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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/15/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (6/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1603

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8244	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE PRESIDENTIAL MEETING FOR IRINA MCCLELLAN <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/21/1986	B1
8249	CABLE	240957Z APR 86 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	4/24/1986	B1
8245	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/25/1986	B1
8250	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	4/23/1986	B1
8246	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET INITIATIVE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/29/1986	B1
8251	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	4/26/1986	B1
8247	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8246 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/29/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~Whitlock~~

April 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM:

RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *rod*

SUBJECT:

Invitation From Wolf Trap Farm

The June 2 performance to which the President and First Lady are invited will be the first by a Soviet group in the Washington area under the U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement signed in Geneva. While there are no compelling political reasons for the President and First Lady to attend, the performance will provide an excellent opportunity for the President to demonstrate publicly his support for the process of dialogue and exchange begun in Geneva.

If demands on their time I allow, I would recommend that the President and First Lady accept the invitation. If they cannot, I think a Presidential message would be appropriate.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

April 14, 1986

TO: ✓ **RODNEY McDANIEL - JACK COURTEMANCHE**

FROM: **FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING**

SUBJ: **REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION**

**PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:**

EVENT: Attend the Kirov Ballet at Wolf Trap with Mrs. Reagan

DATE: June 2, 1986

LOCATION: Vienna, Virginia

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____ Video _____
Routine _____ Written _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE: April 21, 1986 ⁵ TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

3

FILENE CENTER WOLF TRAP FARM PARK FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS
CREATED BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS 1966
THE BARNES OF WOLF TRAP FOUNDATION

THE WOLF TRAP FOUNDATION
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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David Packard
Mrs. Jed W. Pearson
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S. Dillon Ripley
William C. Rountree
Miss Beverly Sills
Roger L. Stevens
Miss Elizabeth Taylor
C. Langhorne Washburn
James R. Whelan
Mrs. Nina Kalden Wright
Mortimer B. Zuckerman

Charles B. Ruttenberg
General Counsel

April 9, 1986

Dear Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan:

On Monday, June 2 Wolf Trap will present the Kirov Ballet as the opening event of its 1986 season. This is quite special as it will be the first performance in Washington of a U.S.S.R. performing arts group since the signing of the Exchanges Agreement.

This letter is to ask if you can join us that evening. The performance begins at 8:30 and will be held in the Filene Center at Wolf Trap.

All at Wolf Trap hope very much that you will find this invitation possible to accept.

With fond greetings to you both.

Sincerely,



Mrs. Jouett Shouse

The President
and Mrs. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 21, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. ^{R. L. TH} MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Kirov Ballet

Attached at Tab I is a suggested response to Fred Ryan concerning the invitation from Wolf Trap Farm to the President and First Lady to attend the June 2 performance of the Kirov ballet. This will be the first performance by a Soviet group in the Washington area under the U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement signed in Geneva.

While there are no compelling political reasons why the President and First Lady need attend, the performance will provide an excellent opportunity for the President to demonstrate publicly his support for the process of dialogue and exchange begun in Geneva. If demands on their time I allow, I would recommend that the President and First Lady accept the invitation. If they cannot, I think a Presidential message would be appropriate.

^{SRS} Steve Sestanovich and ^{JM} Jonathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I recommending that the President and First Lady accept the Wolf Trap invitation if demands on their time allow, and that they send a message to Wolf Trap if they cannot attend.

Approve ⁴⁻²¹

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Frederick J. Ryan

Tab A Memorandum from Frederick J. Ryan
Tab B Invitation from Wolf Trap Farm

FILE^SNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~Netlock~~
✓

April 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *Rock*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting for Irina McClellan

We do not think that a meeting between the President and Irina and Woodford McClellan would be appropriate at this time. We note that the President has already written to the McClellans welcoming Irina and her daughter to the United States.

Attachments:

Tab A Memorandum from Frederick J. Ryan
Tab B Letter from the Hillel Foundation at Purdue University

3096
V

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

April 14, 1986

TO: RODNEY McDANIEL
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Meeting with Irina and Woodford McClellan

DATE: Open

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____ Video _____
Routine _____ Written _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE: April 21³, 1986 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
BASED AT:



B'nai B'rith

HILLEL FOUNDATION at PURDUE UNIVERSITY

RABBI GEDALYAH ENGEL, DIRECTOR

912 WEST STATE
WEST LAFAYETTE, INDIANA 47906
317-743-1293
HOME: 448 LITTLETON
WEST LAFAYETTE, INDIANA 47906
317-743-1716

April 8, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Reagan:

Irina McClellan was welcomed by the Indianapolis community on Friday, April 4, and greeted with great joy by the Indiana Bell conference operators who linked Irina, her husband Woodford, and the Greater Lafayette community for nine of the eleven years of separation.

The McClellans received the keys to Greater Lafayette from our two mayors that afternoon and spent Saturday and Sunday visiting the houses of worship that had supported their efforts to be reunited. Everywhere there were people to greet and hug Irina and shake Woody's hand. The last of the weekend was savored most when the McClellans shared your letter with their friends gathered at the Hillel Foundation. Your letter was for them the most important part of the weekend because it emphasized your concern for individuals. The entire letter was reproduced on page one of the local newspaper, which is enclosed, and was carried as a message on behalf of human rights throughout the world.

During her stay, Irina was given letters addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev from the groups that had gathered to hear her. These letters ask that Vladimir Prestin and Alexander Ioffi, who were on the same petitions as Irina, also be given exit visas. Irina is bringing these letters to the U.S.S.R. embassy today. The McClellans would be grateful to you if they also could appear at the White House and thank you personally for your letters of encouragement on their tenth wedding anniversary, as well as for your recent note. This would also provide an opportunity for them to draw attention to the plight of their two friends whose names appeared with hers on the enclosed petition.

 us about the possibility of the McClellans' visiting

Shalom,


Gedalyah Engel, Spokesman

js
Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting for Irina McClellan

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Fred Ryan indicating that a meeting between the President and Irina and Woodford McClellan would not be appropriate. Irina is a Soviet citizen who recently joined her American husband in the United States after 11 years of trying to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The meeting has been suggested by the Hillel Foundation at Purdue University.

The President has written to the McClellans welcoming Irina to this country. In view, however, of the President's ongoing personal efforts on behalf of those Soviet-American families that remain separated, I do not recommend a meeting with the McClellans at this time.

It is my understanding that a group meeting with the President is being considered which would involve a number of Americans whose Soviet spouses have not been allowed to emigrate. I see no problem with including the McClellans in such a meeting.

Judyt Mandel, Paula Dobriansky and Jonathan Miller concur. *JFM*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I recommending that the President not meet with Irina and Woodford McClellan separately, but include them in a group meeting with American separated spouses if such a meeting is arranged.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Fred Ryan

Tab A Memo from Ryan

Tab B Letter from Purdue University Hillel Foundation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4 #8244

BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

April 21, 1986

J14-69
✓

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. ~~MATLOCK~~ *PLM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Georgi Vins

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Fred Ryan indicating that we do not think a second meeting between the President and Pastor Vins is necessary. Pastor Vins is a former Soviet citizen who was persecuted in the USSR for his religious beliefs.

The President has already met with Vins. At that meeting the President expressed interest in viewing a film Vins has on religious persecution in the USSR. Since that time, however, the President has seen several such films including, I understand, "A Candle in the Wind", perhaps the best recent production on the subject. Indeed, this may be the film Vins wishes to show.

I have indicated in your memo to Ryan that if Vins wishes to forward the film, we could try to schedule a viewing if the President has not already seen it.

Judyt ~~Mandel~~ and Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Fred Ryan indicating that a second meeting with Vins is not necessary, but inviting him to forward his film for possible viewing by the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Frederick J. Ryan

Tab A Memorandum from Ryan

Tab B Letter from Alan Kranowitz to Congressman Henry

Tab C Letter to Alan Kranowitz from Congressman Henry

Tab D Letter to Congressman Henry from E.K. Mol

I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Georgi Vins

The NSC has reviewed the attached appointment request and feels that a meeting with Pastor Vins to view a film on religious persecution in the USSR is not necessary. Since the President first met with Vins he has seen several films on this subject. If Vins wishes to forward his film, however, we see no problem with considering a viewing at the President's convenience if he has not already seen it.

Attachments:

Tab A Memorandum from Frederick J. Ryan
Tab B Letter from Alan Kranowitz to Congressman Henry
Tab C Letter to Alan Kranowitz from Congressman Henry
Tab D Letter to Congressman Henry from E.K. Mol

12

A

3105 B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

April 14, 1986

TO: RODNEY McDANIEL
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Meeting with Mr. Georgi Vins

DATE: Open

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____ Video _____
Routine _____ Written _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE: April 21, 1986 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

B

15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1986

Dear Paul:

Thank you for your correspondence forwarding the request of your constituent, Mr. E. K. Mol, who has asked that a meeting be arranged with the President for Mr. Georgi Vins.

Your interest is appreciated, and I was pleased to direct your letter to the appropriate White House office for careful consideration and prompt response.

With best wishes.

Cordially,



Alan M. Kranowitz
Deputy Assistant to the President

The Honorable Paul Henry
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515



PAUL B. HENRY
5TH DISTRICT MICHIGAN

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
AND LABOR

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

166 FEDERAL BUILDING
GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49503
616/451-8383

ANNE KNOX
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

502 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
202/541-1811

MARY ELLEN SGO
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

March 31, 1986

Mr. Alan Kranowitz
Office of Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Kranowitz:

I have enclosed a letter from my constituent, Mr. E. K. Mol, regarding Mr. Georgi Vins, who was released from a Russian prison.

Apparently, the President expressed interest to Mr. Vins in seeing a film showing the persecution of Christians in Russia. Mr. Vins is anxious to meet with the President and show him the film. I will appreciate any assistance you can provide in resolving this matter.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

PAUL B. HENRY
Member of Congress

PBH:ej

Enclosure



Mol Belting Company

4621 Clyde Park Ave

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49509

616/531-8311



March 13, 1986

MAR 1 1986


The Honorable Mr. Paul Henry
110 Michigan NW
Grand Rapids, Mi. 49503

Dear Mr. Henry:

Two weeks ago we had the privilege of having Mr. Georgi Vins, the Russian Christian who had been imprisoned in Siberia and then released in a prisoner swap negotiated by then President Carter, to our church as guest speaker. An added privilege and honor was to have him over as our personal guest in our home.

While at our home he shared with us his meeting with President Reagan, and how President Reagan told Mr. Vins he would like to see the movie which was filed in Russia showing many of the persecuted Russian Christians. The meeting with President Reagan was shortly before the national elections, so the President suggested sometime after the elections due to his (president's) heavy campaign schedule.

Mr. Vins has been trying to reach the President since the elections but to no avail. Mr. Vins believes the President is not getting the communications regarding the showing of the film and would like to have you help him in getting the message to President Reagan that Mr. Vins is not only willing, but eager to have President Reagan see the film. Can you help?

Very truly yours,

E. K. Mol

cc/Georgi Vins

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*File 20
(chrom)*

NSJWD

PAGE 01
IBM647

ROME 0352

DTG:240957Z APR 86 PSN:000440
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, UR, IT, US
SUBJECT: ITALIAN CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
- ON ARMS CONTROL

1. (C/- ENTIRE TEXT.)
-

2. DURING HIS ONE DAY (APRIL 21) IN ROME, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OF THE NSC DESCRIBED THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS TO MFA SECRETARY GENERAL RUGGIERO, PRIME MINISTER CRAXI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER BADINI, AND VARIOUS INFLUENTIAL ITALIAN OFFICIALS AND JOURNALISTS. HIS INTERLOCUTORS ACCEPTED READILY AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S POINT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRN FOIA-1141478249
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

21

THAT THE PROLIFERATING GORBACHEV PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL HAD NOT BEEN MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS IN VIENNA, STOCKHOLM AND GENEVA. IN THOSE FORA THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PUTTING FORWARD MORE OFTEN THAN NOT IDEAS THAT THEY HAD TO KNOW WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE

UNITED STATES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM RUGGIERO, MATLOCK THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT AN INF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED IF THE SOVIETS REALLY WANTED IT: RUGGIERO SPECULATED THAT ONCE THE SOVIETS HAD REALIZED THAT PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BECOME A REALITY IN EUROPE, THEY COULD THEN HAVE DEVELOPED A REAL INTEREST IN A QUOTE ZERO OPTION UNQUOTE WHICH COULD PROVIDE THEM WITH AN EDGE IN REMAINING SYSTEMS SUCH AS SRINF WHILE TENDING TO DECOUPLE EUROPEAN AND U.S. DEFENSES.

-

3. ONE THEME PREDOMINATED AMONG MATLOCK'S INTERLOCUTORS, NAMELY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EFFECTIVELY WAGING THE BATTLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON ARMS CONTROL. TO A MAN, THE ITALIANS UNDERSTOOD WHY THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT DEAL WITH PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS NOT BACKED BY SOLID NEGOTIATING GIVE AND TAKE, BUT THEY WERE AFRAID THAT THE USSR AND GORBACHEV WERE SUCCEEDING OVER TIME IN CREATING THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THE USSR WANTS PEACE MORE THAN THE U.S. WHILE THE U.S. HAD CONSULTED EFFECTIVELY WITH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS (A POINT STRESSED BY RUGGIERO), THE ORDINARY EUROPEAN WHO UNDERSTANDS LITTLE ABOUT ARMS CONTROL LEARNS FROM THE PRESS ONLY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS, MOST OF WHICH WERE DISMISSED BY THE UNITED STATES AS QUOTE PURE PROPAGANDA, NOTHING NEW. UNQUOTE. ONE JOURNALIST EVEN SPECULATED THAT AT SOME TIME, THE USSR MIGHT QUOTE GIVE UP UNQUOTE, SAYING THAT THEY HAD OFFERED TWO DOZEN PROPOSALS, IN GOOD FAITH, ALL OF WHICH HAD BEEN REJECTED BY THE U.S. AS CRAXI'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISER BADINI PUT IT: "DON'T JUST REJECT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS EVEN IF THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE. PRODUCE POSITIVE ELEMENTS INSTEAD." UNQUOTE. MATLOCK'S INTERLOCUTORS SHARED THE BELIEF THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WOULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION IF THE GENERAL IMPRESSION TOOK HOLD THAT THE USSR IS THE PEACEMAKER AND THE UNITED STATES THE WAR-MONGERS.

-

4. WHILE POINTING OUT HOW INACCURATE AND UNFAIR THESE CHARGES ARE IN LIGHT OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS NOW ON THE VARIOUS TABLES, AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AGREED THAT A PROBLEM EXISTED REQUIRING EFFORT IN WASHINGTON. HE PROMISED TO WORK ON A SOLUTION ON HIS RETURN. THIS EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE ITALIANS OVERSTATED THEIR CASE BUT THAT THERE IS SOMETHING TO THEIR CONCERNS. GIVEN THE ITALIAN LACK OF SOPHISTICATION ABOUT COMPLEX ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, ITALY MAY BE A PLACE WHERE SOVIET PROPAGANDA THRUSTS, HOWEVER EMPTY OF SUBSTANCE AND FOLLOW-

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

22

UP, WORK BETTER THAN ELSEWHERE ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE BEING BACKED BY THE CURRENT SOVIET CAMPAIGN OF SMILES TOWARD ITALY. AT LEAST IN ITALY, WE ARE AT A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DISADVANTAGE WHEN WE STATE OUR PREFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND CONFIDENTIALLY AT THE FORA WHICH EXIST FOR THAT PURPOSE, WHILE THE SOVIETS TELL THE WORLD MEDIA OF THEIR ALLEGED DESIRE TO DO AWAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REDUCE CONVENTIONAL AND FOR GOOD MEASURE DISSOLVE THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES. WE SUGGEST

THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER HOW BEST TO CHECK A PUBLIC OPINION TREND OF CONCERN TO OUR SERIOUS-MINDED ITALIAN FRIENDS.

5. NOTE:

THE ITALIANS, INCLUDING RUGGIERO, SHARED AMBASSADOR MATLOCK'S PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE GAP BETWEEN SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET UNION TO SOME OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS.

RABB

** END OF CABLE **

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

JM-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 25, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Responses to U.S. Actions in Libya

Attached at Tab I for your review is a memorandum from State outlining possible Soviet responses if our confrontation with Libya intensifies. So far, despite the cancellation of Shevardnadze's scheduled visit in May, the Soviets have indicated they want to keep the Libya problem from completely derailing U.S.-Soviet dialogue. Nonetheless, if the Libyan confrontation escalates, they may fear a loss of face in the Third World - particularly the Middle East - and feel compelled to take further actions.

James Stark and Howard Teicher concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

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NLRR F06-114/4#8845
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 APR 24 8:04

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90325

ACTION OFFICER: ~~██████████~~ DUE: 28 APRIL 86

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter // Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
- to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- | | | |
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| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro <input type="checkbox"/> Childress <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb <input type="checkbox"/> Covey <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky <input type="checkbox"/> Donley <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes <input type="checkbox"/> Hughes <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer <input type="checkbox"/> Laux <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Levine <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock <input type="checkbox"/> May <input type="checkbox"/> Menges <input type="checkbox"/> Miller <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> North <input type="checkbox"/> Platt <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond <input type="checkbox"/> Reger <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl <input type="checkbox"/> Sable | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich <input type="checkbox"/> Sigur <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer <input type="checkbox"/> Soos <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Stark <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Teicher <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman <input type="checkbox"/> Wigg <input type="checkbox"/> Wright <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
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- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Rodman
 - Pearson
 - Lehman
 - Secretariat
 - _____
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
#90325

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April 23, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Responses to U.S. Actions in Libya

The Soviet response to our retaliatory raids on Tripoli and Benghazi has been sharper than it was to the Gulf of Sidra exercise last month, but Moscow seems to be trying to bound the problem. If our confrontation with Libya intensifies, however, the Soviets have several options to escalate their own response.

Gorbachev's speech to the East German Communist Party Congress, although highly critical of the U.S., seems to signal a desire to keep the problem from knocking the U.S.- Soviet relationship entirely off-track. The Soviets have said privately to us and the British that they want to contain the damage and appear anxious to proceed with the various experts meetings agreed at last fall's summit. The Soviets did put off the Shevardnadze meeting, but may see this as a relatively low-cost measure; it likely rules out a July Summit, but they never were enthusiastic about a summer meeting in any case.

Nevertheless, Gorbachev doubtless sees important interests at stake in the U.S. - Libya confrontation, particularly the Soviet Union's standing with its Third World clients and the credibility at home of his U.S. policy. He will want to avoid the appearance of being pushed around. This concern will be magnified if, as happened after the Gulf of Sidra, western news accounts quote U.S. government officials as portraying the Soviet response as vacillating or weak. Such stories only increase pressure on Gorbachev to take political and/or military steps to defend an embattled client.

Thus, if our confrontation with Libya intensifies, the Soviets likely will react more broadly, and have a number of military and political options to do so:

Postponement or Cancellation of Other Bilateral Meetings

The Soviets could manipulate the timing of U.S.-Soviet meetings. Postponing the NST talks in Geneva would carry heavy political costs and is unlikely. More likely targets for delay would be the regional experts or risk reduction talks, despite their present desire to keep the regional meetings on track.

Cancelling the Summit

Gorbachev conceivably could rule out a 1986 summit, but this could have significant political costs which he might risk only if he senses that Libya has become so divisive in the West

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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that the U.S., not the USSR, will be seen as bearing the blame for wrecking the process of dialogue.

Military Resupply and Arms Transfers

On the military side, Gorbachev's letter to Qadhafi suggested the Soviets will replace Libyan equipment lost or expended during the U.S. retaliatory strike. The resupply effort could conceivably be massive, like Moscow's Syrian resupply in 1982 and 1983. In addition, the Soviets could significantly expand their qualitative and quantitative supply relationship with Libya. The Libyans, however, could have difficulty absorbing appreciably more or better military equipment than has already been provided.

Soviet Naval Deployments


A bolder Soviet policy would be to deploy naval assets in the Mediterranean to bolster Qadhafi. This show of force would match U.S. efforts and could be used to underscore Gorbachev's proposal for a Mediterranean zone of peace. It would complicate U.S. planning for further retaliatory strikes and position the Soviets to provide valuable intelligence support to Libya. The Soviets must realize this would be a major escalation of their role and of the risk of a confrontation. There have been no indications that Soviet naval forces are being prepared for deployment in this manner.

Increased Soviet Military Presence in Libya

Libya's poor performance with Soviet air defense equipment could lead to an increased Soviet advisory presence or use of Soviet pilots and crews to handle Libyan air defenses. While the Soviets may increase their ground presence to upgrade Libyan air defense we remain skeptical they would provide pilots since this would risk a direct confrontation with the U.S. A larger Soviet advisory presence might position the Soviets to play a role in internal Libyan political maneuvering.

Pressure U.S. in Other Regions

Finally, the Soviets might escalate horizontally by increasing pressure on U.S. clients like Pakistan or increasing military supplies to Nicaragua. Moscow and Kabul have increased pressure on Pakistan in the past month. This may continue or increase incrementally, but we do not expect a dramatic move against Pakistan. Similarly, we believe the Soviets would prefer to keep their profile in Nicaragua low during the continuing Congressional debate on contra aid. After Libya, they cannot be anxious to provide justification for a U.S. move against their clients in this hemisphere.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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27NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20505~~SECRET~~

April 29, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Initiative on Asia and the Pacific

The Soviets have released an official statement on economic and security issues in the Asian and Pacific regions, clearly timed to coincide with the President's trip to the Far East. With few exceptions it is a repackaging of standard Soviet positions. I do not expect it will attract much attention, and the State Department assessment at Tab I may somewhat overstate the potential for ASEAN responsiveness to the proposals.

The statement also constitutes a tacit admission that the long-standing Soviet proposal for an Asian Security Conference has gotten nowhere. In the current package the Conference is indefinitely postponed by being made the final step in a proposed process of regional conflict resolution.

PR Peter Rodman, *SRS* Steve Sestanovich, *DR. H.K.* James Kelly and *n.o.* Richard Childress concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11





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Washington, D.C. 20520 3420

April 26, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: New Soviet Initiative on Asia and the Pacific

The Soviets have released publicly the text of an official government statement on security and economic problems of the Asian and Pacific regions. Their Chargé presented the text officially to Undersecretary Armacost on April 24. The announcement of this Soviet proposal for reducing tension in the region has been carefully timed to coincide with the President's departure for Asia.

The Soviets probably view this move as a pre-emptive diplomatic stroke which will put the U.S. on the defensive and force the President to address their Asian security agenda. While made up, in large measure, of previous Soviet proposals, there are a few new elements and the President is likely to be asked for his reaction.

Familiar elements of the Soviet initiative include:

- o Reiteration of Soviet proposals for elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons, and prevention of the militarization of space;
- o Implementation of "confidence-building measures," and nuclear free zones, including support of SPNFZ; and
- o An Asian Security Conference patterned on the European CSCE.

There are several novel twists, however, which may attract some interest and even spark some wishful thinking among some in ASEAN. First, the Soviet Asian Security Conference proposal, which has never elicited much interest in the region, is presented as the final step in a process of "bilateral and multilateral consultations for a solution to contentious issues." While Cambodia is not mentioned specifically, this part of the Soviet initiative will lead to speculation that there is some new flexibility in their position. On the whole, however, ASEAN is fairly hard-headed in dealing with Soviet gambits.

Second, the call for confidence-building measures is coupled with specific reference to "reduction in the activity of Navies in the Pacific Ocean." While this has been implicit in earlier formulations on CBMs, this is the first time Moscow has spelled it out and there may be some interest among ASEAN states in exploring this further.

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DECL: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

Third, support of SPNFZ attempts to contrast a constructive Soviet position with the tough stance taken recently in Australia by Secretary Weinberger. The Soviets exploit wide-spread anti-nuclear sentiment this way and give a boost to PM Lange's anti-nuclear posturing.

Finally, the proposal seeks to legitimate Soviet participation in Pacific Basin economic development by raising the flag of interdependence and recognizing the importance of regionwide projects while at the same time cautioning against U.S. efforts aimed at "knocking together blocs and counter-blocs, for establishing all kinds of 'axes,' 'triangles,' for forming closed groupings, or cultivating protectionism and discriminatory measures in maintaining mutual trade and economic ties."

The Soviet initiative follows a pattern with which we have become familiar since Gorbachev took over -- more ingenious packaging with little or no change in substance. Proposed talking points for the President's use follow below.

Talking Points


- The Soviet statement skirts the underlying causes of tension in the region.
- It neglects to mention the Soviet Union's large-scale nuclear and conventional military buildup in Asia over the past few years as well as the actions of their clients.
- These include the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, their militarization of the Northern territories and refusal to discuss the territorial question with Japan, and Soviet attempts to improve military relations with North Korea.
- We believe that resolution of these issues could make a contribution to reducing tension in the region.
- There are existing fora for addressing these issues in each of the specific cases I have mentioned. If the Soviets are serious about addressing these issues they have no shortage of opportunities to make a constructive and concrete contribution rather than relying on largely empty declarations.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Matlock

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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INFORMATION

April 29, 1986
Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

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Seen by Jmp

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/4#8247
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

3420

April 26, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: New Soviet Initiative on Asia and the Pacific

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DECL: OADR

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

34

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8603420

RECEIVED 28 APR 86 08

TO POINDEXTER FROM PLATT, N
MATLOCK

DOCDATE 26 APR 86
29 APR 86

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 7/2/02

File

KEYWORDS: USSR ASIA
PACIFIC ISLANDS

SUBJECT: NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE ON ASIA & THE PACIFIC

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK	CHILDRESS LAUX KELLY	PEARSON RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (KL PS)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

e 5/12 Poindexter noted

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

April 29, 1986

Natl Sec Advisor
has seenINFORMATION

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Seen by Jmp

Attachment:

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4 #8248
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

3420

April 26, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
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DECL: OADR

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NLRR F010-114/L#8253

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

86 APR 28 A 6: 45

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3420

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK **ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE: 29 APRIL 86

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter Fortier
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

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| <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Childress <i>u.a.</i> <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb <input type="checkbox"/> Covey <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid <input type="checkbox"/> Djerejian <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky <input type="checkbox"/> Donley <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes <input type="checkbox"/> Hughes <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Laux <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Levine <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock <input type="checkbox"/> May <input type="checkbox"/> Menges <input type="checkbox"/> Miller <input type="checkbox"/> North <input type="checkbox"/> Platt <input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond <input type="checkbox"/> Reger <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl <input type="checkbox"/> Sable | <p>FYI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich <input type="checkbox"/> Sigur <input type="checkbox"/> Small <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer <input type="checkbox"/> Soos <input type="checkbox"/> Stark <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher <input type="checkbox"/> Thompson <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman <input type="checkbox"/> Wigg <input type="checkbox"/> Wright <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>KELLY</u> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
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- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
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 - _____
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS