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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (6/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1507

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8164	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE ALLEGED U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/17/1986	B1
8165	MEMO	MATLOCK TO FORTIER RE ALLEGED U.S. RESPONSIBILITY IN PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/14/1986	B1
8174	MEMO	ABRAMS TO FORTIER RE MOSCOW BLAMES U.S. IN DEATH OF PALME <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/11/1985	B1
8166	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SUMMITRY AND THE SHULTZ-RYZHKOV MEETING <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	4	3/17/1986	B1
8167	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE USIA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	4	3/18/1986	B1
8173	CABLE	051909Z MAR 86 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	6	3/5/1986	B1
8168	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO POINDEXTER RE NOTE TO SHULZ ON PRESIDENT'S UNGA INITIATIVE <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/19/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (6/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1507

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8169	MEMO	SHULTZ RE IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S UNGA INITIATIVE <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8170	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ MEMO ON UNGA REGIONAL INITIATIVE <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/6/1986	B1
8171	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE IMPLEMENTING YOUR UNGA "REGIONAL INITIATIVE" <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/13/1986	B1
8172	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE IMPLEMENTING YOUR UNGA REGIONAL INITIATIVE <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	3/5/1986	B1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 17, 1986

~~Matlock~~
1972
→ FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Alleged U.S. Responsibility for Palme
Assassination (U)

Soviet television on March 6 carried outrageous charges alleging possible U.S. responsibility in the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. We are very pleased that the charges were strongly protested to Soviet Charge Sokolov by the Department. In addition, the Department may wish to consider a further protest during Secretary Shultz's March 15 meeting with Nikolay Ryzhkov. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8/64
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

2
1972

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD R. FORTIER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Alleged U.S. Responsibility in Palme Assassination

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Elliott Abrams in response to Abrams' memo of March 11 (Tab II). Abrams asks if we can protest Soviet accusations that the U.S. is responsible for the deaths of such world leaders as Aldo Moro, Indira Gandhi, Tancredo Neves and Olof Palme. In response we note that State protested these outrageous and irresponsible accusations to Soviet Charge Sokolov on March 14 and suggest that we may raise it again in Secretary Shultz's March 15 meeting with Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

SRS Steve Sestanovich, *PS* Peter Sommer, *n.a.* Walt Raymond and *VC.* Vincent Cannistraro concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you *approve RBM signing the* ~~sign the Fortier/Abrams~~ memo at Tab I.

Approve *NARA* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Fortier to Abrams memorandum
- Tab II Memorandum from Abrams

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/4 #81105

BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/20/13*



United States Department of State

1972

Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

TO: NSC - Mr. Fortier
FROM: ARA - Elliott Abrams
SUBJECT: Moscow Blames U.S. in Death of Palme

I know we have not achieved the full blessings of detente, but I was quite suprised at the attached Moscow Television Service item. It blames the U.S. in the deaths of Palme, Gandhi, Moro, and even Neves.

Can we protest this kind of garbage?

I send this to you in part because it seems to mee that the President should be aware of the kind of trash the Soviets are sending out.

Attachment

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

RW 3/9/11

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/L#8174
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

U.S. 'DISPLEASURE' 'COMMON FACTOR' IN LEADERS' DEATHS

LD062113 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 6 Mar 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valentin Zorin]

[Excerpt] The world press is continuing to publish materials related to the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The investigations into this murder by the Swedish authorities have thus far found no trace of the criminals, although a computer photograph [fotorobot] compiled on the evidence of witnesses has been distributed today.

But as the recently received facts show, it is not a question of the actions of an individual murderer but of a carefully planned plot worked out in fine detail.

Attempting to elucidate whom Olof Palme disturbed in retrospect, the Swedish press recalls that strong disagreements first arose around the personality of the deceased prime minister when he expressed sharp condemnation of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and participated in a mass protest demonstration in Stockholm in 1968. Numerous fresh facts also are adduced. It is particularly recalled that Olof Palme was subjected to crude attacks a year ago, only a year ago, on the part of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Burt. The cause for Washington's displeasure at that time was the Swedish Government head's criticism of Washington's policy with respect to Nicaragua.

In considering the circumstances of the eminent statesman's death, I thought of certain circumstances which I would like to share with you, comrades.

The world has witnessed the violent removal of a number of eminent figures from the political arena over the past few years. Each of these evil deeds is significant in its own right. But if one correlates them, then a most significant chain of events emerges. I will name a few of these terrorist acts:

The murder in Delhi of one of the most prominent statesmen of the past few decades, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Her policy, as is known often aroused sharp criticism from Washington. The tragic death of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who had irritated Washington through his desire to set up cooperation with the Italian Communist Party. The death in August 1981, in an aircraft disaster, of the leader of the Panamanian revolution, Omar Torrijos, who led the Panamanian people's struggle against Yankee imperialism for the right to control the Panama Canal. Friends of General Torrijos -- the remarkable writers Graham Greene and Gabriel Garcia Marquez and also his brother -- have openly accused the U.S. CIA of organizing the aircraft disaster. Also included on this list is the name of Chilean President Salvador Allende, a politician who aroused Washington's special, I would say paranoid, hatred.

And here is the most recent report, just received from the Brazilian capital. Investigations are under way there involving the group of doctors who operated on Tancredo Neves, elected to the post of president of Brazil in the spring of 1985. Neves' impending accession to the post of president caused much unease on the banks of the Potomac, insofar as he had spoken during the preelection campaign of the need to fight U.S. economic and political dominance in Brazil.

As has now become known, the operation, which was carried out on Neves on the eve of his accession to the presidency, took place in most suspicious circumstances. In particular, 18 people were in the operating theater at that time, of whom only half were doctors. Tancredo Neves thus died on the operating table without having occupied the post to which he was elected by the people of Brazil.

The circumstances of the tragic deaths of those whom I have named are different. The common factor is only that each of them was a figure who had aroused the displeasure of Washington.

There are no facts at this time which permit one to say definitely as to who put together the plot against Olof Palme. But, agree with me that the chain of events which I have recalled provides food for thought.

ARBATOV ON LATEST REAGAN SPEECH, SUMMIT PROSPECTS

PM061211 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 86 p 9

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by Marilo Ruiz de Elvira in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow -- Question: What message did Mikhail Gorbachev intend to convey in his policy report to the CPSU congress?

Answer: The message -- though addressed to two different audiences -- is that we cannot continue as at present, that we must change the way we think and behave. For our people this means that we must change, change our social relations, and the way we work within the party and government. For the outside world it means that we have reached a point of no return. If we continue to behave as we have behaved for years, the result will be frightening.

Question: What is the conclusion?

Answer: That despite all the difficulties and problems, we live in the same world, are extremely interdependent, and are in danger. In fact we face many dangers and we can only tackle them if we unite. So, like it or not, we must work together. We can do nothing on our own, and neither can the North Americans or the Europeans.

Question: What are these dangers?

Answer: The danger of war, the arms race, the possibility of the world's irreparable split between rich and poor nations, and the despair of the developing countries, whose situation is worsening daily.

Question: How can a greater degree of security be attained?

Answer: Gorbachev has formulated a new concept of security. Security cannot be built by means of weapons, military organizations, or military technological methods. It would be a miracle. Nowadays security is a political problem that can only be solved by political means. Otherwise the result will be that we will have more weapons and less security.

Question: But the United States cannot be blamed entirely for the cold war. Has the USSR not made mistakes too?

Answer: Nobody is perfect, of course, and if history gave us the chance to live again undoubtedly we would act differently, do other things... but that is a luxury that history does not grant us. It is time not to concentrate on who is more or less to blame but to decide what must be done now. Lenin said on a certain occasion that there are different kinds of mistakes.

Matlock 6

SYSTEM II
90212

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 17, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

SUBJECT: Summitry and the Shultz-Ryzhkov Meeting

The following are my impressions and conclusions from Secretary Shultz's meeting with Ryzhkov Saturday.

Summit Date

Ryzhkov made clear that he could not go beyond Gorbachev's comments to the Party congress, i.e., that the next Summit is important, that it could not be merely "protocollary," and that some "real achievements" would be necessary to justify it. INF and nuclear testing are clearly the Soviet targets for such "achievements," but when Shultz asked Ryzhkov if the President should be told that Gorbachev would not set a date until we reach satisfactory understandings on INF and testing, Ryzhkov refused to confirm. He said that Gorbachev's words at the Party Congress speak for themselves, and that they were still waiting for U.S. suggestions regarding the "content" of the Summit. (Shultz pointed out that we have many proposals on the table.) Just as we were leaving, Ryzhkov said -- as if to give the meeting a more upbeat conclusion -- that we should not "close any doors" to future meetings, and that the question of the date should be discussed further.

I infer from this that the Soviets understand that their interests would not be served if the meeting this year collapses. However, by taking the public stance they have, they seem to have painted themselves into a corner publicly. How they will wiggle out of it remains to be seen, but we doubtless face some continued pressure to define the principal "results" in advance. I suspect that the Soviets feel that we bested them at Geneva, and this feeling lies behind their recent maneuvers. They don't want Gorbachev to come home again with empty hands in terms of Soviet positions.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOIA-114/4 #8166
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

Issues

Shultz went through the talking points which you saw, though in a different order. Ryzhkov picked up on only two issues: INF and nuclear testing.

Regarding INF, he directed his criticism at our position on systems in Asia, saying that they had made a major concession in extending the "notion of the European zone" to Novosibirsk, and agreeing to destroy, not transfer, the missiles, yet they "see no movement." Since he did not single out our position on British and French systems for criticism, one might conclude that the treatment of the missiles in Asia is considered a more serious problem than the rejection of any linkage with the British and French.

He spent more time, however, on the nuclear testing issue, using the familiar Soviet arguments: that continued testing is inconsistent with a commitment to abolish nuclear weapons. As for the President's latest proposal, he claimed to have seen only press reports (probably true, since the text was not delivered in Moscow until noon that day), but was basically negative on the idea of improving verification of threshold testing limits. He asked Shultz directly whether we intend to continue testing, and Shultz confirmed that we do.

General Tone

Ryzhkov's approach, while implicitly accusatory, was more in sorrow than in anger. He repeated several times that developments since Geneva have produced "incomprehension" in Moscow. (Shultz made clear that we also are concerned about the lack of progress since Geneva and cited Soviet stonewalling in several areas.)

Ryzhkov the Man

Self assured and superficially very "Western" in his style, Ryzhkov projects the image of a corporate executive. He looks younger than his 55 years and would blend in well in an IBM Board meeting. His style was less argumentative than Gorbachev's, but this may only reflect the fact that he does not have primary responsibility for foreign affairs. As they parted, Shultz observed that it was a pity they had not had time to discuss economic questions since they share an interest in them. Ryzhkov responded that they would doubtless have opportunities on other occasions to do this -- which seemed to be a clear signal that, whatever their rhetoric at the moment, they are not thinking of ending the dialogue.

COMMENT:

We will probably have to wait until Dobrynin's return for another authoritative exchange regarding the Summit date. In the meantime, I would suggest that we say as little as possible about the date. Otherwise, we risk encouraging the Soviets to believe that we are so eager to nail it down we might yet pay a price -- which would simply add to their incentive to continue their current tactics. When asked, we should simply say that there is an agreement for a meeting this year which we assume the Soviets will honor, and so far as the date is concerned, the ball is in their court. I think we should avoid being drawn out on what dates are acceptable and which ones not acceptable.

If Dobrynin does not bring with him a suggested date, the President might make the following points to him:

1. Our invitation was in good faith, as was our suggestion for a date.
2. We do not understand why the Soviets seem to think that we are not as interested in results as they are.
3. We have made a number of proposals, and are perplexed at the lack of Soviet response to some and their failure to negotiate actively on others.
4. Nevertheless, we do not call the meeting into question, since we feel that it can play a major role in solving some of the current impasses.
5. A firm date could also serve to focus the attention of bureaucracies on both sides on possible achievements.
6. However, we have no greater interest in a meeting than do the Soviets. Preconditions from either side are clearly unacceptable.
7. Practically speaking, we need a few months to prepare a proper visit.
8. For this reason, we would hope that the General Secretary will see fit to indicate his preference regarding timing as soon as possible.

Handwritten:
Hood.
P

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you indicate your reaction to the approach outlined above. If you concur, I will incorporate it in the Briefing Memorandum for the Dobrynin meeting.

Approve *J*

Disapprove _____

2. That you discuss our public stance with the President, Don Regan and Secretary Shultz, and encourage them to minimize comments on the Summit timing and avoid public discussion of the pros and cons of various dates.

Approve *J*

Disapprove _____

Done.

JM-C
10NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 17, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Commentary on Palme Assassination

David Chew has asked NSC concurrence in forwarding to the President Soviet media commentary on the Olof Palme assassination which insinuates that the U.S. was responsible for the murder. Attached at Tab I is Chew's memo with a response from you saying that we have no problem with forwarding the material and noting that the Department of State has officially protested the Soviet statements.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to David Chew at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum from David Chew with response

Tab A Soviet news commentary

URGENT

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3/17/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: NOON 3/18/86

SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTARY ON OLAF PALME'S DEATH

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Do you have any objection to the attached going forward to the President?

RESPONSE: The NSC has no problem with forwarding the attached material to the President. We would note for the President's information that the Department of State has formally protested to the Soviets about these outrageous claims.

U.S. 'DISPLEASURE' 'COMMON FACTOR' IN LEADERS' DEATHS

LD062113 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 6 Mar 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valentin Zorin]

[Excerpt] The world press is continuing to publish materials related to the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The investigations into this murder by the Swedish authorities have thus far found no trace of the criminals, although a computer photograph [fotorobot] compiled on the evidence of witnesses has been distributed today.

But as the recently received facts show, it is not a question of the actions of an individual murderer but of a carefully planned plot worked out in fine detail.

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As has now become known, the operation, which was carried out on Neves on the eve of his accession to the presidency, took place in most suspicious circumstances. In particular, 18 people were in the operating theater at that time, of whom only half were doctors. Tancredo Neves thus died on the operating table without having occupied the post to which he was elected by the people of Brazil.

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ARBATOV ON LATEST REAGAN SPEECH, SUMMIT PROSPECTS

PM061211 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 86 p 9

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by Marilo Ruiz de Elvira in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow -- Question: What message did Mikhail Gorbachev intend to convey in his policy report to the CPSU congress?

Answer: The message -- though addressed to two different audiences -- is that we cannot continue as at present, that we must change the way we think and behave. For our people this means that we must change, change our social relations, and the way we work within the party and government. For the outside world it means that we have reached a point of no return. If we continue to behave as we have behaved for years, the result will be frightening.

Question: What is the conclusion?

Answer: That despite all the difficulties and problems, we live in the same world, are extremely interdependent, and are in danger. In fact we face many dangers and we can only tackle them if we unite. So, like it or not, we must work together. We can do nothing on our own, and neither can the North Americans or the Europeans.

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Answer: The danger of war, the arms race, the possibility of the world's irreparable split between rich and poor nations, and the despair of the developing countries, whose situation is worsening daily.

Question: How can a greater degree of security be attained?

Answer: Gorbachev has formulated a new concept of security. Security cannot be built by means of weapons, military organizations, or military technological methods. It would be a miracle. Nowadays security is a political problem that can only be solved by political means. Otherwise the result will be that we will have more weapons and less security.

Question: But the United States cannot be blamed entirely for the cold war. Has the USSR not made mistakes too?

Answer: Nobody is perfect, of course, and if history gave us the chance to live again undoubtedly we would act differently, do other things... but that is a luxury that history does not grant us. It is time not to concentrate on who is more or less to blame but to decide what must be done now. Lenin said on a certain occasion that there are different kinds of mistakes.

~~no block~~ 1742¹⁴
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1986

Dear Dave:

Many thanks for your letter of February 14 on the Sakharov letters. I appreciated the advance notice.

As you indicated, the letters reveal the stark truth behind Soviet claims that Sakharov is leading a normal life in Gorky.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Mr. David R. Gergen
Senior Managing Editor
U.S. News & World Report
2400 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

15

1742

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 6, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to David Gergen

Attached at Tab I is a letter to David Gergen, Senior Managing Editor of U.S. News & World Report, acknowledging his letter to you of February 14. Gergen wrote to advise you of U.S. News's impending publication of letters from Andrey Sakharov describing the difficult conditions of his exile in Gorky.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to David Gergen at Tab I.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Letter to David Gergen
- Tab II Letter from David Gergen

FEB 18 1986
1P



2400 N Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20037 • (202) 955-2000

*material
body if appropriate*

February 14, 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear John:

U.S. News & World Report is publishing this weekend the first written evidence of Andrei Sakharov's mistreatment by the KGB in his exile in Gorky. The letters, smuggled to his family in the U.S., appearing in this issue and next, stand in stark contrast to the official Soviet version of his exile.

Sincerely,

David

David R. Gergen
Senior Managing Editor

DG/crs

John -

*we thought you and your
colleagues might find this material
especially interesting.*

Hope all goes well,

David

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~Minut.~~ 17
→ FILE
1945

March 17, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *Pat for*
SUBJECT: State Draft Report on S. 1947, Regarding
Protection of U.S. Interests Under the Foreign
Missions Act

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed State draft report on S. 1947, regarding protection of U.S. interests under the Foreign Missions Act.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Draft Report S. 1947



2



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

1945

March 7, 1986

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-

Department of Commerce
National Security Council ✓
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: State draft report on S. 1947, regarding protection
of U.S. interests under the Foreign Missions Act.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than TUESDAY, APRIL 1, 1986.

Questions should be referred to Sue Thau (395-7300),
the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: J. Barie
R. Neely



20
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of State refers to proposed legislation S. 1947, a bill which enhances the protection of United States interests under the Foreign Missions Act.

The Department has noted a tendency on the part of foreign diplomatic offices to blur the distinction between the usual diplomatic functions carried out by foreign missions and commercial, promotional and other activities which have, heretofore, remained outside the limits of traditional diplomatic practices. In broadening the definition of "foreign missions" the proposed legislation would extend the purview of the Foreign Missions Act to encompass these new, hybrid offices. Consequently, the Department would be better equipped to fulfill the intents and purposes of the Act both in terms of exacting reciprocal privileges for its own missions overseas and in enforcing those controls, regulations and policies which may be appropriate for offices and entities controlled by foreign governments and which are located within the United States.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

The Honorable
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: State Draft Report on S. 1947, Regarding
Protection of U.S. Interests Under the Foreign
Missions Act

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed State draft report on S. 1947 regarding protection of U.S. interests under the Foreign Missions Act. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson for your signature.

SD Danzansky and *SA* Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *WMPF* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Ronald K. Peterson
Tab A State Draft Report

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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~~Matlock~~

22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 18, 1986

FILE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *M 3-19*

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: USIA Conference on Public Diplomacy

As you know, USIA conducted a conference of PAO's in NATO countries in London March 3-4. The purpose was to discuss public diplomacy strategy for dealing with East-West issues in Allied countries.

The telegrams reporting on the conference proceedings are at Tab I. Those of us participating came away with the following impressions of European attitudes:

1. An attitude that both superpowers act very much alike (i.e., something close to the "moral equivalence" thesis) is an important sentiment in all the countries with the possible exception of France. It underlies many of our political problems in obtaining Allied consensus on specific issues, especially those involving conflict out of the NATO area.

2. The Geneva Summit had a major impact in all countries, with approval of U.S. handling of East-West issues rising everywhere. Coupled with this, however, was a rise in approval of Soviet foreign policy. In Italy, for example, Gorbachev's "approval ratings" rose more than Reagan's, although the President remains far ahead of Gorbachev. (This suggests, by the way, that we face a PR problem in Europe if the Summit this year does not materialize.)

3. At the moment, Allied cohesion on most arms control issues is solid. Our consultations on Gorbachev's January 15 proposals (which were received skeptically in Europe to begin with) succeeded brilliantly. (This shows, by the way, the value of intensive consultations, particularly when they result in some shift of the U.S. position in response to Allied comments.)

4. Nevertheless, lurking under the surface are problem areas:

a. Some polls indicate that skepticism toward SDI seems to be growing among the broad publics in Europe. It is difficult, however, to interpret the polling evidence since much depends on

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

the way the question is asked. It is probably more relevant to note that SDI is not a front-burner issue in Europe, and a relatively quiet, systematic educational approach seems preferable in dealing with it since there seems no good reason to make it a high profile issue in Europe.

b. In some countries (the UK for example) there is disquiet about our refusal to enter into negotiations on a CTB. (This is not the same as pressure to join the Soviet-proposed moratorium; the British, for example, oppose that, but advocate agreeing to resume negotiations on a CTB. In general, anti-nuclear sentiment is particularly strong in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and on the left side of the political spectrum in Germany.)

5. As noted, public criticism of U.S. policy tends to be greatest in regard to regional conflicts. In most countries (France, again, is an exception), Afghanistan gets little attention, while U.S. policy in Central America is the object of widespread criticism. (The feeling was that we are limited in what we can do directly to swing the sentiment regarding Central America; for this, the most persuasive spokesmen will be persons from the area. We should think more about getting our friends in Central America to put the case more actively in Europe. As for Afghanistan, we clearly need steps to get more news of Soviet actions there into the European media.)

6. France, in many ways the exception to these general trends, presents one of the brightest pictures in Europe, in terms of public attitudes. In recent years, there has been a decided swing of French intellectual sentiment to a more anti-Soviet and pro-American position. Raymond Aron is the intellectual hero of much French youth, and the non-Communist left is bitterly critical of the Soviet Union. This is a reversal of French intellectual attitudes from those prevalent just after World War II. In the past, French intellectual currents have been the precursors of those which sweep through intellectual circles in Europe as a whole. We can only hope that this will prove true in the future as well.

Bearing in mind these general conclusions regarding the substantive job to be done, we also came away with the following impressions of USIA's capacity to deal with them in the field:

1. The meeting was definitely needed; most PAO's were not solidly familiar with important nuances of our current policy, particularly in regard to arms control issues. Their questioning reflected this, and we were able to give them solid guidance across the spectrum of East-West issues. For this, the participation of Linhard, Steiner and Mandel -- backed up by DOD representatives -- was absolutely essential. The USIA officials present were unable to cope with the questions, and indeed, had to be corrected at times on important points.

2. The PAO's, except for Korengold, were not aware of the need for factoring possible Presidential activity into their plans for local treatment of issues. (Example: the possibility of arranging, from time to time, written Presidential interviews in the local media, designed both to deal with important issues in the country in question and to be replayed elsewhere.) They were encouraged to think in advance how Washington involvement to strengthen their programs and plan media coverage pro-actively. Karna Small was particularly effective in advising on techniques and approaches which draw on White House experience, and make use of the support we can offer.

3. Few seemed to have taken a forward look at attitudes in their countries, and developed a long-term strategy to deal with it. Since some fundamental attitudes can only be changed over time, a comprehensive and persistent program is necessary. USIA will be tasking such plans shortly, and the PAO's were asked to start thinking about them.

The following specific taskings were developed at the conference, or are being discussed currently with USIA as a result of the conference:

1. The NSC staff will develop talking points on the most prevalent "myths" about U.S. policy for use in the field. A preliminary version of these points was presented at the conference, and PAO's were instructed to add myths current locally to the list so that we can provide appropriate guidance.

2. USIA, working with State Public Affairs, will refine our current list of speakers available for particular topics, and will add to this an indication of relevant foreign language capability. (In some countries there is a great need for speakers who can deal with the issues in the local language -- particularly effective for TV interviews, for example. We may not be able to help out much with Icelandic, Danish and Dutch, but we should be able to find some who can handle French, German, Spanish or Italian.)

3. We will take another look at the problem of encouraging friendly representatives from Latin America to be more active in spreading the public diplomacy message in Europe. Attention has been given to this in the past, but results so far have been meager. (It is a major problem; one of the first things the Soviets and their clients do is to organize major public efforts utilizing local people -- just look at how much more active the Sandinistas are in Europe than the Costa Ricans, Hondurans and Salvadorans. We clearly need to do more to get our friends to go out front.)

4. Detailed public affairs guidance on dealing with the Washington Summit will be issued as soon as the Summit date is

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- 4 -

set. (A draft was sent up for approval February 28 -- package number 1644.)

✓ 5. We are now discussing with USIA the terms of tasking PAO's formally to develop local long-term strategies for dealing with the underlying misconceptions regarding U.S. handling of East-West issues.

USIA tells me that feed-back from the conference from PAO's has been very positive. Several commented to Kordek, the USIA Assistant Director for Europe, that it was the most useful of recent USIA conferences since it focussed on substantive issues rather than the nuts and bolts which usually dominate USIA conferences.

^{LS}Small, ^{AE}Linhard, ^{AE}Mandel and ^{AE}Steiner concur.

Attachment:

Tab I -- USIA cables reporting on the conference.

cc: Walt Raymond

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UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

INCUMING TELEGRAM

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SINGLE ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, SUCH AS ARMS CONTROL, AND GIVE IT PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHERS. THE U.S. FOUR-POINT AGENDA DEFINES THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR:

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- ✓ -- ELIMINATING THE SOVIET USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE.
- ✓ -- THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
- ✓ -- IMPROVING THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND CONFIDENCE.
- ✓ -- SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WILL INFLUENCE THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WE CAN HAVE THAT SOVIETS WILL CARRY OUT THEIR COMMITMENTS IN OTHER AREAS.

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REHICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TOOK ISSUE WITH SOME OF THE MOST PROMINENT MYTHS EUROPEANS AND OTHERS HOLD ABOUT THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, AMONG THEM: THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION AS SUPERPOWERS TEND TO ACT THE SAME; THAT THE ARMS RACE IS THE PRIMARY THREAT TO PEACE; THAT RHETORIC AND PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION IS IN ITSELF DANGEROUS.

1. SUMMARY: THE FIRST DAY OF THE CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE FOCUSED ON THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIMENSIONS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS CONTROL, SDI, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK PROVIDED CONTEXT FOR THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS REVIEW OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION PREMISED ON THE BELIEF THAT EUROPEAN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN POLICIES ON MANY ISSUES DERIVE FROM BASIC MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. APPROACHES TO THE SOVIET UNION. AMBASSADOR NITZE DISCUSSED PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST SOVIET ARMS PROPOSALS AND PROVIDED THE RATIONALE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT RESPONSE. THE CONFERENCE CLOSED WITH A SECOND DAY'S DISCUSSION OF USIA RESEARCH ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON EAST-WEST ISSUES, DISCUSSION OF HOW THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARING FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT, AND U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE MEETING. END SUMMARY.

DURING DISCUSSION, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD SUMMIT MEETINGS HAD NOT
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2. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION:

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OPENED THE CONFERENCE WITH COMMENTS ABOUT EUROPEAN MISPERCEPTIONS OF A VARIETY OF U.S. POLICIES THAT DERIVE FUNDAMENTALLY FROM MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S. POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES OFTEN TAKE A PAROCHIAL VIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHILE THE U.S. MUST HAVE A BROADER OUTLOOK. HE SAID HE FELT THE U.S. HAD MADE PROGRESS DURING THE PAST TWO-THREE YEARS IN CORRECTING SOME OF THESE MISPERCEPTIONS.

26 MAR 5 3:50

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK BRIEFLY CONSIDERED THE U.S. POSITION AS WE MOVE TOWARD THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING. HE EMPHASIZED THE U.S. VIEW THAT U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS CAN HAVE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV DID IN NOVEMBER, WITHOUT NECESSARILY SIGNING AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THE REAL ACHIEVEMENT OF GENEVA WAS PUTTING A FRAMEWORK IN PLACE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS, AT VARIOUS LEVELS.

SUMMIT MEETINGS SHOULD DEAL WITH THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THEY SHOULD NOT ISOLATE A

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE

CHANGED: THE UNITED STATES STILL WANTED A WELL-PREPARED MEETING, BUT FELT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PRECONDITIONS SUCH AS REQUIREMENTS FOR AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE. THERE WAS ALSO DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER THE FORTHCOMING SUMMITS WOULD LEAD WESTERN PUBLICS TO EXPECT ANNUAL MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS TO BE A PERMANENT FIXTURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA AND WHETHER THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

3. ARMS CONTROL AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS:

AMBASSADOR NITZE SPOKE ON THE U.S. RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE EMPHASIZED THE VALUE OF AMERICA'S CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AND CALLED THEM "A COMPLETE SUCCESS." AS A RESULT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, HE ADDED, "THE ALLIES ARE WITH US AND THE ALLIANCE IS STRONGER."

AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOWED THAT THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIETS' JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS COINCIDED WITH OUR OWN. THE EUROPEANS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF INF WHILE A SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES STILL EXISTS. BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFICIALS REITERATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY PROPOSAL THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE ABOLITION OF THEIR INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENENTS. TAKING THESE CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, THE PRESIDENT IN HIS RESPONSE TO MOSCOW INSISTED THAT SEVERAL STEPS MUST BE COMPLETED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR BEFORE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENENTS MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO THE NEGOTIATING EQUATION.

CTB, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR NITZE, STILL PROVOKES DEBATE IN SOME QUARTERS. POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE CTB. IT IS U.S. POLICY, SAID NITZE, TO GO ON TESTING AS LONG AS WE MUST RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE TO RELY SO EXTENSIVELY ON TESTING.

IN REGARD TO SDI, NITZE NOTED THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT AT THIS TIME NEGOTIATE IT. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, HAVE NOT MADE AN ATTRACTIVE

OFFER ON THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY SIDE, THEIR INF PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE, AND THEY HAVE SAID NOTHING ABOUT STRATEGIC WEAPONS. WE WANT TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP, HE SAID, AND WE WANT AN "OFFENSIVE TREATY AS SOLID AS THE ABM TREATY."

NITZE THEN TURNED TO THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE, WHICH HE HAD ATTENDED OVER THE WEEKEND. HE SAID THAT MANY ALLIED SPOKESMEN THERE WERE SKEPTICAL OF THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION IN BOTH INF AND STRATEGIC FORCES. GERMAN MOD WOERNER, ACCORDING TO NITZE, FULLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSAL. WOERNER FURTHERMORE SEES OTHER WAYS, BESIDES INF, OF "COUPLING" THE U.S. TO WESTERN EUROPE.

AMBASSADOR NITZE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF, AND AN ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S MARATHON SPEECH TO THE PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH HE FOUND PREDICTABLE AND STALE.

COL. ROBERT LINHARD, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL AT THE NSC, ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES AND DESCRIBED THE NSC'S EXPLANATION OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY TO THE U.S. CONGRESS.

HE DISCUSSED THE THREE QUESTIONS ON INF MOST COMMONLY POSED BY AMERICAN REPORTERS: ARE THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/RENICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE

REGIONAL CONFLICTS PRECONDITIONS TO MOVE
FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL? AREN'T THESE
PROPOSALS THE SAME OLD ZERO-ZERO OPTION OF
1982? WON'T THE ELIMINATION OF INF LEAD TO
"DECOUPLING?" THE ANSWER TO ALL THREE
QUESTIONS IS "NO."

PETER SULLIVAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY TO THE DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR
FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, SPOKE ON MBFR,
CDE, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN ALL THREE,
VERIFICATION REMAINS THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO
AGREEMENT AND THERE CAN BE NO AGREEMENT UNTIL
THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT
BEEN FORTHCOMING IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THEY
WILL PROBABLY NOT BE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. SDI AND NUCLEAR TESTING:

DISCUSSION WAS LED BY COL. ROBERT LINHARD AND
STEVE STEINER, NSC, AND PETER SULLIVAN, DOD.
STEINER REVIEWED THE WORK OF THE INTERAGENCY
GROUP WORKING ON SDI PUBLIC HANDLING POLICY
AND CITED MAIN ISSUES RELATING TO THE
INITIATIVE. THE FLOOR WAS THEN THROWN OPEN FOR
DISCUSSION. PAOS' CONCERNS CENTERED ON: U.S.-
ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER THE DESIRABILITY OF
TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CTBT; THE POSSIBLE COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVENESS OF USING A SUGGESTED TALKING POINT
THAT A HALT TO U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING WOULD AMONG
OTHER THINGS LEAD TO THE LOSS OF SCIENTISTS FROM
U.S. WEAPONS LABORATORIES; THE DIFFICULTY OF
CONVINCING ALLIES THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS A
POOR IDEA WHEN OUR OWN CONGRESS HAS PASSED A
RESOLUTION FAVORING IT; PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE
SUDDEN APPARENT SOVIET FORTHCOMINGNESS ON
VERIFICATION AND THE NEED TO BASE OUR DEFENSE
OF CONTINUED NUCLEAR TESTING ON THE
REQUIREMENT (THAT WILL REMAIN VALID AS LONG AS
DETERRENCE IS BASED ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS) TO
TEST OUR STOCK TO ENSURE IT REMAINS RELIABLE
AND USABLE; THE NEED FOR SENSITIVITY IN
EXPLAINING TO PUBLICS THE SMALL BUT IMPORTANT
NUCLEAR COMPONENT OF THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM;
PUBLIC QUESTIONING OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITMENT TO SHARE SDI TECHNOLOGY WITH THE
SOVIETS; AND U.S. OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TO THE
EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, RECALLING A CABLE POSTS HAD
PROVIDED IN LATE 1985 ON SDI, SUGGESTED
THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR AN UPDATE WITH POSTS'
CURRENT VIEW ON HOW PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SDI
HAD EVOLVED.

5. REGIONAL ISSUES:

MATLOCK OPENED THIS SESSION WITH A DISCUSSION
OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR THE PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. HE SAID THAT
THE U.S. DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REPLY
IMMEDIATELY TO THIS PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, "OVER TIME,
AND WITH ENOUGH INCENTIVES, THEY MAY RESPOND."

THE GROUP DISCUSSED SEVERAL OF THOSE REGIONAL
ISSUES--AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, ANGOLA--
AND NOTED SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THESE AREAS
PRESENT IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.

ALL AGREED THAT THOSE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN
EACH OF THESE ISSUES OUGHT TO BE IN THE
FOREFRONT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. FOR
EXAMPLE, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM COSTA RICA
AND GUATEMALA SHOULD ADVOCATE THEIR OWN
CAUSES. WHEN THE U.S. TRIES TO SUBSTITUTE
FOR THEM IT ERODES CREDIBILITY.

ACTION:

THAT THE U.S. ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY VISITS TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BY
CREDIBLE PERSONS FROM THE REGIONS INVOLVED.

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USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REHICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE

THIS SHOULD INCLUDE, WHEN APPROPRIATE,
APPEARANCES ON WORLDNET.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS:

JUDYT MANDEL, NSC, DISCUSSED THREE KEY MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES:

-- THAT THE U.S. WAS CURRENTLY "PULLING ITS PUNCHES" ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BECAUSE OF THE SUMMIT ATMOSPHERE. NOT SO, SHE SAID; HUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT ABOUT ABUSES BUT IN GENERAL TERMS, AVOIDING THE PUBLIC AIRING OF SPECIFIC CASES.

-- THAT WE HAVE SINGLED OUT THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISM AND IGNORED EQUALLY BLATANT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTRIES CLOSE TO THE U.S. ON THE CONTRARY, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IS UNIVERSAL. WE HAVE BEEN QUITE FORTHRIGHT IN CONDEMNING ABUSES EVERYWHERE.

-- THAT A FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS JEOPARDIZES MORE IMPORTANT EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL OR REGIONAL ISSUES. THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR ABILITY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS ACROSS THE BROAD FRONT OF ISSUES THAT CONCERN US, BUT THERE IS NO "LINKAGE" BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT CONGRESS HAD MANDATED LINKAGE BETWEEN EMIGRATION AND TRADE MATTERS.

7. THE SECOND DAY OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONFERENCE WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS FALLOUT FROM THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT AND PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. PAOS NOTED THE VERY POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE GENEVA MEETING. THEY ALSO REVIEWED OTHER MAJOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONCERNS IN THEIR COUNTRIES. A CONCLUDING DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION BY WASHINGTON AND FIELD POSTS ADDRESSED TO THE SEVERAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THE CONFERENCE. -

8. USIA RESEARCH ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON

PHIL ARNOLD OF USIA'S PROGRAM BUREAU REVIEWED RECENT AGENCY RESEARCH. HE NOTED P/R'S FEELING THAT THE U.S. PRE-GENEVA MEETING PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY WORKED IN THAT EXPECTATIONS THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD OR SHOULD PRODUCE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WERE KEPT LOW AND SDI REMAINED A SUBSIDIARY ISSUE. HE NOTED POLL RESULTS SHOWING MAJORITIES IN KEY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS BELIEVING THAT U.S. ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE GENUINE. DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, PAOS VOICED CONCERNS ABOUT EVIDENCE OF A CONTINUING "MORAL EQUIVALENCY" PRECONCEPTION, THE MISPERCEPTION THAT SDI IS A BARRIER ON THE ROAD TO ARMS CONTROL, AND EUROPEAN FEARS THAT THE PROTECTION OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA MAY BE TAKEN AWAY WITH THE COMING OF SDI AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STEINER (NSC) URGED POSTS TO STRESS THAT IN FACT SDI IS NOT PROVING A BARRIER TO ARMS CONTROL DESPITE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO LINK PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF SDI. MANDEL (NSC) REMINDED THE GROUP THAT OUR PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSITION LOOKED BAD IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE INF DEBATE, BUT GRADUALLY EUROPEAN AUDIENCES WERE SENSITIZED TO THE SOVIET SS-20 THREAT AND THE NEED FOR A NATO RESPONSE; SHE ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR A STEADY, PATIENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM STRESSING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN VERY VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF
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O 051909Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0913

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 LONDON 04778

USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REHICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE

STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH.

9. COUNTRY REPORTS: THE REACTION TO GENEVA:

ALL PAOS AGREED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT WAS A
BOON TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL IMAGE IN
EUROPE AND TO MOST-COUNTRY ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES. POLLS INDICATE THAT THE
PRESIDENT GAINED IN APPROVAL RATINGS
EVERYWHERE. THIS IMPROVEMENT VARIED FROM SLIGHT
IN ITALY TO DRAMATIC IN GREAT BRITAIN. GORBACHEV
ALSO BENEFITED FROM THE SUMMIT, REGISTERING
ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN ITALY.

SDI, ACCORDING TO THE PAOS, CONTINUES TO CLAIM
MUCH ATTENTION, ALTHOUGH IN MOST COUNTRIES
POLLS SUGGEST THAT IT HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED BY
HALF OR MORE OF THE POPULATION. U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA, HOWEVER, REMAINS
UNPOPULAR AMONG SMALL BUT VOCAL MINORITIES IN
EVERY COUNTRY.

THE SOVIETS ARE HELD IN LOW REPUTE IN WESTERN EUROPE
FOR THEIR POLICIES TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS, POLAND AND
AFGHANISTAN. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN FRANCE,
A COUNTRY INCREASINGLY PRO-AMERICAN BUT ONE PRE-
OCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES.

FINALLY, THE PAOS AGREED THAT U.S. CONSULTATIONS
WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON
ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR POLICIES.

10. SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT:

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AND MOSCOW PAO RAY BENSON
OPENED THE DISCUSSION. BENSON CONSIDERED
PUBLIC THEMES THE SOVIETS ARE EMPHASIZING
DURING THIS PRE-SUMMIT PERIOD. HE EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT POST BUDGETS WOULD BE CUT UNDER
GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS AT A TIME WHEN MORE
NEEDS TO BE DONE, AND AT THE VERY TIME WHEN
THE SOVIETS ARE USING FAR MORE SOPHISTICATED
PUBLIC AFFAIRS TOOLS THAN THEY HAVE USED IN
THE PAST. BENSON ALSO NOTED THAT THE MOST
EFFECTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS VEHICLE WAS STILL THE
WELL-INFORMED AGENCY OFFICER MEETING AND
DEBATING WITH HIS CONTACTS. MATLOCK SAID THAT
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SHOULD STRESS THE SAME

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WE DID IN THE LEAD-UP TO
GENEVA. HE OPINED THAT, WHILE GORBACHEV IS
GETTING MORE MEDIA ATTENTION, IN THE LONG RUN
A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLICS IS LIKELY
TO DEPEND ON CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY. IF THE
SOVIETS ARE GETTING MORE PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSCIOUS,
HE SAID, THAT COULD BE GOOD IF THE FEEDBACK THEY
GET LEADS THEM TO BE MORE SENSITIVE TO WESTERN
CONCERNS AND THUS TO ALTER THEIR POSITIONS ON
SOME ISSUES. HE JUDGES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
EXAGGERATING THEIR WORRIES ABOUT SDI AND THEY
WOULD FALL OFF THEIR PRESENT POSITION--WHICH
THEY KNOW IS NOT NEGOTIABLE--WHEN THEY ARE READY
FOR AN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MATLOCK
SAID HE SENSED SOME DECLINE IN EUROPEAN PREOCCUPATION
WITH SDI, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT
HAVE TO HAVE ACTIVE EUROPEAN SUPPORT TO CARRY OUT
THE PROGRAM, IN CONTRAST TO INF WHEN THE APPROVAL
OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS WAS ESSENTIAL. IF THE
ISSUE IS QUIESCENT, HE ARGUED, WE SHOULD NOT ACT
TO STIR UP A DISPUTE WHERE THERE IS NONE.

STEINER (NSC) SAID THERE WERE STILL SITUATIONS
IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHERE APPROPRIATE SDI
PROGRAMMING WOULD SEEM WORTHWHILE. HE NOTED
THAT WASHINGTON WOULD SOON HAVE READY A NEW
PAMPHLET EXPOSING SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS
AGAINST SDI.

MATLOCK NOTED THAT RECENT U.S.-SOVIET MEDIA
EXCHANGES HAD PROVEN USEFUL AND THAT WE SHOULD
SEEK MORE. THE PRESIDENT'S APPEARANCES ON
BT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

TELEGRAM 31

PAGE 01

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ACTION OFFICE SPEC-04 HANDLED AS SPECDIS
INFO /004 A3 1

O 051909Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0914
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 LONDON 04778

USIA

FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK

EO 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U. S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE

SOVIET TELEVISION DURING THE GENEVA MEETING AND ON NEW YEAR'S DAY SERVED TO DE-DEMONIZE HIM IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC AND UNDERMINED SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRUM UP XENOPHOBIC FEELINGS. MATLOCK SAID GORBACHEV HAS ESSENTIALLY MADE TWO ACCUSATIONS AGAINST SDI, BOTH OF THEM EASILY REFUTABLE. GORBACHEV HAS SAID THAT SDI COULD BE USED TO SUPPORT A U. S. FIRST-STRIKE STRATEGY. HOWEVER, U. S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY AIMS FOR DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH CUTS WOULD MAKE ANY SUCH STRATEGY UNTHINKABLE. SECONDLY, GORBACHEV CLAIMS THAT ONCE WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED IN SPACE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER THEY ARE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. HOWEVER, SDI DEPLOYMENTS WOULD NOT BE A REASONABLE WAY TO OPTIMIZE THE USE OF SPACE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. ||

11. SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR EUROPE:

A CONSENSUS EMERGED THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO FINDING AND SPONSORING EFFECTIVE SPEAKERS FOR BOTH THE PRE- AND POST-SUMMIT PERIODS, IF POSSIBLE SPEAKERS WITH A FLUENT COMMAND OF THE HOST-COUNTRY LANGUAGE. SDI BRIEFING TEAMS HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL, AND THE PAOS ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING MORE OF THEM.

ACTION:

- ✓ 1. WORK UNDERWAY IN USIA, STATE AND NSC SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LISTS OF AVAILABLE SPEAKERS.
- ✓ 2. NSC WILL DEVELOP, IN COOPERATION WITH STATE AND USIA, APPROVED TALKING POINTS TO BE USED TO REFUTE THE MORE IMPORTANT MISPERCEPTIONS OF U. S. POLICY ON EAST-WEST ISSUES.
- ✓ 3. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING THE RUN-UP TO THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED.

KORENGOLD
BT
*4778

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01
IBM172

LONDON 4806

DTG:061209Z MAR 86 PSN:058589
TOR: 065/1213Z CSN:EHA510

DISTRIBUTION:

NSJL EAST EUROPE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SOVIET USSR
NSHGS SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY USSR
NSSRS EAST EUROPE SOVIET USSR
NSDGM SOVIET USSR
NSJEM SOVIET USSR
NSHP UK
NSJD UK
NSNDS EUROPE
NSPJD EAST EUROPE

WHSR COMMENT:

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MATL
EOB:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHLD #4806 0651209
R 061209Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO USIA WASHDC 0921
UNCLAS LONDON 04806

USIA

USIA FOR EU/KORDEK, REMICK; NSC FOR AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK

EO 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES OF
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK

1. AS AN ADJUNCT TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE
MARCH 3-4 USIA/NSC CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR
DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS, NSC,
CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF HIGHLY USEFUL PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES FOR USIS LONDON. HE MET
WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF KEY GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND JOURNALISTS DEALING
WITH EAST-WEST AFFAIRS, OUTLINING IN EACH
INSTANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE NEAR AND LONG
TERM. HIS DETAILED SCHEDULE WAS AS FOLLOWS:

TUESDAY PM: DRINKS AND DISCUSSION WITH LORD

-- BETHELL, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
-- POLITICAL COMMITTEE RAPPORTEUR,
-- ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY REPORT
-- ON U.S./EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
-- POLITICAL RELATIONS.

WEDNESDAY AM: MEETINGS WITH CABINET
-- OFFICE DEPUTY SECRETARY
-- CHRISTOPHER MALLABY; TIMOTHY
-- RENTON, FCO MINISTER OF
-- STATE; DEREK THOMAS, FCO
-- POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY
-- UNDER SECRETARY.

LUNCH: HOSTED BY DCM RAY SEITZ. GUESTS
-- INCLUDED NICHOLAS ASHFORD,
-- DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, THE
-- TIMES; MICHAEL BRUNSON, DIPLO-
-- MATIC EDITOR, INDEPENDENT TELE-
-- VISION NEWS; PROFESSOR LAWRENCE
-- FREEDMAN, KING'S COLLEGE; NIK
-- GOWING, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
-- CORRESPONDENT, CHANNEL 4 NEWS;
-- SIR CURTIS KEEBLE, FORMER UK
-- AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW DURING AMB.
-- MATLOCK'S TIME; MALCOLM
-- MAC INTOSH, CABINET OFFICER,
-- EAST EUROPE EXPERT; DR. ROBERT
-- O'NEILL, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
-- INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES.

WEDNESDAY PM: ROUND TABLE MEETING ON
-- U.S./USSR RELATIONS AT CHATHAM
-- HOUSE. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED
-- NICHOLAS ASHFORD (ABOVE);
-- ADMIRAL SIR JAMES EBERLE,
-- DIRECTOR, CHATHAM HOUSE;
-- ROBERT KLEIMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW;
-- DAVID KORN, RESEARCH FELLOW;
-- KEITH KYLE, MEETINGS SECRETARY;
-- WILLIAM WALLACE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
-- AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES;
-- JOHN ROPER, EDITOR, INTER-
-- NATIONAL AFFAIRS; PAULINE
-- NEVILLE-JONES, FOREIGN OFFICE;

DINNER: HOSTED BY PAO ROBERT KORENGOLD.
-- GUESTS INCLUDED MELVIN LASKY,
-- EDITOR, ENCOUNTER MAGAZINE; MARK
-- FRANKLAND, COLUMNIST ON SOVIET
-- AFFAIRS FOR THE OBSERVER; DAVID
-- BUCHAN, EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
-- CORRESPONDENT, FINANCIAL TIMES;

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-- ALFRED CAHEN, SECRETARY-GENERAL,
-- WEST EUROPEAN UNION.

2. POST IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK FOR HIS WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION IN
POST PROGRAM. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE HIM
RETURN AT ANY TIME.

KORENGOLD

** END OF CABLE **

July - 35

2112

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 18, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter to the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a brief letter from Gorbachev thanking the President for his greeting on the occasion of Gorbachev's 55th birthday.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Steve ^{n.a.} Sestanovich and Judy ^{JM} Mandel concur.

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to the President from Gorbachev

Tab II Memorandum from State

Tab III Cover letter from the Soviet Embassy

Tab IV Russian language text of Gorbachev message

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Letter of Acknowledgment from Gorbachev


Attached is a brief letter from Gorbachev thanking you for your recent birthday greeting. Gorbachev turned 55 on March 2.

RecommendationOKNo

That you read the attached message.

Attachment:

Tab A Message from Gorbachev



Unofficial translation

His Excellency
Ronald W. REAGAN
The President of the
United States of America

March 14, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your congratulations on my fifty-fifth birthday. Sharing the hope you expressed for moving along the path set in Geneva, I would like to note that it can be achieved first of all by steps which would contribute to strengthening peace and international security.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASSED)





8608607 2112
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED


March 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Reply to President's Birthday Message

Soviet Charge d'Affaires Sokolov has forwarded to us General Secretary Gorbachev's reply to the President's congratulatory message on the occasion of Gorbachev's fifty-fifth birthday. In his reply Gorbachev says that he shares the President's hope for moving along the path set in Geneva and states that this "can be achieved first of all by steps which contribute to strengthening peace and international security."

English and Russian language texts of the message supplied by the Soviet Embassy are at Tab A. Sokolov's covering letter is at Tab B.


Nicholas Platt *for*
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- A. English and Russian Texts of Gorbachev Letter.
- B. Sokolov Transmittal Letter.

UNCLASSIFIED



March 14, 1986

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have been instructed to transmit herewith the text of the reply by General Secretary M.S.Gorbachev to the President's congratulatory message on the occasion of the General Secretary's fifty-fifth birthday.

Your forwarding of this text to the President will be appreciated.

Sincerely,



O.SOKOLOV

Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

The Honorable George P.SHULTS

The Secretary of State

The Department of State

II

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Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. РЕЙГАНУ
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравление по случаю моего пятидесяти-
пятилетия. Разделяя выраженную Вами надежду на продвижение по
намеченному в Женеве пути, хотел бы отметить, что этого можно
достигнуть с помощью прежде всего тех шагов, которые содейст-
вовали бы укреплению мира и международной безопасности.

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

14 марта 1986 года

DECLASSIFIED (RE/ASO)
Department of State Guidelines, July 27, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 7/3/02

~~SECRET~~

~~Matlock~~ 44
2232

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Chow

~~SECRET~~

March 19, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT: Note to Shultz on President's UNGA Initiative

You asked for a short note to George Shultz briefly summarizing concerns raised by his paper to the President on implementing the UNGA "regional initiative."

The attached draft focuses on Afghanistan and Cambodia, the two areas on which State is proposing some specific actions in the near future. We could quibble about a number of other points in Shultz's paper, but these are much less significant and probably not appropriate for this message.

RYS Rodman, *NA* Matlock, *SRS* Childress, *all for* Tahrir Kheli concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached note to Shultz.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Note to Shultz
- Tab II Sestanovich Memo to Poindexter, March 6
- Tab III Poindexter Memo to the President, March 13
- Tab IV Shultz Memo to the President, March 5

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Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/4 #8168
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Implementing the President's UNGA Initiative (U)

The President has had a chance to look over the paper you sent him on March 5, about how to follow up on last year's "regional initiative." He is pleased with the basic approach it describes (presented more fully in the longer paper you forwarded to me). In briefing him on it last week -- and in expressing my own strong support -- I also told him that I would pass on to you a few concerns about implementation. (C)

These relate primarily to Afghanistan and Cambodia, where your paper envisions the most innovation in the short term. In both of these cases our policy stands or falls on cooperation with other governments, and we need to be sure that "initiatives" do not inadvertently send them the wrong message. We will be worse off if we seem to convey that US-Soviet considerations are dictating a change of direction on these issues. Our friends need to be sure that our innovations will in fact help them. (S)

That is why, on Afghanistan, when we get around to making these suggestions to the Soviet side, we should take another hard, close look at whether they still seem sound at that moment. We should re-raise them with the Paks with the same question in mind. To propose consultations on an "economic reconstruction mechanism," for example, may only make us seem unrealistically ahead of the game. Even the advisability of spending an entire day on Afghanistan in a Shevardnadze meeting may look very different if the overall Afghan pace is accelerating. (S)

On Cambodia, it will be much easier to prevent misunderstandings. I strongly support the idea of approaching the Thai first. But even here it should be absolutely clear that our question (to them and the other members of ASEAN) is: will an ASEAN initiative at Bali help them? If not, they have to feel free to say no. To guarantee that they do feel free will require considerable presentational care. (I understand our Asia staff members are addressing this matter in the same spirit.) (S)

My staff will work closely with yours as we follow up in implementing the ideas you've presented. (U)

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Folio-114/4 #8169
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

6 March 1986

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SR*

NLRR *Fole 114/4 #8170*
BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/20/13*

SUBJECT: Shultz Memo on UNGA Regional Initiative

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a paper on pursuing the UNGA "regional initiative" in discussions with the Soviets. This makes sense (and is timely given the President's ASEAN visit), but it has gained extra impetus within State from fears of a showy Soviet initiative on Afghanistan that would throw us and the Pakistanis off balance. So far this has not materialized.

Beyond familiar points for the on-going series of bilateral talks on regional issues, the paper recommends two specific approaches:

° That, when he sees Shevardnadze, the Secretary raise elements of a "specific peace plan" for Afghanistan, challenging the Soviets to show whether they are really interested in a negotiated outcome. This would include a six-month withdrawal timetable, "direct talks on reconciliation" and other ideas.

° That we approach Thailand, and later the rest of ASEAN, about a negotiating proposal on Cambodia that the foreign ministers would raise with the President in Bali. They'd ask him to press it on the Soviets; we would then urge the Soviets to press it on Hanoi.

These approaches could be effective, but obviously timing, tone, and details are crucial to ensuring that our friends understand what we're doing. In the current environment, with the Soviets trying to feed Pakistani fears that some sort of superpower deal is in the works, a "specific peace plan" for Afghanistan might be misunderstood. The NSC staff has made sure that cables on consultations with the Paks reflect this necessary caution. (Shultz's paper, unfortunately, reflects earlier, less refined thinking in the Department on this subject.) On Cambodia, we also have to assure consistency with our MIAs policy.

The attached memo to the President describes the paper and alerts him to some of the problems. If you wish, we can prepare points for you to use in following up with Shultz, or draft a memo from Rod McDaniel back to State, detailing some of our concerns.

SR Burghardt, *SR* Childress, *SR* Matlock, *SR* Ringdahl, and *SR* Tahir-Kheli concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

to change brief summary on concerns.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET NOT Seen 3/12/86
1801
~~SESTANOVICH~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *John*

SUBJECT: Implementing Your UNGA "Regional Initiative"

George Shultz has sent you some thoughts (Tab A) about how to keep alive the "regional initiative" you presented to the UN last October.

This is a good idea: it could help to highlight both the importance of regional conflicts in US-Soviet relations and our commitment -- unlike the Soviets -- to pursue diplomatic solutions where possible. We want international recognition that to end these wars groups like UNITA, the Afghan resistance coalition, and the Nicaraguan opposition must play a role.

As the State Department paper makes clear, each region needs different handling. We have proposals on the table for Central America, but the Soviets obviously should play no part in them. And our regular discussions with the Soviets on southern Africa (one round was underway this week) should also stay very low-key.

George is, however, proposing specific approaches to the Soviets in two cases -- Afghanistan and Cambodia -- and, although these break no truly new ground, my staff will work closely with his on the details. The absolutely essential thing is to make sure that our friends -- Pakistan, the Afghan resistance, the Southeast Asian governments -- understand what we're doing and feel that it helps them. This is especially important now, when some friends are wondering about how their concerns fit into US-Soviet relations. Since Geneva we have seen a series of Soviet disinformation efforts to frighten the Pakistanis that a superpower deal is being cut on Afghanistan. For this reason, it would be very unwise to give Zia the idea that we want to set up separate negotiations with Moscow on this issue.

As for Cambodia, State hopes to use your ASEAN meeting in Bali to re-raise a plan for "proximity" talks; we'd urge Moscow to support the idea with Vietnam. Here again, we'll have to be careful to avoid misunderstandings in the region (and to assure consistency with our broader policy and with domestic concerns over MIAs).

I'm sure George agrees with these points. With your approval, I'll take these matters up with him in greater depth.

Attachment
Tab A - Shultz Memo of March 5, 1986

Prepared by:
Stephen Sestanovich

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc Vice President

BY *RW*
NLR/E06-114/4 #8171
NARA DATE 3/20/13

DECLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 5, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Implementing Your UNGA Regional Initiative

As you know, the Soviets have never formally responded to the regional initiative you announced at the UN last October, perhaps hoping that their silence will make the initiative fade away. I believe we should disabuse them of such a notion. My people have taken a fresh look at how to build on your initiative and have developed a package of proposals for diplomatic actions tailored to each of the regions mentioned in your UN speech.

The initiatives would serve a number of important purposes:

o Keeping regional issues on the public agenda (which the Soviets clearly wish to avoid) between now and the next summit;

o Maintaining diplomatic pressure on Moscow to live up to its declarations of support for political solutions;

o Testing Soviet readiness for a serious diplomatic process;

o Reinforcing our friends and allies in the regions and driving wedges between Moscow and its clients where we can;

o Demonstrating your support for political solutions to these problems, which will be important in countering criticism from the Soviets and in the Congress as we increase our support for the freedom fighters.

The Soviets seem to be taking a more activist approach to some of their Third World involvements. So far, this has mostly entailed military support for their clients. However, as we have seen on arms control, Gorbachev can also make the bold diplomatic stroke and Soviet initiatives on regional questions are possible. We should position ourselves now so the Soviets have to respond to our moves, not the other way around. A synopsis of our ideas follows below; detailed proposals are being forwarded separately to the NSC.

All of the ideas outlined below require consultation and

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

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NLRR FD6-114/4 #8172
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

collaboration with our friends and allies in the region; I would like your approval for us to move forward.

Afghanistan

Our goals are to protect Pakistan from increased Soviet pressure, present a negotiating position that will test Soviet intentions and provide a sound basis for a settlement, and neutralize a possible Soviet "peace offensive." To these ends, when I next meet with Shevardnadze, I will outline a specific peace plan, encompassing: a six-month withdrawal of Soviet troops in three equal phases; Soviet acceptance of the already negotiated guarantees agreement; Soviet exploration of political reconciliation inside Afghanistan (perhaps including direct talks with the resistance); development of an international monitoring mechanism and; international consultations on an economic reconstruction mechanism for post-war independent Afghanistan. To heighten pressure on the Soviets we should, at an appropriate point, make this plan public and seek to build support for it in the UN and elsewhere.

Cambodia

Our objective is to utilize the lead role of the ASEAN countries to pressure Vietnam to withdraw its troops and pursue a negotiated settlement. The core of our effort would be a renewed ASEAN proposal for negotiations and a request by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to you at the Bali meeting in April to raise Cambodia with the Soviets. In agreeing to the ASEAN request, we would agree to participate in guarantees of a settlement, along with other interested states, after the parties directly involved have come to terms. We would also indicate that we are prepared to play a major role in the rehabilitation of Cambodia after a settlement, and to normalize relations with Vietnam.

Africa

Our goal on Angola is to deter Soviet military escalation, and thereby to support those in the MPLA who favor a political solution. We do this by our aid to Savimbi and by showing that Soviet escalation is risky. In talks with the Soviets in March we will stress the costs of their escalation, caution that support for a military solution will be futile and will harm U.S.-Soviet relations, and press the Soviets to recognize the military stalemate and hence the need for a political solution. On the Horn, we will explore Soviet views and assess whether political developments in the Sudan might offer new openings with Ethiopia.

SP

Nicaragua

We want to discourage Soviet meddling, while demonstrating our interest in a political solution based on national reconciliation. In experts' talks in May we will ensure they understand our determination and the limits of our toleration, keep discussion of diplomatic efforts focused on the issues of importance to us, and seek to place the Soviets and their friends in the position of obstacles to political solutions. Specifically, we will offer to resume dialogue with the Sandinistas if they meet with the armed democratic opposition, and to respond to internal and external policy changes in Nicaragua as they occur. If, as expected, the Soviets are unresponsive, we will seek to use this with the Congress and the Contadora countries to attempt to build support for our strategy, including aid for the armed opposition.