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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (6/6)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

YARHI-MILO

1810

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8631	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE NEXT STEPS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	10/17/1986	B1
8632	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? (CONTAINS 2 COPIES OF P.2) <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	7	ND	B1
45801	PAPER	P.2-3 OF DRAFT VERSION OT ITEM 8632 <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1
8633	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM DEAN AND MILLISON RE MSG FOR JOURNAL OF COMMERCE RE TRADE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	10/21/1986	B1
8634	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8632 <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	4	10/22/1986	B1
8635	MEMO	SOMMER/MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE RECONFIGURING EMBASSY MOSCOW <i>R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	1	10/24/1986	B1
8636	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE RECONFIGURING EMBASSY MOSCOW <i>R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/20/2005

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8639	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE RECONFIGURING EMBASSY MOSCOW PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	10/24/1986	B1 B3
8637	MEMO	EMBASSY'S PROPOSED STAFFING FOR MOSCOW D 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	ND	B1 B3
8640	CABLE	241026Z OCT 86 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/24/1986	B1
8638	MEMO	MATLOCK TO RODMAN RE UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	10/29/1986	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90728

~~SECRET~~

October 17, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is a Memorandum to the President which reviews the Soviet reaction to Reykjavik and suggests a stance for the U.S. to take in broad terms.

Bob Linhard has been working with the ACSG on specific arms control positions, and will be communicating with you separately on this. The attached paper addresses the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a broader context and indicates that specific recommendations regarding the separate issues will be forthcoming shortly.

pr Peter Rodman, *wc* Bill Cockell, *RL* Bob Linhard and *SS* Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8631

BY CN NARADATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Where Do We Go From Here?

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR EOL-114/S #8632
BY CS NARA DATE 11/29/07

As we review the results of your meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik and observe the Soviet commentary, we are convinced that we may have made some truly historic breakthroughs on a number of key issues. Furthermore, while they are unlikely to endorse a plan that explicitly legitimizes SDI deployments, the Soviet position on the issue of SDI research and testing may not be as rigid as Gorbachev came across in that final session with you. I would like to summarize some of our impressions about the Soviet attitude and make some broad suggestions regarding the stance we should take over the coming weeks.

Soviet Attitudes

If you strip away the rhetoric about the Soviets making all the constructive proposals and SDI development being the barrier to real arms reduction, it is striking that Gorbachev is saying essentially the same things about the Reykjavik meetings as we are: great progress was made on many issues; all proposals remain on the table; U.S. and Soviet positions are closer than they have ever been before; and the dialogue must be continued without walking away from any of the agreements reached in Reykjavik.

This public stance is reinforced by private messages we are receiving from Soviet officials. The most important was Dubinin's comments to George Shultz Tuesday, which indicated some clear "give" in the Soviet position on SDI. But, in addition to this, every senior Soviet official who has talked to our people this week has stressed that the Reykjavik meeting made great progress in Soviet eyes, and that they consider it essential to proceed from the base of the agreements reached there.

The Soviets have also made at least one gesture since Reykjavik which was probably intended to improve the atmosphere. That is, the release of Mr. and Mrs. Goldfarb. (You will recall that he was the Soviet citizen who refused to participate in a "set up" of Nick Daniloff a couple of years ago.) We had asked for him in exchange for Zakharov, but the Soviets refused. By releasing him now, after Reykjavik, the Soviets may be signalling that they

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify: OADR

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7 PM 2A

revised page 2 of
next steps.

m

want to put the Daniloff and Zakharov issues definitively behind us.

One important element in the Soviet propaganda treatment of Reykjavik is their claim that they made all the proposals, and that you came "with empty hands and empty pockets." Actually, of course, they either accepted our position or came very close to it in all the areas where there was agreement, and it is annoying to see them trying to get public credit for making our proposals.

However, this propaganda definitely has a bright side. The fact is that a Soviet leader cannot allow himself to be seen capitulating to foreign pressure. Therefore, when he in fact capitulates, he must claim that he made the proposal and forced it on the other side. This seems to be precisely the tactic Gorbachev is following publicly. In part it is doubtless designed to bolster his public image as a man of peace. But it also serves to make acceptable to the Soviet public, and the various Soviet interest groups, the compromises which he has made. Since he is pretending that he forced them on you, he cannot easily walk away from the points of agreement recorded.

On Saturday morning while you were meeting with Gorbachev, I spent two hours talking with Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He is a remarkable man. Everybody who talked with him came away with the same feeling. It was most unusual that Gorbachev brought him and then placed him at the head of their working group. I came away from my discussion with him convinced that the Soviets want agreements and from a military viewpoint they do not have any concerns with SDI once ballistic missiles are eliminated. I think they are concerned with the transition from offense to defense and Gorbachev has a political problem with SDI since he has been so outspoken against it.

U.S. Strategy

Our first aim should be to "pocket" the concessions the Soviets made. We will be preparing instructions to our negotiators with this aim in mind.

We should also seek means to keep the pressure on the Soviets to hold to the agreements reached and continue constructive negotiation on the issues that remain. Aside from our negotiating posture, we should continue our public statements expressing our commitment to the agreements, and if the Soviets start backsliding, we should make a public issue of it.

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4

want to put the Daniloff and Zakharov issues definitively behind us. They also have not yet retaliated in any fashion for the expulsion of their 25 spies in New York, despite their earlier public threats. If they continue to avoid retaliation, it may well be in part to avoid another public "row" which could "spoil" the atmosphere.

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We should attempt to maintain a constructive atmosphere so far as circumstances permit, by not gratuitously creating new public issues. However, we should not hesitate to take actions against Soviet interests if necessary and warranted. (For example, your decision to respond to their retaliation against our offices in the Soviet Union for the expulsion of the 25 intelligence officers at the UN is just right.)

We should also make a special effort to attract public attention to the non-arms control areas of our agenda. They have been rather overshadowed by the dramatic events in Reykjavik, and we must see to it that they stay up front in the public eye. (Several events are planned which will call attention to issues such as human rights and expanded contacts.)

We should also do what we can to minimize attention to the question of the date for Gorbachev's visit to the United States. It is possible that Gorbachev was under the false impression at Reykjavik that announcing a date before the November elections was important enough to you to give him leverage over issues of substance. If so, you certainly disabused him of that misperception. Nevertheless, it will be important to convey to the Soviets indirectly that the question of an early date is a matter of indifference to you.

I suspect that Gorbachev will soon find that pressures will build on him to arrange for an early meeting -- and thus validate his claim that much was achieved at Reykjavik. In any event, his delay in agreeing to a date gives us time to continue to press him on issues such as emigration and Afghanistan, as part of a summit "package."

Next Steps

I will be sending you shortly concrete recommendations for steps to take in the arms control field. Broadly speaking, however, I would see a desirable scenario of U.S. actions over the coming weeks as including the following:

1. Issue instructions to our negotiators in Geneva to nail down as quickly as possible the agreements in Reykjavik and proceed with detailed negotiations to work them out in concrete, specific terms.
2. Proceed with arrangements for talks or negotiations on the subjects other than arms control, as agreed at Reykjavik.

3. Possibly, send a letter from you to Gorbachev next week, which would summarize the agreements reached in Reykjavik as we understand them and suggest ways to resolve the remaining key issues.

4. Agree to a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Vienna when they are both there for the opening of the CSCE review conference November 5-7. (If you had sent Gorbachev a letter with suggestions, this meeting would provide an opportunity for a Soviet reply.)

5. Throughout, keep our public relations efforts in high gear, in order to bolster public and Allied support for our positions.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

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DECLASSIFIED

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5. Throughout, keep our public relations efforts in high gear, in order to bolster public and Allied support for our positions.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *RSD for JFM*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Response to Armand Hammer Letter on Daniloff

At Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a draft answer to Armand Hammer. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff case and enclosed a tape of his interview on the CBS Evening News about the Daniloff case. Tab A is the draft answer. Tab B is Hammer's original letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the draft response.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

asa for JEM
Judy Mandel and Paul Hanley *asa for PWH* concur.

Attachments

- Tab I McDaniel Memo to Kelley
- Tab A Draft Answer to Hammer
- Tab B Hammer's incoming letter and videotape

10

7274

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL
SUBJECT: Letter to Armand Hammer

At Tab A is a draft response to Armand Hammer for signature by an appropriate White House staffer. Dr. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff affair and sent a copy of Hammer's interview on the CBS Evening News.

The draft thanks Hammer for his letter and his support on the Daniloff case. It notes the Soviets still do not understand US concern for the individual. It concludes by thanking him for helping to convey US concerns during his trip to Moscow.

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Hammer
- Tab B Dr. Hammer's Letter and Videotape

11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Hammer:

The President has asked me to thank you for your letter of October 2 and your support on the Daniloff case. The Soviets unfortunately still have much to learn about the importance the United States attaches to their callous disregard for the individual. The President appreciated your help in conveying his concerns.

Sincerely,

Dr. Armand Hammer
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Suite 1600
10889 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024

421307
12

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD · SUITE 1600
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024
(213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

October 2, 1986

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

My congratulations on an exceptionally well done negotiation with General Secretary Gorbachev. I believe this is another landmark in the history of our relations and expect that it will lead to very great success in Iceland and, later, here in the United States.

I chaired your Cancer Panel meeting at Harvard's Dana Farber Institute Monday, during which Dan Rather called me and asked me to come through New York for a live appearance on his news show.

I was pleased to do so under condition that I would only comment on the overview and not the details, however minor, of my own involvement and swift trip to Moscow last week.

I was very pleased that this gave me the chance to say that I congratulated you on your victory and your statesmanship. I enclose a tape and transcript.

I will be in the Soviet Union attending the opening of my art collection in Kiev, done as part of your cultural exchange, during the weekend of October 11th and 12th. My thoughts will be with you in Iceland, along with my confidence that our country and the world are fortunate to have you in command at this time.

Respectfully,

Armand

Enclosures

AH:ec

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Rob for*
SUBJECT: Thank you letter for Iceland Book

At Tab A is a draft letter thanking Mrs. Pamela Sanders for the autographed copy of her book Iceland. Mrs. Sanders is married to Marshall Bremont, former US Ambassador to Iceland. She wrote the text for the book of photographs she sent the President. The book is non-political.

Under the circumstances, we believe a letter with the President's signature would be appropriate.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Thank you to Sanders

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Pamela:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of your magnificent book on Iceland. The pictures are beautiful and your text delightful. Since I didn't have time to see much of Iceland last weekend, your book makes me want to return in the future when circumstances will permit me to enjoy the scenery and people more fully.

I very much appreciated your thoughtfulness. Please give my warm regards to Marshall.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Pamela Sanders
Naval War College
Newport, R.I. 02840

WHITE HOUSE GIFT REGISTER
(For President/First Lady)

15

Please Complete as Thoroughly as Possible

Send Gift and Register to: White House Gift Unit, Room 457, OEOB (456-7133)

Date: Oct. 15, 1986

Date Gift Received: Oct 9, 1986

Accepted By or Presented to: via WH Mail Room

Title: for Amb Matlock

Office: NSC, for European and Soviet Affairs

GII I
INTENDED FOR

President: First Lady: President & First Lady:

Other First Family Member (Name): _____

DONOR INFORMATION

Name of Donor: Pamela Sanders

Title of Donor: wife of Amb Marshall Brement

Address of Donor: Naval War College

Newport, RI. 02840

Country US

PRESENTED BY:

Donor: _____ Other (Name): Washington Times Newspaper

Address: 3600 NY Ave NE, Washington DC 20002

GIFT INFORMATION

Circumstances of Presentation: (including date; location, and purpose of event) In honor of President's trip to Iceland, Oct 10-12, 1986.

Description of Gift: Book "Iceland" by (donor) Pamela Sanders & Roloff Beny

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Copy Attached: X To be Handled by Gift Unit: _____

Coordinate acknowledgment with other office: _____
(ie, Hospitality, NSC, State)

REPORT PREPARED BY

Name: Scott Dean Tel: 395-6959

Office: European and Soviet Affairs NSC Room No.: 368 OEOB

OTHER COMMENTS

For Gift Unit Use:

Date received: _____

Through: _____

For Chron 10

6410

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS F. GIBSON

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Request from the Journal of Commerce for
Presidential Statement

As you noted in your memo to me of September 3, the Journal of Commerce has requested a Presidential statement for their November 24 issue (along with the Soviet Economic Gazette) on trade with the Soviet Union.

The NSC recommends that the President not issue such a statement. Superpower relations are now in a period of considerable turbulence, and many aspects of our bilateral ties are "on hold." This includes our policy toward the promotion of economic intercourse, which is unlikely to move forward without progress on Soviet compliance on human rights.

Attachments

Tab A Your memo to me of Sept. 3
Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Oct 21, 1986

Note to the files:

From Scott

Subj: 6410 Request from Journal
of Commerce for Pres statement
on US-Sov trade.

at Pearson's request a reason was
added to the McDaniel Gibson memo
as to why the NSC thinks such a
statement is a bad idea.

Jay drafted the reason in the
amb's absence. I showed it to
Alex Platt but - at Jay's instructions -
did not reclear through everybody
(Danyansky, Hamley, Lavin, Sestanovich,
Matlock) for lack of time.

To SCOTT Dean - Pls give Rattland
to Alix

6410

17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DIL

Oct 17

October 15, 1986

Alex:

Bob Pearson asked that I check with you on the attached to see if you can give us a reason for why the President should not do this. Our memo back to Gibson just says "no" but we would like to add a line clarifying our position on why it shouldn't be done. Can you help us out? Thanks.

Commerce for Presidential

CM
Cathy Millison
ext 6534

responding to his
whether the President should
sue of the Journal of

sue such a statement.

nding the President not
et Union for the Journal

Disapprove _____
rank Lavin ^{RSB} and Steve ^{FL} ^{SRS}

TO PLATT
↓
→ Scott?
TB: 14
Any comments? (I haven't a clue)
Alix

r to the President

MSG FROM: NSRSD --CPUA TO: NSPMC --CPUA
To: NSPMC --CPUA

18
10/21/86 17:

NOTE FROM: R. Scott Dean
Subject: #6410 - Msg for Journal of Commerce re trade
*** Forwarding note from NSCLM --CPUA 10/21/86 15:04 ***
To: NSRSD --CPUA

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: Cathy L. Millison
Subject: #6410 - Msg for Journal of Commerce re trade

I understand that you have this package back. We need to move it as quick possible. Thanks.

*** Forwarding note from NSCLM --CPUA 10/21/86 13:49 ***
To: NSTC --CPUA

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: Cathy L. Millison
SUBJECT: #6410 - Msg for Journal of Commerce re trade

Talked to Alex Platt earlier today and he said that he had sent this on t for action. If I remember correctly we were giving Gibson's office a nega response but Bob thought that we should give them a reason for why we did want to do it. Tom Gibson's office is calling and would like to get a res either today or tomorrow. Can we try to move this quickly. Thanks

cc: NSSGB --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR fob-1141578633

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MATLOCK

19

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

System II
90602

13

October 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM R. GRAHAM
Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (C)

Attached is a copy of National Security Decision Directive 244 which was approved by the President for his Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. NSDDs fall within a special accountability requirement of the NSC. (C)

13

Rodney B. McDaniel
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment
NSDD 244

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on:

OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CRS* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

DECLASSIFIED

SYSTEM II 20
90728

NLRR FOI 714/5 #8634

BY Ad NARA DATE 11/29/07 THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 22, 1986
RR

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JP*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Where Do We Go From Here?

As we review the results of your meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik and observe the Soviet commentary, we are convinced that we may have made some truly historic breakthroughs on a number of key issues. Furthermore, while they are unlikely to endorse a plan that explicitly legitimizes SDI deployments, the Soviet position on the issue of SDI research and testing may not be as rigid as Gorbachev came across in that final session with you. I would like to summarize some of our impressions about the Soviet attitude and make some broad suggestions regarding the stance we should take over the coming weeks.

Soviet Attitudes

If you strip away the rhetoric about the Soviets making all the constructive proposals and SDI development being the barrier to real arms reduction, it is striking that Gorbachev is saying essentially the same things about the Reykjavik meetings as we are: great progress was made on many issues; all proposals remain on the table; U.S. and Soviet positions are closer than they have ever been before; and the dialogue must be continued without walking away from any of the agreements reached in Reykjavik.

This public stance is reinforced by private messages we are receiving from Soviet officials. The most important was Dubinin's comments to George Shultz Tuesday, which indicated some clear "give" in the Soviet position on SDI. But, in addition to this, every senior Soviet official who has talked to our people this week has stressed that the Reykjavik meeting made great progress in Soviet eyes, and that they consider it essential to proceed from the base of the agreements reached there.

The Soviets have also made at least one gesture since Reykjavik which was probably intended to improve the atmosphere. That is, the release of Mr. and Mrs. Goldfarb. (You will recall that he was the Soviet citizen who refused to participate in a "set up" of Nick Daniloff a couple of years ago.) We had asked for him in exchange for Zakharov, but the Soviets refused. By releasing him now, after Reykjavik, the Soviets may be signalling that they

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Declassify: OADR

want to put the Daniloff and Zakharov issues definitively behind us.

One important element in the Soviet propaganda treatment of Reykjavik is their claim that they made all the proposals, and that you came "with empty hands and empty pockets." Actually, of course, they either accepted our position or came very close to it in all the areas where there was agreement, and it is annoying to see them trying to get public credit for making our proposals.

However, this propaganda definitely has a bright side. The fact is that a Soviet leader cannot allow himself to be seen capitulating to foreign pressure. Therefore, when he in fact capitulates, he must claim that he made the proposal and forced it on the other side. This seems to be precisely the tactic Gorbachev is following publicly. In part it is doubtless designed to bolster his public image as a man of peace. But it also serves to make acceptable to the Soviet public, and the various Soviet interest groups, the compromises which he has made. Since he is pretending that he forced them on you, he cannot easily walk away from the points of agreement recorded.

On Saturday morning while you were meeting with Gorbachev, I spent two hours talking with Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He is a remarkable man. Everybody who talked with him came away with the same feeling. It was most unusual that Gorbachev brought him and then placed him at the head of their working group. I came away from my discussion with him convinced that the Soviets want agreements and from a military viewpoint they do not have any concerns with SDI once ballistic missiles are eliminated. I think they are concerned with the transition from offense to defense and Gorbachev has a political problem with SDI since he has been so outspoken against it.

U.S. Strategy

Our first aim should be to "pocket" the concessions the Soviets made. We will be preparing instructions to our negotiators with this aim in mind.

We should also seek means to keep the pressure on the Soviets to hold to the agreements reached and continue constructive negotiation on the issues that remain. Aside from our negotiating posture, we should continue our public statements expressing our commitment to the agreements, and if the Soviets start backsliding, we should make a public issue of it.

We should attempt to maintain a constructive atmosphere so far as circumstances permit, by not gratuitously creating new public issues. However, we should not hesitate to take actions against Soviet interests if necessary and warranted. (For example, your decision to respond to their retaliation against our offices in the Soviet Union for the expulsion of the 25 intelligence officers at the UN is just right.)

We should also make a special effort to attract public attention to the non-arms control areas of our agenda. They have been rather overshadowed by the dramatic events in Reykjavik, and we must see to it that they stay up front in the public eye. (Several events are planned which will call attention to issues such as human rights and expanded contacts.)

We should also do what we can to minimize attention to the question of the date for Gorbachev's visit to the United States. It is possible that Gorbachev was under the false impression at Reykjavik that announcing a date before the November elections was important enough to you to give him leverage over issues of substance. If so, you certainly disabused him of that misperception. Nevertheless, it will be important to convey to the Soviets indirectly that the question of an early date is a matter of indifference to you.

I suspect that Gorbachev will soon find that pressures will build on him to arrange for an early meeting -- and thus validate his claim that much was achieved at Reykjavik. In any event, his delay in agreeing to a date gives us time to continue to press him on issues such as emigration and Afghanistan, as part of a summit "package."

Next Steps

I will be sending you shortly concrete recommendations for steps to take in the arms control field. Broadly speaking, however, I would see a desirable scenario of U.S. actions over the coming weeks as including the following:

1. Issue instructions to our negotiators in Geneva to nail down as quickly as possible the agreements in Reykjavik and proceed with detailed negotiations to work them out in concrete, specific terms.
2. Proceed with arrangements for talks or negotiations on the subjects other than arms control, as agreed at Reykjavik.

3. Possibly, send a letter from you to Gorbachev next week, which would summarize the agreements reached in Reykjavik as we understand them and suggest ways to resolve the remaining key issues.

4. Agree to a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Vienna when they are both there for the opening of the CSCE review conference November 5-7. (If you had sent Gorbachev a letter with suggestions, this meeting would provide an opportunity for a Soviet reply.)

5. Throughout, keep our public relations efforts in high gear, in order to bolster public and Allied support for our positions.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS F. GIBSON

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Bob for*

SUBJECT: Request from the Journal of Commerce for
Presidential Statement

As you noted in your memo to me of September 3, the Journal of Commerce has requested a Presidential statement for their November 24 issue (along with the Soviet Economic Gazette) on trade with the Soviet Union.

The NSC recommends that the President not issue such a statement. Superpower relations are now in a period of considerable turbulence, and many aspects of our bilateral ties are "on hold." This includes our policy toward the promotion of economic intercourse, which is unlikely to move forward without progress on Soviet compliance on human rights.

Attachments

Tab A Your memo to me of Sept. 3
Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY MCDANIEL

FROM: TOM GIBSON *TG*

SUBJECT: Journal of Commerce

Attached, for your attention, is a self-explanatory interview request from the influential Journal of Commerce for the President to provide a brief statement on trade with the Soviet Union. The statement would be jointly published in the Journal and the Soviet Economic Gazette on November 24.

If this is something the President should pursue, we would be happy to handle arrangements with the Journal as well as assist in preparing the statement.

Please let us have your recommendation.

Attachment

5
Tom Nelson

26

The Journal of Commerce

NEW YORK

OFFICE OF THE
PUBLISHER

110 WALL STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005
(212) 425 1616

August 20, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
White House
Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Reagan:

On November 24, 1986, The Journal of Commerce and the Soviet Economic Gazette will jointly publish two historic special sections on U.S./Soviet trade.

Clearly, this is a significant indication of the Soviet desire to do more trade with the United States, a development that stems in no small part from your strong leadership.

Interestingly, it was just last year that the People's Republic of China began sponsoring special sections on trade in The Journal of Commerce, clearly manifesting the strengthening capitalist tendencies of that former foe.

These events remind me of comments made a few years ago by Dr. Armand Hammer, who stressed the importance of continuing a dialogue with the Communists regardless of the ups and downs of their relations with the free world.

By talking, Dr. Hammer said we avoid crises and it is only a matter of time before even the most ardent Communists realize that economically their system simply does not work.

Many of my Chinese friends have lately agreed with this observation, and our early sessions with the Russians indicate what appears to be a new attitude in the way they are approaching trade and business. They want to know how they can sell more goods in the United States and what products they should be buying from here. As with the Chinese, they exhibit a certain lack of sophistication with the ways of private enterprise, but I for one am delighted at what seems to me a very important breakthrough.

The foregoing is by way of background for a request for a brief special statement from you on trade with the Soviet Union to appear in the Soviet Economic Gazette and The Journal of Commerce. This would be a splendid opportunity for your words to reach the more than three million readers of the Economic Gazette who constitute the Soviet Union's government and business leadership. Our Russian contacts indicate that if you made such a statement, Chairman Gorbachev might do the same. I think that would constitute a marvelous message for the entire world.

Mr. President, I thank you for your consideration and I shall be pleased to provide more details to one of your staff.

With best wishes on the continuation of your highly successful presidency.

Yours sincerely,



Don C. Becker

DCB/sr

24

6410

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request from Journal of Commerce for Presidential Statement

At Tab I is a memo from you to Tom Gibson responding to his request for an NSC recommendation on whether the President should issue a statement for the November 24 issue of the Journal of Commerce on trade with the Soviet Union.

The memo recommends the President not issue such a statement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I, recommending the President not issue a statement on trade with the Soviet Union for the Journal of Commerce.

Approve *LMP*

Disapprove _____

RSB/FLC Ty Cobb, *RSB/SD* Steve Danzansky, *RSB/FLH* Paul Hanley, *RSB/FL* Frank Lavin and *SLS* Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo from you to Gibson
- Tab A Gibson memo to you
- Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS F. GIBSON

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

SUBJECT

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*Revised
Tab I 6410*

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Attachments

- Tab A Your memo to me of Sept. 3
- Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

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6410

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS F. GIBSON

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Request from the Journal of Commerce for
Presidential Statement

As you noted in your memo to me of September 3, the Journal of Commerce has requested a Presidential statement for their November 24 issue (along with the Soviet Economic Gazette) on trade with the Soviet Union.

The NSC recommends that the President not issue such a statement.

Attachments

- Tab A Your memo to me of Sept. 3
- Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/~~
~~SECRET Attachment~~

SYSTEM II
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER *Peter Sommer* SOMMER/JACK F. *Jack* MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Reconfiguring Embassy Moscow

State has forwarded Ambassador Hartman's recommendation on how best to staff Embassy Moscow under its new limits (Tab II). State's memo stresses that "Ambassador Hartman, as the President's personal representative on the scene, is best qualified to decide how the Embassy should be reconfigured to preserve its ability to meet long-term USG objectives in the Soviet Union."

State's memo also emphasizes that the Department "will need strong support from the President and you in carrying out" the restaffing process. In blunt terms, State wants your help in keeping agencies off their backs and from second-guessing Hartman's recommendations.

Hartman clearly needs the President's support in carrying out this difficult readjustment -- which you can give. But it would neither serve our interest, nor are we equipped, to micromanage the staffing of Embassy Moscow. At the same time, we need to leave the door slightly ajar for a reclama by any agency that feels its mission will be seriously undercut by the Embassy's new staffing pattern.

This is done implicitly rather than explicitly. Our memo gives Presidential support to State and Hartman in carrying out their difficult tasks; it also urges that any interagency disagreements over staffing be handled through State's established coordinating group -- this is standard practice. Of course, if any agency feels that its mission has been seriously undermined, we will hear about it.

Jack has just returned from Europe and has a number of constructive suggestions on how State and Embassy Moscow might help ease the transition pain. They have been incorporated into our memo to State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the Tab I memo to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

ack Bill Cockell, *one for* Peter Rodman, *ack* Ty Cobb, and *ack* Ken Graffenreid concur. Ron St. Martin approves the memo, but notes that DoD must have an opportunity to reclama, prior to any final reductions. He is concerned that State may make cuts without interagency agreement and underlines that the proposed cuts for DoD are disproportionate.

- Attachments
- Tab I Memo to State
- Tab II State's Incoming

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reconfiguring Embassy Moscow (U)

This memo replies to your memo on "Reconfiguring Embassy Moscow." (U)

Please be assured that the Department and Ambassador Hartman have the President's and Admiral Poindexter's full support in carrying out the difficult task of establishing a new staffing pattern for Embassy Moscow. We know this will not be an easy job and strongly endorse your objective of accomplishing this task with minimum disruption to Embassy operations and personnel. (C)

We consider it appropriate that the Department's Office of Management Operations should be responsible for coordinating the new staffing pattern with other agencies represented in Moscow. We are not in a position to endorse specific manning levels by agency, but do want to underline the need to maintain adequate intelligence collection capabilities. Given the extraordinary circumstances, we hope there will not be any major interagency disagreements on staff levels and urge that any differing views be handled by the Department's coordinating group. (C)

Since we have not had the opportunity to discuss the proposed arrangements with Department officials, we would like to pass on a few suggestions which may not have yet been considered and which might help ease the transition. (C)

We do not believe it is in our interest to transfer current Embassy personnel until replacements (for support functions) are ready to arrive in Moscow. We hope the Department will consider, as well, the impact of employing more spouses and adult dependents of staff members. In our view, we should count a working couple (except when both are diplomatically accredited) as one person on our quota, since a spouse and dependents have a right to be at post, whether working or not -- and since we do not count working spouses in calculating the ceiling of the Soviet Embassy. Maximizing the employment of spouses and dependents could reduce the number of substantive positions which have to be eliminated. (C)

We also suggest that Embassy Moscow investigate whether dependents of personnel at friendly embassies are interested in employment in support positions. We do not believe the Soviet government could legitimately interfere in employing persons from the diplomatic community.

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NLRR FOI 114/5 #8636
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/4

We also wonder whether it would be feasible to establish at a nearby embassy (such as Helsinki) a support section which could do much of the clerical work required to support budget and fiscal, personnel, general services and consular operations, thus reducing the need for support staff on the spot. (C)

As we have informed the Department, NSC staff members stand ready to meet with Department officials dealing with this problem, so that a common approach can be worked out. In the absence of such consultation, we will not be in a position to endorse any particular proposed arrangement. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel

- cc: Executive Secretary, OSD
- Executive Secretary, JCS
- Executive Secretary, CIA
- Executive Secretary, NSA
- Executive Secretary, Agriculture
- Executive Secretary, Commerce

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90741~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~**NODIS**

October 24, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Reconfiguring Embassy Moscow

Ambassador Hartman reports from Moscow that our Embassy is meeting the challenge posed by the withdrawal of Soviet local employees with great professionalism and a "pioneer spirit."

The overnight loss of the Embassy's Soviet staff has nonetheless forced the Embassy radically to alter the way it does business. As we move to provide the infrastructure needed to support essential reporting and other functions over the long term, a major reconfiguration of the Embassy's staffing will be necessary. And since, under the 225-person ceiling the Soviets have imposed, new support positions will have to replace existing positions, the Embassy needs urgently to identify personnel whose departure will be necessary as we create an all-American Embassy.

Ambassador Hartman, as the President's personal representative on the scene, is best qualified to decide how the Embassy should be reconfigured to preserve its ability to meet long-term U.S. Government objectives in the Soviet Union. His recommendations, and their impact on the various agencies represented in Moscow, are summarized in the attachments. In essence, they provide for:

- Assignment of 90 support employees to replace the approximately 180 Soviets withdrawn. (We are exploring on a crash basis means of meeting this need, including the possible short-term use of DOD personnel).
- Commensurate reductions in the direct-hire components of most agencies concerned, including State, by close to half of authorized positions.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

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- 2 -

Given the urgent need for action, the Secretary has authorized Ambassador Hartman to identify personnel whose departure will be necessary, and to inform those affected of his decisions beginning Monday, October 27. We will need strong support from the President and you in carrying out this process quickly and effectively.

The Department's Office of Management Operations (M/MO) will have responsibility for coordinating with agencies represented in Moscow to minimize disruption to operations and inconvenience to personnel.

Recommendations for reconfiguring our Consulate General in Leningrad will be forthcoming once we have received input from that post and Embassy Moscow.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Amb. Hartman's Recommendations

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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USIA

USIA FOR EU (BELL)
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. MATLOCK
AMCONSUL BARCELONA FOR BPAO CECERE

E. O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: PLACEMENT REPORT: INTERVIEW WITH AMPART
AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, NSC

1. POST IS PLEASED TO REPORT PLACEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR MATLOCK IN SPANISH MEDIA. JUAN "ROLDAN" QF "SER" (SERVICIOS ESPANOLAS DE RADIODIFUSION) LIBERAL PRIVATE RADIO NETWORK COVERED AMB. MATLOCK'S PRESENCE IN MADRID ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1986 AT 22:45.

2. TWO DAILIES COVERED AMB. MATLOCK'S VISIT ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 24. "EL PAIS" (LIBERAL LEFT DAILY, CIRCULATION 347,512) NOTE READ "JACK F. MATLOCK, RONALD REAGAN'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, WILL INFORM HIGH-LEVEL SPANISH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS OF THE RESULTS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT." "YA" (CATHOLIC CENTRIST, CIRCULATION 96,186) CARRIED A COVER PAGE ARTICLE IN OCTOBER 24 ISSUE HEADLINED "REAGAN'S SPECIAL ENVOY IN MADRID." QUOTES: "...ACCORDING TO "SER" THE APPARENT REASON... IS TO INFORM GOS ON THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT..."

3. OCTOBER 26, 1986 "EL PAIS" (LIBERAL LEFT DAILY, SUNDAY CIRCULATION 583,411) PUBLISHED ON PAGE 4 AN INTERVIEW BY ANDRES ORTEGA HEADLINED "JACK MATLOCK: 'REAGAN AND GORBACHEV SOMETIMES TELL EACH OTHER JOKES,'" SUBHEAD "NEITHER OF THE TWO PARTIES TRIED TO SET A TRAP FOR THE OTHER RN REYKJAVIK." FULL REPORT FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 08063

USIA

USIA FOR P/DF-BGUY; EU-SCHLOEDER

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: P/DF AMPART AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK: COPENHAGEN
WRAP-UP

REF: (A) USIA 71613 (B) STATE 325892

1. AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK'S VISIT TO COPENHAGEN WAS A STUNNING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SUCCESS, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD TO COMPETE IN PRESS COVERAGE WITH TODAY'S STORY OF 55 EXPELLED SOVIET DIPLOMATS FROM THE U.S. THANKS TO CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN USIS AND THE POL SECTION, EXCELLENT ASSISTANCE BY THE DANISH FOREIGN POLICY SOCIETY AND QUICK MOBILIZATION WITH ONLY TWO WORKING DAYS' LEAD TIME, A FULL PROGRAM WAS ARRANGED WHICH GAVE MATLOCK EXTRAORDINARY EXPOSURE FOR HIS ONE-DAY PROGRAM. GIVEN THE OBJECTIVE OF STRAIGHTENING THE RECORD ON THE REYKJAVIK MEETING, AND PRESENTING U.S. VIEWS OF THE OUTCOME, THE TRIP CAME AT THE IDEAL TIME, WITH THE DANISH PRESS AND PUBLIC CURRENTLY IN A QUANDARY OVER EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED, AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING VISITS BY GEORGIY ARBATOV OF MOSCOW'S USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE AND POST-REYKJAVIK SPECIAL ENVOY ALEKSANDROV AGENTOV. REACTIONS AMONG SECURITY EXPERTS, MAJOR POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE MEDIA WERE HIGHLY FAVORABLE. THE MATLOCK VISIT CLARIFIED A COMPLEX WEB OF ISSUES AND TURNED KEY INDIVIDUALS' OPINIONS AROUND IN MORE THAN A FEW INSTANCES.

2. THE TWO PREVAILING THEMES TO EMERGE IN DISCUSSIONS, AND IN THE MEDIA, FROM MATLOCK'S VISIT WERE: (1) THE WELL-FOUNDED OPTIMISM NOW EMERGING FOR U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 10 DAYS AFTER THE REYKJAVIK MEETING, AND (2) THE REINTRODUCTION OF THE NOTION OF A WESTERN EUROPE WITHOUT A BALLISTIC MISSILE DETERRENT, WITH THE RESULTING IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A PROSPECT FOR THE FUTURE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

3. CONTACT WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WAS REACHED AT THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL, GIVEN THAT THE PRIME

MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER WERE ALL OUT OF THE COUNTRY AT THE TIME. SCHOOL HOLIDAYS WERE ALSO IN FULL SWING. MATLOCK MET WITH PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN POLITICAL AFFAIRS BENNY KIMBERG AT THE MFA IN A ONE-ON-ONE (WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR TODMAN PRESENT), THEN ATTENDED A LUNCH HOSTED BY KIMBERG WITH FIVE OTHER HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE HEAD OF THE MFA DISARMAMENT SECRETARIAT AND AN UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. RECEPTION WAS FAVORABLE AND ENTHUSIASTIC.

4. RECORD TURN-OUTS MARKED TWO HIGH-PROFILE GATHERINGS WHERE MATLOCK EXPLAINED U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. A HASTILY ARRANGED MEETING OF THE STRATEGIC STUDY GROUP OF THE DANISH FOREIGN POLICY SOCIETY DREW OVER 20 MEMBERS OF THIS INFLUENTIAL GROUP, COMPRISING ACADEMICIANS, JOURNALISTS, THINK-TANK MEMBERS AND OFFICIALS. MATLOCK'S SUPERBLY LUCID AND FORCEFUL TALK, PARTICULARLY ON THE SPACE AND DEFENSE AGENDA OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING, UNRAVELLED A HOST OF COMPLICATED ISSUES, SPARKING AN ANIMATED DISCUSSION AND DRAWING COMMENTS FROM THE GROUP TO THE EFFECT THAT THE INITIAL NEGATIVE PRESS COVERAGE OF REYKJAVIK HAD NOW BEEN SHOWN TO BE WHOLLY OFF THE MARK.

5. A WORKING DINNER AT AMBASSOR TODMAN'S RESIDENCE ALSO DREW A RECORD ATTENDANCE OF WELL-PLACED PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING BOTH THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AND SECURITY POLICY SPOKESMAN OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SDP) BOTH STRONG CRITICS OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS AT REYKJAVIK, NOW AS A RESULT OF THE MATLOCK

VISIT ADMITTING THAT THE U.S. HAD MADE MAJOR STEPS FORWARD AT THE MEETING. ALSO PARTICIPATING WERE THE EDITORS-IN-CHIEF OF TWO OF DENMARK'S THREE MAJOR NEWSPAPERS AVAILABLE AT THE TIME AND THE EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR OF THE THIRD, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DANISH ATLANTIC ASSOCIATION, AS WELL AS ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE DANISH FOREIGN POLICY SOCIETY, THE DANISH CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF, AND RANKING MEMBERS OF FOUR MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING TWO CHAIRMEN, IN ADDITION TO THE SDP.

6. A PRESS CONFERENCE DREW THE MAJOR NEWSPAPERS AND WIRE SERVICES, AND RESULTED IN PLACEMENT THE FOLLOWING
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 08063

USIA

USIA FOR P/DF-BGUY; EU-SCHLOEDER

E. O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: P/DF AMPART AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK: COPENHAGEN

MORNING IN THREE DAILIES. SEPTEL FOLLOWS ON MEDIA
REACTION. A TELEVISION INTERVIEW WAS TAPED BUT NOT
AIRED TUESDAY NIGHT, POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF COMPETITION
WITH THE STORY ON THE 55 EXPELLED SOVIET DIPLOMATS.
SEPTEL ON TELEVISION COVERAGE WILL FOLLOW IF AND WHEN
THERE IS ANY. NANK ACTING
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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UNCLAS LONDON 23294

USIA

USIA FOR P/DF (B. GUY); EU (JACKOVICH)

E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: AMPART JACK MATLOCK: LONDON WRAP-UP

REF: (A) USIA 71613; (B) AMEMBASSY LONDON 22662

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK DEMONSTRATED VERSATILITY AS WELL AS STAMINA IN THE COURSE OF NINE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EVENTS WITHIN 24 HOURS DURING HIS OCTOBER 24-25 LONDON VISIT. HIS PROGRAMS COMPLEMENTED THOSE PRESENTED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RICHARD PERLE THE PRECEDING WEEKEND, AND CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO OUR POST-REYKJAVIK PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

2. OVER 25 MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S 14:30 PRESS CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON, EVEN THOUGH IT COINCIDED WITH HMG'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. AFTER A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS AT REYKJAVIK, THE AMBASSADOR CORRECTED NUMEROUS MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AT THE MEETING, AND ALLAYED FEARS THAT THE SPATE OF RECIPROCAL SOVIET AND U.S. EXPULSIONS SINCE REYKJAVIK WOULD SERIOUSLY HARM THE ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

3. FOLLOWING THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THE AMBASSADOR GRANTED A LAST-MINUTE REQUEST FROM ITV'S CHANNEL 4 NEWS FOR A TELEVISED INTERVIEW IN THE EMBASSY AUDITORIUM, WHICH WAS BROADCAST THAT EVENING AT 7:00 P.M.

4. AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AT 16:00, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S CONFIDENTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACTIVITIES AT REYKJAVIK WAS MUCH APPRECIATED BY ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY RATFORD AND OTHER FCO OFFICIALS. ALL PARTIES AGREED THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS ARE EXTREMELY VALUABLE, AND THAT THEY

5. AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT 17:00, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK ADDRESSED A ROUNDTABLE OF SOME 20 ACADEMICS AND JOURNALISTS, HOSTED BY ALEXANDER PRAVDA, DIRECTOR OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM. THE DISCUSSION WAS ANIMATED AND ENDED AFTER 75 MINUTES ONLY BECAUSE THE AMBASSADOR HAD TO LEAVE FOR HIS INTERVIEWS AT BROADCASTING HOUSE.

6. AT BROADCASTING HOUSE AT 18:30, THE AMBASSADOR GAVE TWO CONSECUTIVE INTERVIEWS - FIRST TO BBC RADIO 4'S NEWS PROGRAM "THE WORLD TONIGHT," AND THEN FOR BBC WORLD SERVICE'S NEWS PROGRAM "24 HOURS." THE TWO FIVE-MINUTE INTERVIEWS WERE MODELS OF CONCISION AND CLARITY.

7. ON FRIDAY EVENING THE COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS HOSTED A HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE WORKING DINNER AT HIS RESIDENCE FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EMBASSY OFFICERS, AND LEADING SOVIET SPECIALISTS FROM ACADEMIA AND THE MEDIA.

8. ON SATURDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 25, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MET WITH BRIAN BEEDHAM, FOREIGN EDITOR OF THE ECONOMIST AT 9:30, AND WITH SHIRLEY WILLIAMS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AT 10:30 BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE AIRPORT AT 11:30.

9. MEDIA COVERAGE. INDEPENDENT TELEVISION'S CHANNEL

4 NEWS CARRIED APPROXIMATELY 90 SECONDS OF AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S INTERVIEW ON ITS 7:00 P.M. NEWS PROGRAM FRIDAY EVENING. BBC'S RADIO 4 USED THE AMBASSADOR'S FULL FIVE-MINUTE INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD KERSHAW ON ITS 22:30 NEWS PROGRAM "THE WORLD TONIGHT" THE SAME EVENING, AND OVER FOUR MINUTES OF HIS INTERVIEW FOR BBC'S WORLD SERVICE WAS CARRIED ON THE FRIDAY EVENING EDITION OF "24 HOURS" AT 21:15. FURTHER MEDIA COVERAGE WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL. KORENGOLD

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 COPENHAGEN 8121 DTG: 241026Z OCT 86 PSN: 048895 EOB979 AN007975 TOR: 297/1213Z CSN: CR1785

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 08121

USIA

USIA FOR P/DF-BGUY; EU-SCHLOEDER

E.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: P/DF AMPART AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK: ADDENDUM TO COPENHAGEN WRAP-UP

REF: (A) USIA 71613 (B) STATE 325892 (C) COPENHAGEN 08063

1. POST WOULD LIKE TO REPORT FURTHER ON PARA 5 OF REF C, TOUCHING UPON THE EXTRAORDINARILY SUCCESSFUL DINNER FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AT AMBASSADOR TODMAN'S RESIDENCE ON OCTOBER 21. THIS CABLE WILL SEEK TO OUTLINE THE CONTENTS OF THE DINNER DISCUSSION, AS WELL AS REPERCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY COME TO OUR ATTENTION, BOTH INFORMALLY AND IN THE PRESS.

2. MATLOCK GAVE A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING, FOLLOWED BY A HIGHLY ANIMATED DISCUSSION INVOLVING LEADERS AND ANALYSTS ON EVERY SIDE OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. HE EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE AT REYKJAVIK TO REACH A TOTAL CONSENSUS, AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE CURRENT OPTIMISM FOR FUTURE PROGRESS. THE SETTING OF A WORKING DINNER PROVIDED A SERIOUS AND CONCENTRATED ATMOSPHERE, WITH MANY GAPS OF INFORMATION AMONG THE DANISH PARTICIPANTS FILLED IN AND A GREATER DEGREE OF CONSENSUS AFTER THAN BEFORE. MATLOCK WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE THE PERFECT BALANCE OF THOROUGH, FACTUAL TREATMENT OF HIS TOPIC WITH THE ANECDOTAL DETAILS OF AN INSIDER, A COMBINATION WHICH WON THE LISTENERS' RAPT ATTENTION.

3. STRIKING WAS THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO EDITORS OF "BERLINGSKE WEEKENDAVISEN," JØRGEN SCHLEIMANN AND TØGER SEIDENFADEN, AND SDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN SVEND AUKEN AND SECURITY SPOKESMAN LASSE BUDTZ. THE FORMER, BOTH PRO-NATO AND STRONG ON DEFENSE, EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN OVER THE POTENTIAL DECOUPLING EFFECT OF A RENEWED REMOVAL OF THE U.S. INF DETERRENT FROM EUROPE WHILE AUKEN AND BUDTZ FELT CONSTRAINED ON THEIR PART TO ADMIT

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AT REYKJAVIK. AUKEN STILL FELT THE NEED TO EXPRESS REGRET THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE ON SDI TO PERMIT THE SIGNATURE OF A COMPLETE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE. BUDTZ ON THE OTHER HAND SEEMED BETTER ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO RETURN TO GENEVA TO WORK OUT THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENTS.

4. IB FAURBY, EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR ("POLITIKEN," LEFT-OF-CENTER DAILY) AND LEADING EXPERT ON SECURITY ISSUES, COMMENTED THAT THE DINNER HAD "ALTERED MY ENTIRE WELTANSCHAUUNG" ON SECURITY MATTERS; BJØRN ELMQUIST, MP FOR THE LIBERAL PARTY (VENSTRE), SAID HE HAD FOUND THE OCCASION PROFOUNDLY INFORMATIVE AND USEFUL; POUL ØLGAARD, PROFESSOR OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND LEADING EXPERT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, REMARKED THAT HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW ANYONE PRESENT COULD FAIL TO BE IMPRESSED.

5. IN A LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS TO AMBASSADOR TODMAN, LT. GEN. JØRGEN LYNG, CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF AND HEADQUARTERS CHIEF OF DEFENSE, NOTED THE DEEP AND LASTING IMPRESSION THE "EXTRAORDINARY" EVENT HAD LEFT ON ALL PARTICIPANTS. HE REFERRED TO THE DINNER AS "DIPLOMACY IN ITS TRUE SENSE," AND CITED MATLOCK'S "BRILLIANT COMMENTS." HE PREDICTED THAT WHILE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS MIGHT BE ELUSIVE, THERE WOULD BE FAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS AS TIME WENT ON, AMONG INFLUENTIAL OPINION-MAKERS.

6. IN FACT, EFFECTS MORE IMMEDIATE THAN ANYONE WOULD HAVE IMAGINED SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE. NIELS HELVIG PETERSEN, MP AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NEUTRALIST/CENTRIST RADICAL LIBERAL PARTY WHOSE SWING VOTES FREQUENTLY DETERMINE DANISH POLICY ON MATTERS SUCH AS NATO FOOTNOTES, SHOWED KEEN INTEREST AT THE DINNER. THE LEAD STORY IN THE OCTOBER 23 "JYLLANDS-POSTEN" (CONSERVATIVE DAILY) CARRIES THE HEADLINE "RADICAL LIBERALS CHANGE DEFENSE POLICY SIGNALS." ON THE OCCASION OF THE GLENEAGLES CONFERENCE NOW TAKING PLACE AMONG NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AND DANISH CONSERVATIVE DEFENSE MINISTER HANS ENGELL'S PARLIAMENTARY OBLIGATION TO FOOTNOTE PRO-SDI RESOLUTIONS, PETERSEN IS QUOTED AS SAYING, "IF HANS ENGELL IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING IMPLIES THAT WE MUST CHANGE SOME OF BT

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USIA

USIA FOR P/DF-BGUY; EU-SCHLOEDER

THE DANISH ATTITUDES, THEN HE SHOULD COME FORTH AND
EXPLAIN WHAT HE WANTS. WE WILL THEN LISTEN TO HIM IN
CASE HE WANTS ANOTHER MANDATE." NANK ACTING
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Following is a full translation of a commentary by Frank Bjerkholt in Morgenbladet, October 22, 1986. Bjerkholt, a former foreign editor of the paper, now contributes commentaries on a regular basis.

(begin text) An INF agreement would face Europe with the challenge of providing its own anti-missile defense.

President Reagan's special advisor on security matter, Ambassador Jack Matlock Jr., said during a visit to Oslo this week that an INF agreement continues to offer the best opportunities in the disarmament negotiations. If Moscow choses to see the problem isolated from other issues - which at the moment is not clear - then an agreement is possible. An arrangement has been outlined for one hundred Soviet warheads in Asia, none in Europe and one hundred in the U.S.

However, this solution does not sound so good to European ears. When Morgenbladet asked Ambassador Matlock whether such a solution was not a bit hazardous, since the other Soviet missiles in Europe are of a shorter range type, but equally threatening, he answered that one has to take one step at a time.

The zero option was originally introduced by NATO in connection with the dual track decision in 1979. But that was before the Russians responded to this deployment by deploying additional SS-21s and SS-23s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. These missiles can, either with nuclear or conventional warheads, destroy all of NATO's vital centers in a first strike.

So, here the Europeans have a problem should the superpowers reach an agreement on INF. The Europeans are not put at ease by the fact that the Soviet Union will have one hundred SS-20s in Asia, since these weapons are mobile. Even the French government, which is fairly self-supplied with nuclear weapon, has voiced scepticism over the proposed solution. It would bring Western Europe into the kind of decoupling from the American deterrent, which was the main objective of the 1979 accord to avoid, Paris fears.

After a removal of the American missiles the Europeans must find their own answer to the series of SS-21-22-23. Equivalent American missiles? It is possible but not very likely in view of the current atmosphere in Europe. A European anti-ballistic defense weapon? That is more probable, and has been the subject of debate for some time. This requirement has been a factor contributing to the support which Bonn, London and Rome have given SDI. And in Paris, both the president and the new government parties have announsed that they see the need for a separate European space weapons tehnology in the future.

In case an INF agreement is reached, the Europeans will have to face up to the fact that they have become increasingly more vulnerable, also to Soviet conventional forces, and therefore have to assume greater responsibility for their own security and their own defense. (end text)

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SUBJECT: MEDIA COVERAGE: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK JR.
VISIT TO OSLO.

REF: OSLO 06487-C AND PREVIOUS

1. NORWEGIAN TELEVISION (NRK) IN PRIME TIME NEWSCAST OCTOBER 20, SEEN BY ESTIMATED 1.6 MILLION VIEWERS, CARRIED A TWO AND A HALF MINUTE EXCERPT OF AN INTERVIEW WITH THE AMBASSADOR. IN THIS SEGMENT MATLOCK COVERED EXPULSION OF FIVE U.S. DIPLOMATS, DOING ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER BUSINESS WITH THE GORBACHEV REGIME, AND THE JEWISH EMIGRATION/HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE USSR. THE FULL INTERVIEW, MADE BY NRK'S FORMER MOSCOW CORRESPONDENT WILHELM STEINFELT, WILL BE CARRIED AT A LATER DATE.

2. ONE OF THE HARSHTEST CRITICS, LABOR PARTY-AFFILIATED "ARBEIDERBLADET" ON OCTOBER 21 CARRIED A FOUR-COLUMN ARTICLE BASED ON AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S MONDAY AFTERNOON SEMINAR WITH THE PRESS AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS, HEADLINED: "UNCLEAR ANSWER FROM U.S."

HALVOR ELVIK, THE PAPER'S SECURITY AFFAIRS COMMENTATOR, GAVE A STRAIGHT ACCOUNT OF THE AMBASSADOR'S BRIEFING ON PROGRESS MADE AT REYKJAVIK, BUT HE FOCUSED ON A THEME HE HAS STRESSED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS: AN APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN GERARD SMITH'S JULY 18, 1972 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY ON THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ON THE LEGALITY OF SDI TESTING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LABORATORIES.

- SAID ELVIK: "THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON THE ABM TREATY OF 1972 REMAINS UNCLEAR AFTER THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SECURITY POLICY ADVISER, AMBASSADOR JACK MARLOCK JR., WAS IN OSLO YESTERDAY TO EXPLAIN TO NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE PUBLIC WHAT THE SITUATION IS AFTER REYKJAVIK. THE AMBASSADOR'S ANSWER CONCERNING THE ABM TREATY WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES AFTER REYKJAVIK."

- "IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTED FROM THE INTERPRETATION CHIEF NEGOTIATOR GERARD SMITH GAVE IN 1972 OF THE ABM TREATY IN A CONGRESSIONAL HEARING, THE AMBASSADOR SAID: 'IN A WAY, WE NEVER DEPARTED FROM THAT INTERPRETATION.'

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- "GERARD SMITH IN 1972 MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ABM TREATY BANS TESTING OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK SAID 'THIS WAS AN ISOLATED STATEMENT BY ONE OF OUR NEGOTIATORS.' INSTEAD, THE AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO A STUDY OF THE TREATY BY A STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL EXPERT, WHICH SHOWED THERE WAS ROOM FOR A 'BROADER' INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY."

- THE AMBASSADOR UNDERScoreD THAT PRESENT AMERICAN RESEARCH IS WELL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF STRICT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY. HE DID NOT SUGGEST A TIME FOR WHEN RESEARCH WILL DEMAND A 'BROADER INTERPRETATION,' ADDING THAT ONLY WHEN THE TWO SIDES ARE FACED WITH DEPLOYMENT WILL IT BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE OR WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS 'RATHER IRRITATING.'"

3. POST IS PROVIDING COPIES OF DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISOR ABRAHAM SOFAER'S "THE ABM TREATY AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE" FROM JUNE 1986 HARVARD LAW REVIEW TO ELVIK AND SEVERAL OTHERS WHO INQUIRED ABOUT THIS ISSUE.
CARLSON##

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RUFH P/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 4838
RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO 3299
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3573
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 08223

USIA

FOR P/DF-BUD GUY; EU-SHIPPE; STATE FOR EUR/P

E. O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT? P/DF AMPART AMB. ACK MATLOCK

REF: (A) USIA 71613; (B) THE HAGUE 8032

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK PROVIDED US WITH A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AND VERY VALUABLE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM IN THE NETHERLANDS ON OCTOBER 22. IN MEETINGS WITH TOP CHIEF EDITORS, ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS AND PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALISTS AND A RADIO INTERVIEW, AMB. MATLOCK FORCEFULLY AND CLEARLY LAID OUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, HIS PRESENTATION FOCUSED ON THE ESSENTIAL AGREEMENTS REACHED ON SEVERAL POINTS AND THE TWO IMPORTANT ITEMS IDENTIFIED FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION: SDI, AND THE DIFFERING DEFINITIONS HELD BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS OVER "BALLISTIC MISSILES" AND "STRATEGIC WEAPONS."

2. MATLOCK DELIVERED A CONVINCINGLY UPLIFTING MESSAGE, WHICH STRESSED THAT MUCH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN REYKJAVIK WHICH COULD SERVE AS A NEW BASIS FOR CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. HIS AUDIENCES WERE NOT WITHOUT SKEPTICISM, BUT REACTED WITH RAPT ATTENTION TO THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATIONS. THE RESULT, WE ESTIMATE, IS A MUCH CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE USG POSITION ON THE PART OF A HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT AND INFLUENTIAL AUDIENCE GROUP IN THE NETHERLANDS. END SUMMARY.

3. IN THE 12 AVAILABLE PROGRAM HOURS ON OCTOBER 22, THE POST ORGANIZED A HIGHLY TARGETED, FAST-PACED PROGRAM BUILT AROUND A PRESS LUNCHEON, A VISIT TO THE DUTCH BROADCASTING CENTER AT HILVERSUM, A DISCUSSION WITH DEFENSE SPECIALISTS FROM ACADEME, AND A DINNER WITH PARLIAMENTARIANS HOSTED BY THE CHARGE. HIS BLUE-RIBBON LUNCHEON AUDIENCE INCLUDED THE TOP EDITORS FROM SIX OF THE NETHERLANDS' MOST INFLUENTIAL MEDIA CONCERNS, INCLUDING THE CHIEF EDITORS OF THE LARGEST CIRCULATION DAILY, THE MOST RESPECTED DAILY, THE LARGEST CIRCULATION OPINION WEEKLY AND THE TELEVISION NEWS SERVICE. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S RADIO INTERVIEW WITH NCRV (PROTESTANT BROADCASTING), ONE OF THE EIGHT MAJOR DUTCH BROADCASTERS, RAN IN A POPULAR MORNING RUSH-HOUR TIME SLOT OCT. 23, AND REACHED AN ESTIMATED AUDIENCE OF 800,000. HIS DINNER COMPANIONS INCLUDED DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALISTS FOR THE PARLIAMENTARY FRACTIONS OF THE THREE LARGEST DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC

AND LIBERAL PARTIES WHICH CURRENTLY FORM THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT COALITION. THE AMBASSADOR'S SCHEDULE INVOLVED CAR TRAVEL TO THREE DIFFERENT PROGRAM CITIES AND THE POST WAS IMPRESSED BY HIS STAMINA AND GRATEFUL FOR THE GOOD HUMOR WITH WHICH HE UNDERTOOK HIS DEMANDING PROGRAM IN THE NETHERLANDS.

3. AMB. MATLOCK PROVIDED AN AUTHORITATIVE, HIGHLY DETAILED AND EXCITING EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT OF REYKJAVIK AND WHAT THE U.S. BELIEVES WAS ACHIEVED THERE. HE WAS VERY EFFECTIVE IN CLARIFYING SUCH POINTS OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION AS THE SEEMING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MEETING AND THE SATISFACTION EXPRESSED IN LATER STATEMENT. HE ALSO STRESSED FOR OUR AUDIENCES THAT SDI WAS NOT THE ONLY POINT OF CONTENTION AT THE MEETING; THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. FOCUS ON "BALLISTIC MISSILES" AND SOVIET PREFERENCE FOR "STRATEGIC SYSTEMS" ALSO POSED A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO FURTHER AGREEMENT. THE AMBASSADOR ENERGETICALLY NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS RESULT- TWO MAJOR POINTS OF CONTENTION IN PLACE OF THE MANY WHICH WERE OUTSTANDING BEFORE - REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD AND IS CERTAINLY NO REASON FOR PESSIMISM. AMB. MATLOCK EMPHASIZED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO INCORPORATE THE AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE REACHED IN REYKJAVIK INTO THEIR RESPECTIVE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, A POINT RECEIVED VERY WELL BY OUR AUDIENCES.

4. THE POST AIMED AT PAIRING THE AMBASSADOR WITH THOSE INFLUENTIAL OPINION-LEADERS FROM THE MEDIA, ACADEMIA AND POLITICS WHO WILL CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE THE INTERPRETATION OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING IN THE FUTURE
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SERVICE REQUESTED. TEXT GARBLED.

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 THE HAGUE 08223

USIA

FOR P/DF-BUD GUY; EU-SHIPPE; STATE FOR EUR/P

DUTCH PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND WE VIEW HIS VISIT AS
EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL. IT PROVIDED KEY AUDIENCE GROUPS
WITH AN AUTHORITATIVE EXPOSITION OF THE U.S. ANALYSIS
OF THE STATE OF U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS
POST-REYKJAVIK. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK CLARIFIED AND
STRENGTHENED OUR DIALOGUE WITH CRUCIAL AUDIENCES IN
THE NETHERLANDS, AND WE HOPE TO SEE THE RESULTS OF
THIS PROGRAM SOON IN A BETTER-INFORMED PUBLIC DEBATE.
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RUFHTH/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 2693
RUFHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0221
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UNCLAS OSLO 06561

USIA

E. O. 12356: N/A
SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING IN OSLO FOR
AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK

REF: OSLO 06487-C AND PREVIOUS

1. OSLO IS ESPECIALLY APPRECIATIVE TO USIA AND NSC FOR MAKING AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMMING HERE OCTOBER 19 AND 20. HIS UNTIRING AND EXTREMELY USEFUL PARTICIPATION IN OUR EFFORTS TO SHAPE NORWEGIAN VIEWS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING AND THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL, AS WELL AS OF THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH SDI CAN MAKE TO ARMS REDUCTIONS, WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT HERE.

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE OSLO PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM AMBASSADOR MATLOCK MET WITH THE NATIONAL TELEVISION NETWORK, WITH EDITORS OF ALL MAJOR OSLO PUBLICATIONS AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN AN INTENSIVE AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL LUNCHEON AND IN A SUBSTANTIVE TWO-HOUR SEMINAR WITH POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, JOURNALISTS, SECURITY POLICY RESEARCHERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AT THE EMBASSY AUDITORIUM. HE ALSO MET WITH SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE PARLIAMENT'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE WHO WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN HOW SDI COULD CONTRIBUTE OR BLOCK FURTHER PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, AS WELL AS THE NSC ADVISOR'S JUDGMENTS ON HOW ONE BEST CAN DO BUSINESS WITH THE GORBACHEV REGIME. IT WAS A STIMULATING HOUR. THE DAY CONCLUDED WITH A DINNER WITH SOVIET SPECIALISTS WHICH REHRI1 (S6>53&0M=ZYL.C. &VV>' US*9 AND A PRIVATE ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 20.

4. WE BELIEVE AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S PROGRAM IN OSLO WAS EXACTLY WHAT WE NEEDED TO BEGIN TURNING THE TIDE OF NEGATIVISM WHICH HAS BEEN RUNNING SINCE REYKJAVIK. WE HAVE NOT WON OVER THE NORWEGIAN BODY POLITIC TO SUPPORT SDI, BUT PERHAPS WE HAVE GAINED AN INCREASING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH LIE BEFORE US AS A RESULT TO THE REKJAVIK MEETING. MEDIA COVERAGE REPORTED SEPTELS. CARLSON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 29, 1986

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR PETER RODMAN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Upcoming Meetings with the Soviets

As you requested, here is a contribution towards what meetings we have coming up with the Soviets.

Meetings sides have agreed to in principle (dates may not be firm):

NST VI is now in session. ~~(U)~~ The US has proposed ending the session on November 4. ~~(S/EXDIS)~~

SCC is now in session in Geneva. ~~(U)~~ USG expects the round may end on Nov. 13. ~~(S/EXDIS)~~

MBFR is now in Vienna in its 40th session. Began Sept. 25. ~~(U)~~ The round is to run through December 14. ~~(S/EXDIS)~~

Peaceful uses of outer space. Experts' talks took place at the National Academy of Sciences Oct. 27-30. ~~(U)~~

Chemical Weapons Convention Bilaterals began in New York on Oct. 28 to run through mid-November. ~~(C)~~

Transport Agreement: Sides agreed at Reykjavik to begin negotiations. Dates have yet to be scheduled. ~~(U)~~

US proposed talks in Washington week of Oct. 27. ~~(C)~~

3rd Follow-up to CSCE is to start in Vienna on November 4. ~~(U)~~

Shultz-Shevardnadze in Vienna on November 5-6. ~~(U)~~

Maritime Search and Rescue Talks. US proposed that Coast Guard meet with the Soviets for informal meeting at International Maritime Organization Council meeting in London Nov. 10-14. ~~(U)~~

Maritime Radio Navigation. US proposed that Coast Guard meet with the Soviets for informal meeting at International Maritime Organization Council meeting in London Nov. 10-14. ~~(U)~~

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/5 #8638

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

51

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Negotiations on Maritime Boundaries are to continue. (U)

The next round is to take place in Moscow. Likely dates are November 10-14. (C)

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Meeting is to take place in Geneva--likely date: November 12. (S/EXDIS)

Nuclear Testing Experts' Talks in Geneva are to start November 13 to last two weeks. (U)

Secretary Pierce of HHS is going to the USSR in mid-November. (U)

Consular Review Talks (CRT) begin Oct. 29 in Washington. (U)

The Joint Commercial Commission is to hold its annual meeting on December 4-5 in Washington. (U)

Non-Proliferation Bilaterals are to start in Washington in mid-December. (U)

Maritime Agreement negotiations set for Jan. 13-16 in Washington. (U)

Bilateral Review Commission. US proposed meeting in early 1987. (U)

The next round of talks on an Agricultural Cooperation Agreement have not yet been scheduled. They last took place last August in Moscow. (U)

Possible Meetings:

Nuclear Fusion: US has proposed meeting in Japan in November. (C)

US has proposed a Humanitarian Working Group meeting for December 1. (C)

Energy Agreement: US willing to have experts meet at a "mutually convenient time." (C)

SECRET

52

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Basic Science Agreement: US willing to have experts meet at a "mutually convenient time." (C)

Nuclear Regulatory Commission is planning a visit to Moscow. (C)

Talks on a long term grain agreement have been postponed. They normally meet semiannually. (U)

This information comes from State (EUR/SOV) and they are very concerned about release of any of the classified portions. I would recommend that we coordinate with them before going beyond what is unclassified here.

Prepared by:
R. Scott Dean

~~SECRET~~

Chlor

53

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7274

October 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Beh for*
SUBJECT: Letter to Armand Hammer

At Tab A is a draft response to Armand Hammer for signature by an appropriate White House staffer. Dr. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff affair and sent a copy of Hammer's interview on the CBS Evening News.

The draft thanks Hammer for his support and his trip to the USSR on the Daniloff case. It also thanks him for his efforts in securing the release of Soviet dissident Dr. David Goldfarb.

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Hammer
- Tab B Dr. Hammer's Letter and Videotape

54

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Hammer:

The President has asked me to thank you for your letter of October 2 and your support on the Daniloff case. The Soviets unfortunately still have much to learn about the importance the United States attaches to their callous disregard for the individual. The President appreciated your help in conveying his concerns.

On behalf of the President, let me also thank you for your outstanding efforts in obtaining the release of Dr. David Goldfarb. Your intervention on his behalf was invaluable, and a sterling example of the American commitment to human rights.

Sincerely,

Dr. Armand Hammer
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Suite 1600
10889 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 28, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Response to Armand Hammer Letter on Daniloff

At Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a draft answer to Armand Hammer. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff case and enclosed a tape of his interview on the CBS Evening News about the Daniloff case. Tab A is the draft answer. Tab B is Hammer's original letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the draft response.

Approve *WJR*

Disapprove _____

^{RSO for JEM}
Judy Mandel concurs.

Attachments

Tab I McDaniel Memo to Kelley
Tab A Draft Answer to Hammer
Tab B Hammer's incoming letter and videotape

SIGNED

428507
56

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD · SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

October 2, 1986

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

My congratulations on an exceptionally well done negotiation with General Secretary Gorbachev. I believe this is another landmark in the history of our relations and expect that it will lead to very great success in Iceland and, later, here in the United States.

I chaired your Cancer Panel meeting at Harvard's Dana Farber Institute Monday, during which Dan Rather called me and asked me to come through New York for a live appearance on his news show.

I was pleased to do so under condition that I would only comment on the overview and not the details, however minor, of my own involvement and swift trip to Moscow last week.

I was very pleased that this gave me the chance to say that I congratulated you on your victory and your statesmanship. I enclose a tape and transcript.

I will be in the Soviet Union attending the opening of my art collection in Kiev, done as part of your cultural exchange, during the weekend of October 11th and 12th. My thoughts will be with you in Iceland, along with my confidence that our country and the world are fortunate to have you in command at this time.

Respectfully,

Armand

Enclosures

AH:ec

7:00 pm CBS NEWS
DOCTOR HAMMER INTERVIEW WITH DAN RATHER:
SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

57

DAN RATHER (DR) - EIGHTY EIGHT YEAR OLD AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIST DOCTOR ARMAND HAMMER IS AMONG THE SELECT FEW AMERICANS WITH EASY ACCESS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND IT GOES ALL THE WAY BACK TO LENIN'S TIME AND THEN RIGHT ON UP TO THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL AND WHAT JUST LED UP TO THE DANILOFF DEAL. I TALKED WITH DOCTOR HAMMER LATE TODAY.

DR - DOCTOR HAMMER, WHO WON, WHO LOST, WHO BLINKED?

AH - I THINK THEY BOTH BLINKED. I DON'T THINK THAT EITHER ONE LOST; I THINK THEY BOTH WON.

DR - NOW EXPLAIN THAT TO ME.

AH - WELL, I THINK THAT MR. GORBACHEV GOT WHAT HE WANTED. MR. REAGAN GOT WHAT HE WANTED AND I THINK THAT THE RESULT IS GOING TO BE GOOD FOR THE WORLD. THING WAS THAT THE DANILOFF INCIDENT CAME AT A TIME WHEN IT COULD HAVE WRECKED THE WHOLE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT.

DR - WHAT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT WANT TO SWAP DANILOFF FOR ZAKHAROV AND, HOWEVER YOU DESCRIBE IT, THIS WAS A DEAL FOR A SWAP. SO, THERE IS THIS ARGUMENT THAT HE HAS GIVEN AWAY ENOUGH TO INDICATE SOFTNESS, WEAKNESS TO GORBACHEV.

AH - I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK THE PRESIDENT HAS SHOWN STATEMANSHIP. I THINK SHULTZ HAS SHOWN STATESMANSHIP. I THINK THE STAKES ARE MUCH GREATER THAN THE PERSONAL EGO OF EITHER ONE.

DR - DOCTOR ARMAND HAMMER ALSO SAID THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THE SOVIETS WILL CONCENTRATE ON ARMS CONTROL IN ICELAND.

58

100 428508

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

7274

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 02, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ARMAND HAMMER

SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING AN INTERVIEW WITH DAN RATHER
AND ENCLOSES A TAPE AND TRANSCRIPT ON SAME

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
JOHN POINDEXTER		ORG	86/10/02		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
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	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS: SENT TO HAROLD WEST - RED TAG

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OE0B) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

anon
51

7274

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 28, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Response to Armand Hammer Letter on Daniloff

At Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a draft answer to Armand Hammer. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff case and enclosed a tape of his interview on the CBS Evening News about the Daniloff case. Tab A is the draft answer. Tab B is Hammer's original letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the draft response.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Judyt Mandel ^{rsa for JEM} concurs.

Attachments

- Tab I McDaniel Memo to Kelley
- Tab A Draft Answer to Hammer
- Tab B Hammer's incoming letter and videotape

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

60
7274

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL
SUBJECT: Letter to Armand Hammer

At Tab A is a draft response to Armand Hammer for signature by an appropriate White House staffer. Dr. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff affair and sent a copy of Hammer's interview on the CBS Evening News.

The draft thanks Hammer for his support and his trip to the USSR on the Daniloff case. It also thanks him for his efforts in securing the release of Soviet dissident Dr. David Goldfarb.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Hammer
Tab B Dr. Hammer's Letter and Videotape

61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Hammer:

The President has asked me to thank you for your letter of October 2 and your support on the Daniloff case. The Soviets unfortunately still have much to learn about the importance the United States attaches to their callous disregard for the individual. The President appreciated your help in conveying his concerns.

On behalf of the President, let me also thank you for your outstanding efforts in obtaining the release of Dr. David Goldfarb. Your intervention on his behalf was invaluable, and a sterling example of the American commitment to human rights.

Sincerely,

Dr. Armand Hammer
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Suite 1600
10889 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024

428507
62

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024
(213) 208-8800

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

October 2, 1986

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

My congratulations on an exceptionally well done negotiation with General Secretary Gorbachev. I believe this is another landmark in the history of our relations and expect that it will lead to very great success in Iceland and, later, here in the United States.

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Armand

Enclosures

AH:ec

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SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

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DR - DOCTOR ARMAND HAMMER ALSO SAID THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THE SOVIETS WILL CONCENTRATE ON ARMS CONTROL IN ICELAND.

43A


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Sincerely,

Dr. Armand Hammer
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Suite 1600
10889 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024



64

7274

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL
SUBJECT: Letter to Armand Hammer

At Tab A is a draft response to Armand Hammer for signature by an appropriate White House staffer. Dr. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff affair and sent a copy of Hammer's interview on the CBS Evening News.

The draft thanks Hammer for his letter and his support on the Daniloff case. It notes the Soviets still do not understand US concern for the individual. It concludes by thanking him for helping to convey US concerns during his trip to Moscow.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Hammer
Tab B Dr. Hammer's Letter and Videotape

65

7274

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *RS for JFM*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Response to Armand Hammer Letter on Daniloff

At Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a draft answer to Armand Hammer. Hammer congratulated the President on his handling of the Daniloff case and enclosed a tape of his interview on the CBS Evening News about the Daniloff case. Tab A is the draft answer. Tab B is Hammer's original letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the draft response.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Judyt Mandel *as for JEM* and Paul Hanley *as for PWH* concur.

Attachments

- Tab I McDaniel Memo to Kelley
- Tab A Draft Answer to Hammer
- Tab B Hammer's incoming letter and videotape

8

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NSC

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 1600
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024
(213) 208-8800

October 27, 1986

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply touched by your very kind letter from Air Force One. You might be interested to know that in my many years of letters from Presidents, dating back to President Roosevelt, I have never previously received one from the airplane.

I saw Dr. Goldfarb, who was greatly heartened by your call to him. Since that time we have arranged for a special prosthesis, and he will, with this American technology, soon be able to walk again.

I hope very much that I may bring Dr. Goldfarb to see you on the happy occasion of his first public steps. He is currently undergoing skin grafts prior to starting with the various technical aspects of the equipment.

As I have always told you, I pledge to do everything possible to be of assistance in your pursuit of a true and lasting understanding between the superpowers, repeating your words that there can never be any winners in a nuclear war.

In line with that, I believe I may have contributed some small assistance Saturday at the UN Concert. I made a round trip from Los Angeles in order to host Tom Simons and Mark Parris at the concert and dinner dance, along with Ambassador Dubinin and Minister Sokolov and their wives. I think we broke through the diplomatic chill and started the process of warming up the lines of communication. I had a chance to discuss this with John Whitehead at the concert. Ambassador Dubinin particularly wanted to talk with Don Regan and after dinner I brought the two of them together.

Please convey my warmest regards to Nancy. Frances and I very much hope that we will all see each other again soon.

Respectfully,

Armand

AH:ec

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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October 31, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Reply to Rep. Rudd on US Expulsion of 25 Soviets
from Soviet Mission to the UN

The draft reply at Tab A updates a State draft for Congressman Rudd on the Administration's expulsion of 25 Soviets from the Soviet Mission to the UN.

At Tab I is a memo to Kathy Jaffke for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Kathy Jaffke.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Judy Mandel, Ron Sable and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Kathy Jaffke
Tab A Proposed Reply to Rep. Rudd
Tab B Congressman Rudd's Letter
Tab C Your memo to State requesting draft response

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7577

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY R. JAFFKE

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Reply to Rep. Rudd on US Expulsion of 25 Soviets
from Soviet Mission to the UN

On October 2 Congressman Rudd wrote the President to express concern over reports the Administration was reconsidering its order expelling 25 Soviets from the Soviet UN Mission.

The NSC recommends the draft at Tab A to respond to Congressman Rudd. It updates an earlier State draft to reflect our actions against Soviet intelligence agents at the Soviet Embassy, and our moves to bring the numbers at the Embassy into parity with our Embassy in Moscow. State drafted a response to Congressman Rudd as per your request at Tab C.

Attachments:

Tab A	Proposed Reply to Rep. Rudd
Tab B	Congressman Rudd's Letter
Tab C	Your memo to State requesting draft response

69

Dear Congressman Rudd:

Thank you for your letter of October 2 on reports the Administration might rescind its order to expel 25 Soviet diplomats from the Soviet Mission to the U.N.. The Soviets have complied with our reduction order. The last of those 25 Soviets left the United States on October 14.

In March we announced to the Soviets a program of reductions that will cut the size of their missions to the U.N. by about 100 personnel by April 1, 1988. The list of 25 we gave the Soviets on September 17 was part of this larger reduction plan.

As has been made clear by events since your letter, the Administration has not only held firm on expelling these 25 at the U.N., but we have also declared persona non grata 5 Soviets at their Embassy and have expelled 50 more and have brought the Soviet Embassy here into parity with our Embassy in Moscow.

Throughout all of these actions, the President has made it clear to the Soviet Union that we will not allow the Soviet presence here to be safehaven for espionage activities. We intend to stick to that policy.

We appreciate your support, and that of other members of Congress, for our efforts to reduce espionage activities in the United States.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Eldon Rudd
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington D.C. 20515

ELDON RUDD
4TH DISTRICT ARIZONA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

P860128-0268

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives


Washington, DC 20515

October 2, 1986

WASHINGTON OFFICE
2465 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-3361

DISTRICT OFFICE
6900 E. CAMELBACK ROAD
SCOTTSDALE, AZ 85251
(602) 241-2801

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IO

#367
SOB1

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United
States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am greatly disturbed by news reports, quoting "top administration officials," indicating the United States may rescind its order that 25 Soviets be expelled from the U.N. mission.

As you are aware, the order by your administration originally set yesterday as the deadline for the Soviet's departure. Congress too has passed legislation requiring a reduction in the number of Soviet personnel at the United Nations. We have also cut almost \$20 million in U.S. contributions to the organization in FY '87 believing these monies help to subsidize the KGB's and GRU's subversive activities against the United States.

On a matter of national security, such as the expulsion of these identified Soviet espionage agents, I strongly believe there should be no reconsideration of their status. If they remain in this country, they have the potential to jeopardize the future security and freedoms of all Americans. Therefore, an "agreement" with the Soviet leadership on this question should not be a subject for negotiation during your upcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland.

News accounts have also suggested the United States may use the Soviet envoys to help win the release of imprisoned Soviet dissidents. While their release would be both morally right and politically appealing, I respectfully suggest it cannot be a prudent action, or an appropriate concession if we allow the Soviet personnel to remain on American soil.

I have applauded your decision to issue the expulsion order for the Soviet personnel, Mr. President. We cannot tolerate continued Soviet abuse of the international civil service system. Nor can we legitimize their actions by allowing identified espionage agents to remain in this country under any circumstances.

With every best wish,

LOO

986 OCT -9 AM 9:56

Sincerely,

Eldon Rudd
Eldon Rudd
Member of Congress

FAIM/IAP/WI

1986 OCT -9 AM 9:10

RECEIVED BY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ER/ff

cc: Honorable George Shultz ✓
Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter

-1-

3631444 11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR:

S/S
CATHY THIBODEAU
Congressional Correspondence
Department of State

FROM:

KATHY RATTE JAFFKE *KRJ*
Director, Congressional
Correspondence

SUBJECT:

Soviets Expelled from the
U.N. Mission

In the attached letter, Congressman Eldon Rudd indicates concern over reports that the Administration may rescind its order that 25 Soviets be expelled from the U.N. mission.

I would appreciate State's guidance in a draft response for Will Ball's signature.

Thanks so much for your help.

cc: Records Management - FYI (ID# 428720)

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

3631444

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: OCTOBER 06, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ELDON RUDD

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER NEWS REPORTS
INDICATING THAT THE U.S. MAY RESCIND ITS
ORDER THAT 25 SOVIETS BE EXPELLED FROM THE
UNITED NATIONS MISSION

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
WILLIAM BALL	ORG	86/10/06		C 86110107
99STAT REFERRAL NOTE: _____	D	86110108		T 1
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: _____		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 _____
MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY * | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8631444

Date October 18, 1986

For: VADM John M. Poindexter
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Congressman Rudd

Date: October 2, 1986 Subject: 25 Soviets expelled
from UN Mission


Referral Dated: October 7, 1986 ID# 428720
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- X A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

for 
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY JAFFKE

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Reply to Rep. Rudd on US Expulsion of 25 Soviets
from Soviet Mission to the UN

On October 2 Congressman Rudd wrote the President to express concern over reports the Administration was reconsidering its order expelling 25 Soviets from the Soviet UN Mission.

The NSC concurs in the response at Tab A to Congressman Rudd. State drafted this response to Congressman Rudd as per your request at Tab C.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Reply to Rep. Rudd
Tab B Congressman Rudd's Letter
Tab C Your memo to State requesting draft response

These are the original
versions. They need not
be copied or sent to
the Secretariat - but should
be attached to our chron copy

74A

75

Department of State
Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Rudd:

I am responding to your letter to the President concerning reports that the Administration might rescind its order to expel 25 Soviets from the U.N. The Soviets have complied with our reduction order. The last of the 25 Soviets left the United States on October 14.

As you are aware, we have made it clear to the Soviet Union that we will not allow the United Nations to be a safehaven for espionage activities. In March we announced to the Soviets a program of reductions that will decrease the size of their missions to the United Nations by approximately 100 personnel by April 1, 1988. The list of 25 we provided to the Soviets on September 17 was part of this larger reduction plan.

We appreciate your support, and that of other members of Congress, for our efforts to reduce espionage activities in the United States.

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable
Eldon Rudd,
House of Representatives.

State draft

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR:

~~5/5~~
CATHY THIBODEAU
Congressional Correspondence
Department of State

FROM:

KATHY RATTE JAFFKE *KRJ*
Director, Congressional
Correspondence

SUBJECT:

Soviets Expelled from the
U.N. Mission

In the attached letter, Congressman Eldon Rudd indicates concern over reports that the Administration may rescind its order that 25 Soviets be expelled from the U.N. mission.

I would appreciate State's guidance in a draft response for Will Ball's signature.

Thanks so much for your help.

cc: Records Management - FYI (ID# 428720)