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File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (7/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1508

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8175	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8176	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8175 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8177	MEMCON	RESIDENCE OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR, STOCKHOLM SWEDEN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	10	3/15/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~Harlock~~

2189

~~File~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *RL for*
SUBJECT: Letter to Dr. Rozboril, President, Czechoslovak
National Council of America

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter to Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President, Czechoslovak National Council of America (TAB A) in response to his letter to the President (TAB B), concerning the potential influence of Soviet pressure on American television networks.

Attachments:

- Tab A Proposed Letter to Dr. Rozboril
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

2189 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8606778

Date March 13, 1986

For: VADM John M. Poindexter
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Dr. Leopold Rozboril

Date: February 13, 1986 Subject: Soviet Influence on
American Television Networks

Referral Dated: March 3, 1986 ID# 377310
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- XX A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

Boni L. Bunder
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Dr. Rozboril:

The President has asked me to respond to your letter of February 13 concerning the potential influence of Soviet pressure on American television networks.

We agree that the American people depend to a great extent on television for factual information and in forming their opinions on foreign affairs. Consequently, we too would be seriously concerned should American television networks, or any other elements of the American media, distort their programming or fail to report events objectively in response to Soviet pressure or threats of reprisals.

As private enterprises, television networks and other news organizations are guaranteed speech free of U.S. government interference by the Constitution. They are also free to enter into contracts with whomever they choose, so long as those contracts and their purposes are not inconsistent with the law. We believe these legal provisions guarantee an atmosphere in which truth and objectivity ultimately prevail.

We must rely on our own unceasing efforts to set the record

straight when we encounter biased or untrue press reports, as well as on the good sense of the American people to distinguish fact from distortion. Your group's appeals to the chairmen of the three major American television networks affirm our belief that our reliance on this process is not misplaced.

Thank you for your letter and your concern.

Sincerely,

5
8606778

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MARCH 3, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 377310

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1986

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL
PRESIDENT
CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
AMERICA
ROOM 202
2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE
CICERO IL 60650

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF
RECENT SOVIET PRESSURE ON AMERICAN TELEVISION
NETWORK

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 20, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF
RECENT SOVIET PRESSURE ON AMERICAN TELEVISION
NETWORK

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS		ORG	86/02/20	C	86 02/20
<i>PL CHAM</i>		R	86 10 20	TR	86 10 24
<i>PL KOTE</i>		R	86 02 25		1 1
<i>99 DOS</i>		D	86 03 23		1 1
					1 1
					1 1

COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____
PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

5
*Czechoslovak
National Council
of America*

L. Kozels
A non-profit organization
founded in 1918

2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE

ROOM 202

CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

TELEPHONE 656-1117

377310 1
8606778

February 13, 1986

HONORARY PRESIDENTS:
DR. MIKULAS FERJENCIK
DR. JAN PAPANEK
DR. FRANCIS SCHWARZENBERG
VLASTA VRAZ

OFFICERS:

PRESIDENT:

DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL

VICE PRESIDENTS:

STEFAN PAPANEK
DR. VLASTISLAV CHALUPA
ANNA FALTUS

SECRETARY:

VLASTA VRAZ

TREASURER:

JAMES V. KRAKORA

LEGAL COUNSEL:

DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL
Chicago, Illinois

WASHINGTON LIAISON OFFICERS:

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George Spanek

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George Sova

Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol

Jan Sopoci
John Golosinec

Czechoslovak Sokol Abroad

Vaclav Zenisek
Dagmar Fiala

National Alliance of Czech Catholics

Jaroslava Kolbaba
Rev. Vojtech Vit, O.S.B.

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mr. President:

The Czechoslovak National Council of America is seriously concerned about the potential influence of recent Soviet pressure on an American television network. Our concern is reflected in letters we sent to the chairmen of our major networks (copies enclosed).

Many television programs are biased in favor of the Soviet Union for ideological reasons. Should this bias be increased by fear of Soviet reprisals, the distortion in programming could have serious adverse effects on the support you would receive from our public opinion in your next meeting with Mr. Gorbachev.

This potential danger calls for identifying and countering attempts at misleading our citizenry. It is in the minds of Americans that our battles are won-or lost.

Czechoslovak National Council
of America

Dr. Leopold Rozboril

Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President

cc: Mr. Grant Tinker, Chairman NBC
cc: Mr. Thomas Wyman, Chairman CBS Inc.
cc: Mr. Thomas S. Murphy, Chairman ABC Inc.

8

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CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

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Vaclav Zenisek
Dagmar Fiala

National Alliance of Czech Catholics

Jaroslava Kolbaba
Rev. Vojtech Vit, O.S.B.

Mr. Grant Tinker, Chairman
National Broadcasting Company
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10112

Dear Mr. Tinker:

Later during this year, Mr. Gorbachev will visit the United States to meet our President. The outcome of this meeting will depend, to a large extent, on the climate of public opinion in our country.

The public forms its opinion on the basis of its knowledge of foreign affairs, and it draws this knowledge mainly from television reporting, commentaries and programming.

We as spokesmen for Americans of Czechoslovak origin were therefore alarmed by the pressure brought by the Soviet government on ABC in the matter of selection of its programs. The pressure has not reached its objective in this particular instance. Nevertheless, we are concerned about indirect and invisible consequences of the Soviet threat, namely, that our television networks might impose on themselves a sort of self-censorship to avoid reprisals by the Soviet Union. A result of such a self-imposed censorship would be the avoidance of reporting unpleasant facts about Soviet domestic and foreign policies, the soft-peddling of criticism and ultimately a distorted education of the American public about the problems we as a country face.

We therefore appeal to you, Mr. Tinker, in your capacity as chairman of NBC to protect the integrity of NBC programming in all respects regardless of any outside pressure exerted on your corporation.

Sincerely,
Czechoslovak National Council
of America



Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President

9

Czechoslovak National Council of America

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founded in 1918

2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE

ROOM 202

CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

TELEPHONE 656-1117

February 13, 1986

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DR. FRANCIS SCHWARZENBERG
VLASTA VRAZ

OFFICERS:

PRESIDENT:

DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL

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National Alliance of Czech Catholics

Jaroslava Kolbaba
Rev. Vojtech Vit, O.S.B.

Mr. Thomas Wyman, Chairman
CBS Inc.
51 West 52nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10019

Dear Mr. Wyman:

Later during this year, Mr. Gorbachev will visit the United States to meet our President. The outcome of this meeting will depend, to a large extent, on the climate of public opinion in our country.


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We therefore appeal to you, Mr. Wyman, in your capacity as chairman of CBS to protect the integrity of CBS programming in all respects regardless of any outside pressure exerted on your corporation.

Sincerely,

Czechoslovak National Council
of America



Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President

10

Czechoslovak National Council of America

A non-profit organization
founded in 1918

2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE

ROOM 202

CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

TELEPHONE 656-1117

February 13, 1986

HONORARY PRESIDENTS:
DR. MIKULAS FERJENCIK
DR. JAN PAPANEK
DR. FRANCIS SCHWARZENBERG
VLASTA VRAZ

Mr. Thomas S. Murphy, Chairman
Capital Cities/ ABC Inc
24 East 51st Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

OFFICERS:

PRESIDENT:

DR. LEOPOLD ROZBORIL

VICE PRESIDENTS:

STEFAN PAPANEK
DR. VLASTISLAV CHALUPA
ANNA FALTUS

SECRETARY:

VLASTA VRAZ

TREASURER:

JAMES V. KRAKORA

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We therefore appeal to you, Mr. Murphy, in your capacity as chairman of ABC to protect the integrity of ABC programming in all respects regardless of any outside pressure exerted on your corporation.

Sincerely,
Czechoslovak National Council
of America


Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President

The American Bulletin

PUBLISHED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICA

A non-profit organization of Americans of Czech and Slovak descent
founded in 1918

2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE — ROOM 202
CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

January 1986 — No. 344

436

ON THE BATTLEFIELD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

For the past year the United States has not contributed to UNESCO. There has been a long bitter struggle within the organization under Director — General Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow of Africa. The purpose of UNESCO was often forgotten as M'Bow politicized aid to nations of the Third World; his policies were moving far from our Western concept. One of the controversial areas involved communications and the "New World Information Order" toward training and sharing technology programs which threatened press freedom. ("UNESCO in Transition," Michael J. Berlin, *The Interdependent*, published by the United Nations Association, Nov.-Dec. 1985). There were many disagreements who should receive help and for what purposes. The United States had been paying 25 percent of the budget and since much of the money was misspent, in our opinion, the United States finally fulfilled its threat by withdrawing from UNESCO until such time as there would be an improvement in planning and administration. This can hardly be expected under the present directorship of M'Bow. A year later, Britain followed Washington's example.

In October and November the agency's 23rd General Conference was held in Sofia, Bulgaria. The West proposed many reforms and most were approved by the 50 members of the Executive Board. The budget for 1986 and 1987, set originally at \$200 million each year, had to be trimmed by the 25 percent the United States has withheld.

It is believed that the United States lesson is taking effect. UNESCO is improving, writes Berlin, and it is unlikely that other Western nations will leave UNESCO. This has been a dangerous threat, however, and the pendulum may swing back again; so long as M'Bow is at the helm, it is doubtful that the United States or Britain will return.

NICARAGUA INDIANS AT UN

At the fourth session of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Nicaragua was accused of practicing "repressive and assimilative policies" against the Indian people of Nicaragua, the Miskito, Sumo and Rama.

"The intention of the Sandinista government is to control the Indian peoples, their lands and their resources... The Sandinista have transferred our land and resources to state ownership and in the six years of the revolution have failed to recognize even one single principle of Indian rights" ("Misurasata Leader's U.N. Statement Poignant," *Americans before Columbus*, published by the National Youth Council, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1985). The writer Brooklyn Rivera

states that the Indians have never lost their inherent sovereignty by treaty, conquest, consent or vote, or by occupation and settlement of their lands.

"Due to misinformation, I must clarify that our armed resistance came before the fighting by others known as counterrevolutionaries, or contras. Moreover, our struggle has nothing to do with the interests of the contras or of the external forces of aggression. Our legitimate resistance is human and ethnic, developed within our own traditional territory by the Indian patriots with only the support of our peoples. It is in this manner that we seek to change the racist policies of the Government, and to achieve peaceful co-existence with the rest of the country... We fiercely resist the forced assimilation that signifies the destruction of our Indian peoples."

The Indian movement is known as Misurasata. To provide immediate relief to the suffering people, three basic points have been presented at the negotiations: Release of the Indian political prisoners; Reestablishment of subsistence fishing and agriculture and commercial activities of the Indian villages; Avoidance of military offensive action between the Government army and the Indian resistance forces in order to facilitate and support the provision of humanitarian aid.

"The core of the Indian struggle has been the right to autonomy, lands and resources... We are sure that the Government is trying to diminish the Indian rights and not to recognize the traditional territory and Indian autonomy... We are sure that the Government will continue to impose war and death upon us."

"The Government removed Indian communities in Wanko four years ago... They have suffered terribly and wish to rejoin their people." At the time of their removal, the Government "maintained that it was necessary to relocate forcibly the Indians to protect and defend them from the supposed attacks and aggression of the counterrevolution and imperialism."

The Government's justification is an old lie. Now it has permitted some of the Indians to return when the plan failed completely, after causing much suffering to the dislocated families.

BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM

The six-week conference held in Budapest, which was to have improved cultural relations between East and West, ended on November 26 without a concluding document. This is the second Helsinki meeting on human rights to end without it (*American Bulletin*, Nov.-Dec. 1985).

The American Bulletin

January 1986

OFFICE: 2137 SOUTH LOMBARD AVENUE, CICERO, ILLINOIS 60650

TELEPHONE: AREA CODE 312-856-1117

Published monthly

Editor: VLASTA VRAZ

Annual Subscription: \$4.00 — Outside USA: \$5.00

Budapest was to have been the "first step of European intellectuals to meet each other and have a free discussion." The Hungarian government saw to it that no public symposium was held. From Czechoslovakia, the regime sent a Communist representative who claimed that "Czechoslovak writers were free to create and were uncensored." The best answer to the lie was *Besieged Culture*, published in Sweden, the testimony of banned writers in Czechoslovakia and of the expelled well-known writers living in exile. It is a 300 page documentation on the mutilation of culture.

A QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHAT TO DO

There were also answers of writers still in Prague to a questionnaire by the Forum. The question was: What could be done for their besieged culture. The most characteristic answer came from Ludvík Vaculík in his inimitable, daring style: "It is as if you were to ask what a cow can do for flowers on the meadow. There is a simple answer: It could stop eating them. But can a cow do that? No way. For that reason there is no point in inviting a cow to some conference, seminar, or symposium about meadow flowers. The cow will gladly come, just for the show, but anything it might say there is worth... cow dung."

Ludvík Vaculík, author of the Manifesto "Two Thousand Words" that gave the impetus to Prague Spring at the Union of Czech Writers, started life as a Communist, son of die-hard (skalní) Communists, described in his first, partly autobiographical novel "The Axe (Sekyra). The Communist regime has tried to win him over back to the fold but he remains bold in his devastating criticism of communism. Ever since Vaculík signed Charter 77, his writings have been banned in Czechoslovakia and circulate only in samizdat, underground literature. His most important works have been published by '68 Publishers, Toronto.

THE MEDVID COVERUP

Although the unfortunate seaman Miroslav Medvid who was refused asylum by the United States when he jumped off a Soviet ship at our shore is not a Lithuanian, Americans of Lithuanian descent are following his case very carefully for they have had a similar experience fifteen years ago with a Lithuanian sailor, Simas Kudirka, who was also handed over to the Soviets.

Back in Soviet-occupied Lithuania, Kudirka was accused of treason and spent four years of a 10 year sentence in various labor camps (*Chicago Latvian Newsletter*, Jan. 1986). Many in the United States labored for his release and Kudirka was finally allowed to emigrate. In the United States, Mr. Kudirka testified on November 7 before the House Subcommittee on Europe and brought out several important facts. According to Mr. Kudirka, Medvid had been heavily drugged by the Soviets and terrorized before his meeting with the Americans who interviewed him.

12

There are certain Soviet procedures for dealing with would-be-defectors, said Mr. Kudirka. "Each ship carries a manual with specific instructions outlining interrogations and intimidation procedures to be carried out by the KGB officer on board. Among these are instructions on inflicting bodily harm on the defector which cannot be visually detected... Whatever threats or promises were made to Medvid by Soviet officials they do not reflect the reality which awaits him."

THE CONGRESS FOR PEACE

Over 200 delegates from 47 countries attended in Warsaw the conference called the Congress for Intellectuals for a Peaceful Future of the World. It was evident that the Warsaw regime was trying to "obtain international legitimacy for its decision to suppress the free union under martial law four years ago" (*Christian Science Monitor*, January 21, 1986). Although it was to have been an international peace congress, many Western prominent intellectuals shunned the meeting. As one Swede delegate expressed it: "There can be no world peace without respect for human rights."

THE EAGLE AND THE CROW

And while this sham congress was going on to bluff the naive of this world, Poland's intellectuals were feeding their underground press secretly in defiance of the government and under threat of imprisonment. (The situation is very similar to that of Czechoslovakia.) When General Jaruzelski clamped down on Solidarity with his elite corps WRON, the underground changed the name into "wrona." In Polish wrona is an eagle, the national symbol, and WRON is a crow. The slogan is appropriate: The crow cannot defeat the eagle. Scholars have been collecting samples of samizdat from Poland; it seems the samizdat is publishing everything (as in Czechoslovakia): political journals, history, poetry, translations of Orwell and Czech poet Seifert, etc. A sampling is now on exhibit at the Widener Library at Harvard University ("Poland's Vigorous Underground Press," Keith Henderson, *Christian Science Monitor*, January 21, 1986).

THE HELSINKI PROCESS

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act has been an inspiration to the countries behind the Iron Curtain. It inspired the creation of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and VONS. Human rights has become "the battlecry of the captives," the basis of their struggle.

In the West there is some disenchantment after Ottawa and Budapest as the assembled countries failed to sign at least a concluding document. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has raised the question of the advisability of continuing the Helsinki Process.

The Czechoslovak National Council of America, which has been deeply involved in the process from the beginning and has not lost hope, has answered with the testimony of Mrs. Anna Faltus, vice-president, who has been the main participant, translating material of the Chartists and VONS, securing documentary material and sharing the information with the Commission and others interested in the Helsinki process.

"I will focus attention on the activities of the citizens' initiative in Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 and its right arm, the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). Charter 77 was founded in January, 1977, when over 240 individuals, from all walks of life, signed a Human Rights Manifesto, stating the goals they wished to accomplish. During the subsequent years, more Czechoslovak citizens added their name to the Manifesto. Today, there are over 1,200 Charter 77 signatories, with hundreds of thousands of sympathizers.

The Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) was founded in April, 1978, and its task is to document, from available information, individual cases of human rights violations perpetrated by the Czechoslovak authorities.

"After the publication of the Charter 77 Manifesto, hundreds of persons were fired from their jobs, either for signing the Charter, or for expressing sympathy with it. Some persons were arrested and imprisoned for various periods of time. The government actually declared war on Charter 77 and its resolve to monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. To make its point, the Communist Party official newspaper, "Rudé Právo," published in January a long tirade against Charter 77 Manifesto and its signatories, saying that those, who lie on the rails to stop the train of history, must expect to get their legs cut off..."

"VONS is documenting the persecution of Czechoslovak citizens on the basis of court proceedings, police arrests, detentions and interrogations. Since members of VONS do not have access to those documents in the courthouse or police stations, it is obvious that they receive assistance from persons employed within the "system," who do not work against the regime publicly, but support the goals and activities of the human rights activists. VONS has, during the eight years of its existence, issued close to 500 "communiques," documenting over 2,500 cases of individual persecution and violations of human rights. In view of the fact that this Committee is operating under extremely difficult conditions, it is amazing that it was able to document that many cases of human rights violations. Many more cases, however, remain unreported for obvious reasons.

"Charter 77 itself has since 1977 issued approximately 250 major documents. These documents deal with issues, such as: discrimination in employment; abuse of Czechoslovak Laws and Constitution; prison conditions; right to education; distortion of history; economic issues; ecological issues; right to travel, free flow of information; deployment of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia; situation in churches; the so-called "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia; it addressed itself to the Belgrade Review Meeting; to the Madrid Review Conference and its Concluding Document; to the Ottawa Human Rights Meeting; to the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act; to the Budapest Cultural Forum with a three page statement and a 300 page publication, entitled "A Besieged Culture."

"Some of the documents are one page in length, while others are 5, 10, 15, 20 and even 30 pages long.

"Charter 77 also issued:

a) a document, addressed to the Polish authorities, when Marshall Law was declared in Poland; it has, since then,

issued several documents on the situation in Poland, the last one on November 7, 1985; several activists were imprisoned for handing out leaflets in support of Polish workers;

b) a document, dated September 5, 1983, in which it denounced the shooting down of the Korean airliner expressing sympathy for the relatives of the victims;

c) and just recently Charter 77 voiced protest against planned restrictions on travel to Hungary and pointed out that such restrictions would cause hardship for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, whose members would find it difficult to visit their relatives and friends in Hungary.

"Besides issuing documents, individual members of the Charter 77 initiative also write letters to various officials on subjects concerning human rights and related issues. Hundreds of such letters have been addressed to Czechoslovak authorities, from President Husák down to the heads of various departments.

"In 1979 the Czechoslovak authorities staged a mass trial of ten members of VONS (Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted) and sentenced six of them to various prison terms under para 98, item 1, 2 and b) of the Czechoslovak Penal Code (subversion of the Republic in collusion with a foreign power) for their activities in Charter 77 and VONS and for "spreading hostile propaganda" against the socialist system: Václav Havel to 4½ years, Jiří Dienstbier to 3 years, Václav Benda to 4 years; Petr Uhl to 5 years, Ota Bednářová to 3 years and Dana Němcová received a 2 year suspended sentence.

"Yet, even from their prison cells Václav Havel, Jiří Dienstbier and Václav Benda managed to smuggle a letter in December, 1980, which was addressed to the delegates of the Madrid Review Conference. And in January 1981, another group of political prisoners smuggled another letter out of their prison, which, too, was addressed to the delegates of the Review Conference in Madrid.

"The reasons I am referring to the various documents are these: (1) it takes courage to take a public stand in a totally controlled society; (2) it is dangerous to comment on a situation abroad, when the comment is in opposition to the official view; (3) it is extremely dangerous to comment on anything from a prison. Yet — all this is happening, because the human rights activists behind the Iron Curtain believe in the CSCE process.

"The difficulties are compounded for the following reasons:

- a) Charter 77 signatories do not enjoy the luxury of being able to meet and to discuss the preparation of a document;
- b) they cannot use the telephone, because it is equipped with a listening device, or they are not permitted to have one;
- c) they cannot correspond about it, because the mail is censored;
- d) they have to communicate indirectly, through friends and sympathizers;
- e) documents — especially those addressing issues such as the abuse of laws, discrimination in education, etc. — are prepared in section by Charter 77 signatories and by specialists in their field, such as lawyers, scientists, historians, educators, etc. who may not be Charter 77 signatories, but who support Charter 77 goals and activities;

f) when all sections of a specific document are ready to "put together," someone will have to type it and make copies.

To make things even more difficult, the security police will use any pretext to conduct a house or an apartment search, during which they confiscate all documents, drafts and other literature and very often delay the issuance of a document, because no copies are available and it has to be drafted from scratch. And on top of everything else, the regime is using para 118 of the Czechoslovak Penal Code ("unauthorized business venture") — which is to be used in cases of illegal production of drugs, firearms, etc — to confiscate typewriters, paper and duplicating devices, claiming that the person using these tools is engaged in "unauthorized business venture" and this makes it almost impossible for anyone, not working for the "system," to function.

Charter 77 signatories and their friends and sympathizers are also involved in keeping up the "flow of information" in a "samizdat" form, through "self-service" — by copying articles, historical theses, essays, papers on various subjects, articles published abroad, etc. and distributing them through underground channels to interested citizens. A network of dedicated men and women work on these projects in their underground "editorial rooms," on their own, without a cent of contribution from anyone, and with the knowledge that it will not bring them any glory; that, on the contrary, they may be arrested, interrogated, or even imprisoned. Their only hope is that sometime, in the future, someone will appreciate their endeavor to uphold the continuity of the nation's culture.

"Only when we realize all these difficulties, complications, and the total control by the Communist regime over the population, its public and private life, from cradle to grave, will we be able to appreciate their courage and dedication to the idea of freedom and self-determination.

"It is easy for us here, in the free world, where we have so much freedom that we sometimes do not know what to do with it — and, therefore, very often abuse it — to be "arm-chair generals" and regard the people "over there" as "complacent," "satisfied with their lot," enjoying "goulash communism," etc., etc., implying that they could do more for themselves. Yet — when they do go out in the streets and try to fight tanks and machine guns with bare hands, stones and sticks, as happened in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, we get scared and fear that they will start a war "...in which we would have to go and fight for people we know nothing about..."

"Since no one wants war — least of all the people behind the Iron Curtain, because they would be its first victims — we have to give them encouragement and assurance that their dedication to freedom and self-determination is not wasted. No resolutions and speeches — but physical presence where it counts. Charter 77 signatories still firmly believe in the CSCE process and are dedicated to it; however they are tired and exhausted after so many years of persecution, interrogations, detentions and imprisonment.

"Charter 77 prepared, in November, 1979, some suggestions for the Madrid Review Conference, as to what new programs, within the framework of the CSCE process, should be proposed. We have included these suggestions in a Brief, prepared on October 31, 1980 for Counselor Rozanne Ridgway, State Department, on behalf of the American East European Ethnic Conference (AEEEC) and again in a Point

Paper, prepared by the same working group on December 13, 1983 for the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams.

"We feel that these suggestions should be made a part of the agenda of the next Review Conference in Vienna in November, 1986.

"In closing I would like to commend the Commission for its initiative in sending to the human rights activists behind the Iron Curtain a brochure with a greeting and pertinent information concerning human rights — their rights — and the Cultural Forum in Budapest."

NOBEL LAUREATE SEIFERT DIED

The beloved Czech poet Jaroslav Seifert died on January 10, in Prague, after a long illness at age 84. Little known in the West because of his untranslatable style of "inner rhythms," he won the love of his people especially during the war years and in the difficult years that followed because he loved the city of his birth and his country with a poet's vision. "He was a symbol, both as a poet and as a symbol of freedom of expression for writers" under two regimes, under the Nazis and the communists. As a very young man he had communist, humanistic leanings, but a trip to Moscow dispelled this hope. "In 1968, he condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and was one of those who signed Charter 77, an appeal to the Government for greater freedom ("Jaroslav Seifert," Herbert Mitgang, *The New York Times*, January 11, 1986).

In bestowing the Nobel award in 1984, the Swedish Academy said that his work was "endowed with freshness, sensuality and rich inventiveness, and provides a liberating image of the indomitable spirit and versatility of man."

The Communist Party of course called him disloyal to his class (he was born of poor parents in Žižkov, a working-class district of Prague). There were years when his work was not published. During the first signs of the thaw, Seifert criticized his Government's cultural policies. Especially unforgivable was his statement at the Writers Union meeting and his chastisement of the Warsaw Pact countries for their invasion in August 1968.

As a People's Artist (národní umělec) Seifert was entitled to a state funeral. This placed the Government in a dilemma: officially, Seifert was no longer a member of the state-controlled Writers Union because of his rebellion. Nevertheless, the Cultural Minister was named as head of the commission to make funeral arrangements. From latest reports from Prague, Seifert was buried at a small cemetery at Královka; this part of the funeral services ruled out the presence of the Communist hierarchy.

Many have tackled the difficult task of translating Seifert. In 1980, the Czechoslovak Society of Arts & Sciences published a bilingual edition of "The Plague Monument," translation by Lyn Coffin, preface by Prof. William E. Harkins of Harvard University.

Bi-annual convention of the Czechoslovak National Council of America will be held on April 19-20, in Chicago (CSA Building, Berwyn, IL).

51




**CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF AMERICA**

2137 SO. LOMBARD AVE. - ROOM 202
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60650-2081

Address Correction Requested



The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 19, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Dr. Leopold Rozboril in Response to his Letter to the President

SIGNED

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (TAB A) prepared by the Department of State to Dr. Leopold Rozboril, President of the Czechoslovak National Council of America, in response to his letter to the President (TAB B), concerning the potential influence of Soviet pressure on American television networks. Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for your signature.

Sestanovich, Mandel, Small

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Sally Kelley at TAB I.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A Proposed Draft to Dr. Rozboril
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

~~Methodic~~ 1991
FILE 17
✓

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *Bob for*
SUBJECT: Invitation from the Council for Chemical Research

Although the letter of invitation to the President from the Council for Chemical Research opens with a reference to General Secretary Gorbachev, the proposed address does not appear to have a close connection with national security or foreign policy issues. We feel, therefore, that it would be more appropriate for the President's domestic advisers to provide guidance.

Attachments:

- Tab A Your memorandum of March 11
- Tab B Letter from the Council for Chemical Research, Inc.

1991
18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

March 11, 1986

TO: ~~W~~ODNEY McDANIEL - AL KINGON - JACK SVAHN
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Address the annual meeting of the Council for Chemical
Research

DATE: ~~S~~eptember 28 or 29, 1986

LOCATION: Chicago, Illinois

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____
Routine _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE: March 17, 1986 TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON



**Council
for
Chemical
Research, Inc.**

stg *12/19/86*
NSC

19

In reply please address:
Professor Paul G. Gassman
Department of Chemistry
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

January 23, 1986

HONORARY CHAIRMAN

**M. E. PRUITT, CONSULTANT TO
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY**

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SECRETARY

J. E. McEVOY
COUNCIL FOR CHEMICAL RESEARCH, INC.

TREASURER

B. M. RUSHTON
AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC.

COUNSEL

M. R. WESSEL
SWIDLER, BERLIN & STRELOW

AUDITOR

R. M. ANDREWS
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Recently, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev stated that:

"Development of pure science must be given priority. It is precisely this science that generates ideas, effects breakthroughs in new fields, and makes it possible to attain new levels of efficiency. Pure research is a matter that is too crucial to accept weakness..."

I believe that the United States has a comparable commitment to pure science and I believe that it would be very beneficial to have this stated publicly by you.

On behalf of the Council for Chemical Research, I would like to invite you to address our annual meeting on the evening of September 28, 1986 (preferred), or anytime on September 29, 1986, in Chicago, Illinois. The collective membership of the Council for Chemical Research constitutes approximately 90% of the leadership of both basic and applied research in the chemical sciences. There is no other organization which brings together in a single room the collective leadership of industry, academia, and government for discussion of common problems in a single area. The individuals to whom you would speak have major responsibility for determining the future direction of chemical research and, hence, of chemistry and the chemical industry in the United States. Although this group is relatively small (ca. 350), it is both prestigious and influential. As the newly elected vice chairman of the Council for Chemical Research and as program chairman for our 1986 annual meeting, I feel that our meeting would be an ideal forum for a renewed statement by our government on the role of basic research in our nation's future.


We hope that you will be able to accept our invitation. A presentation by you stressing the commitment of our government to the basic sciences would help to attract some of the best young minds in the United States into the sciences. In addition, it would provide an opportunity to (a) provide a statement on our nation's commitment to expand our store of basic

20
President Reagan
January 23, 1986
Page 2

scientific knowledge; (b) indicate in more specific terms, our need for a strengthened chemical industry (one of the few areas which traditionally has had a very favorable balance of trade); (c) indicate our government's broad commitment to generating knowledge for knowledge's sake in response to Gorbachev's statement.

We look forward to your response to this invitation.

Sincerely yours,



Paul G. Gassman
Program Chairman

PGG/cml
Enclosure: CCR brochure

21

1991

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 17, 1986

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Council for Chemical Research - Invitation to the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Frederick J. Ryan in response to his memo to you of March 11. Ryan has asked for NSC comment on an invitation to the President to address the Council for Chemical Research. In my view this does not appear to be a matter with any direct national security or foreign policy bearing. It would be better addressed by the President's domestic advisers. I think the action was mistakenly routed to the NSC staff because the letter of invitation opens with a reference to Gorbachev.

SRS
Steve Sestanovich, *JM* Judy Mandel and Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I suggesting that Ryan pursue the question with the president's domestic staff.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Frederick Ryan

Tab A Memorandum from Frederick Ryan

Tab B Letter from the Council for Chemical Research

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

2238

~~Matlock~~

22

FILE

March 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, Friday,
March 21, 1986

The President will meet with Ambassador Hartman Friday March 21
at 9:45 a.m. for 15 minutes in the Oval Office. Participants are
as follows:

The President
Vice President George Bush
Acting Secretary of State John Whitehead
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Arthur A. Hartman
Stephen R. Sestanovich



Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

23

2238

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 20, 1986

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman's March 21 Meeting with the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Nicholas Platt officially informing Ambassador Hartman of his March 21 meeting with the President.

Johnathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *WLP for* Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Nicholas Platt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen 3/2/86
2227
RR File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

~~HARTMAN~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN

DATE: March 21, 1986
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 09:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER JB

I. PURPOSE

To review recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND

Will provide opportunity to hear Art's views on the just-concluded Communist Party Congress and Soviet attitudes toward a 1986 summit. Art has just received an award from Georgetown for his excellent work.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
John C. Whitehead
Donald Regan
John Poindexter
Arthur Hartman
Stephen R. Sestanovich

IV. PRESS PLAN

None; staff photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Greet Hartman, congratulate him on his recent award, and initiate discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Prepared by:
Jon R. Purnell

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)

cc Vice President
Don Regan

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

CS 7/2/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25

2227

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- Glad to see you again. Congratulations on your award from Georgetown.

- What do you think the results of the Party Congress mean for Gorbachev and for U.S.-Soviet relations?

- Do you think the Soviets are still serious about a meeting this year? Do they think they can pressure us into arms control concessions by stalling on setting a date?

- Please let your staff know how much we appreciate the fine job they are doing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8175
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

24

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

March 19, 1986

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *Ph FM*

SUBJECT: Meeting Memorandum for Ambassador Hartman

Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and Talking Points for the President's meeting with Art Hartman.

Rodney *McDaniel* concurs. Johnathan *Miller* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and Talking Points at Tab A.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)
- Tab II Clearance List

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

ASJ
2/15/05

27

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OE0B

Please admit the following appointments on FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 19 86

for THE PRESIDENT of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President
John C. Whitehead
Mr. Donald T. Regan
Admiral John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock

MEETING LOCATION

Building WHITE HOUSE WEST WING Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK
Room No. OVAl OFFICE Room No. 368 Telephone X5112
Time of Meeting 9:45 AM Date of request March 19, 1986

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OE0B - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

JMC
28

2227

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 19, 1986

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Meeting Memorandum for Ambassador Hartman

Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and Talking Points for the President's meeting with Art Hartman.

Jonathan Miller & Rodney McDaniel concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and Talking Points at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Meeting Memorandum
- Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)
- Tab II Clearance List

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
JFM
2/15/05

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN

DATE: March 21, 1986
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 09:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.
FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

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III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
John C. Whitehead
Donald Regan
John Poindexter
Arthur Hartman
Stephen R. Sestanovich

IV. PRESS PLAN

None; staff photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Greet Hartman, congratulate him on his recent award, and initiate discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Prepared by:
Jon R. Purnell

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

101
2/15/05

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKING POINTS

- Glad to see you again. Congratulations on your award from Georgetown.

- What do you think the results of the Party Congress mean for Gorbachev and for U.S.-Soviet relations?

- Do you think the Soviets are still serious about a meeting this year? Do they think they can pressure us into arms control concessions by stalling on setting a date?

- Please let your staff know how much we appreciate the fine job they are doing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-1144#8176
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

TALKING POINTS -- MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR
HARTMAN, FRIDAY, MARCH 21 at 9:45 a.m.

- GLAD TO SEE YOU AGAIN. CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR AWARD FROM GEORGETOWN.
- WHAT DO YOU THINK THE RESULTS OF THE PARTY CONGRESS MEAN FOR GORBACHEV AND FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS?

-2-

- DO YOU THINK THE SOVIETS ARE STILL SERIOUS ABOUT A MEETING THIS YEAR? DO THEY THINK THEY CAN PRESSURE US INTO ARMS CONTROL CONCESSIONS BY STALLING ON SETTING A DATE?
- PLEASE LET YOUR STAFF KNOW HOW MUCH WE APPRECIATE THE FINE JOB THEY ARE DOING.

32

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1986

for THE PRESIDENT of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President
John C. Whitehead
Donald T. Regan
Admiral John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Stephen R. Sestanovich

MEETING LOCATION

Building WHITE HOUSE WEST WING Requested by JACK F. MATLOCK
Room No. OVAl OFFICE Room No. 368 Telephone 5112
Time of Meeting 9:45 AM Date of request March 19, 1986

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

J4-e
33

System II
90219

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's March 15 Meeting with Ryzhkov

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation from the Shultz/Ryzhkov meeting in Stockholm. I have reviewed and concur with the text. My own reactions to the meeting were forwarded to you March 17 in system II package 90212.

Attachments:

Tab I Shultz/Ryzhkov memorandum of conversation

cc. Peter W. Rodman
Robert E. Linhard
Stephen R. Sestanovich

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By C+S NARA, Date 7/3/02



35



SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: Saturday, March 15, 1986
TIME: 4:45 - 6:35 PM
PLACE: Residence of Soviet Ambassador, Stockholm, Sweden

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

Soviet Side

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
DAS Mark Palmer
Mark Parris, Notetaker
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Premier Ryzhkov
First Deputy FM Maltsev
Ambassador to Sweden Pankin
CDE Ambassador Grinevskiy
Premier's Chef de Cabinet Batsanov
Mr. Obukhov, Interpreter

Ryzhkov opened the meeting, which immediately followed the Palme funeral service, with the observation, "Life goes on." The Secretary agreed, "In a very profound way." The Palme funeral had been oriented to the future, and the ideas and visions celebrated there were lasting ones. The Secretary and Ryzhkov agreed that it was their task now to think about life.

Ryzhkov moved into the substance of the meeting by noting that, when informed of the U.S. desire to meet in Stockholm, Moscow had agreed it would be useful to take advantage of the opportunity. The press was already speculating on what he and the Secretary would talk about and agree upon. But it was important to talk.

The Geneva meeting had been a good start. It provided an opportunity to begin a constructive dialogue to have a good discussion. Since then several months had passed. During that period, some things had unfortunately happened which the Soviet side did not understand. To be frank, there were doubts in Moscow as to where the process was leading. The world was talking of the next summit. Some had even tried to determine its dates. But the events of the months since Geneva had brought much which the Soviets did not understand. Some of these events had put their stamp on the forthcoming meeting. Therefore the Soviet side saw the present meeting as an opportunity to clarify views. Ryzhkov believed the U.S. might be as concerned about the situation as the Soviets were. This

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/4#8177

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

was the first meeting at this level to take place since the Geneva summit. Ryzhkov would therefore like to hear the Secretary's views on the issues he had raised. As the guest, he invited the Secretary to speak first.

After thanking Ryzhkov for the opportunity, the Secretary recalled a Japanese saying: "The reverse side has its own reverse side." Ryzhkov had described a situation from one side. The Secretary could agree with everything the Premier had said. But, just as the Soviets were puzzled by us, we were puzzled by the Soviets.

The Secretary agreed, and, he noted President Reagan agreed that a very good start had been made in Geneva. We wanted to continue the process now. To make the most of that start, the Secretary felt the way to do that was to focus on the context of issues and to identify areas where we needed to -- and might be able to -- move ahead. In that spirit he proposed to touch illustratively on a number of specific issues to show the direction in which we would like to go. Ryzhkov agreed.

Starting with bilateral issues, the Secretary noted that there had been progress since Geneva in a number of areas, citing exchanges and civil aviation in particular. On the whole our interaction had been constructive. We had gone forward very much in the spirit of Geneva, even as each side had looked to its own interests. Direct air service between the two countries, for example, would resume in late April. That was good -- a clear, objective fact. We needed to continue to work in that spirit.

On the "tremendously important" area of arms control, we had seen little movement, although there had been a number of promising straws in the wind. It was in this area that we had the greatest sense of disappointment that our leaders' objectives had not been fulfilled.

Starting with issues not covered in the Geneva nuclear and space talks (NST), the Secretary noted that we had recently had a relatively good meeting on chemical weapons (CW) proliferation. It was not clear where that dialogue would go, but we had made a start and there was substance.

On the more general question of a CW Treaty, there had been less motion. The problem there was verification. In this regard we had noted and been gladdened by some of General Secretary Gorbachev's recent statements on verification, especially his more positive treatment of the possibilities for on-site inspection. This was a "definite plus" from our standpoint. But we failed so far to see the operational context of such statements with regard to CW.

Similarly in MBFR, there had been initiatives from both sides since Geneva, but the most recent Soviet counterproposals did not go far enough to meet our verification concerns.

On CDE, everyone seemed to believe it could be done. The Secretary and Shevardnadze, and before Shevardnadze the Secretary and Gromyko, had said so to each other; the President and Gorbachev had said so to each other. We saw some progress, but we were afraid the process would stall out. Noting that Ambassador Grinevskiy had agreed to Ambassador Barry's invitation to visit Washington in April, the Secretary expressed hope for a fruitful discussion. Each side needed to tell its representative to push a little.

On another issue, we had agreed in principle to discuss risk reduction centers, but had not been able to agree on where to talk. The Secretary told Ryzhkov that he was prepared at this meeting to tell the Soviets to name their site. He personally believed it would be better for the two superpowers to use their own capitals for such discussions than third capitals, but it was the Soviets' call. You name it and we will be there.

The Secretary spent considerable time elaborating the U.S. position on nuclear testing. We agreed with Moscow that testing was an important issue. The U.S. did not agree that all testing should be banned as long as both sides had large numbers of nuclear weapons and the process of working on them had not been brought under an agreement to radically reduce them (which both sides favored), and until we had an operational ability of getting nuclear weapons totally under control.

The U.S. was nonetheless prepared to discuss nuclear testing seriously. We were, in fact, prepared to take deliberate, concrete steps in the field. The step we had in mind took into account General Secretary Gorbachev's recent comments on verification, as well as the potential benefit of ratification of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) and Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). We did not require amendment of those treaties. What we had in mind was an effort on verification which could be coupled with an understanding on their ratification. The Secretary handed Ryzhkov the signed original of President Reagan's proposal to this effect to Gorbachev, the text of which had been conveyed to the General Secretary March 14 in Moscow.

The Secretary emphasized that the U.S. proposal opened up the prospect of a concrete step on arms control in a time frame we could calculate. It built on Gorbachev's recent remarks on

verification and on-site inspection. It addressed the dilemma posed by the fact that both sides had charged the other with violating megatonnage thresholds, while stating with certainty that such charges were unfounded as far as its own program was concerned. This situation showed that we could not be confident of our ability to verify nuclear yields. Our proposal was simple, non-intrusive and could substantially improve confidence in our ability to verify the two treaties in question. What the President was saying was that, if the Soviets accepted our proposal, we could move to ratify these treaties.

Thus, in the non-NST complex of arms control issues, including nuclear non-proliferation, there had been some progress. With the necessary push from each side, more might be accomplished.

We had seen less movement in the NST area -- the most important one of all -- despite our leaders agreement in Geneva that there were possibilities there. The President had found Gorbachev's January 15 proposals "stimulating," but ultimately inadequate in certain respects. On START and space/defense, they did not address our previous proposals.

There seemed to be a bit more progress on INF. The Soviets had made a proposal, and we had made a counterproposal. But our negotiators in this forum had not been able to get down to real bargaining. While there were possibilities, we continued to see the problem of missiles as one which had to be resolved on a global basis because of their mobility. This was an issue which had to be addressed. Still, there were possibilities in INF and in the other fora. Both sides had made clear their discomfort with the mountains of weapons which had accumulated. We needed to roll up our sleeves in Geneva and get to it.

Briefly turning to other issues, The Secretary noted that it had been possible in most cases to set dates and places for the next round of regional experts talks. We owed the Soviets an answer on one area, there was some uncertainty on another. Thus, the regional dialogue was proceeding. We regretted, however, that in the March 6 discussions on Southern Africa, the Soviet representatives had not seemed prepared to engage. This was a volatile, dangerous area.

We would like, the Secretary continued, to see the regional talks get somewhere. That was why he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had agreed on the margins of the Geneva meeting to take up such issues at their level in future meetings. It had not yet proved possible to schedule such a meeting. But the

39

U.S. continued to believe, as Gorbachev himself had noted in Geneva, that regional conflicts were one of the main sources of international tension. Such tensions lead to armaments, not the reverse. Problems like Southern Africa were problems we could only solve together. The Soviets were not responsible for what was happening there. Neither were we. But we should be able to work together to get at the real issues.

Switching the focus to human rights, the Secretary reaffirmed the importance of the issue to the American people. There had been progress since the Geneva meeting and we welcomed it. But as a general proposition there were still great problems. We had noted the General Secretary's unequivocal condemnation of terrorism at the CPSU Party Congress, and had cooperated with the Soviets on this problem at the U.N. We felt there was more room for cooperation in this important area.

Concluding, the Secretary stated that the President had asked him to convey that our commitment and dedication to making progress on the various issues of the relationship was as strong as on the day we left Geneva. The Secretary had tried to review these issues from the standpoint of their content. In summary, we saw movement in some, not in others. We saw a need for energetic movement in the NST talks. And we felt progress was possible on nuclear testing. The Secretary thanked Ryzhkov for hearing him out.

Ryzhkov prefaced his own remarks by noting that the Secretary had accurately characterized the period since the Geneva summit as one of "disappointment." The Soviets agreed. Nonetheless, the Geneva meeting had established some prerequisites for further work. It had elaborated certain common principles on issues of concern to the entire world as well as to the two leaders. People on both sides had expected an active and constructive dialogue after Geneva on the most vital issues of modern times.

The Soviet political leadership thus took a most serious approach to the results of the Geneva meeting. The first meeting of the leaders of the two superpowers in seven years could not be considered merely a protocol meeting. The Secretary strongly agreed, noting that it was a real meeting between two strong people.

The proof of the seriousness of the Soviet leadership's approach, Ryzhkov continued, was the comprehensive arms control proposals made by the General Secretary on January 15. The Soviet leadership expected that this major initiative would be seriously considered and would lead to constructive discussions

and constructive results. They had no illusions that it would be possible to solve all outstanding issues "at a single stroke." But they did hope that a step-by-step process would be set in motion which would lead to concrete results.

The U.S. response had arrived on the eve of the opening of the CPSU Congress. Gorbachev had summarized the Soviet reaction in his report. Ryzhkov wanted to take the opportunity of his face-to-face meeting with the Secretary to say that Moscow was frankly disappointed with the U.S. reply. On the one hand, it appeared to support the notion that outstanding problems should be resolved. But it was so encumbered with conditions and linkages as to suggest that there was no real will to find solutions.

Similarly, the Soviets had hoped that the fourth round of the NST talks would clarify issues in such a way as to make possible constructive discussions and ultimately, solutions. Ryzhkov felt the Secretary would agree that the round had produced no forward movement. Against this backdrop, Ryzhkov observed, what he called a "global question" arose: Where are events leading? Months were passing. There was no forward movement. The Soviet leadership ever more frequently found itself asking: "What is to be done? Why is this happening?" They hear the U.S. claim it wants to solve problems. But when it comes to practical steps to answer the "global question," there is no constructive movement. The Soviets were thus asking themselves why this was happening. Noting that there was a similar saying in Russian, Ryzhkov concluded his general remarks by admitting that the Secretary could apply his Japanese "reverse" argument to what he had just said.

Returning to the Secretary's remarks on nuclear testing, Ryzhkov had some specific comments. Ryzhkov recalled that the Geneva Joint Statement had called unequivocally for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The first and necessary step toward this goal, he argued, was to ban nuclear testing. He therefore found it puzzling that the U.S. position should be that such tests should continue. The sole purpose of such tests was to perfect nuclear weapons. Where was the logic in this? How could one eliminate nuclear weapons while at the same time perfecting new ones?

Ryzhkov said he had not seen the contents of the President's letter to Gorbachev on testing. He could not give an authoritative response to the letter to Secretary Shultz. But he and his colleagues around the table had been puzzled by Western media accounts of the letter's contents. The testing issue could only be resolved by banning testing. Verification made sense only in the context of such a ban. Yet the U.S. seemed to be proposing to perfect the verification not of a ban,

but of testing. The American approach focused too much on technicalities while ignoring the central issue of banning testing.

Ryzhkov claimed that both sides had more than adequate means of determining whether nuclear tests had occurred. Rather than seek to verify the caliber of a test, efforts should be directed to banning all tests. While press accounts of the U.S. position might be distorted, the U.S. appeared to be proposing that Soviet technicians come to the U.S. in April to monitor a nuclear explosion. From this, it appeared the U.S. leadership was determined to continue testing.

As for the TTBT and PNET Treaties, it was Ryzhkov's understanding that they dealt not with banning testing, but with thresholds. These were two different things. It appeared the two sides were speaking in different languages. The Soviet position had been made clear in Gorbachev's letter to the Delhi Six. The Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate fully in verifying a ban on nuclear testing.

Ryzhkov indicated he would not address all the issues raised by the Secretary, as Soviet views had been clearly expressed in the recent CPSU Congress. He did wish to call attention to General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks on future meetings with President Reagan. However, while it might not be possible to reach agreement on all issues in advance of such a meeting, it was the Soviet view that for such a meeting to be fruitful it would be necessary to "resolve" two sets of issues: nuclear testing and INF.

Without getting into details, Ryzhkov noted that the Soviet position on INF had been made clear in the January 15 proposal. He underscored the Soviets' willingness to include Soviet territory up to 80 degrees longitude, which goes to the Novosibirsk area in its definition of the "European" U.S.S.R. for purposes of an INF agreement. Within this zone, the Soviets would be prepared to destroy, not merely move, LRINF missiles. It was unfortunate that there had been no forward movement from the U.S. in response.

Ryzhkov noted that the Secretary had not touched on the next summit, about what should be addressed there. Both sides seemed to recognize that this meeting could not be just a protocol affair. Too many people would be disappointed by such a meeting. Rather, it would have to be a fruitful meeting.

The Secretary agreed that the next summit should be fruitful. He had tried to show in his review of the issues the varying degrees of progress achieved to date. We agreed that

progress in NST was desirable and that INF was a likely candidate. But it would be a mistake to rule out other areas. There were important things on the table. Progress could be made.

Maltsev interrupted to ask if the Secretary included nuclear testing in that category. The Secretary noted that nuclear testing was not covered in the NST talks, but it appeared we could have a useful exchange on testing. He could not predict that we would agree. But when one had a goal, the way to get there was to take a step. When that had been done, there would be a basis for further progress. That was why it was important to cap megatonnage and improve verification. As for a testing ban, the Secretary wondered if the Russians had an equivalent of the expression: "putting the cart before the horse." In response to Ryzhkov's confirmation that they did, the Secretary observed that the problem was one of deciding what was the cart and what the horse. We believed the first task was to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons, and only then consider a ban on testing. But even within those parameters, we could have a useful discussion of testing issues.

Ryzhkov quipped that he thought the "cart horse" saying worked against the U.S. position. The U.S. proposal did not represent a real "step." The Soviets, on the other hand, had made three steps: with their August 1985 moratorium, with their extension of the moratorium, and with their response to the Delhi Six to continue the moratorium so long as the U.S. conducted no nuclear tests. The U.S.S.R. had gone eight months without a test. Ryzhkov had a frank question for the Secretary: Had the U.S. decided to conduct a new test?

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would continue testing. In reviewing his earlier argumentation on the rationale for the U.S. testing proposal, he emphasized the prospects it opened for early concrete progress on testing. Capping megatonnage and improving verification means would make it possible to go on from there.

Ryzhkov indicated he would report the Secretary's answer to Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. Both sides had to work, he added. They had to work, moreover, in ways other than they had in the months since Geneva.

The Secretary agreed. But he also felt, on a personal basis, that it was important to establish a time for the next summit meeting, as well as for his next meeting with Shevardnadze. Experience had proven that the existence of dates tended to put drive into the process on both sides. The Secretary had found this to be the case when he was in a

business organization. He knew that the Premier had extensive management experience of his own, and suspected he had had similar experiences. It was important to pin the matter down. The Soviets had the U.S. proposal for dates. We would wait for a response.

Ryzhkov asked what the next meeting should address. The Secretary asked in response if he could pose a frank question of his own: "What should he report to the President...?" Before he could finish the question, Ryzhkov interrupted to note that that was precisely what he, Ryzhkov, wanted to know. What could he tell the Soviet leadership when he returned to Moscow? The only firm thing he could say was that he had asked a frank question and received a frank response about testing. The Secretary observed that those of Ryzhkov's colleagues who had worked with the Secretary in the past would tell him that his answers were always frank and reliable, even if his listeners did not always like them. Ryzhkov allowed that he had heard a lot about the Secretary from his "comrades" who had dealt with him. But frankness was one thing. Substance was another.

Maltsev interrupted to say "two words." As former Ambassador to Sweden, he claimed to know the Swedes well. The U.S. could ask the Swedes, who were very good in such matters, whether or not calibration tests were necessary to detect nuclear explosions. They would tell us that they were not. The Soviets did not have to ask the Swedes. Their own capabilities were sufficient to detect even unannounced U.S. explosions. Ryzhkov stepped in to comment ruefully that his and the Secretary's task till they reported to their leaders was to figure out what to tell them.

Returning to his original question as to what he should tell the President, the Secretary asked if he should say that there should be no more discussion of summit dates until there were mutually satisfactory agreements on INF and nuclear testing. The Secretary stressed that he asked the question because what Ryzhkov had said left him uncertain.

Ryzhkov responded that he had simply repeated what Gorbachev had said at the CPSU Congress. The Secretary said he had not understood Gorbachev to be so categorical as Ryzhkov had sounded. Maltsev produced a copy of Gorbachev's report and read the text in question. The Secretary indicated that he had posed the question not because he was angry, but because he wanted to be clear about what he should tell the President. Ryzhkov said he would not go beyond what Gorbachev had said.

The Secretary asked if he should tell the President that until he agreed to cease nuclear testing and to accept a non-global INF agreement, the Soviet leadership did not want to discuss a next meeting. Again, the Secretary stressed he was simply seeking information. It would obviously save everyone a lot of trouble if we didn't need to worry about the next summit.

Amid whispered prompting on the Soviet side, Ryzhkov replied that the issue the General Secretary had sought to address in his report was an important one. The Soviets recognized that everything could not be solved in a single day. What was needed was constructive proposals, a demonstration of readiness to address the issues constructively, calling for frankness. Ryzhkov observed that the U.S. wanted a date. On the other hand, it would continue testing. This was a bad combination. [The last two sentences were not translated into English by the Soviet interpreter because of the Secretary's following interjection:]

The Secretary replied that he was not asking for a date. He only wished to clarify the Soviet position. Ryzhkov repeated that this was something to consider carefully once he and the Secretary had returned to their capitals.

Noting that the press would be interested in their discussion, the Secretary asked for Ryzhkov's reactions to some themes the Secretary proposed to use in describing the meeting. Ryzhkov concurred with one exception: in place of the Secretary's suggestion that they indicate it had not been possible to resolve the question of summit dates, Ryzhkov proposed that he say only that the issue would be discussed further. The Secretary agreed.

Prior to departing, the Secretary expressed regret that he and Ryzhkov had not had an opportunity for an in-depth discussion of economic issues as the Secretary had once had with Ryzhkov's predecessor, Kosygin. Ryzhkov replied that he was sure the two would meet again and that he would look forward to such a discussion.

As the meeting was breaking up, Ryzhkov stressed with some feeling the need for continued work on the full range of issues, including the question of a future meeting. The Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be closed with respect to such a meeting.

The two superpowers had a responsibility for the future of the entire world. He hoped the meeting could conclude on that note. The Secretary agreed.

~~Matlock~~ 45
System II
90219

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

→ FILE

~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's March 15 Meeting with Ryzhkov

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation from the Shultz/Ryzhkov meeting in Stockholm. I have reviewed and concur with the text. My own reactions to the meeting were forwarded to you March 17 in system II package 90212.

Attachments:

Tab I Shultz/Ryzhkov memorandum of conversation

cc: Peter W. Rodman
Robert E. Linhard
Stephen R. Sestanovich

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 7/3/02

FILE 46
2259 ✓

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

March 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: SVEN ^{SK}KRAEMER/JON PURNELL *JP*

SUBJECT: Religious Leaders' Meeting -- March 26, 1986

Attached for your signature at Tab I is a memorandum to Fred Ryan recommending that the President not meet with a group of religious leaders who are proposing an immediate nuclear testing moratorium as indicated in the group's letter to the President (Tab A) and in a parallel letter to Jack Matlock (Tab II).

Your memo to Fred Ryan indicates that we have arranged for representatives of the group to meet on an informal and off-the-record basis with Jack Matlock and Sven Kraemer on March 26. (In such a meeting, Matlock would cover US/Soviet summit issues, and Kraemer would briefly review the President's latest nuclear testing limitations initiatives. Jon Purnell and Steve Steiner would also attend.)

JP Jack Matlock, *Steve* Steve Steiner, *Jm* Judyt Mandel and *Bob* Bob Inghard concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the Matlock/Kraemer meeting with the religious group's representatives on the above basis.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to Fred Ryan at Tab I, responding to his memorandum and to the group's letter to the President at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Ryan
- A Incoming Correspondence
- Tab II Religious Group's Letter to Matlock

I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: Religious Leaders' Meeting -- March 26, 1986

We recommend against a meeting by the President with an interdenominational group of religious leaders, under the coordination of the American Friends Service Committee, who have sought such a meeting next week to present their case for an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing.

We do not believe that a discussion by this group with the President would be productive, as they clearly do not support his policy on the subject, and as they would probably use such a meeting to heighten their media profile.

On the other hand, we do believe it appropriate that representatives of the group meet on an informal and off-the-record basis with appropriate members of the NSC Staff, and we have arranged such a meeting for the afternoon of March 26 with the NSC's Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, Ambassador Jack Matlock, and with the NSC's Director for Arms Control, Mr. Sven Kraemer, who has met previously with members of this group.

We have indicated to the group that following their meeting with NSC staff, they cannot have a press conference in the White House complex as they had requested and they have agreed.

We understand that representatives of the group will not be able to meet with Secretary Shultz, whom they had hoped to meet, but that they may be able to meet with Under Secretary Whitehead.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming Correspondence

A

2259
SD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

March 17, 1986

TO: ✓ RODNEY McDANIEL - LINAS KOJELIS
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Meeting with religious leaders to discuss their concern
over the continuation of nuclear testing

DATE: March 24-28, 1986

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ___ Regret X Surrogate Message ___ Other ___
Priority NSC Staff
Routine ___

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE: ASAP TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON





American Friends Service Committee

Washington Office
James H. Matlack, Director
Kathy Flewellen, Associate Director

1822 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
202/ 483-3341

March 12, 1986

Hon. Ronald Reagan
President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attention: Jean A. Jackson
Deputy Director of Scheduling
Room 182 OEOB

Dear President Reagan,

I write to you on behalf of a distinguished group of religious leaders who seek an appointment in the week of March 24 to 28 to share with you their concern over the continuation of nuclear testing and their plea for mutual cessation of such testing in light of the current Soviet moratorium which will expire at the end of March.

I enclose a copy of the statement which some 200 eminent religious leaders have signed. They urgently seek an opportunity for a small delegation to convey this message in person to you during the last week of March. The fact that, for the Christians in the group, it is Holy Week lends special emphasis to a conversation on such profound issues of policy and morality.

While I cannot list all the names in this brief letter, I can tell you that the group includes the heads of the following denominations: American Baptist Church, Church of the Brethren, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Reformed Church in America, United Church of Christ, and the Unitarian Universalist Association as well as 20 bishops from the Episcopal Church, seven bishops from the Lutheran Church in America, and three Catholic bishops. Other notable signers include Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University; Rev. Arie Brouer, General Secretary of the National Council of Churches; Bishop John Hurst Adams, Chairman of the National Congress of Black Churches; Ira Silverman, President of the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College; Arthur Hertzberg, past President of the American Jewish Congress; and Dr. Doris Younger, General Director of Church Women United.

The American Friends Service Committee--the principal Quaker agency for humanitarian aid, peace, and social justice work--and Clergy and Laity Concerned--an ecumenical peace organization--have coordinated the effort to secure so broad and impressive a list of signers. I have been asked to make arrangements for an appointment, if possible, with the President or his near advisors on this matter.

The best days for such a meeting would be Tuesday, March 25, or Wednesday, March 26. I expect that 7 or 8 heads of denominations and other high officials would attend. I know that your schedule is always very tight but hope that some time might be found for this important visitation. I can be reached at 483-3341.

An Affirmative Action Employer

52

Dear Mr. President:

There are moments when decisive action can change the course of history. One such moment occurred at the end of World War II, when the US and USSR might have found a way to prevent the beginning of the nuclear arms race. They failed, and we live under the darkening nuclear shadow today because of that failure.

Another moment occurred in 1963, when President John F. Kennedy announced that the US would suspend nuclear tests in the atmosphere for as long as other nations did the same. The Soviets responded positively to Kennedy's call and within a short time the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed, saving future generations around the globe from ever increasing levels of radioactive fallout.

Today, Mr. President, we stand at another such moment, and you are the leader with the chance to take an action which can turn the world toward peace. As you know, last July Secretary Gorbachev announced a 5-month moratorium on nuclear testing and asked the United States to do the same, an initiative not unlike President Kennedy's in 1963. The Soviets did observe the five-month moratorium, despite the fact that we used that time to continue tests of new weapons. In January, Mr. Gorbachev announced a three-month extension of the moratorium, to the end of March 1986.

The Soviet moratorium may or may not mean that they are open to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but we will never know unless we take the next step.

We urge you to take that next essential step: immediately call a halt to nuclear explosion tests until the Summit meeting and indicate your openness to a further extension if the Soviets do not resume testing.

Your action will not endanger national security. A nuclear testing moratorium is verifiable. Seismic monitoring facilities can detect underground nuclear explosions with high reliability. Your action can also test the Soviet statement that they are willing to discuss on site inspection. This has always been a goal of US policy, and we urge you to explore this opening fully.

As religious leaders in a nation which places great reliance on religious values, we are deeply troubled by our nation's growing reliance on weapons of mass destruction as our source of security. Throughout the scriptures, nations are warned not to trust in weapons and warriors for security, but in God. To do otherwise, scripture teaches, is to invite destruction, and history is littered with the remains of those who ignored this warning.

We seriously question the morality and the wisdom of the endless stockpiling of nuclear weapons capable of ending all life on earth, and of military budgets which call for spending \$2000 per year for every man, woman and child in this nation. These weapons exact a terrible toll on all the peoples of the world, even if they are never used in battle. Resources spent on weapons leave the hungry without food, the homeless without shelter, the sick without care, and the unemployed without jobs.

We stand at a crossroads. One way leads to the dead end of nuclear Armageddon. The other leads to a future of peace and prosperity without nuclear weapons, and with life in abundance for all the world's people. You have the power to start the world down the second way. As people of faith, to a person of faith, we urge you, Mr. President, to choose life in this historic moment and announce that the United States will halt the testing of nuclear weapons.

3

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American Friends Service Committee

Washington Office
James H. Matlack, Director
Kathy Flewelling, Associate Director

1822 R Street, NW
Washington, DC 20009
202/483-3341

March 12, 1986

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Room 368 OEOB
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attention: Ms. Stella Brackman

Dear Ambassador Matlock,

I write to you on behalf of a distinguished group of religious leaders who seek an appointment in the week of March 24 to 28 with President Reagan or his close advisors to share their concern over the continuation of nuclear testing and their plea for mutual cessation of such testing in light of the current Soviet moratorium which will expire at the end of March.

I enclose a copy of the statement which some 200 eminent religious leaders have signed. They seek an opportunity for a small delegation to convey this message in person during the last week of March. The fact that, for the Christians in the group, it is Holy Week lends special emphasis to a conversation on such profound issues of policy and morality.

While I cannot list all the names in this brief letter, I can tell you that the group includes the heads of the following denominations: American Baptist Church, Church of the Brethren, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Reformed Church in America, United Church of Christ, and the Unitarian Universalist Association as well as 20 bishops from the Episcopal Church, seven bishops from the Lutheran Church in America, and three Catholic bishops. Other notable signers include: Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame University; Rev. Arie Brouer, General Secretary of the National Council of Churches; Bishop John Hurst Adams, Chairman of the National Congress of Black Churches; Ira Silverman, President of the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College; Arthur Hertzberg, past President of the American Jewish Congress; and Doris Younger, General Director of Church Women United.

The American Friends Service Committee (the principal Quaker agency for humanitarian relief, peace, and social justice work) and Clergy and Laity Concerned (an ecumenical peace organization) have coordinated the effort to secure so broad and impressive a list of signers. As Director of the AFSC Washington Office, I have been asked to seek an appointment, if possible, with the President or his close advisors on this matter. Having spoken with President Reagan's Scheduling Office, there is almost no chance to meet with him during the week in question. Thus I turn to you for a possible appointment.

The best days for a meeting would be Tuesday, March 25, or Wednesday, March 26. I expect that 7 or 8 persons would attend representing various denominations at the highest level. I hope that time might be found for this visitation.

Please call me at 483-3341 for further information or to discuss details of a possible appointment. With best wishes.

Sincerely,

James Matlack

James Matlack

An Affirmative Action Employer

Director
AFSC Washington Office

55

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