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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8338	MEMO	DONLEY/BROOKS TO POINDEXTER RE HOFFMAN MEMO RE LONG-TERM STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	6/11/1986	B1
8339	MEMO	HOFFMAN TO POINDEXTER RE NSDD-219 PROCESS AND LONGER TERM ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND PROGRAMS <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	13	5/28/1986	B1
8340	MEMO	MATLOCK TO RAYMOND RE SITE NEGOTIATIONS IN TURKEY FOR VOA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	6/11/1986	B1
8341	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE JUNE 11 MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	6/12/1986	B1
8342	CABLE	SECRETARY---DUBININ MEETING 6/11/86 (MEMCON) <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	6/12/1986	B1
8343	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8341 <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	6/12/1986	B1

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8338

System II  
90419

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*File*

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INFORMATION

June 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: MICHAEL DONLEY/<sup>MD</sup>LINTON BROOKS *Linton*

SUBJECT: Hoffman Memorandum re Long-Term Strategy, Policy,  
and Programs

Fred Hoffman has sent you the memorandum at Tab I, summarizing his views on those issues emerging as we enter the final years of the Reagan Presidency. His emphasis is on the strategic nuclear balance: mainly force development and employment, especially as they relate to the offense-defense issues surrounding SDI. While many of Fred's comments in this area are not directly relevant to the rewrite of NSDD-32, they will provide grist for follow-on activities related to SDI. However, he also had some useful comments on low intensity conflict which we are incorporating into a new draft of NSDD-32.

Fred's most basic message is that SDI is not likely to survive this Administration unless the program is restructured to emphasize some intermediate goal between site defense and full territorial defense. In doing so we must reopen some fundamental issues of strategic policy. We concur that we must ensure the long-term survival of the SDI program, but the timeframe and circumstances in which a restructuring could be successfully orchestrated are not self-evident. We need to give more thought to creating a political and fiscal climate receptive to the consideration of SDI transition issues, in a way that would not jeopardize the future of the program.

Fred's second broad message is that employment policy for offensive nuclear forces requires reconsideration to ensure greater flexibility and military utility. Drawing on his work for Fred Ikle's Nuclear Strategy Development Group, he advocates publicly asserting that we do not depend on launching under attack and have options other than threats of mutual suicide. He suggests a number of topics for further study. While Fred's points have merit, a White House nuclear warfighting reexamination is more than the traffic will bear right now. Thus we recommend these issues continue to be worked in DOD.

Bob Linhard, Ken deGraffenreid, Jack Matlock, Ron St. Martin, and Howard Teicher concurred by telephone.

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum from Fred Hoffman

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD8-125/2 #8338

BY KML NARA DATE 10/28/10

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

I.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90419  
May 28, 1986

3  
8339

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: FRED S. HOFFMAN

SUBJECT: The NSDD-219 process and longer term issues of national security policies and programs

My task as I understand it is to consider the course of national security policy for the remainder of the current Administration, in the light of high priority goals for the Administration and the creation of conditions that increase the likelihood of continuing and effective efforts beyond 1989 to strengthen the U.S. in the long term competition with the Soviet Union. I have concentrated on military aspects of national security policies, but have touched on other aspects. Within the military, my heaviest emphasis has been on issues of nuclear strategy.

1. Approach

Mike Donley has proposed that the NSDD-219 effort distinguish issues that can be handled within the current schedule for NSDD-32 review and those requiring more extended treatment including studies by DOD or other agencies. As part of the current NSDD 219 effort, such issues should be identified and a Phase II of the Packard Commission implementation effort should be directed to deal with them. In this memorandum I provide some views on the longer term issues as background, propose some changes in NSDD-32 language designed to motivate their consideration, and formulate statements of the issues for possible use with the agencies.

2. General Background for Issue Identification

As President Reagan's Administration moves toward its conclusion, it becomes increasingly important, in addition to continuing the implementation of his program, to provide a point of departure that will make it likely that a successor will continue viable programs for competing with Soviet military strength. This is especially important for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) because of its close personal identification with the President, its distant horizon and the heavy ideological burden it bears. The SDI also is the most visible symbol of the President's attempt to establish a more viable nuclear component of a strategy for our long term competition with the Soviet Union.

The major problems in creating and maintaining the military posture needed for the long term competition are:

Continuing fiscal stringency

Public desire at home and even more so among friends and allies to see movement toward reduction in the threat of nuclear destruction and the likelihood of war.

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M08-12512# 8339  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

Belief among the public that such movement depends on arms agreements and that failure to conclude such agreements will result in an "arms race" and increase the probability of war.

Soviet exploitation of the above through propaganda and divisive diplomatic tactics

Public reluctance to support the use of military power to oppose aggression by adversaries of the U.S. unless extremely strict conditions are met concerning the prospects of low-cost, quick and decisive victory, the avoidance of harm to innocent civilians and the democratic virtue of those allied with or supported by the U.S.

Inadequate U.S. effectiveness in translating technological superiority into politically viable, usable and affordable military power.

These problems clearly transcend military strategy but pose important tasks for that strategy. Several factors, some related to the above, will assist in mounting the necessary efforts.

Soviet internal problems and bureaucratic rigidity

Continuing disaffection for the Soviet Union and Soviet-supported regimes among Soviet satellite nations

Distrust of the Soviet Union among the public in the West

The magnitude of our required future defense efforts will depend not only on our effectiveness in exploiting our relative strengths and Soviet vulnerabilities but to some degree on the rate of growth in the size and effectiveness of Soviet military capabilities. The outlook for a continued Soviet military buildup is currently less clear than in the past because of mounting evidence of Soviet internal economic and social problems and strains among the satellite nations. However, in assessing the possibility that internal difficulties will limit Soviet military efforts we should take account of the failure of past predictions in this vein to materialize. Moreover, Soviet economic strains are likely to cause them to seek relief in the form of Western capital and technology, once again intensifying differences between us and our friends and allies over the control of such flows.

In addition, it is becoming clear that requirements to deal with low level conflict and state-sponsored terrorism are likely to pose increasing burdens, if not on the size, then on the qualitative capabilities of our military forces. Where they occur in the Western Hemisphere, such conflicts may also increasingly divert our attention from containing the USSR on its periphery.

The following sections go further into the background for issues of strategic offensive forces and active defense, respectively.

### 3. Background for Strategic Offensive Force Issues

My comments in this area are without benefit of ESI clearance (which I have not held since something like 1968), and with access to significant compartmented information but of a degree of completeness I am, of course, unable to assess. On the basis of information available to me and discussions with those I presume to have greater access, I have reached the following conclusions.

NSDD-13 notwithstanding, the range of options and degree of flexibility in the current SIOP and the assumed range of Soviet operational options are so limited that they are believed to provide little scope for precise, discriminate systems capabilities, and selective options for their use, in affecting the outcome of strategic nuclear operations if they occur.

Our knowledge of Soviet operational planning for intercontinental operations depends on a combination of exercise data, inferences from force posture trends, doctrinal statements and some intelligence windows that allow us to understand plans and preferred operations. There remain major uncertainties about strategic operational flexibility in a real war and unanswered questions about the relationship between military planners and the political leaders who would make decisions about the use of military forces.

Considerations of Soviet self-interest and prudence, together with their doctrines subordinating military force to political objectives will create powerful incentives for them to move in the direction of greater flexibility and selectivity in strategic options, notwithstanding the relatively greater competitive advantage and political-military urgency for the U.S. in moving in this direction; however, their declaratory policy will continue to deny this possibility for political effect.

Our concerns over our ability to ensure continuing C<sup>3</sup> together with the current and projected vulnerability of land-based elements of our strategic forces fundamentally condition our own policies and plans.

The resulting set of policies and programs will be increasingly hard to defend before the U.S. public and as a basis for maintaining credibility in U.S. alliance guarantees and for what Michael Howard has called "reassurance" of our friends and allies. This results from public perceptions (often reinforced by official statements--certainly not convincingly refuted by them) that any use of nuclear weapons would lead inevitably to uncontrolled use with catastrophic results to both sides (as well

as noncombatants) and that postures on both sides offer intense incentives to strike before being struck in crises.

The SDI reflects the President's sense of the long term problems with simply holding the line on current strategic policy and leaving these public perceptions unchanged. For the future, new technologies of offense and defense and those available to support robust and enduring C<sup>3</sup>I offer the possibility of moving in the direction of nuclear operational capabilities (supplemented by long-range nonnuclear capabilities) that would offer greater operational flexibility in strategic operations, a more secure and stable second-strike capability, and a more politically defensible set of programs.

Specifically, we should seek a posture that will permit us to assert as soon as possible that our ability to respond to attack does not depend on irrevocably launching under attack and avoids reliance on threats of mutual suicide.. To quote from the Nuclear Strategy Development Group Report, a document approved by the JCS as providing "useful general guidance on the direction of future US strategy."

The United States should not rely on launching its nuclear forces in an irrevocable manner upon warning that a Soviet missile attack has begun. This would increase the risk of accidental war. Continued improvements in U.S. tactical warning and attack assessment capability and enhanced C<sup>3</sup> and forces survivability are a high priority in order to permit a more deliberate presidential decision on whether or not to commit the United States to nuclear war, and what kind of offensive nuclear strike option to choose. The future U.S. offensive forces posture should aim at having any NCA decision to retaliate with nuclear forces determined by the nature and size<sub>3</sub> of the Soviet attack, not the vulnerability of forces and C<sup>3</sup> assets. [p. 25]

Further, we should move toward a posture that supports the assertion that our plans for responding to Soviet attack including Soviet use of nuclear weapons are based on options that deny the objectives of the Soviet attack and that would serve U.S. interests if they had to be executed. In both employment policy and programs we need to give greater weight to improving our ability to respond as above under plausible contingencies of attack relative to making marginal improvements in outcomes under extreme and relatively implausible contingencies.

This would require, as part of the Phase II effort, review an amendment of NSDD-13 to:

- Change the language on maintaining Soviet uncertainty about our response to warning;
- To reflect the need to maintain the credibility of U.S. response to plausible Soviet attacks, by adding to the



document's present emphasis on keeping Soviet assessments of war outcomes "dangerous and uncertain" an emphasis on options that would threaten Soviet interests and deny Soviet attack objectives while serving U.S. national interests under the circumstances if actually executed--rather than only when threatened in advance;

-Establish priority between "immediate options" and maintaining the integrity of pre-planned SIOP options.

?  
We need to reassess the future roles of elements of the triad and the requirements for prompt hard target capabilities in the light of prospective changes in U.S. and Soviet postures, including the possibilities of active defense, mobility, concealment and deception. I am suggesting for Phase II of Packard Commission implementation a number of questions for further analysis by DOD to clarify these issues.

In this connection, the vulnerability of at least the first 50 Peacekeeper missiles is a troublesome issue. For this reason, I have couched suggested changes to NSDD-32 in the form of objectives for policy and programs "beyond the current Strategic Modernization program". For obvious reasons, these suggested emphases in policies and programs should not be held up until completion of that program. If a basing mode like the "carry-hard" movable hard capsule system could be viable for the second 50, it would clearly be extremely attractive in resolving the issue. At the moment, however, the only fix in view for the vulnerability of the first 50 appears to depend on some form of early defense deployment.

A hard-site defense is not the only contender here. An approach that is more consistent with the goals of the SDI might be a first-stage deployment of a country-wide defense (including elements of an exo-atmospheric area defense and endo-atmospheric terminal defense) to deny Soviet objectives in attacks against M-X and other high priority targets including precursor attacks against the NCA and possible limited attacks on objectives such as force projection facilities critical to our plans to reinforce NATO. It would not be necessary for such a defense to offer a high level of protection from the outset if it showed prospect of growth to convey that the U.S. was not committed to a vulnerable deployment for the long term. If desirable, the deployment could be approached initially as a Treaty-consistent defense with the number of interceptors and deployment area as prescribed in the Treaty. The protected area afforded by the exo-atmospheric layer would, nevertheless, be very large with the addition of adjunct sensors. In such an approach, the decision about further deployments would be left open. It would incidentally serve the NSDD-119 objective of contributing to a hedge against Soviet breakout by giving us a warm production base analogous to the one that causes our anxiety about Soviet breakout. An IOC objective of this sort illustrates one first step in the kind of

evolutionary approach required for a successful SDI transition, discussed below.

4. Background on the future of SDI beyond President Reagan's term

The recent letter signed by 46 Senators illustrates the surfacing of some of the problems that I have believed were inherent in the Administration's posture on SDI from my earliest involvement in it in 1983. Others are clearly in evidence.

The Administration's posture on SDI has been presented and is generally perceived as a commitment to conduct a five-year program limited to research and ending after President Reagan's term of office with a decision about whether to drop the effort or to enter a systems development phase. The objective of the program is taken to be "population defense" which, in turn is understood to be the achievement of a defense effective enough to protect against a massive Soviet attack focussed on cities--precisely the kind of attack assumed by those who either favor MAD or regard it as an inevitable outcome of any use of nuclear weapons, ignoring what we know of Soviet military doctrine, forces and plans. The actual problem of population protection in the event of nuclear attack is that of protecting civilians from the collateral effects of Soviet attacks on military targets, a systems design problem with different implications from the other.

Both critics and supporters of the program have often equated lesser defense capabilities with "hard-site" defenses, an objective rejected by Secretary Weinberger as a dead end for the program. The exception to this during the past year has been a possible SDI contribution to a defense against theater ballistic missiles. The net effect has been to put success in SDI on an "all or nothing" basis, requiring achievement of the program's technical goals in many, if not all, of the extremely advanced and risky technologies pursued under the program. Success is therefore also very distant in terms of time. These factors together with the cost and high visibility of the program create several threats to SDI's future viability:

- o Expert opinion will continue to insist that "SDI is infeasible" and intolerably expensive
- o Its riskiness, cost and distant time horizon will permit critics to question the allocation of substantial resources to the program
- o The DOD will have difficulty in justifying the allocation of such large resources to a distant and risky payoff given budgetary pressures on other programs in the 6.0 to 6.3A area with similar time horizons, especially since it serves no mission explicitly identified as essential by the JCS

- o Critics will dwell on the immediate arms control opportunities foregone by unwillingness to limit an SDI program with dubious benefits
- o Some who will not attack the program outright will nevertheless argue that interim constraints on the program are consistent with its distant time horizon and the uncertainty of success
- o Continuation of the current posture on the program will certainly provide no reason for reopening the ABM Treaty within President Reagan's term or even reinterpreting it to provide more latitude for SDI tests and demonstrations

Since President Reagan's successor is unlikely to have as close a personal identification with the program as he, to be better situated for reopening the ABM Treaty or to experience a markedly easier fiscal situation, the prospects for a useful outcome from the SDI look gloomy unless some of the foregoing conditions are changed. I believe it is crucial that a process leading to changes be initiated soon if it is to have an effect on the FY89 program guidance, the last opportunity for this Administration to affect the formulation and presentation of DOD programs.

Several conditions can be identified as necessary to changing the outlook:

- o The program requires a constituency among the services in the DOD
- o It must offer some foreseeable benefits of a degree of urgency commensurate with its funding level
- o The restrictive effects of the ABM Treaty (and our interpretation of its provisions) must be more clearly understood in relation to program activities necessary to produce early, useful results.

All of the above require a process for identifying possible missions for an initial defense deployment as a first step in an evolutionary program with foreseeable benefits within a time horizon commensurate with the resource and political costs of proceeding. Such a process requires an interaction between USD/P, the JCS and the SDIO. Ultimately, it must lead to JCS approval of initial deployment objectives as a basis for dealing with the problems identified above.

The above problems and opportunities motivate the changes suggested below in NSDD-32 language and the selection of issues for further treatment.

5. NSDD-32 Language Changes by Issue Area and by Section, with Associated Issues Identified for Study

A. Nuclear Strategy and Programs

Global Objectives §

Insert in place of "To neutralize...disinformation":

To neutralize efforts by the U.S.S.R. to increase its influence and weaken ties between the U.S. and countries allied to or friendly with this country, by exploiting anxiety over nuclear destruction and desires for arms limitations, by its use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation.

Insert as new global objectives:

To reduce the threat of nuclear destruction over time by increasing our ability to keep control of our forces during military operations, by basing deterrence of plausible Soviet attacks increasingly on defensive systems and on weapons that permit us to achieve our military objectives through selective means while avoiding unintended or undesired destruction, and, as consistent with these objectives, by reducing our reliance on weapons of widespread destruction and creating incentives for the USSR to do so too.

In the event of war with the Soviet Union to exploit the potential for fragmenting the Warsaw Pact through a selective policy for attacking or withholding attacks on targets within the East European countries.

Nuclear Strategic Forces §

[My amendment of John Douglass' proposed language]

Completion of the planned modernization of our strategic forces and the pursuit of research and development on the Strategic Defense Initiative shall receive the first priority.

A prudent basis for deterring Soviet attacks requires strategic offensive and defensive forces capable of responding to the full range of plausible Soviet attacks in ways that would deny Soviet confidence in achieving the objectives of the attacks and that would be in the U.S. interest in the specific circumstances. This requires the ability to destroy military targets where it serves the national interest, while restricting collateral damage to

provide continuing incentives for the Soviets to limit their own force employment.

The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear deterrent by sustaining its five part Strategic Modernization Program, which includes the Strategic Defense Initiative, in accordance with guidance provided in NSDD-178, NSDD-13, and NSDD-172. The strategic force modernization program set forth in NSDD-178 is reaffirmed except as may be modified by new decisions in the basing mode for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Special emphasis will be placed on achievement of the initial operational capability date for the new stealthy Advanced Technology Bomber set forth in NSDD-178.

Beyond these programs, we should plan to develop and acquire offensive and defensive forces and the means to direct and keep control of their use during combat operations so as to maintain a prudent deterrent posture. It is in the long term interest of the U.S. to achieve this objective at the lowest possible level of nuclear forces and offensive weapon yields consistent with responding to the threat and if possible to do so with levels that decline over time. Our plans should take account of the opportunities being provided by new technologies to maintain a high level of military effectiveness and to keep continuing control over forces during military operations while limiting damage to ourselves and our Allies and restricting unintended destruction to innocent civilians. In this context we should assess the value of non-nuclear options as a supplement to nuclear capabilities. Such plans should also take account of the utility of the strategic offensive triad of land-based ballistic missiles in complicating a surprise Soviet attack and guarding against technical surprise that might jeopardize any single leg of the triad.

Issue 1:

What characteristics of our future forces, plans for their use and declaratory policies on nuclear strategy can counter Soviet attempts to fragment our alliance relations in peacetime? What elements of our posture contribute to countering such attempts in crises?

Issue 2:

Given projected Soviet SOF trends (hardening, mobility), passive defense of critical leadership targets, improving accuracy, what should be the objectives of our future strategic offensive force programs? Specifically:

What are our specific target objectives under various contingencies of attack and how do they influence the outcome?

What aspects of Soviet future force structure critically threaten our own strategic objectives?

What assumptions should we employ about Soviet strategic attack objectives as a basis for our force planning?

What is the difference in outcomes under various plausible future attack contingencies and over the range of uncertainties in operational factors of different levels of prompt, hard target kill capability?

What aggregate levels of damage to the U.S. and USSR result from employment of alternative postures above and what incentives are implied for each side to execute or withhold elements of the attack.

Issue 3:

What solutions can we find to the vulnerability of our land-based strategic forces or other critical strategic targets? Evaluate them in terms of their effect on Soviet attack assessments and on attack outcomes.

Issue 4:

What measures can we adopt in the future to provide continuing intelligence, attack assessment and warning capabilities, to maintain their functions under attack, and reconstitute them? Assess the cost and effectiveness of different levels of capability in term of the outcomes during protracted combat involving the use of nuclear weapons. Assess the role of SDI technologies for this purpose.

Issue 5:

Similarly identify the means and assess the effect on outcomes of capabilities to deny enemy intelligence, attack assessment and warning capabilities.

Issue 6:

Assess tradeoffs between offensive and defensive capabilities in meeting our objectives for future force structures, given projected trends in Soviet offensive and defensive posture.

Issue 7:

Assess Soviet responses to US deployment of active defenses over time, taking account of realistic Soviet strategic objectives. Specifically evaluate Soviet assessments of

their ability to achieve attack objectives by increasing offensive force levels if they are unable to negate defenses by qualitative countermeasures. Consider the effect on Soviet force planning over time. Consider the calculation of cost-effectiveness at the margin that would be made in the course of Soviet force planning, given realistic Soviet force posture objectives.

Issue 8:

Define possible initial and growth missions for alternative evolutionary SDI deployments. Establish estimated time paths for such deployments, based on current assessments of progress in the SDI research program and the estimated growth pattern of their technical capabilities. Consider as one alternative an ABM Treaty-compliant IOC and address the possible utility of such a deployment in meeting objectives of future force posture. Identify elements of the SDI that could contribute to such an IOC. Identify associated air defense requirements needed to realize the benefits. Base the assessment on realistic assumptions about Soviet attack objectives and Soviet assessment of its attack capability. Specifically, what levels of defense capability and what combinations of defense components could contribute significantly to:

- Protection of NCA, intelligence, warning and attack assessment systems, and bomber bases against precursor attacks
- Protection of missile silos
- Reducing the potential attractiveness of Soviet selective attack options against critical military facilities

Issue 9:

Assess the roles, cost and effectiveness in our future strategic force structure and operations of advanced technologies including:

Nuclear weapons with tailored effects, e.g. earth penetrator weapons

Non-nuclear weapons of extreme accuracy with tailored warheads for long range attack on selected strategic targets

Improved, high data rate communications systems with SSBNs

B. General Purpose Forces Issues

Global Objectives §

Insert new objective:

To increase our ability to deal with low-level, relatively likely conflicts requiring the use of parts of our military forces, while deterring large scale attack or maintaining readiness to protect U.S. interests in situations requiring our full military capabilities.

General Purpose Forces §

Insert at beginning of existing ¶ 3 of §:

US General Purpose Forces must provide the flexibility to deal quickly, decisively and discriminately with low-level conflict contingencies requiring US military involvement. In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union,...

Force Integration §

Insert as new ¶ between present ¶5 and ¶6.

It has become increasingly clear that our forces must provide the flexibility to respond to the need for military action in contingencies of low-level conflict. Such contingencies require flexibility, effectiveness and an ability for discriminate action not currently provided by our forces, which have been sized, deployed, equipped and trained primarily for global conflict against the Soviet Union. To provide the needed capabilities for low level conflict contingencies, our future force development should be based on an appropriate mix of special-purpose forces, general purpose forces, and appropriate elements of long-range attack forces, suitably trained, equipped and in readiness for such missions. Where special-purpose equipment, exploiting advanced technology, is appropriate and unsuitable or unaffordable as standard equipment for global conflict, it should be acquired and deployed in quantities appropriate for low-level conflict.

Issue 1:

[Adapted from Linton Brooks language on "Resource Priorities"]

Develop the implications for our general purpose forces of adopting the following order of priorities:



Equipping, maintaining and training our forces to provide, where and when required, combined arms teams suitable for dealing with contingencies of low-level conflict or state-sponsored terrorism quickly, decisively and discriminately

Applying advanced technologies as appropriate for modernizing our general purpose forces for high level or global war with the USSR

Improving our mobilization base and reserves for a global war with the USSR

Operating and maintaining our general purpose forces in a high state of readiness for global war with the USSR

Assess tradeoffs among these force objectives in terms of our ability to handle plausible contingencies of conflict, and the nature of the risks we would incur in the near term and in the more distant future, given projected levels of resources.

Issue 2.

Assess the alternatives of establishing, equipping and training specialized combined arms teams for low-level conflict situations against relying on deployed general purpose forces for such missions, provided with special equipment, if and where appropriate, in quantities required for such missions.

C. Arms Control

NSDD-32 currently has no language on arms control. The Executive Summary of NSSD 1-82 has a single sentence (page vii). The following should be included in NSDD-32:

Global Objectives §

Our policy in negotiating arms agreements, our evaluation of arms control proposals and our policies for observing existing agreements should be based on realistic assessments of our ability to ensure a level of compliance that will result in equal restraints on the parties.

Issue 1:

Assess the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty on the SDI in relation to a baseline established by considering how the program would have been designed in the absence of Treaty constraints. Assess our ability to enforce Soviet compliance with analogous constraints in the future. Develop principles for observance of the Treaty based on equal constraints.

8340

10

W Raymond - 6/12

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4134

I agree. If we  
get the sites in Israel,  
won't this do (and  
be about all we can  
fund)?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 11, 1986

MATLOCK  
R SOMMER  
LENCZOWSKI



*Jick*

RAYMOND

Site Negotiations in Turkey

I have not been normally negative. I believe that this Wick effort to open up Turkey is a loser. Nothing in the attached chronology suggests otherwise. You will note that we did try the Presidential card on April 1985.

I have talked at length to Paul Henze, who has spent many years in Turkey, and in an earlier incarnation tried to establish a Western radio in Turkey. He is preparing a memorandum for me on the basis of several delicate conversations that he has had in Turkey which may offer a new opportunity to move forward. There is an element high up in the Turkish government that would like to develop a broadcasting capability to broadcast to the Soviet Union. They will need money, technical advice, and subsequently professional programmatic assistance. He believes that with a very limited financial commitment we could set in motion a low-visibility joint study commission which could seek to work on the problem. I am not certain what will come out, but it may afford us an opportunity under some type of country arrangement to get a great deal of the RPE/RL material broadcast over a Turkish radio and the Soviet Union.

Henze's recommendation is that we not actively pursue the Wick angle because it is not going to go any place. I would urge that you not discuss the Henze idea with anyone outside of the NSC until I get the detailed memo which he has promised me. Meanwhile -- unless any of the three of you have a different idea -- I do not think that we should expend much energy or equity in pursuing Charlie Wick's Turkish caper. We have so many other negotiations going on concerning VOA and so little actual building that has been done as a result of these negotiations, I would rather concentrate VOA's energies on building the facilities for which they have already negotiated and which will cost over \$1 billion anyway. Lastly, if we were successful in getting a Turkish site, I have no idea how we would pay for it.

Comments?

Attachment

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR FD6-114/4#8340  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

17  
June 12, 1986

TO: Sven Kraemer  
Judyt Mandel  
✓ Jack Matlock  
Don Mahley  
Lint Brooks  
Karna Small  
Ed Djerejian/Mike Guest

FROM: Steve Steiner

SUBJECT: Adelman Article on Strategic Arms Control

Attached is an article which the NYT has agreed to run on Sunday. Given to us and other agencies on very short notice. ACDA staff gave to NYT already as a first draft to get commitment to run, but with understanding there will be changes. While I told ACDA this is not generally an acceptable procedure, I think it is o.k. in this case because the issue is hot and we want to get as much good stuff as we can out there--ASAP.

PM has cleared already. OSD has not answered; at my suggestion, ACDA is calling them and trying to get them on board. I have given a provisional green lite, with the fixes indicated here. My main purpose with these fixes, and consistent with the ACDA title here, is to make this a FORWARD looking article on strategic AC, not backward on SALT. I think this is consistent with what the President was saying last nite.

If you have any problems with this, please advise right away.  
This is a moving train. Sunday NYT has excellent circulation, and we want to make it.

Thanks.

copies to:  
Rod McDaniel  
Walt Raymond  
Will Tobey

For Sunday NYT.

BEYOND SALT - ARMS CONTROL WITH REALISM

Kenneth L. Adelman

Bertrand Russell once remarked that we often defend most passionately those opinions for which we have the least factual basis. It is difficult to find any other way to explain the torrent of emotion that has greeted the President's decision on

~~SALT II~~ strategic arms control.

Even on its face, the case against the President's decision looks dubious at best. After all, the Senate Armed Services Committee agreed unanimously in 1979 that SALT II was not in the nation's "national security interests." The treaty was never ratified. It never had the force of law. It never ~~subsequently~~ gained the support needed for ratification. The chief prediction of its critics--that it would permit a vast modernization and expansion of Soviet strategic forces--has come true, in spades.

7  
make  
sure

On top of all this, the Soviet Union is violating the agreement's ~~key provisions~~ *central provisions of*

What could be more clear-cut? Why do critics say that the ~~President~~ *U.S.* should continue to abide by SALT II *unilaterally?*

let me  
relate  
some  
of the  
arguments  
I've  
heard  
resp

1. Soviet violations are alleged to be "peripheral." The President's critics would like to have it both ways. When SALT II was up for ratification in 1979, treaty supporters commonly cited three provisions as the treaty's main advantages: (1) the numerical limits (on warheads-per-launcher and overall launchers); (2) the prohibition on *more than 1* ~~a second~~ new type of ICBM; (3) the restraints on encoding test data. The Soviets are completely contravening provisions (2) and (3), in addition to exceeding

We find it difficult to understand and impossible to accept the claim that

the launcher limit in provision (1). ~~In other words~~ treaty provisions hailed as central when SALT II was being sold have somehow become "peripheral" since the Soviets began violating them.

2. The Soviet violations are sometimes said to be "ambiguous" or unimportant. The new, <sup>illegal Soviet</sup> ~~SALT-violating~~ <sup>missile</sup> SS-25 is not in any sense marginal. It is one of two powerful new land-based strategic missiles the Soviets are now fielding. In short, a major portion of the current Soviet ICBM buildup is occurring in clear contravention of SALT II. The violation is clear since the throwweight of the SS-25 missile is not, ~~as some critics~~ <sup>as some critics</sup> continue to claim, just "slightly" greater than <sup>its</sup> ~~its~~ alleged predecessor (the SS-13), but roughly twice that--clearly beyond the treaty-permitted 5 percent. In addition, Soviet signal scrambling is seriously impeding verification.

explains the provision

dismantled

3. It is sometimes claimed that the Soviets have ~~retired~~ 1000 or more systems to comply with SALT. <sup>This is contradicted by the fact that</sup> ~~Notably~~ the Soviets themselves claim only 540 dismantlements under SALT. More important, what the critics' figures really demonstrate are not the quantitative limits on the Soviet arsenal, but the vast qualitative growth of the Soviet arsenal under the treaty. The Soviets dismantled more during SALT than the U.S. because they built faster and modernized much more than we did. The vast majority of silos cited by the critics became the homes of new, vastly more powerful missiles. The figures are less a testimony to SALT's effectiveness than a measure of what it failed to control.

Word game?

Nor should we attribute dismantlements solely or even mainly to SALT. When new Soviet systems come on, old, obsolescent systems <sup>generally</sup> go. For example, 650 SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles --unconstrained by any arms accord--were dismantled by the Soviets as the SS-20 came on stream. The claim that Soviet dismantlements during the period of SALT were <sup>necessarily</sup> due to SALT is a case of misplaced causality.

4. Critics claim that without SALT II the Soviets will vastly increase their warheads and accelerate the arms buildup. Projections of large Soviet warhead increases--beyond the considerable increases already anticipated under SALT--are easily made on paper. In reality, such changes are neither quick nor cheap--nor even <sup>necessarily</sup> militarily useful. For example, some critics claim that the Soviets would put 20 or 30 warheads on the SS-18 missile, instead of 10--but this is likely to undermine, if not preclude, the SS-18's main mission, that is, to destroy our missiles in their silos.

The basic notion that SALT is meaningfully constraining the Soviet buildup now, or would do so in the future, is <sup>highly questionable</sup> ~~an illusion~~. It presumes future compliance on critical treaty provisions, when we already have seen clear and major violations of key parts. Even within the terms of SALT II, ~~Strategic Arms~~ Soviet warheads have nearly doubled from 5,000 to 9,200. Under SALT II they could rise to further to 12,000 by 1990. With or without SALT II, we envision a 5 to 7 percent growth in Soviet strategic investment every year as far out as we can see. With or without SALT II, we envision an all-new Soviet ICBM force in the next decade.

If this is constraint, it is hard to envision non-constraint. With their defense spending running at 15 to 17 percent of GNP, the Soviets already have their accelerator near or on the floor.

Ironically, many of the critics who now base so much of their argument <sup>predicting</sup> on Soviet warhead increases beyond those envisioned under SALT II (which did not explicitly limit warheads) used to tell us that warheads don't count. Back in the 1970s, when the United States enjoyed a 3-to-1 advantage in warheads, many of these same critics were arguing that "strategic superiority" and numbers of warheads were "meaningless" and could be bargained away without loss to U.S. security.

5. It is argued that <sup>this decision</sup> leaving SALT II behind is bad for our alliances. Despite extensive Administration consultations with the Allies, <sup>there have been some Allied disagreement + some</sup> we ~~anticipated~~ <sup>we actually</sup> adverse effects among some segments of Allied public opinion. <sup>We regret this.</sup> This is ~~unfortunate~~ <sup>and</sup> as the reasoning for the decision and the facts become <sup>better</sup> known, we hope this will change.

Indiv. All's

But short-term popularity <sup>can</sup> ~~is~~ not the criterion by which we judge the wisdom of policy. Continued adherence to a ineffective and unratified treaty that our adversary <sup>is seriously violating</sup> ~~has trampled~~ <sup>to the</sup> ground is not cost- or risk-free. <sup>Our overriding concern must remain</sup> ~~Others. Such a stance suggests~~ that the U.S. is ~~more concerned about the momentary state of public opinion than~~ long-term strategic safety and genuine arms control. <sup>-- as the press said, real reductions. Only this will provide</sup> Such a course might provide the mirage of mutual restraint. <sup>a solid basis for</sup> ~~but never the reality.~~

while seeking a new and more solid AC framework, 22

6. It is alleged that the administration wants an "all-out arms race." This is simply false. Anyone who reads the President's decision <sup>ad lists to what he is saying</sup> will see that we have provided a clear new formula for mutual restraint, <sup>which will be</sup> potentially more effective than SALT. The President pledged <sup>that we will on our own continue to exercise utmost restraint</sup> not to increase launchers or ballistic missile warheads above Soviet levels. ~~[Real reductions in the Soviet arsenal will be reciprocated on our side]~~ This is a serious pledge, one which creates real costs for a Soviet buildup and provides real rewards for Soviet <sup>reductions +</sup> restraint--just as genuine arms control should do. It is verifiable and do-able. In contrast, <sup>continued</sup> unilateral observance of SALT II in the absence of Soviet compliance <sup>would</sup> merely reinforce the dangerous idea that ~~we can do nothing about Soviet violations~~ <sup>can easily be tolerated</sup>, and may <sup>will likely encourage even further</sup> even encourage the Soviets <sup>to</sup> on their drive for military superiority. <sup>SALT</sup>

For example we will

further violation

<sup>In sum,</sup> The President's decision bears on the heart of our security and the future integrity of the arms control process. It was made with seriousness and care. It needs to be debated on its merits and on the facts.

As the President has repeatedly made clear, what we seek ~~is~~ are serious negotiations in Geneva leading to <sup>deep, quite + verifiable</sup> ~~reductions~~ reductions in US + Soviet nuclear arsenals. ~~to~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

4596

ACTION

June 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *RM* TO  
SUBJECT: Word Processing/Printer Requirements Questionnaire

Attached is a questionnaire asking about your word processing and computer printer needs. The information you provide on this questionnaire will be reviewed by a visiting systems analyst, Mr. Richard Clausen, who will recommend to me improvements in computer support to meet the needs of the NSC staff.

Please take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire. Return it by Wednesday, 18 June, to George Van Eron who is coordinating Mr. Clausen's efforts. Your answers will have an important impact on the support you receive in the future.

Attachment  
Computer User Survey Questionnaire

*From Jack Matlock*

COMPUTER USER SURVEY  
6-JUN-1986

Name:  
Office:  
Ext:

To support your computing requirements, the NSC is conducting a survey of how you use your terminal or workstation. Please take a few minutes to answer these questions. There is space for your comments at the end. If you have any questions, please call Lance Charnes or Nell Hurley at x5132.

1. How do you use your workstation?

Evaluate each of the following tasks as an approximate percentage of your computer use. Don't worry if the percentages don't add exactly to 100%. If appropriate, indicate the average number of people who review or revise this work.

TASK	% OF WORKTIME	AVG # OF REVIEWERS
Memorandum/report/document preparation	<del>40</del> 60%	<u>2</u>
Profs notes/electronic mail	<del>40</del> 40%	<u>3</u>
Reading cables (messages)	_____	_____
GESCAN (text search & retrieval)	_____	_____
Administrative (Personnel evaluations, etc.)	_____	_____
Statistics/numerical analysis	_____	_____
Doc Log	_____	_____
Calendar/personal schedules	_____	_____
Graphics (briefing slides, etc.)	_____	_____
Other _____	_____	_____

2. Document Processing.

Document processing includes creating, coordinating, revising, and printing. Your document processing needs are of particular interest. Please rate the importance to you of the following typical document processing functions and circle the appropriate number. A "1" means you must have this feature to do your job. A "4" means you probably wouldn't use the feature.

FEATURE	MUST HAVE 1	IMPORTANT 2	NICE TO HAVE 3	PROBABLY WOULDN'T USE 4
Simultaneous display of two documents	1	2	3	4
Simultaneous editing of two documents	1	2	3	4
Text block operations (move, copy, or delete blocks of text)	1	2	3	4
Adjustable tab stops & margins	1	2	3	4
Right-justification of text	1	2	3	4
Boldfacing/underlining text	1	2	3	4
Proofreading ("spell-check")	1	2	3	4
Automatic page numbering	1	2	3	4
Automatic placing of headers/footers/footnotes	1	2	3	4
Search and replace	1	2	3	4
"Undo" (reverse the last operation)	1	2	3	4
Mixed text and graphics	1	2	3	4
On-screen help	1	2	3	4
Other _____	1	2	3	4

3. More Document Processing

Rank-order the importance to you of these document processing attributes. "1" is most important, "8" is least important.

ATTRIBUTE	ORDER OF IMPORTANCE
Ease of storing documents	4
Ease of deleting documents	7
Ease of use ("user-friendliness")	6
Speed of operation	3
Security of documents	1
Ease of invoking/exiting functions	5
Variety of functions	2
Other _____	_____

4. Printing

Rank-order the importance to you of these printing attributes. "1" is most important, "11" is least important.

ATTRIBUTE	ORDER OF IMPORTANCE
Proximity of printer to your desk	_____
Ability to print draft quality at your desk	_____
Ability to print letter quality in your office	1
Ability to print cables (messages) in your office	5
Printing mixed text and graphics	_____
Multiple typefaces/fonts	4
Physical size of your printer	_____
Ability to print on different paper types and thicknesses	_____
Ability to print on different sizes of paper	2
Speed	3
Other _____	_____

5. Additional features you recommend and their relative importance:

6. Changes you recommend to your workstation (as opposed to the computer):

Daniel

Stultz-Dubinin  
6/11/86

Amb. Matlock  
~~For your eyes only~~  
OEOB  
room 368

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED

CS 6/21/02

Preservation Copy

8341  
CC: ROEMER  
MATLOCK  
SETANOWICZTHE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: June 11 Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The arms control initiative Dubinin wanted to convey was a copy of a proposal being made to UN Secretary General de Cuellar for multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. I reminded Dubinin that Moscow had been unresponsive to our own earlier proposals for space cooperation, but said we welcomed in principle the opportunity to work together in this area. I am sending John Poindexter the text and our analysis of the document.

As we discussed, I took the occasion to make three points which I asked Dubinin to convey on your behalf to Gorbachev:

-- That we viewed the Soviets' recent proposals in Geneva as serious ones, and that they would receive careful study and a reply;

-- That you had noted what has been done in resolving some humanitarian cases, and viewed recent steps as positive and welcome;

-- And that, if Gorbachev wanted to suggest a date in mid-November for the 1986 summit, you would be prepared to accept.

Dubinin undertook to convey your message to Gorbachev personally. He then asked -- on a "personal" basis -- what we intended to do about SALT II. I outlined the rationale for your decision, emphasizing our desire to achieve a reliable regime of mutual restraint, and pointing to the first element of your message to Gorbachev as evidence of your desire to achieve real reductions in strategic weapons. Dubinin noted in response only that the timing of a decision to exceed SALT restraints was "an important element." He seemed to be suggesting that it might be difficult for Gorbachev to come here with such a decision hanging over him or having just been made.

Dubinin confirmed he would be returning from Moscow in time to present his credentials to you June 23 as we had proposed.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

NLRR MD8-125/2 #8341

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

~~SECRET~~

EUR/SOV: MRPARRIS:MRP  
6/12/86 647-3738 WANG 0951F  
EUR: MPALMER

S: | S/S:  
S/S-0 |

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION NODIS//ADAM

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

RMP  
MRP  
S S/S  
S/S-0

SUBJECT: SECRETARY - DUBININ MEETING 6/11/86 {MEMCON}

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF A DETAILED MEMCON FOR SUBJECT MEETING. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SEPTTEL SECPRES COVERING HIGHLIGHTS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSAL TO UN SEC GEN FOR CREATION OF WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION {SEPTTEL}, THE SECRETARY INDICATED HE WISHED TO GIVE DUBININ A READ-OUT OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD JUST HAD WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

4. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF THE PROPOSAL THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THAT MORNING IN THE START WORKING GROUP AT THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. WE HAD ALSO NOTED THE SOVIETS' NEW IDEAS THE WEEK BEFORE IN THE SPACE WORKING GROUP. WHILE WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD TO SAY REFERRED EXPLICITLY TO THOSE INITIATIVES, WE HAD ALSO TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE NEW WARSAW PACT INITIATIVE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. WE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR MD8-125/2 #8342

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10



~~SECRET~~

IMPRESSED IN THE CASE OF THE NST PROPOSALS THAT THEY HAD BEEN MADE PRIVATELY, RATHER THAN THROUGH THE MEDIA. WE HAD NOTED THAT, APPRECIATED IT, AND FELT IT WAS A GOOD WAY TO PROCEED.

5. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT, WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD LEARNED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE MEETING WITH DUBININ, AND THAT DUBININ WOULD BE RETURNING TO MOSCOW, HE HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO CONVEY THREE POINTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT HOPED COULD BE PASSED TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

-- THE FIRST WAS THAT WE REGARDED THE PROPOSALS THE SOVIETS HAD MADE IN GENEVA AS CLEARLY SERIOUS PROPOSALS. THEY WOULD RECEIVE INTENSIVE AND CAREFUL STUDY HERE. WE WOULD BE RESPONDING TO THEM.

-- SECOND, RECALLING THEIR CONVERSATION IN GENEVA, THE PRESIDENT DID NOT WANT THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO MISUNDERSTAND THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT SAID A LOT ABOUT THE HUMANITARIAN CASES WHICH HAD BEEN RESOLVED SINCE THEN. THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SEEN WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, AND THAT HE REGARDS IT AS A POSITIVE AND WELCOME MOVE BY THE SOVIET UNION.

-- FINALLY, THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT, IF THE GENERAL SECRETARY WANTED TO SUGGEST A DATE IN MID-NOVEMBER OR SO FOR THEIR NEXT MEETING, THE PRESIDENT WOULD ACCEPT. {THE SECRETARY ADDED FOR DUBININ'S INFORMATION THAT THE PRESIDENT HABITUALLY SPENT THANKSGIVING AT HIS CALIFORNIA RANCH, AND THAT, IF THE NOTION OF A NOVEMBER MEETING WERE OF INTEREST TO MOSCOW, THE WEEK BEFORE THANKSGIVING MIGHT BE THE BEST TIME}. THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY COULD MAKE A SUGGESTION FOR THIS PERIOD KNOWING THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ACCEPT.

6. DUBININ EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR THE SECRETARY'S WORDS AND SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONVEY THEM TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY. DUBININ NOTED THAT DURING THEIR LAST MEETING THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED WHEN DUBININ WOULD RETURN FROM MOSCOW. THE WHITE HOUSE HAD PROPOSED JUNE 23 AS THE DATE FOR DUBININ'S PRESENTATION OF HIS CREDENTIALS TO THE PRESIDENT. DUBININ WAS NOT YET IN A POSITION TO SPECIFY THE DATE OF HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW, BUT HE COULD CONFIRM HE WOULD RETURN BY THE TWENTY THIRD. HE COULD THEREFORE ACCEPT WITH GRATITUDE THE DATE PROPOSED. HE WOULD TRY TO BE BACK A DAY OR TWO IN ADVANCE TO OVERCOME JET LAG.

~~SECRET~~

7. IN TERMS OF HIS OWN SCHEDULE, THE SECRETARY INFORMED DUBININ THAT HE WOULD BE IN THE FAR EAST ALL OF THE WEEK OF JUNE 21. IN HIS ABSENCE, DUBININ COULD DEAL WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD OR UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST IF THERE WERE SOMETHING TO TRANSMIT; AND OF COURSE THE SECRETARY HIMSELF WAS IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT.

8. DUBININ SAID HE WAS TEMPTED TO ASK THE SECRETARY A QUESTION "OFF THE RECORD": WHAT DID THE U.S. PLAN TO DO ABOUT START II? THE SECRETARY RECALLED FOR DUBININ THE RATIONALE USED BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS LATE MAY STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS. SUMMARIZING, HE STRESSED THAT: FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE WOULD REMAIN IN COMPLIANCE WITH SALT II NUMERICAL LIMITS; THE THRUST OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WAS A CALL FOR A REGIME OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT; AND THE STATEMENT CONTAINED A SERIES OF FLAT ASSURANCES THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT EXCEED SOVIET LEVELS IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS OR LAUNCHERS.

9. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION BY DUBININ AS TO WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD ULTIMATELY EXCEED SALT II NUMERICAL LIMITS, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT HAD MADE OUR LEVELS A FUNCTION OF SOVIET LEVELS. WE WOULD HAVE NO MORE LAUNCHERS OR WARHEADS THAN THE SOVIETS. WE HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD NO PLANS FOR A MAJOR EXPANSION OF OUR CAPABILITIES IN THESE AREAS. DUBININ SAID HE HAD ASKED THE QUESTION BECAUSE, WHILE THE SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEWS ON THE COMPLIANCE QUESTION, THE ESSENCE OF THEIR POSITION WAS TO PRESERVE THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF KEEPING THE ARMS RACE IN CHECK. THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE DOUBTS; THE SOVIETS HAD DOUBTS OF THEIR OWN. BUT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE WERE DOUBTS TO OPEN THE WAY TO AN UNRESTRICTED ARMS RACE. THAT, THE SECRETARY NOTED, WAS WHY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HAD EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR MUTUAL RESTRAINT.

10. DUBININ TOOK THE POINT, BUT ADDED THAT THE STATEMENT HAD ALSO REFERRED TO A "MOMENT OF DECISION" AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. THE TIMING OF SUCH A DECISION WAS VERY IMPORTANT. PRESERVING THE TREATY WAS THE IMPORTANT THING. IF THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE A DECISION ON SALT II NUMERICAL RESTRAINTS BY THE END OF THE YEAR, THAT WAS "ANOTHER ELEMENT" WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ASSESSING THE GENERAL SITUATION -- AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT. THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID HE WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET

~~SECRET~~

ACTIONS IN MAKING ANY DECISIONS: THIS INCLUDED NOT JUST DEPLOYMENTS, BUT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WHOLE CONTEXT.

11. DUBININ CAUTIONED THAT MAKING SUCH EVALUATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE "BEHAVIOUR" OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WAS AN "UNCOMFORTABLE" WAY OF DOING BUSINESS. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE KEY WAS TO REMEMBER WHAT HAD BEEN SAID IN GENEVA ON THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON RADICAL REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC FORCES. THIS WAS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THE SECRETARY TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THE SECRETARY HAD GIVEN DUBININ FOR GORBACHEV ON OUR INTENTION TO STUDY WITH GREAT CARE RECENT SOVIET START AND OTHER PROPOSALS.

YY

*NB: JMP says Pres authorized GS to tell Y.D. later that Pres. would not go over S-II hint in Nov if MG coming here.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

34

TIME STAMP

86 JUN 12 P 3: 23

SYSTEM II  
90452

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICER: \_\_\_\_\_ DUE: \_\_\_\_\_

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. \_\_\_\_\_

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Brooks</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Childress</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Cobb</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Donley</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Douglass</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Farrar</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Grimes</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Hanley</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Kelly</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer</li> </ul> | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Laux</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Levine</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Linhard</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Mahley</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Major</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Mandel</li> <li><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Matlock</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> May</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> North</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Perry</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Platt</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Raymond</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Reger</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl</li> </ul> | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Ross</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Sable</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Sachs</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Small</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Sommer</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Soos</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Stark</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Steiner</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> St Martin</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Teicher</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Thompson</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> Tillman</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> _____</li> <li><input type="checkbox"/> _____</li> </ul> |
|---|---|---|

- INFORMATION  McDaniel  Rodman  Pearson  \_\_\_\_\_  Secretariat  \_\_\_\_\_
- Poindexter (advance)  Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS NO ACTION IS REQUIRED, PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY SEEN.

DECLASSIFIED

With House Guidelines August 23, 1997  
By WJ NASA Date 6/21/02

~~SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat

8343 35

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1986

JRS

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: June 11 Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 #8343

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

~~MATLOCK~~ 34

4619

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Resignation Acceptance Letter to Gerald Carmen

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for David Chew noting NSC concurrence with a draft Presidential letter accepting Gerald Carmen's resignation as Representative of the United States to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva.

*out of town*  
Peter Sommer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *JFM 6-13* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo for DChew
- Tab A Draft Presidential Ltr

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Resignation Acceptance Letter to Gerald Carmen

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for David Chew noting NSC concurrence with a draft Presidential letter accepting Gerald Carmen's resignation as Representative of the United States to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva.

*out of town*  
Peter Sommer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

Tab I Memo for DChew  
Tab A Draft Presidential Ltr

38

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Resignation Acceptance Letter to Gerald Carmen

The National Security Council concurs with the attached draft Presidential letter accepting Gerald Carmen's resignation as Representative of the United States to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Presidential Ltr



# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REFERRAL

TIME STAMP

86 JUN 13 All: 06

SYSTEM I LOG NUMBER: 4619

(FIRST DRAFT OF REMARKS)

*Matlock*

ACTION OFFICER: \_\_\_\_\_

DUE: 13 June TODAY

- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Speakes
- Prepare Memo \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

**IMMEDIATE**

\*\*\* PUT RESPECTIVE STAFF OFFICER'S NAME IN MARGIN BESIDE CHANGES.

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

DUE: \_\_\_\_\_

\*PHONE to action officer at ext. \_\_\_\_\_

- |  |   |  |
|--|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brooks        | <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski         | <input type="checkbox"/> Sable             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt     | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine             | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard            | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley             | <input type="checkbox"/> Small             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb          | <input type="checkbox"/> Major              | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sommer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel             | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Matlock | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky    | <input type="checkbox"/> May                | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley        | <input type="checkbox"/> North              | <input type="checkbox"/> St Martin         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass      | <input type="checkbox"/> Perry              | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Farrar        | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt              | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes        | <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi         | <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hanley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond            | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kelly         | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger              | <input type="checkbox"/> _____             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer       | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl           | <input type="checkbox"/> _____             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux          | <input type="checkbox"/> Ross               | <input type="checkbox"/> _____             |

INFORMATION

McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

\_\_\_\_\_

Exec. Sec. Desk

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

# WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 6/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: COB TODAY

SUBJECT: RESIGNATION ACCEPTANCE LETTER TO GERALD CARMEN

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> SS	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Do you have any objection/comments on the attached?

RESPONSE:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1986

Dear Jerry:

It is with deep regret that I accept your resignation as Representative of the United States of America to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, effective August 31, 1986.

You mention Robert Frost's lines about taking the "road less traveled," and that making all the difference. You and I go back a long way together, Jerry, and seeing everything you've done for the people of the United States in behalf of our agenda of hope and opportunity, I am convinced those are words you live by.

Throughout your career, your dedication to excellence and your unflinching commitment to our nation's well-being have served as shining examples. Your appreciation for the power of ideas and your lifelong devotion to liberty and human rights have inspired all who cherish freedom and self-government.

I am proud to have had you on my campaign teams as well, Jerry. You have fought the good fight with energy, conviction, and enthusiasm. You have helped us focus on our fundamental principles and you've spared neither time nor effort to make sure policy reflected those principles.

Your ability, vision, and drive will continue to serve you well. It's good to know that I can call on you in the future. I too remember that first phone call of ours -- but perhaps we'll try to make the next one or two simply to ask how those gorgeous New Hampshire woods look to you and Anita.

From the bottom of my heart, thank you for all those promises you've kept and all the many miles we have walked together. God bless you and Anita always.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Gerald P. Carmen  
Representative of the  
United States of America  
European Office of the United Nations  
Geneva



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 13, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Chernobyl: Resolution re Emergency Medical Assistance

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Sally Kelley noting that NSC has reviewed and concurs with the attached draft letter to Ralph J. Perk, President of American Nationalities Movement of Ohio, regarding his proposal that the US offer assistance to the Soviet Union following the Chernobyl disaster.

*not available*  
Steve Danzansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memo for Sally Kelley
- Tab A Draft Ltr to Perk
- Tab B Incoming Resolution

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4615

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Chernobyl: Resolution re Emergency Medical Assistance

The National Security Council has reviewed and concurs with the attached draft response to Ralph J. Perk, President of American Nationalities Movement of Ohio, regarding his proposal that the US offer assistance to the Soviet Union following the Chernobyl disaster.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Response  
Tab B: Incoming Proposal

46:5

44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8616604

Date June 12, 1986

For: VADM John M. Poindexter  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: The Honorable Ralph J. Perk  
Date: May 10, 1986 Subject: Resolution providing  
emergency medical assistance to those effected by Chernobyl.  
Referral Dated: May 29, 1986 ID# 403539  
(if any)

           The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

- XX A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

*for* *Tom Collins*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Perk:

I am replying to your May 10 letter regarding your proposal that the United States offer assistance to the Soviet Union following the Chernobyl accident.

When the Department first learned of the accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station, we sent a message to the Soviet Government expressing our regret and hope that casualties would be limited. In that same message we offered humanitarian and technical assistance. The Soviet Government expressed appreciation for our offer of assistance but indicated their resources were sufficient.

A communique issued May 5 by the leaders of all seven nations attending the Tokyo Economic Summit reflects the position of the United States Government on international cooperation for nuclear safety and reporting of nuclear incidents. We remain ready to extend assistance, in particular medical and technical, when and if requested. We believe each

The Honorable

Ralph J. Perk,

President, American Nationalities

Movement of Ohio,

207 Statler Office Building,

Cleveland, Ohio.

country engaged in nuclear power generation bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its installations. Furthermore, each country is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete information on nuclear emergencies and accidents, in particular those with potential trans-boundary consequences. Each of the economic summit countries accepts that responsibility, and we urge the government of the Soviet Union, which did not do so in the case of Chernobyl, to provide such information in a timely manner.

We were pleased that the Soviets invited International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix and two of his associates to Moscow for discussions and a site visit in connection with the Chernobyl accident. We welcome and encourage the work of the IAEA in seeking to improve international cooperation on the safety of nuclear installations, the handling of nuclear accidents and their consequences, and the provision of mutual emergency assistance. We urge an early commitment by the parties to report and exchange information in the event of nuclear emergencies. The U.S. proposed such an international convention in 1981.

Sincerely,



47  
8616604

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE  
REFERRAL

MAY 29, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 403539

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MAY 10, 1986

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE RALPH J. PERK  
PRESIDENT  
AMERICAN NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF  
OHIO  
207 STATLER OFFICE BUILDING  
1127 EUCLID AVENUE  
CLEVELAND OH 44115

SUBJECT: FORWARDS RESOLUTION SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO  
PROVIDE EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO ALL  
PEOPLE EFFECTED BY THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

48

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 22, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE RALPH J. PERK

SUBJECT: FORWARDS RESOLUTION SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO  
PROVIDE EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO ALL  
PEOPLE EFFECTED BY THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D
LINAS KOJELIS		ORG	86/05/22		___/___/___
<u>199005</u>	REFERRAL NOTE: _____	D	86/05/29 <sup>TR</sup>		___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___
	REFERRAL NOTE: _____				___/___/___

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: 2 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

- \*\*\*\*\*
- |                          |                      |                      |   |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES:           | *DISPOSITION         | *OUTGOING            | * |
| *                        | *                    | *CORRESPONDENCE:     | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION    | *A-ANSWERED          | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS  | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM         | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER          | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE        | *C-COMPLETED         | * CODE = A           | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET    | *S-SUSPENDED         | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* |                      | * OUTGOING           | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * |                      |                      | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE         |                      |                      | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY         |                      |                      | * |
- \*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



# AMERICAN NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF OHIO

Ralph J. Perk, President • 207 Statler Office Bldg. • 1127 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 441  
• (216) 861-550

*L. Kogel*

*JA*

May 10, 1986

- Albanian
- Bulgarian
- Byelorussian
- Croatian
- Cuban
- Czech
- Estonian
- German
- Greek
- Hungarian
- Indian
- Irish
- Italian
- Lebanese
- Latvian
- Lithuanian
- Polish
- Puerto Rican
- Rumanian
- Russin
- Serbian
- Slovak
- Slovenian
- Ukrainian
- Vietnamese

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington, D.C.

## RESOLUTION

The American Nationalities Movement of Ohio representing 25 ethnic communities, at its annual meeting held on May 8, 1986 at the Donauschwaben Hall in Olmsted Township, Ohio, unanimously endorsed the following resolution:

**WHEREAS** the Chernobyl nuclear explosion in Ukraine is the worst catastrophe in the history of nuclear power, and

**WHEREAS** this explosion has affected the lives of tens of thousands of fellow Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and

**WHEREAS** many of our members have close family ties with the people effected in the immediate area of the nuclear plant, and

**WHEREAS** the nuclear radiation is affecting the health of our members' relatives living in the neighboring countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Roumania, and other areas of the European continent.

**We**, the representatives of 25 ethnic nationalities of Ohio, deeply concerned about the effects of this explosion on human lives, whole heartedly support the President's efforts to provide emergency medical and other material assistance to all people effected by this catastrophe.

In the spirit of humanitarian principles, we urge the President to impress upon the Soviet government and the governments of Eastern Europe to open up the channels of communication between the families of our members and their relatives effected by this tragic nuclear explosion.



# AMERICAN NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF OHIO

Ralph J. Perk, President • 207 Statler Office Bldg. • 1127 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 44111

• (216) 861-550

Albanian  
Bulgarian  
Byelorussian  
Croatian  
Cuban  
Czech  
Estonian  
German  
Greek  
Hungarian  
Indian  
Irish  
Italian  
Lebanese  
Latvian  
Lithuanian  
Polish  
Puerto Rican  
Rumanian  
Russin  
Serbian  
Slovak  
Slovenian  
Ukrainian  
Vietnamese

Page 2

May 10, 1986

We offer our help to any appropriate international organization directly responsible to supply medical and other badly needed assistance.

We urge our President to appeal to the Soviet leadership not to use political prisoners to clean-up contaminated areas.

Respectfully submitted by:

*The Hon.*

Ralph J. Perk, President  
American Nationalities Movement of Ohio

Dr. William Liscynsky, President  
United Ukrainian Organization of  
Greater Cleveland

John Rakovich, President  
Byelorussian Community of Greater  
Cleveland