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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (5/6)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

YARHI-MILO

1809

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8621	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRESENTED TO GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8629	TALKING POINTS	SOVIET JEWRY GIVEN TO SOVIETS IN REYKJAVIK R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/11/1986	B1
8622	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE STATE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS GIVEN GORBACHEV R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8623	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE POSSIBLE SOVIET RETALIATION FOR THE EXPULSION OF MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8624	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET RETALIATION FOR THE "25" R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8625	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8624 R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8626	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8623 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1986 (5/6)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

YARHI-MILO

1809

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8627	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8622 R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8628	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8621 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/16/1986	B1
8630	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8629 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	10/11/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Chlor

6410

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request from Journal of Commerce for Presidential Statement

At Tab I is a memo from you to Tom Gibson responding to his request for an NSC recommendation on whether the President should issue a statement for the November 24 issue of the Journal of Commerce on trade with the Soviet Union.

The memo recommends the President not issue such a statement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I, recommending the President not issue a statement on trade with the Soviet Union for the Journal of Commerce.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Ty Cobb, *RSO/TC* Steve Danzansky, *RSO/SD* Paul Hanley, *RSO/PH* Frank Lavin, *RSO/FL* and Steve Sestanovich, *SLS* concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo from you to Gibson
- Tab A Gibson memo to you
- Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

2

6410

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *AGW*

SUBJECT: Request from Journal of Commerce for Presidential Statement

At Tab I is a memo from you to Tom Gibson responding to his request for an NSC recommendation on whether the President should issue a statement for the November 24 issue of the Journal of Commerce on trade with the Soviet Union.

The memo recommends the President not issue such a statement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I, recommending the President not issue a statement on trade with the Soviet Union for the Journal of Commerce.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Ty Cobb, Steve Danzansky, Paul Hanley, Frank Lavin and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo from you to Gibson
- Tab A Gibson memo to you
- Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

6410

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS F. GIBSON

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: Request from the Journal of Commerce for
Presidential Statement

As you noted in your memo to me of September 3, the Journal of Commerce has requested a Presidential statement for their November 24 issue (along with the Soviet Economic Gazette) on trade with the Soviet Union.

The NSC recommends that the President not issue such a statement.

Attachments

- Tab A Your memo to me of Sept. 3
- Tab B Journal of Commerce letter to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY MCDANIEL

FROM: TOM GIBSON *tg*
SUBJECT: Journal of Commerce

Attached, for your attention, is a self-explanatory interview request from the influential Journal of Commerce for the President to provide a brief statement on trade with the Soviet Union. The statement would be jointly published in the Journal and the Soviet Economic Gazette on November 24.

If this is something the President should pursue, we would be happy to handle arrangements with the Journal as well as assist in preparing the statement.

Please let us have your recommendation.

Attachment

13
Tomi Nelson

5

The Journal of Commerce

NEW YORK

110 WALL STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005
(212) 425 1616

OFFICE OF THE
PUBLISHER

August 20, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
White House
Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Reagan:

On November 24, 1986, The Journal of Commerce and the Soviet Economic Gazette will jointly publish two historic special sections on U.S./Soviet trade.

Clearly, this is a significant indication of the Soviet desire to do more trade with the United States, a development that stems in no small part from your strong leadership.

Interestingly, it was just last year that the People's Republic of China began sponsoring special sections on trade in The Journal of Commerce, clearly manifesting the strengthening capitalist tendencies of that former foe.

These events remind me of comments made a few years ago by Dr. Armand Hammer, who stressed the importance of continuing a dialogue with the Communists regardless of the ups and downs of their relations with the free world.

By talking, Dr. Hammer said we avoid crises and it is only a matter of time before even the most ardent Communists realize that economically their system simply does not work.

Many of my Chinese friends have lately agreed with this observation, and our early sessions with the Russians indicate what appears to be a new attitude in the way they are approaching trade and business. They want to know how they can sell more goods in the United States and what products they should be buying from here. As with the Chinese, they exhibit a certain lack of sophistication with the ways of private enterprise, but I for one am delighted at what seems to me a very important breakthrough.

The foregoing is by way of background for a request for a brief special statement from you on trade with the Soviet Union to appear in the Soviet Economic Gazette and The Journal of Commerce. This would be a splendid opportunity for your words to reach the more than three million readers of the Economic Gazette who constitute the Soviet Union's government and business leadership. Our Russian contacts indicate that if you made such a statement, Chairman Gorbachev might do the same. I think that would constitute a marvelous message for the entire world.

Mr. President, I thank you for your consideration and I shall be pleased to provide more details to one of your staff.

With best wishes on the continuation of your highly successful presidency.

Yours sincerely,



Don C. Becker

DCB/sr

For Steve Danzansky 7
From Scott Dean x6959
Subj: Journal of Commerce
Request for Presidential
Statement on Soviet Trade

Amb Matlock feels the President should not issue such a statement, but wanted to ask you before he sent this out for general concurrence.

If you think the President should issue such a statement, could you take the lead on it?

Either way, please let me know today (Thurs Oct 14).

Thanks,
Scott

8

Oct 10

FOR AMB MATLOCK

FROM SCOTT

SUBJECT: Journal of Commerce

This came in before my time here so I don't know what--if any actions--we took earlier. The Secretariat, however, says they have no record of action.

This is a request for a Presidential statement for the Journal of Commerce on Soviet American trade.

1) Should we recommend such a statement be prepared?

Yes

No

2) If yes, who should draft the statement?

State?

NSC? Danzansky?

NSC Other?

Commerce?

USTRadeRep?

But
ask
Danzansky's
opinion -
He should
probably
take action -
John

9

Scott Dean

phys I talked to
you about.

Rick B.

+ 2224

10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 SEP 5 P 3: 23

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6410

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK

DUE: 9 SEP

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier / Keel | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo <u>MCDANIEL</u> | to <u>GIBSON</u> |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | FYI | FYI | FYI |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Laux | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lavin | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Small |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> May | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> Mingle | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> North | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hanley | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- | | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> McDaniel | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
| | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rodman | <input type="checkbox"/> Cockell | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Keel (advance) |

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

File Chron 11

7442

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
R. SCOTT DEAN

SUBJECT: Thank you letter to Pamela Sanders for Iceland
Book

At Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley. It forwards a draft thank you letter to Pamela Sanders for sending her book Iceland to the President. Pamela is the wife of Marshall Brement, who was our Ambassador to Iceland until Nick Ruwe replaced him last year.

The book will be forwarded to the Gift Unit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the draft thank you letter at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Your memo to Kelley
- Tab A Draft thank you to Sanders

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Thank you letter for Iceland Book

At Tab A is a draft letter thanking Mrs. Pamela Sanders for the autographed copy of her book Iceland. Mrs. Sanders is married to Marshall Bremont, former US Ambassador to Iceland. She wrote the text for the book of photographs she sent the President. The book is non-political.

Under the circumstances, we believe a letter with the President's signature would be appropriate.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Thank you to Sanders

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Pamela:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of your magnificent book on Iceland. The pictures are beautiful and your text delightful. Since I didn't have time to see much of Iceland last weekend, your book makes me want to return in the future when circumstances will permit me to enjoy the scenery and people more fully.

I very much appreciated your thoughtfulness. Please give my warm regards to Marshall.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Pamela Sanders
Naval War College
Newport, R.I. 02840

Matlock

14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

October 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive SecretarySUBJECT: Paper on Human Rights Presented to Gorbachev in
Reykjavik (S)

A copy of the paper which the Department supplied to the President to present to Gorbachev in Reykjavik was received by the NSC staff only after the paper was presented. We realize that preparations for the meetings in Reykjavik proceeded at a rapid pace which may have made difficult full consultation in advance, but -- for future guidance -- believe that the following NSC staff comments on the paper may be useful. (S)

Given the delicacy of the human rights issue in the Soviet political system, it is important that U.S. representations, particularly those in written form, be scrupulously accurate, be edited so as to avoid information and comments the Soviets might consider prejudicial to the individuals, and contain sufficient information about the individuals so that extensive staff research on the Soviet part is not required to identify them. Such lists are most effective if they are prepared in Russian, so that the Soviets do not have to arrange for translations before they can be used. (S)

The paper in question does not fully meet these criteria. Most seriously, it identifies three spouses of American citizens as married to "defectors," a pejorative term in Soviet parlance. While the Soviet authorities certainly know who the spouses are and the circumstances of their departure from the Soviet Union, it is clearly preferable in a document presented to Soviet authorities to avoid such terminology. It should be sufficient to note that the spouse has been resident in the United States (or a citizen of the United States) since a given date. (S)

Aside from the use of the term defector, other information is provided which does not seem designed to induce a favorable Soviet reaction. For example, pointing out that Bogdan Kuzmin "has stopped applying for emigration," provides the Soviet authorities with a convenient pretext for not approving a non-existent application. Nor is it clear what reminding the Soviets that Elena Kaplan was attacked in the Soviet press was designed to achieve. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8621

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07


~~SECRET~~

2

While these possibly prejudicial pieces of information were included, other information which would facilitate bureaucratic handling in the Soviet system was omitted. It would have been helpful, for example, to include the Soviet address of separated spouses and divided families, and also the name of the spouse or family member in the United States. (The latter was included in some instances and not in others.) (S)

Since it is likely that it will be desirable in the future to prepare written presentations for the President and other senior officials to convey to the Soviet authorities on human rights cases, it would be appreciated if the Department would review its procedures and facilities for preparing such presentations, so that Soviet attitudes and bureaucratic procedures are taken into account in making the most effective presentation. (S)

Needless to say, in the future, we would expect to have the opportunity to review in advance material prepared specifically for Presidential use. (S)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

TAB A Copy of Presentation on Human Rights Presented to the Soviets in Reykjavik October 11, 1986

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR FO6-114/S #8629

BY CW NARADATE 11/29/87

SOVIET JEWRY

Given to Soviet
11 Oct 1986 14
Raykjavik

-- I want to discuss the subject of Jewish emigration from your country.

-- I'm raising this issue, not to cause controversy, but because I want you to understand its importance to me and my countrymen.

-- Our concerns have grown since our last meeting as the number of Jews permitted to leave has steadily declined.

INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

-- I know that sometimes your officials claim that raising this issue is "interference in your internal affairs."

-- Raising this issue is perfectly legitimate. Both our Governments have signed politically binding international instruments which require respect for basic human rights.

In the Helsinki Final Act, we agreed to respect basic human rights and to promote family reunification.

We also agreed to act in conformity with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to leave one's country and to return.

TRENDS IN JEWISH EMIGRATION

-- Jewish emigration is of deep concern to the American people and to me personally. The decline in emigration is a serious obstacle in our efforts to improve our relations.

-- I want to briefly review the trends in emigration.

In the 1970s your Government permitted more than 250,000 Jews to emigrate.

In the peak year, 1979, more than 51,000 emigrated.

-- These developments were welcome although even then substantial numbers of Soviet Jews were denied the right to emigrate.

In the 1980s the numbers began to plummet.

By 1984, the total had dropped to 894, down 98 percent from the 1979 high.

So far this year only 631 Soviet Jews have been allowed to leave.

17

If this unfortunate trend continues, 1986 could be the lowest in 20 years.

CLAIMS THAT ALL WHO WISH HAVE ALREADY LEFT

-- Your officials sometimes claim this fall in emigration resulted from the fact that all Soviet Jews who wish to leave have already done so.

But we know the names and addresses of approximately 11,000 Soviet Jews who have applied for and been denied permission to emigrate. These are the "refuseniks."


We can confirm that approximately 380,000 additional Soviet Jews have requested the invitations from abroad that are the first step in the long and cumbersome Soviet process of obtaining permission to leave the USSR.


Some of these people may not have applied for exit permission because they fear the consequences of becoming "refuseniks." Some have been fired from their jobs, harassed or even imprisoned.

-- There is, then, a very serious problem of Jewish emigration, of deep concern to me, to American Jews and to members of Congress. If there isn't progress on this soon, it could jeopardize our efforts to improve relations.

JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION

Thousands





AFFIDAVITS OF
 INVITATIONS (VIZOFS)
 SENT FROM ISRAEL
 FROM OCT 1968 TO
 SEPT 1986 648,824

ARRIVALS IN VIENNA
 OCT 1968 TO
 SEPT 1986 266,288

 382,536

POPULATION

JEWISH POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION



1,800,000

REQUESTED
VYZOVS



380,000

EMIGRATED
1968-1986



266,000

REFUSENIKS



11,000

EMIGRATED
1985



1,140

21

Selected Representational List Cases
Presented to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
September 19-20, 1986

American Citizens (Dual Nationals)

Abe Stolar: Soviets promised his case would be resolved, but have denied his daughter-in-law permission to depart with Stolar and his family.

Garo Chrovian: Was told in January his case would be resolved. Thus far, no action.

Separated Spouses

Matvey Finkel: Married since 1979 to American citizen Susan Graham. First child expected in December. Finkel has applied 10 times.

Yuri Balovlenkov: Married 1978 to American citizen Elena Kusmenko Balovlenkova. Two daughters, only one of whom has ever seen her father. Two hunger strikes, most recently in 1985.

Galina Goltzman: Separated from her husband, defector Anatoliy Michelson, since 1956.

Sergei Petrov: Married 1981.

Divided Families

Isabella Livshits and family: U.S. informed twice this year their cases would be resolved, but family has had no confirmation.

Bogdan Kuz'min and family: Refused repeatedly. No reasons ever given. Reportedly "lost hope" earlier this year and has stopped applying for emigration.

Faina Glukhova and family: Repeated refusals have resulted in three nervous breakdowns. July 1986 application refused because of "state of relations between U.S. and USSR."

Remaining 18 Separated Spouse Cases

Balovlenkov, Yuri
Married 1978. Two young daughters; only one has seen father.

Bogomolov, Mikhail
Married 1985.

Braun, Svetlana Ilyinichina
Married 1984.

Finkel, Matvey
Married 1979. One of cases raised by Secretary with Shevardnadze in September. First child by American wife Susan Graham expected in December.

Goltzman, Galina
Most long standing case. Husband, Anatoliy Michelson, defected 1956. One adult daughter and grandson also want to leave.

Jachno, Lydia Mikhailovna
Husband defected 1981.

Jurqutiene, Mariya
Husband defected 1974. Mariya lost job; she and daughter harassed.

Kaplan, Elena
Married 1974. Attacked in Soviet press.

Koldre, Valentin
Married 1982.

Kostin, Vladislav
Married 1979.

Krylova, Yelena
Married 1983.

Melnikova-Eichenwald, Sonia
Married 1985. Husband reports she is deeply depressed, possibly suicidal.

Pakenas, Petras Tuozo
Married March 1986. Lost job as lawyer; now clerk in meat factory.

Petrov, Sergei
Married 1981.

Rezian, Poghos
Has been informed case will be resolved.

Smith, Nina
Married 1981.

Vlasenkov, Dmitriy
Married 1981.

Zhukovskiy, Evgeniy Aleksandr
Has been informed case will be resolved.

Persons of Special Interest to the U.S.
List Given to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
September 19-20, 1986

Ida Nudel

Naum and Inna Meiman

Josef Begun and family

David and Tsitsilia Goldfarb

Vitautis Skuodis and family

Anatoliy Marchenko and Larisa Bogoraz

? Irina Ratushinskaya and Igor Gerashchenko

Leyla Ali-Guseynova Gordievskaya and daughters Mariya and Anna

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

25

Log Number 7510

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1992
By CJS
NARA, Date 6/25/02

Date October 10, 1986

Subject: PRESENTATION TO GORBACHEV

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	#CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec. sec/Room 7241	orig			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION % ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, VA				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W., Room 800				
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 18th & E. Street N.W., Room 6151				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th S.W., Room 200A				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg. 17 & F St. NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 1500 C Street, Room 828				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125 8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 451 7th Street SW, Room 10000				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

October 16, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

State Paper on Human Rights Given Gorbachev

We have reviewed the paper which, on Secretary Shultz's recommendation, the President presented to Gorbachev in Reykjavik October 11. A copy was provided us only after it was presented, so that we had no opportunity to review it in advance. Unfortunately it is seriously flawed and does not make the most persuasive case for the individuals listed.

Any paper presented to the Soviets, particularly on a subject as delicate as human rights, must be carefully prepared so that it is scrupulously accurate, avoids use of terminology which is offensive to Soviet authorities, and provides enough information about individuals so that cases can be "staffed" without extensive research. Ideally, such material should be in Russian so that the Soviets do not have to arrange for a translation before it can be used in the bureaucracy. The State paper meets none of these criteria.

Most seriously, three persons on the list are identified as spouses of "defectors" -- a pejorative term in Soviet eyes, and one which should never be used in official representations if our desire is to assist resolution of the problem. Even if the spouse is a "defector" in common parlance, neutral terms should be used such as "resident of U.S. since 1956," rather than "defected in 1956." The point is not that we can conceal the circumstances of the spouse's departure from the Soviet Union from the Soviet authorities, but rather that using such terms in a quasi-official document is clearly prejudicial to the case.

Second, the information given is meager. In no case is the Soviet address of the individual listed. In many cases the name of the spouse is not provided. Furthermore, when information is given it is sometimes prejudicial, as for example the comment that Bogdan Kuzmin "has stopped applying for emigration." (If he has stopped applying, why should the Soviets approve a non-existent application?) It is also noted that Elena Kaplan was "attacked in the Soviet press."

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8622

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

Finally, the lists do not make clear exactly what we are requesting in all cases. For example, Irina Ratushinskaya is included on a list of persons who wish to leave the Soviet Union. So far as we are aware, she has never requested to leave the Soviet Union. Our representations have been (or should have been) directed at securing her release from imprisonment. (She was in fact released shortly before the Reykjavik meeting began, but the list was not revised to reflect this fact, even though it would have been a simple matter to do so.)

While nothing can be done to improve this particular paper, since it has already been presented, I believe it is important to call State's attention to its deficiencies and to insist that, in the future, the preparation of materials for the President's use be coordinated with us in advance. (You should be aware that we attempted repeatedly to obtain these materials from State and to participate in developing them, but met a stonewall, with the result that nobody on our staff had an opportunity to review them in advance.)

Paula Dobriansky ^{PD} and Judyt Mandel ^{JEM} concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to send the memorandum at Tab I to Nick Platt.

Approve AM 10-11 Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
- Tab A State Paper Presented in Reykjavik

~~SECRET~~

matlock
 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SENSITIVE

*Chron
File 28*

October 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
 Executive Secretary
 Department of State

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Retaliation for the Expulsion of
 Members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (S)

As the Department is aware, the Soviets have indicated publicly and privately that they intend some form of retaliation for our expulsion of 25 intelligence officers from their mission to the United Nations. Pursuant to the President's directive, the Soviets have been informed privately but authoritatively that, if there is retaliation against any U.S. installations in the Soviet Union, the United States will require that the comparable Soviet installation in the United States be reduced to exact parity with the size of the American office, after which we will levy a proportionate counter-retaliation. (S)

Now that all 25 of the Soviet intelligence officers expelled by us have departed the United States, it is possible that the Soviet authorities will retaliate as they have threatened to do, despite our warnings. Therefore, it would be appreciated if the Department would develop contingency plans for executing the President's decision, in the event the Soviets proceed to embark upon some form of retaliation. (S)

Such contingency plans should include the following:

(1) The numbers of U.S. and Soviet personnel permanently assigned to the following "counterpart" activities:

- U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Soviet Embassy in Washington
- U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad and Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco;
- U.S. commercial offices in USSR and Soviet commercial offices in the United States without diplomatic immunity;
- U.S. correspondents in the Soviet Union and Soviet correspondents in the United States. (S)

(2) The appropriate reduction in the Soviet personnel ceiling for each of the categories, should retaliation occur against the counterpart U.S. activity. (S)

(3) Other possible Soviet moves in retaliation, and suggested responses to them. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR


NLRR FC6-114/5 #8623

SENSITIVEBY CW NARA DATE 1/29/67

29

These contingency plans should be coordinated with the FBI and the CIA and any other agency which could be directly involved to a significant extent. (S)

A report would be appreciated by close of business Friday, October 17. (U)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 16, 1986



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Retaliation for the "25"

Background:

The Soviets have publicly threatened retaliation, though not recently. We have informed them through the "Vienna channel" that if they retaliated against our bilateral representation we would bring the comparable Soviet office down to parity and then counterretaliate. (In every instance, except correspondents, there is a current imbalance in the Soviet favor.)

Likely Soviet Reaction:

The Soviets will be determined to find some means to retaliate, unless they are firmly convinced that such retaliation will hurt them more than it does us. We cannot know whether or not the message in Vienna has convinced them, since they must have concluded that there is division in the USG on this matter.

Possible forms of "retaliation" run the gamut from expelling 25 of our people (highly unlikely), to measures which are relatively painless to us and create no permanent disability (for example, delaying the opening of Kiev/New York, sending home some TDY workers -- but allowing us to replace them, or removing some local employees from the U.S. Embassy). If they want to avoid another political issue in our relations, they might take some action which is calculated to make it difficult for us to respond in the same fashion.

Heading It Off

Since we cannot predict what form retaliation will take (or even if it will occur), it is difficult to devise further means to deter Soviet retaliation. We have laid down a marker in Vienna. I would suggest that we let it lie and take no further steps -- which would only convey nervousness on our part. We should, however, be certain that we can implement promptly the threat we made at Vienna -- and if possible give it an unexpected twist.

Options for U.S. Response

1. Expulsion of U.S. Personnel: If there is an expulsion of USG personnel obviously in retaliation for the 25, we should do the following as a minimum:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8624

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

a. Lower the personnel ceiling of the comparable Soviet office to the same number as we have in our office; and

b. Expel the exact same number, by name, from the residual.

c. This should be coupled with another Vienna meeting to inform the KGB that things can stop here -- or can go on if they wish, but that they will lose more than we at every step.

2. Expulsion of a few individuals, ostensibly for "cause": This would be somewhat more difficult to respond to, depending on the circumstances and magnitude.

The most appropriate response to this might be: expelling a comparable number of Soviets, also for "cause," plus further action against SMUN (e.g., moving up the effective date of the next reduction, or expelling an additional group by name).

3. Expulsion of TDY personnel: Expel a similar number of Soviet TDY personnel and take some action (such as those listed above) against SMUN.

4. Removal of local employees: If the Soviets take this step, our response should depend upon how much damage it does ongoing operations. One response would be to fire immediately some of those employees remaining who we have reason to believe exercise KGB control functions over the others (that is, the local employees the KGB wants to keep at the Embassy).

5. Other steps: Response would depend upon the magnitude of the Soviet action and the degree of inconvenience to us. Some actions, if largely cosmetic, could possibly be ignored.

Basically, we should respond with a comparable action plus an action which creates a permanent additional disability for the KGB. Thus, many actions could be coupled with further moves against SMUN personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to send the memorandum to Nick Platt at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

PR Rodman, *uc* Cockell, *ES* Sestanovich, and *DM* Major concur.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Nick Platt

32

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM RODNEY B. MCDANIEL 456-2224 _____
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Soviet Mission to the U.N.
NSC LOG# 7499

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>NICHOLAS PLATT</u>	<u>Exec Sec</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

REMARKS _____

URGENT

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/25/02

Carson
33

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 16, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Retaliation for the "25"

Background:

The Soviets have publicly threatened retaliation, though not recently. We have informed them through the "Vienna channel" that if they retaliated against our bilateral representation we would bring the comparable Soviet office down to parity and then counterretaliate. (In every instance, except correspondents, there is a current imbalance in the Soviet favor.)

Likely Soviet Reaction:

The Soviets will be determined to find some means to retaliate, unless they are firmly convinced that such retaliation will hurt them more than it does us. We cannot know whether or not the message in Vienna has convinced them, since they must have concluded that there is division in the USG on this matter.

Possible forms of "retaliation" run the gamut from expelling 25 of our people (highly unlikely), to measures which are relatively painless to us and create no permanent disability (for example, delaying the opening of Kiev/New York, sending home some TDY workers -- but allowing us to replace them, or removing some local employees from the U.S. Embassy). If they want to avoid another political issue in our relations, they might take some action which is calculated to make it difficult for us to respond in the same fashion.

Heading It Off

Since we cannot predict what form retaliation will take (or even if it will occur), it is difficult to devise further means to deter Soviet retaliation. We have laid down a marker in Vienna. I would suggest that we let it lie and take no further steps -- which would only convey nervousness on our part. We should, however, be certain that we can implement promptly the threat we made at Vienna -- and if possible give it an unexpected twist.

Options for U.S. Response

1. Expulsion of U.S. Personnel: If there is an expulsion of USG personnel obviously in retaliation for the 25, we should do the following as a minimum:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/5 #8625

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/01

a. Lower the personnel ceiling of the comparable Soviet office to the same number as we have in our office; and

b. Expel the exact same number, by name, from the residual.

c. This should be coupled with another Vienna meeting to inform the KGB that things can stop here -- or can go on if they wish, but that they will lose more than we at every step.

2. Expulsion of a few individuals, ostensibly for "cause": This would be somewhat more difficult to respond to, depending on the circumstances and magnitude.

The most appropriate response to this might be: expelling a comparable number of Soviets, also for "cause," plus further action against SMUN (e.g., moving up the effective date of the next reduction, or expelling an additional group by name).

3. Expulsion of TDY personnel: Expel a similar number of Soviet TDY personnel and take some action (such as those listed above) against SMUN.

4. Removal of local employees: If the Soviets take this step, our response should depend upon how much damage it does ongoing operations. One response would be to fire immediately some of those employees remaining who we have reason to believe exercise KGB control functions over the others (that is, the local employees the KGB wants to keep at the Embassy).

4. Other steps: Response would depend upon the magnitude of the Soviet action and the degree of inconvenience to us. Some actions, if largely cosmetic, could possibly be ignored.

Basically, we should respond with a comparable action plus an action which creates a permanent additional disability for the KGB. Thus, many actions could be coupled with further moves against SMUN personnel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to send the memorandum to Nick Platt at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Rodman, Cockell, Sestanovich, and Major concur.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Nick Platt

5

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/S #8626

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Retaliation for the Expulsion of
Members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (S)

As the Department is aware, the Soviets have indicated publicly and privately that they intend some form of retaliation for our expulsion of 25 intelligence officers from their mission to the United Nations. Pursuant to the President's directive, the Soviets have been informed privately but authoritatively that, if there is retaliation against any U.S. installations in the Soviet Union, the United States will require that the comparable Soviet installation in the United States be reduced to exact parity with the size of the American office, after which we will levy a proportionate counter-retaliation. (S)

Now that all 25 of the Soviet intelligence officers expelled by us have departed the United States, it is possible that the Soviet authorities will retaliate as they have threatened to do, despite our warnings. Therefore, it would be appreciated if the Department would develop contingency plans for executing the President's decision, in the event the Soviets proceed to embark upon some form of retaliation. (S)

Such contingency plans should include the following:

(1) The numbers of U.S. and Soviet personnel permanently assigned to the following "counterpart" activities:

- U.S. Embassy in Moscow and Soviet Embassy in Washington
- U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad and Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco;
- U.S. commercial offices in USSR and Soviet commercial offices in the United States without diplomatic immunity;
- U.S. correspondents in the Soviet Union and Soviet correspondents in the United States. (S)

(2) The appropriate reduction in the Soviet personnel ceiling for each of the categories, should retaliation occur against the counterpart U.S. activity. (S)

(3) Other possible Soviet moves in retaliation, and suggested responses to them. (S)

These contingency plans should be coordinated with the FBI and the CIA and any other agency which could be directly involved to a significant extent. ~~(S)~~

A report would be appreciated by close of business Friday, October 17. ~~(U)~~

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

clon
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 16, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: State Paper on Human Rights Given Gorbachev

We have reviewed the paper which, on Secretary Shultz's recommendation, the President presented to Gorbachev in Reykjavik October 11. A copy was provided us only after it was presented, so that we had no opportunity to review it in advance. Unfortunately it is seriously flawed and does not make the most persuasive case for the individuals listed.

Any paper presented to the Soviets, particularly on a subject as delicate as human rights, must be carefully prepared so that it is scrupulously accurate, avoids use of terminology which is offensive to Soviet authorities, and provides enough information about individuals so that cases can be "staffed" without extensive research. Ideally, such material should be in Russian so that the Soviets do not have to arrange for a translation before it can be used in the bureaucracy. The State paper meets none of these criteria.

Most seriously, three persons on the list are identified as spouses of "defectors" -- a pejorative term in Soviet eyes, and one which should never be used in official representations if our desire is to assist resolution of the problem. Even if the spouse is a "defector" in common parlance, neutral terms should be used such as "resident of U.S. since 1956," rather than "defected in 1956." The point is not that we can conceal the circumstances of the spouse's departure from the Soviet Union from the Soviet authorities, but rather that using such terms in a quasi-official document is clearly prejudicial to the case.

Second, the information given is meager. In no case is the Soviet address of the individual listed. In many cases the name of the spouse is not provided. Furthermore, when information is given it is sometimes prejudicial, as for example the comment that Bogdan Kuzmin "has stopped applying for emigration." (If he has stopped applying, why should the Soviets approve a non-existent application?) It is also noted that Elena Kaplan was "attacked in the Soviet press."

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/5 # 8627
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/01

38

Finally, the lists do not make clear exactly what we are requesting in all cases. For example, Irina Ratushinskaya is included on a list of persons who wish to leave the Soviet Union. So far as we are aware, she has never requested to leave the Soviet Union. Our representations have been (or should have been) directed at securing her release from imprisonment. (She was in fact released shortly before the Reykjavik meeting began, but the list was not revised to reflect this fact, even though it would have been a simple matter to do so.)

While nothing can be done to improve this particular paper, since it has already been presented, I believe it is important to call State's attention to its deficiencies and to insist that, in the future, the preparation of materials for the President's use be coordinated with us in advance. (You should be aware that we attempted repeatedly to obtain these materials from State and to participate in developing them, but met a stonewall, with the result that nobody on our staff had an opportunity to review them in advance.)

Paula Dobriansky ^{PD} and Judyt Mandel ^{JEM} concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to send the memorandum at Tab I to Nick Platt.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
- Tab A State Paper Presented in Reykjavik

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

October 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive SecretarySUBJECT: Paper on Human Rights Presented to Gorbachev in
Reykjavik (S)

A copy of the paper which the Department supplied to the President to present to Gorbachev in Reykjavik was received by the NSC staff only after the paper was presented. We realize that preparations for the meetings in Reykjavik proceeded at a rapid pace which may have made difficult full consultation in advance, but -- for future guidance -- believe that the following NSC staff comments on the paper may be useful. (S)

Given the delicacy of the human rights issue in the Soviet political system, it is important that U.S. representations, particularly those in written form, be scrupulously accurate, be edited so as to avoid information and comments the Soviets might consider prejudicial to the individuals, and contain sufficient information about the individuals so that extensive staff research on the Soviet part is not required to identify them. Such lists are most effective if they are prepared in Russian, so that the Soviets do not have to arrange for translations before they can be used. (S)

The paper in question does not fully meet these criteria. Most seriously, it identifies three spouses of American citizens as married to "defectors," a pejorative term in Soviet parlance. While the Soviet authorities certainly know who the spouses are and the circumstances of their departure from the Soviet Union, it is clearly preferable in a document presented to Soviet authorities to avoid such terminology. It should be sufficient to note that the spouse has been resident in the United States (or a citizen of the United States) since a given date. (S)

Aside from the use of the term defector, other information is provided which does not seem designed to induce a favorable Soviet reaction. For example, pointing out that Bogdan Kuzmin "has stopped applying for emigration," provides the Soviet authorities with a convenient pretext for not approving a non-existent application. Nor is it clear what reminding the Soviets that Elena Kaplan was attacked in the Soviet press was designed to achieve. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/5 #8628
BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~

2

40

While these possibly prejudicial pieces of information were included, other information which would facilitate bureaucratic handling in the Soviet system was omitted. It would have been helpful, for example, to include the Soviet address of separated spouses and divided families, and also the name of the spouse or family member in the United States. (The latter was included in some instances and not in others.) (S)

Since it is likely that it will be desirable in the future to prepare written presentations for the President and other senior officials to convey to the Soviet authorities on human rights cases, it would be appreciated if the Department would review its procedures and facilities for preparing such presentations, so that Soviet attitudes and bureaucratic procedures are taken into account in making the most effective presentation. (S)

Needless to say, in the future, we would expect to have the opportunity to review in advance material prepared specifically for Presidential use. (S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

TAB A Copy of Presentation on Human Rights Presented to the Soviets in Reykjavik October 11, 1986

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED/RE/CASD)

NLRR FOIA #8630

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

Given to Soviet 42
11 Oct. 1986
Reykjavik

SOVIET JEWRY

-- I want to discuss the subject of Jewish emigration from your country.

-- I'm raising this issue, not to cause controversy, but because I want you to understand its importance to me and my countrymen.

-- Our concerns have grown since our last meeting as the number of Jews permitted to leave has steadily declined.

INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

-- I know that sometimes your officials claim that raising this issue is "interference in your internal affairs."

-- Raising this issue is perfectly legitimate. Both our Governments have signed politically binding international instruments which require respect for basic human rights.

In the Helsinki Final Act, we agreed to respect basic human rights and to promote family reunification.

We also agreed to act in conformity with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to leave one's country and to return.

TRENDS IN JEWISH EMIGRATION

-- Jewish emigration is of deep concern to the American people and to me personally. The decline in emigration is a serious obstacle in our efforts to improve our relations.

-- I want to briefly review the trends in emigration.

In the 1970s your Government permitted more than 250,000 Jews to emigrate.

In the peak year, 1979, more than 51,000 emigrated.

-- These developments were welcome although even then substantial numbers of Soviet Jews were denied the right to emigrate.

In the 1980s the numbers began to plummet.

By 1984, the total had dropped to 894, down 98 percent from the 1979 high.

So far this year only 631 Soviet Jews have been allowed to leave.

If this unfortunate trend continues, 1986 could be the lowest in 20 years.

CLAIMS THAT ALL WHO WISH HAVE ALREADY LEFT

-- Your officials sometimes claim this fall in emigration resulted from the fact that all Soviet Jews who wish to leave have already done so.

But we know the names and addresses of approximately 11,000 Soviet Jews who have applied for and been denied permission to emigrate. These are the "refuseniks."


We can confirm that approximately 380,000 additional Soviet Jews have requested the invitations from abroad that are the first step in the long and cumbersome Soviet process of obtaining permission to leave the USSR.


Some of these people may not have applied for exit permission because they fear the consequences of becoming "refuseniks." Some have been fired from their jobs, harassed or even imprisoned.

-- There is, then, a very serious problem of Jewish emigration, of deep concern to me, to American Jews and to members of Congress. If there isn't progress on this soon, it could jeopardize our efforts to improve relations.

JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION

sands





AFFIDAVITS OF INVITATIONS (VIZOFS) SENT FROM ISRAEL FROM OCT 1968 TO SEPT 1986 648,824

ARRIVALS IN VIENNA OCT 1968 TO SEPT 1986 266,288

----- 382,536

45

TOTAL
JEWISH
POPULATION

JEWISH POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION

REQUESTED
VYZOVS

EMIGRATED
1968-1986



1,800,000



380,000



266,000

REFUSENIKS



11,000

EMIGRATED
1985



1,140

47

Selected Representational List Cases
Presented to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
September 19-20, 1986

American Citizens (Dual Nationals)

Abe Stolar: Soviets promised his case would be resolved, but have denied his daughter-in-law permission to depart with Stolar and his family.

Garo Chrovian: Was told in January his case would be resolved. Thus far, no action.

Separated Spouses

Matvey Finkel: Married since 1979 to American citizen Susan Graham. First child expected in December. Finkel has applied 10 times.

Yuri Balovlenkov: Married 1978 to American citizen Elena Kusmenko Balovlenkova. Two daughters, only one of whom has ever seen her father. Two hunger strikes, most recently in 1985.

Galina Goltzman: Separated from her husband, defector Anatoliy Michelson, since 1956.

Sergei Petrov: Married 1981.

Divided Families

Isabella Livshits and family: U.S. informed twice this year their cases would be resolved, but family has had no confirmation.

Bogdan Kuz'min and family: Refused repeatedly. No reasons ever given. Reportedly "lost hope" earlier this year and has stopped applying for emigration.

Faina Glukhova and family: Repeated refusals have resulted in three nervous breakdowns. July 1986 application refused because of "state of relations between U.S. and USSR."

Remaining 18 Separated Spouse Cases

Balovlenkov, Yuri
Married 1978. Two young daughters; only one has seen father.

Bogomolov, Mikhail
Married 1985.

Braun, Svetlana Ilyinichina
Married 1984.

Finkel, Matvey
Married 1979. One of cases raised by Secretary with Shevardnadze in September. First child by American wife Susan Graham expected in December.

Goltzman, Galina
Most long standing case. Husband, Anatoliy Michelson, defected 1956. One adult daughter and grandson also want to leave.

Jachno, Lydia Mikhailovna
Husband defected 1981.

Jurgutiene, Mariya
Husband defected 1974. Mariya lost job; she and daughter harassed.

Kaplan, Elena
Married 1974. Attacked in Soviet press.

Koldre, Valentin
Married 1982.

Kostin, Vladislav
Married 1979.

Krylova, Yelena
Married 1983.

Melnikova-Eichenwald, Sonia
Married 1985. Husband reports she is deeply depressed, possibly suicidal.

Pakenas, Petras Tuozo
Married March 1986. Lost job as lawyer; now clerk in meat factory.

Petrov, Sergei
Married 1981.

Rezian, Poghos

Has been informed case will be resolved.

Smith, Nina

Married 1981.

Vlasenkov, Dmitriy

Married 1981.

Zhukovskiy, Evgeniy Aleksandr

Has been informed case will be resolved.

8

Persons of Special Interest to the U.S.
List Given to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
September 19-20, 1986

Ida Nudel

Naum and Inna Meiman

Josef Begun and family

David and Tsitsilia Goldfarb

Vitautis Skuodis and family

Anatoliy Marchenko and Larisa Bogoraz

> Irina Ratushinskaya and Igor Gerashchenko

Leyla Ali-Guseynova Gordievskaya and daughters Mariya and Anna