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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1986 (1/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1510

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8182	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET INSINUATIONS OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	4/1/1984	B1
8193	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE PROTEST OVER SOVIET INSINUATIONS OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/29/1986	B1
8183	MEMO	MEMO FROM MCNEIL RE USSR: MORE INSINUATIONS ABOUT PALME'S ASSASSINATION <i>PAR 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	3/25/1986	B1
8184	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE ALLEGED U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/17/1986	B1
8185	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: DISARRAY IN MOSCOW? <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/2/1986	B1
8186	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	4/2/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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8187	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 6/23/2010 M125/2</i>	4	4/2/1986	B1
8188	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8185 <i>R 1/11/2012 M125/2</i>	3	4/2/1986	B1
8189	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	4	4/2/1986	B1
8190	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	4	4/2/1986	B1
8191	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	4/3/1986	B1
8192	TALKING POINTS	PRESIDENT'S APRIL 8 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	4/3/1986	B1

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2582

8182

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 1, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
~~INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. ~~MATLOCK~~ ^{APR 1986}

SUBJECT: Soviet Insinuations of U.S. Responsibility for
Palme Assassination

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from the Department of State providing an update on the Soviet campaign of insinuations that the CIA was responsible for the assassination of Olof Palme. State has twice protested to the Soviet Embassy, and, as outlined in the Tab I memo, the Soviets have publicly backed off somewhat.

A more detailed look at the slander campaign, attached at Tab A, suggests the Soviets are adopting a subtler line toward the assassination, exploiting the case on behalf of their arms control proposal.

Walt ^{WR} Raymond and Peter ^{RS} Sommer concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from State

Tab A Internal State memorandum to the Acting Secretary
Tab B McDaniel to Platt memorandum of March 17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/4#8182
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11





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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 #2582


March 29, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~(WITH SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON ATTACHMENT)~~MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Protest Over Soviet Insinuations Of U.S.
Responsibility For Palme Assassination

As noted in your March 17 memorandum, the Soviets continued to make outrageous insinuations of U.S. responsibility for the Palme assassination following our March 3 protest. The March 6 piece by Valentin Zorin on Soviet television was particularly scurrilous. Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer again protested the continuation of the campaign to Soviet Charge Sokolov on March 20, citing the Zorin piece and a March 2 Izvestia article by Georigy Arbatov.

Interestingly, it now appears that our original March 3 protest and the negative Swedish reaction to the Soviet statements may have had some effect. One of the Soviet writers involved in the campaign, Chingiz Aytmatov, felt it necessary to publicly deny any intent to hint at CIA involvement in the Palme assassination. Aytmatov told the Swedish daily "Dagens Nyheter" in an interview appearing March 17 that he was "alarmed" his March 2 Pravda article had been interpreted in the Swedish press as insinuating CIA involvement in Palme's death.

As noted in the attached memorandum prepared by our Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Soviet propaganda on the Palme assassination is now taking a more subtle line, implying only that his death was the work of those who opposed his efforts on behalf of peace and disarmament.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment.
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOC-114/11 #8193
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

A

8143 5



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

March 25, 1986

~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: INR - Frank McNeill Acting

SUBJECT: USSR: More Insinuations About Palme's Assassination

Soviet media have dropped the initial implied charge that the US was involved in the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Palme, but the subtler linkage of an international conspiracy against peace and disarmament now seems to be emerging. A recent report alleging a coincidence between Palme's advocacy of Gorbachev's peace proposals and the timing of his death suggests the Soviets intend to continue exploiting the Palme case on behalf of their disarmament campaign.

* * *

Immediately after Palme's assassination Soviet media insinuated that the US was implicated in the murder. For example, TASS March 1 alleged that Palme had aroused US hostility and had long been kept under surveillance by the CIA for his opposition to the war in Vietnam. Georgiy Arbatov wrote in Izvestiya March 2 that he did not know who killed Palme but he "knew who hated him," implying a US hand in the murder.

This line of guilt by innuendo largely dropped out of central Soviet media organs after the US protest to the Soviet Embassy in Washington March 3, although Soviet commentator Valentin Zorin in a subsequent Soviet domestic TV broadcast (March 6) drew a parallel between Palme's death and those of Indira Gandhi, Aldo Moro, Omar Torrijos and others, stating that each had aroused the displeasure of Washington. (Soviet media had insinuated CIA involvement in all these deaths.)

(3), (1), (3)
FOIA(b)(1), (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
 NLR/FD-6-114/4883
 BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

There were no propaganda overtones attendant to Soviet Premier Ryzhkov's attendance at the Palme funeral. However, the media continued to carry praise of Palme as a peace activist and to imply that his death was the work of those who were against his activities on behalf of disarmament and peace. In his eulogy Arbatov had noted that Palme's last thoughts were focused on the USSR's new disarmament proposals, and Soviet press spokesman Lomeyko March 14 observed that he had championed a world without nuclear weapons and supported a ban on nuclear testing.

On March 4, USIA sent a worldwide cable to the field asking for reports on any media items or enquiries regarding a US/CIA role in Olof Palme's death. Several posts responded, mostly with replays of the TASS item appearing in the local communist party organ. USIA guidance to posts was that they should not even dignify the charge of US involvement in the Palme murder with a comment. This was essentially the same tack taken by the Department spokesman.

While the US demarche may have put to rest the initial innuendos, we can expect to see more of this subtler, less direct linkage of an international conspiracy against disarmament and peace, with the implication that the US stands in the background.

Drafted: INR/SEE: IKulski: INR/IC: SRapoport
3/24/86 x9212



8184

8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1972

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8608755

ACTION: EUR

March 17, 1986

COPIES:

S
D
P CONFIDENTIAL

S/S MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
S/S-S Executive Secretary
TMA Department of State
S/S-S-SL

RF:vhd SUBJECT: Alleged U.S. Responsibility for Palme
Assassination (U)

V BD

Soviet television on March 6 carried outrageous charges alleging possible U.S. responsibility in the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. We are very pleased that the charges were strongly protested to Soviet Charge Sokolov by the Department. In addition, the Department may wish to consider a further protest during Secretary Shultz's March 15 meeting with Nikolay Ryzhkov. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8184

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

Received in 5/3-1
3/17/86 - 11:10 P.M.

ngp

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 2, 1986

9
Mallock
FILEACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request to Travel to Tokyo to Attend Economic Summit May 1 - 7, 1986

I have been invited to participate in the bilateral talks at the Economic Summit in Tokyo, Japan starting May 3 - 7, 1986.

Travel and accommodation expenses will be covered by the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve *4-10*Disapprove

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: April 2, 1986

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Jack F. Matlock

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To participate in bilaterals at the Economic Summit in Tokyo, Japan on March 3-7, 1986

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): WASHINGTON/TOKYO/WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE DATE May 1, 1986 RETURN DATE May 7, 1986
TIME _____ TIME _____

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
CLIPPER CLASS TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____ TOTAL TRIP COST _____

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Jack F. Matlock

13. APPROVALS: X [Signature]

July 11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Invitation from the United Nations Association

I have been invited to speak at an April 5 dinner here in Washington in connection with a joint conference on security and arms control issues sponsored by the United Nations Associations of the United States and the USSR.

I will send over my proposed talking points when I return from Austin on Friday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my speaking at the UNA dinner.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I UNA Invitation



- Elliot L. Richardson
- Orville L. Freeman
- Cyrus R. Vance
- Ruth J. Hinerfeld
Past President, League of Women Voters, USA
- Harry W. Knight
Chairman, Hillsboro Associates, Inc.
- Estelle Linzer
Southern New York State Division, UNA
- Jean Picker
US Representative, UN Commission for Social Development (1969-1977)
- Richard J. Schmeelk
Managing Director & Member of the Executive Committee
Salomon Brothers Inc
- Brent Scowcroft
Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
- Secretary
William J. vanden Heuvel
Partner—Stroock & Stroock & Lavan
- Treasurer
John R. Petty
Chairman, Marine Midland Bank, N.A.
- Chairman, Finance & Budget Committee
Ivan Selin
Chairman, American Management Systems, Inc.
- Chairman, Economic Policy Council
Robert O. Anderson
Chairman, Atlantic Richfield Company
- Chairman, Policy Studies Committee
Robert V. Roosa
Partner—Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.
- Chairman, East Asian Program
William W. Scranton
- Chairman, Soviet Far East Studies Program
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Former Deputy Secretary of State
- Chairman, Advisory Group
Multilateral Issues & Institutional Framework
Matthew Nimetz
Former Under-Secretary of State
- Chairman, WFTUNA Committee
Christopher H. Phillips
President, The National Council for US-China Trade
- Governor
Jean Benjamin
Past President, Great Neck Chapter, UNA
- John C. Bierwirth
Chairman, Grumman Corporation
- Sybil Craig
Past President, Rochester Chapter, UNA
- Arthur T. Downey
Partner—Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan
- Ann Fouts
Chairperson, Steering Committee
Council of Chapter & Division Presidents
- Mary Hall
Past President, Greater St. Louis Chapter, UNA
- Armand Hammer
Chairman, Occidental Petroleum Corporation
- Jerome Jacobson
President, Economic Studies, Inc.
- Wilbert J. LeMelle
President, Mercy College
- Leo Nevas
Nevas, Nevas & Rubin
- William S. Norman
Executive Vice President—Marketing & Business Development, National Railroad Passenger Corp.
- Evelyn M. Pickarts
Past President, Pasadena Chapter, UNA
- Arthur Ross
Vice Chairman,
Central National—Gottesman, Inc.
- Rabbi Alexander Schindler
President, Union of American Hebrew Congregations
- Edith B. Segall
Chairman, Conference of UN Representatives
- Sam F. Segnar
Chairman & CEO, HNG/InterNorth
- Jacob Sheinkman
Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution
- Michael Witunski
President, James S. McDonnell Foundation

United Nations Association of the United States of America

300 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017

212•697•3232

Cable: UNASAMER

National Chairman, UN Dec. 297
 (by appointment of
 the President of the U.S.A.)
 Peter H. Dailey, President
 World Business Council

Edward C. Luck

Robert S. Benjamin
1909-1979

James S. McDonnell
1899-1980

Honorary Chairman
Arthur J. Goldberg

March 17, 1986

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
 Special Assistant to the President and
 Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs
 National Security Council
 Old Executive Office Building
 17th and Pennsylvania Avenues, NW
 Washington, DC 20223

Dear Jack,

Thanks for once again agreeing to brief UNA's Parallel Studies Program with the Soviet Union on Thursday, March 27th from 11:00am to 11:45am. The US panel will be chaired by Walt Stoessel and, in a departure for UNA, will include some Congressional representation. We will be meeting with an exceptionally high-level group of Soviets-- as you can see from the enclosed list. I think there are many unanswered questions on both sides about future policy and I am glad UNA can serve a useful function in clarifying points of view on either side.

It is really wonderful of you to agree to speak to the dinner in honor of both the US and Soviet delegations on Saturday, April 5th, at the Sheraton Grand Hotel (525 NJ Avenue, NW). We will begin at 7:00pm with cocktails in the Montpelier Room and serve dinner at 7:45pm. The evening should be over by 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock at the latest. I hope that Mrs. Matlock will be able to joint us-- Charles has promised to try as well!

You can make what you want of the occasion. Obviously, we would like your comments to be a "major policy address" on US-Soviet relations, but given the state of bilateral relations, I am sure whatever you say will be analyzed very carefully by the Soviets. Our agenda is primarily arms

Peggy Sanford Carlin

Toby Trister Gati

Sylvia Ann Hewlett


Louis J. Provenzale

Stanley Raisen

14
control and security issues although a small group from our economics subpanel will be meeting with Dr. Martynov on global economic issues as well.

If you have any questions about either the briefing or the dinner, please call.

Sincerely,



Toby Trister Gati
Vice President
for Policy Studies

15

United Nations Association of the United States of America

300 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017

212•697•3232

Cable: UNASAMER



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 Ivan Selin
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 Former Deputy Secretary of State
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 Multilateral Issues & Institutions Program
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 Sam F. Segnar
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James S. McDonnell
1899-1980

Honorary Chairman
Arthur J. Goldberg

National Chairman
Peter H. Dailey, President
World Business Council

Preliminary

A M E R I C A N P A R T I C I P A N T S

IN

THE JOINT MEETING

BETWEEN

UNA-USA AND THE SOVIET UNA

ON

SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

April 4 - 6, 1986
Sheraton Grand Hotel
Washington, DC

CHAIRMAN

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Formerly, Deputy Secretary of State
and Ambassador to
the USSR, Poland, and
the Federal Republic of Germany

Special Vice President
Peggy Sanford Carlin

Vice President
Toby Trister Gati

Vice President
Sylvia Ann Hewlett

Vice President
Louis J. Provenzale

Director
Special Event
Stanley Raisen



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WILLIAM BEECHER
Diplomatic Correspondent
The Boston Globe

BARRY E. CARTER
Associate Professor of Law
Georgetown University School of Law

NORMAN D. DICKS
Democrat - Washington State
US House of Representatives

ORVILLE FREEMAN
Chairman, UNA-USA
Board of Governors

TOBY TRISTER GATI
Vice President
for Policy Studies
UNA-USA

EDWARD C. LUCK
President
UNA-USA

GERALD E. MILLER
Vice Admiral (retired)
United States Navy

STEPHEN MEYER
Associate Professor of
Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

JOSEPH NYE
Professor of Government
JFK School of Government
Harvard University

STANLEY RESOR
Partner
Debevoise & Plimpton

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Chairman of the Association
UNA-USA

OLIN C. ROBISON
President and
Professor of Political Science
Middlebury College

BRENT SCOWCROFT
Lieutenant General (retired)
United States Air Force

HELMUT SONNENFELDT
Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution

JAMES WOOLSEY
Partner
Shea & Gardner

17

S O V I E T P A R T I C I P A N T S
IN
THE JOINT MEETING
BETWEEN
UNA-USA AND THE SOVIET UNA
ON
SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

April 4-6, 1986
Sheraton Grand Hotel
Washington, DC

CHAIRMAN

ACADEMICIAN GEORGY A. ARBATOV
President, UNA-USSR
Director
Institute on US and Canadian Studies
Academician, USSR Academy of Sciences

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GUELYI BATENIN	-General, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
EVGENY GRIGORIEV	-Department Editor-in-Chief <u>Pravda</u>
VITALY I. KOBYSH	-Sector Chief (US Policy) International Information Department Central Committee, CPSU
VLADIMIR LUKIN	-Head of Department Institute on US and Canadian Studies USSR Academy of Sciences
VLADLEN MARTYNOV	-Deputy Director Institute on World Economy and International Relations
MIRA PETROVSKAYA	-Senior Scientific Researcher Institute of US and Canadian Studies USSR Academy of Sciences
KARINA POGOSOVA	-Senior Staff Member UNA-USSR
ROALD Z. SAGDEEV	-Director Institute of Space Research Academician, USSR Academy of Sciences
GEORGY SHAKHNAZAROV	-President Soviet Association of Political Science Institute of State and Law USSR Academy of Sciences
YURI K. SHIYAN	-Executive Secretary Committee on Disarmament and Security USSR Academy of Sciences
VLADIMIR V. SHUSTOV	-Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN
NIKOLAI SHISHLIN	-Head of Section Propaganda Department Central Committee, CPSU
GENRIKH A. TROFIMENKO	-Chief, Foreign Policy Department Institute on US and Canadian Studies USSR Academy of Sciences
ALEKSEI VASILIEV	-Head of Section Institute of US and Canadian Studies USSR Academy of Sciences
VITALY V. ZHURKIN	-Deputy Director Institute of US and Canadian Studies USSR Academy of Sciences

P R O P O S E D A G E N D A

J O I N T M E E T I N G

U N A - U S A A N D T H E S O V I E T U N A S S O C I A T I O N

Washington, DC
April 4-6, 1986

1. US-Soviet Political Relationship after the Geneva Summit-- Results and Perspectives.

- 2 . Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Proposed Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Steps Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban and the Establishment of Nuclear-Free Zones.

4. Chemical Weapons.

5. Conventional Weapons: Force Reduction in Europe and the Stockholm Conference.

6. Strengthening the United Nations in the International Year of Peace.

~~Matlock~~

20

2650
7-FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Invitation from the United Nations Association

I have been invited to speak at an April 5 dinner here in Washington in connection with a joint conference on security and arms control issues sponsored by the United Nations Associations of the United States and the USSR.

I will send over my proposed talking points when I return from Austin on Friday.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my speaking at the UNA dinner.

Approve *JM 4-3*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I UNA Invitation

21
United Nations Association of the United States of America

300 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017

212•697•3232

Cable: UNASAMEI

Elliot L. Richards:

Orville L. Freeman:

Cyrus P. Vance

Ruth J. Hinertic
Past President, League of Women Voters, USA

Harry W. Knight
Chairman, Hillsboro Associates, Inc

Estelle Linzer
Southern New York State Division, UNA

Jean Picker
US Representative, UN Commission
for Social Development (1969-1977)

Richard J. Schmeelk
Managing Director & Member of the
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Chairman, American Management Systems, Inc

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Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Former Deputy Secretary of State

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President, Union of American Hebrew
Congregations

Edith B. Segall
Chairman, Conference of UN Representatives

Sam F. Segnar
Chairman & CEO, HNG/InterNorth

Jacob Sheinkman
Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO

Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution

Michael Witonski
President, James S. McDonnell Foundation

Edward C. Luck

Robert S. Beniamin
1909-1979

James S. McDonnell
1899-1981

Arthur J. Goldberg

Peter H. Dainoff, President
World Business Council

March 17, 1986

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenues, NW
Washington, DC 20223

Dear Jack,

Thanks for once again agreeing to brief UNA's Parallel Studies Program with the Soviet Union on Thursday, March 27th from 11:00am to 11:45am. The US panel will be chaired by Walt Stoessel and, in a departure for UNA, will include some Congressional representation. We will be meeting with an exceptionally high-level group of Soviets-- as you can see from the enclosed list. I think there are many unanswered questions on both sides about future policy and I am glad UNA can serve a useful function in clarifying points of view on either side.

It is really wonderful of you to agree to speak to the dinner in honor of both the US and Soviet delegations on Saturday, April 5th, at the Sheraton Grand Hotel (525 NJ Avenue, NW). We will begin at 7:00pm with cocktails in the Montpelier Room and serve dinner at 7:45pm. The evening should be over by 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock at the latest. I hope that Mrs. Matlock will be able to join us-- Charles has promised to try as well!

You can make what you want of the occasion. Obviously, we would like your comments to be a "major policy address" on US-Soviet relations, but given the state of bilateral relations, I am sure whatever you say will be analyzed very carefully by the Soviets. Our agenda is primarily arms

Peggy Sanford Carter

Totiv Trister-Gat

Sylvia Ann Hewlett

Louis J. Provenza


Stanley...

22

control and security issues although a small group from our economics subpanel will be meeting with Dr. Martynov on global economic issues as well.

If you have any questions about either the briefing or the dinner, please call.

Sincerely,



Toby Trister Gati
Vice President
for Policy Studies

23

United Nations Association of the United States of America

300 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017

212•697•3232

Cable: UNASAMEI

Eliot L. Richardson

Orville L. Freeman

Cyrus R. Vance

Ruth J. Hinertfeld
Past President, League of Women Voters, USA

Harry W. Knight
Chairman, Hillisboro Associates, Inc.

Estelle Linzer
Southern New York State Division, UNA

Jean Picker
US Representative, UN Commission
for Social Development (1969-1977)

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Peter H. Dailey President
World Business Council

Preliminary

A M E R I C A N P A R T I C I P A N T S

IN

THE JOINT MEETING

BETWEEN

UNA-USA AND THE SOVIET UNA

ON

SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

April 4 - 6, 1986
Sheraton Grand Hotel
Washington, DC

CHAIRMAN

WALTER J. STOESEL, JR.
Formerly, Deputy Secretary of State
and Ambassador to
the USSR, Poland, and
the Federal Republic of Germany

Peggy Sanford Carlin

Toby Trister Gat

Sylvia Ann Hewlett

Louis J. Provenza

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The Boston Globe

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United States Air Force

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Vice Admiral (retired)
United States Navy

HELMUT SONNENFELDT
Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution

JAMES WOOLSEY
Partner
Shea & Gardner

25

S O V I E T P A R T I C I P A N T S
IN
THE JOINT MEETING
BETWEEN
UNA-USA AND THE SOVIET UNA
ON
SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

April 4-6, 1986
Sheraton Grand Hotel
Washington, DC

CHAIRMAN

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President, UNA-USSR
Director
Institute on US and Canadian Studies
Academician, USSR Academy of Sciences

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USSR Academy of Sciences

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Permanent Mission of the USSR to the U

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Institute of US and Canadian Studies
USSR Academy of Sciences

VITALY V. ZHURKIN -Deputy Director
Institute of US and Canadian Studies
USSR Academy of Sciences

P R O P O S E D A G E N D A

JOINT MEETING

UNA-USA AND THE SOVIET UN ASSOCIATION

Washington, DC
April 4-6, 1986

1. US-Soviet Political Relationship after the Geneva Summit-- Results and Perspectives.
- 2 . Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Proposed Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
3. Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Steps Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban and the Establishment of Nuclear-Free Zones.
4. Chemical Weapons.
5. Conventional Weapons: Force Reduction in Europe and the Stockholm Conference.
6. Strengthening the United Nations in the International Year of Peace.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Outside the System 28
Disarray in 4/19/62

PRESERVATION COPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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US-Sov
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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

April 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Disarray in Moscow?

Recent Soviet behavior can be interpreted broadly in two ways. Assertive Soviet behavior in regional conflicts, the heavy ideological tone of Gorbachev's Party Congress report, the clearly propagandistic nature of Soviet arms control proposals and the apparent attempt to extract substantive concessions in exchange for agreeing to a summit date are read by some as a sign that Gorbachev is not serious in reaching any accommodation with the United States, but rather is determined to test our resolve and to play to the "peace" galleries in the West in order to strain our alliances and bring pressure to bear for unilateral concessions.

The alternate interpretation is that Gorbachev in fact sees it in his interest to lower tensions with the United States, but is constrained by internal divisions and major opposition to changes of policy and furthermore misled by faulty political advice regarding the most effective tactics in dealing with the United States. The current Soviet stance, according to this interpretation, does not signify that Gorbachev has set out to challenge the United States, but rather that he must maintain the image of standing up to U.S. pressure to change long-standing Soviet policies. Those inclined to this interpretation see signs that he may be subject to criticism for returning from Geneva empty-handed, and simply cannot risk another summit without some concrete results. This interpretation, of course, does not deny the obvious fact that Soviet actions have been heavily influenced by propagandistic considerations, but would hold that these are not inconsistent in Soviet eyes with a genuine effort to reduce tensions.

After careful reflection on the events since the Geneva Summit, I am convinced that the second interpretation is closer to reality than the first. It would take an extended essay to describe all the reasons which led me to this conviction, but the key factors are the following:

1. Evidence of disarray at the Party Congress: no consistent line, directly contradictory elements -- even in the "Central

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Declassify on: OADR

BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12

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Committee report" read by Gorbachev -- and striking differences in approach by some of the speakers.

2. Retention of persons Gorbachev clearly wished to remove.
3. Contradictions in the Five-Year Plan.
4. A slowdown (and in some cases a total stalling) of some of the "campaigns" and "reforms" proposed by Gorbachev.
5. Accumulating evidence that the military is not enthusiastic about accommodation with the U.S.: lukewarm treatment of Geneva summit in the military press; behavior of military representatives in the various negotiations (introducing elements which political representatives had agreed to change).

In sum, Gorbachev seems not to have his act together yet. Furthermore, he has made some mistakes which open him to criticism. For example, in espousing the nuclear testing moratorium, he can be accused of failure to achieve anything. Not only has the U.S. not gone along, but it has not had the propaganda effect anticipated. (It is probably not accidental that he made his speech last Saturday on Soviet TV. It was in part aimed at peace movements in the West, but more importantly it was aimed at a Soviet audience, and was meant to explain his failure and to cast the U.S. as the guilty party. There was an unmistakable note of defensiveness in the Russian text.)

He also is possibly accused of agreeing too readily to a pattern of future summit meetings. The argument likely used is that the President uses the meetings to obtain backing for his policies at home, and that Gorbachev -- inexperienced in national security affairs -- fell into a trap. Both elements of the military and the old guard political leadership -- the latter now fighting for its life -- probably resorts to such arguments.

Even if this second interpretation is correct, it does not mean that we should change any policies. In my opinion, we are exactly on the right track. We must demonstrate firmness and continuity. However, if we are to put Gorbachev's intentions and political clout to a valid test, we should do two things: (1) convey clearly to him what sort of substantive outcome we consider possible at the next summit (and perhaps the one after that); and (2) avoid gratuitous public slaps.

Regarding the second point, I would observe that such moves as supplying stingers to the mujahedin can be most useful. Talking about it, however, can be counterproductive. The same goes for drawing public attention to programs like stealth. The leverage is in the action itself. Public threats (even in the form of leaked stories) simply pushes the Soviet leadership into a corner. The thing they are unable to tolerate is public humiliation. Under such circumstances, their habit is to stand pat and become demonstrably truculent.

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It is of course a tall order to attempt to bring pressure to bear quietly, given our inability to control leaks and the need to go public on a number of issues in order to garner support. However, we need to do better on this score if we are to maximize pressure and the prospects for successful negotiation.

One final note regarding Soviet (and Russian) psychology: As I have pointed out in previous papers, Russians tend to proceed deductively in their reasoning and approach to negotiations. This is in contrast to the normal American inductive approach. Concretely, what this means is that they have a psychological need to be assured in advance where we are headed, before they will address the concrete steps necessary to get there. They are quite capable of proceeding step by step -- but only if they are convinced that there is a real prospect of agreement at the end of the process.

Although we cannot and should not interpret recent Soviet actions as benign, it seems clear to me that there is some measure of a genuine element in the repeated Soviet requests to define what we wish to achieve at future summit meetings. In effect, they are asking: "Is the President willing to conclude major agreements at all, or is he simply diddling us with negotiations to hold domestic forces at bay?"

In sum, my judgment is that the greatest tactical risk at present is not that our actions can be interpreted by the Soviets as showing insufficient resolve (I think they are fully convinced on this score), but that they may draw the conclusion that concrete negotiation is futile. Therefore, I believe that some steps to provide reassurance that the President has a real desire to enter into major arms reduction agreements could be helpful. I believe this can be done without in any way damaging our substantive positions.

Recommendations:

1. That the President stress to Dobrynin his desire to conclude concrete agreements on key issues, and sketch out a plan of what he would like to achieve. He should make clear that optimally, he would like to see a resolution of the key issues of the NST talks and appropriate treaties signed and ratified during his administration. (Note: he can make reference to some of the suggestions in his private correspondence.)
2. That we make another effort to establish more private means of communication. Dobrynin's new appointment may facilitate this, since he may now be a key player in Moscow and not just a messenger here. His appointment could provide the Soviets with an appropriate counterpart in Moscow for dealing with (for example) Paul Nitze in a very quiet way.
3. That we take concrete steps to compartmentalize very restrictively any confidential consultations, so as to preclude any risk of leaks.

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4/2/86

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government.
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in U.S.-Soviet relationship.
- We do not see improvement up to now.
- Soviet actions in support of Qadhafi add extra burden.
- Must address seriously.
- If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.
- Best to reach settlements which avoid Soviet and U.S. military involvement.
- Afghanistan good place to start - but progress in any will be welcome.

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NLRR 108-125/2 #8186

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

Jack,
I think these are fine.
8186 32
[Signature]

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Second example: U.S. efforts to make progress on nuclear testing ignored or just turned aside. We cannot respond positively to one-sided demands.
- If we are to solve these issues we must negotiate in good faith.

-- *It is important that we make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.*

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive progress. However, beginning to wonder if Mr. Gorbachev does. Strange tactics on his part.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve, since Soviet response to U.S. proposals slow and disappointing. However, can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.

-- Optimum Goals:

- a - Agreement in 1986 on the key elements of a treaty to reduce strategic weapons by 50%, to eliminate any first-strike potential on either side and to prevent basing weapons of mass destruction in space.
- b - Agreement for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles - with stages of reduction if necessary.
- c - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and a commitment to pursue further limitations on testing - with an ultimate goal of banning all tests.
- d - Progress in bringing peace to some of the regions now torn by conflict.
- e - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit a major expansion of trade and cooperation.

~~SECRET~~

- These are optimum goals, but I believe they are not unrealistic if we both get down to work now and stop jockeying for propaganda points.
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
- Minimal Goals
 - A meeting would be most useful even if we are not able to achieve the optimum goals.
 - Substantial progress in any one of these areas would be a worthwhile achievement.
 - There are also other important areas: agreement on a chemical weapons ban, agreement on an approach to reducing conventional forces in Central Europe, agreement on more effective confidence-building measures.
 - We are willing to work constructively on all of them.

COMMUNICATION

- Playing to the public galleries harms the negotiation process.
- U.S. wants serious negotiations.
- Secretary Shultz can go over our ideas in more detail when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze accepts our invitation for a meeting.
- Willing to designate Paul Nitze ^{and Jack Matlock} to work privately with whomever Mr. Gorbachev wants to designate.
- But we must get on with it.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell the General Secretary I am very much looking forward to his visit.
- I hope he will be able to stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- I would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- But we want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

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- Best to reach settlements which avoid Soviet and U.S. military involvement.

Leavel as in

-- Afghanistan good place to start - *no desire by US to keep Afghanistan*
~~be welcome. a "bleeding wound."~~ *but progress in any will*

- *Unfortunately, Soviet actions and pressure on Pakistan belie calls for*

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NLRR M08-125/2 #8187

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

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40

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

April 2, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Disarray in Moscow?

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/1/12

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4. A slowdown (and in some cases a total stalling) of some of the "campaigns" and "reforms" proposed by Gorbachev.
5. Accumulating evidence that the military is not enthusiastic about accommodation with the U.S.: lukewarm treatment of Geneva summit in the military press; behavior of military representatives in the various negotiations (introducing elements which political representatives had agreed to change).

In sum, Gorbachev seems not to have his act together yet. Furthermore, he has made some mistakes which open him to criticism. For example, in espousing the nuclear testing moratorium, he can be accused of failure to achieve anything. Not only has the U.S. not gone along, but it has not had the propaganda effect anticipated. (It is probably not accidental that he made his speech last Saturday on Soviet TV. It was in part aimed at peace movements in the West, but more importantly it was aimed at a Soviet audience, and was meant to explain his failure and to cast the U.S. as the guilty party. There was an unmistakable note of defensiveness in the Russian text.)

He also is possibly accused of agreeing too readily to a pattern of future summit meetings. The argument likely used is that the President uses the meetings to obtain backing for his policies at home, and that Gorbachev -- inexperienced in national security affairs -- fell into a trap. Both elements of the military and the old guard political leadership -- the latter now fighting for its life -- probably resorts to such arguments.

Even if this second interpretation is correct, it does not mean that we should change any policies. In my opinion, we are exactly on the right track. We must demonstrate firmness and continuity. However, if we are to put Gorbachev's intentions and political clout to a valid test, we should do two things: (1) convey clearly to him what sort of substantive outcome we consider possible at the next summit (and perhaps the one after that); and (2) avoid gratuitous public slaps.

Regarding the second point, I would observe that such moves as supplying stingers to the mujahedin can be most useful. Talking about it, however, can be counterproductive. The same goes for drawing public attention to programs like stealth. The leverage is in the action itself. Public threats (even in the form of leaked stories) simply pushes the Soviet leadership into a corner. The thing they are unable to tolerate is public humiliation. Under such circumstances, their habit is to stand pat and become demonstrably truculent.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

It is of course a tall order to attempt to bring pressure to bear quietly, given our inability to control leaks and the need to go public on a number of issues in order to garner support. However, we need to do better on this score if we are to maximize pressure and the prospects for successful negotiation.

One final note regarding Soviet (and Russian) psychology: As I have pointed out in previous papers, Russians tend to proceed deductively in their reasoning and approach to negotiations. This is in contrast to the normal American inductive approach. Concretely, what this means is that they have a psychological need to be assured in advance where we are headed, before they will address the concrete steps necessary to get there. They are quite capable of proceeding step by step -- but only if they are convinced that there is a real prospect of agreement at the end of the process.

Although we cannot and should not interpret recent Soviet actions as benign, it seems clear to me that there is some measure of a genuine element in the repeated Soviet requests to define what we wish to achieve at future summit meetings. In effect, they are asking: "Is the President willing to conclude major agreements at all, or is he simply diddling us with negotiations to hold domestic forces at bay?"

In sum, my judgment is that the greatest tactical risk at present is not that our actions can be interpreted by the Soviets as showing insufficient resolve (I think they are fully convinced on this score), but that they may draw the conclusion that concrete negotiation is futile. Therefore, I believe that some steps to provide reassurance that the President has a real desire to enter into major arms reduction agreements could be helpful. I believe this can be done without in any way damaging our substantive positions.

Recommendations:

1. That the President stress to Dobrynin his desire to conclude concrete agreements on key issues, and sketch out a plan of what he would like to achieve. He should make clear that optimally, he would like to see a resolution of the key issues of the NST talks and appropriate treaties signed and ratified during his administration. (Note: he can make reference to some of the suggestions in his private correspondence.)
2. That we make another effort to establish more private means of communication. Dobrynin's new appointment may facilitate this, since he may now be a key player in Moscow and not just a messenger here. His appointment could provide the Soviets with an appropriate counterpart in Moscow for dealing with (for example) Paul Nitze in a very quiet way.
3. That we take concrete steps to compartmentalize very restrictively any confidential consultations, so as to preclude any risk of leaks. (This may require cutting the staffs of some Departments out altogether.)

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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4/2/86

President's April 8 Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Talking Points

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made some progress, especially in bilateral areas. People-to-people exchanges have wide appeal here. Glad to see strong interest by your government. ^
- However, disappointed by overall lack of progress in key areas since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS (State)

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in U.S.-Soviet relationship.
- We do not see improvement up to now.
- Soviet actions in support of Qadhafi add extra burden.
- Must address seriously.
- [If Soviet Union takes steps to terminate military involvement, the U.S. will refrain from military involvement. If not, U.S. will have no choice but to support its friends.]
- Best to reach settlements which avoid Soviet and U.S. military involvement.
- Afghanistan good place to start - but progress in any will be welcome.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8189

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

~~SECRET~~

ARMS CONTROL

- See potential progress in some areas but frustrated by lack of Soviet response to U.S. proposals.
- Example: no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction.
- Second example: U.S. efforts to make progress on nuclear testing ignored or just turned aside. We cannot respond positively to one-sided demands.
- If we are to solve these issues we must negotiate in good faith.

It is important that we make small steps forward to build confidence. There is too much distrust on both sides to agree to grandiose proposals.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive progress. However, beginning to wonder if Mr. Gorbachev does. Strange tactics on his part.
- Cannot predict now what we will achieve, since Soviet response to U.S. proposals slow and disappointing. However, can say what I would like to achieve - and what I believe is possible if we both work for it.

-- Optimum Goals:

- a - Agreement in 1986 on the key elements of a treaty to reduce strategic weapons by 50%, to eliminate any first-strike potential on either side and to prevent basing weapons of mass destruction in space.
- b - Agreement for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles - with stages of reduction if necessary.
- c - Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and a commitment to pursue further limitations on testing - with an ultimate goal of banning all tests.
- d - Progress in bringing peace to some of the regions now torn by conflict.
- e - Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit a major expansion of trade and cooperation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- These are optimum goals, but I believe they are not unrealistic if we both get down to work now and stop jockeying for propaganda points.
- Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of Mr. Gorbachev's Jan. 15 proposal.
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for our meeting in 1987 - which in turn would make ratification possible before our 1988 election campaign.
- Minimal Goals
 - A meeting would be most useful even if we are not able to achieve the optimum goals.
 - Substantial progress in any one of these areas would be a worthwhile achievement.
 - There are also other important areas: agreement on a chemical weapons ban, agreement on an approach to reducing conventional forces in Central Europe, agreement on more effective confidence-building measures.
 - We are willing to work constructively on all of them.

COMMUNICATION

- Playing to the public galleries harms the negotiation process. *our ability to conduct confid talks.*
- U.S. wants serious negotiations.
- Secretary Shultz can go ~~over~~ our ideas in more detail when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze accepts our invitation for a meeting.
- Willing to designate Paul Nitze ^{and Jack Matlock} to work privately with whomever Mr. Gorbachev wants to designate.
- But we must get on with it.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell the General Secretary I am very much looking forward to his visit.
- I hope he will be able to stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- I would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- But we want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell the General Secretary I am very much looking forward to his visit.
- I hope he will be able to stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- I would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
- But we want to hear his desires before going further in our planning.

~~SECRET~~

Talking Points for President's 4/8 Meeting with Dobrynin

- Congratulations on your election as Secretary of Central Committee.

STATE OF RELATIONS/NEXT STEPS

- I am eager to move forward along lines agreed in Geneva.
- Have made selective progress, especially in bilateral areas. Glad to see your interest in people-to-people exchanges, which have wide appeal here. Recognize you made some steps on human rights (Shcharanskiy), but progress has stopped.
- Disappointed by overall lack of progress on key security issues since November.
- Much remains to be done in all areas.

NEXT SUMMIT

- Want substantive outcome from next summit, but cannot accept preconditions for agreement to summit date.
- Cannot predict now what can be achieved; your response to our recent proposals has been slow and disappointing. But can say what I would like to achieve -- and what seems possible if we both work for it.
- Following are optimum goals but are not unrealistic if we both get to work now:
 - a. Agreement on key elements of treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.
 - b. Agreement on key elements of INF treaty.
 - c. Agreement preventing basing of offensive weapons in space.
 - d. Agreement on* more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and commitment to pursue further limits on testing with ultimate goal of banning all tests.
 - e. Agreement on chemical weapons ban.
 - f. Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
 - g. Improvements in political atmosphere permitting major expansion of trade and cooperation.

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(ratification)
- Agreements on key elements in 1986 would make possible negotiation of treaties in time for 1987 summit.
 - Even if we cannot achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in a representative number of these areas would be worthwhile achievement.
 - Also other important goals: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
 - We are ready to work constructively on all of them.

ARMS CONTROL

- We've been negotiating at Geneva for a year. Major issues have been thoroughly discussed and principal obstacles to agreement clearly defined.
- At Geneva, General Secretary and I agreed to seek early progress. Wrote to him afterwards to suggest we set as private goal practical way of doing this.
- If we are to achieve real progress, primary issues must be resolved. Because of their importance, I believe resolution is possible only if General Secretary and I become more directly involved in their discussion.
- Possibilities should be explored away from glare of public debate.
- Accordingly, I propose that he and I designate personal representatives to initiate series of private, informal discussions of major issues separating us in Geneva.
- Purpose of process would be to cut through rhetoric and explore, without final commitment by two of us, possibilities for removing any or all obstacles to agreement.
- Results of discussions would be ad ref and could form basis for decisions by General Secretary and me.
- Am prepared to designate Ambassador Nitze as my personal representative for the discussions.
- Should General Secretary agree to this procedure, Ambassador Nitze will be prepared to meet with Soviet representative at a mutually agreeable time and place.
- Can't overemphasize importance of privacy if effort to succeed.

- Suggest you discuss this further with Secretary Shultz and that you and Ambassador Nitze get together before you depart so you'll have full picture to take back to General Secretary on how this special channel might work.

NUCLEAR TESTING

- Regret your efforts to make propaganda on nuclear testing.
- We are ready to open bilateral talks without preconditions; would encompass entire agenda of nuclear testing issues, including concerns of both sides.
- We intend to stress our priority goal of agreement on concrete verification improvements for TTBT and PNET. We will listen carefully to your position.
- See no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at next summit.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

- Soviet military involvement creates major problems in our relations. Welcome your stated desire to resolve conflicts, but thus far we do not see improvement.
- Libya flagrant example; your support of Qadhafi in denying us access to international waters raises risk of confrontation.
- Termination of military involvement will make military involvement of others unnecessary.
- Studied Gorbachev's Party Congress remarks on Afghanistan. No desire by U.S. to keep Afghanistan a "bleeding wound."
- Unfortunately, Soviet actions and pressure on Pakistan belie calls for political settlement.
- Would welcome details of Soviet withdrawal and clear statement of Soviet willingness to guarantee such a settlement.

OTHER ELEMENTS OF GORBACHEV VISIT

- Tell General Secretary I very much look forward to his visit.
- Hope he can stay at least a week. This would leave time both for substantive meetings and to see something of our country.
- Would like to accompany him for part of his travel. That way, we could have a working meeting every day we are together.
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Talking Points for President's 4/8 Meeting with Dobrynin

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 - e. Agreement on chemical weapons ban. ~~addition~~
 - f. Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.
 - g. Improvements in political atmosphere permitting major expansion of trade and cooperation.

no reference to preconditions in your draft

BY RW NARRA DATE 3/9/11
NLRP F06-1144#8192

DECLASSIFIED

State ~~to~~ drop your reference to eliminating just state potential - point a. and your follow up reference to Gorbachev's Jan 15

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- Also other important goals: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures.
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(incorporated your points listed under "communication")

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no reference to your examples of Soviet unresponsiveness and our inability to buy on to genuine proposals.

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REGIONAL CONFLICTS - *State add more detail on Afghanistan*

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