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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/19/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1986 (2/4)

FOIA

F06-114/5

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YARHI-MILO

1703

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8444	POST IT NOTES	MATLOCK TO RODMAN AND SESTANOVICH RE CABLE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	ND	B1
8452	CABLE	100918Z JUL 86 <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	5	7/10/1986	B1
8445	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE GORDIYEVSKY ESSAY ON GORBACHEV ATTITUDES <i>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	2	7/9/1986	B1
8446	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GORBACHEV ON SUMMIT AND ARMS CONTROL: VIEWS OF A KGB DEFECTOR <i>D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5</i>	2	ND	B1 B3
8447	MEMO	CASEY TO POINDEXTER RE GORDIYEVSKIY <i>PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5</i>	1	7/3/1986	B1 B3
8448	MEMO	REFLECTIONS ON PROSPECTS FOR A SECOND SUMMIT AND SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS <i>D 3/14/2011 F06-114/5</i>	8	ND	B1 B3
8449	FAX COVER SHEET	MATLOCK TO STARK RE BLACK SEA CHALLENGE <i>R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5</i>	1	7/9/1986	B1

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8450	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE TELEPHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT NIXON R 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5	1	7/10/1986	B1
8451	FAX COVER SHEET	MATLOCK TO PUGLIARESI RE STATE'S PROPOSAL R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5	1	7/10/1986	B1

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- 1 - Rodwan
- 2 - Sestanovich

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The attached cable is quite interesting.

There is a recurrent pattern for some "Statue" lecturers to deal with problems more frankly than the Soviet media, so I don't take this as necessarily a harbinger

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASE

NLRR FOI-114/S #8444

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07

of more accurate media coverage?
It does show, however, that those really interested in the area have enough facts & knowledge to ask some penetrating questions -

Jack



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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 1692

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, XE
SUBJECT: CANDID ZNANIYE LECTURE ON MIDDLE EAST

REF: 85 MOSCOW 12944 (NOTAL)

1 C - ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY

2. IN AN UNUSUALLY FRANK ZNANIYE LECTURE, THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE'S PROFESSOR STARCHENKO DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE HAGHREB TO AFGHANISTAN. THE GREATLY INTERESTED AUDIENCE IGNORED STARCHENKO'S THEME OF A POSSIBLE AMERICAN THREAT TO THE USSR FROM THE "NORTHERN TIER," BUT ENCOURAGED HIM THROUGH OFTEN KNOWLEDGEABLE QUESTIONS TO DEAL SUBSTANTIVELY WITH THE REGION'S MYRIAD PROBLEMS. STARCHENKO OBSERVED THAT

--SECTARIAN PROBLEMS, RATHER THAN AMERICAN/ ISRAELI SUBTERFUGE, WERE THE MAIN SOURCE OF TURMOIL IN LEBANON.

--SYRIA OPPOSED PLO UNITY.

--LIBYAN POLICIES AT LEAST INDIRECTLY SUPPORTED TERRORISM.

--IRAN WAS A PRIME PRACTITIONER OF TERRORISM.

--NEITHER UNITY NOR MARXISM WAS IN THE ARAB FUTURE, AT LEAST FOR NOW.

END SUMMARY

3. PROFESSOR STARCHENKO OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE SPOKE ON JUNE 30 TO AN AUDIENCE OF PERHAPS SEVENTY-FIVE REGARDING THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST (I.E. FROM MOROCCO THROUGH AFGHANISTAN). STARCHENKO LECTURED FOR AN HOUR, FIRST MAKING GENERAL REMARKS AND THEN LOOKING AT DEVELOPMENTS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. HIS REMARKS BOTH IN THE LECTURE AND IN THE FOLLOWING HOUR OF Q'S AND A'S WERE SURPRISINGLY FRANK, HELPING TO GIVE HIS ENTHUSIASTIC AND, IN SOME INSTANCES, KNOWLEDGEABLE LISTENERS A SENSE OF THE REGION'S COMPLEXITIES.

Glasnost!

OVERVIEW: THE REGION AS A TINDERBOX

4. STARCHENKO BEGAN WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE REGION'S IMPORTANCE, NOTING THAT IT:

--CONTAINED A PREPONDERANCE OF THE NON-SOCIALIST WORLD'S ENERGY SUPPLIES;

--WAS A GEO-POLITICAL CROSSROADS; AND

--BORDERED ON THE USSR.

PRESSING THE SECURITY THEME WITH HIS AUDIENCE, STARCHENKO CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. SAW THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST AS A ZONE OF CONFLICT WITH THE USSR. WITH THIS IN MIND THE U.S. HAD ATTEMPTED TO BUILD UP ITS PRESENCE ON THE "NORTHERN TIER" THROUGH CENTCOM IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND U.S. TROOP PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON A FEW YEARS AGO. THE U.S. HAD ALSO

FORGED A STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH ISRAEL AND ISRAEL HAD JOINED SDI. IN STARCHENKO'S VIEW, ISRAELI AGGRESSIVENESS, AMERICAN SUPPORT AND COUNTERVAILING ARAB AND SOVIET INTERESTS MADE THE REGION A TINDERBOX.

LEBANON

5. IN HIS SET REMARKS STARCHENKO ASCRIBED THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON TO SECTARIAN RIVALRIES, THE ISRAELI INVASION AND AMERICAN INTERFERENCE AND THE PARALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT DUE TO ITS

*Arabs
Mikhailov*

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 11692

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, XE
SUBJECT: CANDID ZNANIYE LECTURE ON MIDDLE EAST

SECTARIAN STRUCTURE. THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE "COMPLICATED". THE SITUATION; SYRIAN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE LEBANESE RECONCILIATION HAD FAILED, BUT THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN LEBANON RECOGNIZED DAMASCUS' LEGITIMATE ROLE THERE.

6. ONE QUESTIONER, WANTING STARCHENKO TO GO FURTHER INTO HIS RELATIVELY NON-IDEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF LEBANON, ASKED WHY, "IMPERIALIST PLOTS ASIDE," AMAL WAS FIGHTING THE PALESTINIANS. STARCHENKO ANSWERED THAT THE PALESTINIANS WERE COLLECTING ARMS IN THE CAMPS TO STRIKE ISRAEL, BUT THEY ALSO USED THE WEAPONS IN LOCAL CONFLICTS. AS AMAL CONTROLLED THE AREAS NEAR THE CAMPS, IT WANTED TO DISARM THE PALESTINIANS. THE PALESTINIANS RESISTED AND FIGHTING STARTED.

THE PLO

7. STARCHENKO OBSERVED THAT THE PLO WAS PLAGUED BY SCHISM, DATING BACK TO THE EVACUATION FROM WEST BEIRUT AND THE 1983 REVOLT OF ABU MUSA. THE PLO HAD IN "ONE SPIRIT" CONDEMNED THE EGYPTIANS AND CAMP DAVID UNTIL ARAFAT WENT TO CAIRO. WITH THIS, ARAFAT BEGAN TO TRAVEL THE "CAMP DAVID ROUTE," WHICH LED TO THE NOVEMBER 1984 PNC AND THE AMMAN AGREEMENT. ARAFAT ONLY TURNED AWAY FROM THIS COMPROMISE IN PRINCIPLE AFTER THE USG REFUSED TO MEET WITH A JOINT JORDANIAN/ PALESTINIAN DELEGATION, ISRAEL BOMBED PLO HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS AND THE FEBRUARY 1986 NEGOTIATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN BROKE

DOWN. SINCE THEN, STARCHENKO ASSERTED, ARAFAT OFFICIALLY RENOUNCED THE AMMAN AGREEMENT. STARCHENKO NOTED THAT SYRIA SUPPORTED ABU MUSA AGAINST ARAFAT FROM THE START AND HAD REMAINED A FOE OF PLO UNITY. THIS WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF ARAFAT'S COMPROMISE ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND SYRIA'S PRINCIPLED STAND ON PEACE WITH ISRAEL.

ISRAEL

8. STARCHENKO NOTED THE COSTS OF THE LEBANON CAMPAIGN, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND RECOVERY, THE GROWTH OF EXTREME RIGHT WING POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. QUESTIONS IN THIS AREA INDICATED BOTH SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE AREA:

--ONE PERSON ASKED IF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLO STATE ON THE WEST BANK WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THE DISMEMBERMENT OF ISRAEL.

--ANOTHER WONDERED IF THE PALESTINIANS, IN FACT, CONSTITUTED A MAJORITY IN JORDAN.

--A THIRD ASKED ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN ISLAMIC BOMB--WHICH PROMPTED STARCHENKO TO NOTE THAT ISRAEL WAS AT OR BEYOND THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND WOULD NEVER PERMIT PAKISTAN, IRAQ, OR ANY OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRY TO ACQUIRE THE BOMB.

--A FOURTH ASKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL AIMS OF KAHANE'S KACH PARTY, WHICH STARCHENKO DESCRIBED

IN SOME DETAIL.

--WHEN ASKED ABOUT ISRAEL'S MILITARY VICTORIES OVER SYRIA IN PAST WARS, STARCHENKO PREDICTABLY ATTRIBUTED THEM TO THE MODERN CAPABILITIES OF ISRAEL'S POPULATION COMPARED WITH SYRIAN "FELLAHIN."

EGYPT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 11692

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, XE
SUBJECT: CANDID ZNANIYE LECTURE ON MIDDLE EAST

9. STARCHENKO GAVE AN ASSESSMENT OF EGYPT THAT WAS DOWNBEAT ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE, BUT UPBEAT ON FOREIGN POLICY. HE DWELT AT LENGTH ON EGYPT'S ECONOMIC CRISIS, TYING IT TO THE DROP IN OIL PRICES. HE SAID THAT SADAT'S OPEN ECONOMIC POLICY INCREASED INEQUALITY AND, TOGETHER WITH DECLINING REVENUES, HELPED TO EXPLAIN WHY FORTY PERCENT OF EGYPT'S POPULATION LIVED BELOW THE POVERTY LINE. RAPID POPULATION GROWTH ADDED TO THE PROBLEM AND POPULAR DISSATISFACTION--MANIFEST IN FEBRUARY POLICE RIOTS--WAS GROWING.

10. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY LINKAGE WITH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. WAS NOT HINDERING ITS READMISSION TO THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLDS--WITNESS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, GROWING TIES WITH IRAQ AND EGYPT'S READMISSION TO THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

11. ONE MEMBER OF THE AUDIENCE ASKED ABOUT SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. STARCHENKO OBSERVED THAT THEY HAD IMPROVED UNDER MUBARAK. EGYPT HAD BEGUN TO REPAY THE MILITARY DEBT, ON WHICH SADAT HAD DECLARED A MORATORIUM; THE TWO COUNTRIES EXCHANGED AMBASSADORS IN 1984 AND THE USSR WAS STARTING NEW PROJECTS IN EGYPT.

LIBYA

12. STARCHENKO WAS SURPRISINGLY FRANK ON LIBYA, IMPLICITLY NOTING ITS ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORISM. WHILE CLAIMING THAT THE U.S. USED TERRORISM AS A PRETEXT TO ATTACK LIBYA, STARCHENKO ADMITTED QADHAFI'S SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WORLDWIDE--E.G., IN IRELAND AND NEW CALEDONIA--WHICH AT TIMES EMPLOYED METHODS CONSIDERED TERRORIST BY SOME. HE ALSO SAID THAT LIBYA WAS NOT AWARE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE GROUPS RECEIVING ITS AID. WHEN ASKED ABOUT SOVIET-LIBYAN RELATIONS, HE SOMEWHAT DISTANCED MOSCOW FROM TRIPOLI: HE NOTED SOVIET ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI AND SAID THAT THERE WAS A BASIS FOR MORE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. BUT THAT DID NOT MEAN, HE CONCLUDED, SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ALL LIBYAN POLICIES.

IRAN, IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR

13. STARCHENKO DESCRIBED IN BLEAK TERMS RELIGIOUS FANATICISM IN IRAN. HE ASCRIBED THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR TO IRAN'S RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND ASSERTED THAT EVEN AFTER KHOMEINI'S DEATH THE WAR WOULD GO ON. HE CLAIMED THAT IRAN WAS A PRACTITIONER OF TERRORISM AND DREAMS OF PARADISE TEMPTED ENTHUSIASTIC CANDIDATES FOR EVEN SUICIDE OPERATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT IRANIAN TERRORIST BRIGADES WERE IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE AND EVEN LATIN AMERICA.

14. THE NORTHERN GULF PROMPTED GREAT INTEREST FROM THE AUDIENCE. ONE QUESTIONER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT MOSCOW'S RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD. STARCHENKO CAST A CLOUD OVER SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS, NOTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN AND CONSTANT CRITICISM OF THE USSR. IN CONTRAST, HE CITED THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN NOTING THE SOUNDNESS OF SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS. A SEPARATE QUESTION ON THE TUDEH DREW THE RESPONSE THAT TEHRAN WAS TRYING TO USE ONGOING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE TUDEH TO INFLUENCE SOVIET POLICY. A QUESTION ON HIZBOLLAH GAVE STARCHENKO THE OPPORTUNITY TO AGAIN DETAIL IRAN'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 11692

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, XE
SUBJECT: CANDID ZNANIYE LECTURE ON MIDDLE EAST

15. WHEN ASKED IF THE GULF WAR BEGAN WITH IRAQ'S AGGRESSION, STARCHENKO SAID THAT IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS HAD SPARKED AN IRAQI ATTACK AND NOW IRAQ WANTED PEACE. HE EXPLAINED TO ONE QUESTIONER THAT SYRIAN AND LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR IRAN WAS NOT RATIONAL AND TO ANOTHER THAT KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS TO RECONCILE SYRIA AND IRAQ FOUNDERED OVER THE LONG-TIME RIVALRY OF TWO WINGS OF THE BAAATH PARTY. HE TOLD A THIRD THAT SUNNI-SHIA TENSIONS WERE NOT THE MAIN FACTOR IN THE OUTBREAK OF THE GULF WAR--IRANIAN FANATICISM WAS.

AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH YEMEN

16. STARCHENKO LEFT TWO TROUBLE SPOTS FOR MOSCOW OFF HIS AGENDA--AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTH YEMEN. THE AUDIENCE, HOWEVER, HAD OTHER IDEAS. STARCHENKO RESPONDED TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY NOTING THAT NAJIBULLAH WAS A MORE ACTIVE LEADER THAN BABRAK. NAJIBULLAH ALSO HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING WHOLLY PUSHTUN, RATHER THAN HALF TADZHIK AND HALF PUSHTUN LIKE BABRAK--AND AFGHANISTAN WAS A PUSHTUN NATION. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A LARGE PUSHTUN POPULATION IN PAKISTAN AND NAJIBULLAH COULD USE THIS TO TRY TO STOP PAKISTAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN. WHEN ASKED WHY BEIJING SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN "BANDITS," STARCHENKO DESCRIBED IT AS PART OF THE PRC'S ANTI-SOVIET POLICIES, ATTEMPTING TO WEAKEN MOSCOW.

17. STARCHENKO EXPLAINED TO ANOTHER QUESTIONER THAT THE RETURN OF ABD AL FATAH ISMAIL FROM MOSCOW TO ADEN SET THE STAGE FOR THE "TRAGIC" JANUARY "EVENTS." ABD AL FATAH WAS GAINING STRENGTH, ALI NASIR MOHAMAD DECIDED TO REMOVE HIM AND THE RESULT WAS NEARLY CIVIL WAR. NOW, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION WAS STABILIZING.

NEITHER UNITY NOR MARXISM FOR THE ARABS

18. WHEN ASKED, STARCHENKO EXPRESSED GRAVE DOUBTS THAT THE ARABS WOULD EVER UNITE. THE REGION WAS DIVIDED BY RELIGION, SOCIETAL STRUCTURE, ANCIENT RIVALRIES AND PERSONALITIES. HE ALSO SAW LITTLE HOPE FOR THE "WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT." IN STARCHENKO'S VIEW, THERE WAS NO REAL PROLETARIAT IN THE AREA, AND THE ARAB COMMUNIST PARTIES THEREFORE WERE SMALL. MOREOVER, EVEN COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO THE USSR LIKE SYRIA AND LIBYA USED MARXISM IN DISTORTED FORM. HE CONCLUDED THE SESSION BY OBSERVING THAT IT WAS NOT SOUND POLICY TO BUILD COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE NEAR EAST.

COMMENT

19. THE FRANKNESS OF STARCHENKO'S REMARKS SURPRISED US. WHILE HE SAID NOTHING NEW TO STUDENTS OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST, MANY OF HIS POINTS HAVE YET TO APPEAR IN PRAVDA OR IZVESTIYA. HIS DESCRIPTION OF IRANIAN

TERRORISM AND SYRIAN OPPOSITION TO PLO UNITY AND HIS IMPLICIT ADMISSION OF LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM WERE GOOD EXAMPLES. ON THE WHOLE, HIS CANDOR MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION ON THE AUDIENCE, SOME OF WHOM HAD ATTENDED A RATHER STERILE ZNANIYE PRESENTATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST LAST SEPTEMBER (REFTEL).

20. AUDIENCE QUESTIONS DEMONSTRATED SOME KNOWLEDGE OF THE REGION, SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL AND LITTLE INTEREST IN THE IDEOLOGICAL PLATITUDES WHICH SHAPED SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE AREA. THE ENTHUSIASTIC AUDIENCE WAS RAISING QUESTION BT

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, XE
SUBJECT: CANDID ZNANIYE LECTURE ON MIDDLE EAST

AFTER QUESTION, EVEN AFTER THE ZNANIYE LECTURE ORGANIZER ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS TIME TO SHUT THE HALL. WHEN THE MICROPHONE WAS TURNED OFF, PERHAPS TWENTY-FIVE PEOPLE APPROACHED THE PODIUM TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION.

21. RIYADH - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HARTMAN
BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR PETER RODMAN
WALT RAYMOND
STEVE SESTANOVICH
SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: European Parliament on Afghanistan

When I was in Brussels last week, Poettering, a CDU representative in the European Parliament, called my attention to a resolution on Afghanistan which was passed by the European Parliament on June 12 by an overwhelming vote: 219 in favor, 33 opposed and 19 abstentions.

I have not seen mention of this in the media. It occurs to me that there is a lot of good material here for our public diplomacy. Could we not do more to call attention to it, particularly in Europe?

Attachments:

Tab A Resolution
Tab B Report (circulate)

European Parliament
9

RESOLUTION

219 Yes
33 No
19 Abstentions

on the situation in Afghanistan

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its resolution of 16 June 1982 on the situation in Afghanistan¹,
- having regard to its resolution of 16 June 1982 on a visit by a delegation from the European Parliament to Pakistan²,
- having regard to its resolutions adopted, following urgent debate, on 15 October 1982 on the situation in Poland and Afghanistan³, on 16 December 1982 on Afghanistan⁴, on 14 April 1983 on the arrest of the French doctor, Mr Augoyard in Afghanistan⁵, on 16 February 1984 on the situation in Afghanistan⁶, on 11 October 1984 on the arrest in Afghanistan of Mr Jacques Abouchar⁷, on 25 October 1984 on the sentencing of the French journalist Jacques Abouchar by the Afghan authorities⁸, and on 24 May 1984 on a plan of emergency Community aid for the Shamali-Paghman region in Afghanistan⁹,
- having regard to its resolution of 12 December 1985 on the situation in Afghanistan¹⁰,
- having regard to the following motions for resolutions:
 - by Mr VAN MIERT on the situation in Afghanistan (Doc. 2-1823/84),
 - by Mr GLINNE on the situation in Afghanistan (Doc. B 2-326/85),
 - by Mr DEPRez on the European response to the situation in Afghanistan (Doc. B 2-437/85),
 - by Mr KLEPSCH and others on behalf of the EPP Group on the situation in Afghanistan (Doc B2-576)
 - by Mr GLINNE and others on the situation in Afghanistan (Doc. B2-569/85),
 - by Mrs BLOCH VON BLOTTNITZ and others on behalf of the Rainbow Gp on violations of the Geneva Convention in the war against the people of Afghanistan (Doc. B 2-1076/85),
- having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (Doc. A 2-38/86)

1 OJ No. C 182, 19.7.1982, p. 43
 2 OJ No. C 182, 19.7.1982, p. 45
 3 OJ No. C 292, 8.11.1982, p. 110
 4 OJ No. C 13, 17.1.1983, p. 85
 5 OJ No. C 128, 16.5.1983, p. 64
 6 OJ No. C 77, 19.3.1984, p. 83
 7 OJ No. C 300, 12.11.1984, p. 35
 8 OJ No. C 315, 26.11.1984, p. 48
 9 OJ No. C 172, 2.7.1984, p. 122
 10 OJ No. C 352, 31.12.1985, p. 82

- 10
- A. having regard to the report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Felix Ermacora, in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights' Resolution 1984/55, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Document E/CN.4/1985/21 of 19 February 1985 and the further report by Mr Ermacora to the General Assembly at its 40th session, Document A/40/843 of 5 November 1985,
 - B. having regard to the United Nations' resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which were adopted by a large majority, and in particular, resolutions Es-6/2 of 14 January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 November 1982, 38/29 of 23 November 1983, 39/13 of 15 November 1984 and 40/12 of 13 November 1985,
 - C. having regard to the United Nations' efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the indirect negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan which have meanwhile resumed in Geneva under UN mediation with the object of restoring peace and independence in Afghanistan and safeguarding its status as a non-aligned country,
 - D. having regard to the following facts:
 - (a) the military occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union has already lasted for six years and the situation has steadily deteriorated during this time; it has had very serious consequences for the country's civilian population both from the social and economic point of view and as regards respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms,
 - (b) the problem of the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and other countries has assumed dramatic proportions,
 - (c) the majority of the Afghan people oppose the government in Kabul, the Soviet influence on their domestic policies and the military occupation by the Red Army,
 - (d) the Soviet Union refuses to withdraw from Afghanistan and thereby comply with the wishes expressed over the past 6 years by 122 countries in the world, the Islamic Summit and the Non-Aligned States. The USSR has even increased the number of its troops stationed in Afghanistan, which in 1985 totalled over 121 000 soldiers. They are supported by between 25 000 and 30 000 soldiers stationed in the Soviet provinces on the Soviet-Afghan border who are flown in to Afghanistan for action on a daily or weekly basis,
 - (e) the Soviet Union has fully occupied the Wakhan Salient in Eastern Afghanistan, expelling the local population, in effect annexing the area and creating for the first time a substantial frontier between the Soviet Union and Pakistan,

- (f) a number of Soviet army soldiers, estimated at several hundred, have deserted their units and are presently fighting with the Afghan resistance or are held prisoner by them in very difficult conditions, in some cases for periods of many years,
- (g) Afghanistan did not represent a serious threat to the USSR either because of its own army or because of Western or other arms supplies. Before the Communist take-over in April 1978, the relationship with Afghanistan was held up by the Soviet Union as an example of the 'peaceful coexistence' of states with different social structures,
- (h) the political and military resistance of the freedom fighters in Afghanistan remains undiminished after 6 years.
- (i) the Soviet war in Afghanistan has brought unimaginable suffering to the Afghan people. It is estimated that 1.5 million Afghans have been killed and 1.2 million wounded. Over 4 million escaped from their native country or were driven out. More than 3 million Afghans are now living in Pakistan and 1 million in Iran. Many hundreds of thousands of people are living in hiding without any support in the mountains of Afghanistan; the Soviet Union is guilty of mass murder in Afghanistan,
- (j) the proceedings of the meeting of jurists held in Turin on 30 November 1985 under the auspices of the European committees set up to support the Afghan resistance movement clearly concluded that the resistance was a representative body and took the view that despite its internal differences, it was competent to represent the Afghan people in the fight for its right to self-determination and national identity,
- (k) the border incursions by the regular Afghan army and the Soviet occupying forces into Pakistan could lead to the spread of the war and an escalation of fighting, which means that the situation in Afghanistan is a serious threat to world peace,
- (l) the Soviet forces in Afghanistan are increasingly turning their attacks to civilian targets, in contravention of international law. The Soviet Union is using its weapons for calculated terrorist attacks on the Afghan population in areas occupied by the resistance. This calculated terrorism involves the following tactics : bombing of villages, destruction of identifiable hospitals in the villages, obstructing the work of doctors and medical staff, refusing to allow the International Red Cross to operate in all the regions of Afghanistan, destruction of the harvest and cattle, if necessary, use of chemical weapons which either cause burning or have severe effects on the skin, lungs and nerves, arrests, torture and murder on political grounds, murder of prisoners of war, attacks on the civilian population, including women and children, such as the dropping of small plastic 'butterfly bombs' which explode when touched and have very often caused serious injuries to children. These tactics employed by the Soviet army seriously contravene the most important international law agreements on nations and war. They represent a wholesale violation of human rights, as was made clear in the UN report of 19 February 1985,
- (m) the purpose of the terrorist action described above is to intimidate the population and destroy the resistance.

- (n) the Soviet Union is also banking on the fact that the West will ultimately accept this type of inhuman warfare and occupation. Afghanistan is to be turned into a completely dependent satellite state of the Soviet Union.
- (o) there are many instances of civilians being murdered by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.
- (p) medical care for the population in the provinces concerned by the fighting is totally inadequate and large-scale international aid is needed,
- (q) the Afghan resistance is one more example of the struggle for self-determination, freedom and peace and is comparable in many ways with the resistance of the European peoples against totalitarian foreign rule,

1. Emphasizes once again that the Soviet Union must withdraw its troops from Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally and thereby restore Afghanistan's neutral and non-aligned status;
2. Calls for the International Red Cross to be allowed into Afghanistan, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and urges the Member States of the European Community to continue to support the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to extend its humanitarian aid to all the victims and obtain authorization to carry out its work of providing protection and assistance in Afghanistan;
3. Condemns,
 - (a) imprisonment on political grounds, and calls for the many thousands of political prisoners to be released,
 - (b) systematic torture in prisons and camps,
 - (c) the atrocities committed by both belligerent parties,
 - (d) the deportation of 50,000 Afghans, including many children, to the Soviet Union for indoctrination,
 - (e) the killing of prisoners of war,
 - (f) the destruction of villages, cattle and harvests,
 - (g) the repeated bombing of recognized medical centres in the provinces,

- (h) the use of 'butterfly bombs', whose principal victims are children,
- (i) the interference with the work of doctors and medical staff and the banning of the International Red Cross from Afghanistan,
- (j) the use of caustic, irritating and noxious chemical weapons,
- (k) the attacks by Soviet aircraft on the territory of Pakistan,
- (l) the prohibition of free media coverage of the events in Pakistan,
- (m) the deaths of some one and a half million Afghans since the beginning of the Soviet intervention, out of the original total population of 15 million, while four and a half million refugees have had to flee to Pakistan and Iran and a million Afghans are surviving in extremely difficult conditions within the country itself;

4. Calls on the Commission to step up economic and financial aid and the supply of medicines and food for the Afghanistan people through both the International Red Cross and the private aid organizations (e.g. Médecins sans Frontières, Aide Médicale Internationale, Médecins du Monde) and to provide for the necessary appropriations in the budget.

These aid measures should serve in particular the following purposes:

- (a) the recruitment of doctors and medical staff and the purchase of medicines and medical care in the provinces of Afghanistan, in which European medical centres should be set up, which would be run by the International Red Cross. In addition doctors and medical staff in Europe should be asked to provide voluntary assistance in Afghanistan;
- (b) the stepping-up of food aid as called for by the European Parliament in its resolution of 12 December 1985 and special material assistance for Pakistan and the 3.5 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan to relieve their extremely difficult situation, and the supply of clothing and footwear via non-governmental organizations;
- (c) the training of Afghan refugees in skilled trades;
- (d) the creation of a special fund to promote cultural events in order to safeguard Afghanistan's cultural heritage;

(e) a concerted programme by the Twelve to rescue and offer sanctuary to Soviet soldiers who have deserted their units in Afghanistan and wish to live in a Western country,

5. Calls on the Council of Ministers to establish close cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees so as to ensure that the measures taken by the EEC and the United Nations on behalf of the Afghan refugees are properly coordinated and do not overlap, so as to provide the maximum possible amount of aid;
6. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve, meeting in political cooperation, to submit each year a 'report on the situation regarding the rights of the Afghan people'. This report should give an account of the human rights situation and describe the action taken by the Member States and the Community itself to secure self-determination for the Afghan people. It should also provide detailed information about the situation of the refugees;
7. Calls on the Community and on the governments of the Member States furthermore to recognize the Afghan resistance movement as being competent to represent the Afghan people in its fight to exercise its right to self-determination;
8. Calls on the Commission, the Council and the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to work actively towards an early negotiated political solution involving all the parties concerned, including the various factions of the Afghan resistance movement;
9. Notes with interest the statement made by UN negotiator Diego CORDOVEZ in Islamabad on 18 March 1986, concerning a draft timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; welcomes further the continuation of the Geneva negotiations taking fully into consideration the political platform of the Afghan resistance whose objectives should be the conclusion of a political agreement which would restore peace and independence to Afghanistan and acknowledge its position as a non-aligned nation;

- 15
10. Calls for 'national reconciliation talks', with the direct participation of the resistance aimed at achieving a cease-fire in the near future. Such a cease-fire should be supervised by a UN peace-keeping force. It would be the necessary precondition for the exercise by the Afghan people of its right to self-determination in complete freedom and without outside interference;

 11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the Community meeting in political cooperation, the Council, the Commission, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and Pakistan and the United Nations.



European Communities

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

WORKING DOCUMENTS

English Edition

1986-87

7 May 1986

SERIES A

DOCUMENT A 2-38/86

REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee
on the situation in Afghanistan

Rapporteur: Mr H.-G. POETTERING

8445 17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

July 9, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Essay on Gorbachev's Attitudes

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
As Amended
E.O. 13526

I agree that [REDACTED] views are most interesting. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I was impressed both by his insights and his integrity in making clear what was speculation on his part and what was based on direct knowledge. Most of the views in his essay are speculation, but I believe we should take it seriously, since it comes from a person who had [REDACTED]

I agree with [REDACTED] comments on the Soviet attitude toward summitry, though I think the chances that Gorbachev would pull out of the meeting here are rather slimmer than he suggests. If things don't seem to jell in at least one arms control area, however, he might try to postpone the trip to the U.S. until early next year.

His comment on the Soviet attitude toward compliance is interesting -- that the Soviets are quite willing to violate if they suspect we are violating. Here the operative word is suspect. Their suspicions are so deep and unreasonable that this may indeed be one key to the way they consider the issue psychologically. They may well assume, for example, that we have cleverly retained some BW capability, and use this to justify in their own minds their decision to do so. (This should, of course, not be considered in any way a valid excuse for their action, but only as a point in understanding the Soviet mind-set.)

I believe [REDACTED] is absolutely right in his reading of the Soviet attitude toward INF. Possibly, he is also largely correct in what he says about nuclear testing. Although he does not say so, I believe the Soviets have concluded that we refuse to agree to a test ban because of SDI research, not because we need testing for stockpile verification and weapons modernization. Their attitude is probably that if they can do without the latter, why can't we?

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/5 #8445
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11


~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A  essay

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	VADM J. Poindexter	7/7	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

~~SECRET~~ 21

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 40268

COPY NO. 1 OF 1


ACTION		FILE
APPROVAL	X	INFORMATION
COMMENT		PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE		RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY		RETURN
DISPATCH		SIGNATURE

HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY

REMARKS:

Admiral,
 I forwarded a copy of the
 TD to Matlock & Linhard.
 v/r Jim Radzinski

NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



Warning Notice
 Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
 Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions


DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 25, 1997

By CWS NARA, Date 6/25/02

~~SECRET~~


8447 22



~~SECRET~~
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

3 July 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, USN
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500



Dear John,

I thought you might find this think piece [redacted] interesting.
[redacted] seems more knowledgeable and sophisticated
about Soviet political thinking than any other [redacted]
[redacted] stuff I have read.

Yours,

William J. Casey

Attachment:



~~SECRET~~

FOIA(b)(1), (3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/5 #8447
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: ALEX DIMITRIEF *Alex Dimitrief*
OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM GOVERNOR SNELLING REGARDING
THE SOVIET UNION

Because the attached letter from Governor Snelling about the President's efforts toward the Soviet Union is so open-ended and invites a variety of responses, I would appreciate receiving guidance from your office as to what type of response we should prepare -- i.e., general or specific, tone, etc. We plan, of course, to clear any letter with your office before sending it out.

I can be reached at X-7154. Thank you for your help.

7/10 I would thank him for his thoughts and assure him that the President indeed intends to do just what he suggests -- to test Soviet intentions in concrete negotiations directed at solving specific problems.

Jack Matlock

SNELLING '86

387241
U.S. SENATE 32

(802) 985-9471
(800) FOR-VT86

Co-Chairmen

Gov. Deane C. Davis
Mrs. Lola P. Aiken

April 8, 1986

*M. Daniels
cc: A. Card*

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

When we last visited, we discussed how I could help you bring the federal budget deficit under control as a member of the United States Senate.

Today, I want to take a few minutes of your time to urge you to pursue an unprecedented opportunity for world peace -- an opportunity brought about by the steadfastness of your leadership in restoring America's national defense capability.

Before your second term of office ends, I believe you have an opportunity to perform one of the greatest services ever performed by any Chief of State in the history of the world.

Your conduct in office has prepared you to lead the way to the creation of a new relationship with the Soviet Union. Even as Richard Nixon's public policies provided him with an unusual opportunity to establish rapport with the People's Republic of China, you have created a situation which might facilitate the development of a new relationship with the Soviet Union -- if they, in fact, are prepared to make genuine, honest and well-balanced commitments to a process aimed at relieving world tensions and the awful threat of global war by miscalculation.

Mr. President, I do not know if the new Soviet regime believes that they should put aside efforts to bring more and more people under their domination by force and preserve huge conventional and nuclear arsenals.

I do believe, however, that the actions of both the United States of America, under your leadership, and the peoples of western Europe during the last half dozen years, together with a number of domestic developments within the

The Snelling '86 Committee
Jelly Mill Common, Route 7
Box 1986
Shelburne, VT 05482

The President
April 8, 1986

Page 2

Soviet Union, provide the possibility that a safe and reliable accommodation between our two powerful nations can be reached.

History clearly demonstrates, and I believe the people of the United States understand, the firmness of purpose with which the Soviet Union proceeds towards its goal of world domination by Communism. Most of us here in the United States have hopes that over the long run the whole world will come to enjoy democracy. Our belief is that individuals, given a choice, will elect to govern themselves. But the Marxist philosophy is that it is perfectly appropriate to use force to establish Communist dictatorships wherever it appears that such a goal may be achieved.

Fortunately, the United States has maintained a formidable defense capacity. And, thank God, the United States has encouraged and assisted many other nations of the world to maintain a strong defense capacity and to reject Communist inroads and demands.

I believe the Soviet Union must have been very surprised as it watched the peoples and governments of western Europe vote over and over again in recent years for the deployment of NATO missiles as a partial Free World response to the SS 20 Soviet missiles put in place in 1979/80.

Soviet planners had hoped that the 1981 clamor within the United States for an arms "freeze," despite the then overwhelming superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional weaponry and the morbid threat of the huge Soviet nuclear weapons already in place, would enable them to freeze a status quo in which they were immensely stronger. However, the good judgment of the American people and of the United States Congress, together with the response of the people of western Europe, resulted in an effective cancellation of the Soviet missile threat to western Europe.

Mr. President, I believe you are largely responsible for having given the Russians real reasons to negotiate honestly on the subjects of disarmament and peace. They see in you someone who is not easily bluffed and not at all dissuadable from creating the kind of strength which reduces the potential gain for Russian adventurism.

34

Simultaneously, of course, you have created within the United States broad support for the belief that it is important to maintain sufficient national strength to guarantee that the United States need never surrender its own liberty or abandon any ally in response to Soviet blackmail backed by superior strength.

You and your country have a unique opportunity to aggressively probe the willingness of the Soviet Union to make genuine and important changes in their policies in pursuit of a lengthy period of reduced tensions, reduced inventories of weapons, and reduced confrontation.

In addition to what you have done, and what the actions of the people of Europe have done, to create a climate in which genuine, safe and reliable accommodations might occur, there are other events which argue for intensive probing of the Russian interest in reaching genuine accommodation at this time:

1) Premier Gorbachev enjoys a substantially different position in the Soviet hierarchy than any of his predecessors for many years. He is of a new generation and, perhaps, representative of the new technocrats coming into power. I do not have any reason to believe he is less of an ideologue than his predecessors, but I think there is an abundance of feeling that he is more than just an ideologue.

Further, his age gives the people, and particularly the other leaders of the Soviet Union, every reason to believe he will be around for quite a while. If, for no other reason, he has a greater opportunity to actually negotiate and deliver than did those predecessors who were seen as interim leaders.

2) Premier Gorbachev now has in his government some senior officials with substantial experience in the United States. These are people who also have enough power and standing to explain how the United States is likely to behave without the personal risk which formerly followed the pronouncements of Soviet diplomats who had served in Washington. Dobrynin and Gromyko might offer good advice to Gorbachev about the American interest in a reasonable peace - and might also counsel not to mistake overtures from the United States as signs of weakness.

The president
April 8, 1986

Page 4

3) While Americans debate what level of defense we can afford, there is reason to believe that a similar debate is going on in a much smaller arena within the Soviet Union. Russian military expense is twice as large a share of GNP as American defense. Although citizens of the Soviet Union cannot and do not effectively complain about shortages of consumer goods, it is a fact that Soviet planners are failing year after year to meet their own targets for industrial output.

Even dictators can't change all the rules of the game. The Soviet Union is unable, despite the privation and shortages their people endure, to apply the capital required to accomplish adequate expansion of industrial capacity or productivity, or even of agricultural capacity. At least some of Gorbachev's advisors and colleagues should see what is in it for them to make reasonable concessions which might permit a period of accommodation, with substantial reductions in military expenditures, both nuclear and conventional.

I have and do applaude your determination to make the United States of America strong. One of the best arguments for clearly demonstrable strength is that such strength is an essential prerequisite to undertaking any negotiations from which one might expect real progress at acceptable levels of risk.

And now, as you approach the final several years of service as President, you are in the best possible position to probe the sincerity of all Russian statements about negotiations, disarmament and reduction of tensions. You could exchange as many as four visits with Soviet officials between now and the end of your term, so the pace of negotiations would not impose the disadvantages which have frequently accompanied U.S.-Soviet negotiations of the past.

If the Russians understand us at all, they might well be willing now to back their claimed desires to ease tensions with deeds. You are in a position to do for U.S.-Soviet relations what Richard Nixon did for U.S.-China relations -- or more.

The President
April 8, 1986

Page 5

I urge you to demonstrate the highest level of interest in exploring the Soviet willingness to achieve an accommodation with the United States and the western world, which will reduce tensions throughout the world.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Snelling
Former Governor Richard A. Snelling
Candidate for U. S. Senate

7/9/86

37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

Jim Stark
pls see JFM's
notation.

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 5076

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06 7/4/85 #8449

BY CS NARA DATE 11/29/67 10 JUL

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Fortier

to

many

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 7353

FYI

- Brooks
- Burghardt
- Cannistraro
- Childress
- Cobb
- Danzansky
- deGraffenreid
- Djerejian
- Dobriansky
- Donley
- Douglass
- Farrar
- Grimes
- Hanley
- Kelly
- Kraemer

FYI

- Laux
- Lenczowski
- Levine
- Linhard
- Mahley
- Major
- Mandel
- May
- North
- Perry
- Platt
- Pugliaresi
- Raymond
- Reger
- Ringdahl

FYI

- Ross
- Sable
- Sachs
- Sestanovich
- Small
- Sommer
- Soos
- Stark
- Steiner
- St Martin
- Tahir-Kheli
- Teicher
- Thompson
- Tillman
- MORTON
- _____

INFORMATION McDaniel

Rodman

Pearson

Secretariat

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

I agree with State that it would be wise not to conduct the Black Sea challenge at this time. How often is it necessary? In the past, once each year or two was considered sufficient to uphold our LOS position - Jack

SECRET

Return to Secretariat

secret

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: FRANKLIN L. LAVIN *Frank Lavin ml*
Deputy Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Vanderbilt IMPACT Symposium

As the attached information indicates, the President will soon receive an invitation to participate in the IMPACT Symposium at Vanderbilt University.

The NSC recommends that the invitation be regretted.

Attachment:

Letter with brochure

cc: Jack Matlock

7/10
Why do we recommend against
this?
It is on a domestic theme.
There is no reason for the
NSC to make a recommendation
from one way or the
other!
Jack

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Handwritten: 8450
~~Matlock~~ 5168
7/11/39

SECRET

July 10, 1986

ACTION

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JMP*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from President Nixon

President Nixon has requested a private conversation with you the morning of July 11. George Shultz has heard that he may have received an invitation to visit Moscow, and therefore it is possible that the purpose of the call is to consult you regarding how to respond to the invitation.

I believe strongly that you should discourage Nixon from making a trip to Moscow at this time. The Soviet intent is obviously to involve as many prominent people as possible in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue as a means of bringing pressure to bear on you. Even though Nixon would probably be responsible in his comments on substance, a visit at this time would only encourage the Soviets to pursue their splitting tactics and possibly delay their getting down to the real business of negotiating with you. Furthermore, it would carry an unfortunate imagery with the public -- if we are subsequently able to reach some sound agreements with the Soviets, it might seem to many that Nixon had played a key role. In fact, if we are successful, it will be the result of your own strategy and your own efforts.

I have attached two sets of suggested talking points: one for use in case Nixon asks your advice and the other for use if he tells you he intends to go.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you draw on the talking points at Tab I if Nixon should telephone you regarding the advisability of his accepting an invitation to visit Moscow.

OK NO

RR
—

—

Call made

Attachment:
Tab A

Suggested Talking Points

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/5 #8450
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11

~~Matlock~~ 46
4792
File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Brzezinski Book

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Cap Weinberger has sent you a summary of the points in Zbig Brzezinski's recent book, Game Plan.

Zbig makes some interesting and sound points regarding our strategy in dealing with the Soviets, and you may wish to look over the summary.

I would call attention in particular to Brzezinski's dictum "For the United States, not losing in the American-Soviet rivalry means prevailing; for the Soviet Union, not prevailing means losing."

I believe that is absolutely correct, since we have much the stronger, more efficient and humane society. I would put it even more concisely: "The U.S. will prevail if it does not lose; the USSR will lose if it does not prevail."

RECOMMENDATION

That you read the summary at Tab A.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Summary



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

June 20, 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear John:

Enclosed is the review of the Brzezinski book I mentioned
and a paper on varying defense budget figures.

As you will see from the second set of figures (from the
top), the Congressional Budget Resolution offers considerable
worries to us, not only in 1987 but also for 1988 and 89.

The bottom set of figures represents a set of goals
toward which we believe we should work for all three years.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "S. Papp", is written below the word "Sincerely,".

Enclosures - 2

*not here.
Please get.
see last page*



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

42

June 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER

SUBJECT: Review of Zbigniew Brzezinski's New Book, "Game Plan"
-- ACTION MEMORANDUM

Dr. Brzezinski has written a very provocative and timely book. This is a rare case of a basically academic piece that is relevant to the present world. Historical trends and strategic thought are bound with an understanding of how government works around a central proposition: "The American-Soviet contest is not some temporary aberration but a historical rivalry that will long endure." His thesis: "This rivalry is global in scope but it has clear geopolitical priorities, and to prevail the United States must wage it on the basis of a consistent and broad strategic perspective." The purpose of his book: To serve as "a practical guide to action."

The Imperial Collision

Brzezinski believes there is "an enduring sense of direction" that gives "geopolitical substance to Soviet foreign policy moves," which contrasts with "the West's practice of foreign policy by reflex." He quotes Gromyko, the West often "mistakes tactics for strategy....The absence of a solid, coherent, and consistent policy is their big flaw."

He argues that "geopolitical factors laid the groundwork for a collision between the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II. The fact that America and Russia differed from each other to a greater extent than any previous historical rivals made conflict almost inevitable.....By all previous standards, the United States and the Soviet Union should have gone to war against each other on some occasion, but the destructiveness of nuclear weapons has induced an unprecedented measure of restraint."

Is the Soviet Union inherently aggressive or just paranoid and insecure? Brzezinski aptly quotes Richard Pipes, "Common sense, of course, might suggest even to those who lack knowledge of the facts that a country can no more become the world's most spacious as a result of suffering constant invasions than an individual can gain wealth from being repeatedly robbed."

The reality of enduring the American-Soviet conflict is precluded by "prudence -- induced by the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons -- place a high premium on a long-term strategy for a global contest in which the outcome, also for the first time, is not likely to be determined by a direct clash of arms."

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According to Brzezinski the global American-Soviet contest is waged on three central strategic fronts: the far Western, the far Eastern, and the Southwestern. Central to understanding Soviet aims is that "for the Soviet leaders, the exclusion of America from Eurasia has been a major political goal since their agreement to that effort with Hitler in 1940."

The outcome of this contest, he argues "is likely to be determined by who controls or influences the "geopolitical linchpins in their respective regions:" Poland, Germany, South Korea, the Philippines, and either Iran or the combination of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"In the broadest terms," he theorizes, "Soviet strategy is focused on both a negative and positive central goal. Defensively, it is to prevent the political and military encirclement of the Soviet Union by the United States and its allies. Moscow's greatest fear is a united Europe, militarily and politically revitalized, tied closely to the United States and exercising a magnetic attraction on Eastern Europe; and a close U.S.-Japanese-Chinese connection, with China and Japan eventually capable of pressing hard on the relatively empty territories of Soviet Siberia....To foreclose the possibility of such an encirclement, the Soviets must sever the connection with America at each end of the Eurasian continent. And that, in turn, would tip the global balance in Russia's favor...As a result, the debate about whether the Soviets are primarily insecure (defensive) or aggressive (offensive) is meaningless."

Peripheral Zones of Special Vulnerability

He argues that, "despite forty years of "enforced indoctrination," all the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe remain in power through "heavy reliance on severe internal police control, reinforced by the potential threat of Soviet intervention -- and by Soviet troops on the ground in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary." It is clear that the only doctrine that shapes the political reality of these countries is not Marxist doctrine but the Brezhnev Doctrine.

For the United States he warns that "By the end of the century, especially if in the meantime the United States remains largely on the geopolitical defensive, it is quite possible that a fourth central strategic front may be opened on the Rio Grande."

The One-Dimensional Rival: A Threat Assessment

Brzezinski believes that, "In the course of about a decade, the continuing Soviet buildup of strategic weapons and the covert expansion of Soviet strategic defenses could create a more unbalanced and inherently insecure situation." "Indeed," he adds, "The main danger is not that of a first-strike as such but rather that the increased U.S. vulnerability to such a strike would give the Soviet Union greater flexibility for the use of both its strategic and conventional military power, while inducing geostrategic paralysis on the American side." The solution: "Unless the threat of one-sided vulnerability is alleviated by a comprehensive arms control agreement, the key issues for the near future are in what mix and numbers U.S. strategic offensive forces must be deployed so that a survivable U.S. second-strike capability credibly deters a Soviet first-strike; and/or what kind of strategic defenses the United States should also deploy so that a Soviet first-strike is rendered militarily pointless."

He also cites "a truly ominous shift in Moscow's military doctrines. By the early 1980s, Soviet military theorists had focused their attention on a 'general conventional war' waged on a broad front and lasting for a protracted period until a Soviet victory without the use of nuclear weapons by either side." A deterioration of the strategic balance "might affect the American willingness and capacity to deter the use of Soviet conventional forces in geopolitically critical areas proximate to the Soviet Union."

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

Brzezinski argues that, "Once (Soviet) military power is checked, the Soviet Union ceases to be a historically threatening rival." He highlights the necessity of maintaining a military capability sufficient to negate Soviet efforts to intimidate strategic U.S. friends and allies, to block "direct and indirect Soviet expansionism," and maintain "a secure nuclear retaliatory force capable of inflicting massive societal devastation on the Soviet Union even after a Soviet first-strike directed at U.S. strategic forces."

He attacks those "well-meaning Americans," who believe "arms control is the shortcut to peace and security," which contrasts to Soviet leaders who view it "as a tool for seeking strategic preponderance." The "key danger," is "the contamination of strategy by pacifism." He notes that "outspoken proponents of arms control, who have opposed since the 1970s the acquisition of new strategic weapons systems," provide "Kremlin leaders...an incentive to stall in negotiations."

Brzezinski argues that arms control "Should be viewed as part of -- not a substitute for -- American national defense

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policy." Unless a "truly historical transformation" takes place in U.S.-Soviet relations, "The most promising route for arms control is to seek narrowly focused, highly specific, and perhaps interim agreements...subject to genuine verifications, including, in the case of mobile missile launchers, some form of on-site inspection." He argues that "The United States "must make a major public issue of Soviet strategic secrecy, and insist that its veil be lifted for the sake of mutual security." Agreements "must concentrate on the central issue: the first-strike system that represent the most acute security problem for each side," with the emphasis being in future comprehensive arms control agreements on 'qualitative prohibitions' -- the number of systems capable of undertaking a precise first-strike attack below the number required to make such an attack militarily effective."

He then makes an intriguing suggestion for "parallal arrangements for the security of space-based early warning and reconnaissance satellites" citing a Wohlstetter proposal for designating zones in space for exclusive U.S. or Soviet satellite deployment." (See Tab B.)

Brzezinski believes in a common American Soviet objective, in which each side knows "that a disarming first-strike against its opponent would be militarily futile and that it would be suicidal." Strategic defensive forces play a fundamental role in this arrangement. He believes that the United States should move toward deploying a limited strategic defense, composed of a space-based screen to destroy missiles in the boost phase and a land-based terminal defense to intercept in-coming warheads. This would inject a degree of randomness into any Soviet planning of a first-strike nuclear attack." The United States should propose a "renegotiation" of the outdated ABM Treaty and "give notice of its intent to reevaluate its adherence to the treaty, and possibly abrogate it and proceed with the deployment of a two-tier, limited, counter-first-strike strategic defense."

Brzezinski then argues for "more global conventional flexibility." His point: We presently have "a military posture so skewed in favor of Europe" that it "clearly needs to be adjusted." He says that "a gradual -- and certainly only partial -- reduction in the level of the American forces in Europe is necessary to increase U.S. flexibility for meeting threats elsewhere." He believes a joint American-European anti-tactical missile project and the application of SDI technologies to conventional warfare could more than offset the proposed reduction in U.S. forces in Europe." He states that, "budgetary savings from these reductions should be allocated to a significant expansion of U.S. air-life capability," and that "manpower withdrawn from Europe should be absorbed into an enlarged Rapid Deployment Force through the creation of additional light divisions."

U.S. Geopolitical Priorities

The United States "must deliberately promote...several key geopolitical objectives," Brzezinski believes. These should include: accelerating "the emergence of a more self-reliant Western Europe and eventually, a Europe restored from its post war division;" promoting "an informal strategic triangle in the Far East through wider economic and political cooperation among the United States, Japan, and China;" shoring up "the soft underbelly of Southwest Asia by strengthening politically and reinforcing militarily the Soviet Union's southern neighbors; and supporting "the internal pressures in the Soviet-dominated East European states and even within the Soviet Union itself for greater political diversity and tolerance."

Prevailing Historically

Brzezinski sums up the U.S.-Soviet challenge this way: "For the United States, not losing in the American-Soviet rivalry means prevailing; for the Soviet Union, not prevailing means losing." To prevail, "The United States must have constancy in purpose and continuity in geostrategy."


Comments

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His emphasis on the other dimensions of SDI, especially ATBM and conventional improvement, were particularly worthwhile. SDI must be portrayed as more than an indefinite research program, it has to have some merit in the world of today's threat -- if only because of the political climate manifested in the anti-SDI letter signed by too many members of the Senate. SDI could well be the key to maintaining our overall deterrent into the future as well as provide a means for alliance cohesion if pursued carefully. It is at the forefront of what we do best to keep the peace -- maintaining our technological edge. This competitive strategy plays to our strength. A speech drawing on many of the excellent points, while sidestepping the point-defense issue could be useful. An activist approach could use some of Brzezinski's arguments while preempting the withdrawal from Europe crowd.

Recommend that you sign the letter to Dr. Brzezinski (Tab A).


John Duncan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Travel Authorization

The Institute for East-West Security Studies has invited me to attend a working dinner in New York on Wednesday, July 16. Authorization is requested for my travel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached travel authorization.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment: Travel Authorization

cc: Admin Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATIONDATE: July 11, 1986

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1. TRAVELER'S NAME: AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S):
To attend Institute for East-West Security Studies
Working Dinner
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington, D.C., to New York City, NY, and return
- DEPARTURE DATE 7/15/86 RETURN DATE 7/16/86
TIME pm TIME early pm
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR COMMERCIAL AIR X POV RAIL OTHER
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION \$110^t PER DIEM \$126 OTHER \$24 TOTAL TRIP COST \$260
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES NO
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ None
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock
13. APPROVALS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Brzezinski Book

Cap Weinberger has sent you a summary of the points in Zbig Brzezinski's recent book, Game Plan.

Zbig makes some interesting and sound points regarding our strategy in dealing with the Soviets, and you may wish to look over the summary.

I would call attention in particular to Brzezinski's dictum "For the United States, not losing in the American-Soviet rivalry means prevailing; for the Soviet Union, not prevailing means losing."

I believe that is absolutely correct, since we have much the stronger, more efficient and humane society. I would put it even more concisely: "The U.S. will prevail if it does not lose; the USSR will lose if it does not prevail."

RECOMMENDATION

That you read the summary at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Summary

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

June 20, 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear John:

Enclosed is the review of the Brzezinski book I mentioned and a paper on varying defense budget figures.

As you will see from the second set of figures (from the top), the Congressional Budget Resolution offers considerable worries to us, not only in 1987 but also for 1988 and 89.

The bottom set of figures represents a set of goals toward which we believe we should work for all three years.

If you have any questions, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "F. S. P." or similar, written in a cursive style.

Enclosures - 2



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

51
June 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER

SUBJECT: Review of Zbigniew Brzezinski's New Book, "Game Plan"
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
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John Duncan

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 JUL 10 A 7: 19

DECLASSIFIED

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 5110

NLRR FC06-114/S #8451

ACTION OFFICER: PUGLIARESI

BY CU NARA DATE 11/29/07 DUE: 12 JULY

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter Fortier

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3550

FYI

FYI

FYI

Brooks

Laux

Ross

Burghardt

Lenczowski

Sable

Cannistraro

Levine

Sachs

Childress

Linhard

Sestanovich

Cobb

Mahley

Small

Danzansky

Major

Sommer

deGraffenreid

Mandel

Soos

Djerejian

Matlock

Stark

Dobriansky

May

Steiner

Donley

North

St Martin

Douglass

Perry

Tahir-Kheli

Farrar

Platt

Teicher

Grimes

Pugliaresi

Thompson

Hanley

Raymond

Tillman

Kelly

Reger

Kraemer

Ringdahl

INFORMATION McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

I think State's proposal is sound. We probably do ourselves some harm in CoCom by trying to block reports which are not strategically sensitive.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Return to Secretariat