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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1986 (2/2)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1707

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8496	MEMO	PRE-MINISTERIAL WORK PROGRAM CHECK LIST [22 - 23] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	8/20/1986	B1
8497	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR SOVIET MINISTER EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE [24 - 24] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	8/25/1986	B1
8498	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO SIMPSON RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE [26 - 26] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1986 (2/2)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1707

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8500	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE [29 - 29] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	8/23/1986	B1
8499	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8496 [33 - 34] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	8/20/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT:

Khrushchev's Visit to the U.S.

Ken Adelman has prepared a study reviewing the "lessons" of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959. He makes a number of observations which are useful to bear in mind as we prepare for Gorbachev's visit here.

Attachment

Tab A: Adelman Memo

2



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 AUG 15 5:17

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6022

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 19 AUGUST

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier / Keel
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

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- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - Cockell
 - Fortier (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - Keel (advance)

COMMENTS

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

August 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Careful thought should begin on the nature of Gorbachev's visit to the U.S., if, as I believe, the summit takes place this Fall. There is no better way to start this thought than by learning from history--Nikita Khrushchev's 1959 tour of the U.S. preceding his summit with President Eisenhower.

The lessons learned from that occasion were:

1. Gorbachev will probably be more interested in output than input--in getting the Soviets' message across to the world rather than in seriously learning about the U.S.
2. There will be many hassles with media and security, mostly unavoidable, which will limit his mobility and what Gorbachev can see and learn about America.
3. We can probably get more say over Gorbachev's itinerary than we did over Khrushchev's in 1959, if we are more precise, even insistent with the Soviets about where to go.
4. The European audience is just as critical as ours.
5. Both U.S. and European publics will probably be more receptive to the Soviet leader today than they were in 1959.

The attached makes for fascinating reading. It teaches quite a bit.

Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment: a/s

PS - I gave copy of the paper to Don R. as well

If there is a summit this year, Gorbachev may wish to travel beyond Washington, Camp David, or Santa Barbara. If the Soviet leader comes to the United States, and if he decides to see the sights, it's worth learning what we can from the only other visit by a Soviet leader that included real sightseeing--Khrushchev's 1959 summit with President Eisenhower. Khrushchev visited the United States for 12 days in September 1959, for the first U.S.-Soviet summit held on American soil.

What went wrong with this visit? What went right? What might we expect to happen this time?

Propaganda Barrage

One thing that is plain from the 1959 experience is that an extended Khrushchev-style visit would provide Gorbachev with an extremely valuable public-relations opportunity. In the course of his 12-day visit, Khrushchev had no fewer than 21 occasions on which to convey his message to the public. The last day of his trip included a one-hour press conference and a one-hour TV address on NBC to the nation. "Not since the televised Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954," a Washington Post article observed, "has television so concentrated on a single man." Coverage of Gorbachev is likely to be as or even more intense.

In Breaking with Moscow, Arkady Shevchenko, the senior Soviet diplomat who defected to the United States in 1978, recalls how this looked from the point of view of Soviet officialdom:

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A veneer of propaganda obscured almost everything related to Khrushchev's visit to the United States. He was obviously delighted that President Eisenhower had invited him to pay an official visit. The mere fact of the invitation was important to him: he saw it as the United States' admission that the U.S.S.R. was an equal with whom solutions to international problems must be sought. The Soviet Union had striven persistently for such status. Khrushchev felt that his visit would bring him and the Soviet Union prestige regardless of whether the talks with Eisenhower succeeded or failed.

The Soviet leader set out his major theme straightforwardly upon arriving in Washington. "There are only two nations which are powerful--the Soviet Union and the U.S.," he declared. "You people must accept the facts of life. You must recognize that we are here to stay."

The visit was carefully orchestrated to get this message across, and at the same time to build pressure on President Eisenhower for concessions during the Camp David talks scheduled for the end of the trip.

(It is interesting to note that the 1959 summit happened essentially by accident. The President had meant to convey to the Soviets the message that he was interested in a summit on the condition that concrete progress was made at an earlier foreign ministers' conference. To the President's dismay, the message was bungled. The invitation was presented to the Soviets without the condition--and quickly seized upon by Khrushchev.)

The first sally of the Soviet P.R. campaign was launched three days before the Soviet leader's departure for the United States, when the Soviets fired a rocket to the moon, the Lunik II.

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On arriving in the Oval Office, Khrushchev presented the President with a replica of the object sent to the moon. President Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs that the Lunik II launch was "a noteworthy feat, but the propaganda purpose of the timing was blatant." (These, remember, were the days of Sputnik and the "missile gap," when the Kremlin leader was endlessly boasting about the Soviet Union's capabilities in nuclear missiles, and U.S. spacecraft were having trouble getting off the ground. Coincidentally, during the period of the Khrushchev visit, the U.S. space program suffered some noteworthy failures.)

Khrushchev's other major theme was disarmament and an end to the Cold War. After meeting with President Eisenhower, he kicked off his U.S. tour with a major speech to the United Nations General Assembly proposing a bold three-stage plan for general and complete disarmament (a forerunner of Gorbachev's January 15, 1986 proposal).

In all his U.S. pronouncements, Khrushchev applied what Henry Kissinger had called the Kremlin's "strategy of ambiguity"--mixing threats with blandishments, outbursts of anger with the soothing themes of a "peace offensive." Khrushchev's tactic was to stir up popular anxiety about nuclear holocaust, while at the same time presenting himself to the world as a man of peace --all of this designed to pressure President Eisenhower into concessions on Berlin and other issues. As the Soviet leader wrote in his memoirs, "Eisenhower was being forced to listen to voices in democratic circles and in the business community which advocated concrete measures to reduce tensions."

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The New York Times headline of September 17 captured the dual nature of the Soviet leader's message:

Khrushchev Has An Arms Plan;
Asks Peace Effort Lest Earth
Turn Into "Ashes and Graves"

Finally, Khrushchev's messages were aimed as much at the European and Soviet audiences as at the American one. The United States in World Affairs 1959 noted: "Every detail of the visitor's itinerary, so far as it lay within Soviet control, appeared to have been calculated for the fullest effect on American opinion and, beyond it, on the world at large. The Soviet people read glowing press accounts of the welcome supposedly accorded their leader."

"The Man Who Came to Teach and Not to Listen"

At an April 12 press conference, President Eisenhower expressed his hopes concerning what Khrushchev might see on his visit--which are remarkably similiar to President Reagan's hopes for Gorbachev to see California by helicopter:

I would like for him, among other things, to see this: the evidence that the fine, small or modest homes that Americans live in are not unusual or exceptional as he seemed to think the sample we sent to [the American exhibit in] Moscow was. . . .

I would like to see him go into our great farmland and see our farmers, each one operating on his own, not regimented.

. . . .
Now, I want him to see our great industrial plants and what we are doing.

Hardly any of this happened. What went wrong?

First, the Soviet leader made a point of showing little

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interest in the various evidences presented to him of capitalist prosperity and American success. "Even when his hosts drove him through towns with tall white steeples, through prosperous farms, friendly campuses and towering skyscrapers," Time complained, "he barely bothered to look out the window." James Reston titled his September 20 column on Khrushchev's visit "The Man Who Came to Teach and Not to Listen." President Eisenhower was disappointed when the Soviet leader, aloft in the Presidential helicopter, made "no expression revealing his reaction" to the suburban American landscape below, with its plentiful houses, cars, and manicured streets. Instead, Khrushchev "openly expressed his admiration for the helicopter itself" (and indeed ordered three of them for his personal use after returning to Moscow).

But of course, all this was in line with Khrushchev's purpose, which was to dramatize the power and legitimacy of the Soviet system, not the virtues of the United States. He subordinated his visible responses to this political goal. Gorbachev may act similarly.

Logistics

There were also serious logistical problems.

First, media people formed an almost impenetrable cordon around the Soviet leader. "Mr. Khrushchev cannot see America for all the cops and photographers," Reston wrote in The New York Times on September 24, the day after the visit to an Iowa farm. "[N]ewsmen are not reporting the visit; they are smothering it . . . All this, mind you, gives Mr. Khrushchev no pain. He

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is less interested in seeing America than in having the world see him in America."

Second, security was tight. The Soviet leader complained at one point of being kept under "house arrest" and claimed he was being barred from meeting "ordinary Americans." Security considerations resulted in the famous cancellation of Khrushchev's Disneyland visit, and the Premier's angry response: "Just now I was told I could not go to Disneyland. I asked: Why not? What is it? Do you have rocket-launching pads there? I do not know." (In point of fact, Khrushchev's security people had agreed with the cancellation.) But after the Disneyland episode, security was loosened slightly to permit the General Secretary more access to ordinary citizens.

Such episodes contributed to an impression that trip was poorly organized. The Washington Post called it a "three-ring circus," blaming the State Department's planning.

The third major problem, which in part explained the disarray, was the scheduling, which had been tightly controlled by the Soviet ambassador, Mihail Menshikov. Menshikov accepted a number of invitations from labor groups and others without prior consultation of the State Department, causing some scheduling conflicts. (Gorbachev is likely to get a number of invitations from private groups and institutions, as he did from Stanford University, and the Soviets may be disinclined to coordinate all of them with U.S. officials.)

It is worth remembering the Soviet schedule was designed to

show the Soviet leader, not the United States, in a good light. Menshikov ignored the President's expressed wish that the tour include Abilene, Kansas--his home town--and Levittown. Moreover, the schedule was extremely tight, with emphasis on meetings with dignitaries. Henry Cabot Lodge, charged with escorting the Soviet leader, later told Gromyko, "There have been too many banquets and they have lasted too long."

Finally, to add to the impression of confusion, there were frequent angry encounters between local officials, eager for the limelight, and the Soviet Premier. Whether from a genuine incomprehension of the independence of American local government or to score points in the propaganda war, Khrushchev accused Washington of orchestrating provocations. The White House was finally prompted to issue a statement on September 22 to the effect that "The purpose of constructive meetings at Camp David is not served by any personal discourtesies extended to the Chairman during his visit."

Khrushchev's Impression on the Public

The American media were far more openly suspicious of the Soviet leader in 1959 than they would be today. It's a sad sign of the times, but nonetheless true. When U.S. News & World Report printed excerpts from Khrushchev's American speeches in their September 28 issue, the editors followed each excerpt with a paragraph in boldface type refuting the Soviet premier--something sadly unlikely to happen in 1986.

Time's 1959 evaluation of the Khrushchev visit was bluntly negative:

The U.S., long since disabused of the image of Nikita the Vodka-Slopping Peasant, already knew Khrushchev to be the skillful and dynamic leader of 200 million people. The U.S. found out, as Khrushchev boiled into excessive rages in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles (twice) before TV crowds of millions, that Khrushchev could also carry out a combination of uncontrolled willfulness, ignorance and ill temper. Above all, the U.S. found out last week that Khrushchev's New Course of Communism was the same Old Course; that his protestations of peace and friendship cloaked a naked drive for world power no less sustained than that of the late Joseph Stalin.

Time, however, was especially harsh. Some argued that Khrushchev's presence put a more human face on the Soviet system. The Khrushchev outbursts mentioned by Time did not always work to the Soviet Premier's disadvantage. In fact, many speculated that they were calculated.

Following a Khrushchev outburst at the National Press Club on September 16, Arthur Krock wrote admiringly in The New York Times that Khrushchev had "matched the best performances of politicians put to the question in democratic parliaments" -- a remark one can easily imagine being made about Gorbachev.

Nor was Khrushchev without charm, suggested by the following question put to President Eisenhower during a September 17 press conference:

Mr. President, with millions of Americans seeing Mr. Khrushchev on TV, and noting his apparent conviction and sincerity when he speaks, and also at times his friendliness and warmth of personality--do you think some Americans' opposition to Communism might weaken and they might become psychologically disarmed?

(President Eisenhower answered, among other things, that he did

"not believe the master debater or great appearances of sincerity or anything else are going to fool the American people long.")

In fact, from a public relations standpoint, Khrushchev's overall impact in the United States was mixed. Shortly before and shortly after the visit, the Gallup Poll asked, "Just your own impression--what type of person do you think Premier Khrushchev is?" The results were as follows:

	<u>Before Visit</u>	<u>After Visit</u>
Intelligent	11%	18%
Cooperative	2%	9%
Unyielding	12%	9%
Untrustworthy	12%	22%
Domineering	10%	6%
Ruthless	9%	5%

A majority (59%) surveyed in the U.S. after the Soviet premier's visit thought he was not "sincere in wanting to work out an effective disarmament plan." Only 20% believed he was sincere in this effort. Gorbachev today would probably score much higher.

Some Western European media responded more receptively to the summit. The London Daily Telegraph for example, proclaimed lavishly:

What we are witnessing today is a diplomatic revolution, nonetheless profound for being--let us hope--bloodless. September 15, 1959, marks the day when the United States and the Soviet Union symbolically affirm their joint responsibility for determining the future of the world.

The Paris-Journal noted:

Two men, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, know that they alone hold the fantastic power to destroy the world or to halt the race to the abyss. . . Nobody can make us believe that Eisenhower, despite his verbal precautions, will not open a major negotiation with Khrushchev in a concrete way.

What Did Khrushchev Learn?

For all his show of indifference to his setting, there was a feeling among sophisticated observers that Khrushchev had clearly grasped some of the realities of American life.

During a brief tour of an IBM Plant in San Jose, the Soviet leader asked two workers about their wages, and how they spent their income. One worker said he was spending \$100 a month for a house he was buying. "You mean for an apartment?" Khrushchev said. "No," said the worker, "a house. I am buying a house." On the way back to San Francisco, Khrushchev requested another, unscheduled stop at a housing development under construction, where he asked workers similar questions, as if to verify his impressions.

An assessment of the Khrushchev trip done by the State Department for the NSC in 1973 made the point that U.S. advantages in agriculture were and are likely to come through especially clearly to any Soviet leader:

The beneficial impact of a visit to an agricultural area in the United States cannot be exaggerated. American superiority, efficiency and per capita production are more readily recognized by Soviet leaders in the agricultural than in the industrial sector. This productive efficiency together with the high standard of living prevailing in US agricultural areas combine to make a strong impact on Soviet visitors.

Of course whether what Khrushchev saw influenced him toward peace is another question, and far less clear. The same State Department document pointed out that the Soviet leader's perception of the American people's strong desire for peace could actually encourage Soviet hope that the USSR could achieve its goals

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"through more assertive tactics without incurring increased risks of war." But Khrushchev, who had given indications of wishing to drive a wedge between the U.S. President and the people, also evidently perceived the popular support for President Eisenhower's foreign policy.

The Political Consequences of the Summit

Thus far we have left the large diplomatic issues out of the summit story. A concluding word, therefore, about the foreign policy upshot of the meeting.

The Camp David summit occurred against the backdrop of two major Soviet challenges--the space/missile race, begun with the 1957 Sputnik launch, and, more pressingly, the Berlin Crisis, ignited in November 1958 when Khrushchev demanded a peace treaty requiring withdrawal of the three Western powers from that city.

The specific issues at stake in 1959 were naturally somewhat different from those of concern now. Arms control was not so clearly at center stage. But the pressures on the President to engage in summit meetings--coming most heavily from the Soviets and the Western allies--were strikingly similar.

President Eisenhower was very clear on the pitfalls of summitry. In his press conference of February 25, 1959, the President said:

When the people of the world understand there is going to be a head of state or a head of government summit conference, they expect something to come out of it; and a feeling of pessimism and, in a way, hopelessness, I think, would be

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increased if you entered such a meeting and then nothing real came out of it as, indeed, was the case at Geneva [in 1955]. There was a great deal of talk about the spirit of Geneva, but frankly, before we went there, while we were there, and afterward, our government said one thing: the proof of the sanity and value of this Geneva meeting was going to be shown within the next few months when we went down to the concrete problems. And there we went over in October--the foreign ministers did--and we got exactly zero progress.

President Eisenhower insisted on limited aims for the Camp David conference. The purpose, he said, was "to melt a little bit of the ice that seems to freeze our relationships with the Soviets." On August 27 the President stated:

I myself am not conducting negotiations for anybody else with Mr. Khrushchev. I am conducting conversations, trying to explore his mind, to see whether there's any kind of proposal, suggestion, that he can make, that would indeed make him a real leader in the search for peace in the world.

One of the President's best-advised moves was to travel to Europe shortly before Khrushchev's scheduled arrival in the U.S., conferring with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn, Prime Minister Macmillan in London, and President DeGaulle in Paris. The Presidential trip was credited with solidifying the alliance on the eve of the meeting with Khrushchev.

In the end, the immediate effect of the Camp David summit was to diffuse some of the tensions over Berlin. (The crisis would reemerge, however, in almost identical form two years later under President Kennedy.) President Eisenhower noted later that the visit resulted in "a better atmosphere," though he felt Khrushchev's references to "the Spirit of Camp David" to be unwarranted.

According to Shevchenko, Khrushchev talked of the meeting a year later on an ocean voyage to New York. "As for

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the United States," writes Shevchenko, "for the time being he saw little hope of changing its attitude, but there were many opportunities for 'kindling distrust' of the Americans in Europe. 'We threw a little scare into the NATO countries last year with the spirit of Camp David,' he said in recalling his 1959 talks with President Eisenhower. 'We must work further at turning the United States against Europe, and Europe against the United States. That was the technique Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin] taught us.'"

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6136

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Meetings Scheduled

The attached memorandum from Nick Platt lists the US-Soviet meetings scheduled between now and mid-September. Although I believe you have been informed of all of them, the attachment provides a handy checklist.

Attachment

Tab A: Platt/Poindexter Memo of 8/21/86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987

By *CS* NARA, Date *6/25/02*



CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 AUG 22 08:48

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6136

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 26 AUG

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier / Keel
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5113

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - Cockell
 - Fortier (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - Keel (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
 BY CU DATE 4/26/02
 AUTHORITY: NSA, Date

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to Secretariat



21
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 8626111

August 21, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PRE-MINISTERIAL WORK PROGRAM

The enclosed checklist outlines the agreed program of U.S.-Soviet meetings already held or scheduled to be held prior to the September ministerial between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

OK NARA, Date *6/25/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22
August 20, 1986

PRE-MINISTERIAL WORK PROGRAM CHECK LIST

NST

Experts meeting held August 11-12 in Moscow (Nitze/Karpov). Second round confirmed September 5-6 in Washington.

TESTING

Experts talks held July 25-August 1 in Geneva (Barker/Petrosyants). Second meeting confirmed September 4 in Geneva; U.S. envisages two week session.

NPT

Bilateral talks held July 28-August 1 in Moscow (Kennedy/Semenov). Next session proposed week of November 10 in Washington.

MBFR

Experts talks held August 6-7 in Moscow (Blackwill/Mikhailov). Second meeting confirmed September 10-11 in Washington.

CDE

Experts talks held August 14-15 in Stockholm (Barry/Grinevskiy). Meetings will continue on an ad hoc basis for the next four weeks until the end of the CDE.

CW TREATY

Special pre-ministerial meeting held August 18 in Geneva (Lowitz/Issraelyan). Further meetings on margin of CD expected.

CW PROLIFERATION

Bilateral talks held March 5-6 in Bern (Hawes/Issraelyan). Second meeting confirmed September 4-5 in Bern.

RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Second round confirmed August 24-25 in Geneva (Perle, Linhard/Obukhov).

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-11415 #8496

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

HOTLINE UPGRADE

Sixth round confirmed September 2-5 in Moscow
(Ribera/Chirkov)

REGIONAL ISSUES

First meeting on general regional issues confirmed August
26-27 in Washington (Armacost/Adamishin).

Senior regional experts meeting on Afghanistan confirmed
September 2-3 in Moscow (Raphel/Alekseev).

BILATERAL

Bilateral Review Commission met July 22-31 in Moscow
(Sell/Abramenko).

General review held August 12-14 in Washington
(Simons/Mikol'chak). Second meeting proposed September 1
and 4 in Moscow.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

First meeting held July 29-August 5 in Washington
(Rhinesmith/Kashlev). Agreement in principle to hold
further meetings in September in Moscow.

Chautauqua conference confirmed September 14-18 in Riga,
USSR (Matlock, Bradley, Perle/Soviet Friendship Society).

HUMAN RIGHTS

Discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh July
25-28, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Administration
Head Kashlev July 29-August 5, and USA-Canada Department
Deputy Director Mikol'chak August 12-14; will be discussed
during second Simons/Mikol'chak round in Moscow September
1-4.

ATOMIC ENERGY

Joint Commission meeting in session August 18-22 in Moscow
(Trivelpiece/Petrosyants).

SPACE COOPERATION

Experts meeting proposed September 8-10 in Moscow
(Allen/undetermined).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

The Soviets have requested, and State Department recommends, that Secret Service protection be accorded Foreign Minister Shevardnadze during his visit to the United States on September 19-20. The Foreign Minister's travel schedule is not known at the moment, but it is anticipated that he may depart for New York on September 21 to attend the United Nations General Assembly.

Shevardnadze, like his predecessor Mr. Gromyko, has received Secret Service protection during previous visits.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memorandum at Tab I recommending Secret Service protection for Shevardnadze.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I McDaniel/Simpson Memo
Tab A State Dept Memo

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 114/5 #8497

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

6



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

24
6177

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN R. SIMPSON
Director
U.S. Secret Service

SUBJECT: Secret Service Protection for
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

State Department recommends and NSC concurs that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze be accorded Secret Service protection during his forthcoming trip to the United States on September 19 and 20. The Foreign Minister's schedule is not known at the moment, but it is anticipated that he may depart for New York on September 21 to attend the United Nations General Assembly.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, like his predecessor Mr. Gromyko, has received Secret Service protection during previous trips to the United States. Given the importance of this trip, the high profile of the visit, and the precedent of earlier Secret Service protection, we recommend that this protection be provided during the forthcoming trip.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File-114/5 #8498
BY CS NARA DATE 11/29/07



CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 AUG 25 7:44

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 6177

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 28 AUG

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier / Keel
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| FYI | FYI | FYI |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Laux | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt | <input type="checkbox"/> Lavin | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burns | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Saunders |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input type="checkbox"/> Small |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> Mingle | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> North | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kissell | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - Cockell
 - Fortier (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - Keel (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
NARA Date 6/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to Secretariat

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

#6177

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 23, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Secret Service Protection for Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze

The Soviets have requested Secret Service protection for Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during his approaching visit to the United States. Mr. Shevardnadze will be in Washington on September 19 and 20 for meetings with the Secretary. Further details of his travel schedule are still unknown, but he may arrive in Washington on September 18 and depart for New York on September 21 for the United Nations General Assembly.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, like his predecessor Mr. Gromyko, has received Secret Service protection during his past visits. In light of the importance of the trip, the high profile of the visit, and the precedent of earlier USSS protection, we believe that Secret Service protection is essential. We ask that you convey our request for this coverage to the appropriate officials.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECL: OADR

NLRR F06-114/5 #8520

BY GAS NARA DATE 11/29/07

EA

Matlock


20

National Security Council
The White House

86 AUG 26 21
P 8: 12

System # I
Package # 6136
DOCLOG 27 A/D

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>21</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel			
Rodman/Cockell			
Don Fortier			
Al Keel			
Paul Thompson	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2/4</u>	<u>PBT</u>	<u>OACOM N</u>
Situation Room	<u>2A</u>	<u>(R)</u>	<u>D</u>



Information
 A = Action
 R = Retain
 D = Dispatch
 N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other Keel LB

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

6136 Matlock US - Soviets Meetings Scheduled JMP noted

31
File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1986

Nati Sec Advisor
has seen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Meetings Scheduled

The attached memorandum from Nick Platt lists the US-Soviet meetings scheduled between now and mid-September. Although I believe you have been informed of all of them, the attachment provides a handy checklist.

Attachment

Tab A: Platt/Poindexter Memo of 8/21/86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 6/25/02



32
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

8626111

August 21, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PRE-MINISTERIAL WORK PROGRAM

The enclosed checklist outlines the agreed program of U.S.-Soviet meetings already held or scheduled to be held prior to the September ministerial between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CAS NARA, Date 4/25/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33
August 20, 1986

PRE-MINISTERIAL WORK PROGRAM CHECK LIST

NST

Experts meeting held August 11-12 in Moscow (Nitze/Karpov). Second round confirmed September 5-6 in Washington.

TESTING

Experts talks held July 25-August 1 in Geneva (Barker/Petrosyants). Second meeting confirmed September 4 in Geneva; U.S. envisages two week session.

NPT

Bilateral talks held July 28-August 1 in Moscow (Kennedy/Semenov). Next session proposed week of November 10 in Washington.

MBFR

Experts talks held August 6-7 in Moscow (Blackwill/Mikhailov). Second meeting confirmed September 10-11 in Washington.

CDE

Experts talks held August 14-15 in Stockholm (Barry/Grinevskiy). Meetings will continue on an ad hoc basis for the next four weeks until the end of the CDE.

CW TREATY

Special pre-ministerial meeting held August 18 in Geneva (Lowitz/Issraelyan). Further meetings on margin of CD expected.

CW PROLIFERATION

Bilateral talks held March 5-6 in Bern (Hawes/Issraelyan). Second meeting confirmed September 4-5 in Bern.

RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Second round confirmed August 24-25 in Geneva (Perle, Linhard/Obukhov).

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

NLRR F06-114/5 #8999
BY OK NARA DATE 11/29/07

HOTLINE UPGRADE

Sixth round confirmed September 2-5 in Moscow
(Ribera/Chirkov)

REGIONAL ISSUES

First meeting on general regional issues confirmed August
26-27 in Washington (Armacost/Adamishin).

Senior regional experts meeting on Afghanistan confirmed
September 2-3 in Moscow (Raphel/Alekseev).

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(Sell/Abramenko).

General review held August 12-14 in Washington
(Simons/Mikol'chak). Second meeting proposed September 1
and 4 in Moscow.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

First meeting held July 29-August 5 in Washington
(Rhinesmith/Kashlev). Agreement in principle to hold
further meetings in September in Moscow.

Chautauqua conference confirmed September 14-18 in Riga,
USSR (Matlock, Bradley, Perle/Soviet Friendship Society).

HUMAN RIGHTS

Discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh July
25-28, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Administration
Head Kashlev July 29-August 5, and USA-Canada Department
Deputy Director Mikol'chak August 12-14; will be discussed
during second Simons/Mikol'chak round in Moscow September
1-4.

ATOMIC ENERGY

Joint Commission meeting in session August 18-22 in Moscow
(Trivelpiece/Petrosyants).

SPACE COOPERATION

Experts meeting proposed September 8-10 in Moscow
(Allen/undetermined).

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1986

Dear Mr. Kindness:

Your letter enclosing correspondence from your constituent, Mr. Karlis Vanags, has been referred to me.

In response to Mr. Vanags' interest regarding the upcoming meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials in Latvia, the United States policy of refusing to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union is in no way affected by participation of some United States government officials in the Chautauqua-style Conference to be held near Riga in September.

For many years now, our policy has been to allow the travel of U.S. officials, other than our ambassador accredited to the Soviet Union, the President and cabinet members, to the Baltic states so long as no substantial or official contact occurred with officials of the so-called "Latvian (or Lithuanian or Estonian) Soviet Socialist Republic." Since the Conference does not involve official contact with any such officials, participation in it by U.S. officials is fully consistent with established U.S. policy.


U.S. officials frequently participate in conferences with Soviets in other countries: recently, for example, in Switzerland, Italy and West Germany. U.S. participation in the Chautauqua Conference does not imply that we are conceding Soviet jurisdiction over the locale of the Conference. Furthermore, we do not think that we do patriotic Latvians a service if we offer them no possibility of contact with us -- which would be the case if we refused to travel to Latvia just because it is under Soviet occupation.

The Chautauqua Conference was, of course, organized privately and the U.S. Government is not a sponsor of it. However, if U.S. officials refuse to participate, it is unlikely that U.S. policies and attitudes will be clearly and accurately expressed at the Conference. During the Conference, you can be sure that all American representatives -- both those from the private sector and from the government -- will express very clearly our attitudes toward the issues of human rights, religious freedom and the right to travel and emigrate.

I am enclosing a copy of a statement from the American Latvian Association in the United States which may be of interest to you and Mr. Vanags. It was supplied by the American organizers of the Conference, who consulted with Dr. Kalnins during preparations for the Conference. The organizers have assured us that several representatives of the Latvian-American and Baltic-American communities will take part in the Conference.

I hope this letter addresses Mr. Vanags' concerns.

Sincerely yours,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Encl.

The Honorable Thomas N. Kindness
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



37

AMERIKAS LATVIEŠU APVIENĪBA
American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc.
400 HURLEY AVENUE
P. O. BOX 4578, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850-0432
TEL: (301) 340-1914

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 10, 1986

CONTACT: Ojars Kalnins
(301) 340-8174

STATEMENT FROM AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION

REGARDING THE SEPT. 15-19, 1986

CHAUTAQUA-TYPE MEETING IN SOVIET-OCCUPIED LATVIA

Rockville, MD - Aristids Lambergs, president of the American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc., has released the following statement concerning the proposed Sept. 15-19, 1986 Chautauqua-type meeting with Soviet citizens in the city of Lielupe in Soviet-occupied Latvia:

"The American Latvian Association has been informed by the Department of State that several U.S. Government officials will be participating in "The Chautauqua Institution - The Eisenhower Institute Conference on U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Journey in Open Diplomacy" scheduled for Sept. 15-19 in the Soviet Union. We have also been told that part of this conference will take place in the city of Lielupe in the Soviet occupied country of Latvia.

The American Latvian Association has expressed concern about the presence of U.S. government officials at this conference in occupied Latvia in light of the long-standing U.S. policy which does not recognize the forcible and unlawful incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union. As an integral part of this policy, the United States government continues to recognize and conduct business with the diplomatic representatives of the last independent Baltic governments.

Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead has assured us that U.S. Official participation in the Chautauqua Conference will in no way jeopardize or weaken the non-recognition policy, and has reiterated the the longstanding U.S. position on this issue. In addition, in a press conference in Washington DC on June 9, 1986, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Palmer stated that U.S. concerns about the situation in occupied Latvia would in fact be raised by the U.S. delegation during the debates.

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PAGE TWO -ALA RESPONDS TO CONFERENCE IN LATVIA

In light of these assurances, the American Latvian Association believes that the Chauataqua Conference could provide a unique opportunity for the U.S. government, American citizens and the international press to publicly raise the issue of the illegal Soviet occupation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as the plight of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian people struggling to survive under brutal Soviet rule. While we do not endorse this conference, we will also not oppose it.

We do however wish to urge all members of the Chautauqua delegation and the press, to familiarize themselves with the history of the Latvian people and their nation, including their years of independence, the Soviet invasion of the country in 1940, and the illegal annexation to the USSR.

We wish to make it perfectly clear that Latvia today is an occupied nation under colonial rule from Moscow. The Latvian people never chose to be a part of the Soviet Union, and given the opportunity would enthusiastically choose to regain their independence and right to self-determination.

This desire for self-determination is especially critical today in light of systematic Soviet russification policies that are endangering the survival of the Latvian people, culture and language. The history of the independent Latvian nation has been erased from Soviet history books. Latvian prisoners of conscience, whose only crime is a love of their homeland and native culture, are languishing in Soviet prison camps.

The American Latvian Association is grateful to the United States government, other Western nations and all freedom loving people of the world who have expressed support to Latvian people in their aspiration for independence and self-determination. We hope and pray that the Chautauqua Conference will help further these aspirations."

The American Latvian Association is a non-profit organization that represents nearly 200 secular and religious Latvian American organizations throughout the United States. For additional information contact Ojars Kalnins, Public Relations Director, (301) 340-8174.

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Thomas N. Kindress

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Sept. 15, 1986 meeting between US & Soviet officials in Soviet occupied Latvia

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
✓ OPL	Kojalis	ORIGINATOR	860816	NAN	C	860816
✓ LA	Att'n: Sally Ironfield	A	860811	WB	A	860815
✓ NS	matlock	A	860819			1 1
			1 1			1 1
			1 1			1 1

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

August 15, 1986

Dear Mr. Kindness:

Thank you for your August 4 letter enclosing correspondence from your constituent, Mr. Karlis Vanags, regarding an upcoming meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials in Soviet occupied Latvia.

Your interest on behalf of your constituent is appreciated. I have directed your inquiry to the appropriate Administration officials in order that Mr. Vanags' concerns may be addressed.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Thomas N. Kindness
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

WLB:KRJ:MDB:mdb
cc: w/copy of inc to John Matlock (NSC) -
for further action
cc: w/copy of inc to Linas Kojelis - FYI
WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL
INCOMING

THOMAS N. KINDNESS
8TH DISTRICT, OHIO

434344

41
2417 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-6205

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

646 HIGH STREET
HAMILTON, OH 45011
(513) 895-5656
TOLL FREE 1-800-582-1001

234 EAST MAIN STREET
GREENVILLE, OH 45331
(513) 548-8817

August 4, 1986

Mr. Linas J. Kojelis
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Kojelis:

I recently received the enclosed inquiry from
Karlis Vanags expressing concern about a reported
September 15th meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials
in Soviet occupied Latvia.

I would appreciate your checking into this, and
providing me with any information which may be helpful
in responding to this concern.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



THOMAS N. KINDNESS
Member of Congress

TNK/ts

July 12, 1986

e.f.c.

THE HON. THOMAS N. KINDNESS
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

JUL 28 REC'D

Dear Mr. Kindness:

Our neighbors in Ohio are highly praising you as their elected representative in our national legislative body, who not only understands the plight of the Baltic people under the Soviet yoke, the desire of the oppressed for human rights, freedom and national sovereignty, but who also has long standing supported in the US Congress every endeavour to condemn the forcibly occupation of the once free Baltic States by the Soviet aggressors. The American-Balts are deeply appreciative of your conviction, Sir.

I respectfully ask your kind attention, dear Congressman, to the following unfortunate situation, which earnestly worries great many of us.

Forty-six years the United States, thanks to the Resolutions of the Congress, has continued a firm policy of nonrecognizing the illegally occupied Baltic States as ultimate constituency of the Soviet Empire. To avoid an implication of a taciturnly recognition of the annexation of them into the USSR and legitimizing the Soviet sovereignty over those Soviet occupied territories, forty-six years it was under a taboo for the U.S. government officials to visit those, once independent Baltic States.

This U.S. stance is causing to the Kremlin's bosses internal political perturbation, and sustains in the mind and hearts of the enslaved Baltic people the flame of freedom.

Now the Soviet strategists, cunningly exploiting the present American trend to expedite the Summit, have manipulated a diabolic trap to crush the U.S. stance regarding the nonrecognition of the Baltic States annexation, and to judiciously degrade the annual Baltic Freedom Day resolutions of the U.S. Congress to an international laughing-stock and a meaningless U.S. governments lip-service, with no practical consequences.

On September 15, the Soviet propaganda tacticians, under the auspices of the Chautauqua Institution (N.Y.), have arranged a widely planned bilateral political conference on USA and USSR relations, the nuclear treat and the unrest in South America and Middle East, which will be held - alas! - in the Soviet occupied Latvia, at the Baltic searesort of Lielupe, 12 miles from the City of Riga, the former capital of the Latvian Democratic Republic! Sic!

The formal host of that large scale USA - USSR political meeting in the Soviet occupied Latvia, will be the communist auxiliary organization in Moscow - The USSR-USA Society. As in the Soviet Union there are no private character political organizations, but all citizen assemblies are blind servants for the Communist party goals and the long-arm of the police state, every ruble and kopeck for the accomodation, wining and dining of the American delegation in occupied Latvia, is allotted by the communist government, and its prolifical spending for the communists aims, will be cautiously conducted by the dreadful GPU (Cheka)!

p.t.o.

2.


There would not be any concern at all if the participants from the U.S.A. in that political conference were merely our detentists and peace-doves of personal diplomacy, but it is a scandal per se that this dubious political gathering will be unbecomingly attended by the very top officials of our Government, namely by Mr. John F. Matlock, Jr., (the White House), Mrs. Roxanne Ridgway (the State Dept), Mr. Richard M. Perle (Department of Defence), and many other American elite political experts!. The chair in that conference presumably will be held by the Soviet grand-propagandist "comrade" Vladimir Posner, and Mr. John Wallach, U.S. Information Agency. And all this is in concert with our State department who should be fully aware of its politically and morally devastating effect on the steadfast policy of the U.S. Congress, of not recognizing occupied Latvia as a legitimate part of the Soviet Union! By no means the Soviet propaganda will take all the advantages of the U.S. high rank official presence in the occupied Latvia to accentuate projectively and internationally that the U.S. declarations of not recognizing the Baltic States annexation into USSR is not even worth the paper on which it has been annually printed in the United States Congressional Records!. This treacherous, demoralizing double-dealing, which offends the firm commitment of the U.S. Congress, will utterly ruin the hopes of the millions behind the Iron Curtain that the U.S. stands for freedom and resists the tyrannies, dictatorships, slavery and the Soviet imperialism.

Astonishing is the lack of awareness in our statesmen, what all this actually will do in encouraging and helping the Soviets to break the resistance of the oppressed Latvian people on russification and their struggle for human rights and national freedom. That why for the Soviets it was so essential to arrange this political conference in the occupied Latvia, and not in the beautiful Crimea, at Livadia castle near Yalta, where in 1945 the United States already helped the communists to enslave millions of people.

The gesture of declaration that the U.S. high officials are participating that blunderous meeting in the Soviet occupied Latvia as "private persons", on their vacation-time, is nonsensical. This would be an analogue to a situation where an active duty soldier taking off his uniform and announcing himself now as a private citizen is going over to the enemy to play poker. Also infallible would be any States department's declaration that the visits of the high rank government officials did not implicate de jure recognition of the Soviet regime in the occupied Latvia.

Will you, please, dear Congressman, look at once in this matter, acquaint of all the pertinent facts your caucus and the proper committees of the United States Congress. Would it be proper and possible somehow to initiate an interim view of the President, that the high rank U.S. government officials should abstain from any personal participation, including "unofficial visits", in connection with political activities held in the Soviet occupied Baltic States? Any attendance there should be considered as a flagrant offence against the United States official policy regarding the Soviet occupied Baltic States, which has been repeatedly declared by the United States Congress, and so vividly supported by yourself.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Yours very truly,


44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1986

Dear Suzanne,

This is very much a "first cut"
at getting the notions down that I
hope to convey.

I will very much appreciate
your thoughts, corrections, guidance,
...

Warm regards,

Jack

P.S. - If you can think of a
couple of lines of relevant poetry,
that would be most welcome!

August 26, 1986

Dear Bud -

This is a first, notional draft of what I will put into Russian (and a bit into Latvian) for the Chautauque meeting.

If you have time to look it over, I'd appreciate any comments or suggestions you might have. As you can see, I have left most of the details on issues to you and the others, concentrating instead on explaining American attitudes on some of the key issues -

Best regards -

Jack

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 26, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MARK PALMER

EUR
Department of State
Room 6226

TOM SIMONS
Deputy Assistant for European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6219

JOHN EVANS
Deputy Director
EUR/SOV
Department of State
Room 4217

SUBJECT: My Riga Speech

Here is my first cut at the speech I will give at the Chautauqua-style meeting near Riga on September 15.

Your comments, corrections, additions, cuts -- or just suggestions in general -- will be much appreciated.

Since I will be working on the Russian (and Latvian) texts with USIA late this week and next week, I would appreciate any preliminary comments by Thursday afternoon, August 28.


JACK MATLOCK

Attachment: Riga Speech

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 26, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ROD McDANIEL
PETER RODMAN
BILL COCKELL
KARNA SMALL
WALT RAYMOND
STEVE SESTANOVICH
TY COBB
JUDYT MANDEL
STEVE STEINER

SUBJECT: My Riga Speech

Attached is a very preliminary first draft of the speech I will deliver at the Chautauqua-style meeting near Riga.

This is to be the lead-off speech at the Conference. Mark Palmer will speak the afternoon of the first day, then Bud McFarlane and Richard Perle speak on arms control the second day; the third day will deal with regional issues (Alan Keyes and Hal Sonnenfeldt); the fourth with public opinion (Ben Wattenberg and Ed Djerejian) and the fifth with concluding statements (Jeane Kirkpatrick and Bill Bradley).

Comments, corrections, suggestions, etc., will be much appreciated. Since we must prepare and work over a Russian text, comments would be appreciated by Thursday, August 28, if possible.


JACK MATLOCK

Attachment: Riga Speech