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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1986 (1/2)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1706

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8485	MEMO	MATLOCK TO RAYMOND AND RAYMOND TO GERSHMAN RE USSR R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	8/20/1986	B1
8486	MEMO	MATLOCK RE GORBACHEV SPEECH R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	8/18/1984	B1
8487	MEMO	SOVIET AGREEMENT TO MEETINGS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	8/18/1986	B1
8488	MEMO	BROOKS/KRAEMER TO POINDEXTER RE DEALING WITH SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	2	8/5/1986	B1
8489	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT; LEMON; VITALE; RIXSE; BITOFF; STAPLES RE DEALING WITH SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	ND	B1
8492	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE NUCLEAR TESTING: DEALING WITH A REQUEST TO ADMIT SOVIET SEISMIC EXPERTS R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	7/28/1986	B1
8493	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8492 R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	7/28/1986	B1
8490	MEMO	MATLOCK TO RICHARD COMBS R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	8/22/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

At this time, I believe our comments should be relatively brief and should concentrate on the following elements:

1. The best way to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is to start reducing them. It is unfortunate that G did not have more to say about how we can do this.
2. If he means what he says about verification, then the way to show it is by accepting U.S. proposals to improve verification, ratify the TTBT and PNET, and negotiate further limits on testing on this basis.
3. Soviet claims to support movement to a more peaceful world ring hollow so long as they continue to pursue a brutal, unjust war of conquest in Afghanistan.
4. In sum, if the USSR is genuinely interested in peace, it will stop waging war; if it is interested in eliminating nuclear weapons, it will start reducing them, and if it is interested in ending nuclear testing, it will work with us to improve verification procedures.

5. MORATORIUM ON UNREALISTIC PROPOSALS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 18, 1986

4

Soviet agreement to meetings

Current info indicates lineup for talks with Soviets now as follows:

- (C) 8/18 - US/UR terrorism talks (Sokolov and Oakley)
- 8/26 - US/UR superregional talks in WDC (Armacost)
- 8/26 - US/UR RRC talks in Geneva
- 9/2 -3 US/UR periodic regional talks - on Afghanistan - *Moscow*
- 9/4 - US/UR nuclear testing talks - *Gen.*
- 9/5 - 6 US/UR NST in WDC
- 9/8 week US/UR MBFR talks in WDC
- 9/10 -12 US/UR space cooperation talks in Moscow

NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock

SUBJECT: Soviet agreement to meetings

State has just informed me that Sokolov has:

1. Confirmed the dates we suggested for the NST group's second round in Washington. Soviet team will be the same with Dubinin added.
2. Confirmed the Afghan regional talks for Sept 2-3.
3. On the "Superregional" Talks (Armacost group), confirmed that Admishin will arrive in Washington August 26 with Kazimirov, Zotov, and Krylov. Latter three are specialists on Latin America, Middle East and Africa.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 78487

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~

5565

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

August 5, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: LINTON BROOKS/SVEN KRAEMER ^{SK}

SUBJECT: Dealing With Soviet Nuclear Testing Experts

In May 1986, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a private U.S. group, concluded an agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences on seismic monitoring to demonstrate that a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) is verifiable. While claiming that this is a private agreement the Soviet government has endorsed it and makes frequent reference to it in public statements.

NRDC scientists are now in the Soviet Union and have gained considerable publicity. While no Soviet visa requests have been received, we assume, based on the agreement, that Soviet scientists will seek entry to the United States as "private" citizens to conduct similar monitoring. In anticipation of such a request, State has submitted, without prior coordination by the Nuclear Testing IG, a recommendation (Tab II) that the United States:

- Process any visa requests routinely and, if the Soviets qualify, grant the visas.
- Publicly invite the private Soviet scientists to receive a CORRTEX brief and a demonstration at the Nevada Test Site.

We question State's recommendations on grounds of both substance and process. Substantively, while State is probably correct that the political cost of denying visas per se is unacceptably high (although Ken Adelman advocated such a course to the President at July's nuclear testing NSPG), inviting so-called "private" Soviet scientists to the Nevada Test Site undercuts our position that national security issues such as nuclear testing can only be resolved on a government-to-government basis. Procedurally, the State submission circumvents the interagency process.

Since we have time to make the interagency process work (no visa requests have yet been made), Tab I, prepared for Rod McDaniel's signature, would forward the State proposals for IG review. An alternative would be to say now that the recommendation to provide a CORRTEX brief and a visit to Nevada for the private citizens is disapproved. While we believe the recommendation almost certainly should be disapproved, we owe it to the integrity of the interagency process to solicit agency views.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/5 #8488
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

~~SECRET~~

Recommendation

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the memorandum at Tab I, requesting IG review of State's recommendations. (U)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Bob Linnard, Steve Steiner, Jack Matlock and Steve Sestanovich concur

Attachments

- Tab I -- McDaniel Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A -- Copy of State Recommendation
- Tab II -- State Memorandum Forwarding Proposed Position

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence
Agency

COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN BITOFF
Executive Assistant
to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. WILLIAM VITALE
Executive Secretary
Department of Energy

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Dealing With Soviet Nuclear Testing Experts (U)

It is requested that the Interagency Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations review the attached Department of State recommendation with regard to:

- The wisdom of granting visas to "private" Soviet scientists and the conditions of such visas if any;
- The propriety of offering CORTEX briefs, test site visits, or other government involvement of such a "private" endeavor, given our position that important national security matters such as nuclear testing limitations issues can only be dealt with on a government to government basis; and
- How the United States should respond if a decision is made not to offer any direct government involvement, but the "private" Soviets citizens or the Natural Defense Resources Council subsequently seek access to the Nevada Test Site.
(S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/5 #8489
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

9

TAB A



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 8622722

July 28, 1986

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing: Dealing with A Request to Admit
Soviet Seismic Experts

As you know, American seismologists have gone to the Soviet Union to set up a monitoring station near the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site as part of the private agreement between the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Recent interagency discussions have considered the appropriate response should we be asked to allow Soviet scientists a reciprocal visit to the U.S.

In anticipation of such a request, the Department has instructed Embassy Moscow to notify Washington immediately upon receipt of any visa requests from Soviet scientists wishing to visit the U.S. in conjunction with the NRDC plan. If and when we receive such requests, the applicants will be informed that they will be processed according to routine procedures.

The USG to date has neither endorsed nor stood in the way of the NRDC effort to establish seismic monitoring stations in the USSR. The reasons for this policy remain valid. The NRDC effort cannot substitute for formal arrangements between the two governments on a national security issue such as nuclear testing. At the same time, we should not take on the political costs of blocking what large sectors of public opinion may see as a promising effort on nuclear testing verification. It is also possible that the seismic stations near Semipalatinsk will collect useful information on the Soviet test site and Soviet nuclear tests, as well as calibration information by monitoring US tests.

The Department notes that there are no plausible grounds for routinely denying visas to, or restricting the travel of, Soviet scientists who wish to visit the U.S. under NRDC sponsorship. There are also no compelling national security reasons for denying them access to the U.S. or to the vicinity of the Nevada test site (i.e., approximately as close as the NRDC seismologists were permitted to get to the Soviet test site). Thus, USG rejection of visas would be seen as a political decision to thwart the NRDC plan. It would stand in sharp contrast to Soviet willingness to let American scientists set up monitoring devices near the Soviet nuclear test site.

SECRET
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/5 #849Z

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~SECRET~~


- 2 -

The Department therefore recommends that we respond to any reasonable visa requests in a way which supports our agenda on nuclear testing. Specifically, we should take the following approach:

-- Process any visa requests in a routine way, and, if the Soviets qualify, grant the visas. Any conditions on their activity here should be related to the treatment the NRDC scientists received in the Soviet Union and our need to protect sensitive classified information.

-- In accordance with the President's previous offers, publicly invite them to receive a detailed presentation on the CORTEX measurement system, and possibly a demonstration of it at the Nevada test site.

The Department believes that this approach, in conjunction with the nuclear testing experts talks in Geneva, would keep our nuclear testing agenda in the forefront, demonstrate our commitment to accept intrusive verification arrangements in the interest of arms control progress, and underscore the necessity for government-to-government agreements on national security questions. A Soviet or NRDC refusal of our invitation would strengthen our hand in countering public criticism of our position on nuclear testing arms control.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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TAB II



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 8622722

July 28, 1986

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing: Dealing with A Request to Admit
Soviet Seismic Experts

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DECL: OADR

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BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

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
- 2 -

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Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1986

Dear Mr. Bleiman:

Thank you for your kind invitation to participate on the panel on "Improving US-Soviet Relations: What Can be Done?" during your Sixth Annual Teaching Conference of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament on September 28. The topic is thought provoking and I'm sure the discussion will be most stimulating -- but, unfortunately, my calendar dictates a busy fall season and does not permit the pleasure of participation.

With many good wishes for a successful conference,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Junius J. Bleiman
Chair
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament
40 Witherspoon Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08542

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Former Director
U.S. Disarmament Agency
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
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Robert Moore

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COALITION FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
FOR A WORLD FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS

40 Witherspoon Street
 Princeton, New Jersey 08542
 609-924-5022

August 11, 1986

Sept 28 / 16
schedule
request
Please
request &
draft both
confirm
request -
9-16

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
 Special Assistant to the President and
 Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
 National Security Council
 Old Executive Office Building
 Washington, DC 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

I am writing to ask if you would honor us by participating on a panel about prospects for improved US-Soviet relations as part of the annual teaching conference of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament. The conference will be held Sunday, September 28th, at the Nassau Presbyterian Church on the Princeton University campus.

The Coalition, now in its sixth year, is a community organization in the Central New Jersey area that supports educational and political activities toward slowing and reversing the nuclear arms race. Each year it sponsors a teaching conference on aspects of nuclear weapons issues. Past annual conferences have featured such speakers as George Kennan, Cyrus Vance, Seymour Melman and Freeman Dyson.

Our theme this year is "Clearing Obstacles: What will it take to get to a world without nuclear weapons?" We will focus discussions on the interrelated areas of arms control and US-Soviet relations. Enclosed is a preliminary outline of the program we hope to put in place.

We ask you to participate on the panel on "Improving US-Soviet Relations: What Can be Done?" Confirmed participants are Professor Robert Tucker and Arthur Macy Cox, both of whom I believe you know. In addition, Sergei Rogoff of the Soviet Embassy has accepted in principle, pending approval of his travel by the State Department. The panel is scheduled from 4:30 PM to 6:00 PM.

We would be delighted to have you attend the entire conference or as much of it as would be convenient for you. You could return to Washington that evening, or we could make arrangements for you to spend Sunday night in Princeton.

By way of background, I am assistant dean for graduate placement at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and also a retired career Army officer. Linas Kojelis, the President's special assistant for public liaison and an alumnus of the Wilson School, could, I trust, vouch for my bonafides.


August 11, 1986

and Robert Moore, the executive director of the Coalition, or
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. Reverend
Moore can be reached at 609-924-5022; my office number is 609-452-4812.

Everyone involved with the conference hopes you will accept our
invitation.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,



Junius J. Bleiman
Chair

Encl

cc: Linas Kojelis

PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

18

SIXTH ANNUAL TEACHING CONFERENCE

of the

COALITION FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Sunday, September 28th, 1986

Nassau Presbyterian Church, Princeton, NJ

"CLEARING OBSTACLES: WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO GET TO A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS"

11:00 a.m. Interfaith Service

1:30 p.m. -
3:00 p.m.

Panel on "Arms Control and Disarmament: Current Prospects"

Participants: Prof. Frank von Hippel, Princeton University
Prof. George Rathjens, MIT
Thomas Graham, General Counsel, ACDA
James Bush, Capt., USN-Ret., Center for
Defense Information

3:15 p.m. -
4:15 p.m.

Concurrent Workshops on Issues in Arms Control with
individual panelists.

4:30 p.m. -
6:00 p.m.

Panel on "Improving U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations: What Can
Be Done?"

Participants: Prof. Robert Tucker, Princeton University
Arthur Macy Cox, American Committee on
U.S.-Soviet Relations
Ambassador Jack Matlock, NSC (Invited)
Dr. Sergei Rogoff, Soviet Embassy (Invited)

Dinner

7:30 p.m. -
9:00 p.m.

Panel on "Can There Be Security Without Nuclear Weapons?"

Participants: Howard Morland, Coalition for a New
Foreign and Defense Policy
Prof. Richard Ullman, Princeton University
Franklin C. Miller, OSD
Prof. Johan Galtung

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 21, 1986

Dear Mr. Spravniks:

Thank you for your letter of August 16, 1986. I can assure you that the United States policy of refusing to recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union is in no way affected by participation of some United States government officials in the Chautauqua-style Conference to be held near Riga in September.

For many years now, our policy has been to allow the travel of U.S. officials other than our ambassador accredited to the Soviet Union, the President and cabinet members, to the Baltic states so long as no substantial or official contact occurred with officials of the so-called "Latvian (or Lithuanian or Estonian) Soviet Socialist Republic." Since the Conference does not involve the participation of any such officials, participation in it by U.S. officials is fully consistent with established U.S. policy.

In my earlier visits to Riga (as well as Tallinn and Vilnius), I have met and conversed on a very candid basis with many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians -- all of whom were very frank about their attitudes and very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to an American. Limited as such contact may be, I do not think that we do patriotic Latvians a service if we offer them no possibility of contact with us -- which would be the case if we refused to travel to Latvia just because it is under Soviet occupation.

The Chautauqua Conference was, of course, organized privately and the U.S. Government is not a sponsor of it. However, if U.S. officials refuse to participate, it is unlikely that U.S. policies and attitudes will be clearly and accurately expressed at the Conference. As for my own remarks, I intend to begin them in Latvian and make clear that, so far as the American participants are concerned, the Conference is taking place on Latvian, not Soviet soil. Though I do not speak Latvian, I can read it with a dictionary, and with some help from Latvian friends, am sure that I can read the text in understandable fashion. (On earlier


occasions, I delivered speeches in Tbilisi in Georgian, and in Kiev in Ukrainian -- just to make the point that we do understand and appreciate the vast national differences between the peoples in these areas and the Russians.)

During the Conference, you can be sure that all the American representatives -- both those from the private sector and from the government -- will express very clearly our attitudes toward the issues of human rights, religious freedom and the right to travel and emigrate.

I am enclosing a copy of a statement from the American Latvian Association in the United States which may be of interest. It was supplied to me by the American organizers of the Conference, who I understand consulted with Dr. Kalnins during the preparations for the Conference. The organizers have assured me that several representatives of the Latvian-American and Baltic-American communities will take part in the Conference.

Again, thank you for your interest in the upcoming Conference and the American participation in it.

Sincerely yours,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Encl.

Mr. E. Spravniks
203 Pellatt Avenue
Weston, Ontario
Canada M9N 2P5



21

AMERIKAS LATVIEŠU APVIENĪBA
American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc.
400 HURLEY AVENUE
P. O. BOX 4578, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850-0432
TEL: (301) 340-1914

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 10, 1986

CONTACT: Ojars Kalnins
(301) 340-8174

STATEMENT FROM AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION

REGARDING THE SEPT. 15-19, 1986

CHAUTAUQUA-TYPE MEETING IN SOVIET-OCCUPIED LATVIA

Rockville, MD - Aristids Lambergis, president of the American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc., has released the following statement concerning the proposed Sept. 15-19, 1986 Chautauqua-type meeting with Soviet citizens in the city of Lielupe in Soviet-occupied Latvia:

"The American Latvian Association has been informed by the Department of State that several U.S. Government officials will be participating in "The Chautauqua Institution - The Eisenhower Institute Conference on U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Journey in Open Diplomacy" scheduled for Sept. 15-19 in the Soviet Union. We have also been told that part of this conference will take place in the city of Lielupe in the Soviet occupied country of Latvia.

The American Latvian Association has expressed concern about the presence of U.S. government officials at this conference in occupied Latvia in light of the long-standing U.S. policy which does not recognize the forcible and unlawful incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union. As an integral part of this policy, the United States government continues to recognize and conduct business with the diplomatic representatives of the last independent Baltic governments.

Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead has assured us that U.S. Official participation in the Chautauqua Conference will in no way jeopardize or weaken the non-recognition policy, and has reiterated the longstanding U.S. position on this issue. In addition, in a press conference in Washington DC on June 9, 1986, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Palmer stated that U.S. concerns about the situation in occupied Latvia would in fact be raised by the U.S. delegation during the debates.

PAGE TWO -ALA RESPONDS TO CONFERENCE IN LATVIA

In light of these assurances, the American Latvian Association believes that the Chauataqua Conference could provide a unique opportunity for the U.S. government, American citizens and the international press to publicly raise the issue of the illegal Soviet occupation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as the plight of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian people struggling to survive under brutal Soviet rule. While we do not endorse this conference, we will also not oppose it.

We do however wish to urge all members of the Chautauqua delegation and the press, to familiarize themselves with the history of the Latvian people and their nation, including their years of independence, the Soviet invasion of the country in 1940, and the illegal annexation to the USSR.

We wish to make it perfectly clear that Latvia today is an occupied nation under colonial rule from Moscow. The Latvian people never chose to be a part of the Soviet Union, and given the opportunity would enthusiastically choose to regain their independence and right to self-determination.

This desire for self-determination is especially critical today in light of systematic Soviet russification policies that are endangering the survival of the Latvian people, culture and language. The history of the independent Latvian nation has been erased from Soviet history books. Latvian prisoners of conscience, whose only crime is a love of their homeland and native culture, are languishing in Soviet prison camps.

The American Latvian Association is grateful to the United States government, other Western nations and all freedom loving people of the world who have expressed support to Latvian people in their aspiration for independence and self-determination. We hope and pray that the Chautauqua Conference will help further these aspirations."

The American Latvian Association is a non-profit organization that represents nearly 200 secular and religious Latvian American organizations throughout the United States. For additional information contact Ojars Kalnins, Public Relations Director, (301) 340-8174.

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August 16, 1986

The Hon. Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Matlock,

Someday between the 15th - 19th of Sept. 1986, you will be visiting my Fatherland Latvia, which has been occupied by the Soviet Union Red Army since 1940.

I am concerned that the Latvian people may misunderstand your participation at the Chautauqua Conference as an acceptance of Soviet occupation. This would take away their last hope of regaining freedom for the Baltic States. Please let the people in Latvia know that they haven't been forgotten. The United States of America does care, and will continue in it's efforts to regain freedom for Latvia.

My candleholder represents the feelings of the people of the Baltic States for the last 46 years.

I am afraid that the views expressed by the Latvian people at the conference may be colored by the fear of receiving a one-way ticket to Siberia.

Please do not allow yourself to be misled into thinking that the Baltic people are content with Soviet occupation.


May God Bless you and your great country.

Sincerely yours,

E. Spravniks

Mr. E. Spravniks,
203 Pellatt Ave.,
Weston, Ontario,
Canada M9N 2P5

Eduards Spravniks
Citizen of Canada



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1986


Dear Dick:

Herbert Marshall recently sent me the attached material which may be of interest to you and POL/INT.

The piece by Svetlana was written after her return to the U.S. Although it seems based mainly on gossip in Tbilisi, it may reflect attitudes among intellectuals in Georgia.

We are getting glowing reports on your stellar performance while Art is away. Congratulations, and warm regards to you and Carol.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Encls.

Mr. Richard E. Combs, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires ad Interim
American Embassy
Moscow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRREF06-114/5 #8490
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11



THE MAKING OF A MINISTER

BY

SVETLANA ALLILUEVA

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR FOI 11415 #8494

BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

In July 1985 the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Republic of Georgia has been unexpectedly appointed to be Foreign Minister of USSR - the most difficult job among all the other ministers. The retiring Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had become a familiar face in every capital of the world, he learned to speak English and stored in his memory names, facts and agreements as a computer would do. Now an obscure man from a small Caucasian Republic stepped into his shoes - an unknown person, not fluent even enough in Russian although he came from Soviet Georgia, never trained in foreign affairs and not acquainted with protocol and procedure and the world outside the USSR.

Just last year Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, the late General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. Immediately relatively younger Party members started their way up to positions of power. But it had always been admitted that to run industry one must have specialized knowledge, acquired in Polytechnics and Industrial Academies. A special institute for Foreign Relations in Moscow as well as the High School of Diplomacy have been training for several decades, diplomats to carry out Soviet foreign policies. It was not from the great number of specially educated, young diplomats that the new Minister had emerged.

The diplomatic service in USSR is a highly privileged field, as it used to be in Tzarist Russia. Ambassadors are usually recruited from Russians or Ukrainians, never Jews, Georgians or Armenians. Those Jewish young men who happened to be educated in special schools could not even work as minor

clerks in the Soviet embassies: they were not considered reliable enough. Yet those educated Jews and Armenians were busy at the Foreign Office in Moscow, providing their superiors with insights and research into diplomacy of other countries and supplying the Minister with data and materials. The Foreign Office in Moscow is in itself a school, a real "think-tank", which produces ideas and suggestions whenever the Government requires those and works fast and efficiently.

And suddenly the Minister for Foreign Affairs is Edward Shevardnadze, a Georgian with his poor, slow accented Russian, a graduate of an evening school for teachers in Kutaisi (a provincial center of Western Georgia) who never became a teacher after an unsuccessful attempt to enter a medical school chose an "easier way" in the Young Communist League, and after that in the Georgian KGB. Here he finally has found himself, soon had become the Chief.

In that post Shevardnadze has shown his strong hand, his quick mind and his merciless heart. He did not hesitate to send to jail numbers of people at times, when to arrest a person was not any more regarded to be a good and 'natural' thing: one had to prove carefully and convincingly that indeed such a step was necessary. The new Chief of the Georgian KGB was very convincing and worked with enthusiasm. After having put in jail some of his rivals, he had asserted himself enough in the eyes of Georgian Communist Party and its General Secretary Mzhavanadze to be able to start watching very carefully Mzhavanadze himself. And after a while the General Secretary was found guilty of tremendous corruption (as was also his wife). Edward Shevardnadze thus became himself the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia - a promotion that gained him respect but created certain fears of him. Such quick steps upward within the ranks of the Communist Party are unusual and bespeak of some special talent of the person who achieve it. Eventually

Shevardnadze threw out the former Central Committee of the Soviet Party of Georgia and surrounded himself with people of his own choice.

By the time my daughter Olga and I arrived to reside in Georgia (December 1984) Shevardnadze was already an established ruler of the Republic for nearly ten years. He lived in his dacha (country residence) near Tbilisi and when his chauffeur driven car drove in the middle of Central Avenue he was followed by a security car and all traffic had to be stopped to let him proceed. In Georgia he introduced a long ago forgotten practice of working during the weekend and while he was sitting in his office all through the Sundays (although he also had a family) everyone had to do the same.

The First Secretary of the Party in a Soviet Republic is virtually an absolute ruler - a fact well known generally; and we had experienced this in every personal way upon our arrival in Georgia. Every minute detail of our living in Tbilisi, my daughter's studies, our interests and even people with whom we were supposed to meet had been checked, sorted out and personally approved of by the chief himself. While talking about him, local people - better educated younger members of the Party Central Committee of Georgia, lowered their voices and looked around suspicious that someone might have overheard our conversation.

The artistic intelligentsia, young scientists and school teachers display little respect for the uneducated Communist Party Apparachik.

Shevardnadze took a strange dislike to the renowned dancer Vakhtang Chabukiani, the leader and educator of the whole Georgian Classic ballet in Tbilisi, a creator of modern dance, based on national material (like GORDA), based on exclusively Georgian national subjects, music and plastic characteristics. It is said he may have demanded something for the dying Georgian Opera House, we do not know. But he was suddenly dropped from his position and a Russian

Artistic Director arrived from Moscow. May be here is the answer? To please the Russians?...

Here is another case I learned of - a local sculptor made several years ago - on orders from the Party, designs which were approved of a most expressive and simple Victory Memorial in the large State Park in Tbilisi. Architecturally landscaped on the slope of the high hill, from where cascades of water were running down, symbolizing the Eternal River of Life. It had two figures in its composition: a Victory up on the hill, with a palm branch in her hand, a beautiful modern Georgian woman as a model for it - and down, at the very beginning, where a visitor to a park observes the lovely cascade running towards him, there was a young boy, naked, cheerful and holding a vine in his hand. Vine is a symbol of Georgia, of its eternity, of its spirit. And ONLY in the middle of the cascade, on a platform there was a simple black granite stone with eternal light. Understandable, laconic, impressive. People started coming here and bringing flowers to the slab and to the eternal light.

Then suddenly Shevardnadze said it was, "no good". And the whole, already existing ensemble had to be redone. The sculptor almost had a stroke. He refused to remake anything. It had already been accepted by officials and by the public.

Yet he was forced to remake it. Instead of the black slab, they put a most naturalistic figure of a dying soldier, half-covered with a banner. Banners and more banners in the background, more RED color in RED granite were added. The place has become outrageously overdone even frightening. Shevardnadze had won! An artist cannot win. He had to obey although he believed that all was done well in its simplicity. Maybe someone came from Moscow and "did not like it"? I was a witness to these two events. There had been many more.

Another example, a leading movie director (documentalist), we saw him and his wife an actress of long standing, both are respected people, who travel abroad to Europe and US. He had just returned from his usual trip to France and Italy where he was shooting a co-production film (A Victor Hugo Story). He said he had been searched in the airport, as was another member of his group, their pockets turned inside out etc. This had never happened before. He said, "that is Edward Shevardnadze working now!" The man has weak heart and was shocked by such a treatment. But he had absolutely no illusions about Edward Shevardnadze - he is regarded as a 'policeman' in the Party.

Further Shevardnadze managed to offend national feelings of his compatriots by unduly over-celebrating the infamous Georgievsky Treaty of 1785, whereby Georgia had become a part of the Russian Empire, lost its political independence, its ruling dynasty and turned into a mere province of Russia. (George XIII of Georgia renounced his crown in favor of the Tsar of Russia and in 1801 Georgia became a Russian province).

It was long ago an established historical fact that Petersburg displayed treachery having trapped the Georgian ruling Monarch by promises which had never been fulfilled. To celebrate such a treaty in the time of 'internationalism and democracy and brotherhood of peoples within ISSR' was a poor idea yet Shevardnadze hoped that it would be liked in Moscow and he proved to be right. Orders and decorations to him followed and he had found a mighty patron in the person of the former Prime Minister Tikhonov, an aged man, not well versed in history.

The second offense to the pride of Georgians was even more cruel.

We witnessed during our stay in Georgia that the young people were extremely interested in the outside world. They learned foreign languages and were openly desirous to leave for abroad - by all possible and impossible

means. Two years ago a tragic incident had occurred when a group of young Georgian hijackers managed to shoot one of the crew in a passenger plane and tried to turn it to cross the border to Turkey. They have however been caught, tried and sentenced. Several of them to capital punishment. What had happened afterwards to the young hijackers no one knows, even their parents were not allowed to communicate with them anymore. This produced a wave of disgust and hatred in a small Republic where every young man is treasured. Hundreds of young Georgians have been sent to Afghanistan only to die there or to return crippled.

Such was the picture which we have found in Georgia and just about within several months, an unbelievable rumor was heard: Shevardnadze was going to Moscow to be a full member of the Politburo! He was going to be a Foreign Minister of USSR. No one believed the rumors until we saw on television the President of USSR and then the Premier Tikhonov suggest Shevardnadze - whom he described as an 'experienced politician and an erudite' - to be appointed instead of Gromyko.

For several days - even weeks - the whole of Georgia was in a state of shock. People laughed openly at the 'erudite' thing, everybody repeated those celebrated stories about extolling of Georgievsky with Russia and people were incredulous. All tried to evaluate potential danger of high promotion of a man with such qualities. Somebody joked, "Thank God he has not become a new KGB Chief in Moscow!" and the laughter stopped.

New arrests in Georgia followed soon - now those very close favorites of Shevardnadze whom he had in his time appointed as a Minister of Culture, as a Secretary of the Central Committee in Tbilisi - now one could not understand why it was so? Only to realize later that this was a well-known trick from the past strategy of annihilating those who knew him too well. A former

Minister and a former Secretary were imprisoned. Their f
to their former Chief now in Moscow - but he did not receive u.

He embarked on his first international appointments. We were a
glued to our TV sets, watching him read awkwardly, stuttering, his first
speech at the United Nations in September 1985. He struggled with the Russian
text and visibly perspired. But the speech was correct - written by those
well trained specialists from the Foreign Office.

Then we watched him during Gorbachev's visit to France, where Gor-
bachev did all the talking himself and his Foreign Minister only once or twice
nodded with a ready smile when asked for his opinion. Then we understood
the 'erudite' was needed by Gorbachev, who decided to make foreign policy
himself without the old wolf Gromyko, too knowledgeable, too experienced a
man, too well known, too well respected (though not loved) by everyone....
The provincial Party-man was just right to the yes-ing and nodding and reading
the necessary speeches: but nothing else.

Several months followed and we continuously watched on TV Shevardnadze's
appearances with written speeches to be read, his handshakes with the high
guests in Sheremetyevo Airport, his waving hand during their departures. His
visits to Cuba, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia etc. And we all understood why
he was needed, a silent ignorant man who let Gorbachev do all the talking him-
self. That was the point.

In official party circles in Georgia it had been suggested that an
appointment of a Georgian to such a high post means respect to our nation and
therefore everyone ought to rejoice. * But Georgian intellectuals were of a
different opinion.

Gorbachev's pleasant smiles to his Minister in public were no doubt
encouragements for him. Soon the mouth-to-mouth news (the only news media in

USSR) brought from Moscow reports that a full-day work on Sundays had been introduced in the Foreign Office - something totally forgotten during the last thirty years! Then silently the new Minister started purging 'corruption', 'nepotism' - all those vices which in USSR are published only in some cases, whenever preferred. In other cases when not preferred, corruption remains unnoticed. The enforcement of the Law in USSR is in the hands of the one who wants or does not want to enforce it.

The Foreign Office got worried. People of middle aged and elderly, old graduates of various diplomatic and foreign relations schools as well as of Moscow University felt that their time was running out. New types have been 'drastically promoted' by the Minister, one such rumor dealing with our 'case' all the time we were in USSR has become the closet favorite of the Minister. These were the last news I had about the 'erudite'. Soon the above mentioned blockhead told me with a frozen voice on the telephone that 'a decision was made' to the effect that I 'could leave USSR with my American passport'. Who has made such a decision remains a state secret but I am sure it was not the new Gromyko.

Making a Minister in USSR today remains the same game it used to be thirty and forty and fifty years ago. Earlier than that there used to be no fear of intellectuals and refined 'Bolsheviks' like Krassin, Uritzky or Litvin. They carried out Soviet foreign policies. Then began the era of mistrust towards the educated ones, Litvinov and the likes had been dropped to appease Hitler^{because they were Jewish} and Molotov arrived at the time when Nazi Germany has become a real danger. Is Gorbachev repeating the game? Why not, why present him as

*

The same opinion has been voiced by the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (although on earlier occasion the head of the church expressed concern regarding miserable position of existing churches, all seminaries closed but one, too many Russian priests sent from Moscow, although people definitely prefer services in their mother tongue. Shevardnadze was known as being antagonistic towards religion in general.

something 'totally new' to the Party which has established its own principles and rules on which it brought up its own 'younger generation'? Gorbachev might be 'young' as compared with seventy year old Tikhonov (the one who introduced Shevardnadze - the 'erudite'); but the ruling Party is as old as a dinosaur and the games of one-party-regime is being played the same old way. Nothing has changed.

In our brief stay in the USSR, after not being there for about eighteen years, I have noticed how strong the ruling party bureaucracy is, how still much needed are people experienced in KGB principles more than in diplomacy. We could also witness how much the ordinary people, intellectuals and even educated professionals like those for the Foreign Office are still more alienated from the regime.

Svetlana Allilueva.

For Professor Herbert Marshall, Center for Soviet Studies, Southern Illinois U. Carbondale, Illinois 62901. Tel 618.453.5174 or 618.549.4569.

BULLETIN
of the
CENTER FOR SOVIET & EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES



809 South Forest Street
Carbondale, Illinois 62901, U.S.A.

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Tel.: 453-5174, Area Code 618

Spring-Summer 1986

No. 33

**THE LATEST GOOD NEWS
ABOUT SERGEI PARADJANOV**

In our Bulletin No. 30, we narrated THE HAPPY ENDING OF THE PARADJANOV SAGA, that he had been released from Gulag and delegated, under the auspices of the Georgian Filmmakers Association, to make a film in Georgia. That was in 1984, and since then we had heard nothing. Only now (June 1986) were we able to obtain a report of an eyewitness who saw the film at a private showing in the Filmmakers Club, DOM KINO, in Tbilisi, the capital city of Georgia. This report was specially written for our Bulletin by Ms. Svetlana Allilueva, who is of course of Georgian extraction and only recently returned from Soviet Georgia to the USA, and was our guest at Carbondale.

Here is her account of what is clearly yet another extraordinary film by that genius Sergo Paradjanov. The USSR and the world are enriched by his new contribution.

As I go to press, Alan Stanbrook, the film critic of THE ECONOMIST telephoned from London to inform me that Paradjanov's film *The Legend of Surami Fortress*, was publicly shown with great success at the Pesaro Film Festival, Italy on June 20th.

It was submitted officially by the Soviet Union as part of a festival of National films, which included entries from most of the Soviet National Republics. The film was also shown on the fringe of the Cannes Film Festival and has been acquired for commercial distribution in Great Britain by the ARTIFICIAL EYE Co. and will open in September at the Camden Town Art Cinema, London.

This indeed is good news.

**NEW FILMS BY SERGO PARADJANOV
IN TBILISI**

by Ms. Svetlana Allilueva
(Eyewitness Account)

In early winter of 1986 two new works of the world-renowned Georgian filmmaker Sergei Paradjanov were shown in Dom Kino (Cinema House) in Tbilisi, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Georgia. One was a short film about the paintings of Niko Pirosmanishvili and a full length feature film called "The Legend of Surami Fortress," based on the novel by the Georgian writer Daniel Chonkadze.

Before these two, the latest work of this brilliant artist was "The Color of the Pomegranates," eventually banned in USSR, but appraised all over the world as a great masterpiece. This was in the 70s, after which Paradjanov had been twice arrested and exiled in Gulag. His two new films appeared after a considerable lapse of time, but as ever they continued his own characteristic style, his symbolism, his baroque richness of form and imagination.

However, "Pirosmani" was a short film, simply presenting, with many close-ups, the Georgian primitivist, whose naive art is so appealing to the Georgian heart. Although his not-too-numerous pictures are well known, a new impression has been created here by fixing attention to details, by introducing

music, by flashes of lightning, rendering the same images suddenly brighter and bigger.

The new work "The Legend of Surami Fortress" is based on an ancient Georgian legend about unrequited love and the cruel vengeance of a woman, who had become a soothsayer and gave unbelievable advice to the Prince who abandoned her years ago. This was to immure his young son, born by her rival woman, in the wall of Surami Fortress, to make the fortress stand against the enemy. Its walls could not withstand a siege and would crumble at an onslaught.

One must know the history of Georgia, with its frequent wars, their deep national pride and courage when the fate of their land is at stake, their capacity for sacrifice. One must also know the great upsurge of national feeling in today's Georgia, where everyone stands firm against everything Russian (and therefore—against all official demands and pressures coming from alien Moscow). Therefore, the symbolism of the film could be translated into great national pride, strength and sacrifice—but not for the 'new' ideals, but for the old values of Georgia. A very ancient and deeply Christian country.

A beautiful song, something like a lullaby, sung by a woman—the Mother—permeates the whole film, a haunting melody, which begins and ends the film. Immortal landscapes of Georgia—which look today the same as they did ten centuries ago, sunlit and breezy; the exquisite costumes, bright, festive dancing, all in motion in the open air; faces of women and men of classic, immortal beauty—all sing of life, contrary to the cruelty of revenge, contrary to the gloomy plot of the film.

Levan Uchaneishvili, a 28-year old new star of Georgian cinema, playing the hero Zorab, has that pure, "naive" handsomeness, so befitting to saints and martyrs of all times. It is a radiant face, and the thought that it is he who is to be immured alive in the wall to render the fortress impregnable, is unbearable; and because the plot is well known, one is waiting for the end of the film shuddering with anticipation.

The film opens with a view of a squeaking village cart, pulled by bullocks, filled with bright-yellow straw and . . . hundreds of eggs! (In those times eggs were used as the strongest cement for binding together the stones of castles, fortresses, walls. So—this is for the construction of the fortress that the cart is being pulled slowly). Sunshine, ancient mountains, blue sky over all.

The very same cart, loaded with straw and eggs, appears five minutes before the finale—and by then we already know what this is all for . . . But in between the long, slow story, develops the young love of a Prince for a dark beauty and the sudden end of it. Then another woman comes into his life and becomes his wife and the mother of his children.

The grieving dark beauty travels far away, until she meets an old witch on her death-bed. She learns from her the craft of soothsaying and soon becomes famous. People come to consult her, in her remote place in the mountains, by horse, by camel, on foot. She is now older, but still beautiful and even more evil is her beauty.

Meanwhile the young prince grows up, plays, learns to ride

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a horse. He is the heir to the one she loved long ago. All is well in that family, colors are bright but the fortress they are trying to build keeps falling apart. After many years of bad luck, people from the prince's realm come to the soothsayer, to ask her advice. She looks into a bowl of clear water and sees in it her old love, who encounters misfortune with his fortress.

While she looks, her face changes. A dark thought of revenge is reflected on her face and we know the film is moving towards its tragedy. She tells the messengers that unless the prince would immure into the wall his own young son, the fortress will never stand, and the enemy will never be conquered. They depart, shocked. They bring the news to the prince (without knowing the Georgian language, it is impossible to know what is the text: you have to guess. But, the visual images are so vivid and eloquent, that words are not really needed).

After a number of ramifications, the young prince appears, aware of his fate, but still radiant and not at all gloomy. Then we see again that cart piled with straw and eggs, coming nearer and nearer. Now the young man steps gingerly into an opening in the wall, made of large white stones, and looks around, up and down with his bright grey eyes, like a bright child. Then stonemasons come and pack more straw around him. He looks around and up—not a trace of fear, but some kind of eagerness, of anticipation in his looks. Is he going to be a hero? Is that the ultimate sacrifice? Yet he does not show a bit of suffering or fear. Then more straw is being thrown on his head—the way of construction those days—and for the final mix come dozens of eggs, broken, running, and finally they are covering it all over with some kind of lime or sand . . . Soon we do not see the radiant face anymore. The rows of stones grow and grow, higher and higher . . . We can NEVER forget the luminous looks of that young radiant face. . .

The night descends. The lullaby is heard again, sung either by his mother or possibly by the woman who condemned him to such a vengeful death.

Again the lullaby is heard—"My son, my son"—then his mother approaches the high wall, which now stands firm. She holds a warm blanket in her hands; it is chilly at night in the mountains. Stars glitter in the dark sky. She places the blanket against the wall, stretches and covers it—to keep her child warm in his stone grave. The lullaby goes on.

The storm subsides—no lightning flashes—all is quiet.

On leaving the theater, one begins to think: What was it? What was it that we have just witnessed? This writer could not understand it for quite some time. But slowly came understanding of what Georgia is today: standing firm, ancient as she was, Christian as she was, independent in her values and qualities—as she always was. Was then the film about the young heroes of that land, perhaps the future ones . . . ? Many young heroes of independent Georgia are in jail and exile at present in the places where Sergei Paradjanov himself had just been. The 'crime' of some is because of their heritage, a deep love for their country, their culture, their tongue, their art, their church. Others, who tried to escape by hijacking, or by some other means, are just as young and radiant and innocent as the immured prince, like the actor Levan Uchaneishvili himself. It seems that by making this sacrifice look so simple and NOT morbid, the film director implies admiration for the young man, who met his fate with such bright eyes. And the lullaby of his mother sounds over his cold tomb where she tried to warm him with a blanket. No fanfares, no thunderstorms, no screams or tears, because this is how it SHOULD be—only the lullaby of his mother is heard.

All the visual beauty and color of the film, all its movement and dance, all the wild horses racing on the old roads, and the fights with the enemies by sword and shield; and the glittering jewelry of the regal attire, all the golden embroidery of crimson and purple dresses; all the young beauty of women and children, only complement the radiant face of the sacrificial lamb, buried alive in the stone wall.

One walks out of the theater filled with that beauty, forgetting the woman who plotted her revenge, still hearing the lullaby and its haunting tune.

On the streets of Tbilisi young men, like the prince, like Levan Uchaneishvili, were crowded near the entrance, unable to get tickets. Inside people were standing in the aisles, along the walls, sitting on another's knees. It was a celebration. An old *dudukist* played his *dudek* (kind of flute) especially for Paradjanov, because he is known to like that. People were making speeches about him with deep feelings: it was a great festival of art, it was a celebration of an artist, and it was a grand tribute to the spirit of Georgia.

Svetlana Allilueva
June 1, 1986
Carbondale, Illinois

THE CENTENARY OF VELIMIR KHLEBNIKOV

Following a Soviet friend's inquiry about celebrating the Centenary of Velimir Khlebnikov, I decided it would be most appropriate to cover it as I have written a special essay analysing two of his poems, which is here published for the first time. However, I discovered that his 100th birthday was actually in 1985, nevertheless we will celebrate this extraordinary poet all the same. My other translations of Khlebnikov will appear in our next Bulletin No. 34.



The Futurist poet, V. Khlebnikov.
Drawing by Mayakovsky, 1913.

Indeed as early as 1922, Mayakovsky wrote the following prophetic words at the end of an article on the death of V. Khlebnikov from starvation and lack of medicines:*

In the name of preserving a truthful literary perspective, I consider it my duty to print, in black and white, in my own name and, undoubtedly, in the names of my friends, the poets Aseyev, Burlyuk, Kruchonykh, Kamensky and Pasternak, that we considered him and still consider him one of our poetic teachers and a most magnificent and honest knight in our poetical struggles.

After the death of Khlebnikov, various newspapers and journals printed articles about him, filled with sympathy. I read them with revulsion. When, finally, will these comedies of posthumous cures end?! Where were these writers, when the living Khlebnikov, spat upon by critics, passed through Russia alive? I know others still living, maybe not the equals of Khlebnikov, but who await the same end.

Stop, once and for all, these reverential centenary jubilees, the worship by posthumous publication! Let's have articles on the living! Bread for the living! Paper for the living! **

*Collected Works, Mayakovsky. Vol. XII, p. 28.

**See Yevtushenko's poem, p. 439, *Mayakovsky*, transl. by Herbert Marshall. Pub. Dobson, UK 1965.

POETIC TRANSLATION: AN ANALYSIS IN DEPTH

by Herbert Marshall

Dedicated to Velimir Khlebnikov (1885-1921)

There is one aspect of the art of translation which I consider fundamental and yet which seems to me to be more neglected by the current followers of translation fashion than ever before—I mean a serious study of the original text. Clearly where the translator, or rather adapter, does not know the original, the depth of any study is severely limited. Yet, even those who *do* know the original do not study it sufficiently in depth. I don't mean merely a lack of depth in studying the meaning, the semantic aspect, the translation of the meaning of the words used—though this at times is not only slovenly and lazy but criminal. Sometimes it can be simply an error, a misreading of a word or a phrase or failure to elucidate poetic obscurity—that can be forgiven. But often it is a lack of knowledge of the background of the poet, his milieu, his social and national environment, his political and religious beliefs, all of which help to determine his choice of words, their meaning, and, above all—for poetry—their associations. However, this is not all—translation must be not merely translation of meaning, but translation of poetry, of poetic form, poetic means, poetic tradition, poetic license, poetic association. And the Nabokov school, which denies that such is possible, is automatically denying the right of poetry to be translated as *a work of art*, but only a work of semantic paraphrasing, a prosaic crib or gloss. Nabokov says: "The only object and justification of translation is the conveying of the most exact information possible and this can only be achieved by a literal translation, with notes."¹ Clearly poetry means the *artistic* use of words, in certain artistic forms, which poetry in the given culture has evolved. Not the prosaic use, not just the semantic use, for poetry is poetry above all because it is art, because it is artificial, a more stylised form than prose.

The material of a painting is paint on a surface, its dimensions two, its perception—visual; the material of sculpture is clay or bronze or marble, its dimensions three, its perception—visual-tactual; the material of music is sound, its dimension one, its perception—aural; the material of poetry is words,² poetry is verbal *art*, its dimension one, its perception—visual-aural.

Painting and sculpture are at once apprehensible as they are, without any translation as such, they can be reproduced visually; music is at once apprehensible without any translation as such, it too, can be reproduced aurally; but poetry is not at once apprehensible unless the perceiver knows the language, it has to be translated. And now we come to the fundamental point: *what is translation?*

Here are some definitions:

Dr. Johnson: "to change into another language, retaining the sense."

A. H. Smith: "to translate into another language, retaining as much of the sense as we can: the least will be lost in the translation of language which represents more or less objective (or 'scientific') experience, the most in translating language which represents experience of a more subjective (or 'artistic') kind."³

The principle of equivalent effect: "that translation is best which comes nearest to creating in its audience the same impression as was made by the original on its contemporaries."⁴

Linguistic Definition: "The replacement of textual material in one language (the source language) by equivalent textual material in another language (the target language)."⁵

Now where we are dealing with prose that is not *belle-lettres*—not artistic literature, just scientific or informational material, then Dr. Johnson's definition is adequate: "To

change into another language, retaining the sense." Yet according to Nabokov this applies to all translation. But the textual material we are trying to find the equivalent for, consists not just of sense, not just of semantic meaning, but of artistic sound, of artistic sense, aesthetic meaning.

To the mass of the peoples of the world, poetry at once is differentiated from prose by being rhythmic, repetitive, musical, a dance of words, imagistic, filled with metaphors, similes, alliteration and rhymes, a form that can be more easily remembered because of these things. Most definitions the mass of people won't know, just as Moliere's Msr. Jourdan didn't know he had been speaking prose all of his life.

So we have to define what is the "textual material."

It is, as we said, basically *words*: but the choice of any particular word, which quite often has many synonyms, is mainly determined by an artistic aim—a poetic one, that is, to fit into an artistic framework, as well as a semantic one. Just as music has certain styles, forms, traditional patterns, which a composer uses and chooses, so does the poet. The composer may want to compose a sonata, as a poet a sonnet; a symphony as an epic; a song as a lyric. The creator decides his framework; as the painter chooses his canvas shape; the filmmaker his camera frame and lens; if it is a sonnet, then the framework is laid down as of old: with its special number of lines, its rhyming pattern, its feet, its conclusion etc.

A *Haiku* lays down 17 syllable-characters in three lines of 5, 7, and 5 syllable-characters respectively.

Whitman lays down free verse.

A Persian or Arabic *gazal* lays down *Khasidah*, rhymed couplets.

A French classic poet lays down his Alexandrine lines and so on.

Now if such a special selective choice and care is made by the poet in the original, with such painstaking creative work involved, work in fact which far surpasses the work he does on the semantic content, should not his translator take at least equal care? Even on a work of artistic prose a writer will labor as much; Leo Tolstoy re-wrote *War and Peace* eight times; Oscar Wilde said that he spent a day putting a comma in, and a day taking it out; how much more so a poet on a poem?

Pasternak writes: "And then there is another, quite baffling thing: after the prose, which has been well translated, they reproduce the verse at the end, against all the rules, in a formless, non-poetic rendering, which in fact is simply bad prose. I fail to see the point of tacking this on at the end. Yet at the same time there are excellent, rhymed translations of the verse to hand, but of these nobody knows . . ."⁶

Why then, if we consider translating a poem into another language, do we care to throw overboard all the fantastic work that has gone into the *artistic* fashioning of a poem? That indeed makes it a poem, and not just a collection of words, with a sort of sense or meaning. And in order to give it its textual equivalent, we have to know what was the textual original in all its aspects: rhythm, meter, rhyme, style, metaphor, simile, synecdoche, inversions, alliteration, neologisms, and all the varying artistic forms and frameworks which an artist uses in choosing, placing and combining his words into a poem. However profound the subject or theme, these artistic aspects will far outweigh just the semantic aspect.

Yet these are the very aspects which the Nabokov school ignores deliberately and the "non-school" translators ignore out of laziness or ignorance. Because, let's face it, to try to translate the artistic form of a work of art, a poem, into a parallel artistic form, is probably one of the most difficult tasks any creative person can essay. I have spent months sometimes on just two lines of Mayakovsky or Pasternak, whereas others translate them in a few days. Brusov said "to transfer the creation of a poet from one language to another is impossible; but it is impossible also to reject this dream."⁷

I know that Pasternak or Marshak, who were master translators from English into Russian, took arduous pains and care and research on their translations as poetry.

A study of the great translators of the ages and theoreticians, by and large, confirms that "prose should be translated into prose, and verse, if possible, into verse."⁸ Horace said—remove the form of verse and you strip off the only thing that distinguishes it from prose. This great classic commentator went on: "If now verse is the appropriate form to render verse, why is prose ever used instead? . . . For more than one reason. Verse to be acceptable even to its composer calls for more skill than prose. Again, as a rule, it takes more time to produce." Paul Verlaine has the definitive word on this point:

How many poetic works reduced to prose, that is to their simple meaning, become literally nonexistent! They are anatomical specimens, dead birds! Sometimes, indeed, untrammelled absurdity swarms over these deplorable corpses, their number multiplied by the teaching profession which claims them as food for what is known as the "Curriculum." Verse is put into prose as though into its coffin. This is because the finest verses in the world are trivial or senseless once their harmonic flow has been broken and their sonorous substance altered . . . and once they have been replaced by an expression of no intrinsic musical necessity and no resonance. I would even go so far as to say that the more an apparently poetic work survives being put into prose and retains a certain value after this assault, the less is it the work of a poet.

So much for the protagonists of the free-verse translations of strictly formal originals.

The Romans distinguished verse and prose as metrically bound (*uinctus*) and free (*so-lutas*). But the strange thing is, the contention that to translate into prose gives greater freedom to parallel the original and keep closer to it, is true only in its opposite. Firstly, "in vocabulary verse is freer and fuller than prose; and poetic liberty, or to use the time-honored name "poetic license," is not confined to words but extends to order and constructions. This is especially important in English where an inflexible syntax and stereotyped order are serious impediments to the facile writing of prose."

William Archer, a translator of Ibsen into verse, said, "We have found by experiment that the fact of writing in measure has frequently enabled us to keep closer to the original than would have been possible in prose,"⁹ and a translator of Lucretius said "for accuracy of meaning verse was preferable to prose."¹⁰

And Paul Verlaine stated quite blankly: "De la musique avant toute chose." ("Music above everything else.")

A. Piemen underscored these words with his own: "The basis of a poem is music and the power of emotion."¹¹ Blok wrote: "Formless content, by itself, does not exist, it has no weight."¹²

Brusov explains: "The external [aspect] of a lyric[al] poem, its form, is formed from a whole series of elements, the combination of which incarnates, more or less completely, the emotions and poetic idea of the artist—such are: the style of the language, images, metre, rhythm, the movement of the poem, the play of syllables, and sounds."

And further: "In particular we consider, that a poetic translation must not only convey the content of the original, but also recreate all the characteristic variations of its form. The first task in relation to form is the choice of verse, corresponding to the metre and rhythm of the original, in so far that is realizable in view of the difference [in the given case (HM)] between . . . Russian (Tonic) and Armenian (Syllabic). However we do not carry our demands in pedanticism and do not insist on preserving those peculiarities which depend on the nature of the language itself."¹³

Brusov also stated that translators should strive to observe the "technique of the original in the structure of the verse: i.e. the forms of the strophes, the alternation of rhymes, etc." and also "The sound aspect of the poem, e.g. assonances, alliterations, onomatopoeia, in particular its 'sound track' or 'verbal instrumentation.'"¹⁴

Boris Pasternak said "The musicality of a word consists—not in its sound but in the interrelationship between its sound and its meaning."¹⁵

Summing up: for all reasons *poetry should be translated into poetry.*

But as our classic says only "if possible." It may be that the forms and traditions of the original language have parallels in English, then the paralleling is straightforward, it's a matter of hard work and inspiration!

For example we English have been writing poetry in quatrains for centuries, with the rhyming pattern of a/b/a/b. Therefore if Yevtushenko does this in Russian (as he quite often does) clearly it should be attempted in English. In fact Yevtushenko is far nearer to Nekrassov than Ginsburg! But if classic French uses the Alexandrine, which is not paralleled in English, one must find another solution other than trying to force English into what is, for its nature, an ungainly metre. Finding the equivalent or parallel does not mean a mirror-equivalent, but an *artistic* equivalent. In other words, what the original poet may have used if he had been writing the same poem in English.

But in order to find an artistic parallel, one must find out what is the artistic original! If one merely translates the semantic meaning into prose, then one only skims the surface of the artistic form of the original. And, indeed, even those who purport to translate into poetry of equivalent artistic form, do not always dig deeply into the artistic *framework of the original.*

II

Here is an example of what I mean by digging deeply into the original. And may I say that when I started I had no idea of the depths I would have to dig to; nor of the surprises that awaited! For the poem in question at first seemed so utterly simple, in fact almost English in its terseness, concentration, simplicity, with the use of short words in a language that is so multi-syllabic, with prefixes and suffixes abounding. I mean the Russian language. And the poem is by that genius Velimir Khlebnikov, hardly known even to his Russian people, but highly prized by Mayakovsky and leading Russian poets. Yet he died of starvation.¹⁶

I also chose the poem as an example, for by a miracle, we have an earlier form of the same poem with which to compare what the poet has done in chamfering it, deepening it, simplifying it and thereby multiplying its artistic qualities until it becomes a new whole of utter simplicity and superb poetry.

Here are the two originals:

First form:
Phonetic transcription of original with literal translation underneath

	<i>Nam</i>	<i>mnogo l'</i>	<i>nada?</i>
	Us	much	need?
	<i>Niet:</i>	<i>lomot</i>	<i>khleba</i>
	No	(a) chunk	(of) bread
Нам много ль надо?	<i>s</i>	<i>nim</i>	<i>kap'lu</i>
Нет: ломоть хлеба,	with	him (it)	(a) drop
С ним каплю молока,			<i>moloka.</i>
А солью будет небо			(of) milk
И эти облака.	<i>A</i>	<i>sol'u'</i>	<i>budet</i>
	And	salt	will be
			<i>niebo,</i>
			(the) sky.
			<i>oblaka.</i>
	<i>i</i>	<i>eti</i>	clouds.
	and	these	

Second and final form:

MNE MALO NADO-	Mnye malo	nado
КРАЮШКУ ХЛЕБА,	Me little	need
КАПЛЮ МОЛОКА.	Krayushku	khleba
	(a) crust	of-bread
	Kaplyu	moloka
	(a) drop	of-milk
ДА, ЭТО НЕБО.	Da, eto	nyebo
	Yes, this	sky
ДА, ЭТИ ОБЛАКА.	Da, eti	oblaka.
	And these	clouds.

Notice what has happened: a chipping away of superfluities, a condensation, a simplification, a concentration, leaving more to "me." From a smaller to a larger concept: the sky and those clouds would add savor to even the simplest, sparsest food which turns into an even smaller amount of food, the minimum, not a hunk of bread, but a crust (actually a "crustlet") and a drop of milk, but these would suffice only under this sky and these clouds, i.e. in one's homeland.

The contrasts are heightened by making the need smaller, not just for "us" now, but just for "me," even without salt, a crust under this sky, a drop under these clouds. From a question to a positive statement: not "would be" but "is."

Note also there is more alliteration, more inner rhyme, in the second version and a more composed framework. Not "Do we need much?" but "My need is small."

There are fewer words, 13 instead of 18 in the whole poem, and with less syllables, making it surprisingly nearer to English than is the usual Russian poly-syllabic verse.

Note the increase of poetic power through changing the more stumbling line: "Nam mnogo l' nada?" where the two m's hit each other and instead merge to "Mne malo nada" where the alliteration is felt euphonically.

Then the broken line: "Niet: lomot' khleba" which is in two parts, followed by another broken line: "s nim kaplyu moloka" where the hiatus has no value in the whole composition; whereas in the later version he makes two hiatuses follow one another with a deliberate repetitive rhythmic and semantic effect: "Da eto niebo, Da, eti oblaka." For not only does it give emphasis rhythmically, but also semantically; furthermore there is a kind of punning effect, for the word "Da" is of course "Yes," a word that also is used as an affirmative at the beginning of a slogan like "Da zdravstvuyet," "Long live . . ." but here it means, "but only," i.e. "but only under this sky, but only under these clouds."

Now let us look at the verse from the point of view of metre, of stresses. It is syllabic-accental verse¹⁷ and the first version scans like this:

Nám mnógô l' nádô?	Do we need much?
Níet: lómôt khlebâ	No: a chunk of bread.
S ním káplyû mólôka	with it, a drop of milk
Â sól'û búdet niebô	And the sky will be salt.
î éú oblâka	and these clouds.

If considered from the point of view of classic metre, this is made up of trochaic metre, triple trochaic in fact, for after the first beat there is clearly a pause, equivalent to the off-beat of the unaccentuated part of the trochaic metre. The endings are female, female, masculine, female, masculine.

Total number of words: 18: 4, 3, 4, 4, 3.

Total number of syllables: 29 (not counting the pauses): 5, 5, 6, 7, 6.

Now let us compare this with the final version and see what has happened, how the master craftsman cuts a first-fashioned diamond into a flawless jewel.

Mnye malô nado	My need is small
Krayûshku khlebâ	a crust of bread
kaplyû molôka	a drop of milk
Da, etô nyebô	and, this sky still
Da, eti oblâka.	and, these clouds overhead.

The basic metre is still trochaic, but less regular: there could be a slight pause after the first syllable, but it could be read as unaccentuated; then the next two lines flow without

pauses, but the final two lines do have pauses with clearly pointed commas. The endings are the same as with the first version.

Total number of words now: 13: 3, 2, 2, 3, 3.

Total number of syllables now: 26 (not counting pauses): 5, 5, 5, 6.

But the accents are now in a steep deliberative crescendo: the accents in the first version are 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, in the second 2, 3, 3, 4.

There are, firstly two lines with two accents each, next, two lines with three accents, and finally four accents, if classified according to "classic metric form."

But if the basic beat of accentual speech is taken we get:

^/^/^,
 ^/^/^,
 /^^^/
 /-/^/^,
 /-/^/^/

Or 2, 2, 2, 3, 3.

RHYMES: RUSSIAN ORIGINAL

The first two lines do not end in rhymes; the end words alliterate. The rest of the four lines rhyme ABAB, feminine and masculine rhymes. But there is in-built alliteration; which this chart will show:

ALLITERATION: CHART

1st line:	Consonants:	M	N	M	N
	Vowels:	A	O	A	O
2nd line:	Consonants:	K	K	KH	
	Vowels:	A	YU	YU	A
3rd line:	Consonants:	K	L	L	K
	Vowels:	A	O	O	A
4th line:	Consonants:	D	T	B	
	Vowels:	A	E	O	E
5th line:	Consonants:	D	T	B	
	Vowels:	A	E	O	A

He uses exactly 25 consonants and 26 vowels. Note that the end of the first line is DA, and the start of the fourth and fifth lines are DA. He uses 16 letters of the Russian alphabet, which has 33 letters. It is interesting to note that the vowel A is used 10 times, out of 54 letters, the vowel O is used 7 times, the consonants K and KH are used 6 times, and the consonant L is used 5 times; the rest 3, 2, and 1 times. There are five lines, having 3, 2, 2, 3, 3 words each line, total words 13.

It may not be noticed but these figures 2, 3, 5, 13 are part of the Fibonacci progression or Golden Section! Whether Khlebnikov ever had this in mind consciously—who knows? But it is interesting to note that he was a student of science and also a linguistic experimenter. However, I just suggest this line of analysis as perhaps something worthy of being pursued.¹⁸

My translation tries to incorporate some of the effects of the original.

Words		Accents	Rhyme	Syllables
4	My need is small—	2	+	4
4	A drop of milk	2	A	4
4	A crust of bread	2	B	4
4	And, this sky still	3	A	4
4	And, these clouds overhead	3	B	5

Here the endings, and consequently the rhymes, are all masculine, but in the Russian there are 3 feminine and 2 masculine, for in Russian, word endings are 41% masculine and 39% feminine, almost equal, because Russian words are mainly polysyllabic. In English 80% or more are masculine, because so many words are monosyllabic.

Similarly the total number of words are 13 in the Russian original to 19 in the English translation, yet the total number of syllables are 24 in Russian and 21 in English. There is less counterpoint in English—between words, syllables and between single syllable and multisyllable rhymes, only one word out of 19 having two syllables. Yet in Russian there are 3 technically one-syllable words, 7 two-syllable words and 3 three-syllable words.

I venture to think that the translation is not only faithful to the meaning and intention of the original, but that it does attempt to express the meaning poetically in a form that, in our English style, is an equivalent to the original, albeit, Russian style.

It does invert one line for the sake of getting the rhyme in the right place, but fundamentally it doesn't matter whether bread or milk comes first! The "And" repeats just the original "Da" and gives the effect of special repetitive emphasis. The four alliterative "k"s in the Russian lines 2 and 3, are matched by three "r"s in the English. In other words there is here not a mirror but an equivalent effect. Nevertheless there are four "k"s scattered through the poem! However, I leave it to others to analyse my translation further if it is considered worthy of it.

I only wanted to show how even an apparently simple short poem of five lines has greater depth and overtones than is first apparent, and how much musicality has been woven by the poet into his warp and woof—and how much more so must we strive to parallel it in English.

To translate therefore just the semantic aspect, just the bare meaning, and not the poetry, is not merely to abdicate as a translator, it is to distort the original beyond measure, and finally it ends up in murder, perhaps the worst kind of murder, the killing of a living work of art.

This analysis of a single tiny poem reveals the care and skill and love that a poet has put into his creation—not just that its meaning shall be clear but embellished with every artistic modality—so that the form shall express meaning to its uttermost depths, that it shall be filled with meaning in every part of its form and saturated with form in every part of its meaning.

To present a mere paraphrase of its meaning as a "translation" is not merely deception, it is fraudulent in its worst sense, it is presenting an *ersatz* substitute for the original, and when it is presented by so-called scholars to innocent readers, who do not know the original, and who cannot check on its accuracy and faithfulness, the crime gets worse. It is a desecration of conscientious scholarship, a criminal act of stifling a work of art, smothering it at its second birth, depriving one

people of the artistry of another people, not just distorting its images but eliminating them, not just re-recording its music badly, but eliminating it altogether.

Such so-called translators are traitors; they betray man's highest aspirations, the supreme achievement of man in the universe, his art, his poetry, and for that there is no forgiveness.

¹In NABOKOV TRANSLATED by J. Grayson. Oxford Univ. 1977. Press p. 16.

²"The material of poetry is neither images nor emotions, but words . . . Poetry is verbal art . . ." Zhirmunsky, "Zadachi Poetiki," *Voprosy teorii literatury*. Len., 1928, from Ehrlich, p. 175. Mouton, 1965.

³Quain Prof. of English Language and Lit., Univ. of London, W.C. I.

⁴See Dr. E. V. Rieu: *Cassels Enc. of Lit.*, 1953, Vol. 1, p. 55.

⁵*Theory of Translation*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1965, J. C. Catford, p. 20.

⁶Note by Max Hayward: "It is hard to say which 'excellent, rhymed translations' are referred to here. In so far as it is a question of translation into English, Pasternak may well have had in mind the versions of the Zhivago poems (and many others) done by his sister, Lydia Pasternak-Slater, in Oxford." Note by Herbert Marshall: It is a pity Max Hayward did not listen to Pasternak but went on quoting 'formless, non-poetic renderings' in, for example, Ivinskaya's A CAPTIVE OF TIME for he was otherwise a brilliant translator and editor.

⁷V. B. Brusov. *Collected Works* Vol II, p. 186, p. 77. Moscow, 1955.

⁸Ivinskaya "A Captive of Time" Fontana Collins, U.K. p. 33.

⁹*The Collected Works of Henrik Ibsen*, trans. by Wm. & Chas. Archer, Wm. Heinemann Ltd. 1923, p. xxxi.

¹⁰page 82.

¹¹A. Piemen, p. 422.

¹²A. Blok, "Notebooks," 1930, p. 197.

¹³V. A. Brusov, ed. "The Poetry of Armenia in Russian Translation," Moscow, 1916, pp. 15-16.

¹⁴Brusov, *Ibid.*

¹⁵Boris Pasternak

¹⁶See *Mayakovsky*, trans. Herbert Marshall, Dobson, 1965. p. 33.

¹⁷See Unbegaun, "Russian Versification," Oxford, 1956, p. 8 etc.

¹⁸See S. M. Eisenstein and analysis of Pushkin and his use of the Golden Section in his poetry. Vol. III of *Selected Works*, pp. 51/56. Izd. Isk M. 1964.

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
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August 22, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Department of State


THOMAS SIMONS
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Department of State

FOIA(b)(1), (3)



SUBJECT: Svetlana Allilueva on Shevardnadze

A friend in Academia recently supplied me with the attached paper, written by Stalin's daughter following her return to the United States.

Although it seems largely based on gossip in the intellectual community in Tbilisi, it may be of interest to analysts interested in Shevardnadze's 

Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment: The Making of a Minister
by Svetlana Allilueva

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/17/11

THE MAKING OF A MINISTER

BY

SVETLANA ALLILUEVA

42
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NLRR FOI-114/5 #8495

BY Cel NARA DATE 11/29/07

In July 1985 the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Republic of Georgia has been unexpectedly appointed to be Foreign Minister of USSR - the most difficult job among all the other ministers. The retiring Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had become a familiar face in every capital of the world, he learned to speak English and stored in his memory names, facts and agreements as a computer would do. Now an obscure man from a small Caucasian Republic stepped into his shoes - an unknown person, not fluent even enough in Russian although he came from Soviet Georgia, never trained in foreign affairs and not acquainted with protocol and procedure and the world outside the USSR.

Just last year Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, the late General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. Immediately relatively younger Party members started their way up to positions of power. But it had always been admitted that to run industry one must have specialized knowledge, acquired in Polytechnics and Industrial Academies. A special institute for Foreign Relations in Moscow as well as the High School of Diplomacy have been training for several decades, diplomats to carry out Soviet foreign policies. It was not from the great number of specially educated, young diplomats that the new Minister had emerged.

The diplomatic service in USSR is a highly privileged field, as it used to be in Tzarist Russia. Ambassadors are usually recruited from Russians or Ukrainians, never Jews, Georgians or Armenians. Those Jewish young men who happened to be educated in special schools could not even work as minor

clerks in the Soviet embassies: they were not considered reliable enough. Yet those educated Jews and Armenians were busy at the Foreign Office in Moscow, providing their superiors with insights and research into diplomacy of other countries and supplying the Minister with data and materials. The Foreign Office in Moscow is in itself a school, a real "think-tank", which produces ideas and suggestions whenever the Government requires those and works fast and efficiently.

And suddenly the Minister for Foreign Affairs is Edward Shevardnadze, a Georgian with his poor, slow accented Russian, a graduate of an evening school for teachers in Kutaisi (a provincial center of Western Georgia) who never became a teacher after an unsuccessful attempt to enter a medical school chose an "easier way" in the Young Communist League, and after that in the Georgian KGB. Here he finally has found himself, soon had become the Chief.

In that post Shevardnadze has shown his strong hand, his quick mind and his merciless heart. He did not hesitate to send to jail numbers of people at times, when to arrest a person was not any more regarded to be a good and 'natural' thing: one had to prove carefully and convincingly that indeed such a step was necessary. The new Chief of the Georgian KGB was very convincing and worked with enthusiasm. After having put in jail some of his rivals, he had asserted himself enough in the eyes of Georgian Communist Party and its General Secretary Mzhavanadze to be able to start watching very carefully Mzhavanadze himself. And after a while the General Secretary was found guilty of tremendous corruption (as was also his wife). Edward Shevardnadze thus became himself the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia - a promotion that gained him respect but created certain fears of him. Such quick steps upward within the ranks of the Communist Party are unusual and bespeak of some special talent of the person who achieve it. Eventually

Shevardnadze threw out the former Central Committee of the Soviet Party of Georgia and surrounded himself with people of his own choice.

By the time my daughter Olga and I arrived to reside in Georgia (December 1984) Shevardnadze was already an established ruler of the Republic for nearly ten years. He lived in his dacha (country residence) near Tbilisi and when his chauffeur driven car drove in the middle of Central Avenue he was followed by a security car and all traffic had to be stopped to let him proceed. In Georgia he introduced a long ago forgotten practice of working during the weekend and while he was sitting in his office all through the Sundays (although he also had a family) everyone had to do the same.

The First Secretary of the Party in a Soviet Republic is virtually an absolute ruler - a fact well known generally; and we had experienced this in every personal way upon our arrival in Georgia. Every minute detail of our living in Tbilisi, my daughter's studies, our interests and even people with whom we were supposed to meet had been checked, sorted out and personally approved of by the chief himself. While talking about him, local people - better educated younger members of the Party Central Committee of Georgia, lowered their voices and looked around suspicious that someone might have overheard our conversation.

The artistic intelligentsia, young scientists and school teachers display little respect for the uneducated Communist Party Apparachik.

Shevardnadze took a strange dislike to the renowned dancer Vakhtang Cbabukiani, the leader and educator of the whole Georgian Classic ballet in Tbilisi, a creator of modern dance, based on national material (like GORDA), based on exclusively Georgian national subjects, music and plastic characteristics. It is said he may have demanded something for the dying Georgian Opera House, we do not know. But he was suddenly dropped from his position and a Russian

Artistic Director arrived from Moscow. May be here is the answer? To please the Russians?...

Here is another case I learned of - a local sculptor made several years ago - on orders from the Party, designs which were approved of a most expressive and simple Victory Memorial in the large State Park in Tbilisi. Architecturally landscaped on the slope of the high hill, from where cascades of water were running down, symbolizing the Eternal River of Life. It had two figures in its composition: a Victory up on the hill, with a palm branch in her hand, a beautiful modern Georgian woman as a model for it - and down, at the very beginning, where a visitor to a park observes the lovely cascade running towards him, there was a young boy, naked, cheerful and holding a vine in his hand. Vine is a symbol of Georgia, of its eternity, of its spirit. And ONLY in the middle of the cascade, on a platform there was a simple black granite stone with eternal light. Understandable, laconic, impressive. People started coming here and bringing flowers to the slab and to the eternal light.

Then suddenly Shevardnadze said it was, "no good". And the whole, already existing ensemble had to be redone. The sculptor almost had a stroke. He refused to remake anything. It had already been accepted by officials and by the public.

Yet he was forced to remake it. Instead of the black slab, they put a most naturalistic figure of a dying soldier, half-covered with a banner. Banners and more banners in the background, more RED color in RED granite were added. The place has become outrageously overdone even frightening. Shevardnadze had won! An artist cannot win. He had to obey although he believed that all was done well in its simplicity. Maybe someone came from Moscow and "did not like it"? I was a witness to these two events. There had been many more.

Another example, a leading movie director (documentalist), we saw him and his wife an actress of long standing, both are respected people, who travel abroad to Europe and US. He had just returned from his usual trip to France and Italy where he was shooting a co-production film (A Victor Hugo Story). He said he had been searched in the airport, as was another member of his group, their pockets turned inside out etc. This had never happened before. He said, "that is Edward Shevardnadze working now!" The man has weak heart and was shocked by such a treatment. But he had absolutely no illusions about Edward Shevardnadze - he is regarded as a 'policeman' in the Party.

Further Shevardnadze managed to offend national feelings of his compatriots by unduly over-celebrating the infamous Georgievsky Treaty of 1785, whereby Georgia had become a part of the Russian Empire, lost its political independence, its ruling dynasty and turned into a mere province of Russia. (George XIII of Georgia renounced his crown in favor of the Tsar of Russia and in 1801 Georgia became a Russian province).

It was long ago an established historical fact that Petersburg displayed treachery having trapped the Georgian ruling Monarch by promises which had never been fulfilled. To celebrate such a treaty in the time of 'internationalism and democracy and brotherhood of peoples within USSR' was a poor idea yet Shevardnadze hoped that it would be liked in Moscow and he proved to be right. Orders and decorations to him followed and he had found a mighty patron in the person of the former Prime Minister Tikhonov, an aged man, not well versed in history.

The second offense to the pride of Georgians was even more cruel.

We witnessed during our stay in Georgia that the young people were extremely interested in the outside world. They learned foreign languages and were openly desirous to leave for abroad - by all possible and impossible

means. Two years ago a tragic incident had occurred when a group of young Georgian hijackers managed to shoot one of the crew in a passenger plane and tried to turn it to cross the border to Turkey. They have however been caught, tried and sentenced. Several of them to capital punishment. What had happened afterwards to the young hijackers no one knows, even their parents were not allowed to communicate with them anymore. This produced a wave of disgust and hatred in a small Republic where every young man is treasured. Hundreds of young Georgians have been sent to Afghanistan only to die there or to return crippled.

Such was the picture which we have found in Georgia and just about within several months, an unbelievable rumor was heard: Shevardnadze was going to Moscow to be a full member of the Politburo! He was going to be a Foreign Minister of USSR. No one believed the rumors until we saw on television the President of USSR and then the Premier Tikhonov suggest Shevardnadze - whom he described as an 'experienced politician and an erudite' - to be appointed instead of Gromyko.

For several days - even weeks - the whole of Georgia was in a state of shock. People laughed openly at the 'erudite' thing, everybody repeated those celebrated stories about extolling of Georgievsky with Russia and people were incredulous. All tried to evaluate potential danger of high promotion of a man with such qualities. Somebody joked, "Thank God he has not become a new KGB Chief in Moscow!" and the laughter stopped.

New arrests in Georgia followed soon - now those very close favorites of Shevardnadze whom he had in his time appointed as a Minister of Culture, as a Secretary of the Central Committee in Tbilisi - now one could not understand why it was so? Only to realize later that this was a well-known trick from the past strategy of annihilating those who knew him too well. A former

Minister and a former Secretary were imprisoned. Their families petitioned to their former Chief now in Moscow - but he did not receive them now.

He embarked on his first international appointments. We were all glued to our TV sets, watching him read awkwardly, stuttering, his first speech at the United Nations in September 1985. He struggled with the Russian text and visibly perspired. But the speech was correct - written by those well trained specialists from the Foreign Office.

Then we watched him during Gorbachev's visit to France, where Gorbachev did all the talking himself and his Foreign Minister only once or twice nodded with a ready smile when asked for his opinion. Then we understood the 'erudite' was needed by Gorbachev, who decided to make foreign policy himself without the old wolf Gromyko, too knowledgeable, too experienced a man, too well known, too well respected (though not loved) by everyone.... The provincial Party-man was just right to the yes-ing and nodding and reading the necessary speeches: but nothing else.

Several months followed and we continuously watched on TV Shevardnadze's appearances with written speeches to be read, his handshakes with the high guests in Sheremetyevo Airport, his waving hand during their departures. His visits to Cuba, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia etc. And we all understood why he was needed, a silent ignorant man who let Gorbachev do all the talking himself. That was the point.

In official party circles in Georgia it had been suggested that an appointment of a Georgian to such a high post means respect to our nation and therefore everyone ought to rejoice. But Georgian intellectuals were of a different opinion.

Gorbachev's pleasant smiles to his Minister in public were no doubt encouragements for him. Soon the mouth-to-mouth news (the only news media in

USSR) brought from Moscow reports that a full-day work on Sundays had been introduced in the Foreign Office - something totally forgotten during the last thirty years! Then silently the new Minister started purging 'corruption', 'nepotism' - all those vices which in USSR are published only in some cases, whenever preferred. In other cases when not preferred, corruption remains unnoticed. The enforcement of the Law in USSR is in the hands of the one who wants or does not want to enforce it.

The Foreign Office got worried. People of middle aged and elderly, old graduates of various diplomatic and foreign relations schools as well as of Moscow University felt that their time was running out. New types have been 'drastically promoted' by the Minister, one such rumor dealing with our 'case' all the time we were in USSR has become the closet favorite of the Minister. These were the last news I had about the 'erudite'. Soon the above mentioned blockhead told me with a frozen voice on the telephone that 'a decision was made' to the effect that I 'could leave USSR with my American passport'. Who has made such a decision remains a state secret but I am sure it was not the new Gromyko.

Making a Minister in USSR today remains the same game it used to be thirty and forty and fifty years ago. Earlier than that there used to be no fear of intellectuals and refined 'Bolsheviks' like Krassin, Uritzky or Litvin. They carried out Soviet foreign policies. Then began the era of mistrust towards the educated ones, Litvinov and the likes had been dropped to appease Hitler ^{because they were Jewish} and Molotov arrived at the time when Nazi Germany has become a real danger. Is Gorbachev repeating the game? Why not, why present him as

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The same opinion has been voiced by the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (although on earlier occasion the head of the church expressed concern regarding miserable position of existing churches, all seminaries closed but one, too many Russian priests sent from Moscow, although people definitely prefer services in their mother tongue. Shevardnadze was known as being antagonistic towards religion in general.

something 'totally new' to the Party which has established its own principles and rules on which it brought up its own 'younger generation'? Gorbachev might be 'young' as compared with seventy year old Tikhonov (the one who introduced Shevardnadze - the 'erudite'); but the ruling Party is as old as a dinosaur and the games of one-party-regime is being played the same old way. Nothing has changed.

In our brief stay in the USSR, after not being there for about eighteen years, I have noticed how strong the ruling party bureaucracy is, how still much needed are people experienced in KGB principles more than in diplomacy. We could also witness how much the ordinary people, intellectuals and even educated professionals like those for the Foreign Office are still more alienated from the regime.

Svetlana Allilueva.

For Professor Herbert Marshall, Center for Soviet Studies, Southern Illinois U. Carbondale, Illinois 62901. Tel 618.453.5174 or 618.549.4569.