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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/15/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (3/6)

**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 15

YARHI-MILO

1512

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8211	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, APRIL 8, 1986 (SAME TEXT AS 8204) <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	2	4/5/1986	B1
8212	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE YOUR MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <b>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</b>	1	ND	B1
8213	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	4	ND	B1
8214	MEMO	LINHARD TO MATLOCK RE ARMS CONTROL PORTINS OF PRESIDENTIAL TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <b>PAR 6/23/2010 M125/2; UPHELD PAR 3/9/2011 F06-114/4 #8214</b>	2	4/4/1986	B1
8215	MEMO	ARMS CONTROL AND NEXT SUMMIT <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	1	ND	B1
8216	MEMO	ARMS CONTROL AND NEXT SUMMIT STATE RECOMMENDATIONS <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	1	ND	B1
8217	MEMO	ARMS CONTROL AND NEXT SUMMIT LINHARD VERSION <b>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</b>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/15/2005

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**FOIA**

F06-114/4

**Box Number** 15

YARHI-MILO

1512

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8218	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN (SAME AS FIRST PAGE 8213) <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
8219	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8213 FIRST PAGE <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	1	ND	B1
8220	MEMO	ARMS CONTROL AND NEXT SUMMIT <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	2	ND	B1
8221	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	ND	B1
8222	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	3	ND	B1
8223	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8221 <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	ND	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

8211

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

April 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Dobrynin, April 8, 1986

Attached at TAB A are the talking points I worked out with Mark Palmer in accord with your instructions following your meeting with Secretary Shultz.

I asked Bob Linhard to review the arms control portions, and he strongly recommends three changes in the talking points. His memo citing his reasons is at TAB II. I conveyed Bob's suggestions to Palmer and Ridgway, but they feel strongly that the original version is preferable. Palmer tells me they spoke to Secretary Shultz this morning, and that he also strongly prefers the original version. Accordingly, I have indicated the disputed language in brackets. These points are on page 2 of the talking points at Tab A.

In a separate but related issue, State/EUR and -- according to Palmer -- the Secretary feel that the April 8 test should be delayed a week so as not to coincide with the President's meeting with Dobrynin. Their reasoning is that the timing of the test will be read by the Soviets -- and by many on the Hill -- as provocative, and that this could give momentum to Congressional efforts to limit the testing program. Bob Linhard holds the opposite view, as indicated in his memorandum at TAB II. However, the bottom line at State is that they consider this an NSC call and will not formally insist on a postponement, although they want you to be aware of their views and of their reading of Congressional attitudes.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you convey the version of the talking points which you approve to the President for him to read prior to the prebrief Monday.

Approve

Disapprove

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR MO8-125/2#8211  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

✓

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Talking Points for Dobrynin Meeting

Tab II Linhard Memorandum

Tab III Clean copies of the two versions of the talking points

8212 3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dobrynin, April 8

You will be meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin Tuesday morning. He will be in Washington next week to do his formal farewells as Ambassador, before returning to Moscow to assume a senior position in the Soviet Party structure. As one of the members of the Central Committee Secretariat, it is presumed that he will be responsible for coordinating national security policy and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular.

Soviet officials have indicated to us that we should not expect Dobrynin to come with a date for the Washington summit, but that he will be looking for an indication of what your aims are for the meeting. Therefore, George and I believe it important for you to convey to Dobrynin both your concern over some recent Soviet actions, and your desire to get negotiations moving on some of the key issues.

At Tab A you will find a set of talking points we suggest for the meeting. George and I will discuss them with you at a prebrief on Monday.

Recommendation

OK                      No

\_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_                      That you read the suggested talking points at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A                      Suggested Talking Points for Dobrynin

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify: OADR

NLRR MD8-125/2# 8212  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

8213 4

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRR M08-125/2 # 8213**

**BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10**

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions; [would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues,] including concerns of both sides. ||
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
  - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side [and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space]. ||
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue [State: further limits on testing with] [Linhard: conditions which would let us move forward toward the] ultimate goal of banning all tests. ||



- e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
  - f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
  - g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
- 
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
  - Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
  - Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
  - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
  - We ready to work constructively on all of them.

COMMUNICATION

- As I noted, Geneva negotiations not moving fast enough. But major issues are clear and principal obstacles have been defined.
- Primary issues must be resolved; will require direct involvement of General Secretary and myself.
- Therefore, I propose that the General Secretary and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of the major issues separating us.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing obstacles to agreement.
- These discussions would not be binding, but would be referred personally to the General Secretary and myself for decisions by us.
- If Gorbachev agrees, I am prepared to designate Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock as my personal representatives for these discussions.

1

- They will be prepared to meet with Mr. Gorbachev's representative or representatives at a mutually agreeable time and place.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

~~TOP SECRET~~

NON-LOG

9214 8

NLRR M08-125/2 #8214

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

4 Apr 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: BOB LINHARD *Bob*

SUBJECT: Arms Control Portions of Presidential Talking Points for Meeting with Dobrynin

Attached at Tab A is a copy of the talking points that you provided to me EYES ONLY annotated to reflect my views. I feel strongly that certain changes are needed. The specifics are indicated on the version of the points at Tab A.

Arms Control Section. In the section labeled ARMS CONTROL (page 2), the only real problem I have is with the 6th tick. The changes are intended to make it clear, as we have in context in the past, that the offer is for discussions at the expert level. I would delete the phrase "would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues" because this specific phrase generated the most difficulty when we processed the almost identical demarche suggested by State some three weeks ago. I personally have no problem with the idea that at such a meeting we would talk about what we want to, and the Soviets would be free to raise what they want to. My problem is that we are investing time to bring the system along in a non-confrontational manner to ensure all are behind the President when needed, and the ACSG is working. If this point goes as written, I fear that it simply sends the signal that EUR can afford to let the community spin as it wishes on its demarches, but will always be able to work the key language in the Presidential talking points. I admit that this is (unfortunately) primarily a bureaucratic concern, but it is a critical one if we are going to impose necessary discipline, equitably, within the Administration. To keep necessary credibility, we need to make this fix. I do not see it as hurting thrust or substance — nor am I convinced that the phrase deleted is essential to the President's remarks.

Next Summit. The section labeled NEXT SUMMIT (page 2) causes me more serious, substantive concern.

-- The third tick, item c, is simply not supportable at this time. The USG has not staffed the idea of proposing an agreement on the elimination of first strike potential on either side and especially on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space. I would not put these proposals in their current form, without prior staffing and coordination, in an NSDD on arms control. It would cause a totally unnecessary friction in the administration, prejudice support in some quarters that we could obtain if worked, and put the President at further risk that is needed due to lack of full/thorough staffing. I strongly recommend that this tick not be used. I certainly see no immediate need to make this proposal in this form. If the Admiral and/or the President wants these ideas staffed on a priority and quiet basis — I am prepared to do so. Bottom line, Jack, is that if I could not recommend to the Admiral that he go to the President with an NSDD on this, I can't support the inclusion as unstaffed remarks by the President to Dobrynin. This is not a private Presidential exploratory letter -- this is a routine diplomatic exchange at the highest level of government.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

-- Item d of the same tick also moves us well beyond current USG policy as I understand it. As written, it suggests that the US is prepared to commit to further limits on testing with the ultimate goal of banning all tests. My proposed fix would cast the phrase in a way that would be within current USG policy. I don't object as strongly, here, to the policy change involved. I do object to the method of changing policy via talking points that have very limited staffing. Its just not a healthy way of doing business. I think that we should walk this back until a little foundation work can be laid. I think this is where we end up, but I hate like hell to reach policy changes in ways that can be perceived to end-run the system. I know that that is not your purpose at all. But it could be others.

Process. The concerns I have expressed involve both substance and process. On substance, I am very concerned with the SUMMIT item c. On process, I am equally concerned that, if uncorrected, we simply continue a channel that puts a premium in not staffing material on an interagency basis (close-hold) and that, I fear, will undercut our ability to discipline the system. It also exposes the President to risks that can be avoided by full vetting. This doesn't mean that I object to any of the proposed policy changes per se, just that given time to work them, I can protect the system and the options -- we know some will object to each, but the President has shown that he can hear opinions, judge risks, and make decisions. Protecting the process is critical and central to protecting the President.

E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (4)(X1)

Moving the Test. Finally, I have thought about the idea of moving the test back from April 8. I really don't think this is a good idea. I think that it just gives additional time for mischief on the hill. I also would not that this is not a good test to delay for technical reasons. And, I'm not sure that we aren't being further manipulated by the Soviets.

If the test should be delayed against this judgment -- then it is essential that the offer of an meeting not be repeated at this time. The ACSI carefully worked this scenario in detail. We should avoid a situation in which we make an offer for a meeting independent of the meeting proposed at the Nevada Test Site before we test again. To do so opens a clear door for Congressional pressure for a moratorium on our part until we determine if the discussions will yield fruit. As I said, State/EUR suggested this approach some two weeks ago, and I invested a considerable effort to explore it and staff it. The result was (and I personally agree with this result) that this is not a good scenario for the US. Once we test, then a whole different range of possibilities may open -- and then we certainly want discussion. But let's not run the risk of pulling the Soviet's fat out of the fryer on the moratorium at the last moment. Bottom line: don't delay the test, but if you do, then don't use the President's talking points reoffering a meeting.

I must admit that this talking point process makes me very paranoid. I can't help feeling that State/EUR knows that it (in effect) is attempting to walk back a large investment in interagency work in this manner.

CC: Admiral Poindexter

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.

OUR EXPERTS MEET FOR

We ready to have<sup>v</sup> bilateral talks without preconditions; ~~would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues,~~ including concerns of both sides.



See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

-- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.

-- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.

-- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:

- a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing ~~reducing~~ strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
- b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
- c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side, ~~and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.~~
- d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue ~~further limits on testing with~~ ultimate goal of banning all tests.
- e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD GET US MOVE FORWARD TOWARDS THE

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NLRR M08-125/2 # 8215

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

ADDITIONAL: WHAT WE HAVE PAINSTAKINGLY WORKED IN THE ARSS WOULD PERMIT THIS NOW. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH NSDD 808 AND THE DECEMBER LETTER. THE TEXT IS USED AS WRITTEN, WE SIMPLY IGNORE 2 WEEKS OF ARSS DISCUSSION AND REVERT TO OUR ORIGINAL IDEA. MAY MUST EFFECTIVENESS OF ARSS MORE THAN NEEDED.

THIS HAS NOT BEEN TRIED - AND I DON'T BELIEVE IT CAN BE SUPPORTED.

WITH THIS CHANGE, THE POINT IS ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT, WE ARE BEYOND CURRENT USG POLICY.

8214  
State recommendations,  
p 2.

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our proposal for strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on technical improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We are ready to have bilateral talks without preconditions; would cover entire range of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
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  - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side and on preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR M08-125/2 #8216

*Linhard version, 8217 12*  
*P2*

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas of Soviet response to U.S. proposal
- Example: no answer yet to our November strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on certain improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.
- We ready to have our experts meet without preconditions for bilateral talks, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
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  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c - Agreement on elimination of first-strike potential on either side.
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue conditions which would let us move forward toward ultimate goal of banning all tests.

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NLRR MO8-125/2 #8217

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

13

TAB A



8218 14

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 # 8218

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

13

SYSTEM II  
90274

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

April 7, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Meeting Memorandum for Ambassador Dobrynin

Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and Talking Points for the President's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Jonathan Miller & Rodney McDaniel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and Talking Points at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points (SECRET)
- Tab II Clearance List

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*2/15/05*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

DATE: April 8, 1986  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 09:45 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.  
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To say farewell to Dobrynin and discuss U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND

Dobrynin has just been promoted to a senior position in the Communist Party. He is likely to be carrying a personal message from Gorbachev.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Rozanne L. Ridgway  
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov

IV. PRESS PLAN

None. Staff Photographer.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

President greets Dobrynin, congratulates him on his recent promotion and invites him to open the discussion.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points (SECRET)

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

2/15/85

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

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- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

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NLRR M08-125/2 #8219

BY KML NARA DATE 10/28/10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ARMS CONTROL

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- We ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions, including concerns of both sides.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

NEXT SUMMIT

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  - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
  - c - Agreement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an effective first strike by either side and the use of space for basing offensive weapons capable of mass destruction.
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests and commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing. If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, that would provide a basis for further limitations on testing.
  - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
  - f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO8-17E/7 #8220

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/00

- g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation.
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
- Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
- We ready to work constructively on all of them.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

8221 20

TALKING POINTS -- MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, TUESDAY, APRIL 8 at 9:45 a.m.

- CONGRATULATIONS ON ELECTION AS SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- EAGER TO MOVE FORWARD AS AGREED IN GENEVA.
- HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN BILATERAL AREAS. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES IMPORTANT.
- HOWEVER, DISAPPOINTED BY OVERALL LACK OF PROGRESS.

-2-

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS CREATES MAJOR PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.
- LIBYA FLAGRANT EXAMPLE.
- IF SOVIET UNION TERMINATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT THESE DISPUTES, U.S. WILL REFRAIN. IF NOT, U.S. WILL SUPPORT FRIENDS.

-3-

- STUDIED GORBACHEV'S PARTY CONGRESS REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN. NO DESIRE BY U.S. TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN A "BLEEDING WOUND." SOVIET ESCALATION HAS DONE THAT.
- EAGER TO SEE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN.
- SEE POTENTIAL PROGRESS IN SOME ARMS CONTROL AREAS BUT FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS.

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR M08-125/2 #8221

BY KML NARA DATE 10/28/10

- EXAMPLE: NO ANSWER YET TO OUR NOVEMBER 1 START PROPOSAL.
- RE NUCLEAR TESTING: REGRET YOUR EFFORTS TO MAKE PROPAGANDA.
- OUR PRIORITY GOAL IS AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR TTBT AND PNET.
- IMPORTANT TO MAKE STEPS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE. TOO MUCH DISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES FOR GRANDIOSE PROPOSALS.

- WE READY TO HAVE EXPERTS MEET FOR BILATERAL TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. INCLUDE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES.
- DIALOGUE COULD PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS AT NEXT SUMMIT.

NEXT SUMMIT

- WANT SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME FROM NEXT SUMMIT.
- WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE:



-6-

- A - AGREEMENT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF TREATY REDUCING STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN COMPARABLE CATEGORIES BY 50%.
- B - AGREEMENT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF INF TREATY.
- C - AGREEMENT ON METHODS WHICH ELIMINATE BOTH THE THREAT OF AN EFFECTIVE FIRST-STRIKE BY EITHER SIDE AND THE USE OF SPACE FOR BASING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CAPABLE OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

-7-

- D - AGREEMENT ON MORE RELIABLE MEANS TO VERIFY NUCLEAR TESTS AND COMMITMENT TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE ULTIMATE ELIMINATION OF TESTING. IF WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON TESTING.
- E - AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN.
- F - PROGRESS IN BRINGING PEACE TO REGIONS NOW TORN BY CONFLICT.

- G - IMPROVEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE TO PERMIT MAJOR EXPANSION OF TRADE AND COOPERATION.
- AGREEMENTS ON KEY ELEMENTS IN 1986 WOULD PERMIT NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES IN TIME FOR SUMMIT IN 1987 - WHICH IN TURN WOULD MAKE RATIFICATION POSSIBLE BEFORE OUR 1988 ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
- SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD BE BLUEPRINT FOR FIRST PHASE OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL.

-9-

- OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES: CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.
- EVEN IF WE CANNOT ACHIEVE ALL THESE OPTIMUM GOALS, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN SOME WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.
- WE READY TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON ALL OF THEM.

-10-

GORBACHEV VISIT

- TELL GENERAL SECRETARY I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO HIS VISIT.
- HOPE HE CAN STAY AT LEAST A WEEK.
- WOULD LIKE TO ACCOMPANY HIM FOR PART OF HIS TRAVEL.
- WANT TO HEAR HIS DESIRES.

24

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1986

for THE PRESIDENT of \_\_\_\_\_  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

George P. Shultz  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Rozanne L. Ridgway  
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Anatoly Dobrynin  
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Oleg Sokolov

**MEETING LOCATION**

Building WEST WING Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK  
Room No. OVAL OFFICE Room No. 368 Telephone X5112  
Time of Meeting 9:45 a.m. Date of request April 7, 1986

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

2787

25  
Jm-c

April 7, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dobrynin's April 8 Meeting with the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Nicholas Platt officially informing him of Ambassador Dobrynin's April 8, meeting with the President .

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Nicholas Platt

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Tuesday,  
April 8, 1986

The President will meet with Ambassador Dobrynin Tuesday, April 8, 1986 at 9:45 a.m. for 30 minutes in the Oval Office. Participants are as follows:

The President  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Rozanne Ridgway  
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Deputy Chief of Mission Oleg Sokolov

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

SB-27  
File

SYSTEM II  
90274

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 7, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Meeting Memorandum for Ambassador Dobrynin

Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and Talking Points for the President's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Jonathan Miller & Rodney McDaniel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and Talking Points at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points (SECRET)
- Tab II Clearance List

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*205  
2/15/05*

THE WHITE HOUSE

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

DATE: April 8, 1986  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 09:45 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.  
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

I. PURPOSE

To say farewell to Dobrynin and discuss U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND

Dobrynin has just been promoted to a senior position in the Communist Party. He is likely to be carrying a personal message from Gorbachev.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Rozanne L. Ridgway  
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin  
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov

IV. PRESS PLAN

None. Staff Photographer.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

President greets Dobrynin, congratulates him on his recent promotion and invites him to open the discussion.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points (SECRET)

UNCLASSIFIED  
WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
205  
2/15/85

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin  
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharansky), but progress has stopped.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key security areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement in regional disputes, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound." Soviet escalation has done that.
- We eager to see a political solution in Afghanistan.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-125/2 #8222

BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals. ✓
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Nuclear testing another example: regret your efforts to make propaganda on the issue.
- Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET.
- Important to make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals. ✓
- We ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions, including concerns of both sides. ✓
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit. ✓

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve; your response to our proposals slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals, but not unrealistic:
  - a - Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%. ✓
  - b - Agreement on key elements of INF treaty. ✓
  - c - Agreement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an effective first strike by either side and the use of space for basing offensive weapons capable of mass destruction. ✓
  - d - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests and commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing. If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, that would provide a basis for further limitations on testing. ✓
  - e - Agreement on chemical weapons ban. ✓
  - f - Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.

- g - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation. ✓
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign. ✓
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal. ✓
- Other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures. ✓
- Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be worthwhile achievement. ✓
- We ready to work constructively on all of them. ✓

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit. ✓
- Hope he can stay at least a week. Would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country. ✓
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together. ✓
- Want to hear his desires before going further in our planning. ✓

023

32

TALKING POINTS -- MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, TUESDAY, APRIL 8 at 9:45 a.m.

- CONGRATULATIONS ON ELECTION AS SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- EAGER TO MOVE FORWARD AS AGREED IN GENEVA.
- HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS IN BILATERAL AREAS. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES IMPORTANT.
- HOWEVER, DISAPPOINTED BY OVERALL LACK OF PROGRESS.

-2-

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS CREATES MAJOR PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS.
- LIBYA FLAGRANT EXAMPLE.
- IF SOVIET UNION TERMINATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT THESE DISPUTES, U.S. WILL REFRAIN. IF NOT, U.S. WILL SUPPORT FRIENDS.

-3-

- STUDIED GORBACHEV'S PARTY CONGRESS REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN. NO DESIRE BY U.S. TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN A "BLEEDING WOUND." SOVIET ESCALATION HAS DONE THAT.
- EAGER TO SEE POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN.
- SEE POTENTIAL PROGRESS IN SOME ARMS CONTROL AREAS BUT FRUSTRATED BY LACK OF SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
 NLRR M08-125/2 #8223  
 BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10

-4-

- EXAMPLE: NO ANSWER YET TO OUR NOVEMBER 1 START PROPOSAL.
- RE NUCLEAR TESTING: REGRET YOUR EFFORTS TO MAKE PROPAGANDA.
- OUR PRIORITY GOAL IS AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS FOR TTBT AND PNET.
- IMPORTANT TO MAKE STEPS TO BUILD CONFIDENCE. TOO MUCH DISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES FOR GRANDIOSE PROPOSALS.

-5-

- WE READY TO HAVE EXPERTS MEET FOR BILATERAL TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. INCLUDE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES.
  - DIALOGUE COULD PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS AT NEXT SUMMIT.
- NEXT SUMMIT
- WANT SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME FROM NEXT SUMMIT.
  - WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE:

-6-

- A - AGREEMENT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF TREATY REDUCING STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN COMPARABLE CATEGORIES BY 50%.
- B - AGREEMENT ON KEY ELEMENTS OF INF TREATY.
- C - AGREEMENT ON METHODS WHICH ELIMINATE BOTH THE THREAT OF AN EFFECTIVE FIRST-STRIKE BY EITHER SIDE AND THE USE OF SPACE FOR BASING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CAPABLE OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

-7-

- D - AGREEMENT ON MORE RELIABLE MEANS TO VERIFY NUCLEAR TESTS AND COMMITMENT TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE ULTIMATE ELIMINATION OF TESTING. IF WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THAT WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON TESTING.
- E - AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN.
- F - PROGRESS IN BRINGING PEACE TO REGIONS NOW TORN BY CONFLICT.

- 35
- G - IMPROVEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE TO PERMIT MAJOR EXPANSION OF TRADE AND COOPERATION.
  - AGREEMENTS ON KEY ELEMENTS IN 1986 WOULD PERMIT NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES IN TIME FOR SUMMIT IN 1987 - WHICH IN TURN WOULD MAKE RATIFICATION POSSIBLE BEFORE OUR 1988 ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
  - SUCH AGREEMENTS WOULD BE BLUEPRINT FOR FIRST PHASE OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL.

- OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES: CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.
- EVEN IF WE CANNOT ACHIEVE ALL THESE OPTIMUM GOALS, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN SOME WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.
- WE READY TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON ALL OF THEM.

GORBACHEV VISIT

- TELL GENERAL SECRETARY I VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO HIS VISIT.
- HOPE HE CAN STAY AT LEAST A WEEK.
- WOULD LIKE TO ACCOMPANY HIM FOR PART OF HIS TRAVEL.
- WANT TO HEAR HIS DESIRES.

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1986

for THE PRESIDENT of \_\_\_\_\_ :  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

George P. Shultz  
Donald T. Regan  
John M. Poindexter  
Rozanne L. Ridgway  
Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Anatoly Dobrynin  
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Oleg Sokolov

**MEETING LOCATION**

Building WEST WING Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK

Room No. OVAL OFFICE Room No. 368 Telephone X5112

Time of Meeting 9:45 a.m. Date of request April 7, 1986


Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD R. FORTIER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Coleman

Attached at Tab I is a draft response to a letter from Congressman Coleman which suggested that Kansas City would be an excellent site for Gorbachev to visit during his planned visit to the U.S. this year. We advise the Congressman that we cannot make firm plans for Gorbachev until dates for a summit have been decided, but will forward his suggestion to the office responsible for the logistics of the visit.

Steve Sestanovich and Judy Mandel concur. 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Congressman Coleman and forward a copy to Bill Henkel's office.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Congressman Coleman  
Tab II Letter from Congressman Coleman

S.P.  
JH-C  
31



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Tom:

Thank you for your letter of February 26 concerning the possibility of General Secretary Gorbachev's visiting Kansas City during his trip to the United States this year. There is no doubt that the Kansas City region's combination of agricultural and industrial enterprises makes it an attractive site for such a visit.

Since we have not received a response from the Soviets regarding specific dates for a Gorbachev visit, we are not yet in a position to make firm plans. As we discussed on the phone, I have forwarded a copy of your letter to the office responsible for the logistics of the visit, and I will want to ensure that your suggestion will receive every consideration.

Again, many thanks for contacting me.

Sincerely,

The Honorable E. Thomas Coleman  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

E. THOMAS COLEMAN  
16TH DISTRICT, MISSOURI

COMMITTEE:  
AGRICULTURE

SUBCOMMITTEE:  
CONSERVATION, CREDIT, AND RURAL  
DEVELOPMENT, RANKING,  
DOMESTIC MARKETING, CONSUMER  
RELATIONS, AND NUTRITION

EDUCATION AND LABOR

SUBCOMMITTEE:  
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, RANKING,  
SELECT EDUCATION,  
HUMAN RESOURCES,  
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515  
February 26, 1986

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
2744 FAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515  
(202) 226-704

DISTRICT OFFICE  
5950 NORTH OAK TRAFFICWAY  
KANSAS CITY, MO 64116  
(816) 454-7117

POST OFFICE AND FEDERAL BUILDING  
8TH AND EDMOND  
ST. JOSEPH, MO 64501  
(816) 364-3501

2743

Mr. Donald R. Fortier  
Deputy Assistant to the President on  
National Security Affairs  
Executive Office of the President  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Don:

Pursuant of our conversation I wanted to outline some of the activities and points of interest that make Kansas City an appropriate stop for Secretary Gorbachev during his visit to the United States.

Kansas City is the hub of the most productive agriculture region in the nation. As such, it is the home of the Kansas City Board of Trade and many agribusinesses, including Farmland Industries, the nation's largest agriculture cooperative. Obviously there could be a tour of nearby farming and cattle operations.

Kansas City is also the nation's second largest automobile assembly area. Both Ford and General Motors have assembly operations in Kansas City. I believe both plants would be of interest to Secretary Gorbachev; the Ford plant is in my district and I know the management and employees there would appreciate the opportunity to show him this modern world-class facility. President Reagan visited the plant last year because of its labor-management team work.

The University of Missouri at Kansas City has had a professorial exchange with Moscow State University for several years. It is my impression that it has been very successful.

For many years, Kansas City has had a number of prominent organizations and citizens who have been active in foreign affairs. The Council on Foreign Affairs is a group of prominent Kansas Citians that has long been involved in international political and trade issues. Kansas City also has a Foreign Trade Zone. The Midwest Research Institute, a Kansas City think-tank, has an international reputation as a consultant on scientific and management matters.

Mr. Fortier  
February 26, 1986  
Page Two

I should also add that Kansas City is experiencing a period of phenomenal growth and construction in its central business district. Crown Center, developed by the Hall family, is a world-class shopping and office facility. In nearby Independence, the Truman Library, family home and grave are only a few minutes from downtown.

Obviously I could list many additional reasons that Kansas City would show Secretary Gorbachev the Midwest at its best. I'd like to pursue the invitation further with you soon.

Sincerely,



E. THOMAS COLEMAN  
Member of Congress

ETC:dln

2744

*Mellor 41*  
*✓ JM-C*  
*FILE*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

*Carol Cleveland  
for Cleveland*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Letter on U.S.-Soviet Trade

We have reviewed and concur with the draft response at Tab A, with changes as noted in the text, to a letter for the President from Mr. Rich Walker.

Attachments:

- Tab A Suggested response from Presidential Correspondence
- Tab B Draft reply from State
- Tab C Tasking from Sally Kelley to State
- Tab D Letter from Rich Walker

42

TAB

A

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1986

Dear Mr. Walker:

On behalf of President Reagan, thank you for your message expressing your views on loans to and trade with the Soviet Union.

U.S. Government credits to the Soviet Union are <sup>controlled</sup> prohibited by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, <sup>legal restriction,</sup> This which prohibits credits to any country which does not permit free emigration <sup>to</sup> its people. ~~An~~ In addition, the Johnson Debt Default Act, prohibits private U.S. banks from granting loans to countries which have defaulted on their repayment of obligations to the United States. <sup>while</sup> This restricts certain kinds of loans to the U.S.S.R. from banks located in the U.S., ~~but~~ the Johnson Debt Default Act does not apply to funds raised entirely outside the United States by branches or subsidiaries of U.S. banks. Those branches or subsidiaries are subject to the laws of the country in which they are located.

With respect to trade with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government favors such trade as long as it is in non-strategic goods, such as grain, which are sold at commercial rates and do not involve government credits. In recent years, U.S. farmers have sold some two billion dollars yearly worth of agricultural products to the U.S.S.R. Such sales are beneficial to both the farmers themselves and to the U.S. balance of trade. The Soviet Union could purchase such grain elsewhere should the United States decline to make such sales. Moreover, the grain purchased goes primarily to animal feed as part of a Soviet government program to increase the quantity of meat available to the Soviet consumer. The Soviet system would not fall should the U.S. and other grain exporters refuse to trade with the U.S.S.R.; their citizens would simply have to make do with less meat.

<sup>to</sup> The President is proud of the steps his Administration has taken to strengthen the position of the United States in the world, and to combat Soviet imperialism. The liberation of Grenada, ongoing measures to aid the freedom fighters in Afghanistan and current efforts to gain approval in Congress for assistance to the pro-democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua and Angola are but a few examples.

The President has also made tremendous progress in his program to repair the neglect of U.S. military preparedness that occurred in the years before he assumed office. He has pledged to do everything in his power to keep our defenses strong. As he said in a speech on October 15:

No one in a free country likes to spend money on weapons. I'd much rather see that money left in the hands of those who work for it, but as long as I'm President, I will not see our free country relegated to a position of weakness or inferiority to any other country. . . . If the United States negotiates with anyone, it must be from a position of strength.

✓ I hope you ~~have~~ find this information helpful. With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Director of Correspondence

Mr. Rich Walker  
Distrbutor  
Spanish Publications, Inc.  
724 Dromedary Drive  
Poinciana  
Kissimmee, FL 32758

2744  
45

Letter I.D.....ST.860318.8  
Writer Name.....Mr. Rich Walker  
Number of Pages.....2  
Final Reviewer.....KC  
Final Review Date...860324  
Print Date.....860325  
PARAGRAPHS SELECTED:  
P1:AVH256

NOTES:

ENCLOSURES:  
ENV/LBL.....ENVELOPE





**UNCLASSIFIED**

(Classification)

ST. 860318.8 47  
WALKER  
2744

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8602955

Date February 5, 1986

For: VADM John M. Poindexter  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Rich Walker

Date: December 15, 1985 Subject: Opposes trade

with USSR.

Referral Dated: January 30, 1986 ID# 380087  
(if any)

           The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

**UNCLASSIFIED**

(Classification)

48

Richard H. Walker  
Spanish Publications, Inc.  
724 Dromedary Drive, Poinciana  
Kissimmee, Florida

Dear Mr. Walker:

*On behalf of President Reagan,*

Thank you for your letter ~~to President Reagan of December~~  
~~15~~ expressing your views on loans to and trade with the Soviet  
Union.

U.S. Government credits to the Soviet Union are prohibited  
by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. This  
prohibits credits to any country which does not permit free  
emigration for its people. In addition, the Johnson Debt  
Default Act prohibits private U.S. banks from granting loans to  
countries which have defaulted on their repayment of  
obligations to the <sup>United States -</sup> U.S. This restricts certain kinds of loans  
to the USSR, from banks located in the U.S., but the Johnson  
Debt Default Act does not apply to funds raised entirely  
outside the <sup>United States</sup> U.S. by branches or subsidiaries of U.S. banks.  
Those branches or subsidiaries are subject to the laws of the  
country in which they are located.

With respect to trade with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Government favors such trade as long as it is in non-strategic goods, such as grain, which are sold at commercial rates and do not involve government credits. In recent years, U.S. farmers have sold some two billion dollars yearly worth of agricultural products to the USSR. Such sales are beneficial to both the farmers themselves and to the U.S. balance of trade. The Soviet Union could purchase such grain elsewhere should the U.S. decline to make such sales. Moreover, the grain purchased goes primarily to animal feed as part of a Soviet Government program to increase the quantity of meat available to the Soviet consumer. The Soviet system would not fall should the U.S. and other grain exporters refuse to trade with the USSR; their citizens would simply have to make do with less meat.

United States →

I hope this information is helpful.

With best wishes

Sincerely,

AH

Anne Higgins

and



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8602955

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE  
REFERRAL

JANUARY 30, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:  
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
ANNE HIGGINS

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 380087  
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED DECEMBER 15, 1985  
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN  
FROM: MR. RICH WALKER  
DISTRIBUTOR  
SPANISH PUBLICATIONS, INC.  
724 DROMEDARY DRIVE  
POINCIANA  
KISSIMMEE FL 32758

SUBJECT: AGAINST TRADE WITH RUSSIA

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*rec'd S/S  
1600 1/28/86  
AKK*



AF

**WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 86 11/22

Name of Correspondent:  Mr.  Mrs.  Miss  Ms. Rich Walker

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Against trade with Russia

**ROUTE TO:**

**ACTION**

**DISPOSITION**

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	<u>Co Dono</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>86 10 128</u>			<u>86 10 2106</u>
	<u>Co Hyde</u>					
	<u>✓ DOS</u>		<u>86 10 130</u>			<u>86 10 2105</u>
	<u>✓ COHIGG</u>		<u>AUH reply</u>			
			<u>86 10 207 TR</u>			<u>1 1</u>
						<u>1 1</u>
						<u>1 1</u>

**ACTION CODES:**

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

**DISPOSITION CODES:**

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.





# Spanish Publications, Inc.

380087

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PRINTING SPANISH & PORTUGUESE BIBLES  
724 DROMEDARY DRIVE, POINCIANA  
KISSIMMEE, FLORIDA 32758  
PHONE 813 427-2203

RICHARD H. WALKER  
DISTRIBUTOR

Mrs. William H. Walker  
President

December 15

Dear Pres. Reagan

I am against US banks making money off helping the Soviets, whether by trade or loans. The banks are acting as irresponsible and amoral agents to bring about our destruction. Besides, how can a bank fail when it is supported by the US government? It is US citizens that are paying for bank failures and I think it is time to stop. You had an opportunity to do just that in a bill you rejected 12/3. Why are loans to Communist countries increasing now that we have a conservative in Washington? Have you turned on your supporters? Has power gone to your head? Have the bureaucrats taken over?

Trade with the communists has only helped them and enriched some US businessmen at the expense of the security interests of the mass of honest citizens. If you fail to help your friends and continue to help our enemies our country will only fall. Do not let the peace-at-any-price crowd make you think we can change our enemy. He is determined to destroy us. He cannot change unless he renounce himself. If we were to stop dealing with the communists it is likely that their system would fall. Instead we chase the allmighty dollar and become blind to our peril.

Respectfully yours,

*Rich Walker*

Rich Walker

P.S. Merry Christmas.

I think the expression of sympathy for the dear folk who perished and GANDY was most touching. You have a great ability to get into other peoples shoes and comfort them there. God Bless you.