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JET 4/15/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (5/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 16

YARHI-MILO

1602

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8237	MEMCON	PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	10	ND	B1
8238	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH TERRY PEARCE AND TOM GREEN <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/14/1986	B1
8239	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE LETTER FROM EUGENE ROSTOW <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/30/1986	B1
8242	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ACTIONS IN LIBYA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/15/1986	B1
8240	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/15/1986	B1
8241	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEMO FROM SHULTZ ON THE SOVIET REACTION TO OUR ACTIONS IN LIBYA <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8243	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8242 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/15/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~Matlock~~ 1

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90275



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Dobrynin -
Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation from the President's April 8 meeting with Dobrynin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached memcon and approve its transmittal to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

NFAIR

SEE SYZ 90289

for final action

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CSJ* NARA, Date *7/2/02*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20501

System ID
90275

JM C 2

~~SECRET~~

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Approve _____

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Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 27, 1997
By GLS NARA, Date 7/2/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin of the Soviet Union (S)

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary George P. Shultz
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Rozanne L. Ridgway
Donald R. Fortier
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov

DATE, TIME TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1986
AND PLACE: 09:45 - 11:00 a.m., Oval Office

The President opened the meeting by congratulating Dobrynin on his election as Secretary of the Central Committee, and pointing out that he was eager to move forward along the lines agreed at the Geneva Summit. He noted that we had made some progress, especially in bilateral areas, and said that he was particularly encouraged by the Soviet Government's receptiveness to discussing an expansion of people-to-people programs. Charlie Wick, he observed, had informed him of his good reception during his trip. (C)

However, the President added, he was disappointed by the overall lack of progress in our relations, and was aware that much remains to be done. He then invited Dobrynin's comments. (S)

Dobrynin began by thanking the President for the cooperation he had received during his tenure in Washington, and mentioned that his new duties would involve supervision of the Central Committee's International Department, which would include in the future U.S.-Soviet relations. (C)

He also brought personal greetings from Gorbachev, and mentioned that he had delivered a letter from Gorbachev to Secretary Shultz yesterday. He hoped that there would be a reply soon, and

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Declassify on: OADR.

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NLRR F06-114/4#8237
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

suggested that it would be nice if he could carry one back to the General Secretary. He had had a good talk with Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter yesterday, and wondered if the President had any reaction to Gorbachev's letter. (S)

The President said that he would speak frankly. As he had noted, progress in our relations had not been what he had hoped after Geneva. Soviet military involvement in regional conflicts creates major problems in our relations, and furthermore is dangerous. He and Gorbachev bear a great responsibility: they hold the fate of the world in their hands, and such involvement increases dangers. (S)

Libya is a prime example, the President continued. It is hard for the U.S. to accept Soviet criticism of our maneuvers in international waters, since we both agree that the Gulf of Sidra is international. The U.S. has operated there many times, the recent maneuvers were scheduled well in advance, and were not intended to be provocative. Therefore, the Soviet stance could not be understood here. (S)

The U.S. seeks solutions to these regional problems -- but as long as our friends need help, we will give it. He had studied Gorbachev's remarks on Afghanistan at the Party Congress, and wished to say that the U.S. has no desire to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that. (S)

Regarding arms control, he sees potential progress in some areas, but is frustrated by a lack of Soviet response to the U.S. proposals. For example, there has been no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction. In this respect, we may have different approaches to negotiation. Our approach is for each side to present its optimum desires, and then to narrow the differences through negotiation when the differences in approach are clear. (S)

As for nuclear testing, he regrets Soviet efforts to make propaganda on the issue. The U.S. has made numerous efforts to make progress, but it must be understood that the U.S. is behind the Soviet Union in carrying out its testing program. A moratorium when one side has completed its program and the other is still in the middle of its program is unacceptable. Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for the two treaties which have been signed. It is important to take steps to build confidence, since there is too much distrust on both sides to agree immediately to major changes. As he had told the General Secretary in Geneva, nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they arm themselves because they distrust each other. We are ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions, and they can deal with the concerns of both sides. We see no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at the next summit. (S)

Regarding the next summit, the President stressed that we want a substantive outcome. He then listed the following as optimum goals:

- Agreement on key elements of a treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
- Agreement on key elements of an INF treaty.
- Agreement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an effective first strike by either side and the use of space for basing offensive weapons capable of mass destruction.
- Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests and commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing. If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, that would provide a basis for further limitations on testing.
- Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
- Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
- Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation. (S)

The President then pointed out that agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for meeting planned for 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before the U.S. 1988 election campaign. Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 proposal. (S)

He then noted that other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures, and said that even if they could not achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be a worthwhile achievement. But we are ready to work constructively on all of them. (S)

The President then concluded his presentation by asking Dobrynin to tell Gorbachev that he very much is looking forward to his visit to the United States. He hopes the General Secretary can stay here for at least a week, since he would like to show him something of the United States. The visit should not be all work, although there will be plenty of time for working sessions. But he would like to hear Mr. Gorbachev's desires on this score. (S)

Dobrynin began his response by commenting that they are not trying to avoid a discussion of regional conflicts. There will be further opportunity when the foreign ministers meet. Our views, of course, differ, but we can discuss this. (S)

As for Afghanistan, U.S. involvement prolongs the war, which is what Gorbachev was referring to in his Party Congress speech. The issue of local conflicts is on their minds, however. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be willing to take up three or four of the most important and discuss them in more detail with Secretary Shultz. The Soviets have made good proposals to Pakistan on Afghanistan, and have even set forth a schedule for troop withdrawal. The situation around Libya also bothers them very much, and that is true also of Nicaragua, but he would not take time now to discuss it. We can go into these issues more thoroughly on other occasions. (S)

Regarding the central security issues, the Soviets want something substantial to come out of the next summit. We need to find a minimum number of issues to try to solve. Diplomats must do the negotiation, but they need instructions from the top. Some recent U.S. actions have introduced uncertainty on the Soviet side. (S)

For example, they are concerned regarding the U.S. position on a nuclear test ban. They are willing to discuss verification, but why not discuss a test ban and verification simultaneously? We could either resume the tripartite talks with the UK, or just open bilateral talks on the subject. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if he was proposing this as one of the summit announcements. (S)

Dobrynin said yes, and asked what would be wrong with an announcement that negotiation on U.S. and Soviet ideas would be resumed. (S)

The President noted that there is no agreement yet on the time for his next meeting with Gorbachev. (S)

Dobrynin said that this is precisely the point. Although there are no preconditions, they do not want our leaders going blindfolded into a meeting. History has shown that such meetings are not successful. For example, Kennedy met Khrushchev without preparation in Vienna and it was a flop. The same is true of Eisenhower's meeting with Khrushchev in Paris. On the other hand, the summits that Nixon, Ford and Carter had with Brezhnev, and that the President had with Gorbachev in Geneva were well prepared and were successful. (S)

We need to know what minimum will be achieved, he continued. We cannot risk failure at the top level. Gorbachev wants success just as he feels the President wants success, and he is setting no preconditions, but he is asking specifically what areas we can reach agreement on. (S)

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviets are familiar with the three broad areas of our relations, security, regional conflict and bilateral, and are willing to work on all of them. We began to prepare well before the Geneva summit last year, and although we stopped for a while, these preparations permitted the staff to work out the joint statement the last night. This would not have been possible without the prior work. But the joint statement was a good one and had an impact on public opinion. (S)

Now five months have passed, and what do we have that we can announce at the next meeting? That is, if there is a meeting this year -- and Gorbachev assumes there will be one. We have no clearcut minimum goal. (S)

So Gorbachev's main message is: Let's sit down and find at least the minimum. We can work on the proposals of both to define the minimum. When Nixon came to the Soviet Union in 1972 he had 80 percent of the results in his pocket. It is dangerous to go into these meetings entirely ex promptu. We have presented some ideas; you may have other ideas. This is not to substitute for the work at the meeting itself, but rather to insure that it is successful. (S)

The President said that we had in fact proposed a number of things, and observed that we may look at negotiations from different viewpoints. He recalled that for 25 years he had been chief negotiator for his labor union, the Screen Actors' Guild. In those negotiations, the union would make a proposal, and management would make a proposal, and that way they came to understand the differences between them which had to be negotiated. (S)

Regarding INF, we seem close to agreement. We agree that we should go down to zero. We do disagree on how to apply this globally. But we could bridge that at the next summit. (S)

As for START, we have agreed on a 50 percent reduction. We apply this to different systems. It is a complex question because of the types of weapons and the fact that each side has a different force structure. But we have come a long way in agreeing on a world without nuclear weapons. U.S. proposals have been presented in response to Soviet proposals, and if our negotiators are freed up so they can discuss the differences, we might hammer out an agreement on the remaining issues at the next summit. If we could do that, our public would clap their hands, since they fear the nuclear threat and want to have it eliminated. (S)

As for agreements at earlier summits, some of these seem to have been reached just for the sake of agreement. There have been some violations of them, which is evidence of this. Therefore the President said he is not impressed by what had been achieved at these earlier meetings. Previous agreements merely agreed on the pace of an increase, not on reductions. But he wondered what

is keeping us from settling how we do the 50 percent reductions to which we have agreed. (S)

Dobrynin said that what the Soviets are trying to do is to find a way for the leaders to give instructions to our negotiators to narrow the differences. Negotiations will continue in the various fora, but our Foreign Ministers should sit down and see what goals would be realistic. We need something for our bosses to sign or announce. Then they will have some birds in hand as they go into their meeting, and can see how much more they can get during the meeting. (S)

For example, a simple announcement that they agree to begin negotiations on a [comprehensive] test ban and verification of testing is one possibility. Or, as regards SDI, an announcement that we will begin talks on how to strengthen the ABM Treaty. The point is that we need some definition of the minimum which can be achieved or announced. (S)

Dobrynin then observed that Gorbachev, like the President, is a politician, and just cannot risk coming home from the summit without some definable result. He observed that when the President meets with his Allies, he always has something in mind in advance. This is also a good rule to follow with others. That way, formal negotiations can go forward, but at the same time we can reach an understanding on what the minimum results will be. (S)

Dobrynin then pulled out a paper in Russian and translated what he characterized as an "oral message" from Gorbachev, remarking that it had been given to him when he saw Gorbachev the day before his departure from Moscow. It contained the following points:

-- Gorbachev is committed to pursuing the obligation he and the President assumed in Geneva to work toward an improvement of the international situation.

-- Since Geneva, the actions of the USSR have been designed to achieve the aims agreed at the summit. These have been consistent with preparing for the next meeting, agreed to at Geneva.

-- He, Gorbachev, is prepared to be guided by the mutual agreements undertaken at the Geneva Summit.

-- U.S. actions, however, leave a different impression. Rhetoric has intensified. Certain U.S. steps can be interpreted as unfriendly acts, directed against the improvement of relations. And all this has happened while there was no dialogue between the US and USSR regarding plans for the next summit meeting.

-- He is trying to understand what the U.S. wishes to achieve. He took note of Secretary Shultz's statement to Ryzhkov that the President is committed to an improvement in relations.

-- The main thing is to insure the success of the next Summit meeting. We need an understanding on what specific results can be counted on.

-- He wishes to invite the President's personal attention to this problem. When matters of such importance are involved, extemporaneous actions and meetings can be dangerous. Khrushchev's meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, which proceeded on such an "extemporaneous" basis, aggravated relations.

-- He is not making an attempt to impose preconditions for the summit meeting. Rather, his desire is to agree in advance on the possible content of the meeting -- what we each will be bringing to the meeting and what we hope to achieve. Specifically, what agreements or understandings, as a minimum, will be the result?

-- He believes that every opportunity should be taken to prepare a productive meeting so he can visit the United States this year. But he wants that meeting to be meaningful and substantial. (S)

Having read these points, Dobrynin observed that our Foreign Ministers would be meeting in May. [Secretary Shultz observed, "May 14-16."] Dobrynin then summed up his presentation by saying that his main message is that we should try together to clarify what the positive results of the next summit will be, and that Gorbachev hopes to see the President in this country this year. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he would like to repeat what the President had already said, so that it would be clearly understood. (S)

First, we want a meeting associated with progress in reaching accords. (S)

Second, we know the only way is to work on the subject matter ahead of time. We must know 80-90% of what we have in hand before the meeting. It is therefore good that his meeting with Shevardnadze has been scheduled. (S)

Third, they should look carefully at what the President has said regarding potential areas for agreement. He will go through them with Dobrynin later this week, but he wanted to emphasize their importance now. [Note: A written text of the President's "optimum goals" was given to Dobrynin's staff later, and Secretary Shultz reviewed them again with Dobrynin at his April 9 meeting.] (S)

The President observed that both sides have now made similar statements. They have made proposals, and we have answered them. We accepted some of the Soviet ideas, and made some of our own. But we have no response. (S)

However, both of us have expressed a desire to achieve the same goal. He understands the point that both he and Gorbachev are politicians, and that a political leader cannot be pushed into a corner. This holds true on both sides. (S)

If he and the General Secretary get together and come to an agreement, some elements will be from the proposals of one side and some elements from those of the other. That way each can say afterward what he obtained in terms of his own proposals. (S)

The President then said that he wanted to mention another subject -- human rights. He has no desire to push the General Secretary into a corner on this issue. He noted that he had discussed it previously with Dobrynin, and emphasized that he was not pushing for an agreement as such. However, this is one area where, if the Soviet Union takes some actions, it will make it possible for him, the President, to do some things that both want. (S)

The President added that one out of ten Americans has relatives or ancestors in the Soviet Union. They are emotional about what happens there. If positive action is taken, he will never open his mouth to say that we suggested it. But it will be easier for him to say that he had agreed to this or that with the Soviet Union. Therefore, he hoped that we would see more progress in this area. (S)

Regarding arms control, testing and the like, he felt that we have enough areas to work on. We use the same figures as our basis for negotiation. But if the General Secretary proposes one date as a goal for something and we propose an earlier one, that is not the sort of issue where one side "caves in" if it agrees with the other. Rather it would be a compromise. (S)

The President then wondered if we have the same understanding of the word "compromise." We seem to look at it in different ways. (S)

Dobrynin stated that "compromise" means the same in both languages, and that Gorbachev is in favor of compromise. He knows there must be compromise on security issues. (S)

As for dates when things can be accomplished, Gorbachev had mentioned some in his January 15 proposal. If the U.S. wants to speed them up, that is all right with Gorbachev. (S)

Regarding the U.S. November 1 proposal, this was made before the Geneva summit. Gorbachev's January 15 proposal was based on the discussion at Geneva and took the November 1 proposal and the

discussions at the summit in Geneva into account. We must look at the situation now and find a way out. (S)

Regarding medium-range missiles [i.e., INF], the Soviets have made major concessions. They have agreed that there could be a separate agreement, that the SS-20's could be eliminated in Europe, that deactivated missiles would be destroyed and not just moved, and have even compromised on the role of British and French systems in any agreement. It is natural that they would insist on a non-transfer provision, so that the agreement could not be circumvented, but the U.S. has said no to this. Secretary Shultz has said that this topic may be an area for a "minimum" achievement at the next summit, but he is not sure we are close enough. (S)

Dobrynin continued by saying that there may be other subjects which could be agreed upon. The 50 percent reductions, for example, but we still have the critical problem of how we define the "content" of the reduction. (S)

Dobrynin then asked if he could say that the U.S. is in favor of activating the negotiating process and simultaneously thinking about what results can be anticipated from the next summit? (S)

The President agreed and Secretary Shultz noted that the President has gone farther than suggesting goals for 1986. He has pointed out that if we are to have a successful meeting in 1987 as well as 1986, we must begin preparations now. That means working on a solution in the strategic arms area. (S)

Dobrynin said that we should hope that the two foreign ministers can get a clearer picture of the prospects for the 1986 meeting. (S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that Dobrynin would be here until Friday evening, and that we would be pursuing discussion of these matters with him and with Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh. He then asked if there is agreement on Shevardnadze's visit to the United States. (S)

Dobrynin confirmed that there is, and Secretary Shultz suggested that by Friday they would try to sum up just where things stand at present. (S)

The President noted that we still need a date for Gorbachev's visit. The Soviets are aware of our problem in the fall -- the election campaign -- and it is not desirable to have the visit at that time. (S)

Dobrynin assured the President that Gorbachev has no desire to be involved in any way in domestic U.S. politics, and understood that a visit during the Congressional campaign would not be a good idea. (S)

The meeting ended about 10:50; Dobrynin stayed for a few minutes with the President after the others had left the room. (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~Matlock~~ ✓

April 14, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

Nat'l Sec Advisor
has seen

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Terry Pearce and Tom Green

You have agreed to meet with Terry Pearce and Tom Green April 15 at 3 p.m. The purpose of the meeting is to underline our concerns over their private initiative to have key world leaders make a public statement "ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2,000."

Setting

Pearce and Green, close friends of Al Schwabacher, have been pressing their initiative for over two years. We have repeatedly advised them that such sweeping declarations are meaningless if not supported by concrete actions, and we see no indications that the Soviets (or others) take the proposal seriously. In addition, the idea runs counter to our emphasis on reaching practical, verifiable agreements with the Soviets. It plays into Soviet hands by offering them the opportunity to resurrect some of their favorite arms control propaganda themes: no first use of nuclear weapons, nuclear free zones, non-militarization of space and, most recently, nuclear disarmament by the year 2,000.

We agreed to forward their proposal to Bud McFarlane and the President out of deference to their close friendship with Schwabacher - himself a good friend of the President's. We must not, however, leave any doubt in their minds as to how we view their idea.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached talking points to underscore our serious concerns over the Pearce/Green initiative.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

^{W.R.}
Walt Raymond concurs.

Attachments:

Tab I Talking Points
Tab II Pearce/Green Peace Initiative

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FDG-114/4 #8238
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

TALKING POINTS

Phy #3008
Mtg 4/15/82
3 PM. 14

-- I appreciate the opportunity to discuss your peace initiative with you in person. I know you have been working on it for several years now.

-- Jack Matlock, Bud McFarlane and I have all reviewed your proposal carefully. The President himself has reviewed the idea.

-- We all share your concerns over the international political climate, but I want to be as candid with you as possible: no formula for peace can succeed unless it is backed by the concrete political actions of all concerned parties.

-- This is really what the President proposed at the U.N. last October when he suggested a formula for moving toward peace in major regional conflicts around the world. The goal is the same as the goal of your initiative, but we believe it is a more practical approach.

-- We see no indications that the Soviet Union is prepared seriously to reconsider its policy of using force and the threat of force to exploit regional problems. They might well be willing to declare that as their aim in some distant future, but this would be meaningless unless they change their policy of using force.

-- In the absence of serious commitment from the Soviets, we must be careful not to play into their hands by promoting an initiative which could allow them to resurrect some of their favorite propoganda themes - like their public calls for no first use of nuclear weapons or the non-militarization of space.

-- Given the realities of Soviet policy, we think it is still premature to consider giving official endorsement to your initiative. But the aim of the President's regional initiative is precisely the same.

15

TOM GREEN TERRY PEARCE
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920 U.S.A.
415/435-9663 415/381-1598

September 12, 1985

Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

The attached memorandum updates you on the private initiative for the joint televised U.S./Soviet Declaration, acknowledged in your letters of February and April of last year. The initiative was encouraged early on by friends of yours and is now strongly supported. The Soviets have recently been responsive, and want to discuss it before the Summit. It is time to take the next step.

This is a plan to inspire and engage the global population in the same way you have inspired and engaged the American people. First, you have clearly stated our goals, and then pressed for the specific actions to meet those goals.

One leader, one nation will not meet global challenges alone. But one leader will begin. This plan calls for uncommon statesmanship with minimal risk. It will clearly establish our leadership, form a new context for U.S./Soviet relations and point a new direction for the youth of the world, consistent with our values as Americans.

The plan is practical, well-advanced, can be done now, and it will work.

God bless.

With deepest respect,

Tom Green

Terry Pearce

TG:TP:jl

Enclosure

September 12, 1985

Mr. President:

This memorandum summarizes and evaluates the private initiative for a joint Declaration we first discussed in January of 1984. Early encouragement for the work came from Holmes Tuttle, Al Schwabacher and Nancy Cooke de Herrera of Los Angeles, and contact with your staff has been primarily through Jack Matlock and me.

Implementation thus far has been carried out, without publicity, by two American businessmen through private channels, with selected government officials of the U.S., USSR, and the PRC fully informed. Responses have now been received.

The plan's purpose is to create a substantial shift in the international political climate through a dramatic, catalytic action: a joint, concurrent televised forceful statement by you and General Secretary Gorbachev, he from Moscow, you from Washington, declaring your personal commitments and that of your people to the goal of ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2000. Under the plan, you will speak to the people of the United States and then directly to the Soviet people. Gorbachev will speak to his country, then to ours directly. You will both then address the world's population, inviting other national leaders to join in the commitment.

The plan's proponents claim strong support from the PRC will follow immediately, and assume an equally positive response from Prime Minister Ghandi, who is also aware of this plan, though in less detail. The statement will have an impact exceeding Anwar Sadat's 1976 speech to the Knesset and President Nixon's trip to China in 1972, as it will be on a global scale.

This plan is distinct in substantive ways:

1. It sets a goal for the future. It does not require a renunciation of force now, but rather suggests a commitment to create conditions, by a specific time in the future - the year 2000 - when force will not be necessary to settle international differences.
2. It reverses the normal approach of diplomacy. Rather than focusing first on negotiating the specific methods (arms control, regional conflicts, human rights, etc.), it first defines the destination for all such specific actions.
3. The goal is global in scale. It, therefore, requires the cooperation of you and Secretary Gorbachev. This would be the first Declaration of a global goal.

- 17
4. It applies worldwide television in a dramatic way never used for statesmanship. Implementation will result in your direct access to the Soviet public and to a world audience.
 5. It is a private initiative. It does not bear the burden of a government proposal. The United States and the Soviets could suggest implementation of this non-governmental plan.
 6. It has had no publicity.

Progress

The plan was presented privately to Chernenko in February, 1984 and was backed up by a presentation to Dobrynin in April. Private delivery to Chairman Deng was accomplished in February, 1984 and backed up through the PRC Embassy here, in April, 1984. In December, 1984, the sponsors distributed clarifications to all three governments in response to questions and comments, and also added India, again through private businessmen, with Dobrynin, Zhang and me informed.

In February, 1985, and again in May, the plan and its amendments were channeled to Gorbachev, along with an indication approved by our office of our interest in their response.

The PRC responded with support, most recently through Ambassador Han in July of 1985.

The Soviet Embassy last month indicated to the plan's sponsors they would be interested in discussing the plan in preparation for the Summit.

Timing

It is suggested a rare opportunity is present now, and the opportunity is perishable, primarily because:

- The United States can now begin this drive for permanent peace based on justice from a position of strength. The nation currently has the strong leader and stability and power to match its will. This condition will last at a minimum through your term, long enough to test the willingness of the Soviets to move in concrete ways toward the goal.
- The captivation of the Soviet youth with Western culture is strong now, and could change. Your personal appeal to that generation, not yet party members, to work toward the goal, could accelerate the pace of cooperation dramatically.
- Gorbachev is currently trying to rally his people to new domestic production. He may not be willing to make this commitment later, should he be successful in his ever-broadening media campaign. This initiative may have particular appeal to him at this time.

Support

The plan has been exposed to very few Americans, all who are deeply respected and are from a wide spectrum in business, academics and politics from both sides of the aisle. They are realists and it has their support.

Risks

The plan's initiators claim, with some reason, that risks are minimal. No change in position or specific action is required by us or the Soviets, although some of the agreed-to specifics on the agenda for the Summit could be announced as evidence of our intent. Expectations may be raised in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and our political system may be more responsive to such expectation. However, the time remaining in your term is adequate to gauge the Soviet responsiveness and to prevent any action which would jeopardize our security.

Proponent's Recommendation

They recommend we acknowledge to the Soviets our receipt of this initiative, initiate discussion, and schedule the Declaration after the Summit, from Moscow and Washington.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION

Assessment

- No change in policy or specific action is required. In fact, such a commitment will allow any inconsistent actions of the Soviets to be showcased more effectively.
- No abandonment of our preparations to use force if and when necessary in our present circumstances is required.
- The plan has been successfully delivered to the USSR and the PRC and remains without publicity.
- It is supported by a few highly-respected individuals and is well-documented in its theory.
- The risks are minimal.
- The outcome of the plan is based on the assumption that the Soviet leadership wants to reduce tensions, at least temporarily. Such an assumption may not be valid and this Declaration could give rise to a propaganda campaign.
- It is a strong move in a new direction - a demonstration of our commitment to our values.
- Our allies will strongly support the action.
- It might accomplish a breakthrough in the international political climate. The rewards would be immeasurable.

Recommendation

This plan calls for unparalleled statesmanship, and we have an opportunity to take the lead; and it is possible such a commitment could induce positive concrete action by the Soviets. There is enough indication of potential success to pursue the plan further, to determine the plan's technical feasibility and the support of our allies. It strongly reflects our values. It would be a clear signal to the world that something worthwhile has been stated that will last beyond changes in leadership.

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment - Sample text (highlighted portions to be common to Soviet and American statements).

DRAFT

The President of the United States of America's Speech, November 1985

As announced earlier, our regularly scheduled program has been rescheduled to permit a special address by the President, the topic of which has not been announced. No one here knows what the President will be speaking about, or why he has chosen 10:00 in the morning to do so. We have just learned that with him in the Oval Office are his wife Nancy, their children and closest friends, Vice President Bush, former Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon, House Speaker O'Neill, and Senator Dole - obviously a remarkable and historic gathering. The President is about to speak.

Ladies and gentlemen, from the Oval Office in the White House, The President of the United States...

(over, please...)

The President of the United States of America speech, November 1985.

"My fellow Americans, today it is my privilege to report to you on the most significant turning point in human history: the time when the world has chosen to move to end war between nations...to move beyond the use or threat of mass destruction as an acceptable means of resolving our conflicts as nations. I am speaking to you at this time of day and with these other representatives of our nation because right now, simultaneously, General Secretary Gorbachev and representatives of the Soviet government are addressing the people of the Soviet Union.

Our two nations, and in fact all nations, have vast differences. We do not embrace their form of government; they do not embrace ours. Without being blind to the real differences between people, we know the people of all nations have common human interests. We all inhabit the planet, breathe the same air and cherish our children's future.

This growing interdependence, combined with the real and increasing threat of mutual extinction, and the contributions by millions today and throughout history toward the goal of peace, create the conditions in which the time is right, NOW, to commit to an end to armed conflict. No nation, no leader alone, can produce world peace. Many have tried and it has not been achieved. For the first time in human history it is now time for the world to focus on and commit to ending the use of national force.

Accordingly, in concert with General Secretary Gorbachev for the Soviet Union, and using the power heretofore used by our Presidents to declare war, I hereby declare and commit the United States of America to the goal of ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2000. We invite all nations of the world to join in this commitment.

Fellow Americans, peace between nations is possible. There will be risks. We will need strong defense along the way. We will maintain our freedom and security. It will not be easy, and with your support and that of the world's people, in the next 15 years we will develop an effective, non-violent means of resolving our conflicts as nations. We will realize conditions where war and the threat of war are obsolete as instruments of national policy, and then eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

In a few moments, Secretary Gorbachev will be directly addressing you stating his country's commitment to us and to the world, and I will be directly addressing his nation on your behalf. Then this evening I will be speaking to you and a joint session of Congress about specific actions agreed to at the summit and being taken today to produce peace between nations and about the role each of us can play in this shared journey.

It is our tradition in America to give thanks for our past and to look forward with new vision to our future. Three years ago on Thanksgiving, we recalled the words of a famous hymn, 'Oh God of love, Oh King of Peace, make wars throughout the world to cease.' God willing, this dream will now become real. Thank you, good day, and God bless you."

3/21

22

Terry Pearce and Tom Green have really been bugging me about getting to see you. I have pleaded all kinds of schedule constraints. Is there any possibility that you will see them sometime in the next week or so -- or refer them to Rod McDaniel? Walt Raymond says he doesn't think too much of their proposal and will get something to me soon. If you can't see them in the next few weeks, they will want to pursue other means. I really feel I should give them some sort of answer with regard to whether we can do something soon or that it won't be for a long while. They bother me at least two times each and every week!!

I'll see them in the next couple of weeks _____

Have Rod see them _____

Other _____

Just first 2 weeks of April but not April 9

*Fryman
Apr 15
3:00*

Florence

RECEIVED 04 APR 86 16

TO FORTIER

FROM COLEMAN, THOMAS

DOCDATE 26 FEB 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

FCO

FILE

SUBJECT: LTR TO FORTIER FM COLEMAN RE GORBACHEV VISIT TO KANSAS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR FORTIER DUE: 08 APR 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

MANDEL

RODMAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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E 4/15 Fortier 86d Arz Jm, Se, Ju
Sacks, DF

DISPATCH DFP W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1986

Dear Tom:

Thank you for your letter of February 26 concerning the possibility of General Secretary Gorbachev's visiting Kansas City during his trip to the United States this year. There is no doubt that the Kansas City region's combination of agricultural and industrial enterprises makes it an attractive site for such a visit.

Since we have not received a response from the Soviets regarding specific dates for a Gorbachev visit, we are not yet in a position to make firm plans. As we discussed on the phone, I have forwarded a copy of your letter to the office responsible for the logistics of the visit, and I will want to ensure that your suggestion will receive every consideration.



Again, many thanks for contacting me.

Sincerely,

Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable E. Thomas Coleman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1986

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD R. FORTIER
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Coleman

Attached at Tab I is a draft response to a letter from Congressman Coleman which suggested that Kansas City would be an excellent site for Gorbachev to visit during his planned visit to the U.S. this year. We advise the Congressman that we cannot make firm plans for Gorbachev until dates for a summit have been decided, but will forward his suggestion to the office responsible for the logistics of the visit.

Steve ~~Sestanovich~~ and Judy ~~Mandel~~ concur. Lynn ^{KSS} Sachs concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Congressman Coleman and forward a copy to Bill Henkel's office.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Congressman Coleman
Tab II Letter from Congressman Coleman

*Please redo with
changes which reflect
my phone conversation
with Tom. Thanks!*

E. THOMAS COLEMAN

8TH DISTRICT, MISSOURI

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SUBCOMMITTEES:

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DOMESTIC MARKETING, CONSUMER
RELATIONS, AND NUTRITION

EDUCATION AND LABOR

SUBCOMMITTEES:

POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, RANKING

SELECT EDUCATION

HUMAN RESOURCES

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

February 26, 1986

WASHINGTON OFFICE: 24

2344 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-7041

DISTRICT OFFICES:

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KANSAS CITY, MO 64118
(816) 454-7117

POST OFFICE AND FEDERAL BUILDING
8TH AND EDMOND
ST. JOSEPH, MO 64501
(816) 364-3900

2743

FEB 27 1986

Mr. Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President on
National Security Affairs
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Don:

Pursuant of our conversation I wanted to outline some of the activities and points of interest that make Kansas City an appropriate stop for Secretary Gorbachev during his visit to the United States.

Kansas City is the hub of the most productive agriculture region in the nation. As such, it is the home of the Kansas City Board of Trade and many agribusinesses, including Farmland Industries, the nation's largest agriculture cooperative. Obviously there could be a tour of nearby farming and cattle operations.

Kansas City is also the nation's second largest automobile assembly area. Both Ford and General Motors have assembly operations in Kansas City. I believe both plants would be of interest to Secretary Gorbachev; the Ford plant is in my district and I know the management and employees there would appreciate the opportunity to show him this modern world-class facility. President Reagan visited the plant last year because of its labor-management team work.

The University of Missouri at Kansas City has had a professorial exchange with Moscow State University for several years. It is my impression that it has been very successful.


For many years, Kansas City has had a number of prominent organizations and citizens who have been active in foreign affairs. The Council on Foreign Affairs is a group of prominent Kansas Citians that has long been involved in international political and trade issues. Kansas City also has a Foreign Trade Zone. The Midwest Research Institute, a Kansas City think-tank, has an international reputation as a consultant on scientific and management matters.

Mr. Fortier
February 26, 1986
Page Two

I should also add that Kansas City is experiencing a period of phenomenal growth and construction in its central business district. Crown Center, developed by the Hall family, is a world-class shopping and office facility. In nearby Independence, the Truman Library, family home and grave are only a few minutes from downtown.

Obviously I could list many additional reasons that Kansas City would show Secretary Gorbachev the Midwest at its best. I'd like to pursue the invitation further with you soon.

Sincerely,



E. THOMAS COLEMAN
Member of Congress

ETC:dln

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

National Security Council
The White House

National Security Council
The White House

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Dear Tom:

Thank you for your letter of February 26 concerning the possibility of General Secretary Gorbachev's visiting Kansas City during his trip to the United States this year. There is no doubt that the Kansas City region's combination of agricultural and industrial enterprises makes it an attractive site for such a visit.

Since we have not received a response from the Soviets regarding specific dates for a Gorbachev visit, we are not yet in a position to make firm plans. I ~~will, however,~~ forward a copy of your letter to the office responsible for the logistics of the visit, and I can assure you that your suggestion will receive every consideration.

Again, many thanks for contacting me.

Sincerely,

As we discussed in the meeting, I have

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
ib Pearson			
idney McDaniel			
in Fortier	1	DF	
ul Thompson			
rence Gantt			
hn Poindexter			
dney McDaniel			
C Secretariat	2		D
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEI
Bob Pearson	1	P
Rodney McDaniel		
Don Fortier	2	✓
Paul Thompson		
Florence Gantt		
John Poindexter		
Rodney McDaniel		
NSC Secretariat		
Situation Room		

Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch

: VP Regan Buchanan Other

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

COMMENTS Should be seen by:

DRF changes made + proofed. Enm

*bcc BILL HENKEL
With changes*

The Honorable E. Thomas Coleman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

RECEIVED 24 APR 86 11

TO POINDEXTER

FROM ROSTOW, EUGENE V

DOCDATE 15 APR 86

KEYWORDS: USSR

MP

LIBYA

TERRORISM

Matlock *FILE* ✓

SUBJECT: LTR TO POINDEXTER FM ROSTOW FWDING STUDY RE US DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 30 APR 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

TEICHER

NORTH

RODMAN

COMMENTS

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[Handwritten signature]

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986


Dear Dr. Rostow:

Thank you for your letter of April 15 and your kind words of Congratulation.

I appreciated the opportunity to review your Op Ed piece, and welcome your support for our efforts to deal with international terrorism. I fully agree with your assessment that in his encouragement and sponsorship of terrorism Qadhafi has placed himself far outside the bounds of accepted international behavior, and must be held fully accountable for his actions.

Thank you for your support.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Dr. Eugene V. Rostow
Department of Defense
National Defense University
Washington, D.C. 20319

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 30, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Letter from Eugene Rostow

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a suggested response to Eugene Rostow's letter of April 15. Rostow wrote to congratulate you on your appointment as National Security Adviser (Tab II) and forward a copy of an Op Ed piece he has written in support of our recent actions in Libya (Tab A).

While Rostow's support is welcome, I think his overall assessment is flawed. He sees the issue primarily in terms of East-West security and calls Libya "a cautiously chosen first target" in a broad campaign of more active defense against Soviet expansionism. Such an evaluation loses sight of our real objective of combating terrorism. It also inadvertently lends credence to the Soviet argument that Shevardnadze cannot come to the United States because we are allegedly poisoning the atmosphere of East-West relations.

H.T. Howard Teicher and *O.N.* Oliver North concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Eugene Rostow at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Eugene Rostow
Tab II Letter from Rostow
Tab A Op Ed Piece by Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDG-114/4#8239
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

15 April 1986

Executive Registry

86-1649X

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Admiral John Poindexter
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Admiral Poindexter,

This is the first time I have addressed you since you succeeded Bud. I congratulate you and wish you well in the toughest of assignments, and one of the most important.

I enclose an Op.Ed piece I plan to publish during the next week or so. I hope it will be helpful.

With high regard,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Gene Rostow".

Eugene V. Rostow
Distinguished Visiting Research
Professor of Law and Diplomacy

11 April 1986

The Reagan Doctrine--A First Step

by

Eugene V. Rostow*

It has been obvious for some time that a Western policy of more active defense against Soviet expansion is inevitable. For nearly forty years, the West has carried out the Truman Doctrine of containment, sometimes well and sometimes badly, and waited patiently for Soviet policy to mellow. George Kennan had predicted in 1947 that such a mellowing would come about in ten or fifteen years under the benign influence of Western containment and Russian high culture. His advice has been the basis for Western policy.

But the West can no longer assume that Soviet policy will mellow through natural causes alone. The Soviet thrust for power has gone far beyond what the limits of Western tolerance should be. Unless the Truman Doctrine is rejuvenated, modernized, and supplemented by a prudent and effective strategy of counter-attack, we shall lose whatever chance there may be for true detente with the Soviet Union--that is, for a

*Professor Rostow has been Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (1966-69) and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981-83).

relationship of cooperation in which the Soviet Union gives up its Faustian dream of empire, becomes a responsible member of the Security Council, and lives like other states within its legitimate borders in accordance with the rules of the United Nations Charter.

Libya is a cautiously chosen first target in the Western campaign of active defense called the Reagan Doctrine. The Soviets would have preferred an American attack on Cuba and Nicaragua. Such moves, they could hope, would involve the United States so deeply in Western Hemisphere affairs that it would withdraw troops from Europe and neglect its interests in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. On the other hand, Western intervention in Syria, Poland, or the Soviet Republics of Central Asia would have been more than a warning shot across the bows, and an invitation to serious conversation not about arms control, or arms control alone, but about the far more important question of compliance with the agreed rules of world public order. Forty years of quiet diplomacy on that subject has not gotten the attention of the Soviet leadership.

Libya is a well chosen target for another reason: the forcible removal of the Quaddafi regime would be fully justified under the existing rules of international law.

There have been repeated warnings over the years that unless the Soviet Union complied with the Charter rules, those rules could cease to control the behavior of the Western nations. As Adlai Stevenson remarked a generation ago, the United States will not stand by and be "nibbled to death." And Secretary Shultz has said that it is ridiculous for the Soviet Union, which proclaims its right to support movements of national liberation, to object if we should do likewise.

But an attack on Libya would not require the United States and its allies to take the fateful step of going beyond the nominal rules of international law. Libya under Quaddafi has flagrantly and continually violated those rules. The UN Charter forbids the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state except in self-defense. Libya has supported invasions of other states by armies and irregular forces. It has specialized in terrorism conducted both by its own forces and by terrorist organizations like the PLO.

Under international law, a state is responsible for such activities conducted or directed from its territory not only if it sponsors them or participates in them, but if it knew or should have known that they were taking place. Years of diplomatic effort and military warning have made it clear that Quaddafi has no intention of complying with the law. That being

the case, every state injured by Libya's actions has the right, alone or with others, to use whatever force is reasonably necessary to put an end to Libya's illegal behavior. Libya is in the legal position of the Barbary pirates.

Ideally, the police action against Libya should be undertaken by a group of the larger NATO allies and perhaps other states as well. They should issue a declaration on the responsibility of states for illegal acts committed from their territory, calling on all states to put an end to such practices and announcing that they will act if necessary to enforce compliance with the rule of international law. The Harmel Resolution of the North Atlantic Council adopted in 1967 establishes a procedure for concerting the policies of such groups of allies with respect to threats to alliance security arising outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. The NATO allies have demonstrated their capacity for concerted action on many critical issues over the years, including Middle Eastern policy in 1967-69 and the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in 1981-83. There is every reason to suppose that they could agree on and carry out a realistic and decisive policy for dealing with Quaddafi and the other regimes responsible for terrorism.

No one can rejoice over these somber prospects for American and Western foreign policy. But the state system cannot operate

under a double standard. Unless the Soviet Union and its client states abide by the rules of the United Nations Charter, the Western nations will be reluctantly driven into programs of more and more active defense. They cannot afford to forget that terrorism is a serious subject, and that World War I was detonated by an act of terrorism at Sarajevo for which the world held Serbia responsible.

J.M.C.
38

3018

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting of
CSCE

Anna Faltus, Vice President of the Czechoslovak National Council of America (CNCA), and a strong supporter of this Administration, wrote me a letter regarding the Review Meeting of CSCE to be held in Vienna in November 1986. Specifically, she has made two recommendations (see Tab I) which I believe deserve consideration by the White House Personnel Office: first, that alternates be named to the public members of the U.S. Delegation to CSCE; and second, pending approval of the first recommendation, that Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President of CNCA and Dr. Vlastislav Chalupa, Vice President of CNCA, be considered for these positions.

Her suggestions are sound. I have prepared a memorandum from you to Bob Tuttle forwarding her recommendations. I will notify Mrs. Faltus of this transfer after a memo is dispatched to Tuttle.

D
Dobriansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Tuttle
- Tab A Letter from Anna Faltus

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT H. TUTTLE

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: U.S. Delegation to the Vienna Review Meeting of
CSCE

Anna Faltus, Vice President of the Czechoslovak National Council of America (CNCA), is a strong supporter of this Administration. Recently, she contacted NSC regarding the Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Vienna in November 1986. She has made two recommendations (see Tab A) which I believe deserve your consideration: first, that alternates be named to the public members of the U.S. Delegation to CSCE; and second, pending approval of the first recommendation, that Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President of CNCA and Dr. Vlastislav Chalupa, Vice President of CNCA, be considered for these positions.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter from Anna Faltus



Liberty
For All

CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA

*A Non-Profit Organization Founded in 1918 — Devoted to Promote
Co-Operation of All Peoples for the Preservation of Democratic Freedom
(Chicago, Illinois)*

The Savoy, Apt. 610, 1101 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Tel.: (202) ~~872-1900~~ or 296-4128
857-1562



March 30, 1986

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In view of the importance of the Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be held in Vienna, Austria, in November, 1986, and in view of the fact that a decision has been made "in principle" to include Public Members in the official U.S. Delegation, we are taking the liberty of suggesting that for each Public Member an alternate also be named. This would avoid non-representation in cases of emergency and would assure full support, at all times, for the official U.S. Delegation.

The Czechoslovak National Council of America is submitting the curriculum of its President, Dr. Leopold Rozboril and its Vice President and Chairman of its Foreign Affairs Committee, Dr. Vlastislav Chalupa, for these positions. You met both officials when you were in Chicago several years ago as the American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

I would appreciate it if you would kindly forward the enclosed to the officials at the White House, who will have the responsibility of selecting Public Members for the Vienna Review Conference.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Anna Faltus
Anna Faltus
Vice President

Encl.

41

Czechoslovak National Council of America

A non-profit organization
founded in 1918

2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE

ROOM 202

CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

TELEPHONE 656-1117

HONORARY PRESIDENTS
DR. MIKULAS FERJENCIK
DR. JAN PAPANĚK
DR. FRANCIS SCHWARZENBERG
VLASTA VRAZ

Mrs. Anna Faltus,
1101 New Hampshire Avenue,
The Savoy, Apt. 610,
Washington, D.C. 20037

March 10, 1986

OFFICERS:

PRESIDENT:

DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL

VICE PRESIDENTS:

STEFAN PAPANĚK
DR. VLASTISLAV CHALUPA
ANNA FALTUS

Dear Mrs. Faltus:

SECRETARY:

VLASTA VRAZ

TREASURER:

JAMES V. KRAKORA

LEGAL COUNSEL:

DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL
Chicago, Illinois

WASHINGTON LIAISON OFFICERS:

ANNA FALTUS
DR. JOSEPH HASEK

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Please be advised that the Board of Directors nominated our Vice President, Dr. V. Chalupa and myself as candidates for the status of "public members" in the American Delegation to the "Helsinki" conference in Vienna, scheduled for November, 1986.

We are convinced that both candidates would make substantial contribution to the American Delegation because of their long experience with communist behavior and knowledge of communist methods of operation.

It should be stressed that, this time, the conference shall be held in close vicinity of Czechoslovakia, where its actions will be followed by large numbers of Czechoslovak citizens by watching Austrian TV and by listening to Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.

The above seems to be a compelling reason for American Delegation to have strong representation in delegates of Czechoslovak origin, this year more than ever. Their presence in Vienna will remind people of Czechoslovakia that America still cares.

Please, submit both names to appropriate authorities for selection. 'Resumés' of both candidates are attached in duplicate.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

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Herman Tabak

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Jifi Zemlicka

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George Spanek

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George Sova

Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol

Jan Sopoci
John Golosinec


Czechoslovak Sokol Abroad

Vaclav Zenisek
Dagmar Fiala

National Alliance of Czech Catholics

Jaroslava Kolbaba
Rev. Vojtech Vit, O.S.B.

With best regards


Dr. Leopold Rozboril,
President

42

Leopold Stan ROZBORIL
Born in Cracow, Poland, 69 years
Family: Married, 3 sons and 2 daughters
Profession: Lawyer (former diplomat)
Residence: 627 Saylor Avenue, Elmhurst, Il. 60126
Telephone: 1-312-279-1069

BIRTH:

Born on September 29, 1916 in Cracow, Poland, of Polish mother and Czech father. Family moved to Czechoslovakia in 1919. Polish 'connection' provides Mr. Rozboril with an easy access to Polish organizations.

EDUCATION:

Certificate of Proficiency in English Language from Cambridge University in England (May 1942).

JURIS DOCTOR degree from CHARLES IV University in Prague, Czechoslovakia, (September 1945).

JURIS DOCTOR degree from DePAUL University in Chicago, USA (June 1959).

Ad a/ Mr. Rozboril served in the Free Czechoslovak Brigade in England from July 1940 to 1944 (August). In 1941 (October) he entered London School of Economics which was evacuated to Cambridge. He attended seminars on political science conducted by the famous professor Harold Laski (he has not been converted to socialism!). At that time he passed the above language examination and also the first set of exams towards LLB degree. He returned to the Army in July 1942.

Ad b/ Mr. Rozboril attended the Law School at Masaryk University from the fall of 1935 to November 1939. On November 17, 1939, SS troops occupied Czech colleges and Universities and sent many student hostages to the concentration camp in Oranienburg, near Berlin. Mr. Rozboril completed the last examinations on his return from the war, in Prague. Masaryk University was in Brno, the capital of Moravia.

Ad c/ Mr. Rozboril emigrated to USA in 1954 (from Australia). He entered the Law School of DePaul University in Chicago in September 1955 and graduated in June 1959.

MILITARY SERVICE:

Mr. Rozboril escaped from the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia on January 1, 1940. With the help of the underground he made his way to France through Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon (Beirut). He joined Czechoslovak Army in France and took part in the last stand of the two Czechoslovak regiments on the river Marne, in June 1940. The remnants of the Czechoslovak Army were evacuated to England where they were reorganized into the Free Czechoslovak Brigade. In August 1944 Mr. Rozboril left England with the Czechoslovak Brigade and took part in the siege of the port and fortress Dunkirk. Dunkirk surrendered on May 8, 1945 and the Brigade returned to Czechoslovakia to the part occupied by General Patton's Third Army. He was demobilized in July 1945.

OCCUPATION:

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Mr. Rozboril joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague on November 1, 1945. A month later he was appointed Head of the Czechoslovak Mission for Reparations and Restitution in the British Zone of Germany. Mr. Rozboril took up the post in March 1946. After the Communist coup in Prague (February 1948) Mr. Rozboril intended to resign from his post in protest of the Communist takeover. However, two British generals (general Harvey, head of the Reparation Deptmt of the Military Government and general Carthew, chief of the Allied Liaison Branch of the British Army of the Rhine) advised him to stay in this non-political mission as long as he could. Dr. Rozboril resigned on November 15, 1949 and the entire staff of the mission followed him. This mass defection made headlines in the press of Western Europe and in the USA. See the attached articles in NEW YORK TIMES and LONDON TELEGRAPH, both of 11-17-49.

AUSTRALIA. 1950-1954 - Worked for the City of Brisbane in clerical position under the contract with Australian Government. A condition of admission to Australia was an obligation to work for two years where the Government sent the immigrant. Later as a manager trainee in the department store of PENNEYS LTD.

UNITED STATES. 1954-1986 Mr. Rozboril passed the Bar examination in March 1960 and was admitted to the Illinois Bar in May 1960. Employed by State Farm Insurance Co. as a specialist in personal injury claims. Began to practice law in 1965 and is presently still in general practice in DuPage County, Illinois.

ORGANIZATIONS:

- 1951-1954 President of the Czechoslovak Club in Brisbane, Australia.
- 1952-1954 President of the Central Association of the Czechoslovak Democratic Organizations in Australia and New Zealand.
- 1960-to present: President of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires, Branch Chicago
- 1970-to present: Two terms President and six terms Vice President of the Alliance of Friendship of Central-East European Nations.
- 1978-to present: Legal Counsel to the Czechoslovak National Council of America.
- 1984-to present: President of the Czechoslovak National Council of America.

MEMBERSHIP: Illinois Bar Association, DuPage Bar Association, Bohemian Lawyers Association, Harvard Club of Chicago (as a parent of a Harvard graduate), PHI ALPHA DELTA law fraternity.

AWARDS:

Czechoslovakia's highest military medals. Nominated among "Who Is Who Among Students in American Universities and Colleges (1958-59). Received "Cross of Merit" 1st Class from the Polish Government in London (exiled) in 1984.

PUBLIC RELATIONS:

Spent 6 months traveling with exhibitions on Czechoslovakia and lecturing in England (1943). Lecturing on Communist takeover of Eastern Europe in Australia (1951 to 1954). Occasionally lecturing and writing articles in Czechoslovak newspapers on politics in Czechoslovakia from 1918 to this day and on communism (1960 to present).

CZECHS IN GERMANY REPUDIATE PRAGUE

entire Reparations Mission
Staff Receives Asylum
From British Officials

Special to The New York Times

BERLIN, Nov. 16—Moved by conscience, seven Czechoslovak officials in Western Germany have repudiated the Communist Government in their homeland and sought and received political asylum from British authorities.

Dr. Leopold Rozboril, chief of the Czechoslovak Reparations Delivery and Restitution Mission in the British zone and six of his compatriots, the entire permanent staff of the mission have received "freedom and security," the British announced officially tonight.

Including dependents, there are seventeen persons involved.

When he approached British authorities yesterday Dr. Rozboril explained that he had found it impossible to serve his Government any further in the position he held, the British announced.

Dr. Rozboril and his associates told the British they believed in a political system that allowed an individual to follow his conscience.

Dr. Rozboril said he had become convinced after his experience in Western Germany that the Western

powers had no aggressive intentions against Czechoslovakia or "against any other country in the world."

Dr. Rozboril, who fought with the Czechoslovak forces in France, Belgium and Germany during the war, joined the Czechoslovak Foreign Office in 1945 and came to Germany as head of the reparations mission in March, 1946. His wife and 2-year-old son are with him.

The others who "came over" with Dr. Rozboril are Nevenko Reif, deputy chief of the mission and his wife and two children; Jaroslav Kuril, Tibor Kovalovsky and his wife and two children; Miss Libuse Krizova, Otto Fousek and his wife, and Adolf Richter and his wife.


CZECHS OUST 11 MORMONS

Order Affects Missionaries of
U. S. Church Group

PRAGUE, Czechoslovakia, Nov. 16 (AP) — Eleven United States Mormon missionaries have been ordered expelled from Czechoslovakia, apparently in a Government drive to reduce the number of foreigners in the country, it was disclosed tonight.

Wallace Toronto, president of the Mormon Church mission, said that five missionaries had been ordered out recently, but were still here pending appeals to the Interior Ministry. Six already have gone. The full name of the church is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

- Fifth Ave. at 49th St. open T
- Fifth Ave. at 43rd St. open T




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when you put them on for
the first time your friends

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CZECH MISSION GIVEN ASYLUM BY BRITISH

FAMILIES PLACED UNDER PROTECTION

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT BERLIN, Wednesday.

All seven permanent members of the Czechoslovak Reparations Mission in the British zone of Germany, with their families, have been granted protection and political asylum by the British authorities. A request was made on their behalf yesterday by Dr. Leopold Rozboril, the chief of the mission.

He explained that after careful deliberation he and his colleagues had decided that it was no longer possible to serve their Government. He said that they had been influenced by "certain fundamental disagreements" with the political views of the present Czech Government.

Above all they believed in a political system which allowed the individual to follow his conscience. He was convinced that the Western Powers had no aggressive intentions against Czechoslovakia or any other country.

The party of fugitives numbers 17. It includes five wives and five young children. According to a British announcement to-night, refuge had been granted in accord with the traditional British policy of giving asylum to all who sought it.

The Czech Reparations Mission live at Bad Salzuffen, in the British zone. It is understood that the Czechs are in a place of safety.

CZECH "UNDERGROUND" First Response to Appeal

A DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT writes: Free Czech circles in London consider the resignations to be the first response to an appeal sent last week to all Czechoslovak Foreign missions to dissociate themselves from the Communist-controlled Government.

As exclusively reported in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, the appeal was distributed through the Czechoslovak diplomatic bags and was signed by the "Supreme Committee of Czechoslovak Underground Organisations." The appeal called on all Czechoslovak officials abroad to claim the right of asylum as political refugees.

Following the publication of the appeal some employees of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry in Prague were arrested. It was reported by Reuter from Prague yesterday. Many employees in other Ministries were questioned.

FES VISIT SIGN

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DAILY TEL Visitors to Britain will signals to them reflect again with

This was revealed by the exhibit at a Press conference yesterday. MORRISON, I Council, co expenditure £11,300,000. pected to million. [R

Other featu Barry were a Discovery—the world—and a summit of the mark, the Sh

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AMONG 1,000
OR 2 GUNMEN
HOT IN SHOP
CORRESPONDENT

Mr. CHURCHILL'S
ELECTION CALL
A TURNING POINT
IN HISTORY
DAILY TELEGRAPH REPORTER

46

Vlastislav John CHALUPA
born in Opava, Czechoslovakia, 67 years,
married, 3 sons,
profession: banking (retired)
residence: 55 South Linden Avenue, Palatine, Illinois 60067
312-358-0455

Born November 4, 1919, close to the Czechoslovak border with Germany. As public prosecutor, his father was involved in numerous cases of Nazi subversive activities. This generated in the son a lasting interest in politics.

Mr. Chalupa studied at the Law School of the Masaryk University in Brno in the years 1938 to 1946 under the famous professors Weyr (theory of law) and Englis (theory of economics). His studies were interrupted during the occupation of Czechoslovakia by confinement in the concentration camp Oranienburg (Sachsenhausen near Berlin) in 1938/39 and the closing of Czech universities. He obtained his Doctor's degree in 1946.

During the war (1938-1945), he participated in the resistance organization "Obrana naroda" and after the war (1945-1948), he shared the anti-communist effort by working with the largest anti-communist party, the Czechoslovak Socialists, first as chairman of the Department for Scientific Politics of that party in Brno, editor of a newsletter for their youth organization, public speaker, and finally (1947-48) as chairman of the brain trust for Mr. Petr Zenkl, party chairman and First Vice-Prime Minister. By 1947, he was put on the black list of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

After the Communist take-over (1948), Mr. Chalupa spent several months with the resistance underground, left the country clandestinely for Paris and continued to be in touch with the resistance until 1952, when he immigrated to the United States. During that period, he co-founded the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, a study and research institute incorporated in Leyden, Holland, and co-edited its Czech and English language magazines Tribuna, The Cold War, and Commentary. He published Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State (Stenfort-Kroese, Leyden, Holland, 1953, 294 pages) and several monographs published by the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile: Situation of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia; Communism in a Free Society; The National Front in Czechoslovakia; and other. His latest publication is Catholic Politics? An Examination (Regnery Gateway, Chicago, December 1985, 45 pages).

He became member of the Board of the Czechoslovak National Council of America, Chicago, in 1962, became its Secretary in 1969, then Vicechairman which function he still holds. On behalf of the Council he prepared in 1983 a report on persecution of religion in Czechoslovakia for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate and many other memoranda and submissions on similar subjects for various governmental bodies.

He worked in Chicago with City National Bank (1952-61), Continental Bank (1961-74), American National Bank (1974-79) and again Continental Bank (1979-84) until his retirement as Vicepresident in April 1984. As a recognized expert in the field of international banking operations he was elected chairman of the Mid-America Committee on International Banking (1977-78) and chairman of the National Association of Councils on International Banking (1979-1980), taught courses on

international banking operations at the American Institute of Banking and the Bank Administration Institute, both in Chicago, and as Vice-chairman of the Banking Commission of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce (1980-84) represented the U.S. banking industry at meetings of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

At present, he is active with the Czechoslovak National Council of America, as a consultant in banking matters, and as author. He is working on a book on the transformation and latest strategies of Communism.

ES SENSITIVE 8611859

Matlock

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS* *RR*
SUBJECT: Soviet Reaction to U.S. Actions in Libya

Art Hartman was called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Tuesday afternoon by the head of their U.S.A. Department. The Soviets told Art that because of U.S. actions in Libya the meeting between Shevardnadze and me, scheduled for May 14-16, was "not possible at this time," and that the U.S. was responsible for this turn of events. The Soviets will be making an announcement this evening and they suggested that they may undertake further measures. Art was also told that Soviet planes and ships have been operating, and will continue to operate in the Mediterranean. The Soviets said the U.S. should not seek to interfere with their air and naval activities.

Art Hartman believes that since the Soviets are engaging us publicly on this question, we should be prepared to respond. Art found the White House background materials very useful and believes in particular that when the Soviets raise the question of loss of life resulting from our operations that we respond with chapter and verse on our casualties from acknowledged Libyan terrorist activities. I agree. We will be working with the NSC to ensure that our response is coordinated and effective.

It is not clear at this point whether the Soviets are actually cancelling, postponing, or calling into question the scheduled meeting. At this point, however, we have to assume the meeting will not occur as scheduled. This will of course make it more difficult to organize a July summit. For the Soviets, who appeared in any case to be planning on December, cancelling the meeting is a low cost means of responding not only to the Libya situation, but to such previous slights as our move against their UN mission.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOL 114/4 # 8242
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

April 15, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a memorandum from Secretary Shultz on the Soviet reaction to our actions in Libya. In addition to saying that the Shevardnadze visit is "not possible at this time," the Soviets suggested to Art Hartman that they may undertake further unspecified measures.

I agree with State's assessment that the Soviet decision is a low cost means of responding to the situation and suggests that the Soviets are not seriously attracted to the idea of a July summit, but are aiming for the end of the year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I, unless he has already been informed.

Approve _____

Disapprove *JFM*

I sent Pres the original this morning.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD16-114/4 #8240

BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

50

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Memorandum from George Shultz on the Soviet
Reaction to Our Actions in Libya

Issue

Soviet protest of our actions in Libya.

Facts

The Soviet Foreign Ministry protested to Art Hartman on the 15th. The Soviets said Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to the U.S. is "not possible at this time" and implied that they might undertake further unspecified actions.

Discussion

The Soviet decision appears to be a low cost means of responding to the situation and suggests that they are not seriously attracted to the idea of a July summit, but are aiming for the end of the year.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____

That you review the attached memorandum from George Shultz.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from George Shultz

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File-114/4 #8241
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Soviet Reaction to U.S. Actions in Libya

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/4#8243
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SYSTEM II

86 APR 15 P 2: 53

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90301

SECRET

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 15 APRIL 1986

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

- FYI
- Burghardt
 - Cannistraro
 - Childress
 - Cobb
 - Covey
 - Danzansky
 - deGraffenreid
 - Djerejian
 - Dobriansky
 - Donley
 - Douglass
 - Grimes
 - Hughes
 - Kraemer
 - Laux
 - Lenczowski

- FYI
- Levine
 - Linhard
 - Mahley
 - Major
 - Mandel
 - Matlock
 - May
 - Menges
 - Miller
 - North
 - Platt
 - Pugliaresi
 - Raymond
 - Reger
 - Ringdahl
 - Sable

- FYI
- Sachs
 - Sestanovich
 - Sigur
 - Small
 - Sommer
 - Soos
 - Stark
 - Steiner
 - Tahir-Kheli
 - Teicher
 - Thompson
 - Tillman
 - Wigg
 - Wright
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URGEN

- INFORMATION
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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> McDaniel | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pearson | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Secretariat |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rodman | <input type="checkbox"/> Lehman | <input type="checkbox"/> _____ |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Poindexter (advance) | <input type="checkbox"/> Fortier (advance) | |

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat