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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/15/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1986 (2/4)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1605

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8273	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE APPOINTMENT OF USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	5/14/1986	B1
8274	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. FROM THE USSR <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8289	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE APPOINTMENT OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH DUBININ OF THE USSR AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8275	MEMO	PROPOSED NEW AMBASSADOR: YURIY VLADIMIROVICH DUBININ USSR <i>PAR 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8290	MEMO	RIDGWAY TO ROOSEVELT RE SOVIET AGREEMENT REQUEST <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	5/13/1986	B1
8276	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8277	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8276 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8278	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	5/16/1986	B1
8280	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY	1	5/16/1986	B1
8281	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8280	1	5/16/1986	B1
8279	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8278 R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	5/16/1986	B1
8291	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE GORBACHEV SPEECH ON CHERNOBYL R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	2	5/14/1986	B1
8282	MEMO	MATLOCK TO LINHARD RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT R 12/12/2012 M394/1	2	5/20/1986	B1
8283	MEMO	REVISED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT	4	5/20/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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JET 4/15/2005

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FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1605

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8284	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT	2	5/20/1986	B1
8294	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO SENIOR NSC STAFF RE MICHAEL DEEVER	1	5/20/1986	B6
8285	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ARMAND HAMMER AND DR. ROBERT GALE	1	5/20/1986	B1
8286	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO RYAN SCHEDULE PROPOSAL RE MEETING WITH ARMAND HAMMER AND DR. ROBERT GALE	1	ND	B1
8292	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	5/19/1986	B1
8287	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8285	1	5/20/1986	B1
8288	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8286	1	ND	B1
8293	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8292 R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4	1	5/19/1986	B1

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3816

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Appointment of USSR Ambassador to the US

I have reviewed the information provided by the Department of State (Tab II) and concur in their recommendation of the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the US.

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to Nick Platt noting our concurrence.

Paula ^{PD}Dobriansky, Steve ^{SR}Sestanovich and Judyt ^{JM}Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo for NPlatt
- Tab II Incoming from State

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Declassify on Appointment as Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD16-114/4 #8273
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Ambassador to the United States from the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (S/S)

The President has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation of the Department of State that the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. You are requested to so inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (S/S)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on Appointment as Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8274

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 MAY 14 A 7: 23

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3816

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 16 MAY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro <input type="checkbox"/> Childress <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb <input type="checkbox"/> Covey <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky <input type="checkbox"/> Donley <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes <input type="checkbox"/> Hughes <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer <input type="checkbox"/> Laux <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Levine <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mandel <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock <input type="checkbox"/> May <input type="checkbox"/> Menges <input type="checkbox"/> Miller <input type="checkbox"/> North <input type="checkbox"/> Platt <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond <input type="checkbox"/> Reger <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl <input type="checkbox"/> Sable | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich <input type="checkbox"/> Sigur <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer <input type="checkbox"/> Soos <input type="checkbox"/> Stark <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman <input type="checkbox"/> Wigg <input type="checkbox"/> Wright <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Pearson
 - Lehman
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
Ambassador to the United States

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to the United States (Tab 2). A biography of Mr. Dubinin is attached (Tab 1).

The Department believes from the information available that Mr. Dubinin will make an acceptable Ambassador to the United States and recommends that the President agree to the proposed appointment. If he concurs, the Department will inform the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Biography
2. EUR Memo

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Decl:Oadr

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8289
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11


~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Proposed New Ambassador: Yuriy Vladimirovich DUBININ
(doo BEE nin)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin is a West European specialist who was the Soviet ambassador to Spain from 1978 to 1986 until his appointment as the Permanent Representative of the USSR at the United Nations in March, 1986. A foreign policy professional, Dubinin began his career in 1955 after graduating from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations with a degree in history.

Ambassador Thomas Enders, US Ambassador to Spain, has described Dubinin as an able representative of Soviet views who worked in a patient, low-key, and tactful way to advance the Soviet-Spanish relationship. He also characterized Dubinin as understanding Western political institutions and particularly adept in dealing with the Western press.



FOIA(b)(1), (3)

Dubinin also worked in France during his early career, serving twice in Paris. From 1955-60 he was first a Foreign Service trainee and then a translator for UNESCO; during 1963-68 he was a First Secretary and then a Counselor at the Soviet Embassy. Between these tours he worked on the French Desk at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. In 1968 he became Deputy Chief for the First European Department, which has responsibility for France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, and the Benelux. Three years later he was appointed Department

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/4#8275
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

Chief, and from 1972 until his departure for Spain he was a member of the Ministry's governing board. In addition to his work on France and Spain, Dubinin served in Geneva as Deputy Head of the Soviet CSCE delegation from 1973 to 1975, where he was responsible for basket three issues (cooperation in humanitarian matters).

Dubinin speaks French, English, and Spanish. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

His wife, Liana Zevinovna, speaks German and Spanish and holds a doctorate in French history. They have three daughters.

A check of U.S. Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

Sources Include:

[REDACTED]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Department of State

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1986

~~Secret/Sensitive~~

TO: S/CPR - Selwa Roosevelt
FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway ^{KLR}_{ms}
SUBJECT: Soviet Agreement Request

On May 12th, Soviet chargé Sokolov requested agreement to appoint Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin the new Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Attached is a brief biography of Mr. Dubinin that Mr. Sokolov gave us.

~~Secret/Sensitive~~
Decl:Oadr

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8290
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

8

Yuri Vladimirovich Dubinin was born in 1930. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. Has Ph.D. in history. Foreign languages - French, English and Spanish.

Has great experience in diplomatic work. 1971-1978 - Head of the First European Department, member of the Collegium of the USSR Foreign Ministry. 1978-1986 - USSR Ambassador in Spain. Since March 1986 - Permanent Representative of the USSR at the United Nations and the USSR Representative in the UN Security Council.

Has the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Recipient of the USSR Government awards.

Member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU.

Married. Has three daughters.

JMC 9

3896

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

May 16, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Suzanne Massie, May 20, 1986, 9:45-10:15 a.m.

The President will meet for 30 minutes with Suzanne Massie on Tuesday, May 20, 1986 for 30 minutes. The President wrote to Mrs. Massie in February, and in her response she suggested an informal meeting to discuss the President's comments.

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
2/15/05

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

DATE: May 20, 1986
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To respond in person to the President's letter to her of February 10.

II. BACKGROUND

The President wrote to Mrs. Massie in February concerning recent developments in the Soviet Union.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The First Lady
John Poindexter
Suzanne Massie

IV. PRESS PLAN

None; staff photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Greet Massie, thank her for her letter, and initiate discussion.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A Talking points (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
JMS
2/15/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- Appreciated your letter. Eager to hear about your experiences in Russia.

- What do most Russians think of Gorbachev?

- How important is Russian nationalism as opposed to Communist ideology?

- I've heard there is an upsurge of interest in religion. How important is this?

- Are we communicating effectively with the Russian people?
Are there better ways to get our point of view across?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/4#0276
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

- APPRECIATE YOUR LETTER. EAGER TO HEAR ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES IN RUSSIA.
- WHAT DO MOST RUSSIANS THINK OF GORBACHEV?
- HOW IMPORTANT IS RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AS OPPOSED TO COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY?
- I'VE HEARD THERE IS AN UPSURGE OF INTEREST IN RELIGION. HOW IMPORTANT IS THIS?
- ARE WE COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE? ARE THERE BETTER WAYS TO GET OUR POINT OF VIEW ACROSS?

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR F06-114/4 #8277
 BY LW NARA DATE 3/9/11

13
REVISED

Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5/13/86

MEMORANDUM

TO: JOHN POINDEXTER
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Suzanne Massie

DATE: May 20, 1986

TIME: 9:45 am

DURATION: 30/15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: Yes

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

K. Barun
P. Buchanan
D. Chew
M. Coyne
E. Crispen
M. Daniels
T. Dawson
D. Dellinger
B. Elliott
J. Erkenbeck
L. Faulkner
C. Fuller
W. Henkel

C. Hicks
J. Hooley
A. Kingon
J. Kuhn
C. McCain
W. Ball
R. Riley
G. Walters
R. Shaddick
B. Shaddix
L. Speakes
J. Courtemanche
WHCA Audio/Visual
WHCA Operations

R. McDaniel

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

March 24, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT:

Presidential Meeting with Suzanne Massie

Attached at Tab I is a schedule proposal recommending that the President receive Suzanne Massie for lunch at his convenience. The President wrote to Ms. Massie in February, and in her response (Tab II) she suggests an informal meeting to discuss the President's comments. The President has expressed interest in seeing her.

Johnathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Schedule proposal

Tab II Letter to the President from Suzanne Massie

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

REQUEST: Meeting with Suzanne Massie, author and
historian

PURPOSE: To respond in person to the President's
letter to her of February 10.

BACKGROUND: The President wrote to Mrs. Massie in
February concerning recent developments in
the Soviet Union.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President has met with Mrs. Massie on
several occasions, most recently in
September. He has expressed interest
in seeing her again.

DATE & TIME: At the President's convenience for lunch.

LOCATION: The President's study

PARTICIPANTS: John M. Poindexter

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Informal discussion of Mrs. Massie's recent
trip to the Soviet Union.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

PROPOSED PHOTO: White House Photo

RECOMMENDED BY: ADM. Poindexter

OPPOSED BY: None

SUZANNE MASEE
1 WEST 67TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10023

2351

16

March 12, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you so much for your letter of February 10 which I received with delay as I am now spending much of my time these days in Cambridge working on my book at the Harvard Russian Research Center where I am presently a Fellow.


It has taken me a long time to answer because I wanted to take the time to think over very carefully what you said. The implications of the remarks of which you spoke are so potentially important that it is, as you suggest, vital to judge their worth accurately. I think I know the Russians as well as any American. You know my feeling for the people and their culture. When I read your letter my first reaction was: Wonderful! -- instantly followed by: but be careful! Yet now, after I have had a chance to reflect for some time, to review in my mind the many conversations, experiences and observations of my months in Leningrad this fall, plus the opportunity to carefully study the results and words of the 27th Party Congress and discuss these at Harvard, my reaction leans much more to the positive. I am more convinced than ever that this is an extraordinarily important historic crossroads in our relations. How subtly, how sensitively we react to this situation is the big question.

I have some thoughts about this that I would very much like to share with you informally. Is there anyway that we could do this alone, or best of all, with Mrs. Reagan, whom I have always wanted to meet? As I woman, I would very much like to have her reactions. I know that given the pressures on your time, this may be difficult, but I still hope that it might be possible. I may be presumptuous, but I think I can help you, and I want so much to do so.

In case you find that there might be such a possibility, I can be reached either in New York, at 212- 496 -1786 or at the Harvard Russian Research Center, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge Mas. 02138. Phone : 617-495-4037.

And again, Mr. President, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me. It is an honor and a joy for me. With all best wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Suzanne Massie". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

~~Mallech~~ 18

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3852

File

May 16, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Proposals for International Cooperation
in Nuclear Power Plant Safety (C)

The President has noted the suggestions made by General Secretary Gorbachev regarding international cooperation on nuclear reactor safety. He feels that these suggestions may be responsive to the proposal made by the participants in the Tokyo Summit and is interested in following up on them. (C)

Therefore, it would be appreciated if the Department would arrange for an interagency study of the Gorbachev proposals, and also of the broader question as to whether it is in the U.S. interest to propose new forms of international cooperation in the area of nuclear power plant safety, accident reporting and information exchange. (C)

Since it is important to move with dispatch to respond constructively to the Chernobyl disaster, a report on the interagency views of these questions would be appreciated by May 23. (C)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD06-114/4 #8278
BY RWJ NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 16, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Proposals for International Cooperation on Nuclear Power Plant Safety

You will recall that Gorbachev, in his May 14 speech, made several proposals for international cooperation on nuclear power plant safety. Specifically, he called for the following:

- International cooperation on reactor safety to develop systems for providing quick information on nuclear accidents;
- International mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral aid in case of such disasters;
- Upgrade the staff and resources of the IAEA;
- Work through specialized agencies such as the WHO.

I understand that the President commented on these proposals yesterday morning, saying that they sounded like what the Summit Seven called for at Tokyo. In fact, Gorbachev does seem implicitly to be responding to the suggestion in the Tokyo statement. This seems to be one issue on which we can be responsive to a Gorbachev proposal.

I believe that we should give the question a quick study so that we can pursue this opening with some vigor. Therefore, I have appended for your approval a memorandum from Rod McDaniel to Nick Platt requesting a study and recommendations.

^{na.} Sestanovich and Pugliaresi concur.

RECOMMENDATION: *JM*

That you authorize sending the Memorandum at Tab I.

Enclosures: Approve *JM 5-16* Disapprove

Tab I McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
Tab A State Memorandum on Gorbachev Speech

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FDQ-114/4 #8280
BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/20/13

8281

SM-C
JFM-10
20

3852

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 16, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jay*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Proposals for International Cooperation on Nuclear Power Plant Safety

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- Work through specialized agencies such as the WHO.

I understand that the President commented on these proposals yesterday morning, saying that they sounded like what the Summit Seven called for at Tokyo. In fact, Gorbachev does seem implicitly to be responding to the suggestion in the Tokyo statement. This seems to be one issue on which we can be responsive to a Gorbachev proposal.

I believe that we should give the question a quick study so that we can pursue this opening with some vigor. Therefore, I have appended for your approval a memorandum from Rod McDaniel to Nick Platt requesting a study and recommendations.

^{na.} Sestanovich and Pugliaresi concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize sending the Memorandum at Tab I.

Enclosures: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
Tab A State Memorandum on Gorbachev Speech

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NLRR F06-1144 #8281
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Proposals for International Cooperation
in Nuclear Power Plant Safety (C)

The President has noted the suggestions made by General Secretary Gorbachev regarding international cooperation on nuclear reactor safety. He feels that these suggestions may be responsive to the proposal made by the participants in the Tokyo Summit and is interested in following up on them. (C)

Therefore, it would be appreciated if the Department would arrange for an interagency study of the Gorbachev proposals, and also of the broader question as to whether it is in the U.S. interest to propose new forms of international cooperation in the area of nuclear power plant safety, accident reporting and information exchange. (C)

Since it is important to move with dispatch to respond constructively to the Chernobyl disaster, a report on the interagency views of these questions would be appreciated by May 23. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

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NLRR F06-114/4#8279

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



United States Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D.C. 20520 #3852

May 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Gorbachev Speech on Chernobyl

In his first public remarks on Chernobyl Gorbachev blasted U.S. and Western leaders for exploiting the accident to divert attention from Soviet arms control initiatives. He thanked American doctors for their assistance (the U.S. was the only nation explicitly singled out for thanks) but said that leading circles in the U.S. and its allies, especially the FRG, were using Chernobyl to put barriers in the way of dialogue and peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium. He talked again about meeting the President in a European capital but did not mention a U.S. summit in 1986. In a particularly gratuitous comment, Gorbachev also said that he would be willing to meet the President at Hiroshima. Implicitly seeking to defend the Soviet record on providing information, Gorbachev (falsely) stated that the U.S. had taken 10 days to inform Congress and over a month to inform the IAEA about the accident at Three Mile Island.

In a more positive vein, Gorbachev proposed a number of steps to increase nuclear reactor safety under the IAEA. Many of these proposals are quite similar to those included in the Tokyo summit communique. Specifically, Gorbachev proposed:

- International cooperation on reactor safety to develop systems for providing quick information on nuclear accidents;
- International mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral aid in case of such disasters;
- Upgrade the staff and resources of the IAEA;
- Work through specialized agencies such as the WHO.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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Gorbachev added little new information on the accident itself. Claiming that the worst was over, he said that the fire in reactor four was out and the other three reactors at the site had been shut down. He reaffirmed that two people had died during the initial explosion and said that seven of 299 hospitalized with radiation sickness had subsequently died. Gorbachev said that the Politburo had taken the incident under its direct control as soon as it received complete information. For the first time he said that the special commission on the accident is headed by Premier Ryzhkov, a Gorbachev appointee. Gorbachev went out of his way to praise Ukrainian officials, perhaps to dampen speculation that he would use the accident to remove Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy.

Gorbachev's tone throughout the speech was bitter toward the West. He offered not a word of self-criticism or apology to the Western European nations exposed to radiation from the accident. His remarks on testing were a lame effort to divert Western attention from the Soviet performance during the accident.

Nicholas M. Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

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ACTION OFFICER: _____

DUE: 16 MAY

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Prepare Memo _____

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

FYI

FYI

Burghardt

Levine

Sachs

Cannistraro

Linhard

Sestanovich

Childress

Mahley

Sigur

Cobb

Major

Small

Covey

Mandel

Sommer

Danzansky

Matlock

Soos

deGraffenreid

May

Stark

Djerejian

Menges

Steiner

Dobriansky

Miller

Tahir-Kheli

Donley

North

Teicher

Douglass

Platt

Thompson

Grimes

Pugliaresi

Tillman

Hughes

Raymond

Wigg

Kraemer

Reger

Wright

Laux

Ringdahl

Lenczowski

Sable

INFORMATION McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Lehman

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

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DATE 10/20/02

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Return to Secretariat

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 19, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

Art Hartman has just returned from Moscow and has requested a meeting with the President to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations and the outlook for a 1986 summit. Such a meeting is particularly timely in light of the recent nuclear accident in Chernobyl, and Secretary Shultz recommends that the request be approved.

J.M.
Judyt Mandel and *Michael Plaster for* Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the schedule proposal to Fred Ryan at Tab I for Art Hartman to meet with the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab II State Department memo requesting a meeting with the President for Ambassador Hartman.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By *CSS* NARA, Date *6/20/02*



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

REQUEST: Meeting with Arthur Hartman, U.S. Ambassador
to the Soviet Union.

PURPOSE: To brief the President on U.S.-Soviet
relations and the outlook for a 1986 summit.

BACKGROUND: The Ambassador is in the U.S. on
consultations through the beginning of June.
He has met with the President on previous visits.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Most recently the President met with
Ambassador Hartman in March of this year.

DATE & TIME: May 19-23, 27-28 or June 2.
DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Donald
Regan, John Poindexter, and Jack Matlock

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Ambassador Hartman,
solicits his views on the current situation
in Moscow, and discusses the issues as
appropriate.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

PROPOSED "PHOTO": White House photo

RECOMMENDED BY: ADM Poindexter, Secretary Shultz

OPPOSED BY: None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By aw NARA, Date 6/20/02





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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 16, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President and Ambassador Hartman,
Our Envoy to the Soviet Union

Ambassador Hartman, our envoy to the Soviet Union, will visit Washington in mid to late May and would very much appreciate a fifteen-minute meeting with the President. He would like to review the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and prospects for a meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev this year. The Secretary recommends approval of the Ambassador's request.

The Ambassador will be in Washington on May 15-16, 19-23, 27-28, and June 2. He will meet with the Secretary, and has requested meetings with the Vice President and others.

Nicholas Platt
for
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/20/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986

~~Matlock~~
Filt 30

Dear Professor and Mrs. McClellan:

Thank you very much for your letter to President Reagan of April 7. I would like to reply on his behalf and take the opportunity to address your specific concerns about Alexander and Rosa Ioffi and Vladimir and Elena Prestin.

As you are probably already aware, the Ioffis and Prestins are included on the U.S. government's list of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to emigrate to Israel. This list is periodically presented to high level Soviet officials (most recently in the Autumn of 1985) as an expression of our continued concern over the Soviet government's denial of basic human rights.


In addition, the President personally has made it clear to General Secretary Gorbachev that he considers respect for human rights, including freedom to travel, to be a principal item for discussion in their ongoing dialogue.

You know from your own experience that Soviet authorities are often intransigent in these cases, but that persistence can be rewarded.

I know you will persist in your efforts to support the Ioffis and Prestins. I can assure you that we, too, will continue to work on their behalf and on behalf of the hundreds of other Soviet refuseniks and separated families who suffer a similar plight.

Thank you for sharing your concern with the President.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Professor and Mrs. Woodford McClellan
202 Turkey Ridge Road
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

May 8, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Woodford and Irina McClellan

Attached at Tab I is a suggested response in your name to a letter to the President from Woodford and Irina McClellan (Tab II). The McClellans ask the President's support for two Jewish families in Moscow who have long sought to emigrate.

Irina, you may recall, was granted permission to leave the Soviet Union last Fall after over ten years of unsuccessful efforts to join her husband in the United States. The President wrote to the couple in March welcoming Irina to this country (Tab III).

↗
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I reiterating the President's commitment to addressing the problem of human rights abuse in the Soviet Union.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Suggested response to the McClellans
- Tab II Letter from the McClellans to the President
- Tab III Letter from the President to the McClellans

Irina I. McClellan
202 Turkey Ridge Road
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901

April 7, 1986

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington

Dear President Reagan:

My husband and I are deeply grateful to you and Mrs. Reagan for your kind letter of March 26 addressed to us in care of our friends at the Hillel Foundation in West Lafayette, Indiana. We spent last weekend in the Greater Lafayette area and were delighted to share your letter with the community yesterday.

Tomorrow my husband and I are going to attempt to present to the Soviet Embassy a great number of petitions signed by thousands of residents of the Greater Lafayette area asking the Soviet Government to permit Alexander and Rosa Ioffi, and Vladimir and Elena Prestin, to emigrate to Israel. Both couples have waited many years for permission to leave; there has been no movement in either case. We respectfully bring these two families to your attention and ask that you consider raising the issue of their plight at the appropriate time and in the appropriate forum.

Respectfully,

Irina McClellan
Woodford McClellan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1986


Dear Professor and Mrs. McClellan:

I learned that you are being honored in Greater Lafayette, and I want to join your well-wishers in congratulating you.

It is to the everlasting credit of the Lafayette community that its people kept you in their hearts throughout those eleven long years of forced separation. Such cruel deprivation of one another's company exemplifies vividly why freedom of movement should be recognized as a basic human right. That right is never more sacred than when the unity of families is at stake. But now that you are back together, our happiness is all the greater!

Nancy joins me in rejoicing with you both, and in saluting your fine friends in Greater Lafayette. God bless you all.

Sincerely,



Professor and Mrs. Woodford McClellan

West Lafayette, Indiana

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506ACTION

May 19, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Letter to Pearce and Green

Attached at Tab I is a suggested response to the most recent letter from Tom Green and Terry Pearce. It reiterates that in the absence of substantive change in Soviet behavior we cannot offer any encouragement for their peace plan's likelihood of success.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Tom Green and Terry Pearce.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Pearce and Green
Tab II Letter from Pearce and Green

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Tom and Terry:

Thank you for your letter of April 17.

I would like to assure you that I did find our meeting a worthwhile exchange, and there is no need for an apology. Although I had read your plan and discussed it with Jack Matlock, your personal comments were valuable in confirming my understanding of the idea.

I understand that you do not view your initiative as declaratory policy. My concern, however, based on past experience with the Soviets, is that they see support for the proposal in terms of bolstering their own propaganda positions (non-use of force, non-militarization of space, etc.). They will treat it as declaratory policy despite your intentions and any protestations to the contrary that they might make.

In the absence of substantive change in Soviet behavior, I cannot offer you any encouragement on the likelihood of success for the initiative. I do, however, appreciate your keeping me informed.

Sincerely,

Messrs. Tom Green and Terry Pearce
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920

April 17, 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
National Security Advisor
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

Admiral Poindexter:

Your ability to stay focused on our discussion Tuesday was very impressive in light of recent events. We appreciate that you even allowed the time; it was certainly adequate to have had a thorough hearing.

We feel as though we wasted your time by not confirming your earlier review of the proposal and by failing to anticipate the need to review the idea from its basis. We apologize for this shortsightedness. Certainly, if we saw this plan, as we believe you do, as another attempt at declaratory policy, we would be less than enthusiastic, and in fact would classify it as naive. It is substantially more far-reaching, and is designed precisely to create the atmosphere where continued dialogue and realistic conservative action can be taken.

We were not prepared for the presentation you expected. We believed you had been briefed not only on the nature of the initiative, but also on its basis and breadth. Many of the points brought forth yesterday were covered, we believed thoroughly, in our memorandum to The President (for Mr. McFarlane) of September 12, 1986. (For example, the plan is distinguished from a "non-use of force" proposal as the memorandum's first point. The Soviets see this distinction clearly and consequently are cautious in their assessment of the proposal as well.) The initiative is a concrete action that will set the direction of Soviet/American relations for years to come.

As we discussed, we met with the PRC Embassy today, and will be meeting with the Soviet Embassy on April 18, 1986. We will report their responses to your office through Commander Thompson or Ambassador Matlock next week.

Thank you again. We will be moving through other sponsors to clarify the initiative for you, and to urge its implementation by the President.

Warm regards,

Tom Green and Terry Pearce
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920
(415) 435-9663 (415) 381-1598

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JACK MATLOCK,

What in the world
do they see that we
don't?

OFM09
Luisian L'pant

~~Eyes Only~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
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BY KML NARA DATE 12/12/12

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 20, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT E. LINHARD

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Statement on Interim Restraint

As you know, I would ^{re}prefer if the President could finesse the question of SALT II numerical limits, because I fear the public impact, particularly in Europe, and also the subsequent potential the Soviets have to build up offensive forces more rapidly than we can and escape much public blame for doing so.

However, if the President determines that he must get out of the precedent, I would recommend the following specific changes in the draft:

page 2, line 7: add the phrase "in a manner which impedes verification" following "continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing." [Note that encryption is (unfortunately) allowed if it does not impede verification.]

page 4, final sentence in first para: Omit. This point is open to challenge (even Bud has said that the treaty probably would have been ratified if the Soviets did not invade Afghanistan). Also, putting it in undermines the broader point that we make that arms control is influenced by Soviet behavior in regional conflicts.

page 4, final sentence in third paragraph: I would omit, and cover this issue implicitly with something like the following, which would replace that sentence and the following three paragraphs:

"Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the U.S. must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in a treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and in addition has been violated by the Soviet Union.

"In order to avoid an arms race, the United States will continue to exercise greater restraint than the Soviet Union in the modernization of our nuclear forces. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security

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requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive systems. The U.S. will not deploy more strategic delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with respect to the critical area not covered by SALT-II, the U.S. also will not deploy more strategic ballistic warheads than does the Soviet Union.

"In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint in protecting our strategic deterrence, in order to create the necessary atmosphere for radical reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us and I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint."

Final paragraph on p 5 would be the same, except that I would amend to include the exact language from the Geneva Joint Statement. (see note on draft)

NOTE: I believe this contains all the thoughts in the original, except that it does not state flatly what we will do at the end of the year (I think this is unwise), and puts the stress on our continued restraint. If we put the stress there, I believe that we can minimize fall-out from the "violating SALT-II" syndrome. Yet, the statement does move us off SALT-II as a benchmark, and places it squarely on Soviet levels.

SECOND NOTE: At some point, reference might be made to unilateral statement A attached to the ABM treaty which speaks of the "necesssity for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations" if the ABM Treaty is to remain in force after five years.

May 20, 1986
10:00 a.m.

REVISED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I interim offensive agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. One simply can not be serious about effective arms control unless one is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded at that time that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals in the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union additional, adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. As called for by our policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered both Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas of U.S. concern, there has been no real progress in meeting U.S. concerns with the general pattern of Soviet

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in a manner which impedes effectiveness.

non-compliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new ICBM type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force improvement program. Finally, after the Geneva summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow-up on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by me and General Secretary Gorbachev to seek common ground, especially through implementing in an appropriate manner the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and through an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet behavior since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstance, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned, rather than try to refurbish them.

As part of the same decision, I also announced last June that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet non-compliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the

continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely critical that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet non-compliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their non-compliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of their massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing and deployment of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBMs in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT II Treaty. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty that would have

By plane

forced to make, at that time, I intend to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty.

As indicated by my decision to retire two additional POSEIDON submarines, the United States does not seek an arms race. Rather, we seek immediate and significant reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. The United States has been exercising, and will continue to exercise, greater restraint than the Soviet Union in the modernization of our nuclear forces which we need as a deterrent to aggression. We must and will take those actions needed to provide sufficient, modern forces to underwrite our security and that of our allies. However, we will only maintain those forces needed to contribute to that purpose. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the number of U.S. strategic offensive systems as a result of the decision I have been forced to make with respect to the SALT II Treaty. In fact, in implementing this decision, and using the terms associated with the SALT II Treaty, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Of more importance, with respect to the critical area not covered by SALT II, in implementing this decision, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

Of course, as I noted above, the United States will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months. I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time, even now, to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account. More clearly than ever, the responsibility rests with the Soviet Union. Therefore, once again, I call on the Soviet Union to seize this unique opportunity to join with us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

However, no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva ~~on seeking common ground and making progress in this area.~~ If the Soviet Union does so, we can together immediately achieve greater stability and a safer world.

to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 20, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on Interim Restraint

I am reluctant to intrude in the decision-making process at this late date, but there are a few factors which I would hope the President would consider fully before making a final decision as to whether it is in the U.S. interest explicitly to state that we will not observe the SALT-II limits. If he does the latter, I am convinced that:

1. We can expect a storm in Europe, no matter how unfair. It will put us at the PR disadvantage, which will be hard to overcome, no matter how forthcoming our actual proposals. In particular, it will be a blow to Thatcher and Kohl whose governments are under intense pressure, and could be replaced with much less friendly ones in a year to 18 months.
2. We will lose whatever leverage the SALT-II limits provide over Soviet programs. There will no longer, for example, be a legitimate complaint regarding the SS-25 and encryption in the future. And we should carefully consider both the military impact and the public impact if the Soviets react by testing the SS-18 follow-on with more than ten warheads, or rapidly deploying more missiles long before we can do so.
3. It will hand the Soviets a large club to beat us with publicly -- and to excuse their future behavior. This will have an effect, here and in Europe. It would, as a minimum, provide a very convenient pretext for Gorbachev not to go through with the Summit -- a pretext which would not be rejected out of hand by Western publics.

None of this is an argument in favor of saying we will stay within the SALT-II limits. (We should not do that.) But it is an argument in favor of avoiding saying that we will break them (particularly when we don't necessarily intend to!). The gain from saying we will not be bound is only in the theoretical sphere; the disadvantages are highly practical.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4# 8284

BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR

46

Could we not avoid these risks, yet still avoid reinforcing an unfortunate precedent by:

- (1) Announcing that, for the moment, we will dismantle the subs, for military reasons. Make no commitments, one way or the other, for the future.
- (2) Then, as soon as we can develop it (i.e., within a couple of weeks), make a public proposal for strategic weapons reduction (no big change over our current position, but presented as new), and for an interim restraint regime to cover the period of negotiation.
- (3) Possibly, announce unilaterally a restraint policy, keyed to Soviet force levels. (Implicitly -- or perhaps explicitly -- this would replace SALT-II restraints, and get us off the precedent problem.)
- (4) Use the period between now and the end of the year to bring pressure on the Soviets to negotiate seriously.

Such a scenario would ease us out of the SALT-II constraints, while presenting to the public a forward-looking, constructive image. It would deprive the Soviets of a handy propaganda target and focus attention on their response, without tying the President's hands regarding the November decision.

cc: Bob Linhard (EYES ONLY)

National Security Council
The White House

DM
48

86 MAY 20 10 P 8: 34

System # _____
Package # 90393
DOCLOG DM A/O _____


	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u>2</u>	<u>M 5-20</u>	
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson	<u>3</u>	<u>T</u>	
Florence Gantt	<u>4</u>		
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4/6</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
<u>MATLOCK</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>I</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP
(Date/Time)



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 20, 1986

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale

State has recommended that the President meet with Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale. Since Gale has been the American most involved in treating the Chernobyl victims -- and has met with Gorbachev -- the President will probably be interested in his observations.

At the same time, a meeting would demonstrate the President's personal interest in providing assistance to the Chernobyl victims.

Gale will be returning to Moscow later this week.

Peter ^{#9} Rodman, Robert ^{RL} Linhard and ^{*Michael Costin*} Jonathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the schedule proposal to Fred Ryan at Tab I for Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale to meet with the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

5-21
JFM does not support this.

Attachment:

- Tab I Schedule proposal
- Tab II State Department Memo Recommending a Meeting with the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8285
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

50

I

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

REQUEST: Meeting with Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale, the physician who treated many of the Chernobyl victims.

PURPOSE: To brief the President on their recent meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev and their impressions of the Chernobyl accident.

BACKGROUND: Armand Hammer and Dr. Gale returned from the Soviet Union. Both met with Gorbachev and may be able to provide fresh insights on his current thinking.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Armand Hammer has met with the President on previous occasions.

DATE & TIME: Thursday, May 22, 1986
DURATION: 15 minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: Armand Hammer Vice President Bush
Robert Gale Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Jack F. Matlock

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Armand Hammer and Dr. Gale, solicits their views on the current situation in Moscow, and discusses the issues as appropriate.

REMARKS: None required.

MEDIA: None

PROPOSED "PHOTO": White House photo.

RECOMMENDED BY: Secretary Shultz.

OPPOSED BY: None

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4 #8286
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

52

II

53

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM II
90389

86 MAY 19

SECRET

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: _____

ACTION OFFICER: _____ DUE: 20 MAY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

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- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Pearson
 - Lehman
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) 6/20/02

54

SUPER SENSITIVE
8615554

SYSTEM II
90389

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

I noted in my recent discussions with you that, as a result of Chernobyl and other events since last year's summit, the Soviets are becoming increasingly defensive and withdrawn. Much of this problem is of their own making, and you are under no obligation to make a special effort to bring them back to a more active negotiating posture. Nevertheless, the current Soviet mood undermines the prospects for significant progress in our own agenda. A prolonged deadlock in U.S.-Soviet relations also may increase the electoral difficulties facing such strong supporters of yours as Mrs. Thatcher and Helmut Kohl. An American act of statesmanship now could go a long way to helping us on both these scores in the months ahead.

As I mentioned to you last week, I think the time is right for a forward-looking personal letter to Gorbachev which notes your dissatisfaction with results since the summit, tells him the time for recrimination is over, picks up his suggestions for cooperation on nuclear reactor safety, reminds him of the ideas you gave Dobrynin in April, and urges him to get down to business. The letter also notes that, given Gorbachev's stress on atmospheric, you will make a speech in the near future on U.S.-Soviet relations. A draft letter is attached. We will provide a draft speech text in the next few days.

In addition, I strongly recommend that you receive Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale (the physician who treated many of the Chernobyl victims) on Thursday. Both met recently with Gorbachev and may be able to provide fresh insights on his current thinking. In addition, the meeting would provide an excellent opportunity to underscore your support for greater cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet peoples despite recent tensions in the relationship.

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 9-06-1141 #8297
BY *RWS* NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Armand Hammer and Dr.
Robert Gale

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At the same time, a meeting would demonstrate the President's personal interest in providing assistance to the Chernobyl victims.

Gale will be returning to Moscow later this week.

Peter ^{d.c.} Rodman, Robert ^{ld} Linhard and Jonathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

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Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Schedule proposal
Tab II State Department Memo Recommending a Meeting with the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4 #8287
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

REQUEST: Meeting with Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale, the physician who treated many of the Chernobyl victims.

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PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Armand Hammer has met with the President on previous occasions.

DATE & TIME: Thursday, May 22, 1986
DURATION: 15 minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: Armand Hammer
Robert Gale
John M. Poindexter
Jack F. Matlock

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Armand Hammer and Dr. Gale, solicits their views on the current situation in Moscow, and discusses the issues as appropriate.

REMARKS: None required.

MEDIA: None

PROPOSED "PHOTO": White House photo.

RECOMMENDED BY: Secretary Shultz.

OPPOSED BY: None

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOIA 11/4/4 #8288
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

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6/20/62
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM 11
90389

85 MAY 19 **SECRET**

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICER:

DUE: 20 MAY

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

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| | <input type="checkbox"/> Rodman | <input type="checkbox"/> Lehman | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier (advance) | |

COMMENTS

58

SUPER SENSITIVE
8615554

SYSTEM II
90389

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
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DECLASSIFIED

BY RW
NLRREFD-11414#8293
NARA DATE 3/9/11