

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron September 1986 (8)
Box: 18

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/20/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (8/9)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 18

YARHI-MILO

1803

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8557	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE THOUGHTS ON DANILOFF CASE PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	10	9/27/1986	B1 B3
8558	MEMO	KRAEMER/LINHARD TO POINDEXTER RE SCC INSTRUCTIONS - SCC XXXII	3	9/27/1986	B1
8560	MEMO	SCC INSTRUCTIONS PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	18	ND	B1 B3
8561	MEMO	STAPLES TO POINDEXTER RE DECISIONS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SCC SESSION BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, 1986 R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	9/17/1986	B1
8562	MEMO	DECISIONS REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SCC SESSION BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, 1986	55	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 27, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Thoughts on Daniloff Case

I drafted the attached paper yesterday to put down some of my thoughts regarding handling of the case in the hope that it would eventually be useful as a retrospective look ~~at~~ "lessons learned" when the matter is solved. *at*

Although I am not aware of the present stage of negotiations, I think that some of my remarks may be relevant, even today.

The following things occur to me, in particular:

1) If we have not reached a settlement by Monday, we should definitely take further sanctions against the KGB presence here. Commercial installations in N.Y. should be the next target, and the Soviets should be given to understand that further steps will follow at regular intervals.

2) Under no circumstances should we consider in any way going back on our expulsion of the 25 -- aside from giving them a few more days to pack up and leave if there is a settlement. (But if there is none, the Oct. 1 date should stand firm.)

3) We should make sure that we have done the staffing to counter-retaliate if the Soviets retaliate on our installations in any meaningful fashion. (I do not believe this has been done yet, despite some preliminary work by Dave Major.)

The attached "think piece" is for you only. I suspect you already agree with what I have to say, but I thought it might be useful to try to put my thoughts down in coherent fashion. No one has seen this piece but me (I personally ran it off without giving it to my secretary) and I do not intend to give it to anyone else. But it does point up some real problems which worry me a great deal as I think about the future. If you have a chance to discuss them, I would welcome the opportunity.

Attachment:

"The Daniloff Case: Afterthoughts"

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR FD10-114/5 #8557
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

The Daniloff Case: Afterthoughts

Taking advantage of lessons I have absorbed over the years in dealing with hostage situations created by the Soviets -- I would like to pass on a few thoughts about the Soviet attitude toward these situations. I have the feeling that some of our policy makers have misjudged the real Soviet attitudes, and that this has complicated our efforts to develop a consistent and prompt policy. Some of the misconceptions have a bearing on other negotiations, so that I believe it useful to state my views -- not in order primarily to critique the past, but in order to call attention to the problems created by projecting American attitudes on our Soviet interlocutors. I believe that the Soviet handling of the Daniloff case highlights certain important differences in the American and Soviet views of some very basic issues, and therefore a review of them may be enlightening.

Basic Soviet Attitudes

I am personally convinced of the following, although in some instances I cannot "prove" the case using American judiciary rules of evidence:

1. Daniloff was arrested primarily to obtain a hostage to free Zakharov, and secondarily to intimidate the Western press corps in Moscow and to put Soviet citizens on notice that unofficial contacts with the Western press can be dangerous.
2. It was primarily a KGB operation. Although it would have required approval on the Politburo level, this approval may have been perfunctory at the outset -- and conceivably may not have involved Gorbachev personally, since he was on vacation. Who approved it precisely, however, is not particularly important.
3. What is important is that the Daniloff arrest was almost certainly not intended to have an important affect on other matters. Past experience would have suggested to the Soviets that it would be unlikely to spill over, and that we would act promptly to do whatever is necessary to free an American citizen.
4. In Soviet minds, it was not particularly important whether Daniloff was innocent or guilty, except from the standpoint of public presentation. The set-up and arrest was a political act, not one of law-enforcement.
5. The tenuous evidence the Soviets had of some slight connection between Daniloff and U.S. intelligence would have been viewed by them as an asset in the sense that it could be used to blackmail us if we indicated that we were worried about these facts becoming public knowledge. They were not, however, relevant to a decision on whether to free Daniloff or not.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

6. In short: the Soviet decision to arrest Daniloff was a political decision to achieve a limited aim; it could be defeated only if and when the Soviets grasped that it would not achieve that aim -- and in addition could cause lasting damage to their intelligence assets and damage to other issues of interest to them.

The Burden of the Past

Past handling of such incidents complicated our task, since it gave the Soviets every reason to suppose at the outset that we would negotiate a trade of sorts which would meet their requirements, without either leaving them with any permanent disabilities as a result of their action, or impinging importantly on other issues.

Of the three previous hostage cases of this sort, Kennedy handled his most satisfactorily, but still imperfectly: he said Barghoorn was innocent and (so far as I am aware) negotiated on nothing until Barghoorn was released. Barghoorn was in fact released fairly promptly and the Soviet spy was subsequently convicted, remanded in custody, and had to stay in the U.S. for several years. Nevertheless, the KGB suffered no permanent disability from their action, since no moves were made against the KGB presence here. Result: more or less a draw.

The second case, in 1972, was by all odds the worse so far as U.S. handling is concerned: When an American was arrested, Kissinger made a deal within a few days for a straight swap. It was close to the 1972 Summit, and the Soviet conclusion was clearly that the hostage tactic is very effective from their point of view when summitry is in the air. Result: total Soviet victory, and trouble for the future.

The third case, in 1978, was handled much better than the one in 1972, but still was deficient. There was a mutual remanding in custody, followed by the release of the American, followed by a trial of the Soviet spies (who were remanded in custody pending appeal), and subsequently swapped for some dissidents. The convicted Soviets spent no time in jail and the KGB suffered no long-term disability. Result: No Soviet win, but also no longterm KGB disability which would have argued against use of the ploy against a subsequent Administration.

Rational U.S. Aims

Our objectives should have been four-fold: (1) Get Daniloff out as soon as possible; (2) Deter repeat performances in the future by exacting a tangible price on the organization that perpetuated the outrage (with the collateral benefit of improving our ability to guard our internal security); (3) Handle in a manner so that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

any spill-over to other issues could be used to the U.S. advantage in handling those issues; and (4) Position ourselves so that we get Daniloff out first, and then use the leverage Zakharov provided to extract the maximum number of individuals from the Soviet Union.

In pursuing these goals, it was important not to let any take absolute precedence over the others. In fact, the most effective strategy for each of them was to tackle the first three simultaneously, and bide our time on the fourth. In particular, the second goal was not an enemy of the first, but actually suggested instruments to achieve the first.

Particularly given past experiences, it was vitally important from the outset to let the Soviets know three things: (1) We would not link Daniloff with Zakharov in any fashion (despite their past experience); (2) We would exact a concrete price for their action, which would escalate with time, and which would leave the KGB with a permanent disability in their operations; and (3) The matter would spill over into other issues and endanger the summit if prolonged.

It was important to get these points across at the inception of the incident precisely because they would have represented a basic shift in U.S. treatment of such issues. How are the Soviets to know that U.S. policy has changed if we don't tell them?

The first message should have been given both privately and publicly; the second privately but unmistakably; the third indirectly in public (by not stating that Daniloff would have no effect on summit plans) and directly in private (summit unthinkable while Daniloff held).

Timing was critical, since the longer the situation persisted, the more public prestige of each side would become involved, and therefore the more difficult it would be to resolve it to U.S. satisfaction. Therefore, maximum incentive should be given to the Soviets, from the very start, to resolve the matter to our satisfaction with minimum delay. Only a signal that we would move, by escalating stages, against the Soviet intelligence presence in the U.S., and would not try to insulate the outrage from other issues had the potential for creating the proper incentives on the Soviet part.

Soviet Bureaucratic Factors

We will never know enough about internal Kremlin politics to hope for success in playing one faction off against another. However, we do know enough about bureaucratic imperatives to make use of obvious bureaucratic interests.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Daniloff's arrest was a KGB move (doubtless with high-level political sanction) to achieve a limited goal: Zakharov's freedom. This meant that we could serve our ends by convincing the KGB, very early on, that if the matter were prolonged and escalated, their own parochial interests would suffer in a very tangible way -- and the longer the matter were prolonged, the more ~~it~~ would suffer.

To avoid ^{Key} unnecessarily engaging Soviet prestige, such a message should have been sent privately (e.g., the Vienna channel) within a couple of days of Daniloff's arrest, and gradual steps directed at the KGB presence in the U.S. begun immediately as a token of our seriousness.

This would have achieved several objectives: (1) It would have given the KGB tangible incentive to encourage the Soviet leadership to find a quick way out; (2) It would have left the KGB with a net disability, the magnitude of which would be commensurate with delay, when the affair was settled. (The latter is an important consideration in terms of deterring similar acts in the future.)

In sum, by moving immediately to affect KGB assets, we would have maneuvered to give the KGB incentives to ally themselves with us for a quick solution, before the prestige of the political leadership became inextricably engaged.

U.S. Tactical Mistakes:

1. We should never have taken any initiative to link the Daniloff and Zakharov cases in any fashion. Although the initial demarche Armacost delivered tried by artful wording to avoid linkage, in fact the very mention of Zakharov in the same meeting when we demanded Daniloff's release was read by the Soviets to mean that we were willing to link the two -- and therefore their hostage play had a good chance of success. (I believe that this is also at the root of Korniyenko's possibly honest remark to me that our handling of the matter convinced him of Daniloff's guilt. The fact is that, if we had set up an innocent Soviet citizen, the Soviets never would have allowed any linkage to anything else.)

What we should have done at that meeting was (1) to demand Daniloff's immediate and unconditional release; and (2) announce at least the first of what would be a series of sanctions (conveyed in more detail in the Vienna or another private channel). If the Soviets made any mention of Zakharov, the U.S. representative should have refused to discuss any aspect of his case at the same meeting, in order to drive home that we would not allow any linkage. He should have told them that if they wanted to discuss other, unrelated matters, they should seek an appointment to do so.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

2. We should have avoided any statements which indicated that Daniloff's arrest would not affect summit meetings or other issues. (It would not have been helpful to invoke publicly threats re the summit meeting early on, but we definitely should have avoided any hint that planning would not be affected.)

3. After putting in place a series of escalating sanctions -- and carrying them out with punctilious regularity -- we should have sat back and let the Soviets come to us with suggestions. Public pressure would build, but as each of the sanctions were announced, it would tend to be directed at the Soviets, and not at us for "inept handling."

4. If they did not solve the matter promptly (by simply expelling Daniloff), we could be certain that we would always have the option of agreeing to a mutual remanding in custody (if we felt that Daniloff's stay in prison was becoming too prolonged). However, if the Soviets had been the first to suggest this, we probably could have driven a much harder bargain -- at least not simultaneous -- and the clock would have been working in our favor.

By not having in effect a series of automatic and escalating sanctions against the KGB when we agreed to the remanding in custody, we put ourselves in a weak bargaining position -- and also created major problems in public perceptions of the President's resolve.

5. While it was fine to set as a U.S. goal the release of some dissidents in return for Zakharov eventually, it was a major tactical blunder to introduce this question when and as we did. Again, it signalled an eagerness on our part to bargain (rather than demand our rights, as the Soviets would have done, were the situations reversed).

6. The expulsion of the 25 was an important move in and of itself; it finally forced the Soviets to take serious notice of our stance and to begin to find ways out. However, it would have been much more effective if it had been combined with an indication (preferably not in a formal message) that other steps would follow at fixed -- and accelerating -- intervals. Without the latter, we relieved the Soviets of much of the time pressure and gave them incentive to try to whittle down or negate this move as part of a package.

7. We were correct to continue the full schedule of meetings on other subjects, but without the "sanctions" part of the package, this move, too, was subject to misinterpretation.

Why Didn't We? -- Misperceptions of Soviet Psychology

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

51

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Our failure to move promptly in what I would consider the only effective way was the product of many factors, the dispersal of senior decision-makers at the time Daniloff was arrested being one of them. I am convinced, however, that other, deeper factors were involved which we need to recognize and correct if we are not going to be subject to miscalculations in the future. The problem is not that anybody is a wimp, or lacked courage, ability, intelligence or judgment. This is definitely not the case. Everybody involved was highly responsible, intelligent and dedicated to doing the right thing.

What was missing, however, was a firm grasp of the way the Soviets viewed the matter, and, following from this, uncertainty regarding what sort of tactics which would be effective in dealing with the Soviets. This led to hesitations and to the choice of moves on our part that in fact made it more difficult to get Daniloff freed promptly, provide disincentives to repeat performances in the future, avoid damaging spill-over into other issues -- and even to maximize the number and importance of the dissidents we could "buy" with Zakharov.

Specifically, I believe that those who argued against the course suggested above (which I suggested to State Department officials the very day of Daniloff's arrest) did so from some combination of the following misperceptions:

1. Concern that forceful action would prolong Daniloff's stay in prison. This was a very legitimate concern, but it led us to actions and inactions which were almost certainly counterproductive. His release would probably have been accelerated if we had started a process of gradual sanctions earlier, and communicated this policy discreetly to the Soviets. Certainly, his release would not have been delayed by such action.

2. A feeling that the issue of Daniloff's guilt or innocence was an important one for the Soviets. In fact, this issue was relevant only to the public handling. Daniloff was not arrested because they thought he was guilty. Proving his innocence, therefore, was not relevant to a Soviet decision to release him. (This does not mean that we should not have stated his innocence and answered Soviet charges -- we of course should have done so, to protect our public position, if nothing else. But nobody should have had any illusions that all we had to do to secure his release was to convince Gorbachev that Daniloff did not work for the CIA. Gorbachev really doesn't care whether he does or not.)


3. A feeling that there were aspects which would be embarrassing if made public. Though nobody mentioned such factors explicitly, I had the distinct feeling that some felt that (1) FBI had acted rashly in arresting Zakharov (or at least in publicizing the arrest), that (2) [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1), (3)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

52

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

 -- and therefore, there were weaknesses in our position. The fact is that even if these worries had some real basis (I do not believe they do), it should not have affected our handling of the issue one iota. The basic fact was that the Soviets made a decision to frame Daniloff in order to secure a hostage. If we allow doubts or uncertainties regarding U.S. actions -- which have no bearing on the central issue -- to creep into our own thinking, it paralyzes straight and clear thinking on the issue. It is truly a case of being mesmerized by the possibility of mote in our eye and forgetting the beam in the Soviet eye.

The Soviets are very astute in reading symptoms of such an attitude, and adept in exploiting them. Unfortunately, some of our actions probably encouraged them to feel that we were "vulnerable" to "public exposure" and therefore the implicit threat to do so would make us more amenable to a deal on their terms.

4. A disproportionate fear of Soviet retaliation on us. No vigorous move is without its potential risks, and nobody can be certain that the Soviets will not attempt some retaliation against U.S. installations in the USSR if we move against the KGB here. Normally they do retaliate if they think they can get by with it, and normally they do not if they have good reason to believe that counterretaliation will leave them in a worse position than before. For example, they have not retaliated against the French for very large expulsions from Paris, because they know that the French will hit them even harder if they do.

Traditionally, we have always been too cautious on this score -- and have left all the wrong impressions with the Soviets. The proper attitude is to be willing to risk retaliation if required, but let it be known that if they do so, we will make them suffer even more. It might take one round of reciprocal expulsions to make the point -- but if so, they would hurt more than we would and would certainly call the whole thing off before it spiralled into a general bloodletting.

5. Taking the Soviets seriously when they say "This is not the way to deal with us." It is true that threats made publicly back the Soviets into a corner and make it very difficult for them to back down. The same is, however, not true of credible threats made privately. At times, this is the only way to deal with the Soviets effectively. The frequency with which they claim that this is not the way to deal with them only proves the point that it is precisely the way to do so, when you have the leverage and the will to make the threats stick. (B'r Rabbit and the briar patch is not a part of Russian folklore!)

6. Fear that vigorous action regarding Daniloff could get into the way of "bigger issues" -- such as arms control or summitry. Paradoxically, the fact is that absence of forceful action

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

regarding Daniloff's arrest poses a greater threat to other issues that forceful action would.

7. Failure to recognize the importance of sending the right signals from the very start, before the sides are locked into a competition for prestige -- and the top leaders are involved.

8. Failure to give careful attention to modalities. With the Soviets, how you do something is often as important as what you do. The trouble with State is that nobody thinks of doing anything except officially, up front, with public announcements (or resigned anticipation that there is no way leaks can be avoided). In fact, many things are best done unofficially; some should be done only if they are done unofficially. Yet this aspect of policy rarely gets any attention at all. (And, unfortunately, when State does it, leaks do seem to be inevitable. However, the Vienna channel and the sensitive portion of Gorbachev's letter have not leaked -- and with a comparable super-close hold, other steps would not leak either.)

Conclusions:

I have written this analysis not to point fingers or to argue over what might have been. I have no stomach for either. I have written it because I sincerely believe that the way the Daniloff matter was handled has illustrated in the most striking fashion a vulnerability we face as we go into what will possibly be the most important series of negotiations we have had for several decades with the Soviet Union.

Aside from outlining, the very day Daniloff was arrested, to officers in State/EUR the general approach I felt would be effective (which they not merely ignored but in effect opposed by refusing to staff the details even as an option), I have not discussed these judgments outside the "Daniloff club" on our staff -- and have not discussed these thoughts with them in such comprehensive fashion. Nevertheless, from comments volunteered to me, I am convinced that every Soviet specialist who has extensive experience in dealing with the Soviets and who understands the psychology which lies behind Soviet actions would agree with me on virtually every particular. This is true of those both inside and outside the government; unfortunately those inside the government (except those on our own staff) have not been in the loop on these decisions.

The tragedy is that Secretary Shultz does not seem to have the benefit of the advice of anyone who has a firm grasp of the realities of Soviet psychology. Unless some way is found to correct this -- or at the very least to provide the President with more of these very essential insights -- we will face real

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

problems in the future in conducting our affairs with the Soviets in the most effective fashion.

One other related point comes to mind. The Soviets make extensive and very effective use of unofficial probes, comments, and occasional outright disinformation. Except for the Vienna channel talks, we have not been in a position to do any of this to them. Nobody seems to think of this aspect of things and there is nobody around to orchestrate it. Yet it is potentially very effective.

For example -- as a supplement to the other things we were doing, we should have arranged for some of the CIA's or FBI's indirect contacts with Soviet officials (e.g., academics to talk to them and keep us informed) to spread stories that there is a faction in the USG determined to use Daniloff's arrest to queer the whole relationship -- they can only be thwarted by a quick release of Daniloff. And/or, that forces in the USG are pushing hard to wipe out the KGB in the US -- in a move that would make the British 105 look like a spat at a garden party -- and that they would likely be successful if Daniloff is not out PDQ. And so on ... Such "tidbits" flowing into the Moscow "Center" would encourage increasing nervousness -- if we were officially actually cutting them back -- and would cultivate some powerful incentives to cut bait in a hurry and put the matter behind us before "anti-Soviet forces" in the U.S. get their way.

This is a form of absolutely risk-free covert action which we seem to ignore totally. We should finally do something to activate such a capability. To be effective, it would have to be directed carefully -- and held very closely.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II
90671
9/27/86

PRESERVATION COPY

TAB I

SCC INSTRUCTIONS *w/AGENCY Positions*

*NSR STAFF WOULD RECOMMEND
OUTSTANDING ISSUES BE RESOLVED
BY MAKING THE SPECIFIC DELETION
AND FEW ADDITIONS TO THESE
INSTRUCTIONS AS INDICATED.*

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE US COMPONENT OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) FOR THE SESSION BEGINNING OCTOBER 1, 1986, HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE.

3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCC AND NST

IN VIEW OF THE OVERLAP IN THE SUBJECT MATTER BEING DEALT WITH IN THE SCC AND IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (NST), IN PARTICULAR, MATTERS RELATED TO THE "EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY," THE US COMPONENT OF THE SCC, LIKE THE NST DELEGATION, SHOULD ENSURE THAT IN THOSE SUBJECT AREAS WHERE THERE IS OVERLAP A CONSISTENT US POLICY IS FOLLOWED AND CLOSE COORDINATION IS MAINTAINED.

4. APPROACH

A. THE SCC SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH ISSUES REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY, CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE TREATY. IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF -- AS IN THE PAST -- WITH THE PRECISE LEGAL MEANINGS OF THE AGREEMENTS AND THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AS APPROPRIATE. THE SCC SHOULD REMAIN THE FORUM IN WHICH WE NEGOTIATE ANY AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS, TREATY CLARIFICATIONS, OR OTHER LANGUAGE TO REDRESS COMPLIANCE ISSUES.

B. CONSISTENT WITH ITS SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS, THE US COMPONENT, DURING SCC-XXXII, SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY BY SEEKING TO ELIMINATE, BY THEIR RESOLUTION, AS MANY ABM AGENDA ITEMS AS POSSIBLE. IT SHOULD ALSO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE 1987 ABM TREATY REVIEW BY CONTINUING TO HIGHLIGHT UNRESOLVED US CONCERNS OVER SOVIET ACTIVITIES WHICH IN THEIR TOTALITY AND INTERRELATIONSHIP INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE PREPARING AN ABM DEFENSE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

C. THE US COMPONENT, SHOULD REPEAT, IN A MANNER WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS SINCE SCC-XXXI, THE PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN US IN ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM FRAMEWORK OF "TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT." SHOULD THE SOVIET SIDE AGAIN QUESTION THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 DECISION THE US COMPONENT SHOULD RELY ON THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCC-XXXI IN PREPARING ITS RESPONSE.

5. DURATION OF SESSION

A. THE US COMMISSIONER IS AUTHORIZED TO NEGOTIATE A CONCLUSION DATE TO SCC-XXXII WHICH IS, IN HIS JUDGEMENT, APPROPRIATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SCC AGENDA.

B. THE US COMMISSIONER IS AUTHORIZED TO NEGOTIATE A DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF SCC WORK IN THE SPRING 1987 AS IS, IN HIS JUDGMENT, APPROPRIATE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PROSPECTIVE VOLUME OF WORK ON THE SCC AGENDA.

6. SOVIET CLAIMS OF LACK OF CONCRETE INFORMATION

IF THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD CONTINUE ITS THEME OF COMPLAINING THAT THE US HAS NOT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO DETERMINE THE BASIS OF US CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ABM TREATY ISSUES, THE US COMPONENT MAY STATE THAT THE US SIDE IS CONFIDENT THAT IT HAS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR THE SOVIETS TO DETERMINE THE BASIS OF US CONCERNS, AND THAT SOVIET TREATMENT OF THESE ISSUES RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES.

7. REFERENCES

THE US COMPONENT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE INTERAGENCY AGREED PAPERS IN PREPARING FOR ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET SIDE. THE MOST RECENT AGREED PAPER/PUBLICATION ON AN ISSUE TAKES PRECEDENCE.


8. NOTIFICATIONS

~~OPTION 1:~~


*NSC
STAPP
RECOMMENDS
DELETION*

~~A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PROVIDE ABM TREATY NOTIFICATIONS AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1986, CONSISTENT WITH US NOTIFICATION PRACTICES UNDER THE ABM TREATY, THE APPLICABLE PROTOCOLS ON PROCEDURES, AND BASED ON RELEVANT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.~~

~~B. IN RECEIVING THE NOTIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET COMPONENT OF THE SCC, THE US COMPONENT SHOULD NOTE THAT THE US SIDE MAY RETURN TO THE SUBJECT, IF NECESSARY, FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE STUDY.~~




~~C. IF ASKED BY THE SOVIETS ABOUT INTERIM AGREEMENT NOTIFICATIONS, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD RESPOND THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED ON MAY 27, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT CORRECTED ITS NONCOMPLIANCE, REVERSED ITS UNWARRANTED MILITARY BUILDUP, OR SERIOUSLY PURSUED EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENTS. IN THE FUTURE THE US WILL BASE DECISIONS REGARDING ITS STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE ON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES AND NOT ON STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THE SALT STRUCTURE AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT PROVIDE SUCH NOTIFICATIONS. THE US IS IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II, AND THE US INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO BE IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE UNTIL THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 131ST BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCM CARRIAGE.~~



~~OPTION 2:~~


A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1986, CONSISTENT WITH US NOTIFICATION PRACTICES UNDER THE APPLICABLE PROTOCOLS ON PROCEDURES TO THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND BASED ON RELEVANT INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.



B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD ALSO STATE THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF MAY 27, 1986 THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO BE IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE OF THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SALT II TREATY AND INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO BE IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE UNTIL THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 131ST HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCM CARRIAGE.


C. IN RECEIVING THE NOTIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET COMPONENT OF THE SCC, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOTE THAT THE US SIDE MAY RETURN TO THE SUBJECT, IF NECESSARY, FOLLOWING APPROPRIATE STUDY.

D. IF ASKED BY THE SOVIETS WHETHER THE US WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE SAME NOTIFICATIONS, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT, IN ANY WAY, INDICATE THAT SUCH PRACTICES WILL CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE.



~~OPTIONAL ADDITION:~~

~~THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT NOTIFICATIONS ARE BEING PROVIDED ON THE BASIS OF UNILATERAL RESTRAINT.~~



9. EXPANDED RECIPROCAL NOTIFICATIONS

*MSR REF
RECOMMENDS
ACTION*

~~OPTION 1:~~

*PENDING THE COMPLETION OF THE CURRENT STUDY OF
US INTERIM RESTRICTION POLICY AND THE RECEIPT OF
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE AREA*

*JCS, ACDA
OSD*

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT SEEK EXPANDED RECIPROCAL NOTIFICATIONS DURING SCC-XXXII.

~~OPTION 2:~~

~~OPTION 2A: -~~

~~A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PROPOSE:~~

(1) AN EXCHANGE OF DATA ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE TO ALLEVIATE TENSIONS, AS AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR, AND AS AN AID TO THE START NEGOTIATIONS. THE SIDES WOULD EXCHANGE DATA ON NUMBERS OF EXISTING DEPLOYED SYSTEMS BY TYPE, ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES (EXISTING DEPLOYED SYSTEMS ARE DEFINED AS THOSE IN OPERATIONAL UNITS):

- THE NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF DEPLOYED ICBM LAUNCHER, MISSILES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE LAUNCHERS, AND REENTRY VEHICLES ON THESE MISSILES;

- THE NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF DEPLOYED SSBN, SLBM LAUNCHERS ON THESE SSBNS, AND REENTRY VEHICLES ON EACH TYPE OF SLBM; AND


- THE NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF HEAVY BOMBER NOT EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS, EACH TYPE OF HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS, AND NUMBER OF ALCMS CARRIED ON EACH TYPE OF HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCMS.

(2) PROVISION OF NOTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES.

B. IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR EACH SIDE TO AGREE TO THE OTHER SIDE'S DATA REPORT, BUT EACH COULD RAISE QUESTIONS. DATA WOULD BE UPDATED SEMI-ANNUALLY IN THE SCC UNTIL SUPERCEDED BY A REPORTING REQUIREMENT UNDER A START AGREEMENT.

OPTION 2B:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD SEEK AGREEMENT TO NOTIFY ACTIONS THAT ARE PERTINENT TO THE SNDV AND STRATEGIC



~~BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD DEPLOYMENT LIMITS CITED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY. THESE ARE NOTIFICATIONS OF CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, LAUNCHERS OF FIXED ICBMS, LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, LAUNCHERS OF SLBMS, LAUNCHERS OF SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, HEAVY BOMBERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED WITH LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. THE US COMMISSIONER MAY INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT PERTINENCE TO THE SNDV AND RV DEPLOYMENT LIMITS CITED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY IS THE CRITERION THAT SERVED AS THE BASIS FOR SEEKING NOTIFICATIONS OF THESE PARTICULAR ACTIONS.~~

SCC

10. SOVIET SALT II OR SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN SCC-XXXII.

~~OPTION 1:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT PURSUE SOVIET SALT II OR SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE ISSUES DURING SCC-XXXII.

JCS, STATE,
ACDA, OSD

NOTE: If the decision is to adopt option 1 sections 10A to 10F do not apply.

~~OPTION 2:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PURSUE THOSE SALT II AND INTERIM AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE ISSUES ELABORATED IN SUBSEQUENT SECTIONS OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS DURING SCC-XXXII.

SCC

10A. SNDV LIMITS

THE US COMPONENT SHOULD REMIND THE SOVIET SIDE OF PREVIOUS UNSUCCESSFUL US ATTEMPTS TO GET MEANINGFUL RESPONSES TO US QUESTIONS FROM THE SOVIETS AND STATE THAT THE ONLY RESOLUTION WHICH COULD NOW BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WOULD BE THE DISMANTLING OF A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SNDVS SO AS NOT TO EXCEED 2504.

IF THE SOVIET SIDE QUESTIONS HOW MANY SNDVS IT SHOULD DISMANTLE THE US SIDE SHOULD REMIND THEM OF THE SNDV DISCUSSIONS DURING SCC-XXIX AND SCC-XXX.

10B. SS-25

A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REMIND THE SOVIET SIDE OF: (1) THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 23, 1985, UNCLASSIFIED

~~FINDING; (2) THE IRREVERSIBLE NATURE OF THE TESTING VIOLATION; (3) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SS-25 VIOLATION TO THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27, 1986, DECISION; AND (4) THAT THE PRESIDENT DECIDED ON MAY 27 THAT THE US SMALL ICBM PROGRAM MAKES A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION AS AN APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE TO THE IRREVERSIBLE SOVIET VIOLATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE SS-25 MOBILE ICBM.~~

B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD THEN REMIND THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE US SOUGHT IN SCC-XXX THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL SS-25 MISSILES AND THEIR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND LAUNCHERS AS NECESSARY CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR THE DEPLOYMENT VIOLATION.

OPTIONAL ADDITION:

C. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT INITIATE OR PURSUE DISCUSSION OF THE SS-25 TELEMETRY PACKAGE OR PRESS THE SOVIETS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING WHEN THE SS-25 WILL BE TESTED WITHOUT TELEMETRY.

DCI, OSD,
JCS

10C. USE OF "REMAINING FACILITIES" AT FORMER SS-7 SITES

OPTION 1:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF "REMAINING FACILITIES".

SCC

OPTION 2:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REMIND THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DETERMINED THAT THEIR ACTIVITIES AT FORMER SS-7 SITES WERE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND OF THE AVAILABLE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE --EITHER DESTRUCTION OF THE REMAINING FACILITIES OR CESSATION OF THEIR USE.

OSD, JCS
STATE, ACDA

10D. A CERTAIN SLBM'S THROW-WEIGHT

OPTION 1:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF A CERTAIN SLBM'S THROW-WEIGHT. IF THE SOVIET SIDE RAISES THE ISSUE, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REFER THE ISSUE TO WASHINGTON.

JCS, DCI
ACDA, STATE

~~OPTION 2:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD ADVISE THE SOVIETS THAT THE US WISHES TO RAISE THIS MATTER AS A SERIOUS COMPLIANCE CONCERN AND REQUEST CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE COMPATIBILITY OF THAT SLBM, WHICH HAS AN "OTHER APPROPRIATE DEVICE" FOR DISPENSING AND TARGETING TWO OR MORE RVS, WITH ARTICLE IX, PARAGRAPH 1 (E) OF THE SALT II TREATY. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REPORT ANY SOVIET RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUE.

OSD

10E. ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY

OPTION 1:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION.

DCI, SCC

OPTION 2:

A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REFERENCE THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 DECISION AND CALL FOR A HALT TO SOVIET ENCRYPTION PRACTICES. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOTE THAT THE EXPANDING SOVIET VIOLATION OF THE CONCEALMENT PROHIBITION OF SALT II WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. HE SHOULD FURTHER NOTE THAT CONTINUATION OF SOVIET CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH FUTURE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR REACHING SUCH NEW AGREEMENTS.

OSD, JCS
STATE, ACDA

B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REMIND THE SOVIETS OF THE NEED TO REVERT TO PRE-1979 PRACTICES AS AN INTERIM MEASURE AND REITERATE THE US START PROPOSAL BANNING ENCRYPTION ALL TOGETHER.

10F. CONCEALMENT OF MISSILE/LAUNCHER ASSOCIATION

OPTION 1:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF CONCEALMENT OF MISSILE/LAUNCHER ASSOCIATION.

DCI, SCC

~~OPTION 2:~~

A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT, IN ADDITION TO ENCRYPTION, SOVIET ASSURANCES NOTWITHSTANDING, CONCEALMENT CONTINUES TO CHARACTERIZE SOVIET MISSILE TEST PROGRAMS, AND THAT THIS CONCEALMENT IMPEDED THE ABILITY OF THE US TO VERIFY, BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE SALT II TREATY. OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE US WAS THE SOVIET UNION'S ACTIVITIES AT PLESETSK WHICH CONCEALED THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE SS-25 ICBM AND ITS LAUNCHER DURING TESTING.

OSD, JCS
ACDA, STATE

B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REQUEST THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CEASE ITS STANDARD PRACTICE OF THE CONCEALMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN A MISSILE AND ITS LAUNCHER.

11. HOW TO RESPOND TO SALT II AND SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE CONCERNS WHICH MAY BE RAISED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

~~OPTION 1:~~

A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD ADVISE THE SOVIET SIDE, IN RESPONSE TO A SALT II OR INTERIM AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE CONCERN, THAT THE US WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RELEVANT AGREEMENT BEFORE MAY 27, 1986, AND NOW IS IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE OF THE RELEVANT AGREEMENT AND INTENDS TO BE UNTIL THE 131ST HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCM CARRIAGE IS DEPLOYED. THE US, HOWEVER, WILL NO LONGER BASE ITS STRATEGIC FORCE DECISIONS ON THE STANDARDS OF SALT II OR THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT IS THEREFORE UNNECESSARY/INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE US TO RESPOND. HAVING MADE THIS STATEMENT:

JCS, STATE
ACDA, OSD

B. IF THE SOVIET SIDE RE-RAISES RAISED SALT II OR ISSUES RELATING TO THE SALT II INTERIM AGREEMENT OR SALT II TREATY DISCUSSED AT OPTIONAL ADDITION PREVIOUS SCF SESSIONS, BUT NOT UNDER ARTICLE XIII OF THE ABM TREATY, THE US COMMISSIONER MAY DRAW UPON PREVIOUS GUIDANCE TO ASSURE THAT SOVIET ASSERTIONS ABOUT ALLEGED US NON-OBSERVANCE DO NOT GO UNANSWERED.

C. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE ISSUES RELATING TO THE SALT II INTERIM AGREEMENT OR SALT II TREATY, UNDER ARTICLE XIII OF THE ABM TREATY, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD SEEK GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

ACDA, STATE

TOTALLY NEW ISSUES OR

~~OPTION 2:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER WOULD ADVISE THE SOVIET SIDE, IN RESPONSE TO A SALT II OR INTERIM AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE CONCERN, THAT THE US WAS IN COMPLIANCE BEFORE MAY 27, 1986, AND NOW IS IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE. THE US WILL BE IN TECHNICAL OBSERVANCE OF THE SALT II TREATY UNTIL

SCC
↓

NOTE: THE NSC STAFF RECOMMENDED ADDITION IN PARA 11 B AND C ABOVE GOES BEYOND ANY PROPOSED OPTION. HOWEVER, WHILE WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE NO LONGER FEEL BOUND TO ANSWER SUCH SOVIET QUESTIONS, WE SHOULD AVOID (1) GIVING THE SOVIETS THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSERT WE ARE/HAVE NOT OBSERVED OUR COMMITMENTS, AND (2) THE HEADLINE "US INSTRUCTS COMMISSIONER NOT TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERNS." -- ESPECIALLY THIS FALL.

~~THE 131ST HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED FOR ALCM CARRIAGE IS DEPLOYED. HOWEVER, THE US WILL NO LONGER BASE ITS STRATEGIC FORCE DECISIONS ON THE STANDARDS OF SALT II OR THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT.~~

~~THE US COMMISSIONER, DRAWING UPON THE APPROPRIATE SCC BACKSTOPPING COMMITTEE PAPER TO ANSWER SOVIET CONCERNS, WOULD RESPOND TO THOSE ISSUES RAISED BY THE SOVIETS THAT ARE PERTINENT TO THE SNDV AND STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEAD DEPLOYMENT LIMITS CITED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY. THESE ISSUES ARE ARTICLE XII OF THE SALT II TREATY, TITAN D OR D AND ACTIVITIES AT F.E. WARREN AFB. THE US COMMISSIONER MAY INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT PERTINENCE TO THE SNDV AND RV DEPLOYMENT LIMITS CITED IN THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY IS THE CRITERION THAT SERVED AS THE BASIS FOR RESPONDING ON THESE, AND NOT OTHER, SALT II AND INTERIM AGREEMENT ISSUES.~~

12: SAM UPGRADE

~~OPTION 1:~~

~~THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PURSUE THE MATTER OF SAM UPGRADE ONLY AS PART OF THE US CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET TERRITORIAL DEFENSE POTENTIAL.~~

ACDA

~~OPTION 2:~~


A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD: (1) ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET SIDE TO DESCRIBE THE LIMITS OF THE SA-X-12'S CAPABILITIES; AND (2) SEEK EITHER A SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF SOVIET SA-X-12 SYSTEM CAPABILITIES OR A CESSATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF ANY POTENTIAL SA-X-12 ABM CAPABILITY.

JCS, OSD
STATE

B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (1) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS BEING CONDUCTED ON NEW AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS WITH CAPABILITIES AGAINST SOME TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES.
- (2) THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IS BEING CONDUCTED AT A TEST RANGE HISTORICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.
- (3) IN ARTICLE VI (A) OF THE ABM TREATY, THE PARTIES

UNDERTOOK NOT TO GIVE SYSTEMS OTHER THAN ABM SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES. (4) THE PRINCIPAL SYSTEM OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. IS THE SYSTEM WHICH THE U.S. CALLS THE SA-X-12. (5) THE US HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THIS SYSTEM HAS CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER AT LEAST SOME BALLISTIC MISSILES IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY.



~~OPTIONAL ADDITION:~~

(6) A SYSTEM WITH CAPABILITIES AGAINST SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES COULD HAVE FEATURES FOUND IN AN ABM SYSTEM, POSSIBLY GIVING IT CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES IN FLIGHT TRAJECTORY. (7) THE US SIDE IS INTERESTED IN HOW THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR AIR DEFENSE, FOR ATBM AND FOR ABM PURPOSES.



13: MOBILE ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS


~~OPTION 1:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PURSUE THE MATTER OF MOBILE ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS ONLY AS PART OF THE US CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET TERRITORIAL DEFENSE POTENTIAL.

ACDA

~~OPTION 2:~~

- A. THE US COMPONENT SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK MORE INFORMATION REGARDING THE PAWN SHOP RADAR.
- B. IN DOING THIS THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD:
 - (1) HIGHLIGHT THAT SPECIFICALLY, THE US IS CONCERNED THAT RADARS MOUNTED ON A SINGLE VAN LOCATED AT THE TEST RANGE IN THE VICINITY OF SARY SHAGAN ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RAPIDLY-DEPLOYABLE, LAND-BASED SYSTEM.
 - (2) STRESS THAT SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT DEVELOPING MOBILE ABM COMPONENTS AND ITS STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. HAD EVIDENTLY OBSERVED A RADAR USED AS INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT AND FOR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION WERE ACCOMPANIED BY NO SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.
 - (3) AGAIN STATE THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS TO BE AN ABM RADAR POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RAPIDLY-DEPLOYABLE,



MOBILE ABM SYSTEM, UNTIL AND UNLESS PROVIDED WITH UNAMBIGUOUS INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY. (4) INDICATE THE US CONCERN, AS STATED IN THE FINDING OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS, THAT THE USSR'S DEVELOPMENT OF COMPONENTS OF AN ABM SYSTEM, WHICH APPARENTLY ARE DESIGNED TO BE DEPLOYABLE AT SITES REQUIRING RELATIVELY LIMITED SITE PREPARATION, REPRESENTS A POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE ABM TREATY. (5) POINT OUT THAT THIS AND OTHER ABM-RELATED SOVIET ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT THE USSR MAY BE PREPARING AN ABM DEFENSE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

C. THE US COMPONENT SHOULD BE SENSITIVE TO US TEST PROGRAMS IN PURSUING THIS ISSUE.

14. CONCURRENT ACTIVITIES

~~OPTION 1:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PURSUE THE MATTER OF CONCURRENT OPERATIONS ONLY AS PART OF THE US CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET TERRITORIAL DEFENSE POTENTIAL.

ACDA, STATE
OSD

~~OPTION 2:~~


A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THE "OTHER CATEGORIES" OF CONCURRENT ACTIVITY ARE OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. AND SHOULD SEEK SOVIET EXPLANATIONS OF WHY THESE INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURRED.

B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT: (1) INCIDENTS OF CONCURRENT OPERATION OF AIR DEFENSE COMPONENTS AND ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS HAVE CREATED A LONG-STANDING CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI OF THE ABM TREATY; (2) THE JUNE 1985 COMMON UNDERSTANDING DEALS EXCLUSIVELY WITH CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES OR ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES ARE IN FLIGHT. BEHAVIOR CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THAT COMMON UNDERSTANDING WILL PRECLUDE ONLY CONCURRENT OPERATIONS OF THAT TYPE. (3) THE US IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT TWO OTHER KINDS OF CONCURRENT OPERATIONS OF ABM SYSTEM COMPONENTS AND AIR DEFENSE COMPONENTS THAT ARE NOT COVERED BY THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING. ONE OF THESE IS THE CONCURRENT OPERATION OF ABM AND AIR DEFENSE (SAM) RADARS WHEN NO STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE OR

JCS

INTERCEPTOR MISSILE IS IN FLIGHT. THE OTHER IS THE OPERATION OF ABM RADARS CONCURRENTLY WITH LAUNCHES OF SAM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES.

C. IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING WHY WE DID NOT RAISE THESE "OTHER CATEGORIES OF CONCURRENT OPERATIONS" BEFORE THE 1985 COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS SIGNED, THE US COMPONENT SHOULD STATE THAT THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY COVERED BY THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS OF PRIMARY CONCERN.



15. ABM RAPID RELOAD

~~OPTION 1:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD PURSUE THE MATTER OF ABM RAPID RELOAD ONLY AS PART OF THE US CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET ABM TERRITORIAL DEFENSE POTENTIAL.

ACDA

~~OPTION 2:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEMONSTRATED THE RELOAD OF AN ABM INTERCEPTOR LAUNCHER IN MUCH LESS THAN A DAY. THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS WITH THE HIGH ACCELERATION INTERCEPTOR MISSILE LAUNCHER AT SARY SHAGAN. THE US SIDE HAS MADE THE US CONCERN SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO MERIT A MEANINGFUL, SUBSTANTIVE, FACTUAL RESPONSE IN ORDER THAT OUR CONCERN NOT BE EXACERBATED. THIS ACTIVITY IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN WHEN CONSIDERED WITH OTHER SOVIET ACTIVITIES, WHICH IN THEIR TOTALITY AND INTERRELATIONSHIP, SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE PREPARING AN ABM DEFENSE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

OSO, JCS,
STATE

~~OPTIONAL ADDITION:~~

THE US COMMISSIONER IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE, IF ASKED THAT THE US CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET RAPID RELOAD CAPABILITIES DOES NOT INVOLVE AUTOMATIC OR SEMI-AUTOMATIC MECHANISMS.

State

B. THE US COMPONENT SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSING [REDACTED]

16. KRASNOYARSK RADAR

A. THE US OBJECTIVE REMAINS TO HAVE THE SOVIET SIDE DISMANTLE THE LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADAR IN THE VICINITY OF KRASNOYARSK.



FOIA(b)(1)(3)

B. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT THE ISSUE OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR HAS BEEN ON THE SCC AGENDA AND THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF MOVEMENT TOWARD ITS RESOLUTION. HE SHOULD PROPERLY FIX RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS BY PRESENTING A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE VOLUMINOUS TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED BY THE US SIDE IN SUPPORT OF THE US POSITION THAT THIS RADAR IS FOR EARLY WARNING OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK AND TO REFUTE THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS THAT THIS RADAR IS FOR SPACETRACK. THE US SIDE ALSO SHOULD REPEAT THE REQUEST THAT THIS RADAR BE DISMANTLED AND AGAIN NOTE THAT WITHOUT DISMANTLING THIS RADAR, THIS VIOLATION CANNOT BE REVERSED.

C. IF THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT RESPOND TO THE US STATEMENT BY AGREEING TO DISMANTLE THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD REITERATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR VIOLATES THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT TO DATE THE SOVIET SIDE'S RESPONSE HAS BEEN UNACCEPTABLE. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOTE, AS HE HAS BEFORE, THAT: (1) THE SOVIET SIDE'S ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIS RADAR REPRESENTS A HIGHLY NEGATIVE CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLVING THIS ISSUE AND TO BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL; (2) CONTINUED FAILURE BY THE SOVIET SIDE TO TAKE ACTIONS TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE UNITED STATES IN ALL APPROPRIATE ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS OF NEW AGREEMENTS; AND (3) THIS MATTER, ERODES THE VIABILITY OF THE ABM TREATY AND INDEED OF THE ENTIRE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN ANNOUNCING HIS MAY 27, 1986, DECISION REGARDING THE SALT II TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, STATED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WAS ONE OF THREE KEY SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND "DEMONSTRATED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE CAPABLE OF VIOLATING ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS EVEN WHEN THEY ARE NEGOTIATING WITH THE UNITED STATES OR WHEN THEY KNOW WE WILL DETECT A VIOLATION."

STATE, OSD
JCS, ACOA

~~OPTIONAL ADDITION:~~

~~THE US COMMISSIONER IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE THAT SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE UNDERMINED US INTERIM RESTRAINT FOR THE SALT II TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND, AS A RESULT, IT NOW BASES ITS DECISIONS REGARDING ITS STRATEGIC~~

OSD

~~FORCES ON THE NATURE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THAT THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY AND THAT THIS CONTINUED SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE TO THE ABM TREATY WILL COMPEL THE US TO REVIEW THE BASIS ON WHICH IT STRUCTURES ITS STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES.~~

17. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD, IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THAT IN WHICH HE HAS DONE IN RECENT SCC SESSIONS, REAFFIRM THE VIEW THAT SOVIET ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS COULD AFFECT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THUS FUTURE PROGRESS IN THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. IN CONVEYING THIS VIEW, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD TAKE CARE TO AVOID IMPLYING THAT RESOLUTION OF THE BWC ISSUE IS A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS OR DECISIONS IN OTHER AREAS.

18. TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

A. THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THE TOTALITY AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE ABM OR ABM-RELATED ACTIVITIES THAT SUPPORT OUR STATED CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE PREPARING AN ABM DEFENSE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY.

B. IN DOING THIS THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD POINT OUT THAT:

(1) THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ABM AND ABM-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IN THEIR TOTALITY AND INTERRELATIONSHIP SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE PREPARING AN ABM DEFENSE OF ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY. (2) THE US SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS WOULD BE THE KEY ELEMENT IN PROVIDING A BASE FOR TERRITORIAL DEFENSE. WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BUILT OR IS BUILDING A NUMBER OF LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADARS WHICH TOGETHER COULD POTENTIALLY SUPPORT A NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE. THE NEW CONSTRUCTION OF TWO ADDITIONAL LPARS INCREASES THIS CONCERN. (3) THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LARGE PHASED-ARRAY RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK, IN VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY, CAN ONLY

LEAD THE US TO REGARD WITH MORE CONCERN OTHER SOVIET ABM AND ABM-RELATED ACTIVITIES. (4) IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE SOVIET UNION, IN ADDITION TO TAKING THE NECESSARY STEP OF DISMANTLING THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, TO ALSO GIVE CLEAR AND DETAILED EXPLANATIONS REGARDING OTHER ABM AND ABM-RELATED ACTIVITIES.

C. IN PURSUING THE ISSUE OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE THE US COMPONENT SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSION OF US PROGRAMS (LPARS, SDI, ETC.), ESPECIALLY MODERNIZATION OF BMEWS AND COMPARISON OF US PAVE PAWS RADARS WITH THE US PARCS (PAR) RADAR.

19. ABM RESEARCH AND TESTING ACTIVITIES:

IF THE SOVIET SIDE RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE HOMING OVERLAY EXPERIMENT, THE DESIGNATED OPTICAL TRACKER, QUEEN MATCH, THE SIGNATURE MEASUREMENTS RADAR OR OTHER ABM RESEARCH OR TESTING ACTIVITIES COVERED IN AN INTERAGENCY AGREED PAPER THE US COMPONENT SHOULD DRAW UPON THAT PAPER IN PREPARING ITS RESPONSE.

20. PAVE PAWS RADARS:

IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THIS ISSUE AGAIN, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD ASSERT THAT THESE RADARS ARE LOCATED ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE US AND ORIENTED OUTWARD, AS ALLOWED BY THE ABM TREATY, AND REQUEST SPECIFICS FROM THE SOVIETS ON WHY THEY BELIEVE THAT THEIR CHARACTERISTICS SHOW THAT THEY MAY BE, IN THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE, OTHER THAN EARLY WARNING RADARS, WHILE SOVIET LPARS, IN THE VIEW OF THE SOVIET SIDE, ARE EARLY WARNING RADARS. THE US COMPONENT ALSO SHOULD DRAW UPON THE TALKING POINTS IN THE APPROPRIATE INTERAGENCY AGREED PAPER IN FORMULATING ITS RESPONSE.

21. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE:

A. IF THE SOVIET SIDE RAISES QUESTIONS REGARDING SDI ACTIVITIES, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD USE THE APPROPRIATE INTERAGENCY PAPER TO RESPOND AND, IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS, REQUEST GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

B. IF THE SOVIET SIDE RAISES COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS REGARDING ELEMENTS OF THE SDI PROGRAM FOR WHICH THE US HAS NOT CONDUCTED AN OBSERVABLE DEMONSTRATION, THE US

COMMISSIONER SHOULD RESPOND ALONG THE SAME LINES AS HE DID ON US ACTIVITIES AT SHEMYA IN OCTOBER 1984. HE SHOULD:

(1) STATE, IF APPROPRIATE, THAT NO PLANNED US ACTIVITY WILL VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY.

(2) STATE THAT NO ONGOING US ACTIVITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY.

22. MODERNIZATION OF THE THULE AND FYLINGDALES RADARS:

IF THE SOVIETS AGAIN CHALLENGE THE MODERNIZATION OF THE THULE OR FYLINGDALES RADARS, THE US COMPONENT SHOULD RESPOND DRAWING UPON THE APPROPRIATE INTERAGENCY PAPER.

23. RADAR CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS EXCHANGE:


~~OPTION 1:~~

A. DURING SCC-XXXII, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD NOT SEEK TO DISTINGUISH ABM RADARS FROM EARLY WARNING RADARS OR TO DEFINE EARLY WARNING RADARS BY THEIR CHARACTERISTICS. IF THE SOVIET COMPONENT PURSUES THE ISSUE OF DEFINING ABM AND EW RADARS BY THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, OR OTHERWISE CONTINUES TO SUGGEST AN EXCHANGE OF LPAR PARAMETERS, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD SEEK TO CLOSE DISCUSSION OF DEFINING ABM AND EW RADARS BY THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, AND SHOULD MAKE ONE FINAL EFFORT TO OBTAIN THE TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF SOVIET LPARS.

B. IF THE SOVIETS PURSUE THEIR PROPOSAL ON RADAR CHARACTERISTICS OR PARAMETERS, THE COMMISSIONER SHOULD FIRST SEEK TO DRAW OUT DETAILS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, AND THEN INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT:

- THE US SIDE HAS STUDIED THIS ISSUE FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT AND HAS DETERMINED THAT A COMPARISON OF TYPES OF RADARS, BASED SOLELY ON INDIVIDUAL PARAMETERS OR PHYSICAL FEATURES, WILL NOT BE DEFINITIVE IN DISTINGUISHING ABM RADARS FROM EARLY WARNING RADARS.

- IT IS CLEAR THAT ROLE AND CAPABILITY, AND ULTIMATELY THE LEGALITY OF RADAR SYSTEMS UNDER THE ABM TREATY, MUST BE JUDGED IN THE CONTEXT OF A BROADER PICTURE, INCLUDING RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER RADARS AND ABM SYSTEMS OR SYSTEMS WITH ABM POTENTIAL.



C. IF IN THE DISCUSSION THE SOVIETS DO NOT PROVIDE ANY RECIPROCAL DATA, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD CLOSE THE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE BY NOTING THAT:

- IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT US PAVE PAWS RADARS THE US WAS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN AN EXCHANGE OF DATA OF US AND SOVIET LPARS ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. THE US SIDE NOTES THAT AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER IN THE SCC, LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE US SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING, AS THE US SIDE HAS BEEN, AND, UNLESS RECIPROCAL INFORMATION IS PROVIDED, THE US SIDE CAN SEE NO UTILITY IN FURTHER PURSUIT OF THIS ISSUE.

- IF ASKED BY THE SOVIETS WHAT TYPE OF DATA THE US PROPOSED TO EXCHANGE, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD STATE THAT THE US SIDE EXPECTS THE SAME TYPE OF INFORMATION WHICH THE US PROVIDED TO THE SOVIET SIDE IN 1979. (THE US SIDE WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF US RADARS NOR COMPARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PAVE PAWS WITH THOSE OF PARCS.)

D. IF THE SOVIETS PROVIDE RELEVANT INFORMATION, THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE US WILL RESPOND AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

~~OPTION 2:~~

~~IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE ISSUE OF RADAR CHARACTERISTICS AND PARAMETERS EXCHANGE THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD SEEK TO DEFER THE ISSUE BY EXPLAINING THAT: THE US IS CONTINUING TO STUDY THIS MATTER, HAS PROVIDED ITS DATA, AND IS AWAITING COMPARABLE SOVIET DATA AND A FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL BEFORE PROCEEDING.~~

SCC

OPTION 3:

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD ADVISE THE SOVIET SIDE THAT:

(1) SINCE SCC- XXX WE HAVE STUDIED THIS ISSUE FROM A TECHNICAL STANDPOINT, AND HAVE DETERMINED THAT A COMPARISON OF TYPE RADARS, BASED SOLELY ON INDIVIDUAL PARAMETERS OR PHYSICAL FEATURES, AS OBSERVED BY NTM, WILL PROVIDE ONLY AMBIGUOUS CONCLUSIONS, AND WILL NOT BE DEFINITIVE IN MANIFESTLY DISTINGUISHING ABM RADARS FROM EARLY WARNING RADARS.

JCS

~~(2) IT IS CLEAR THAT ROLE AND CAPABILITY, AND ULTIMATELY THE LEGALITY OF RADAR SYSTEMS UNDER THE ABM TREATY, MUST BE JUDGED IN THE CONTEXT OF A BROADER PICTURE, AS INTEGRATED WITH OTHER RADARS, AND ABM OR ABM POTENTIAL SYSTEMS.~~

~~(3) HAVING STUDIED THIS IDEA IN SOME DEPTH, THE US SIDE SEES NO UTILITY IN FURTHER PURSUIT OF THIS ISSUE.~~

~~ADDITION TO ALL OPTIONS:~~

E. DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT INCLUDE WHAT NTM CAN OR CAN NOT DO.

24. "GOLDSTONE" AND THE ABM TREATY:

IF THE SOVIETS AGAIN IMPLY THAT THE US "GOLDSTONE" NUCLEAR TEST COULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY, THE US COMPONENT SHOULD RESPOND DRAWING UPON THE APPROPRIATE INTERAGENCY APPROVED PAPER.

25. PROTECTION OF US INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

THE US COMMISSIONER SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT US INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS,

ARE PROTECTED.

TAB II

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90653

35

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

September 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Decisions Regarding Instructions for the SCC Session
Beginning October 1, 1986

Attached is a paper prepared by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) Backstopping Committee containing issues for decision regarding instructions for the next session of the SCC beginning on October 1, 1986. Also attached are draft instructions consistent with the options in the decision memorandum. (C)

The SCC Backstopping Committee notes that the development of the SCC decision document and its associated instructions has proceeded in parallel with work associated with the exposition of a regime of mutual restraint and with the exposition of our NST position, including the relationship of the ABM Treaty with SDI, both done in special channels. The Committee recognizes that the decisions on all these areas are interrelated even though the interrelationships are not explicitly dealt with in this paper. (S)



William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED BY: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/5 #8561
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11