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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (5/9)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1712

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8530	MEMO	POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	9/19/1986	B1
8531	TALKING POINTS	DRAFT TALKING POINTS RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1
8532	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO POINDEXTER RE VISIT OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	3	9/18/1986	B1
8541	CABLE	191250Z SEP 86 <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	9/10/1986	B1
8538	CABLE	182345Z SEP 86 <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	3	9/18/1986	B1
8539	CABLE	182345Z SEP 86 <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	3	9/18/1986	B1
8533	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO SHEVARDNADZE RE MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1
8534	TALKING POINTS	DRAFT TALKING POINTS PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

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File Folder MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (5/9)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1712

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8535	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO POINDEXTER RE VISIT OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	9/18/1986	B1
8536	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE CONVERSATION WITH KORNIYENKO, SEPTEMBER 15, 1986 R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	5	9/21/1986	B1
8537	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE CONVERSATION WITH KORNIYENKO R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	4	9/20/1986	B1
8540	CABLE	231916Z SEP 86 R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	4	9/23/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Eyes Only~~

9/19/86

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

005 6/25/02

File Matlock 2

The President has seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90645

PR

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

DATE: September 19, 1986
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: To Be Determined

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To inform the FM directly of your strong insistence that Daniloff be freed immediately; to drive home the fact that the Daniloff case highlights again the importance of human rights in U.S.-Soviet relations overall.

II. BACKGROUND

You have decided not to meet with Shevardnadze, but have agreed that you may summon the FM to the White House to receive your feelings on the Daniloff case directly.

Should you decide to meet with Shevardnadze you may want to stress that our patience is exhausted. We provided the Soviet leadership adequate time to reflect on the consequences of their ill-conceived actions. Further, you will probably wish to stress that you have twice given your personal assurances to the General Secretary that Daniloff has never engaged in espionage for the U.S. Government.

You will want to conclude that the Soviet Government's action has severely eroded the foundation for a cooperative relationship; the longer the situation persists, the longer it will take to persuade the American people that the Soviet Union is a power we can do business with.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Jack Matlock

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8530

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

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Soviet Union

FM E. Shevardnadze
A. A. Bessmertnykh
Y. V. Dubinin
P. R. Palazhchenko
Tarasenko
Interpreter

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press coverage; no photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

FM Shevardnadze arrives with Secretary Shultz and party through Southwest Gate, and is escorted to Oval Office.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

Draft Talking Points

- Important for me to convey directly my feelings on Daniloff's arrest. Feel Soviet leadership made serious miscalculation.
- Realize that our patience in trying to find a solution may have been misinterpreted in Moscow.
- However, I provided General Secretary Gorbachev my personal assurances twice that Daniloff had not engaged in espionage for U.S.
- I did not do this lightly. Obviously, I would not have unless I were sure of the facts.
- Frankly, I found rejection of my assurances personally offensive.
- Not only I, but American people as a whole, are outraged by Daniloff's treatment. Indignation will grow as long as he is not allowed to leave Soviet Union.
- Freedom of an innocent American detained by a foreign power is of the highest national importance in our society. Fact that he is but one individual does not affect the depth and intensity of our concern.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/5-#8531

BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/07

5

-- Soviet Government's continued unwillingness to free Daniloff is eroding the foundation for a cooperative relationship. Longer it persists, the greater the damage to our ability to work with you.

-- Too much at stake for both our countries to let this festering wound continue to poison the relationship.

-- We want to be able to proceed in working out the various issues before us in a businesslike fashion. We were beginning to make real progress when this happened. But if Daniloff continues to be held, it will inevitably affect other issues.

-- It is important that you convey to the General Secretary the intensity of our feelings and the damage it can do to our relationship if it is not resolved immediately.

-- (If SMUN reductions raised) We find your use of UN for spying unacceptable. You can be sure we will continue to do whatever is necessary to defend ourselves against this misuse.

4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

13 SEP 18 P12: 19

~~SECRET~~

September 18, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. *fm* MATLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB *mc*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

We understand that at present the President is not planning on receiving Soviet FM Shevardnadze tomorrow. However, in the event that a meeting does take place the President has indicated that it would focus on one topic only -- Daniloff.

The memorandum at Tab I from you to the President provides the latest information on the status of the Daniloff case and forwards suggested talking points for his use. Although the President has indicated he would restrict such a meeting to the single topic, there is a possibility that the Soviets may bring a Gorbachev reply to the President's July 25th letter. Given that the President may decide to pursue discussions on arms control contingency talking points have been included.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____
Bill *pc* Cockell, Peter *mc* Rodman, Jack Matlock and Bob *pc* Linhard concur.

Attachments
Tab I

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8532
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

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7

MESSAGE FROM KGB

Re Zakharov/Daniloff: You insist that you have evidence of Zakharov's guilt but you do not present any evidence. We have already stated that Zakharov is not a member of the KGB. He is a scientist at the UN. His contact with the student was in the context of being a UN staff member. He didn't see anything suspicious in the context of a criminal act. Therefore we look upon his being brought into court as a gross provocation.

As concerns Daniloff, we would like once more to explain that Soviet investigative organs have solid and direct evidence of his espionage activity on the territory of the USSR on behalf of CIA. And if his case goes into court, evidence will prove Daniloff's guilt. As professionals we should ask one another if it is necessary to bring this case to court. We suppose that nobody will win in this case. As for the public opinion and sharp political reaction in the U.S., we believe that the American side has undertaken a broad propaganda campaign to evoke this sharp reaction in your country. You will put yourself in a corner. Here it is very important to underline that you didn't take into consideration our opinion about the necessity for our special services to show a wise and balanced approach, i.e. not to get into an emotional and political discourse but realistically to evaluate the current situation and the capabilities of our two services to influence (things).

In the Soviet Union we also have public opinion in which the illegal treatment against Zakharov and 25 members of the SMUN evokes great condemnation. The same reaction was evoked by the fact of the espionage activity of Daniloff on the territory of the USSR under cover as a journalist. All this should be taken into account. In this connection we would like to repeat our profound conviction that CIA clearly understands why Daniloff was arrested, clearly understands the direct connection between your service and the activities of Daniloff, Stombaugh and Natirboff. CIA will be in a very difficult situation when it is evident to everybody that Daniloff was a spy and fulfilled tasks. Concerning Daniloff, given the fact that we have irrefutable evidence, he will be tried in strict accordance with Soviet law. In these circumstances we are prepared for an exchange or other actions on the basis of parity. Perhaps it could be possible to examine the question of a simultaneous exchange of Zakharov and Daniloff on the territory of a third country, if you are not prepared for a simultaneous departure of Zakharov from the U.S. and Daniloff from the USSR.

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We would like to stress that the resolution of this question is possible only on mutual acceptance of parity, not harming the dignity of one or the other.

As professionals you should understand that our service observed Daniloff for a long time, gathered evidence for a long time and the decisions concerning him were taken after proper consideration of all the established facts.

We would like to stress especially that, taking into consideration the firm guilt of Daniloff, there can be no exchange of Daniloff for Zakharov plus dissidents. Such a package in the final analysis cannot be. As for the threat of expulsions, the Soviet Union is not the kind of country with which one can speak in such a tone. The American side must understand clearly that your acts will not be without consequences. And what measures we shall take is our business. Measures will follow.

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McDaniel for Poindexter

PAGE 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 16273 191252Z

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Poindexter		9/19
Keel	O	
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Rodman	C	
Cockell	C	
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<i>Matlock</i>	C	
<i>Major</i>	C	
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REMARKS:		
C: Copy O: Original F: FYI S: Should See C/H: Copy Hand Delivered C/T: Contacted Via Phone		

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BY _____

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WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By C/S NARA, Date 6/25/02

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PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 16273 191252Z
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E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: DANILOFF CASE: PERSONAL LETTER TO
SECRETARY SHULTZ

1. NICK DANILOFF HAS ASKED US TO DELIVER A
PERSONAL, HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM HIM TO THE
SECRETARY. AS WE HAVE NO ONE TRAVELING DIRECTLY
TO WASHINGTON IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, NICK
HAS AGREED TO OUR SENDING THE TEXT VIA CABLE.
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/SOV.

--
2. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

WORD HAS REACHED ME THAT AT HARVARD'S 350TH
ANNIVERSARY YOU MENTIONED THE NAME OF A CERTAIN
MEMBER OF THE CLASS OF 1956 WHO IS TODAY A
HOSTAGE IN MOSCOW. I COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN MORE
HONORED OR MORE GRATIFIED. HARVARD IS, INDEED,
THE WELL-SPRING OF MY WORLD VIEW, OF MY
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CIVILIZATION MEANS. AND

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8541

BY EN NARA DATE 11/29/07

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PAGE 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 16273 191252Z C06/10 002603 NOD705

I AM GLAD THAT YOU NOTED THAT AN INNOCENT JOURNALIST IS NOT TO BE COMPARED TO A PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

SINCE MY CONDITIONAL RELEASE, BOTH MY SPIRITS AND MY PHYSICAL CONDITION HAVE IMPROVED. THE HOSPITALITY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IS HELPING ME FORGET THE HELL OF THE 13 DAYS IN LEFORTOVO PRISON. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT I DO NOT CONSIDER RELEASE INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE EMBASSY--OR EMBASSIES--TO BE A SWAP. IT IS A JUST STEP. FOR THE SAKE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, NOT TO SPEAK OF THE WELFARE OF MY FAMILY, I REALIZE SOME KIND OF POLITICAL SOLUTION MUST BE REACHED. I BELIEVE THIS WILL REQUIRE EXTRAORDINARY DIPLOMATIC SKILL AND MAY TAKE A WHILE. AS FAR AS LETTING THE SOVIETS GET AWAY WITH THEIR LATEST OUTRAGE--I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE OR WILL. THEY WILL BEAR INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA SCARS FOR YEARS TO COME.

RESPECTFULLY,
/S/ NICK DANILOFF

END TEXT.

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 04 STATE 294658

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INTERESTS, WHICH ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE SAME AS THOSE OF U. S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, IF THIS INFORMATION IS MADE PUBLIC, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR ND TO POINT TO HIS INCARCERATION AND INTERROGATION AS EVIDENCE THAT HIS STATEMENTS TO THE KGB WERE MADE UNDER DURESS.

-- AND IF THIS INFORMATION IS MADE PUBLIC, IT COULD PUT THE SOVIETS IN A POSITION WHERE THEY FEEL IT ALMOST MANDATORY TO PUT ND ON TRIAL.

-- THESE ARE OUR CONCERNS. WE WILL INFORM ND THAT WE HAVE PASSED THIS REPORT TO YOU AS HE REQUESTED, AND THAT WE HAVE EXPRESSED THESE CONCERNS TO YOU.

END TALKING POINTS.

3. GERGEN STATED THAT THE POINTS WERE FAIR, AND EMPHASIZED THAT USNWR WAS ASKING FOR THE MATERIAL FOR INTERNAL USE, NOT FOR PUBLICATION. HE ALSO INDICATED, EVEN BEFORE THE TALKING POINTS WERE READ, THAT NOTHING ON DANILOFF'S EXPERIENCES WOULD BE PUBLISHED AT THIS TIME, OR UNTIL DANILOFF WAS OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION.

4. SOFAER SAID HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR THAT. WHILE WE WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT ASK THE MAGAZINE NOT TO PRINT, DEPT IS VERY CONCERNED FOR DANILOFF. DANILOFF DOES NOT HAVE HIS OWN LAWYER, AND ANY PUBLICATION COULD BE DAMAGING TO HIS INTERESTS.

5. GERGEN SAID HE WOULD BE CAREFUL TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN USNWR AND

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PAGE 04 OF 04 STATE 294658

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6. GERGEN SAID THAT TREWHITT HAD PREPARED IN MOSCOW AN ANALYSIS OF DANILOFF'S SITUATION AND THAT THEY COULD NOT GET IT OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE ASKED HELP OF USG. SOFAER SAID WE WOULD CONSIDER HANDLING THE MATTER IN THE SAME WAY AS DANILOFF'S MESSAGE, SO LONG AS DANILOFF HAD NO OBJECTION. SOFAER SAID THE MATERIAL COULD BE GIVEN TO CHARGE COMBS FOR POSSIBLE TRANSMITTAL.

7. GERGEN REPORTED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT DANILOFF MIGHT HAVE BEEN DRUGGED BY THE KGB DURING INCARCERATION. HE ASKED WHETHER DANILOFF HAD BEEN MEDICALLY EXAMINED. COULD THE EMBASSY DOCTOR TALK TO DANILOFF AND, IF POSSIBLE, RENDER AN OPINION? SHULTZ

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PAGE 03 OF 04 STATE 294658

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90645

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PR

MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

DATE: September 19, 1986
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: To Be Determined

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To inform the FM directly of your strong insistence that Daniloff be freed immediately; to drive home the fact that the Daniloff case highlights again the importance of human rights in U.S.-Soviet relations overall.

II. BACKGROUND

You have decided not to meet with Shevardnadze, but have agreed that you may summon the FM to the White House to receive your feelings on the Daniloff case directly.

Should you decide to meet with Shevardnadze you may want to stress that our patience is exhausted. We provided the Soviet leadership adequate time to reflect on the consequences of their ill-conceived actions. Further, you will probably wish to stress that you have twice given your personal assurances to the General Secretary that Daniloff has never engaged in espionage for the U.S. Government.

You will want to conclude that the Soviet Government's action has severely eroded the foundation for a cooperative relationship; the longer the situation persists, the longer it will take to persuade the American people that the Soviet Union is a power we can do business with.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Jack Matlock

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-11415 #8533
BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

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2

Soviet Union
FM E. Shevardnadze
A. A. Bessmertnykh
Y. V. Dubinin
P. R. Palazhchenko
Tarasenko
Interpreter

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press coverage; no photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

FM Shevardnadze arrives with Secretary Shultz and party through Southwest Gate, and is escorted to Oval Office.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachments:
Tab A Talking Points

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PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

Draft Talking Points

- Important for me to convey directly my feelings on Daniloff's arrest. Feel Soviet leadership made serious miscalculation.

- Realize that our patience in trying to find a solution may have been misinterpreted in Moscow.

- However, I provided General Secretary Gorbachev my personal assurances twice that Daniloff had not engaged in espionage for U.S.

- I did not do this lightly. Obviously, I would not have unless I were sure of the facts.

- Frankly, I found rejection of my assurances personally offensive.

- Not only I, but American people as a whole, are outraged by Daniloff's treatment. Indignation will grow as long as he is not allowed to leave Soviet Union.

- Freedom of an innocent American detained by a foreign power is of the highest national importance in our society. Fact that he is but one individual does not affect the depth and intensity of our concern.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/S #8534

BY CV NARA DATE 11/29/07

-- Soviet Government's continued unwillingness to free Daniloff is eroding the foundation for a cooperative relationship. Longer it persists, the greater the damage to our ability to work with you.

-- Too much at stake for both our countries to let this festering wound continue to poison the relationship.

-- We want to be able to proceed in working out the various issues before us in a businesslike fashion. We were beginning to make real progress when this happened. But if Daniloff continues to be held, it will inevitably affect other issues.

-- It is important that you convey to the General Secretary the intensity of our feelings and the damage it can do to our relationship if it is not resolved immediately.

-- (If SMUN reductions raised) We find your use of UN for spying unacceptable. You can be sure we will continue to do whatever is necessary to defend ourselves against this misuse.

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SYSTEM II
90645

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET P12: 19

~~SECRET~~

September 18, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. *fm* MATLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB *mc*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

We understand that at present the President is not planning on receiving Soviet FM Shevardnadze tomorrow. However, in the event that a meeting does take place the President has indicated that it would focus on one topic only -- Daniloff.

The memorandum at Tab I from you to the President provides the latest information on the status of the Daniloff case and forwards suggested talking points for his use. Although the President has indicated he would restrict such a meeting to the single topic, there is a possibility that the Soviets may bring a Gorbachev reply to the President's July 25th letter. Given that the President may decide to pursue discussions on arms control contingency talking points have been included.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____
Bill *bc* Cockell, Peter *mc* Rodman, Jack Matlock and Bob *bc* Linhard concur.


Attachments
Tab I

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/5 #8535
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

~~Eyes Only~~ 9/21/86

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



PRESERVATION COPY
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CAS 6/25/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 21, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Conversation with Korniyenko,
September 15, 1986

Georgy Korniyenko, Dobrynin's deputy in the Central Committee International Department (and former First Deputy Foreign Minister), asked me during the Chautauqua conference if we could get together Monday evening. He had come to Riga for the conference, although he did not speak, and the only apparent reason for his doing so was to have a private conversation with me. I agreed and we met for an hour and a half Monday evening in a private conference room in the hotel where we both were staying. Nobody else was present and neither of us took notes -- though I must assume that Korniyenko has access to a tape of the conversation!

We both spoke Russian and the conversation was relaxed. He went out of his way to adopt a reasonable, non-polemical tone (which is not generally characteristic of his approach). He made no reference at all to the verbal fireworks of the day, but got right to business.

He started by observing that our positions still seem far apart on all the key issues and asked whether I really thought that we could reach closure on any of the major ones this year. I told him at the outset that I did not know in advance that we would be meeting, therefore was not in a position to give more than my strictly personal view. However, with that caveat, it seemed to me that if the Daniloff case is resolved promptly and satisfactorily, there is no reason why we could not reach agreement on key elements in the various nuclear and space issues. I added that, of course, my judgment presupposed Soviet willingness to do their part to close the gaps that still existed; substantial further movement would be required, but we had no intention of insisting on unilateral advantages. He then asked which area I thought is most promising.

INF

I replied that it seemed to me that agreement on the basic elements of an INF settlement could be close at hand, assuming that

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

25

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

the Soviets had dropped their earlier links to British and French systems, were willing to settle for substantial reductions east of Barnaul as an interim step toward zero worldwide, would accept appropriate limits on short-range systems, and would agree to effective verification.

He did not challenge this judgment but said it would be very difficult to drop the link to British and French systems entirely. I told him this surprised me, since I understood that the most recent Soviet proposals did so -- and in any case, an agreement would be impossible if the Soviets insisted in any form of linkage with third-country systems.

START/SPACE

I also observed that our positions on strategic arms seemed to me moving somewhat closer, and I wondered whether this is also not an area where agreement could be found if we accelerated the negotiations. He agreed that we now seemed close enough on the numbers that solutions might be found in this area, but observed that the Soviets still do not see light at the end of the tunnel regarding space weapons -- and without some agreement on them, START could not be completed.

He then commented that our offer of a five-year non-withdrawal period was really meaningless, since it is obviously impossible to deploy a system in five years. They had stretched things about as far as they could in suggesting ten to fifteen years. Also, he said, they really couldn't formally legitimize SDI by agreeing in advance to the right of unilateral deployment at some point. I told him we thought the commitments offered were really quite generous, what with the offer to allow observation of testing during the development stage, the offer to negotiate for two years if deployment seems desirable, and the offer to look at the possibility of further steps to preclude basing mass destruction weapons in space.

Korniyenko said that we had misunderstood Gorbachev on the latter point. He was not talking about weapons of mass destruction (which the Outer Space Treaty already covers), but of offensive weapons. He then asked whether we would consider a ban on space-based weapons which could strike targets on earth. I told him that we were not thinking about using space-based weapons against targets on earth and that this is not a part of SDI. However, I did not know whether it would be possible to negotiate a ban on such weapons; we might run into definitional problems, since obviously many space-based weapons might have some minimal capability against earth targets. The real point is that this would be an irrational course to take since many existing weapons are much better suited to strike ground targets than any conceivable space-based weapon using exotic technologies.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Korniyenko said that, for example, lasers could be used to damage nuclear power plants and thus cause vast damage. I replied that if that were the aim, conventional munitions could probably do the job more effectively at substantially lower cost.

Nuclear Testing

Korniyenko then made a rather pro forma effort to discuss the testing issue, saying it was a political touchstone of sincerity. I told him that we really have to be realistic about this; the U.S. will not agree to a moratorium. We have made it clear that the road to dealing with the testing issue is by gradual steps, beginning with verification, ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, then discussion of possible further limitations in conjunction with reductions of strategic weapons. He did not pursue the subject further.

Daniloff

I told Korniyenko that it was going to be very difficult to make progress on issues such as the ones mentioned so long as Nick is not allowed to leave the country. I explained the intensity of our feelings on this issue and told him that the longer Daniloff is held, the more severe the impact on our relations would be. Korniyenko said, "The way you have handled this matter has convinced me of his guilt."

I protested that we know very well that he is innocent, and explained that our willingness to agree to the "remanding in custody" arrangement was done solely from the humanitarian motive of extracting an innocent man from prison. I added that he, and the Soviet Government as a whole, would be making a big mistake if they thought we would agree to parallel treatment in the long run. There is no basis for that, and at the end of the day there can be no parallelism. Finally, I observed that it is precisely Daniloff's innocence which has raised feelings in Washington so high.

I also noted that this whole incident had served to call public attention in the U.S. to the Soviet misuse of U.N. installations for espionage. The longer the issue is prolonged, the more public and Congressional attention is likely to be directed at the Soviet exploitation of the fact that the UN is located in the United States.

Aside from observing rather weakly, "We have a lot of evidence about Daniloff's activities," Korniyenko avoided comment on these observations.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~T~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

28

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

COMMENT:

Not much here of substance, except the hint that the Soviets might be fishing for some sort of restriction on space weapons which could be used against targets on earth. As you know, Shevardnadze also alluded to this as one of his points regarding SDI. From these tidbits -- and other hints -- I suspect that what the Soviets are angling for is: (1) Negotiating a non-withdrawal commitment from ABM Treaty (strict interpretation) for something like ten years, plus (2) ban on developing space weapons for use against targets on earth.

His comments on INF were most curious, given the fact that Gorbachev signed his letter the same day stating that the link with British and French systems had been dropped. (Maybe Korniyenko was under instructions not to drop any advance hints on this score.)

I had the feeling that Korniyenko would have been willing to discuss other conceptual possibilities in these various areas, if I had been willing to do so. However, I made it clear from the beginning that I was not in a position to go beyond explaining our current policy, and had no mandate to speculate on other possibilities.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

STRICTLY EYES ONLY

September 20, 1986

TO: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Conversation with Korniyenko: Private Channel

As I mentioned to you, at the conclusion of my conversation with Korniyenko in Riga last Monday, he alluded to the President's private conversation with Dobrynin during the latter's farewell, when the President suggested private and confidential communications with Paul Nitze and myself. Korniyenko asked if we were still interested.

I told him I was not sure. In the absence of a reply from them, we had assumed that they were not interested. I told him, however, that I would check on our current attitude if Gorbachev were interested in pursuing the matter.

Korniyenko said that he was not certain what Gorbachev's final decision would be; they would have to check with him again, and could not do this until Gorbachev returned to Moscow the middle of the week. He then asked if we had viewed this arrangement as one during which the representatives would speak on instructions and, in effect, try to negotiate the issues, or whether it would be a matter of the representatives consulting without precise instructions, with the aim of developing personal recommendations for their leaders, which might be either accepted or rejected --or modified.

I told him that my understanding was that the President had had the latter in mind; he did not view the proposed contact as one which would supplant formal negotiations, or in any way bind either of the parties. It was simply an attempt to provide a method of totally confidential consultation -- which might lead to approaches which could be worked out in detail and formalized at the negotiating table.

Korniyenko observed that they could understand the need for a manner of communicating which would not be subject to leaks and premature public disclosure, and asked if that was a factor in our thinking. I told him it was indeed. Long experience had shown that premature public disclosure and debate can hamper closing gaps in our respective positions. Putting our heads together and thinking quietly and confidentially about possible solutions might bring constructive results -- although this of course could not be guaranteed.

STRICTLY EYES ONLY

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NLRRF06-114/5#8537

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/01

STRICTLY EYES ONLY

Korniyenko then indicated that, if Gorbachev approved such an arrangement, either he or Bessmertnykh would probably be designated to conduct them, inasmuch as Dobrynin's travel would likely draw too much public attention. He asked whether we would have any preference as to place. I told him that, assuming the President is still interested in the arrangement (which I could not predict with certainty -- particularly if the Daniloff case is not resolved promptly), we would be guided entirely by considerations of what locale offered the best opportunity to meet quietly without drawing public attention. I pointed out that Nitze travelled to Europe rather frequently, and it might be easiest to arrange a discreet meeting there. New York during the UNGA might also be a possibility.

Korniyenko said that he agreed that the sole consideration in setting a place would be the practical one of how to ensure confidentiality, and that protocol or other factors should not figure in the decision.

He then asked how they should communicate Gorbachev's desire to establish such a contact, if he should decide to do so. I told him that this could be done privately to Secretary Shultz -- or if this presented a bureaucratic problem on their side, someone could get word directly to Nitze or to me, and we would see that the matter is brought to the President's and Secretary's attention for their decision.

Korniyenko indicated that, should Gorbachev make a positive decision, this would probably be communicated to me. He said, however, that it might not be done during Shevardnadze's stay in Washington, since Shevardnadze would have departed Moscow before the matter could be discussed with Gorbachev.

STRICTLY EYES ONLY

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STRICTLY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8537a

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

STRICTLY EYES ONLY

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STRICTLY EYES ONLY

Ch... MATLOCK 33

6863

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1986

**Natl Sec Advisor
has seen**

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Suzanne Massie
Tuesday, September 23 -- 3:00 p.m.

Suzanne Massie is a personal friend of the President's. On Tuesday at 12:00 noon, she is scheduled to lunch with the President and Mrs. Reagan in the Oval Office for 90 minutes.

You are scheduled to meet with her on Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. in your office. Mrs. Massie recently returned from a trip to the Soviet Union and is writing a book about the restoration of the Pavlovsk Palace which was destroyed by the Germans in World War II. You may wish to have her elaborate on her experiences in search of background information for her book.

Cham 34

6863

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 22, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Suzanne Massie
Tuesday, September 23 -- 3:00 p.m.

Suzanne Massie is a personal friend of the President's. On Tuesday at 12:00 noon, she is scheduled to lunch with the President and Mrs. Reagan in the Oval Office for 90 minutes.

You are scheduled to meet with her on Tuesday at 3:00 p.m. in your office. Mrs. Massie recently returned from a trip to the Soviet Union and is writing a book about the restoration of the Pavlovsk Palace which was destroyed by the Germans in World War II. You may wish to have her elaborate on her experiences in search of background information for her book.

Matlock
35

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: MICHAEL K. BOHN

FYI

The following memo has been addressed to you for information. Please check the appropriate line; if you desire to read the memo, it will be included in your next Situation Room folder.

Matlock - USIA Memo on European Press Reaction on the Daniloff Case (#6602)

The European media recognize Daniloff's innocence and have given US high marks for its handling of case, but overall concern is effect on future East-West relations.

Read _____ Not Read /

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6602

30

September 18, 1986

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: USIA Memo On European Press Reaction on the
Daniloff Case

Attached at Tab A is a memo from Charlie Wick on European press treatment of the Daniloff case.

The European media recognize Daniloff's innocence and have given the US high marks for its treatment of the case. But the overall concern of European media focuses on the future of East-West relations. They do not want it to affect the Summit.

- given copy
- given copy
Paul Hanley, Walt Raymond and Steve Sestanovich concur.

Attachment
Tab A Wick Memo

Prepared by:
R. Scott Dean



September 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral
John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *MLS for CZW*

SUBJECT: West European Attitudes Toward the Daniloff
Case: Support but Concern that the East-West
Relationship not be Held Hostage to it

A survey of senior USIS officers in major West European capitals shows that Europeans agree that Daniloff is innocent. However, the continental Europeans (French, West Germans, Italians, Dutch and Swedes) stress that arms control negotiations and a U.S.-Soviet Summit meeting should not be held hostage to the Daniloff case. They view East-West relations as more important than the fate of one man.

In the UK, where Daniloff has many personal and professional contacts throughout the British establishment, there is emotional outrage over his arrest. British journalists are treating the Daniloff affair mainly as a major human rights case. They have focused to a much lesser extent on its potential implications for East-West relations.

In continental West Europe, the Administration has received high marks for its restraint in responding to the Soviet provocation. In the UK, the Administration has received high marks for its principled stand on the human rights aspects of the case.

There is a general hope that the Daniloff case is nearing resolution, but also continuing fear, especially in Germany, that it could slip out of control. European TV newscasts this evening gave wide play to U.S. news stories that Daniloff and Zakharov may be remanded to the custodies of their respective Ambassadors as an interim move.

Draft from Matlock's office

For Chan 38

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you very much for the splendid gifts you brought Nancy and me. The porcelain plate and the lacquered plaque are beautiful examples of the fine craftsmanship for which your country's artisans have long been noted. They are truly appreciated.

Again, thank you for your thoughtfulness. With our best wishes to you and Mrs. Shevardnadze,

Sincerely,

Have rewritten.
For your approval.

For Amb Matlock
From Scott

Good -
Thanks

Have rewritten.
For your approval.

39

For Aunt Matlock
From Scott

Good -
Thanks

Scott -

40

First sentence will
not do.

Rewrite just to
thank for gift - Jack

Incoming draft

41

September 23, 1986

Dear Mr. Minister:

I valued our recent meeting at the White House, as it afforded us the mutual benefit of exchanging views on issues of vital importance to the Soviet Union and the United States. I continue to look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev ~~in Geneva~~ for the purpose of laying the groundwork toward a more promising future for our two peoples.

The splendid gifts which you brought for Nancy and me are truly appreciated. We shall treasure the porcelain plate and the lacquered plaque as examples of the fine craftsmanship for which your country's artisans are so well noted.

Again, thank you for your thoughtfulness. With our best wishes to you and to Mrs. Shevardnadze,

Sincerely,
RR

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

RR:CMF:JEH:AVH

CLEAR THRU NSC AND DISPATCH THRU STATE.

gh

Scott -
First sentence will
not do.
Rewrite just to
thank for gift - Jack

LENCZOWSKI, *Matlock*

ID # 449548 *92*

PLEASE CONCUR AS IS _____
AS AMENDED _____

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

GI 002

RETURN TO CHRIS OR ART.

Shevardnadze

Priority Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

SUBJECT: *Thank you for gifts received following his recent visit w/ the POTUS.*

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<i>OSIA</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>860925</i>			<i>1 1</i>
<i>NS MCDA</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>8610926 TR</i>			<i>1 1</i>
		<i>1 1</i>			<i>1 1</i>
		<i>1 1</i>			<i>1 1</i>
		<i>1 1</i>			<i>1 1</i>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: — Individual Codes: 3300 _____

Prime Subject Code: GI 002 Secondary Subject Codes: CO 165 _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code Date Comment Form

C _____ Time: _____ P. _____

DSP _____ Time: _____ Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

ID 8600842 A INITIALS CMF

LOGGED 860922 ARRIVAL 860919
ARRIVAL FORM M MAIL ROOM

PREF DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
NAME HIS EXCELLENCY
EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE

TITLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
ORG UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SALUT DEAR MR. MINISTER SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND P PRESIDENT
CATEGORY 0905
HOUSEHOLD - TABLEWARE (GLASSES, DISHES, SILVERWARE)

DESCRIP PORCELAIN PLATE DEPICTING A PEACOCK SURROUNDED BY FLORAL MOTIFS,
IN MULTI COLORS OUTLINED IN GOLD; SCALLOPED EDGE; SIGNED BY THE
ARTIST AND DATED 1985; TITLED IN RUSSIAN; 14" DIAM.

FLAG RARE
APPR TO BE ADDED.

DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT DEL. BY SOVIET EMBASSY MSGR., FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MTG. W/
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE EARLIER IN THE DAY; APPRAISER IS SCHEDULED TO
COME TO WASHINGTON OCT. 22, 23, 24, AND WILL PLACE VALUES THEN.

TOTVALU RARE GIFTS B

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

45

ID 8600842 B INITIALS CMF

LOGGED 860922 ARRIVAL 860919
ARRIVAL FORM M MAIL ROOM

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY
NAME EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE

TITLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
ORG UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SALUT DEAR MR. MINISTER SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA
ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND F FIRST LADY
CATEGORY 0105
ARTWORK - (EXC. PERSONAL LIKENESS) - PLAQUE

DESCRIP LACQUERED PAINTING DEPICTING A SCENE FROM ALEXANDER PUSHKIN'S
FAIRYTALE, "LITTLE GOLDEN COCKEREL", CREATED BY FEDOSKINO CRAFTSMEN;
8 1/2" X 14".

FLAG RARE
APPR TO BE ADDED.
DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT DEL. BY SOVIET EMBASSY MSGR., FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MTG. W/
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE EARLIER IN THE DAY; APPRAISER IS SCHEDULED TO
COME TO WASHINGTON OCT. 22, 23, 24, AND WILL PLACE VALUES THEN.

TOTVALU RARE GIFTS B

40
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

COPY
from ORM

November 4, 1985

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

*Miss Maxine
will be in Wash.
Oct - 22, 23 + 24 --
will place values there*

*Del. by
Soviet Emb.
msg. to 45 -
9-9-86.
RR meets w/mr.
Shevardnadze
in am. same dates.*

Eduard A. SHEVARDNADZE

Member of the Politbureau,
CPSU Central Committee,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR

1985

opportunity to meet
with you at the White House and in New York
to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual
concern to our two countries. I look forward
to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev
in November and establishing a bilateral
dialogue to bring about a more stable future
for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs.
Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you
brought for us. We are pleased to have the
samovar and matching tray and the lacquered
box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry
of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze,
and to your colleagues as we approach our
meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

Miss Maxime
will be in Wash.
Oct - 22, 23 + 24 --
will place values there

Del. by
Soviet Emb.
msg. to 45 -
9-9-86.
RR meets w/mr.
Shevardnadze
in am. ...

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (continued)

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His Excellency

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko,
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

His Excellency

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

His Excellency

Eduard A. Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.

Dear Mr. Minister:

||

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

His Highness

Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahayyan,
President of the United Arab Emirates,
Abu Dhabi.

Your Highness:

His Excellency

Shaikh Rashid ibn Said al-Maktum,
Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates,
Abu Dhabi.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

NOTE: The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs is vacant. However, there is a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who may be addressed as follows:

His Excellency

Rashid Abdallah Ali al-Nuaimi,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
of the United Arab Emirates,
Abu Dhabi.

Dear Mr. Minister:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CABLE NOVS
SECTD 18003
RE DANILOFF
9/23/86
STATE 286416
7/14/86

PRESERVATION COPY

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Department of State

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NODIS - TREAT AS SPECIAL CAPTION

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ

NOT TO ADS, S AND S/S ONLY

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS:

SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO THE SOVIETS ON DANILOFF

- SHEVARDNADZE ASKED LAST NIGHT FOR A MEETING TODAY.
I AGREE AND WE MET THIS MORING AT 10:30 AM.

- HE BEGAN BY PROPOSING THAT DANILOFF AND ZAKAROV BOTH
BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, WITHOUT TRIAL. OR BOTH COULD BE
TRIED AND THEREAFTER RELEASED.

- THEN HE EXPANDED THE OPTIONS, PROPOSING THAT BOTH
BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED WITHOUT TRIAL, BUT ADDING TWO
NEW ELEMENTS:

-- THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD. THREE WEEKS TO THIRTY
DAYS LATER. RELEASE YURIY ORLOV, THE FOUNDER OF THE
HELSINKI MONITORING GROUP, WHO IS WIDELY KNOWN IN THE
U.S. AND THE REST OF THE WEST. ORLOV'S NAME WAS AT THE
TOP OF THE LIST WE HANDED OVER TO SHEVARDNADZE IN
WASHINGTON LAST WEEK.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8570

BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

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Department of State

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-- THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL CYCLE OF REACTION AND COUNTERREACTION AS A RESULT OF OUR SMUN DECISION. SHEVARDNADZE ASKED ME EXPLICITLY "IS THE OCTOBER 1 DEADLINE IN EFFECT?" HE ASKED ME FOR AN ANSWER BY THE END OF THE DAY, SO THAT IF THE DATE STILL HOLDS THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO LEAVE CAN MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. AND THE SOVIETS CAN DECIDE ON THEIR RESPONSE. HE LATER IN OUR MEETING ASKED ME FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE OCTOBER 1 DEADLINE, ON THE GROUNDS OF PROBLEMS CONCERNING FAMILY TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

I REPLIED TO SHEVARDNADZE BY SAYING THAT HE HAD HAD MADE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. I SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE PEOPLE FROM OUR LIST, PARTICULARLY WHOSE WHO ARE SICK, BE RELEASED. I SAID THAT THE TIMING HE MENTIONED FOR THE RELEASED OF ORLOV AND OTHERS WAS A PROBLEM. AND WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UN I POINTED OUT THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF USING THE UN MISSION AS A PLATFORM FOR ESPIONAGE. I SAID THE VERY FACT THAT THERE ARE PEOPLE FROM THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WORKING THERE CREATES A "RUSSIAN ROULETTE" KIND OF SITUATION. I SAID THEY SHOULD STAFF THEIR MISSION AND THEIR UN SECRETARIAT CONTINGENT WITH PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, AND THOSE WHO ARE THERE HOW SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED OUT IN ORDER TO AVOID PNG'D. I SAID I WOULD GIVE HIM AN ANSWER BY THE END OF THE DAY BUT THAT THE OCTOBER 1 DEADLINE STANDS.

- SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THE US IS USING OUR UN MISSION FOR INTELLIGENCE TOO, SO WE SHOULD NOT BE SO RIGHTEOUS ABOUT THIS SITUATION. IN ADDITION, HE SAID, US INTELLIGENCE IS WRONG ABOUT SOME OF THE SOVIETS

WE HAVE DESIGNED. SOME OF THEM, HE SAID, HE NEVER LEFT THE MISSION PREMISES, SO "WE CONSIDER WHAT YOUR SERVICES HAVE DONE TO BE ARBITRARY AND UNPROFESSIONAL."

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-- OFFER SOMETHING MORE REGARDING DANILOFF. THIS MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF OUR UNDERTAKING TO ENCOURAGE DANILOFF AND HIS LAWYERS TO STATE PUBLICLY, UPON HIS RELEASE, THAT HE IS AWARE HE TRANSGRESSED SOVIET LAW, ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT A SPY AND NEVER WORKED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT. (THE SOVIETS MAY NEED SUCH A STATEMENT IN ORDER TO SAVE FACE AND REBUT CHARGES THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE THEIR OWN LAWS.)

- WITH OR WITHOUT SOME GIVE ON THESE TWO ELEMENTS, THE ABOVE PACKAGE CLEARLY GETS US NON-EQUIVALENCY. WE AREN'T WALKING BACK ON THEIR UN MISSION. WE GET DANILOFF AND AN EXTREMELY PROMINENT DISSIDENT, ORLOV. AS FOR ZAKHAROV. HE GETS TRIED. ON THE OTHER HAND, BY ALLOWING THE SOVIETS A DELAY IN THE TIMING OF THE RELEASE OF THE DISSIDENTS, THEY CAN DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE ACCUSATION THAT THEY CAVED.

I TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT I WOULD SEE TO IT THAT YOU WERE INFORMED DIRECTLY THAT GORBACHEV PERSONALLY STEPPED IN TO MAKE THE DECISION ON ORLOV. AND THAT I WOULD BE BACK TO HIM TODAY. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~