soviets a message of national unity. For example, we believe our 5½-year military buildup has been a principal factor in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. So, we need continued support for defense appropriations. So, too, some legislative restrictions passed by the House of Representatives could well jeopardize the chances for successful discussions with the Soviets.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have such a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a credible deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to substantially cut our request for the Strategic Defense Initiatives, a program that promotes a safer future and also underpins our negotiating position in Geneva and our hopes for strategic arms reductions. They voted to deny funds to move beyond certain limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now if it had been ratified—and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially the testing of all nuclear weapons, which we still need to deter war.

These national security proposals, as well as other unacceptable domestic policy provisions, are now included in the governmentwide appropriations bill that is being sent this way. Unless they are changed from the House-passed version, believe me, it will be vetoed. But there is an even larger issue. Every single one of these issues I outlined is under discussion with the Soviets. I cannot afford to have my hands tied in our discussions about them, nor can we fail to have the Government's appropriations resolved for next year. The Soviets must not think that delay could work to their advantage by gaining from the Congress what they cannot win at the negotiating table.

And that's why we need to send to the Soviets a consistent message of clear resolve

and national unity. These upcoming negotiations are important to you, your children, and America's future. Today I'm asking your support and that of the congressional leadership. Bipartisan cooperation has been the keystone of American foreign policy, and as I've said, I'm grateful and deeply touched by the support I've received in the past from all of you.

But right now that support is needed more than ever. The Members of Congress should know that, as I said at the beginning, the people are the experts in any democracy and you will hold accountable those who, for the sake of partisan advantage, trifle with our national security and the chances for peace and freedom.

These are hopeful developments. And that's why I think we can view this whole summit process soberly and yet with a reasonable degree of optimism. Thank you for your support in the past, and as we leave for the talks in Iceland, I hope I can count on you again. Make your views known in Washington and remember to keep us in your prayers as well.

Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:06 p.m. from Camp David, MD.

Federal Initiatives for a Drug-Free America

*Memorandum From the President.
October 4, 1986*

*Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies*

*Subject: Federal Initiatives for a Drug-Free
America*

In furtherance of our policy against drug abuse, I have approved several initiatives that require the support and commitment of all department and agency heads and their senior staff members.

One of our goals is a *drug-free workplace* in the Federal government, in State and local governments, and in private companies, including those that contract with the

Since 1971 Mr. Anderson has been a senior fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University. Previously, he was on leave from Stanford and served as an Assistant to the President for Policy Development, the White House, 1981-1982; a senior adviser in the Reagan-Bush campaign of 1980; and in the office of the President-elect. He joined the faculty of the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University, where he taught until 1968. During 1968 he was the director of research of the Nixon Presidential campaign and later served as a Special Assistant to the President until March 1971, when he went to the Hoover Institution.

Mr. Anderson graduated from Dartmouth College (A.B., 1957), Thayer School of Engineering and Amos Tuck School of Business (M.S.), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D., 1962). He is married and resides in Portola Valley, CA. He was born August 5, 1936, in Lowell, MA.

Federal Home Loan Bank Board

Nomination of Lee H. Henkel, Jr., To Be a Member. October 7, 1986

The President today announced his intention to nominate Lee H. Henkel, Jr., to be a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for a term expiring June 30, 1989. He would succeed Donald I. Hovde.

Mr. Henkel is currently a senior partner, Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore in Atlanta, GA. Previously, he was chairman of the board of Sands Investments, Inc., in Myrtle Beach, SC; General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department; and Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, 1971-1973.

Mr. Henkel graduated from Duke University (A.B., 1949 and J.D., 1952). He is married, has three children, and resides in Atlanta, GA. Mr. Henkel was born September 16, 1928, in Charleston, WV.

Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries

Appointment of Edwin L. Harper as a Member. October 7, 1986

The President today announced his intention to appoint Edwin L. Harper to be a member of the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries for the period of the 1987 fiscal year of the Federal Government. He would succeed Lloyd Norton Cutler.

Since April of this year, Mr. Harper has been a senior vice president and chief financial officer, Campbell Soup Co. in Camden, NJ. Previously, he was executive vice president and director, Dallas Corp., 1983-1986; and Assistant to the President, the White House, 1981-1983.

Mr. Harper is married, has two children, and resides in Bryn Mawr, PA. He was born November 13, 1941, in Belleville, IL.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland

Remarks to Human Rights Advocates. October 7, 1986

The President. I have a few remarks here. I welcome this opportunity to talk with you about a most important subject of my upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev: human rights. And I know your interest in that. And with me, as you know, is Yuriy Orlov and Mrs. Orlov. Yuriy is a founding member of the independent Soviet Helsinki Monitoring Group, a man who has done more to inform the world of current Soviet human rights violations than any man on Earth—as I said yesterday, a hero for our time. The West owes him a profound debt, both for his courage and fortitude under unspeakable conditions and for reminding us how precious are the freedoms that we sometimes take for granted.

As you all know, there has been much speculation that our upcoming meeting in Reykjavik will focus on arms control. But true peace requires respect for human

rights and freedom as well as arms control. We go to Iceland in pursuit of peace, but it's important that the world and our adversaries understand what we mean when we speak of peace. Peace is not simply an absence of war, it's the presence of justice. Human rights, human freedom are its indispensable elements. These fundamental values and beliefs are matters on which we Americans cannot and will not compromise. So, our agenda for the Reykjavik meeting will deal not only with arms reductions but Soviet human rights violations, military intervention by the Soviets and their proxies in regional conflicts, and broadening contacts between our two peoples.

This meeting is not to sign agreements, but to prepare the way for a productive summit. A real improvement in the Soviet Union's human rights record is essential for such a summit. We will not sacrifice fundamental principles or vital U.S. interests to get a summit. I'll make it amply clear to Mr. Gorbachev that unless there is real Soviet movement on human rights, we will not have the kind of political atmosphere necessary to make lasting progress on other issues.

There is much room for improvement—the religious persecution, long divided families, suppression of emigration, and harassment of ethnic and cultural activists. We are realistic about the Soviet Union and have no illusions about the difficulty of making progress on these key issues, but I see no alternative to our twin policy of strength and dialog.

And again, thank you all for being here.

Reporter. Mr. President, did Mr. Orlov tell you anything of significance in your meeting just now?

The President. We have just had a few minutes together before coming in here, and we have said the things I think you would expect us to say.

Q. Did he tell you what he would like you to tell Gorbachev? [*Laughter*]

The President. No, he spoke of wanting to carry on the work that he was carrying on there, to continue to strive for freedom; and his goals are very much those of the people around this table already.

Note: The President spoke at 3:42 p.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Prior

to his remarks, he met privately with Yuriy and Irina Orlov in the Oval Office.

Commodity Credit Corporation

Nomination of Milton J. Hertz To Be a Member of the Board of Directors.

October 7, 1986

The President today announced his intention to nominate Milton J. Hertz, Administrator, Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Commodity Credit Corporation. He would succeed Everett George Rank, Jr.

Since May of this year Mr. Hertz has been Administrator, and he was Associate Administrator, Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Services, 1985–1986; board member, North Dakota State Board of Higher Education, 1976–1983; and owner and operator of Hertz Farms, a diversified grain farm in Mott, ND, 1959–1983.

Mr. Hertz graduated from Dickinson State College (B.S., 1955). He is married, has four children, and resides in Vienna, VA. Mr. Hertz was born January 19, 1935, in Elgin, ND.

Veto of the Small Business Administration Pilot Programs Bill

Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 2787 Without Approval.
October 7, 1986

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2787. Title I of this bill would reauthorize and extend through September 30, 1988, two Small Business Administration (SBA) pilot programs, and Title II would authorize the appropriation of \$10 million

our Nordic-American heritage by holding appropriate exercises and ceremonies in suitable places throughout the land.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this ninth day of October, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eleventh.

Ronald Reagan

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 2:13 p.m., October 9, 1986]

Veto of a Continuing Appropriations Bill

Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 748 Without Approval. October 9, 1986

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning herewith without my approval H.J. Res. 748, continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1987 for two more days until the Congress can agree on a full-year budget.

The Congress has been informed of the Administration's position on a Continuing Resolution, including provisions that warrant my veto. As I had previously made clear, the provision included in this resolution providing for the rehire of air traffic controllers who engaged in the 1981 strike is totally unacceptable. I cannot accept this and certain other provisions included in this measure.

The Administration will continue to work closely with the Congress to reach agreement on an acceptable full-year Continuing Resolution. The Congress has had over eight months to do its job, and complete action on FY 1987 appropriations. The time for action is long past due.

Ronald Reagan

The White House,
October 9, 1986.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland

Remarks on Departure From the White House. October 9, 1986

Thank you all for coming to see us off. As you know, I'm off this morning on an important foreign policy mission, but before I make any remarks on that subject, the events of late yesterday compel me to discuss with you first the critical business of Congress and the budget resolutions.

I have to say at this point that I cannot see need for further temporary extensions of the continuing resolution. Congress has had 8 months now to debate these issues and send us a budget. I've made it perfectly clear that what is necessary in order for me to sign a bill into law, and I've already signed two stopgap funding measures. This is no way to run our government, and the American people deserve better, much better.

On October 3 the United States Senate passed a generally acceptable appropriations bill for the fiscal year that began October 1.

So, my message to the House is that I've had enough. I will not and cannot countenance any further delay in getting our budget done. Any more procrastination can only serve to undercut our mission.

I'm leaving today for Iceland for a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. This will be essentially a private meeting between the two of us. We will not have large staffs with us nor is it planned that we sign substantive agreements. We will, rather, review the subjects that we intend to pursue, with redoubled effort, afterward, looking toward a possible full-scale summit. We'll be talking frankly about the differences between our countries on the major issues on the East-West agenda: arms reduction, human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral contacts. We'll be talking about how we can—while recognizing those differences—still take steps further to make progress on those items and to make the world safer and keep the peace.

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Let me say here—and this is particularly fitting because this is Leif Erikson Day—how much the United States appreciates the hospitality on this occasion of the Icelandic Government and the people of Iceland. The United States and Iceland have been allies for more than 40 years—first, in the defense of freedom and democracy during World War II and, now, in working in NATO to defend peace and freedom and democracy. There can be no better testimony to the enduring commitment of the Icelandic people and Government to the search for a just peace, a lasting peace, than their gracious consent to host these meetings.

At Geneva last year, Mr. Gorbachev and I made a fresh start toward improving relations between our two countries. And when I look back on the success of Geneva, I find myself feeling the real credit belongs to the American people. I knew at every step that I had our nation's unified support. I knew that Americans of both parties had said that differences stopped at the water's edge.

Last Saturday I asked again for unified national support as I head for a second meeting with the Soviet leader. And let me say now how much I appreciate the support that I have received over the years from the American people. Few things have been more gratifying or more important to our success. I'll need this same support through the negotiations of the coming year.

The world has never known a force as strong or decent as that of America when we're unified. Together we Americans settled this great continent that God put between two oceans for free men and women all over the world to find and cherish. Together we're transforming the world with our technology, making life longer with greater opportunities and more fulfilling for millions all over the Earth. And most of all, together we've led the forces of freedom around the world in this century. In World War II, and still today, we've been the great friend of mankind's dreams of freedom, whether in Europe or the Americas or

Africa or Afghanistan. And together we can be true to the cause of freedom even while we're true to the cause of peace.

Last Tuesday, a group of human rights leaders reminded me of how important America's missions of both peace and freedom are. And among them was Yuriy Orlov, who was released only a week ago from Siberian exile where he was being kept for the crime of wanting his government to respect basic human rights. We didn't forget him, and we must never forget those like him. They're our inspiration, and we are their hope.

So, we go to Reykjavik for peace. We go to this meeting for freedom, and we go in hope. As a great American who knew the extremes of hope and despair, Robert E. Lee, once said, "History teaches us to hope." Today we're making history, and we're turning the tide of history to peace and freedom and hope.

I've long believed that if we're to be successful in pursuing peace, we must face the tough issues directly and honestly and with hope. We cannot pretend the differences aren't there, seek to dash off a few quick agreements, and then give speeches about the spirit of Reykjavik. In fact, we have serious problems with the Soviet positions on a great many issues, and success is not guaranteed. But if Mr. Gorbachev comes to Iceland in a truly cooperative spirit, I think we can make some progress.

And that's my goal, and that's my purpose in going to Iceland. The goals of the United States, peace and freedom throughout the world, are great goals; but like all things worth achieving, they are not easy to attain. Reykjavik can be a step, a useful step; and if we persevere, the goal of a better, safer world will someday be ours and all the world's.

So, again, thank you. God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 9:25 a.m. at the South Portico of the White House.

their fullest cooperation and to respond to its surveys fully, honestly, and quickly.

Note: As enacted, H.R. 2721 is Public Law 99-467, approved October 14.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland

Remarks at a White House Briefing for Network Journalists. October 14, 1986

The President. Welcome to the White House. It is a particular pleasure to have you here so soon after returning from a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and that meeting marked new progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

For the first time on the highest level we and the Soviets came close to an agreement on real reductions of both strategic and intermediate-range weapons. For the first time we got Soviet agreement to a worldwide figure of 100 intermediate-range warheads for each side—a drastic cut. For the first time we began to hammer out details of a 50-percent cut in strategic forces over 5 years. We were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And maybe most important, we were in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

I can't help remembering being told just a few years ago that radical arms reduction was an impossible dream, but now it's on the agenda for both sides. I think the first thing that's important to do is to put these talks and what occurred into perspective.

You'll recall that just over a week ago in talking about going to Iceland I said that we did not seek nor did we expect agreements. We described our trip as a base camp before the summit to be held here in the United States. And if there was a surprise in Reykjavik, it was that we discussed so much and moved so far. No one a week ago would have thought there could have been agreement in so many areas. While we didn't sign a document and there remains significant differences, we must not mistake

the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress.

Historic gains were achieved. As you know, after a great deal of discussion, our talks came down to the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI. I offered to delay deployment of advanced strategic defense for 10 years while both sides eliminated all ballistic missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on SDI—in effect kill the program—was nonnegotiable.

Now, the Soviets have made a strategic defense program for years. They've breached the ABM treaty and, as I noted last night, may be preparing to put in place a nationwide ABM system. For us to abandon SDI would leave them with an immediate, permanent advantage, and a dangerous one, and this I would not do. Abandoning SDI would also leave us without an insurance policy that the Soviets will live up to arms reduction agreements.

Strategic defense is the key to making arms reduction work. It protects us against the possibility that at some point, when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete, that the Soviets may change their minds. I'm confident that the Soviets understand our position. They may try to see if they can make us back off our proposals, and I am convinced that they'll come back to the table and talk.

So, here's how I would sum up my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. We addressed the important areas of human rights, regional conflicts, and our bilateral relationship. And we moved the U.S.-Soviet dialog on arms reduction to a new plane. We laid a strong and promising foundation for our negotiators in Geneva to build on. And I'm disappointed, of course, that Mr. Gorbachev decided to hold all agreements hostage to an agreement on SDI. But during our Geneva summit we agreed to move forward where we had found common ground, especially on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arsenals and an INF agreement. I hope he'll at least remember that commitment in the next few weeks, because for our part, we'll seek right away in Geneva to build on the democratic—or the dramatic progress that we made in Iceland.

Now, I think you have a few questions.
Q. Mr. President, before going to Reykjavik, you characterized Mr. Gorbachev as one of the more frank Soviet leaders with whom you have had dealings. Do you stand by that characterization, or do you think Mr. Gorbachev has perhaps engaged in a little duplicity in Reykjavik?

The President. Well, I'm not going to use the word "duplicity" there, but I do say, having had an opportunity in these past several years, and before him, to speak to—while not their outright leaders, their general secretaries, because they kept disappearing—talked to other Russian leaders. And I think the very nature of the talks that we had in this one and the fact that we were finding ourselves in agreement in the extent to which we would disarm and all—but, yes, he was more open than I have experienced before. And it wasn't until we then got down to this proposal of theirs with SDI that we ran into a roadblock, and he made it plain then that everything that we'd been talking about was contingent on our agreeing to that one phase.

But I'm not saying to you he's an easy mark in any way. He's totally dedicated to their system, and frankly, I think he believes sincerely their propaganda about us: that we're beholden to industrial and military complexes and so forth.

Q. Mr. President, now that you've met that base camp, how important right now is this summit that was originally scheduled for after the election? Is there a chance that there will be a summit, or doesn't it matter?

The President. Well, he brought up the matter of summit and referred to it several times as if he was expecting to be here for the summit. I have to say that our arms negotiators have gone back to Geneva. All of these things have gone with them, and it contains all of the notes and memorandums from all of the meetings as to the extent of the agreement that we had reached with regard to the various types of missiles and so forth. And so I have to believe that as they continue to look at that and see that there was only one major point of disagreement that we had that—I'm going to continue to be optimistic.

Q. Mr. President, on the subject of the one sticking point that looms so large, if you could just explain to us your reasons for the

way you handled it, on one point in particular? When it became apparent that all of the concessions that General Secretary Gorbachev was willing to make in the offensive area were contingent on this demand with regard to SDI, did you feel that you had an option of saying: We'll get back to you. We'll study this. We'll turn it over to our experts. I'll give it some more thought? If you had that option, you clearly didn't take it. You decided to make clear to him, then and there, and subsequently in public, that you were rejecting it. Why was that necessary, particularly given the fact that you told us here only a week or so ago that no great agreements were expected out of this meeting? It's not as though we were all out there waiting for you to come out with either a big agreement or a big disagreement.

The President. No, actually, as a matter of fact, he himself from the very beginning had said that what we were talking about is the necessity for coming to some agreements that would then lead to being able to sign things and finalize things at the forthcoming summit.

So, actually, we progressed in those discussions farther than I think either one of us had anticipated we would. And with SDI, I think that is the absolute guarantee. First of all, I'd pledged to the American people that there was no way that I would give away SDI. And looking at their own record—the ABM treaty—they're in violation of that now.

Now, the ABM treaty, which he kept referring to as if it was the Holy Grail—I asked him once what was so great about a treaty that had our governments saying to our people: We won't protect you from a nuclear attack? That's basically what the ABM treaty says. On the other hand, we know and have evidence that they have been going beyond the restrictions of the ABM treaty with their Krasnoyarsk radar, which shows the possibility of being able to provide radar-directed missiles in a defense not just for one spot—Moscow—as the treaty had provided. We never, of course, took advantage of the fact that we could defend one spot. We didn't think that was a very practical idea.

But that they are embarked on a strategic defense initiative of their own. And we feel that, first of all, there are other countries, other individuals, that now that everybody knows how to make a ballistic missile that could be and that are—well, some have them already, others developing. It's true that we are the two that endanger the world most with the great arsenals that we have. But this would be the guarantee against cheating. You wouldn't have to be suspiciously watching each other to see if they were starting to replace missiles. This would be the guarantee against—in the future—a madman coming along. I've likened it—and I explained it to him in this way—that right after World War I—and I reminded him that I was the only one there old enough to remember these times—the nations got together in Geneva to outlaw poison gas, but we kept our gas masks. And thank heaven we did, because now, years later, poison gas is being more and more recognized as a legitimate weapon.

Q. But are you saying, sir, that he left you no choice but to say yes or no there on the spot and that you had no option to say: Very interesting, we'll study it, we'll get back to you?

The President. There wasn't any need of that. There wasn't any way that I was going to back away from SDI.

Q. Mr. President, are you confident that we are going to have another summit?

The President. I can't say that I'm confident, that I have any practical evidence other than the fact that he several times referred to the forthcoming summit that would take place here in the United States.

Q. What did you say when he said that?

The President. The only mention I made of it at all was at one point I asked him legitimately—I said, "Would you like to propose a date—suggest a date for that forthcoming summit?" And at that time his reason for not doing it, he said, was because, well, until our people have all worked things out and we know about how long it's going to take to make the plans for the summit, why I think we should wait on naming a date. And that was the last time that it was mentioned.

Q. Was that after the deadlock, sir? Was that after the deadlock or before the deadlock?

The President. Oh, that was before the deadlock, yes.

Q. Before?

The President. Yes.

Q. Mr. President, I'm puzzled about something. You two gentlemen talked for nearly 11 hours. Obviously there was harmony, because there were unprecedented agreements between you two. And yet in the final analysis SDI became the major hangup. I get the impression that all along Mr. Gorbachev never indicated to you that this was hanging back there in the dark. And my question is: Was he deceitful?

The President. I'm not going to use that word or say that because where this came up was both of us finally at a point proposed that—on Saturday night—that our teams take all of these voluminous notes that had been taken in all of the meetings and discussions with all of the things that had been discussed, and they go to work that night—and they did, and they worked all night—in two groups. Well, I mean there were two—their groups and our groups, but two on each side. One of our groups was dedicated to putting together all the discussion that we'd had on human rights and regional conflicts and so forth. They worked until, as I understand it, about 3:30 in the morning. And the other group was to go through all the things, to come back and find where had we really been in agreement, where there was no problem between us, and where were the sticking points that had not been resolved. And I guess that group worked until about 6 in the morning, didn't they. And then Sunday we went into what was supposed to be a 2-hour meeting and wound up being an all-day meeting.

They put together the things that we had all proposed and that seemed that we could agree on and the places where we were stuck. And that was the first time, really, that it became evident about SDI, because what I had proposed early on was what I talked about here. I told him that what we were proposing with SDI was that once we reached the testing stage we would—well, before that, that right now we were ready and willing to sign a treaty, a binding treaty, that said when we reached the testing stage that both sides would proceed.

Because we told him frankly that we knew they were researching also on defense—nor was that ever denied. And we said we both will go forward with what we're doing. When we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll invite you to participate and see the tests. And if it develops that we have—or I said if you have perfected a system that can be this kind of defense that we're talking about, then we share, so that there won't be one side having this plus offensive weapons, but that we eliminate the offensive weapons and then we make available to all who feel a need for it or want it, this defensive system, so that safety is guaranteed for the future.

Q. Mr. President, you don't want to use the word "deceit," but I'm still puzzled. It seems to me that you wouldn't have agreed with Mr. Gorbachev as you agreed if you'd known that once you got to the 11th hour he would spring this all on SDI or nothing at all.

The President. Well, I think this came out of the summary, then, that came back from our teams to us, where all of this was put together in kind of an agreement. And they weren't denying SDI openly. What they were doing was framing it in such a way that in a 10-year delay they would literally kill SDI, and there just wouldn't be any.

Q. Mr. President, did you tell Mr. Gorbachev that SDI was, as you described it to us, an insurance policy that they will live up to agreements to reduce weapons? And what did he say to you in response?

The President. I'm trying to remember all the things that were said. It was just that they were adamant, that—and the use of words, it came down to the use of words. And their words would have made it not just a 10-year delay, but would have meant that we would come to the end of the reducing the weapons and we—well, SDI would have been killed. And we proposed wording that the research that we were carrying on would be carried on within the provisions of the ABM treaty, and this wasn't good enough for them.

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Appreciate it.

The President. The boss says I'm through here, but you can take them up with the Secretary of State.

All right, thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at 1:24 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.

Patrick J. Buchanan is Assistant to the President and Director of Communications.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland

*Remarks in a Meeting With Officials of the Department of State and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
October 14, 1986*

Well, thank you very much, and welcome to the White House complex. I wanted all of you to come over this afternoon to hear firsthand about our meetings in Iceland, and I have a terrible feeling that almost anything I say is going to have already been said about that trip.

But before I turn to my report, let me first say that I couldn't have gone to Reykjavik without the hard work and dedication, above and beyond the call of duty, of you men and women that I see before me. You labored night and day to get us ready for that first meeting, and I know we sort of sprung it on you at the last minute. I'm grateful to all of you for the fine work you did, and let me say thanks as well to the members of that small team that I took with me to the meeting. They worked around the clock—and I mean that literally. A few of them got no sleep at all while we were there. I've long had great respect for every one of them, and that respect grew even stronger in these 4 days. They were an outstanding team, and all Americans can be proud of them and of the work they did. And you can be proud of the fruit that your work is bearing, for the Reykjavik meeting may have set the stage for a major advance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

At Reykjavik the Soviet Union went farther than ever before in accepting our goal of deep reductions in the level of nuclear weapons. For the first time, we got Soviet agreement to a figure of 100 intermediate-range missiles—warheads for each side worldwide, and that was a truly drastic cut. And for the first time we began to hammer

out the details of a 50-percent cut in strategic forces over 5 years. And we were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And maybe most important, we were in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

Believe me, the significance of that meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn't sign agreements in the end; the significance is that we got as close as we did. The progress that we made would've been inconceivable just a few months ago.

On issue after issue, particularly in the area of arms reduction, we saw that General Secretary Gorbachev was ready for serious bargaining on real arms reductions. And for me, this was especially gratifying. Just 5½ years ago, when we came into office, I said that our objective must be—well, it must not be regulating the growth in nuclear weapons, which is what arms control, as it was known, had been all about. No, I said that our goal must be reducing the number of nuclear weapons, that we had to work to make the world safer, not just control the pace at which it became more dangerous. And now the Soviets, too, are talking about real arms reductions.

And let me say that this wouldn't have been possible without the support that we've had from the American people over the last 5½ years. Because the American people have stood behind us as we worked over the years to rebuild our nation's defenses. We went to the Iceland meeting in a position of strength. The Soviets knew that we had the support, not only of a strong America but a united NATO alliance that was going ahead with deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. So, yes, it was this strength and unity that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table.

And particularly important, of course, was America's support for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Now, as you know, I offered Mr. Gorbachev an important concession on SDI. I offered to put off deployment for a decade, and I coupled that with a 10-year plan for eliminating all Soviet and American ballistic missiles from the face of the Earth.

This may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposal in

the history of the world, but it wasn't good enough for Mr. Gorbachev—he wanted more. He wanted us to accept even tighter limits on SDI than the ABM treaty now requires; that is to stop all but laboratory research. He knew this meant killing strategic defense entirely, which has been a Soviet goal from the start. And, of course, the Soviet Union has long been engaged in extensive strategic defense programs of its own. And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes well beyond research, even to deployment. The Soviet proposal would've given them an immediate, one-sided advantage, and a dangerous one. And I could not and would not agree to that. I won't settle for anything unless it's in the interest of America's security.

Now, America and the West need SDI for long-run insurance. It protects us against the possibility that at some point, when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete, the Soviets may change their mind. We know the Soviet record of playing fast and loose with past agreements. America can't afford to take a chance on waking up in 10 years and finding that the Soviets have an advanced defense system and are ready to put in place more missiles—or more modern missiles. And we have no defense of our own and our deterrence is obsolete because of the Soviet defense system.

If arms reduction is to help bring lasting peace, we must be able to maintain the vital strategic balance which for so long has kept the peace. Nothing could more threaten world peace than arms reduction agreements with loopholes that would leave the West naked to a massive and sudden Soviet buildup in offensive and defensive weapons.

My guess is that the Soviets understand this but want to see how much farther they can push us in public before they once again get down to brass tacks. So, here's how I see the meeting in Iceland adding up.

We addressed the important issues of human rights, regional conflicts, and our bilateral relationship. And Mr. Gorbachev and I got awfully close to historic agreements in the arms reduction process. We took discussions into areas where they had never been before. The United States put good, fair

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Oct. 14 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1986

ideas out on the table, and they won't go away. Good ideas, after all, have a life of their own. The next step will be in Geneva, where our negotiators will work to build on this progress.

The biggest disappointment in Iceland was that Mr. Gorbachev decided to make our progress hostage to his demand that we kill our strategic defense program. But, you know, I've had some experience with this kind of thing. One of my past jobs was as a negotiator of labor agreements in the motion picture industry, and I got used to one side or another walking out of contract talks. It didn't mean that relations had collapsed or that we'd reached an insurmountable impasse. It sometimes meant that a little maneuvering was going on.

Well, it's important for us right now to see the real progress that we made at Reykjavik and to unite so that we'll be strong for the next stage in negotiations. And if we do that, I believe that we have it within our grasp to achieve some truly historic breakthroughs.

Last week I described Iceland as a base camp on our way to the summit. Well, this week I want to report to you that I believe there exists the opportunity to plant a permanent flag of peace at that summit. And I call on the Soviets not to miss this opportunity. The Soviets must not throw this away, must not slip back into a greater arms buildup. The American people don't mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress. We made progress; we must be patient. We made historic advances; we will not turn back.

Thank you, again, all of you, for all that you've done. God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 3:08 p.m. in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building.

Meeting With Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland

*Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President.
October 15, 1986*

General Secretary Gorbachev's report to the Soviet people was unprecedented in its

detail. He emphasized the same areas of progress upon which U.S. officials have commented over the past 2 days, namely, strategic arms reductions and potential agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. He also clearly indicated, just as we have done, that the sticking point which prevented an overall agreement in Iceland was the Soviet Union's demand for an end to the U.S. program on strategic defense.

It is our view that the agreements and positions reached in Iceland remain on the table. The meetings, which reconvene in Geneva today, will begin where we left off in Iceland. The Iceland talks were a very important and significant step in moving negotiations forward. We want to build upon the groundwork of Reykjavik.

We take note of some of the political rhetoric in the General Secretary's speech, but that was expected and unexceptional. What was remarkable was General Secretary Gorbachev's explanation of the progress made.

We are pleased to note that, both at his press conference in Reykjavik and his address to the Soviet people, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that the work that was done in Reykjavik will not go to waste, and the way has now been cleared for further movement towards significant arms reduction. That is our view.

We believe we can go forward from this moment in a businesslike way. We must listen to each other, each explore the views of the other, and seek common approaches and agree on solutions. We think that goal was accomplished at Reykjavik and should be the goal whenever we meet.

We, like the General Secretary, believe that the meeting overcame obstructions and minute details and that new approaches have been developed. We believe there is no going back on what was developed at this meeting, and we look forward to continued negotiations which will build on the progress achieved in Reykjavik.

Note: Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, read the statement to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House during

Oct. 16 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1986

ing how to structure their programs under the JTPA to address them.

The other changes made by the Job Training Partnership Act Amendments fine-tune the program, but in no way compromise the sound principles on which the JTPA is based. They should make the program work even better, and I commend the Congress for the bipartisan support it has given the JTPA.

**Digest of Other
White House Announcements**

The following list includes the President's public schedule and other items of general interest announced by the Office of the Press Secretary and not included elsewhere in this issue.

✓ **October 9**

In the evening, President Reagan arrived at Keflavik Airport, Reykjavik, Iceland, where he was greeted by Icelandic President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir. President Reagan then went to the U.S. Ambassador's residence, where he stayed during his visit to Iceland.

✓ **October 10**

Throughout the morning, the President met with senior advisers at the Ambassador's residence, concluding with a briefing luncheon.

Later in the afternoon, he met with President Finnbogadóttir at her residence, Besastadir, to discuss bilateral issues and his upcoming meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The President then returned to the Ambassador's residence.

October 11

In the morning, the President met with senior advisers at the Ambassador's residence.

Later in the morning, the President participated in the first of four meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev at Hofdi House.

After a briefing luncheon with senior advisers at the Ambassador's residence, the President met again with General Secretary Gorbachev at Hofdi House. Following the meeting, the President returned to the Ambassador's residence.

October 12

In the morning, the President met with senior advisers at the Ambassador's residence.

Later in the morning and again in the afternoon, the President met with General Secretary Gorbachev at Hofdi House.

Later in the afternoon, the President returned to Washington, DC.

October 14

The President met at the White House with:

- members of the White House staff;
- the congressional leadership, to discuss his meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland.

The President declared that major disasters exist in Missouri, Montana, and Oklahoma as a result of flooding.

October 15

The President met at the White House with members of the White House staff.

October 16

The President met at the White House with:

- members of the White House staff;
- Senator Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming, to discuss pending immigration legislation;
- the Vice President, for lunch;
- the Cabinet, to discuss his meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland.

In the morning, the President attended the swearing-in ceremony in the Roosevelt Room for William R. Graham as Science Advisor to the President.

In the afternoon, the President attended a reception in the Residence at the White

33A

Его Превосходительству
РОНАЛЬДУ У. РЕЙГАНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов
Америки

The President



Михаил Сергеевич
Горбачев

33B

Генеральный секретарь Центрального
Комитета Коммунистической партии
Советского Союза, член Президиума
Верховного Совета Союза Советских
Социалистических Республик

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Её Превосходительству
госпоже НЕНСИ РЕЙГАН
(*The First Lady*)



Михаил Сергеевич
Горбачев

337

Генеральный секретарь Центрального
Комитета Коммунистической партии
Советского Союза, член Президиума
Верховного Совета Союза Советских
Социалистических Республик

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *Bob for*
SUBJECT: Reply to Letter on Soviet Emigration

Ms. Paula Morgan, an actress, wrote to the President about the plight of those seeking to leave the Soviet Union, and sent a tape of an interview she had on this subject with "PM Magazine."

The NSC has reviewed the reply at Tab A drafted by the State Department and concurs in it with the handwritten changes shown.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft Reply
Tab B Letter from Morgan
Tab C State Secretariat Transmittal Form with
description of taped interview

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8092

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

November 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter on Soviet Emigration

At Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a draft reply by State to a letter on Soviet emigration. We have made a few editorial changes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the draft reply at Tab A.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

rso for JM
Judy Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur. *rso for JS*

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Kelley
- Tab A Draft Reply with handwritten NSC changes
- Tab B Letter from Morgan
- Tab C State Secretariat Transmittal Form with description of taped interview

STATE DEPARTMENT
DRAFT REPLY

Dear Ms. Morgan:

Thank you for your letter of August 25 to President Reagan and for the videotape you sent. Your thoughtfulness is appreciated.

The plight of those who live in the Soviet Union is an issue of great concern to the President, as well as to all of us in the U.S. Government. As you know, the President recently met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. Human rights and emigration were an important item on the agenda, as they always are at high-level meetings with Soviet officials. As the President reported to the nation on October 14, ^{in his discussion} he made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for ^{substantial} an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States.

with the Soviet

From your videotape, I learned that you are writing a book about your experiences in the Soviet Union. I am glad that in this way you will be able to share your insights with others, and I wish you every success in your endeavor.

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins

Ms. Paula Morgan

108 South Alta Vista,

Los Angeles, California 90036.

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452730

8633567



A H

August 25, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Sometime in the 50's, I appeared as "Lola Montez" on a program sponsored by the Borax Company. It was called "Death Valley Days," and you were the announcer.

You have gone on to become the great communicator of our time, and I've spent my time raising a family, having my books published, and writing screenplays.

I thought in light of all the tumult about the Soviet Union...you might like to watch a five minute story from PM MAGAZINE.

The plight of just one emigree (Bella) in coming to our country might bring some new facts to your committees (that it is not only the Jews in the Soviet Union who are suffering, but everyday people who desire to live their lives as freely as ours).

Please take five minutes out of your extraordinarily busy schedule to view this tape. Maybe it will help.

Many years ago as a young actress at MGM, I met Nancy Davis. My best to her.

Most sincerely,

Paula Morgan
108 S. Alta Vista
Los Angeles, CA. 90036
(213) 938-4745

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

8092³⁸

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S # 8633567

Date: November 7, 1986

FOR: VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Ms. Paula Morgan
Date: August 25, 1986 Subject: Videotape on USSR


WH Referral Dated: October 26, 1986 NSC ID# 452730
(if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
 A draft reply will be forwarded.
 A translation is attached.
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
 The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
 Other.

Remarks: Videotape was reviewed by Department of State. It consists
of a five-minute interview with Ms. Morgan, with an appearance by a
Soviet emigre, Bella, who helped others leave the U.S.S.R.

for 
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

~~SECRET~~

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 28, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
ANNE HIGGINS

REMARKS: CC: C. SHEPHERD

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 452730

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED AUGUST 25, 1986

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MS. PAULA MORGAN
108 SOUTH ALTA VISTA
LOS ANGELES CA 90036SUBJECT: ENCLOSE VIDEOTAPE CONCERNING SOVIET CITIZENS
AND IMMIGRANTSPROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

40
ID # 452730

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

PK011

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 86 / 1 / 1

Name of Correspondent: Mr. Mrs. Miss Ms. Paula Morgan

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Enclose video tape concerning Soviet citizens and immigrants

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION			
Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>Co Dono</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>86 10 24</u>			<u>86 10 1</u>
	<u>Co Hyde</u>	Referral Note:				
	<u>DOS</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>86 10 28</u>			<u>86 10 1</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>AUH response</u>			
		<u>CC: C. Shepherd</u>				<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				
			<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Special Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 - Code = "A"
 - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Sending Directive to HUD on TDY Travel to the USSR

When we drafted the Directive requiring TDY Travel to the USSR to be coordinated with State, we tried to include HUD as an addressee. However, HUD was not included on the final list of addressees. Since HUD Secretary Pierce and HUD Assistant Secretary Koch are going to the Soviet Union (NSC actions 8155 and 8156), it seems an appropriate time to give HUD a copy of the Directive.

The NSC Staff Manual does not include an Executive Secretary for HUD. However, HUD confirms that David Turner is their Executive Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I sending HUD the Directive on Travel to the Soviet Union.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to HUD
- Tab A Memo on TDY Travel to the USSR

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/5 #8670

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

42

7767 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID TURNER
Executive Secretary
Department of Housing and Urban Development

SUBJECT: TDY Travel to the USSR

Attached is a recent Directive applicable to all Departments regarding official travel to the Soviet Union. We understand that the visits of Secretary Pierce and Assistant Secretary Koch have already been coordinated with State. NSC approval of those trips is being sent to HUD separately.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A NSC Memo of Nov. 7 on TDY Travel to the USSR

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NLRR R06-114/5 #8671

BY CN NARA DATE 11/09/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 7, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ROBERT B. ZOELLICK
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. JOHN RICHARDSON
Assistant to the Attorney General
and Chief of Staff
Department of Justice

MR. STEPHEN GLEASON
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of the Interior

MR. FLOYD GAIBLER
Confidential Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Agriculture

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Commerce

MR. DENNIS WHITFIELD
Under Secretary
Department of Labor

MR. JAMES J. DELANEY
Executive Secretary
Department of Health and Human Services

MS. RUTH KNOUSE
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation

MR. WILLIAM VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

MR. L. WAYNE ARNY
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

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NLRR F06-114/5#8672
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

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MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. JAMES FRIERSON
Chief of Staff
U.S. Trade Representative

MR. BERYL SPRINKEL
Chairman
President's Council of Economic Advisors

CAPTAIN JOSEPH C. STRASSER, USN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. SAMUEL CHILK
Secretary of the Commission
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

MR. RICHARD MEYER
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. JONATHAN F. THOMPSON
Executive Assistant to the Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy

MS. JANE KENNY
Administrator
General Services Administration

MR. LARRY R. TAYLOR
Chief of the Executive Secretariat
U.S. Information Agency

MR. HENRY E. CLEMENTS
Executive Officer
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

MR. FITZHUGH GREEN
Associate Administrator of International
Activities
Environmental Protection Agency

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MR. JAMES GEER
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MR. BODA BARTOCHA
Division Director
Division of International Programs
National Science Foundation

MR. WILLIAM H. DRAPER, III
President and Chairman
Export-Import Bank of the U.S.

MS. JANICE OBUCHOWSKI
Assistant to the Chairman for
International Communications
Federal Communications Commission

MR. CHARLES SIEGMAN
Senior Associate Director Division of
International Finance
Federal Reserve Board


National Security Agency

MR. WILLIAM VON RAAB
Commissioner
U.S. Customs Service

SUBJECT: TDY Travel to the USSR

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose a ceiling on U.S. TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we reduce non-essential TDY travel to Moscow and reduce the number of official delegations and visitors requiring Embassy services.

All U.S. agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Office of Soviet Union Affairs of the Department of State, which will coordinate the plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State, (647-8956, 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the longer term.

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
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This memorandum complements the President's Directive of February 22, 1982, on foreign travel, which requires that travel by government officials at the level of Assistant Secretary or above be approved by the National Security Adviser.

The Embassy will make every effort to provide as much support as possible. However, it will be unable to give its customary level of visitor support for the present. While the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations, ticketing, check cashing, and snack bar/commissary support will not be available from the Embassy, they normally can be obtained through Intourist. Exchange visitors should arrange to rely on their Soviet host organizations or Intourist for these services.



Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

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United States Department of State 47

Washington, D.C. 20520 7767

October 25, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Clearing TDY Visitors to Embassy Moscow

In light of the Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of local employees and consequent need to restructure staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for an indefinite time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on US TDY travel will require us to examine all such travel carefully. We recognize that this will pose operational difficulties for US agencies in Moscow but only close coordination of TDY travel will enable us to meet basic USG objectives and equally distribute the burdens involved.

We request that the NSC issue the attached directive requiring that all US agencies clear prospective TDY travel with the Department of State, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. The Department of State will work with concerned agencies to establish mechanisms for clearing and coordinating TDY travel to the USSR.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will normally not be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should not expect any of these services from Embassy Moscow.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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Decl:Oadr

NLRR FD6-114/5# 8674
BY CA NARA DATE 11/29/07

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SUGGESTED DRAFT

TO: Executive Secretaries

All Executive Branch Agencies

In light of the recent Soviet decision to withdraw Embassy Moscow's staff of local employees and to impose restrictions on US TDY travel to the USSR, Ambassador Hartman has asked that we curtail TDY travel to Moscow and sharply reduce the number of official delegations and visitors whose programs could have an impact on Embassy facilities.

The withdrawal of Soviet locals and consequent need to restructure Embassy Moscow staffing patterns means that the Embassy will be unable to provide its customary level of visitor support for an indefinite ~~period of~~ time. In addition, the Soviet decision to establish restrictions on TDY travel to Moscow requires that all such travel be carefully coordinated.

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NLRR E06-114/S#8675

DECL: OADR

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

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All US agencies planning official travel to the Soviet Union should clear travel plans with the Office of Soviet Union Affairs of the Department of State, which will coordinate these plans with Embassy Moscow. Travel plans should be submitted in writing to EUR/SOV, Room 4225, The Department of State (647-8956; 647-8670). The Office of Soviet Union Affairs will work with concerned agencies to establish a regular mechanism to facilitate the coordination of TDY travel over the long term.

In addition, all agencies with programs and exchanges in the USSR should be aware that the Embassy will normally not be able to provide the usual vehicle support, hotel reservations and ticketing arrangements, check cashing facilities and snack bar or commissary support. Exchange visitors whose support will be provided by Soviet host organizations may proceed to the USSR but they should not expect any of these services from Embassy Moscow.

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DECL: OADR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Clearing All TDY Travel to US Embassy Moscow
Through State

At Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to US agencies to require them to clear all temporary travel to our Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet desk at State. State has asked that we do this in light of the Soviets' withdrawal of all Soviet workers from the Embassy and the Soviet threat to reduce severely the number of USG TDY travelers to the Embassy. It would not prevent those on exchange programs from traveling to the Soviet Union, nor affect non-government travel. (C)

State's request seems very reasonable to me in light of the situation. It seems particularly important that if the Soviets will limit the number of TDY workers at the Embassy/Consulate, we coordinate to send our most important TDYers first. I recommend that you authorize Rod McDaniel to issue the directive. (U)

D Dave Major had some concerns with the original memo. He was out today but the new draft should take care of his concerns. (LOU)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memo at Tab I instructing agencies to clear all TDY travel to the US Embassy in Moscow with State. (LOU)

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____
ASD/ATC Ty Cobb, John Lenczowski, *ASD for JM* Judyt Mandel and Steve Sestanovich concur. *SRS*

Attachments

- Tab I Memo from McDaniel to US agencies
- Tab A Platt-Poindexter Memo
- Tab B State Draft for McDaniel Memo

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NLRR FOI-114/5 #8673
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11