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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1976 (4/4)

FOIA

F06-114/5

Box Number 17

YARHI-MILO

1705

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8469	MEMO	U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND SUMMITRY [1 - 2] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	7/24/1986	B1
8470	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8469 [3 - 4] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	7/24/1986	B1
8471	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PROTOCOL TO ABM TREATY [5 - 5] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/28/1986	B1
8472	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE BESSMERTNYKH PROPOSAL FOR SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS [8 - 11] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	4	7/28/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8473	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE BREAKFAST ITEM-JULY 30, 1986 BESSMERTNYKH [12 - 13] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	7/28/1986	B1
8479	MEMCON	PRESIDENT REAGAN AND AMBASSADOR DUBININ MEETING JUNE 23, 1986 [30 - 34] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	5	ND	B1
8474	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE U.S.- USSR BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION [35 - 35] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/31/1986	B1
8480	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8475 ⁸⁴⁷⁷ [36 - 36] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/19/1986	B1

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8475	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE RESEARCH ON CHERNOBYL HEALTH EFFECTS [37 - 37] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/31/1986	B1
8481	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE U.S. INTEREST IN RESEARCH ON CHERNOBYL HEALTH EFFECTS [38 - 40] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	3	7/22/1986	B1
8476	MEMO	'SAME TEXT AS DOC #8474 [47 - 47] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/31/1986	B1
8477	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE FIRST SESSION OF THE BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION [49 - 49] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/19/1986	B1

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8478	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8475 [50 - 50] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/31/1986	B1
8482	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8481 [52 - 53] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	2	7/22/1986	B1
8483	MEMCON	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8479 [65 - 69] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	5	6/23/1986	B1
8484	MEMCON	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8479 [74 - 78] R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	5	6/23/1986	B1

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for 7/24 Kaul bffg.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND SUMMITRY

Outline of Topics

I. Status of Summit Planning

- A. Geneva Agreement to meet in 1986 and 1987
- B. US proposal for summer; no reply
- C. Gorbachev proposal for consultation process in June letter.
- D. Unlikelihood that Soviets will set date before Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in September
- E. U.S. considerations: best times (perhaps only times convenient) are third week in November and first week in December.

II. Potential Issues for Summit

- A. Arms Reduction and Control (Linhard briefing)
 - 1. NST
 - a. Defensive and Space Arms (DST)
 - b. Strategic Arms (START)
 - c. Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF)
 - 2. Nuclear Testing
 - 3. MBFR (Vienna)
 - 4. CDE (Stockholm)
 - 5. Chemical Weapons
 - a. Treaty to Ban (CD, Geneva)
 - b. Non-proliferation (bilateral consultations)
 - 6. Risk Reduction Centers
 - 7. Compliance issues and interim restraint
 - 8. Soviet proposals on conventional arms in Europe
- E. Regional Conflicts
 - 1. President's proposal to UNGA, October, 1985.
 - 2. U.S.-Soviet "Experts" Meetings (Middle East, Central America and Caribbean, Southern Africa, East Asia, Afghanistan)
 - 3. Issues most likely to be discussed at Summit: Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua.
- C. Human Rights
 - 1. The record: Some progress on reuniting families and release of a few notable persons (e.g., Shcharansky), but no substantial progress on emigration (figures at lowest point in over 15 years).
 - 2. Linkage with trade issues:
 - a. Jackson-Vanik
 - b. Political controls on U.S. exports (change in procedures in January)
 - c. Baldrige meetings in 1985

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NLRR F06-714/5 #8969

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

C. Human Rights (Continued)

3. President' policy of quiet diplomacy
 - (a) Private discussion in Geneva
 - (b) Follow-up messages

D. Bilateral Issues, and International "Cooperation"

1. President's initiative for broadening contacts
2. Possible Cooperation Agreements
 - a. Space Cooperation
 - b. Fusion power plant (controversial in USG)
 - c. Nuclear Power Plant safety (IAEA)
3. CSCE Issues (Vienna Review Conference)

III. Other Bilateral Issues

There are a number of secondary issues, often subsets of the topics above, which will be discussed -- for the most part without Presidential involvement -- between now and the end of the year. They include:

- A. Bilateral Review Commission (largely consular and administrative matters)
- B. Consulates in Kiev and New York
- C. Reduction of Soviet Mission to UN
- D. Freedom of Navigation Challenges
- E. Military to military contacts: Weinberger invitation to Sokolov; possible naval ship visits
- F. Medical cooperation:
 1. Study of Chernobyl effects (private)
 2. Cooperation under bilateral agreement
- G. Implementation of Exchanges Agreement (signed at Geneva), and of other cooperative agreements (environmental protection, housing, oceanography, etc.)

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July 24, 1986
(Keel Briefing)

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U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND SUMMITRY

Outline of Topics

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NLRR F06-114/5 #8470

BY OW NARA DATE 11/29/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 28, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Protocol to ABM Treaty

In a recent conversation you raised the question as to whether the U.S. has the right, under the Protocol to the ABM Treaty which limits each side to the protection of a single area, to deploy 100 ABM launchers to protect Washington.

The short answer is that we do not have that right at the moment, but can assert it during the regularly scheduled 1987-1988 review of the ABM Treaty at the SCC, or subsequently at five-year intervals. However, we can make such a change only one time, so that if we shift from the right to protect a missile field to the right to protect the capital, we can not subsequently reverse ourselves.

In brief, the provisions of the Protocol are as follows in this regard:

a: Both sides agreed that they would have only one location for ABM interceptors, instead of the two permitted by the Treaty.

b: For the U.S., the permitted area is where ICBMs are deployed; for the USSR, it is the national capital.

c: If either side wishes to change the designated area, they can do so by giving notice, prior to initiation of construction, during the year beginning on October 3, 1977, and at five year intervals thereafter.

d: The right to change the location permitted for ABM interceptors can be exercised only once.

Incidentally, this provision means that the Soviets are not permitted to deploy any ABM interceptors to protect missile fields unless they dismantle the system around Moscow and give notice as outlined above.

cc: Bob Linhard

Attachment:

Tab I - Text of Protocol to ABM Treaty

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/5 #8471

BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975

Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976

Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976

Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976

Entered into force May 24, 1976

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972,

Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security,

Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol.

2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord

SALT ONE—ABM PROTOCOL

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with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article III

The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.

DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

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Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,

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2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

Article II

1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord

with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977 and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

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For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

July 28, 1986

INFORMATION

**Nat Sec Advisor
has seen**

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Bessmertnykh Proposal for Schedule of Meetings

In the meeting with Ridgway Saturday, Bessmertnykh proposed an elaborate series of meetings, most in August, to prepare for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in September. Clearly the two most important are the ones proposed on NST issues and regional issues.

Consultations on NST

11 AUG-DC
1 SEP-MOS
NITZE
KARPOV
PEZLE
LINTHARD

During the Saturday morning session, Bessmertnykh proposed that a small group meet on NST in either Moscow or Washington in the August 10-15 time frame. Since Bob had gotten the impression the day before that they were asking for someone other than the negotiators plus "experts," I questioned him on these points. In reply, he said that they had in mind three or four people, not necessarily the negotiators, but they would be acceptable if we wished. He said they were not proposing to include "technical experts," since these consultations would be broader and there would be no need for "narrow specialists." However, the chairman might wish to have a person at hand who was familiar with each of the three negotiating areas.

The important thing, he said, was for the session not to be a repeat of the sort of negotiations conducted during the formal sessions -- i.e., that they be directed not to an explanation of current positions, but at trying out new ideas to resolve problems, strictly ad referendum. He also proposed that the meetings be for only a couple of days, after which the group would break, consult in capitals, and perhaps convene again in a week or so.

When I asked Bessmertnykh directly whether the negotiators would be acceptable as our team, he replied, "In my personal view it would be better to name someone else, but the negotiators will be all right if that is what you want." He then implied that if Max led our team, Karpov would probably lead theirs.

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NLRR FOI-114/5 #8472

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

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Declassify: OADR

Regional Issues

Bessmertnykh proposed that we have a general meeting on regional issues around mid-August, involving four or five persons on each side.

I think we should accept, and use the President's UNGA proposal for the basis of our pitch. I believe that Peter Rodman is ideally placed to head our group. However, Simons tells me that Armacost has expressed a personal interest in doing this. Although I have no doubt Mike could do it well, he is too high ranking for his Soviet counterpart. (They have named Polyakov, a division chief in MFA.) I think it ought to be Rodman, Sestanovich, plus office directors from State who cover Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua.

Other Meetings

The other meetings suggested by Bessmertnykh are as follows:

Nuclear Testing: Continue meetings between Barker and Petrosyants which have already started.

Conventional Arms in Europe: Mikhailov (Soviet MBFR negotiator) prepared to meet with our representative in Moscow during the first ten days of August. (Presumably if we accept, we would send Blackwill; this would give us the opportunity to press the Soviets on a more forthcoming reply to the last Western proposal in MBFR, as the Germans strongly desire.)

CDE: Soviets are prepared to have Barry and Grinevsky meet in Washington during the first ten days of August, unless they prefer to meet in Stockholm. The Soviets are interested in discussing where to take up their proposal for Atlantic to Urals conventional arms reduction: CDE-II, enlarged MBFR or something else. (It may be premature for us to get into these things now, although it is clear that the Soviets are angling for something to announce during the summit. If we agree to the meeting, I believe we should use it to stress that we must conclude the CDE satisfactorily, get some progress in MBFR, and also get some progress in Basket III of the CSCE before we set up mechanisms for the recent Soviet proposals on conventional arms.)

Chemical Weapons: Soviets propose that our CD negotiators meet in Geneva in August to discuss verification of a CW ban. They also agree to talks on proliferation in Moscow in September (Hawes has been designated to do this on our side.)

Risk Reduction Centers: As you know, they proposed this week in Geneva; we have told them this is impossible, but we will propose a date.

Terrorism: Ridgway proposed consultations between Oakley and representatives of the Soviet Embassy here. Bessmertnykh accepted.

Bilateral issues: Bessmertnykh proposed that a group be designated to discuss these various issues, either in Moscow or Washington, in August. He seems willing to include "humanitarian" issues. EUR is interested in putting together a team, probably headed by Simons, to do it.

General Comments

It seems absolutely clear that Bessmertnykh is under instructions to get things moving rapidly across the board. He strongly implied that, if the preparations before the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting are "satisfactory," we will receive agreement to a summit date from Shevardnadze, or very shortly thereafter. I would infer that the Soviets have decided that they want the meeting this year, and therefore will be inclined, during August, to compromise at least enough to provide enough "meat" to match whatever criteria they have sent for a "minimal result."

These vibes were all present a day after Bessmertnykh had read the President's letter. Although it was probably too early for him to have received any specific guidance from Moscow, I would conclude that he personally did not react to the proposals in the letter as if they were so tough as to get in the way of summit preparations. Since he is presumably familiar with the bureaucratic scene in Moscow, this may be significant. (Throughout the meetings, both formal and informal, he refrained from any comment on the letter, simply observing that while he might have a personal reaction, he knew that was not of interest to us, and that he would await Gorbachev's reaction before discussing it.)

I was also struck by the fact that Bessmertnykh's presentations were totally devoid of propaganda in any form. He was utterly businesslike, and directed his attention on getting the process moving. Once, when he commented on the meetings proposed, he said that the Soviets wanted to use them to find solutions, and did not intend "long speeches and propaganda." He added that "there are plenty of fora for that," as if to distinguish the process they propose from their normal behavior -- and from the public comments of both sides.

Finally, I would note that during the informal dinner Saturday night the Soviets present spoke spontaneously, at length, and with uncharacteristic candor about Soviet internal difficulties. (Sokolov and Political Counselor Kuznetsov were with Bessmertnykh; Ridgway, her husband, Simons, Parris and myself were there from our side.) They made a number of comments about the dire effects of the "stagnation" brought on by Brezhnev's last years

and Chernenko, asserted that this affected morale and productivity not just among the elite but throughout the population as a whole, and described in some detail the difficulty of changing anything given the fierce resistance of the entrenched bureaucracy. They also observed that the current leadership has maybe a year or at most 18 months to show some palpable changes, or else the entire society will relapse into the torpor of the early eighties.

cc: Peter Rodman, Bob Linhard

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 28, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Breakfast Item - July 30, 1986
Bessmertnykh Visit

Bessmertnykh's visit was devoted exclusively to setting up a schedule of consultations by specialists on the various items on the agenda. I do not believe any of these are controversial among the agencies represented. Therefore, the topic may be no more than a briefing by Whitehead on what was proposed and what our responses have been.

As of now, the proposed meetings and our response (so far as I know) are as follows:

NST: Soviets proposed group of 3-4, between August 10 and 15 in either capital. We responded with a suggestion for Washington August 10. U.S. group will be Kampelman, Nitze, Linhard and Perle.

Regional Conflict: Soviets proposed a group of about four, mid-August, to meet with Soviet group headed by Polyakov, Chief of the MFA Middle East Division. We have suggested groups headed by Armacost and Vorontsov.

Nuclear Testing: Barker/Petrosyants (in progress)

Conventional Arms in Europe: Soviet MBFR negotiator willing to meet during first 10 days of August in Moscow. We have not replied.

CDE: Soviets propose meeting of our respective Ambassadors (Barry and Grinevsky) in Washington between August 1 and 10.

CW: Soviets propose meeting by our Ambassadors to CD in Geneva.

Risk Reduction Centers: Soviets proposed meeting in Geneva this week; we will suggest later date.

Bilateral and Humanitarian: Soviets proposed a group to discuss the range of bilateral and cooperative issues; Washington or Moscow sometime in August.

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Declassify: OADR

NLRR FOI-114/5 #8473
BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

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2

If there is discussion regarding the advisability of any of these, you might wish to encourage a positive response. It is a reasonable way to review the agenda, and though there are a lot of arms control items on the agenda, the Soviets are not trying to avoid the others, it would seem. In most cases, our current negotiators can handle them.

Bob ^{BL} Linhard concurs.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 29, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to John J. McCloy

John F. McCloy sent a letter (Tab B) to the President about the future of US-Soviet bilateral relations. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President recommending that he sign the letter to Mr. McCloy at Tab A. The speechwriters have cleared the text.

Steve ^Sestanovich concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo for Pres
Tab A	Ltr to McCloy
Tab B	Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5467

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Letter to John J. McCloy

Issue

Response to letter from John J. McCloy.

Facts

Mr. McCloy sent you a letter which discusses our future relations with the Soviet Union. Specifically, he expresses concern about the deep mistrust which exists between the US and the Soviet Union. His letter recommends that we devote future bilateral exchanges to resolving this problem.

Discussion

Your response to Mr. McCloy is at Tab A.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the letter to Mr. McCloy at Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A Ltr to McCloy
Tab B Incoming

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. McCloy:

Many thanks for your letter concerning the future of US-USSR bilateral relations.

I fully share your belief that a candid and constructive US-Soviet relationship would benefit both of our peoples and would greatly contribute to the overall lessening of international tensions. As you correctly point out, the enhancement of mutual trust would go a long way towards creating a more favorable atmosphere for East-West relations. Toward that end, I have been seeking to engage Moscow in a constructive dialogue designed to address and resolve existing US-Soviet bilateral and regional problems. However, while I firmly believe that dialogue is important, tangible improvement in our relations will only come about if dialogue is followed up with concrete deeds.

Again, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me.

Mr. John J. McCloy
One Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005

5467 17
JOHN J. McCLOY
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

April 11, 1986

My Dear Mr. President:

Having taken part in two world wars and having observed the international events that have been occurring in our dangerously nuclear-powered world, I am concerned about the course our future relations with the USSR could take.

It is with a real recognition and appreciation of the leadership you have shown, and the heavy responsibilities you carry, that I express my concern over the trends I seem to see developing in our relations with the USSR. I fear that they ultimately may lead to an impairment of the security interests of both the United States and the USSR. A deeply suspicious attitude has grown up between the two countries which I feel could and should be erased by a common attack on the problem rather than an adversary approach to it. This, in my judgment, requires a combined attack on a common problem in order to reach a constructive international agreement which should be designed to maintain and advance the peace as well as the welfare of each of the two countries.

There really are no two countries that have so much to gain as the United States and the USSR by the creation of a constructive relationship between them and, conversely, as much to lose by a faulty or inadequate one. Here we have two countries whose continental parts are separated from each other by thousands of miles. Neither covets any part of the territory of the other and they have no irredentist frictions to plague their relations. Both countries have almost limitless resources to enjoy and, in many respects,

they have a complementary relationship with each other, even though one, as the young but discerning Frenchman deToqueville noted many years ago, operated from a democratic base and the other from an essentially dictatorial one.

I have taken part in a number of missions with leaders or representatives of the USSR which engaged the decision-making process. I suppose among the most spectacular of these was related to the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. I believe that one of the good features of that negotiation was the continuity of the effort made to find the solution to that threatening problem. There was a sustained negotiating effort over a substantial period of time to work out a sensible solution and this was eventually accomplished successfully after a continued effort.

I know that you are wholly sensitive to the weight of the responsibilities you carry. I also have the belief that in the meetings with Mr. Gorbachev last November in Geneva, tensions between the two countries were relieved considerably by the realization that a common high level attack on the problem by the United States and USSR had been initiated.

I believe that if we could attack the common problem together, we should be able to shake ourselves loose from the competition we are now in to devise even meaner and more efficient projectiles to throw at each other when we are already well supplied, if not overloaded, with them.

I know this is not simple to do in view of our differing and competitive ideologies. However, if we stand back a little, I think we will discover that our relationships with the USSR have many complementary aspects. Both sides have made mistakes in dealing with each other in the past. But we won the war together with mammoth efforts from each side contributing to the victory.


While I was somewhat encouraged by Mr. Gorbachev's apparent willingness to contemplate at this time another attempt at a comprehensive test ban - although he clearly should have used a less propagandistic forum to make his announcement -, I was as well impressed by Secretary Shultz's statement that he would hope to go more quietly about

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seeking to make progress in our relationships through private or fewer public negotiations that we seem to have been prone to follow thus far.

Given these considerations, I would like to suggest, Mr. President, that if you for your part and Mr. Gorbachev for his could quietly instruct a group you trust to work on the main problem, I could foresee a further relief to tensions, and possibly even the achievement of a constructive international agreement. I believe that if we could focus together and in conjunction with each other on one common significant problem and solve it, an opportunity might be created for producing a constructive solution of our future relationships as perhaps we have not had for some time.

Respectfully yours,



The President
The White House
Washington
D.C.

To: Dennis Thomas

7/29/86

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THE HOUSE

INGTON

8, 1986

For your reaction and comment.

Dennis-

1. The Soviets have only began to acknowledge that they have a drug problem. I don't think we should suggest that the First Lady make a speech on the topic there. The Soviets would not apply it to their own situation, but would try to use it to "prove" how bad things are in the U.S.

2. As far as Glazer suggesting that the Soviets invite her, I don't think we should encourage it. (Would she really want to make a trip there alone?)

Jack

cent letter regarding
and Raisa Gorbachev
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the Soviet Union,
know I was following

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Thomas
the President

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la 90067

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


~~Mallock~~ 21
✓ VIA LDX
5563

July 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Draft Joint Statement

NSC has reviewed and concurs with attached draft Joint Statement regarding status of preparations for high-level US-Soviet meetings later this year.


RODNEY B. McDANIEL
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A: Draft Joint Statement

A

23

Joint Statement

f State
Secretary of State George Shultz met July 2d with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. ~~Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh~~ is in the United States for consultations with ~~State Department and other~~ U.S. government officials on the status of preparations for high-level U.S. - Soviet meetings later this year.

An initial meeting between the Secretary and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be held in Washington, D.C., September 19 - 20. At that time, the Secretary and Foreign Minister will review progress achieved in the areas addressed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their November, 1985 Geneva meeting, and discuss what additional preparations may be needed for a second meeting between the two leaders later this year.

To lay a firm foundation for a productive September meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, work at the expert level will be intensified in the weeks ahead in the areas of arms control, regional issues, bilateral matters, and humanitarian and human rights concerns. In addition to traditional fora, special working groups will be established to accelerate progress in certain fields.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5563

July 28, 1986

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Draft Joint Statement

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Nick Platt indicating NSC concurrence with State's draft Joint Statement regarding preparations for high-level US-Soviet meetings later this year.

*R*oman, *H*anley, *L*innard, *H*oward concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I McDaniel/Platt Memo
- Tab A Draft Joint Statement

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 31, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President-Dubin Meeting, June 23, 1986

State has supplied a Memorandum of Conversation covering the President's meeting with Dubinin on June 23. The Admiral has already received a copy of it, but you may wish to send the Memorandum to Nick Platt at Tab I approving it for the record.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
- Tab II - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of June 24, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *vs* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President-Dubinina Meeting, June 23, 1986 (U)

The Memorandum of the President's conversation with Soviet
Ambassador Dubinina, provided by your memorandum to Admiral
Poindexter of June 24, 1986, has been approved. (S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By AS NARA, Date 6/25/02

~~SECRET~~

27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 JUN 25 A 8: 09

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 4831

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED] DUE: IMMEDIATELY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro <input type="checkbox"/> Childress <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky <input type="checkbox"/> Donley <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Laux <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski <input type="checkbox"/> Levine <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Linhard <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock <input type="checkbox"/> May <input type="checkbox"/> North <input type="checkbox"/> Perry <input type="checkbox"/> Platt <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond <input type="checkbox"/> Reger <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ross <input type="checkbox"/> Sable <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer <input type="checkbox"/> Soos <input type="checkbox"/> Stark <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
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URGENT

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - _____
 - Fortier (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
 BY CW ON 6/25/02
 NARA Date

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Return to Secretariat

28

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # 4831

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Rodney McDaniel			
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>stuff</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

action: JFM
~~Buchanan~~
 info: PWR JMP
 SRS LBM
 REL WRP

Washington, D.C. 20520

#4831



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PM (R.H.)
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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 24, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The President's June 23 Meeting with
Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The Memorandum of Conversation that took place on June 23
between the President and Soviet Ambassador Dubinin is
attached for clearance.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *CWS* NARA, Date *10/25/02*

DECLASSIFIED

30



NLRR FOI 714/5 #8479

United States Department of State

BY AK NARA DATE 11/29/07

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Reagan and Ambassador Dubinin

Date: June 23, 1986
Place: White House Oval Office
Time: 4:55 - 5:35pm

US Participants:

Soviet Participants:

President Reagan
Chief of Staff Regan
VADM Poindexter
Ambassador Matlock
Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Ambassador Dubinin

After initial greetings, Ambassador Dubinin began to read prepared notes. He said that when he was in Moscow he spoke with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President.

The President thanked the Ambassador, and asked him to transmit his greetings and best wishes in return.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev, speaking to him as Ambassador of the USSR, had given him his evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospect for their improvement. He had also noted the positive elements in Reagan's Glassboro speech, and its tone. Of course, the most decisive thing was practical policy and actions. The sooner the United States stops thinking that it can put the Soviet Union in a difficult situation with respect to arms, technology, economics, etc., the sooner there will be fruitful results and improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an approach is no basis for a bilateral relationship. A good basis for this relationship is to act in accordance with the long-term interests of both countries.

Dubinin continued that Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is not trying to defeat the United States, but it will also not permit itself to be defeated. Its approach is that relations with the U.S. must be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union wishes to improve relations with the United States. It would be dangerous to put these relations to the test.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to tell the President that he was ready to look at regional issues, but that such discussions must be based on realism. The Soviet Union

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

considers that each country has the right to chart its own course and to decide whether its economic system should be a market system or a socialist system. He is prepared to discuss regional issues on a realistic basis. The Soviet Union is for democratization of international relations.

Dubinina said that Gorbachev noted the constructive approach of the Soviet leadership with respect to dialogue with the U.S., including dialogue at the highest level, but stressed the great significance of a possible summit. The possibility of such a meeting has attracted so much attention in the world that preparations for it and its successful conclusion are more important than they were for the Geneva summit.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to transmit a letter which he signed on June 19. The main idea of the letter was that the Soviet Union approaches things constructively and is seeking to find solutions to problems between us. Gorbachev was impressed by the idea the President conveyed to Dobrynin in May, namely that practical possible agreements lay between the optimum requirements of one side or the other. Therefore, this search was something which both sides had in common. In light of this common understanding, Gorbachev proposed that concrete areas be found for practical agreements in time for the summit.

Dubinina continued that the Soviet Union has moved, and is ready for a reduction in arms. In the area of space the Soviets had taken some steps and are ready for practical work. His purpose was not to identify specific elements at this time, but areas where we should concentrate our efforts. Gorbachev positively noted the President's assessment of the latest Soviet proposal on strategic offensive nuclear arms, which was conveyed through Secretary Shultz and Dubinina. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is awaiting a concrete reply and a discussion of the Soviet proposal with the U.S. delegation .

Dubinina indicated that with regard to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev was ready to consider a partial solution. The Soviet side may have some specific thoughts on this score, and if the U.S. side has some as well, the Soviet side is ready for serious work on this. Gorbachev is convinced that a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Dubinina then touched upon the issue of nuclear testing. Gorbachev understood the reasons behind the fact that President Reagan was not ready to cease nuclear tests. He, therefore, had weighed carefully what the President had conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin. In his letter, Gorbachev states that he, too, thinks that there should be talks between experts on all aspects of this issue. Such talks could touch upon questions of verification

and the obligation to determine the conditions and ways of attaining a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Such a meeting which the President had also spoken of, should take place as soon as possible, perhaps at the beginning of July.

Dubinina continued that Gorbachev thinks that the U.S. and USSR have certain common elements of an approach to the important issues, and that it would be possible to cooperate, including at the Summit, on such issues as improvement of nuclear power plant safety, peaceful uses of space, and other bilateral issues. Gorbachev has some thoughts on how to proceed in preparing this work. The Soviet side is proposing to work together without wasting time and using the fora and channels which already exist, such as the respective embassies. The foreign ministers of the two countries could then analyze the results of this work, and make final decisions with regard to the Summit.

Dubinina said that in his letter, Gorbachev indicated that he was for movement, for active preparations, and for a drastic turn in U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this point Dubinina handed Gorbachev's letter to the President, together with an unofficial Soviet translation.

President Reagan thanked the Ambassador and indicated that he was glad to hear that the General Secretary was looking forward to the Summit. The President had never given up belief in a Summit in the US, as was agreed in Geneva. He recalled that when he had talked with the General Secretary in Geneva, the President had indicated that before we could talk about weapons, and what was fair, we needed to remove the distrust which existed between the two countries. This needed to be done more than in words, it needed to be done with deeds. He had indicated that the US did not seek to acquire an advantage over the USSR, but that the record showed that there were reasons for US mistrust. After the Second World War, in which the US and the USSR were allies, the US disarmed. During that war, the US did not acquire one foot of foreign territory. At the same time, after the end of the war, the US was the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. It could have dictated its will to the world, but it did not do so. Instead, it proposed that all weapons be turned over to an international board, so that no country could threaten any other one. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, embarked on a program of massive rearmament which was offensive in nature, and which could not be justified by the need for defense.

President Reagan continued that General Secretary Gorbachev had not said this, but previous Soviet leaders had reiterated many times that the goal of Marxism and Leninism was the achievement of a one-world Communist state. Could the US ignore this and think

that it was not a possible target? General Secretary Gorbachev had not made such a statement and was the first Soviet leader to Reagan's knowledge who proposed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons and to completely eliminate them. The President welcomed this and was willing to join in this effort, since he had had this same goal for many years, but not through something like the SALT Treaty, which simply regulated an arms increase, but real negotiations to reduce the number of such weapons.

The President said that in order to achieve these aims there would need to be deeds to show that both sides wished to eliminate the distrust which exists between them, and which makes each feel on guard against the other.

The President emphasized that the US side was very grateful for the steps taken by the Soviet government to allow reunification of families through emigration. The Soviets had not seen the US give this a lot of publicity, or make public demands or take credit for it. It very much appreciates the Soviet actions.

The President indicated that he wished to conclude the meeting with the following thought, since he had already taken up a great deal of the Ambassador's time. He realized that with the new Soviet administration, June had been too early a date to have set for the Summit. Now the US side was faced with a difficulty due to elections in which members of the U.S. side would be involved. The US would very much appreciate it if the General Secretary or the Ambassador would propose a date after the early November elections for the Summit. Then the two sides could get together to work on issues to decrease the mistrust between the two sides.

Dubinina thanked the President for his frank and candid remarks, especially for discussing those things which he had discussed in private with Gorbachev. The President was aware of the position of the Soviet Union on these issues, since Gorbachev had indicated them, so Dubinina did not wish to dwell on this. He did wish to stress and stress again that the Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the US, and that it had no intentions with regard to the United States or other countries or regions except those of peaceful coexistence, peace and cooperation. The two countries fully shared a common goal of reducing arms. The President would see from Gorbachev's letter that the two sides are close to very significant agreements, and such agreements could be realized in time for a possible Summit. The Soviet side was proposing to begin preparatory work immediately. Then the foreign ministers might meet in September to evaluate the results of the work. This could take place immediately preceding the UN General Assembly. It was very important to prepare thoroughly for the Summit, and the US and USSR could really set an example and start the work of real disarmament.

34

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~~- 5 -~~

Dubinin concluded by saying that the USSR was approaching this in a constructive and optimistic fashion, and that it was ready to get down to work.

Drafted by D. Zarechnak, OPR/LS
Cleared: EUR:TWSimons, Jr.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~Matlock~~
5322 ✓ 3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 31, 1986

NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Bilateral Review Commission

The attached memorandum from Platt reports on plans for the first session of the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Review Commission, which has been organized to review outstanding consular and administrative issues.

State plans to suggest that the Commission be established as permanent body which would meet annually, and believes that this is one arrangement which could be announced at the upcoming Summit meeting.

Attachment:

Tab I - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of July 19, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/S #8474
BY Cal NARA DATE 11/29/07



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 19, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: First Session of the Bilateral Review Commission

The Soviets have agreed to hold a first session of the Bilateral Review Commission (BRC) in Moscow beginning July 22. Establishment of the BRC was one of several bilateral Summit II initiatives first broached with the Soviets in early March. The BRC will be an annual forum for discussion of outstanding bilateral consular and administrative problems. Our Ambassador in Moscow, Arthur A. Hartman, will open the first session.

Among the consular issues we plan to raise are diplomatic privileges and immunities for the families of consular personnel, humanitarian representation list cases, and the possibility of negotiating a dual nationals agreement. We also intend to raise a variety of administrative issues, including construction problems, travel controls on Soviet officials and reciprocal customs arrangements. We expect the Soviets will also raise a number of issues, including housing for their diplomats in this country and the security of their missions in the U.S.

We are seeking Circular 175 negotiating authority where necessary. In addition to any progress we may make on specific issues, we hope to obtain agreement to the concept of annual BRC meetings in alternating capitals. We will propose that the second session be held in Washington in January or February next year. We will seek Soviet agreement to make the formal announcement of establishment of the BRC at the next summit.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECL:OADR

NLRR F06-114/5 #8480

BY CN NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~Matlock~~ 31
5409 ✓

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

July 31, 1986

INFORMATION

MS-1

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Research on Chernobyl Health Effects

State has reported that it has been in contact with Dr. Robert Gale regarding the latter's desire to cooperate with the Soviets in a program for a long-term epidemiological study of the health effects of the Chernobyl accident on persons in the area exposed to radiation.

We have offered USG assistance, which the Soviets have so far declined, but Gale signed an agreement, in his private capacity, with A.I. Vorobiev of the Soviet Central Institute for Advanced Medical Studies to explore post-Chernobyl health effects research.

Gale met with representatives of interested USG agencies on July 1, and was given a research plan developed by the interagency group. Gale intended to return to Moscow July 17 to explore the matter further.

State's memorandum indicates that they will renew U.S. offers for cooperation in this effort in subsequent official contacts.

COMMENT: I am not sanguine that the Soviets will be willing to involve USG agencies in such a study, but see no harm in making clear that we are prepared to be of assistance.

Attachment:

Tab I - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of July 22, 1986.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 806-114/5 #8475

BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/07



July 22, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: U.S. Interest In Research On Chernobyl Health Effects

The potential benefits for the advancement of science through long-term research on radiation exposure effects of the Chernobyl accident are significant. It is not clear, however, whether the Soviets will be willing to open up this potentially embarrassing data to international scientific scrutiny. They have not responded to US offers of bilateral research cooperation conveyed by the Department of Energy, National Academy of Sciences, and National Institutes of Health. They have, however, been forthcoming in their contacts with Dr. Robert Gale of UCLA, who assisted in bone marrow transplant surgery immediately following the accident. In June, Gale and A. I. Vorobiev of the Soviet Central Institute for Advanced Medical Studies signed a memorandum agreeing to explore post-Chernobyl health effects research through the US-USSR bilateral health agreement.

Following consultation within the Health Sub-Group of the Interagency Chernobyl Task Force chaired by FDA, senior representatives of interested agencies met with Dr. Gale July 1 in a meeting chaired by State Assistant Secretary John Negroponte. Negroponte affirmed to Gale US willingness to participate with the USSR in Chernobyl-related studies, and presented him with a research plan developed by the interagency group (Tab B). This is consistent with the President's offer of assistance and reflects the strong interest of several US agencies in such research.

Gale welcomed USG support and expressed hope that his personal efforts could assist in promoting such bilateral cooperation. He now feels, however, that the Soviets may be backing away from a bilateral effort with the US. Gale will accompany Armand Hammer to the USSR July 17 and hopes to obtain Gorbachev's approval of an approach based on the recommendations of a select group of international radiation experts which he and Hammer convened in Los Angeles July 8 (Tab C). He believes that a positive Gorbachev response could also open the door to some form of US-Soviet cooperation. The form that cooperation might take is not yet clear.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/5 #8481

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29

- 2 -

We are working as closely as possible with Gale to ensure that USG interests are reflected in his talks with the Soviets. Moreover, supplementing the Gale channel, we plan to renew our bilateral offers through official contacts in the coming weeks. We are also prepared to join a possible multilateral research effort, e.g., through IAEA or the World Health Organization, should that materialize.

The Gale-Vorobiev Memorandum, the USG proposed research plan, a list of the USG task force participants, and a list of the experts at the July 8 Los Angeles meeting are attached.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Drafted by:EUR/SOV/SOBI:EJSalazar²⁸⁸/OES:REBenedick:dr ¹⁰³
07/07/86:x78957

Cleared:EUR/SOV/SOVI:LDSELL
³⁵⁵EUR/SOV:MRParris) EJS for
EUR:TSimon ^{two}

(0751y:7/17/86)

41

M E M O R A N D U M

At the invitation of the Soviet Government from May 2 till June 7, 1986 with an interval of one week Dr. Robert Peter Gale, Professor at the California University, Los Angeles, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry visited the USSR to participate in the provision of medical care to the patients following Chernobyl accident.

During Dr Robert Peter Gale's visit in the USSR, the question of possible cooperation between the Central Institute for Advanced Medical Studies of the USSR Ministry of Health and the USA National Institutes of Health and the National Academy were discussed in such research areas as: haematology, oncology, genetics & radiation biology, with particular emphasis on medical and biological effects of nuclear energy.

In view of the mutual interest in this problem, the two Parties agree to transmit to the competent bodies of their countries the issue of establishing cooperation in the field to the next VIII Session of the Joint Soviet - American Commission for Cooperation in the field of public health.

The Parties believe that establishment and development of cooperation in the aforementioned fields, within the framework of the Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the USA in the field of medical science and public health of May 23, 1972, will secure progress in the field of medicine and promote public health and strengthening of friendly ties between the people of the USSR and the USA.

The Parties reconfirmed their belief that cooperation of the people of good will in all countries may contribute to the solution of many problems in the contemporary world.

Robert Peter Gale
Robert Peter GALE, M.D., Ph.D.
Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the
International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry
Professor of Medicine, University of
California, Los Angeles

Prof. A. I. Vorobiev
Prof. A. I. VOROBIEV, M.D.
Chief, Department of Haematology,
Central Institute for Advanced
Medical Studies, correspondent member
of the USSR Academy of Medical
Sciences, Moscow, USSR

42

USG COORDINATED RESEARCH PLAN

GOALS

- I. To support the provision of assistance to the U.S.S.R. for humanitarian reasons by offering personnel, equipment, supplies and information that may be of use in health and medical care to persons affected by the Chernobyl accident
- II. To support efforts to collect information appropriate for the worldwide advancement of science with respect to health and environmental consequences of potentially hazardous releases of radioactivity

PROJECTS

While there are many ways to fulfill these goals, the following are elements of a research plan that could be helpful in realizing them:

- A. An assessment of exposure and dose

How much and what kinds of radioactivity were released? Where was the radioactive fallout deposited? Who and how many persons have been exposed? Through what pathways did this exposure occur -- external, inhalation, ingestion? Can meaningful doses be estimated for exposed individuals? Is continued or future exposure likely? How good are these exposure and dose estimates? What were the effects of the accident on crops, livestock and other edibles, including processed foods?

- B. An assessment of selected short-term adverse health effects in relation to estimated levels of exposure (dose-response computation)

1. The design of epidemiologic studies to evaluate reproductive outcomes and outcomes affecting infants

Can exposed women who were pregnant at or soon after the incident be identified? How many of these women are there? How many of these women have had spontaneous or therapeutic abortions? How many have had stillbirths? Of the women who delivered liveborn children, how many had children with birth defects? What kinds of birth defects were they? Of the liveborn children born to exposed mothers, what were the frequency distributions of their birth weights and head circumferences? Did any of the children have neonatal hypothyroidism or lowered thyroid function? How can appropriate comparison data be obtained from unexposed populations?

- 2. The design of epidemiologic studies to evaluate acute radiation sickness

How many persons had acute radiation sickness? What were their radiation doses, their symptoms, and the course of their disease? How many persons died?

- 3. The design of epidemiologic studies to evaluate other acute adverse health effects

Which in vivo techniques were used to assess human radiation doses? How useful were they? How soon and how often should they be used? What are the long-term behavioral sequelae of this incident?

- C. An assessment of long-term adverse health effects in relation to estimated levels of exposure

Can those who were exposed be enrolled into a registry for long-term followup for development of malignancies and specific radiation related chronic diseases? Can subgroups of those exposed be followed for specific adverse health effects? (For example, following children for developmental disabilities, hypothyroidism and childhood cancer; following persons with high exposure to specific radionuclides; following persons exposed by specific pathways; following persons with acute radiation sickness who received different kinds of treatment; following women and men of reproductive age for potential genetic and reproductive effects and the overall rates of development of various cancers.)

- D. A plan for counseling and medical followup of exposed persons

Given the research goals set up in the previous elements, will medical followup take place to allow appropriate public health interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality among the exposed?

- E. An assessment of the environmental transport of released radionuclides

How much of each radionuclide was dispersed from the reactor and in what physical and chemical forms? How were these radionuclides dispersed in the atmosphere? How did the deposition of radionuclides vary with respect to location? How were deposited radionuclides subsequently transported in the soil, water and food chain? How effective were the decontamination and other mitigation measures employed with respect to limiting human exposures and restoring land to normal use?

DISCUSSION

Of the elements listed, A and B should start as soon as possible. The information obtained from an initial exposure assessment is necessary to select groups with different levels of probable exposure, plus appropriate comparison groups, in order to interpret the results of the above two types of health effects. More detailed exposure estimates can then take place during the registration of people for active assessment of selected short-term effects. The information on reproductive outcomes will provide immediate information on the effects of exposure to different levels of radiation during early pregnancy. The last phase will make it possible for the exposed to receive the best medical and public health interventions developed in future years to reduce morbidity and mortality from their exposure.

The establishment and maintenance of a registry of exposed people to detect long-term health effects will require, at a minimum:

- * that adequate means exist to enroll the large number of people needed to detect rare, long-term adverse health effects;
- * that adequate means exist to follow each registered person for a long enough time to detect effects having a long latent period, for example, cancer;
- * that reliable exposure dose estimates can be constructed for each person registered; and
- * that the studies proposed are scientifically worthwhile.

Further discussions are required to determine the feasibility of this approach and its usefulness in achieving the aforementioned goals.

Washington, D.C.

July 1, 1986

List of attendees

Gilbert Beebe, Ph.D. (United States)
Dan Beninson, Ph.D. (Argentina)
Vincent DeVita, M.D. (United States)
Michael Fry, M.D. (United States)
Robert Gale, M.D., Ph.D. (United States)
Marvin Goldberger, Ph.D. (United States)
Armand Hammer, M.D. (United States)
Seymour Jablon (United States)
Charles Land, Ph.D. (United States)
Bo Lindell, Ph.D. (Sweden)
Roger McClellan, D.V.M. (United States)
Sir Edward Pochin (United Kingdom)
J. Edward Rall, M.D., Ph.D. (United States)
Morris Rosen, Ph.D. (Austria)
William Schull, Ph.D. (United States)
Itsuzo Shigematsu (Japan)
Giovanni Silini, Ph.D. (Austria)
Warren Sinclair, Ph.D. (United States)
Arthur Upton, Ph.D. (United States)
Dirk Van Bekkum, Ph.D. (The Netherlands)

44

USG PARTICIPANTS IN CHERNOBYL
HEALTH EFFECTS DISCUSSIONS

NIH

James Wyngaarden
Joseph E. Rall

FDA

Frank Young
John Norris

DOE

Alvin Trivelpiece
James Decker
Charles Delisi

NAS

Victor Rabinowitch
Seymour Jablon
Glenn Schweitzer

EPA

Jerome Pushkin

OSTP

Robert Rabin
Deborah Wince

USDA

George Bickerton

PHS

Hal Thompson
Ian McDonald
Verne Houk
Robert Windom

STATE

Amb. John Negroponte
Richard Benedick
Mark R. Parris

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 31, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Bilateral Review Commission

The attached memorandum from Platt reports on plans for the first session of the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Review Commission, which has been organized to review outstanding consular and administrative issues.

State plans to suggest that the Commission be established as permanent body which would meet annually, and believes that this is one arrangement which could be announced at the upcoming Summit meeting.

Attachment:

Tab I - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of July 19, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR P06-114/5 #8476

BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

48

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 JUL 21 AID: 17

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 5322

ACTION OFFICER: ~~REDACTED~~

DUE: 23 JULY

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

FYI

FYI

Brooks

Laux

Ross

Burghardt

Lenczowski

Sable

Cannistraro

Levine

Sachs

Childress

Linhard

Sestanovich

Cobb

Mahley

Small

Danzansky

Major

Sommer

deGraffenreid

Mandel

Soos

Djerejian

Matlock

Stark

Dobriansky

May

Steiner

Donley

North

St Martin

Douglass

Perry

Tahir-Kheli

Farrar

Platt

Teicher

Grimes

Pugliaresi

Thompson

Hanley

Raymond

Tillman

Kelly

Reger

Kraemer

Ringdahl

INFORMATION McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
Under NND 68801, August 28, 1987
By CS NARA Date 6/25/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to Secretariat



S/S 8622239

#5322

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 19, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: First Session of the Bilateral Review Commission

The Soviets have agreed to hold a first session of the Bilateral Review Commission (BRC) in Moscow beginning July 22. Establishment of the BRC was one of several bilateral Summit II initiatives first broached with the Soviets in early March. The BRC will be an annual forum for discussion of outstanding bilateral consular and administrative problems. Our Ambassador in Moscow, Arthur A. Hartman, will open the first session.

Among the consular issues we plan to raise are diplomatic privileges and immunities for the families of consular personnel, humanitarian representation list cases, and the possibility of negotiating a dual nationals agreement. We also intend to raise a variety of administrative issues, including construction problems, travel controls on Soviet officials and reciprocal customs arrangements. We expect the Soviets will also raise a number of issues, including housing for their diplomats in this country and the security of their missions in the U.S.

We are seeking Circular 175 negotiating authority where necessary. In addition to any progress we may make on specific issues, we hope to obtain agreement to the concept of annual BRC meetings in alternating capitals. We will propose that the second session be held in Washington in January or February next year. We will seek Soviet agreement to make the formal announcement of establishment of the BRC at the next summit.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR 606-114/5 18977

DECL:OADRRV CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 31, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Research on Chernobyl Health Effects

State has reported that it has been in contact with Dr. Robert Gale regarding the latter's desire to cooperate with the Soviets in a program for a long-term epidemiological study of the health effects of the Chernobyl accident on persons in the area exposed to radiation.

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COMMENT: I am not sanguine that the Soviets will be willing to involve USG agencies in such a study, but see no harm in making clear that we are prepared to be of assistance.

Attachment:

Tab I - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of July 22, 1986.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

NLRR F06-114/5 178978
BY CI NARA DATE 11/29/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 111 22 P 3499

ACTION OFFICER: Matlock DUE: 25 July

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| FYI | FYI | FYI |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Laux | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> Small |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mandel | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> May | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> North | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Raymond | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

- INFORMATION McDaniel Pearson Secretariat
- Rodman _____ _____
- Poindexter (advance) Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
With Exemptions Guidelines, August 29, 1997
Date 10/25/02

Return to Secretariat

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



July 22, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: U.S. Interest In Research On Chernobyl Health Effects

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Following consultation within the Health Sub-Group of the Interagency Chernobyl Task Force chaired by FDA, senior representatives of interested agencies met with Dr. Gale July 1 in a meeting chaired by State Assistant Secretary John Negroponte. Negroponte affirmed to Gale US willingness to participate with the USSR in Chernobyl-related studies, and presented him with a research plan developed by the interagency group (Tab B). This is consistent with the President's offer of assistance and reflects the strong interest of several US agencies in such research.

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DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


NLRR F06-114/5 #8452
BY CW NARA DATE 11/29/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

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Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54

M E M O R A N D U M


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
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In view of the mutual interest in this problem, the two Parties agree to transmit to the competent bodies of their countries the issue of establishing cooperation in the field to the next VIII Session of the Joint Soviet - American Commission for Cooperation in the field of public health.

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Professor of Medicine, University of
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Prof. A.I. VOROBIEV, M.D.
Chief, Department of Haematology,
Central Institute for Advanced
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of the USSR Academy of Medical
Sciences, Moscow, USSR

5

USG COORDINATED RESEARCH PLAN

GOALS

- I. To support the provision of assistance to the U.S.S.R. for humanitarian reasons by offering personnel, equipment, supplies and information that may be of use in health and medical care to persons affected by the Chernobyl accident
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PROJECTS

While there are many ways to fulfill these goals, the following are elements of a research plan that could be helpful in realizing them:

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54

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July 1, 1986

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- Seymour Jablon (United States)
- Charles Land, Ph.D. (United States)
- Bo Lindell, Ph.D. (Sweden)
- Roger McClellan, D.V.M. (United States)
- Sir Edward Pochin (United Kingdom)
- J. Edward Rall, M.D., Ph.D. (United States)
- Morris Rosen, Ph.D. (Austria)
- William Schull, Ph.D. (United States)
- Itsuzo Shigematsu (Japan)
- Giovanni Silini, Ph.D. (Austria)
- Warren Sinclair, Ph.D. (United States)
- Arthur Upton, Ph.D. (United States)
- Dirk Van Bekkum, Ph.D. (The Netherlands)

USG PARTICIPANTS IN CHERNOBYL
HEALTH EFFECTS DISCUSSIONS

NIH

James Wyngaarden
Joseph E. Rall

FDA

Frank Young
John Norris

DOE

Alvin Trivelpiece
James Decker
Charles Delisi

NAS

Victor Rabinowitch
Seymour Jablon
Glenn Schweitzer

EPA

Jerome Pushkin

OSTP

Robert Rabin
Deborah Wince

USDA

George Bickerton

PHS

Hal Thompson
Ian McDonald
Verne Houk
Robert Windom

STATE

Amb. John Negroponte
Richard Benedick
Mark R. Parris

60

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 31, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIELL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President-Dubinín Meeting, June 23, 1986

State has supplied a Memorandum of Conversation covering the President's meeting with Dubinín on June 23. The Admiral has already received a copy of it, but you may wish to send the Memorandum to Nick Platt at Tab I approving it for the record.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I - McDaniel-Platt Memorandum

Tab II - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of June 24, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADRDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CJS* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

u

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President-Dubinina Meeting, June 23, 1986 (S)

The Memorandum of the President's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dubinina, provided by your memorandum to Admiral Poindexter of June 24, 1986, has been approved. (S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/25/02

SECRET

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

86 JUN 25 A 8: 09

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 4831

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER: 

DUE: IMMEDIATELY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro <input type="checkbox"/> Childress <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Donley <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Douglass <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Grimes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hanley <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Laux <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski <input type="checkbox"/> Levine <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Linhard <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock <input type="checkbox"/> May <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> North <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Perry <input type="checkbox"/> Platt <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Raymond <input type="checkbox"/> Reger <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl | <p>FYI</p> <p>URGENT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Ross <input type="checkbox"/> Sable <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer <input type="checkbox"/> Soos <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Stark <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Thompson <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tillman <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
|--|---|---|

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Pearson
 - _____
 - Fortier (advance)
 - Secretariat
 - _____

COMMENTS

CVJ
6/25/82

SECRET

Return to Secretariat

National Security Council
The White House

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System # _____
Package # 4831
DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>stop</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

action: JFM
~~Buchanan~~
info: PWR JWP
 SRS LBM
 REL LXP

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Washington, D.C. 20520

#4831



DIST: 6/24

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 24, 1986

S/P (R.H.)

S/ARN (R.H.)

EUR

PM (R.H.)

S/S

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The President's June 23 Meeting with
Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The Memorandum of Conversation that took place on June 23
between the President and Soviet Ambassador Dubinin is
attached for clearance.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *CVS* NARA, Date 6/25/02

DECLASSIFIED



NLRR FOC-114/5⁺8483 United States Department of State
BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/67 Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Reagan and Ambassador Dubinin

Date: June 23, 1986
Place: White House Oval Office
Time: 4:55 - 5:35pm

US Participants:

President Reagan
Chief of Staff Regan
VADM Poindexter
Ambassador Matlock
Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants:

Ambassador Dubinin

After initial greetings, Ambassador Dubinin began to read prepared notes. He said that when he was in Moscow he spoke with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President.

The President thanked the Ambassador, and asked him to transmit his greetings and best wishes in return.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev, speaking to him as Ambassador of the USSR, had given him his evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospect for their improvement. He had also noted the positive elements in Reagan's Glassboro speech, and its tone. Of course, the most decisive thing was practical policy and actions. The sooner the United States stops thinking that it can put the Soviet Union in a difficult situation with respect to arms, technology, economics, etc., the sooner there will be fruitful results and improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an approach is no basis for a bilateral relationship. A good basis for this relationship is to act in accordance with the long-term interests of both countries.

Dubinin continued that Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is not trying to defeat the United States, but it will also not permit itself to be defeated. Its approach is that relations with the U.S. must be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union wishes to improve relations with the United States. It would be dangerous to put these relations to the test.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to tell the President that he was ready to look at regional issues, but that such discussions must be based on realism. The Soviet Union

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

considers that each country has the right to chart its own course and to decide whether its economic system should be a market system or a socialist system. He is prepared to discuss regional issues on a realistic basis. The Soviet Union is for democratization of international relations.

Dubinina said that Gorbachev noted the constructive approach of the Soviet leadership with respect to dialogue with the U.S., including dialogue at the highest level, but stressed the great significance of a possible summit. The possibility of such a meeting has attracted so much attention in the world that preparations for it and its successful conclusion are more important than they were for the Geneva summit.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to transmit a letter which he signed on June 19. The main idea of the letter was that the Soviet Union approaches things constructively and is seeking to find solutions to problems between us. Gorbachev was impressed by the idea the President conveyed to Dobrynin in May, namely that practical possible agreements lay between the optimum requirements of one side or the other. Therefore, this search was something which both sides had in common. In light of this common understanding, Gorbachev proposed that concrete areas be found for practical agreements in time for the summit.

Dubinina continued that the Soviet Union has moved, and is ready for a reduction in arms. In the area of space the Soviets had taken some steps and are ready for practical work. His purpose was not to identify specific elements at this time, but areas where we should concentrate our efforts. Gorbachev positively noted the President's assessment of the latest Soviet proposal on strategic offensive nuclear arms, which was conveyed through Secretary Shultz and Dubinina. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is awaiting a concrete reply and a discussion of the Soviet proposal with the U.S. delegation .

Dubinina indicated that with regard to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev was ready to consider a partial solution. The Soviet side may have some specific thoughts on this score, and if the U.S. side has some as well, the Soviet side is ready for serious work on this. Gorbachev is convinced that a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Dubinina then touched upon the issue of nuclear testing. Gorbachev understood the reasons behind the fact that President Reagan was not ready to cease nuclear tests. He, therefore, had weighed carefully what the President had conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin. In his letter, Gorbachev states that he, too, thinks that there should be talks between experts on all aspects of this issue. Such talks could touch upon questions of verification

and the obligation to determine the conditions and ways of attaining a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Such a meeting which the President had also spoken of, should take place as soon as possible, perhaps at the beginning of July.

Dubinina continued that Gorbachev thinks that the U.S. and USSR have certain common elements of an approach to the important issues, and that it would be possible to cooperate, including at the Summit, on such issues as improvement of nuclear power plant safety, peaceful uses of space, and other bilateral issues. Gorbachev has some thoughts on how to proceed in preparing this work. The Soviet side is proposing to work together without wasting time and using the fora and channels which already exist, such as the respective embassies. The foreign ministers of the two countries could then analyze the results of this work, and make final decisions with regard to the Summit.

Dubinina said that in his letter, Gorbachev indicated that he was for movement, for active preparations, and for a drastic turn in U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this point Dubinina handed Gorbachev's letter to the President, together with an unofficial Soviet translation.

President Reagan thanked the Ambassador and indicated that he was glad to hear that the General Secretary was looking forward to the Summit. The President had never given up belief in a Summit in the US, as was agreed in Geneva. He recalled that when he had talked with the General Secretary in Geneva, the President had indicated that before we could talk about weapons, and what was fair, we needed to remove the distrust which existed between the two countries. This needed to be done more than in words, it needed to be done with deeds. He had indicated that the US did not seek to acquire an advantage over the USSR, but that the record showed that there were reasons for US mistrust. After the Second World War, in which the US and the USSR were allies, the US disarmed. During that war, the US did not acquire one foot of foreign territory. At the same time, after the end of the war, the US was the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. It could have dictated its will to the world, but it did not do so. Instead, it proposed that all weapons be turned over to an international board, so that no country could threaten any other one. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, embarked on a program of massive rearmament which was offensive in nature, and which could not be justified by the need for defense.

President Reagan continued that General Secretary Gorbachev had not said this, but previous Soviet leaders had reiterated many times that the goal of Marxism and Leninism was the achievement of a one-world Communist state. Could the US ignore this and think

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- 4 -

that it was not a possible target? General Secretary Gorbachev had not made such a statement and was the first Soviet leader to Reagan's knowledge who proposed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons and to completely eliminate them. The President welcomed this and was willing to join in this effort, since he had had this same goal for many years, but not through something like the SALT Treaty, which simply regulated an arms increase, but real negotiations to reduce the number of such weapons.

The President said that in order to achieve these aims there would need to be deeds to show that both sides wished to eliminate the distrust which exists between them, and which makes each feel on guard against the other.

The President emphasized that the US side was very grateful for the steps taken by the Soviet government to allow reunification of families through emigration. The Soviets had not seen the US give this a lot of publicity, or make public demands or take credit for it. It very much appreciates the Soviet actions.

The President indicated that he wished to conclude the meeting with the following thought, since he had already taken up a great deal of the Ambassador's time. He realized that with the new Soviet administration, June had been too early a date to have set for the Summit. Now the US side was faced with a difficulty due to elections in which members of the U.S. side would be involved. The US would very much appreciate it if the General Secretary or the Ambassador would propose a date after the early November elections for the Summit. Then the two sides could get together to work on issues to decrease the mistrust between the two sides.

Dubinina thanked the President for his frank and candid remarks, especially for discussing those things which he had discussed in private with Gorbachev. The President was aware of the position of the Soviet Union on these issues, since Gorbachev had indicated them, so Dubinina did not wish to dwell on this. He did wish to stress and stress again that the Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the US, and that it had no intentions with regard to the United States or other countries or regions except those of peaceful coexistence, peace and cooperation. The two countries fully shared a common goal of reducing arms. The President would see from Gorbachev's letter that the two sides are close to very significant agreements, and such agreements could be realized in time for a possible Summit. The Soviet side was proposing to begin preparatory work immediately. Then the foreign ministers might meet in September to evaluate the results of the work. This could take place immediately preceding the UN General Assembly. It was very important to prepare thoroughly for the Summit, and the US and USSR could really set an example and start the work of real disarmament.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 5 -

Dubinin concluded by saying that the USSR was approaching this in a constructive and optimistic fashion, and that it was ready to get down to work.

Drafted by D. Zarechnak, OPR/LS
Cleared: EUR:TWSimons, Jr.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~MATLOCK~~

July 31, 1986

*File in
Pres Meeting
with Sov Officials*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President-Dubinina Meeting, June 23, 1986 (S)

The Memorandum of the President's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dubinina, provided by your memorandum to Admiral Poindexter of June 24, 1986, has been approved. (S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/25/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 31, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President-Dubin in Meeting, June 23, 1986

State has supplied a Memorandum of Conversation covering the President's meeting with Dubinin on June 23. The Admiral has already received a copy of it, but you may wish to send the Memorandum to Nick Platt at Tab I approving it for the record.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *A 7-30* Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I - McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
- Tab II - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of June 24, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CXS* NARA, Date *6/25/02*

SECRET

72

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

86 JUN 25 8:09

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 4831

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: IMMEDIATELY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
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| FYI | FYI | FYI |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks | <input type="checkbox"/> Laux | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Linhard | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley | <input type="checkbox"/> Small |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky | <input type="checkbox"/> Major | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky | <input type="checkbox"/> May | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley | <input type="checkbox"/> North | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |

URGENT

- INFORMATION McDaniel Pearson Secretariat
- Rodman _____ _____
- Poindexter (advance) Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By: CV NARA Date 6/25/02

SECRET

Return to Secretariat

Washington, D.C. 20520

#4831



DIST: 6/24

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SECRET/SENSITIVE
June 24, 1986

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S/ARN (R.H.)
EUR
PM (R.H.)
S/S

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The President's June 23 Meeting with
Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The Memorandum of Conversation that took place on June 23
between the President and Soviet Ambassador Dubinin is
attached for clearance.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/25/92



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Reagan and Ambassador Dubinin

Date: June 23, 1986
Place: White House Oval Office
Time: 4:55 - 5:35pm

US Participants:

Soviet Participants:

President Reagan
Chief of Staff Regan
VADM Poindexter
Ambassador Matlock
Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Ambassador Dubinin

After initial greetings, Ambassador Dubinin began to read prepared notes. He said that when he was in Moscow he spoke with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President.

The President thanked the Ambassador, and asked him to transmit his greetings and best wishes in return.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev, speaking to him as Ambassador of the USSR, had given him his evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospect for their improvement. He had also noted the positive elements in Reagan's Glassboro speech, and its tone. Of course, the most decisive thing was practical policy and actions. The sooner the United States stops thinking that it can put the Soviet Union in a difficult situation with respect to arms, technology, economics, etc., the sooner there will be fruitful results and improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an approach is no basis for a bilateral relationship. A good basis for this relationship is to act in accordance with the long-term interests of both countries.

Dubinin continued that Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is not trying to defeat the United States, but it will also not permit itself to be defeated. Its approach is that relations with the U.S. must be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union wishes to improve relations with the United States. It would be dangerous to put these relations to the test.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to tell the President that he was ready to look at regional issues, but that such discussions must be based on realism. The Soviet Union

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

NLRR FOI 7/14/5 #8484

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

considers that each country has the right to chart its own course and to decide whether its economic system should be a market system or a socialist system. He is prepared to discuss regional issues on a realistic basis. The Soviet Union is for democratization of international relations.

Dubinina said that Gorbachev noted the constructive approach of the Soviet leadership with respect to dialogue with the U.S., including dialogue at the highest level, but stressed the great significance of a possible summit. The possibility of such a meeting has attracted so much attention in the world that preparations for it and its successful conclusion are more important than they were for the Geneva summit.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to transmit a letter which he signed on June 19. The main idea of the letter was that the Soviet Union approaches things constructively and is seeking to find solutions to problems between us. Gorbachev was impressed by the idea the President conveyed to Dobrynin in May, namely that practical possible agreements lay between the optimum requirements of one side or the other. Therefore, this search was something which both sides had in common. In light of this common understanding, Gorbachev proposed that concrete areas be found for practical agreements in time for the summit.

Dubinina continued that the Soviet Union has moved, and is ready for a reduction in arms. In the area of space the Soviets had taken some steps and are ready for practical work. His purpose was not to identify specific elements at this time, but areas where we should concentrate our efforts. Gorbachev positively noted the President's assessment of the latest Soviet proposal on strategic offensive nuclear arms, which was conveyed through Secretary Shultz and Dubinina. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is awaiting a concrete reply and a discussion of the Soviet proposal with the U.S. delegation .

Dubinina indicated that with regard to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev was ready to consider a partial solution. The Soviet side may have some specific thoughts on this score, and if the U.S. side has some as well, the Soviet side is ready for serious work on this. Gorbachev is convinced that a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Dubinina then touched upon the issue of nuclear testing. Gorbachev understood the reasons behind the fact that President Reagan was not ready to cease nuclear tests. He, therefore, had weighed carefully what the President had conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin. In his letter, Gorbachev states that he, too, thinks that there should be talks between experts on all aspects of this issue. Such talks could touch upon questions of verification

and the obligation to determine the conditions and ways of attaining a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Such a meeting which the President had also spoken of, should take place as soon as possible, perhaps at the beginning of July.

Dubinina continued that Gorbachev thinks that the U.S. and USSR have certain common elements of an approach to the important issues, and that it would be possible to cooperate, including at the Summit, on such issues as improvement of nuclear power plant safety, peaceful uses of space, and other bilateral issues. Gorbachev has some thoughts on how to proceed in preparing this work. The Soviet side is proposing to work together without wasting time and using the fora and channels which already exist, such as the respective embassies. The foreign ministers of the two countries could then analyze the results of this work, and make final decisions with regard to the Summit.

Dubinina said that in his letter, Gorbachev indicated that he was for movement, for active preparations, and for a drastic turn in U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this point Dubinina handed Gorbachev's letter to the President, together with an unofficial Soviet translation.

President Reagan thanked the Ambassador and indicated that he was glad to hear that the General Secretary was looking forward to the Summit. The President had never given up belief in a Summit in the US, as was agreed in Geneva. He recalled that when he had talked with the General Secretary in Geneva, the President had indicated that before we could talk about weapons, and what was fair, we needed to remove the distrust which existed between the two countries. This needed to be done more than in words, it needed to be done with deeds. He had indicated that the US did not seek to acquire an advantage over the USSR, but that the record showed that there were reasons for US mistrust. After the Second World War, in which the US and the USSR were allies, the US disarmed. During that war, the US did not acquire one foot of foreign territory. At the same time, after the end of the war, the US was the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. It could have dictated its will to the world, but it did not do so. Instead, it proposed that all weapons be turned over to an international board, so that no country could threaten any other one. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, embarked on a program of massive rearmament which was offensive in nature, and which could not be justified by the need for defense.

President Reagan continued that General Secretary Gorbachev had not said this, but previous Soviet leaders had reiterated many times that the goal of Marxism and Leninism was the achievement of a one-world Communist state. Could the US ignore this and think

that it was not a possible target? General Secretary Gorbachev had not made such a statement and was the first Soviet leader to Reagan's knowledge who proposed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons and to completely eliminate them. The President welcomed this and was willing to join in this effort, since he had had this same goal for many years, but not through something like the SALT Treaty, which simply regulated an arms increase, but real negotiations to reduce the number of such weapons.

The President said that in order to achieve these aims there would need to be deeds to show that both sides wished to eliminate the distrust which exists between them, and which makes each feel on guard against the other.

The President emphasized that the US side was very grateful for the steps taken by the Soviet government to allow reunification of families through emigration. The Soviets had not seen the US give this a lot of publicity, or make public demands or take credit for it. It very much appreciates the Soviet actions.

The President indicated that he wished to conclude the meeting with the following thought, since he had already taken up a great deal of the Ambassador's time. He realized that with the new Soviet administration, June had been too early a date to have set for the Summit. Now the US side was faced with a difficulty due to elections in which members of the U.S. side would be involved. The US would very much appreciate it if the General Secretary or the Ambassador would propose a date after the early November elections for the Summit. Then the two sides could get together to work on issues to decrease the mistrust between the two sides.

Dubinina thanked the President for his frank and candid remarks, especially for discussing those things which he had discussed in private with Gorbachev. The President was aware of the position of the Soviet Union on these issues, since Gorbachev had indicated them, so Dubinina did not wish to dwell on this. He did wish to stress and stress again that the Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the US, and that it had no intentions with regard to the United States or other countries or regions except those of peaceful coexistence, peace and cooperation. The two countries fully shared a common goal of reducing arms. The President would see from Gorbachev's letter that the two sides are close to very significant agreements, and such agreements could be realized in time for a possible Summit. The Soviet side was proposing to begin preparatory work immediately. Then the foreign ministers might meet in September to evaluate the results of the work. This could take place immediately preceding the UN General Assembly. It was very important to prepare thoroughly for the Summit, and the US and USSR could really set an example and start the work of real disarmament.

78

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~~- 5 -~~

Dubin in concluded by saying that the USSR was approaching this in a constructive and optimistic fashion, and that it was ready to get down to work.

Drafted by D. Zarechnak, OPR/LS
Cleared: EUR:TWSimons, Jr.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~