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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (4/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1505

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8145	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE IMPLEMENTING YOUR UNGA "REGIONAL INITIATIVES" <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/13/1986	B1
8158	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE IMPLEMENTING YOUR UNGA REGIONAL INITIATIVES <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	3/5/1986	B1
8146	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ MEMO ON UNGA REGIONAL INITIATIVES <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/6/1986	B1
8147	PAPER	AFGHANISTAN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8148	PAPER	CAMBODIA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8149	PAPER	AFRICA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8150	PAPER	NICARAGUA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8151	MEMO	MATLOCK RE AWARDS CEREMONY FOR SCIENTISTS <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/13/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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8152	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE BRIDGE ACROSS THE BERING STRAIT <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/14/1986	B1
8153	MEMO	WIGG TO POINDEXTER RE MATLOCK COMMENTS ON ADELMAN'S PAPER FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	3/13/1986	B1
8154	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE ADELMAN PAPER ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THE SOVIET UNION (SAME TEXT AS 8132) <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	3/10/1986	B1
8155	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE ACDA PAPER ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THE SOVIET UNION (SAME TEXT AS 8133) <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8159	PAPER	ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THE SOVIET UNION (SAME TEXT AS 8143) <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8156	MEMO	MATLOCK TO FORTIER RE ALLEGED U.S. RESPONSIBILITY IN PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/14/1986	B1

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8157	MEMO	ABRAMS RE ALLEGED U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PALME ASSASSINATION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8160	MEMO	ABRAMS TO FORTIER RE MOSCOW BLAMES U.S. IN DEATH OF PALME <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/11/1986	B1

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JM-C 1

NON-LOG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

THROUGH: PAUL B. THOMPSON

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

Basically, this has some excellent ideas in it. I have only the following comments and observations:

1. I believe the Soviets will want at least two days of formal talks at the outset. (Business before pleasure!) Then one at the end -- either on the West Coast or here -- could wrap up the substantive portion.
2. There may be more travel involved than necessary. I would recommend either New England or South, then one Midwest area, then something on the West Coast.
3. Gorbachev's people have been dickering with Senator Kennedy to arrange a speech at the JFK School in Cambridge. We should be prepared to respond to such a request if it is made by the Soviets. (May be hard to avoid if we put New England into the itinerary.)
4. We should consider some event which would give Gorbachev an idea of how state governments and legislatures work. (Sacramento?)
5. I would go easy on the "history" side (e.g. Mt. Vernon and the like). This does not gain us much mileage.

ccb: Jonathan Miller

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3/7/86

Task notebook -

The Admiral requested that
a copy of this be sent to
you. He would like your views
on it.

Thanks,
Paul

CMP
memo from Hentel³
to D. Reagan

DECLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

WASHINGTON

By C/S NARA, Date 7/3/02

The attached outline schedule of events for the Gorbachev visit is based on the following two broad objectives (expectations) for the visit:

1. Illustrate the inherent value of you and the General Secretary meeting personally and regularly as an effective means for managing the US/USSR relationship.
2. Your desire to expose the General Secretary to a healthy, powerful - both economically and socially - America.
 - o The purpose of the 'tour of America' will be to counteract the General Secretary's pre-conceived views on America's values, people and prosperity.
 - o The tour will allow Gorbachev to see first-hand America's and your vision of a peaceful future where change, technology and individual contributions will lead to a safer and better world.
 - o You will want to show the openness of America's society.
 - o The proposed schedule assumes that you will accompany the General Secretary throughout the tour. Some of the scheduling themes incorporated in the proposed outline schedule are:
 - o To show change in America, as witnessed by you.
 - o You and the General Secretary will meet each day in warm, diverse settings to maintain substantive continuity.
 - o We will develop issue oriented interactive events, i.e., briefing forums with simultaneous interpretation equipment, bilingual displays and charts, enabling you and Gorbachev to speak, ask questions, etc.
 - o You and the General Secretary will participate in joint tours and events showing Americans at work, at home, at school, at play, etc.
 - o You and the General Secretary will participate in an event(s) with a Soviet delegation (Youth Exchange) from the People to People program you initiated in Geneva.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PROPOSED OUTLINE SCHEDULE

GORBACHEV VISIT

EARLY ARRIVAL (If Desired)

The General Secretary rests and adjusts to time change:

Options:

- I. Camp David
- II. Williamsburg
- III. East Coast Resort
- IV. USSR Mission, Washington, D.C.

DAY 1: (OFFICIAL VISIT BEGINS)

The General Secretary may choose to fly directly from Moscow to Andrews Air Force Base and proceed directly to the White House.

a.m. White House South Lawn Arrival Ceremony

Oval Office Tete a Tete

Plenary after Oval Office

p.m.

Options:

- a. Secretary of State Lunch
- b. Meetings with Congressional Leadership on the Hill
- c. Meetings with Members of the Cabinet
- d. Visit Thomas Jefferson High School
- e. Visit historial sites/institutions

p.m. White House State Dinner hosted by yourself and Mrs. Reagan.

DAY 2:

a.m. White House Meeting

Option:

- I. Breakfast followed by private meeting in your study

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a.m. You and the General Secretary depart together on Air Force One and visit cities/areas that exhibit the economic and social health of America and the diversity and dynamism of the American people as you tour from east to west.

Note: Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Gorbachev will probably travel with you but have separate events when appropriate in the various cities/areas.

Options (East Coast):

- I. New England (Boston Area):
 - a. Massachusetts Hi-tech Council
 - b. Digital Equipment
 - c. OIC Training Center
 - d. MIT/Harvard
 - e. Erie Pub
 - f. Restored Harbor Area
- II. Southern New Hampshire
 - a. Concord (State and Local Government)
- III. Pittsburgh ("Most livable city" has become a major developer of computer software, robots and medical technology and since 1982 has created 40,000 new high-tech jobs.)

p.m. Fly South

RON SOUTH

DAY 3:

Options (South):

- I. Tennessee
 - a. GM Saturn Facility
 - b. University of Tennessee
 - c. Tennessee Technology Corridor
 - d. Homecoming '86: "Preserving yesterday's values while we reach for tomorrow's jobs."
- II. Atlanta Area ("The New South")
 - a. Gwinnett County (Heart of Technology Crescent)
 - b. Georgia Tech ("Center of Excellence")

6

Fly to Mid-west

Options (Mid-West):

I. Illinois

- a. Eureka College
- b. Dixon
- c. Tampico
- d. Archer-Daniels-Midland/Agriculture Event

II. St. Louis ("Gateway to the West")

- a. Agro-Industrial Event
- b. Enterprise Zone-St. Louis Technology Center

III. Fly to California

RON MIDWEST/CALIFORNIA

DAY 4: Fly to California

Options: (California)

I. Sacramento Area

- a. Visit State Capitol Building
- b. Agriculture Event

II. San Francisco Area

- a. Stanford
- b. University of California Berkley
- c. Visit area high-tech company

III. Los Angeles Area

- a. Entertainment Industry Event
- b. Dinner/Cultural Event

IV. Ranch/Santa Barbara Area

- a. Lunch/Dinner with Gorbachevs

RON CALIFORNIA

DAY 5: You and the General Secretary will resume intensive, substantive talks for the final phase of the visit.

OPTION I (RETURN TO EAST COAST)

Day 5:

You and the General Secretary will return to the East Coast on Air Force One.

Day 6:

Intensive Talks Begin

Options:

- I. White House
- II. Camp David
- III. Williamsburg
- IV. Other rustic, private setting
(Chesapeake Bay, Eastern Shore, etc.)

Day 7:

Talks continue
Bid farewell

OPTION 2 (REMAIN ON WEST COAST)

Day 5:

California Events Continue

Intensive Talks Begin

Options:

- I. Ranch/Santa Barbara
- II. National Park
- III. Other rustic setting

Day 6:

You and the General Secretary will conclude substantive talks.

Day 7:

Options:

- I. Bid farewell in California; Gorbachev returns to East Coast and departs
- II. You return to East Coast together; Bid Gorbachev farewell from Washington

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE
DO NOT COPY

March 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HENKEL

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*
SUBJECT: Possible Sites for Gorbachev Visit

The following is a preliminary list of possible themes and site visits for the President to show Secretary General Gorbachev during his upcoming visit. Many of these are general notions that can be developed further when the Planning Group meets. However, we thought these general areas may be of value at this stage in the process.

1. HIGH TECHNOLOGY

High Tech Areas	Number of high tech related firms
Portland, Oregon	200
North Carolina Research Triangle	90
Boston, MA (Route 128)	850
Salt Lake City	195
Silicon Valley, California	1600
San Diego, Silicon Beach	329
Central Colorado	225
Minneapolis, St. Paul	370
Dallas-Ft. Worth	800
Phoenix, Arizona	200
Detroit-Ann Arbor	200
Atlanta, Georgia	151
Northern Virginia	825
Austin, Texas	110

Once a specific geographic region is determined, we can provide information about the specific firms within that high tech area.

2. BEST UNIVERSITIES

U.S. News & World Report recently published an article on the top universities in the country. They are as follows:

National Universities

Stanford University
(This school year (85-86) Stanford will receive \$5 million in royalties from corporations and other establishments that licensed 71 Stanford technologies and 17 software programs)
Harvard
Yale

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Princeton
University of Chicago
Duke
Brown University
University of California at Berkley
Chapel Hill
Dartmouth College

State Supported Universities

University of Pennsylvania
University of Virginia
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
University of California at Berkley
Rochester Institute of Technology
The Citadel (South Carolina)

You might also want to keep in mind an article recently published by the CIA in which the Soviets have named those defense technology centers at universities that they feel are the most important:

MIT
Carnegie-Mellon University - Pittsburgh
Harvard
California Tech
University of Michigan
Princeton

Another option would be to look at high-tech future oriented colleges & universities. The are as follows:

Purdue - West Layfayette, Indiana
Strong in work engineering, Neurosciences and robotics

Washington University - St. Louis, MO
Research being done in biomedical technology

Georgia Tech - Atlanta
research school in engineering

University of Texas at Dallas - Health Science Center
This university is the home of two recent Nobel Prize winners in Medicine who attended the luncheon with the President in December.

University of Texas at Austin
Research work done in the field of physics

Case Western University - Cleveland, Ohio
Emphasizes engineering and medical research

Carnegie-Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA

University of Illinois at Urbana
Innovative research in the field of agriculture & engineering

Also along the college lines, there are the four locations of the Super Computer Research Centers. In early '85, the National Science Foundation announced its choice of these sites for university supercomputer centers, a major step in its long-term program to expand access to state-of-the-art equipment among university researchers and thus help maintain US supremacy in computer technology. These supercomputers are being installed as part of a \$200 million, five year foundation program, to be augmented by state and corporate aid for equipment and services:

Cornell
University of Illinois
Princeton
University of California at San Diego

3. BEST CITIES

There are many factors that enter into effect when considering what are the best cities to live in. However, the following are considered the "best cities" according to climate/terrain, housing, health care/environment, crime, transportation, education, the arts, recreation, and economics.

1. Pittsburgh, PA (However, steelworkers situation poses problem).
2. Boston, MA
3. Raleigh-Durham, NC
4. San Francisco, CA
5. Philadelphia, PA
6. Nassau-Suffolk, NY
7. St. Louis, MO
8. Louisville, KY
9. Norwalk, CN
10. Seattle, WA

The list can be further broken down by population size:

America's Best Large Metro Areas (Population 1,000,000 or more)

1. Pittsburgh, PA
2. Boston, MA
3. San Francisco, CA
4. Philadelphia, PA
5. Nassau-Suffolk, NY
6. St. Louis, MO
7. Seattle, WA
8. Atlanta, GA
9. Dallas, TX
10. Buffalo, NY
11. Baltimore, MD
11. Washington, DC

America's Best Medium-Sized Metro Areas
(Population 250,000 to 1,000,000)

1. Raleigh-Durham, NC
2. Louisville, KY
3. Knoxville, TN
4. Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
5. Syracuse, NY
6. Albuquerque, NM
7. Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA
8. Richmond-Petersburg, VA
9. Providence, RI
10. Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ

America's Best Small Metro Areas
(Population less than 250,000)

1. Norwalk, CN
2. Burlington, VT
3. Charlottesville, VA
4. Asheville, NC
5. Stamford, CN
6. Portland, ME
7. Danbury, CN
8. Galveston-Texas City, TX
9. South Bend, IN
10. Middleton, CN

4. OUTSTANDING YOUNG AMERICANS

Once again, this category could be broken down into several areas. If you are looking for the ten top young entrepreneurs - the following could be useful:

Steven Jobs, founded Apple Computers when he was 22. FY85 revenues were \$1.9 billion.

Brett Davis, 26, of Dallas, whose troy nickel real estate investment company grossed \$790 million.

Mark Hughes, 30, of Los Angeles, founded Herbal Life, which grossed \$512 million. He was 23 at start-up.

Jennifer Churney, 28, and Robert Shapiro, 24, both of New York founded R.H. Shapiro & Co. three years ago; last year it grossed \$155 million.

Debbie Fields, 29, of Provo, Utah, started Mrs. Fields Chocolate Chippery nine years ago and last year it grossed \$60 million

Xavier Roberts, 30, of Cleveland, grossed \$40 million from Original Appalachian Artwork Inc., which he started at age 24.

Michael Dell, 20, of Austin, Texas, grossed \$36 million from PC's Limited in 1985. He started the company 20 months ago.

Jay Adoni, 27, of Brooklyn, NY, founded Admos Shoe Corporation at 19; last years it grossed \$20 million.

Barry Minkow, 19, Reseda, CA, founded ZZZZ Best, a carpet cleaning company. Employs 122 people and last year grossed \$3 million.

There is also a list available of the top 100 entrepreneurs of the past 25 years that include many of the obvious choices - cosmetics queen, Mary Kay Ash, McDonalds founder, Ray Kroc etc. There is a Russian immigrant on the entrepreneurs list who started the Nebraska Furniture Mart with \$500.00. (We are now obtaining additional information about him.)

There are also the winners of the Westinghouse Science Scholarships & Awards to consider. These are high school seniors who show outstanding potential in the area of research science and engineering. The winner for this year will be chosen in a couple of days.

Recently, Weekly Reader, sponsored the first invention contest for students between the ages of 5-16. Following are the top winners:

Michael Trakas, 6, of O'Fallon, IL, for velcro sheet fasteners to keep the top and bottom sheets together.

Marcie Wily, 11, Durham, NC, for Florescent toothpaste so that you can brush your teeth in the dark.

Katie Harding, kindergarten, Bloomfield, IN, for a mud-puddle spotter umbrella with a flashlight on the handle to help pedestrians avoid puddles at night.

Suzie Amling, 7, Auburn, Alaska, a rope-like device to help teachers keep track of students as they walk from their school to the library (2/3 of a mile away).

Clint Vaught, 13, Aurora, MO, a "Logg Hogg Lifting Arm" which hoists logs onto a splitter.

Of course, there are also the outstanding Boy Scout/Girl Scouts to look at as well.

5. INNOVATIVE FIRMS

The following lists the eight most innovative giants of U.S. industry. (Innovative being defined as the fact that the management of each of the eight is convinced of the need to innovate, regarding new ideas as the essence of long-term survival. No matter how dependent the companies are on purely technological advances, they are uniformly devoted to marketing).

American Airlines - since the company was deregulated in 1978, they have consistently found ingenious solutions to the difficulties facing all the old trunk carriers.

Apple Computers - declined to follow IBM's example in microcomputer design and won customers over with their easy to use Macintosh technology.

Campbell Soup - once a lumbering dinosaur of the food industry, last year introduced more new and successful products than any other competitor.

General Electric - files more new patents each year than any other U.S. company. (A plant in Columbia, MD, has set up a special reemployment center for those workers they have had to lay off because they decided to shut down its domestic microwave-oven production - [innovative]).

Intel - has dominated key segments of the market for microprocessors by staying on the leading edge of technology.
Merck - has maintained its edge in drug research, most recently in the area of biotechnology.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) - often meets its ambitious goal of getting 25% of its sales from products less than five years old.
Philip Morris - famed as an inventive marketer of cigarettes, soft drinks, and beer, is also an imaginative manufacturer of state of the art plants that have helped increase company's profit margin.

The best managed companies are as follows:

- Kellogg Company
- Maytag Company
- Northrop Corporation
- Toys "R" Us
- Walgreen Drugstores

Fortune Magazine broke down a list of companies based on the following categories:

Innovativeness	Citicorp Gannett 3M
Quality of Management	IBM J.P. Morgan Boeing
Financial Soundness	IBM Exxon Dow Jones
Community & Environmental Responsibility	Eastman Kodak 3M Coca-Cola Johnson & Johnson

6. URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The following provides you with a sampling of urban renewal programs that have been extremely effective in boosting city's economy.

<u>Program</u>	<u>City/State</u>
Southwest Program	Washington, D.C.
Inner Harbor	Baltimore, Maryland
Government Center	Boston, Massachusetts
Lincoln Center	New York City
Golden Triangle	Pittsburgh, PA
Western Addition	San Francisco, CA
Bunker Hill	Los Angeles, CA
Hemisphere Project	San Antonio, TX

7. OUTSTANDING MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

Please keep in mind that medical institutions vary in strengths and few, if any, are equally strong in all departments.

GENERAL HOSPITALS

Massachusetts General Hospital
Boston, Massachusetts

The Johns Hopkins Hospital
Baltimore, Maryland

Mayo Clinic
Rochester, Minnesota

Barnes Hospital
St. Louis, Missouri

The Presbyterian Hospital
New York, New York

UC-San Francisco's Moffitt/Long Hospitals
San Francisco, CA

Brigham and Women's Hospital
Boston, Massachusetts

The New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center
New York, New York

Duke University Hospital
Durham, NC

Stanford University Hospital
Stanford, CA

Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA

UCLA Medical Center
Los Angeles, CA

If you are looking for medical schools that are outstanding, most of the aforementioned hospitals are affiliated with the top medical schools. But again, each medical school offers varying specialties.

I am adding addition medical institutions that specialize in the field of cancer and eye because they seem to be highly researched areas both here and in the Soviet Union.

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1

EYE HOSPITALS

Bascom Palmer Eye Institute
Anne Bates Leach Eye Hospital
University of Miami School of Medicine
Miami, Florida

The Wilmer Eye Institute
The Johns Hopkins Hospital
Baltimore, MD

Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary
Boston, MA

Jules Stein Eye Institute
UCLA Medical Center
Los Angeles, CA

Wills Eye Hospital
Philadelphia, PA

CANCER HOSPITALS

Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center
New York, NY

M.D. Anderson Hospital and Tumor Institute
The University of Texas
Houston, TX

Boswell Park Memorial Institute
Buffalo, NY

Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
Boston, MA

The National Cancer Institute
Bethesda, MD

Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
Seattle, WA

8. OUTSTANDING INVENTIONS/DISCOVERIES- 1985

Dr. Steve Rosenberg/Dr. Vincent DeVita - for their work in oncology - the branch of medicine that deals with tumors.

The skeleton of what was believed to be the earliest known dinosaur, a creature the size of a small ostrich, was discovered in Arizona's Painted Desert by scientists from the University of California at Berkley. The skeleton was estimated to be 3-4 million years older than any dinosaur ever found in North America.

14
Scientists at NASA's Ames Research Center in Mountainview, CA reported a major discovery that supports the emerging theory that life on earth began in clay rather than the sea.

A new genetically engineered drug that could effectively open closed arteries by dissolving blood clots was produced by Genetech Inc., a biotechnology company in San Francisco.

Voyager II discovery of the moons of Uranus

Researchers at various universities developed prototype "walking machines" designed to tread where no tracked wheeled vehicles can go.

The Jarvik-7 artificial heart - (February 1983, Dr. Robert Jarvik was named inventor of the year by the National Inventors Hall of Fame).

There have also been major breakthroughs in the area of birth, surgery, artificial parts, genes, radiology, brain, and drugs.

OTHER IDEAS

Secretary General Gorbachev's recent statements to the Soviet Party Congress seem to indicate an ambitious increase in industrial investment with emphasis on machine building. Mr. Gorbachev also seems to favor middle-level industrial management background which suggests he envisions more economic decision-making in that area.

Therefore you might want to concentrate on companies such as:

Alcoa
Reynolds Metal
Alumax
Inland Steel
Marmon Group
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Armco
Bethlehem Steel
LTV
Navistar
Chrysler
GM's Saturn plant

It also seems that industry is a major concern in the Soviet Union. Other ideas you might want to consider:

Visit site of a venture capital firm

Liposome Company, Princeton, NJ
Xoma Corporation, San Francisco
Speech Systems, Tarzana, CA
Itran, Manchester, NH
Mosaic Systems, Troy, MI
Panelvision, Pittsburgh, PA

Or, he could go to a state fair, meet with youths from the U.S. Jaycees Outstanding Young Farmer Awards, youths that participate in 4-H, etc.

HISTORIC

One purpose of Gorbachev's visit should be to show him some of the newest and most innovative sites in the United States. However, we should consider giving him a taste of the history of our country and our past leaders whose acts, ideas and events gave us the foundation upon which we continue to build.

Visit Mt. Vernon - an early example of colonial America - the place where our country's "father" lived, etc.

Visit Monticello - the home of a president, inventor, governor, ambassador, architect - Thomas Jefferson.

Jefferson exemplified the multi-faceted American and the strides that can be taken by a free-thinker. Jefferson also experimented in agriculture and many of his plants are still there.

We might consider the University of Virginia, which is one of the older institutions and one that Jefferson started.

There is Williamsburg, Virginia, where the ideals of America were developed, the American revolution was formulated and it is an excellent example of colonial life.

Philadelphia - Independence Hall houses the Liberty Bell as well as the document which established colonies as free and independent states.

Of course, there are the numerous historic sites in Washington, D.C. We could have Gorbachev visit Arlington Cemetary, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, the Jefferson/Lincoln/Washington Memorials, the Kennedy Center, etc.

AMERICA

We might also consider places that are representative of "America". Baseball games, Epcot Center, national parks, museums, ballet, architecture, Statue of Liberty, etc.

Or dropping in on a high school, to get a taste of education at the initial stages. particularly like the idea of going back to Thomas Jefferson High School in Alexandria, Virginia.

FYI: People Magazine is asking "America" to write in and tell them what they would like Gorbachev and his wife to see. They will begin publishing the responses March 17.

cc: Dennis Thomas
Don Fortier

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW LITTLEFAIR

FROM: JOHN MCTAGUE / *el 111c T*
SUBJECT: Request for Information

Attached are two outlines I have put together for you. I have not had a chance to put together one for Dallas/Fort Worth, but will try to get it to you on Tuesday, March 4.

Attachments

28 February 1986

St. Louis Area:

Monsanto

Has the world's largest state-of-the-art biotechnology facilities. Spans the areas of agriculture, animal production and drug production.

A visitor could personally splice a gene and see the process and results within 45 minutes.

The biotechnology facility has a very extensive university-industry cooperative research effort.

Washington U., St. Louis

General excellence in medical research. One of the top 2 or 3 in Federal funding.

Science and Math Secondary Magnet Schools

There are a couple of inner city S&M magnet schools of very high quality, 60% black.

Very modern manufacturing facility, good employee relations.
Monsanto Electronic Materials Co. Silicon Wafer chip
production.

28 February 1986

Illinois

John Deere Co., Moline, IL

Innovative manufacturing of agricultural machinery.

Deere is also involved in Space Shuttle based materials research.

Fermilab, Batavia, IL

Our premier high-energy physics laboratory. 4.7 mile circumference ring of superconducting magnets. Particles accelerated to 1000 billion volts. Very impressive.

JM-C 21

2002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 12, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request to Travel to Stockholm on March 14-16, 1986

I have been asked to accompany Secretary of State Shultz to Stockholm in order to participate in his meeting with Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov. I will be traveling on the Secretary's aircraft and accomodation expenses will be covered by the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: March 13, 1986

- 1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK
- 2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): TO ACCOMPANY SECSTATE SHULTZ TO STOCKHOLM TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER RYZHKOV.

- 3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): WASHINGTON/STOCKHOLM/WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE DATE 3/14/86 RETURN DATE 3/16/86
 TIME 8:00 PM TIME _____

- 4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
 GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____

- 5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
 TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____ TOTAL TRIP COST _____

- 6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER DEPT OF STATE

- 7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
TRAVEL ON 'SECRETARY SHULTZ' PLANE AND ACCOMODATION EXPENSES TO BE COVERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- 8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO XX

- 9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____

- 10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____

- 11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: [Signature]

~~SECRET~~

the President has seen 3/13 23
8145 1801

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1986

~~MITLOCK~~
File

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *John*

SUBJECT: Implementing Your UNGA "Regional Initiative"

George Shultz has sent you some thoughts (Tab A) about how to keep alive the "regional initiative" you presented to the UN last October.

This is a good idea: it could help to highlight both the importance of regional conflicts in US-Soviet relations and our commitment -- unlike the Soviets -- to pursue diplomatic solutions where possible. We want international recognition that to end these wars groups like UNITA, the Afghan resistance coalition, and the Nicaraguan opposition must play a role.

As the State Department paper makes clear, each region needs different handling. We have proposals on the table for Central America, but the Soviets obviously should play no part in them. And our regular discussions with the Soviets on southern Africa (one round was underway this week) should also stay very low-key.

George is, however, proposing specific approaches to the Soviets in two cases -- Afghanistan and Cambodia -- and, although these break no truly new ground, my staff will work closely with his on the details. The absolutely essential thing is to make sure that our friends -- Pakistan, the Afghan resistance, the Southeast Asian governments -- understand what we're doing and feel that it helps them. This is especially important now, when some friends are wondering about how their concerns fit into US-Soviet relations. Since Geneva we have seen a series of Soviet disinformation efforts to frighten the Pakistanis that a superpower deal is being cut on Afghanistan. For this reason, it would be very unwise to give Zia the idea that we want to set up separate negotiations with Moscow on this issue.

As for Cambodia, State hopes to use your ASEAN meeting in Bali to re-raise a plan for "proximity" talks; we'd urge Moscow to support the idea with Vietnam. Here again, we'll have to be careful to avoid misunderstandings in the region (and to assure consistency with our broader policy and with domestic concerns over MIAs).

I'm sure George agrees with these points. With your approval, I'll take these matters up with him in greater depth.

Attachment
Tab A - Shultz Memo of March 5, 1986

Prepared by:
Stephen Sestanovich

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc Vice President

BY *DD* NLR/FOL 1/14/94 #8145
DECLASSIFIED
NARA DATE 3/9/11

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Implementing Your UNGA Regional Initiative

As you know, the Soviets have never formally responded to the regional initiative you announced at the UN last October, perhaps hoping that their silence will make the initiative fade away. I believe we should disabuse them of such a notion. My people have taken a fresh look at how to build on your initiative and have developed a package of proposals for diplomatic actions tailored to each of the regions mentioned in your UN speech.

The initiatives would serve a number of important purposes:

o Keeping regional issues on the public agenda (which the Soviets clearly wish to avoid) between now and the next summit;

o Maintaining diplomatic pressure on Moscow to live up to its declarations of support for political solutions;

o Testing Soviet readiness for a serious diplomatic process;

o Reinforcing our friends and allies in the regions and driving wedges between Moscow and its clients where we can;

o Demonstrating your support for political solutions to these problems, which will be important in countering criticism from the Soviets and in the Congress as we increase our support for the freedom fighters.

The Soviets seem to be taking a more activist approach to some of their Third World involvements. So far, this has mostly entailed military support for their clients. However, as we have seen on arms control, Gorbachev can also make the bold diplomatic stroke and Soviet initiatives on regional questions are possible. We should position ourselves now so the Soviets have to respond to our moves, not the other way around. A synopsis of our ideas follows below; detailed proposals are being forwarded separately to the NSC.

All of the ideas outlined below require consultation and

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8158
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

collaboration with our friends and allies in the region; I would like your approval for us to move forward.

Afghanistan

Our goals are to protect Pakistan from increased Soviet pressure, present a negotiating position that will test Soviet intentions and provide a sound basis for a settlement, and neutralize a possible Soviet "peace offensive." To these ends, when I next meet with Shevardnadze, I will outline a specific peace plan, encompassing: a six-month withdrawal of Soviet troops in three equal phases; Soviet acceptance of the already negotiated guarantees agreement; Soviet exploration of political reconciliation inside Afghanistan (perhaps including direct talks with the resistance); development of an international monitoring mechanism and; international consultations on an economic reconstruction mechanism for post-war independent Afghanistan. To heighten pressure on the Soviets we should, at an appropriate point, make this plan public and seek to build support for it in the UN and elsewhere.

Cambodia

Our objective is to utilize the lead role of the ASEAN countries to pressure Vietnam to withdraw its troops and pursue a negotiated settlement. The core of our effort would be a renewed ASEAN proposal for negotiations and a request by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to you at the Bali meeting in April to raise Cambodia with the Soviets. In agreeing to the ASEAN request, we would agree to participate in guarantees of a settlement, along with other interested states, after the parties directly involved have come to terms. We would also indicate that we are prepared to play a major role in the rehabilitation of Cambodia after a settlement, and to normalize relations with Vietnam.

Africa

Our goal on Angola is to deter Soviet military escalation, and thereby to support those in the MPLA who favor a political solution. We do this by our aid to Savimbi and by showing that Soviet escalation is risky. In talks with the Soviets in March we will stress the costs of their escalation, caution that support for a military solution will be futile and will harm U.S.-Soviet relations, and press the Soviets to recognize the military stalemate and hence the need for a political solution. On the Horn, we will explore Soviet views and assess whether political developments in the Sudan might offer new openings with Ethiopia.

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Nicaragua

We want to discourage Soviet meddling, while demonstrating our interest in a political solution based on national reconciliation. In experts' talks in May we will ensure they understand our determination and the limits of our toleration, keep discussion of diplomatic efforts focused on the issues of importance to us, and seek to place the Soviets and their friends in the position of obstacles to political solutions. Specifically, we will offer to resume dialogue with the Sandinistas if they meet with the armed democratic opposition, and to respond to internal and external policy changes in Nicaragua as they occur. If, as expected, the Soviets are unresponsive, we will seek to use this with the Congress and the Contadora countries to attempt to build support for our strategy, including aid for the armed opposition.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6 March 1986

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

NLRR FOI 114/4 #8146
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

SUBJECT: Shultz Memo on UNGA Regional Initiative

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a paper on pursuing the UNGA "regional initiative" in discussions with the Soviets. This makes sense (and is timely given the President's ASEAN visit), but it has gained extra impetus within State from fears of a showy Soviet initiative on Afghanistan that would throw us and the Pakistanis off balance. So far this has not materialized.

Beyond familiar points for the on-going series of bilateral talks on regional issues, the paper recommends two specific approaches:

° That, when he sees Shevardnadze, the Secretary raise elements of a "specific peace plan" for Afghanistan, challenging the Soviets to show whether they are really interested in a negotiated outcome. This would include a six-month withdrawal timetable, "direct talks on reconciliation" and other ideas.

° That we approach Thailand, and later the rest of ASEAN, about a negotiating proposal on Cambodia that the foreign ministers would raise with the President in Bali. They'd ask him to press it on the Soviets; we would then urge the Soviets to press it on Hanoi.

These approaches could be effective, but obviously timing, tone, and details are crucial to ensuring that our friends understand what we're doing. In the current environment, with the Soviets trying to feed Pakistani fears that some sort of superpower deal is in the works, a "specific peace plan" for Afghanistan might be misunderstood. The NSC staff has made sure that cables on consultations with the Paks reflect this necessary caution. (Shultz's paper, unfortunately, reflects earlier, less refined thinking in the Department on this subject.) On Cambodia, we also have to assure consistency with our MIAs policy.

The attached memo to the President describes the paper and alerts him to some of the problems. If you wish, we can prepare points for you to use in following up with Shultz, or draft a memo from Rod McDaniel back to State, detailing some of our concerns.

SRS Burghardt, *SRS* Childress, *SRS* Matlock, *SRS* Ringdahl, and *SRS* Tahir-Kheli concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Draft a short memo for me to George briefly summarizing our concerns.



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Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S
REGIONAL INITIATIVE

The Secretary has sent a memorandum to the President on this subject. A detailed description of the Department's proposals is attached.

B McKimley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *CSJ* NARA, Date *7/3/02*

AFGHANISTAN

Of all the conflicts cited in the President's regional initiative, Afghanistan received the most attention at the Geneva Summit. We have identified five elements of a possible approach to the Soviets which builds on the existing UN negotiating political framework. These elements are also essential to the successful implementation of a comprehensive agreement, and are consistent with the President's regional initiative.

Secretary Shultz would raise these points privately at the next meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Our initiative has four objectives: (1) to preserve and bolster our political position, while protecting the Pakistanis from increased Soviet political and military pressure; (2) to present a credible negotiating position that will test Soviet intentions and provide a sound basis for a potential settlement; (3) to neutralize any possible Soviet "peace offensive" on Afghanistan and; (4) to underscore our commitment to a peaceful settlement under the President's regional initiative.

We intend to consult with the Government of Pakistan on this proposed five-point initiative, with our usual understanding on Afghanistan matters that we will only proceed if they agree. We will also wish to discuss with them how an initiative of this sort might best be presented. Assuming that the Pakistan Government agrees, we will also wish to consult with the Afghan resistance alliance. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union may be preparing a "peace offensive" on Afghanistan, so our initiative will be timely and important.

Withdrawal: We should continue to press for Soviet troop withdrawal as the key to a settlement. We would propose a phased withdrawal in three equal tranches at two month intervals, with the full withdrawal of all combat forces and military advisors to be completed six months after the signing of a comprehensive peace settlement. This element could be become part of our public posture at some point. If we can establish the six-month timeframe solidly in the public mind, it will be more difficult for the Soviets to argue later for a more extended timetable.

Guarantees: We would urge the Soviet Union to match the USG acceptance of the guarantees document negotiated at Geneva.

Direct talks on Self-Determination: Internal political reconciliation is an essential precondition for the successful implementation of Soviet withdrawal, and the first element in the President's regional initiative. We would suggest to the Soviets that they seriously address the central problem of political reconciliation inside Afghanistan by exploring a means for all Afghans to participate in an agreed framework for governing their country. If the Pakistanis agree, we could add the suggestion that the Soviets consider talking directly to the resistance as a first step in devising such a process.

Monitoring mechanism: Given the degree of distrust and suspicion existing among the parties, a neutral, objective monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with the terms of an agreement is an essential component. We would propose that talks begin, possibly under the leadership of the UN, on development of an international monitoring mechanism. By raising this now and providing specific proposals, e.g., an international observers group composed of Islamic nations, we would begin to build international and regional support for an effective monitoring mechanism.

Economic Reconstruction: In line with the President's regional initiative, a proposal for international consultations on the creation of an economic reconstruction mechanism for post-war Afghanistan would add some incentive for a peaceful resolution of the current struggle and highlight our willingness to make a tangible contribution to this effort.

After we have consulted with Pakistan, we will want to consider what elements of this approach to incorporate in our public position, and when and how best to do them.

CAMBODIA

In implementing the President's regional initiative on Cambodia, it is crucial that we support the ASEAN countries in their dual policy of keeping pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces and pursuing negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The approach outlined below involves the ASEANS directly in our dealings with the Soviets.

The core of this effort would be a request by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to the President at the Bali meeting in April to raise Cambodia with the Soviets. In order to implement this approach, we would:

- o Arrange with the ASEANS, before the Bali meeting, to have them renew their proposal for "proximity talks" or develop another formula for getting negotiations started. Our first approach to this end would be with the Thai, to ensure that Bangkok does not misinterpret our move as a policy shift away from concern for its security.
- o By prearrangement, the Ministers would ask the President to carry this proposal to the Soviets and to urge them to persuade Vietnam to enter talks based on ASEAN's proposal.
- o In agreeing to the ASEAN request, the President would commit the U.S. to participate in guarantees of a settlement, along with other interested states, after the parties directly involved had come to terms. He would also indicate that we would be prepared to play a major role in the rehabilitation of Cambodia after a settlement, as well as normalizing relations with Vietnam.
- o We would follow through on the ASEAN request, probably first through a letter from the President to Gorbachev, then in regional discussions, then at the Summit.
- o To lessen the chances of an immediate negative reaction from the Soviets before we have a chance to approach them, in announcing what happened at Bali, we and the ASEANS would note only that they have asked us to raise Cambodia with the Soviets.

As this initiative develops, we will have to work closely with the ASEANS, modifying the proposal, if necessary, to meet their concerns. We will also have to bring China into the process at an early stage, due to its large stake in resisting Vietnam and supporting Thailand.

- 2 -

As we work with ASEAN in pursuing negotiations, we must also keep in mind the other track of the ASEAN policy and do our part to keep pressure on Hanoi. Thus, we need to ensure that we are not seen as wavering in our continued denial of normal diplomatic and economic relations to Vietnam, and we must continue our moral and material support for the non-communist Khmer resistance.

This initiative will improve our political position in the region but will probably not persuade the Soviets to put effective pressure on Vietnam. The Soviets and especially the Vietnamese pay a high cost for the continued occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's consequent isolation. Yet, the Soviets have too much a stake in their military bases in Vietnam and in their rivalry with China to jeopardize their relations with Vietnam. Vietnam is also unlikely to view the political costs of occupation in Cambodia as too high.

Nevertheless, the fact that we are working with ASEAN to inject new life into the negotiating process in the context of the Summit may put additional pressure on the Soviets. The stick of prospective U.S.-Soviet collusion, combined with the carrot of normalized relations with the U.S., may make a negotiated settlement slightly more attractive to Hanoi. In any case, if the Soviets do reject this initiative, we will have solidified our support for the ASEANs by involving them directly in the process and we may have preempted or blunted a potentially disruptive Soviet "peace offensive."

AFRICA

From all indications Soviet policy in Angola and Ethiopia is designed to support the parties and political leaders whom Moscow has been building up for over a decade. The Soviets have shown no real interest in working with us to resolve regional conflicts in Africa, although they pay lip service to the idea of peaceful settlements. While we do not at this stage expect the Soviets to engage in a cooperative effort to resolve conflicts in southern Africa and the Horn as called for in the President's regional initiative, we can pursue more limited objectives that would follow up the initiative by:

- maintaining diplomatic pressure on the Soviets;
- engaging the Soviets in a further exchange on the requirements for regional settlement;
- preventing, if possible, the situation in Angola from worsening; and
- strengthening the hands of those who prefer a negotiated solution in southern Africa.

We will pursue these objectives when Assistant Secretary Chet Crocker next meets his Soviet counterpart, Vasev, in early March. We intend to use this meeting again to challenge the Soviets to take concrete steps to reduce conflict in southern Africa, and to explore current Soviet views on political developments in the Horn.

Angola

In a meeting in Paris last May, Chet Crocker pressed Vasev to go beyond mere lip service and to join us in working to resolve the problems of southern Africa through negotiations. Vasev showed little flexibility on Cuban troop withdrawal, even an indication of Soviet differences with the Angolans on this point. They discussed Angolan reconciliation, but the Soviets indicated that they see Savimbi himself as the problem. They prefer to probe for ways of splitting UNITA and neutralizing Savimbi.

Chet will raise the high level of Soviet support for last fall's MPLA offensive against UNITA as a dangerous development and will urge the Soviets to reduce their military involvement

in the region. Chet will make the point that Soviet support for a military solution in Angola is incompatible with a cooperative approach toward regional problems. He will be able to point to the growing support for Savimbi in the U.S. and to stress the broader implications of Soviet activities in southern Africa for the tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations. He will also challenge the Soviets to recognize that a military solution in Angola is not possible, that the President has pledged support to Savimbi and that the USSR should think seriously about promoting political reconciliation in Angola. To the extent the Soviets are seen by the MPLA as hesitating in their support for a military push on Savimbi's headquarters, the hand of those in the MPLA who favor negotiations will be strengthened.

Ethiopia

Last year, Vasev took the initiative with Crocker in raising the Horn of Africa on the side of the southern Africa meeting. This year Chet intends to follow up that precedent by probing for current Soviet views on the region. While Chet does not intend to get into a formal discussion, we believe that an informal exchange will not only give us a better perspective on Soviet views, but could also increase Mengistu's suspicions about ultimate Soviet designs in the Horn of Africa when he hears about the discussion. We might also want to follow-up with the Soviets if a new moderate government in the Sudan were to be interested in trading Sudanese support for Eritrean rebels for an end to Ethiopian aid to rebels in the south of Sudan.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NICARAGUA

In Nicaragua, as elsewhere, the essential first step in implementing the President's regional initiative would be measures toward national reconciliation, including talks between the Sandinistas and the armed democratic resistance. We made such talks the center of our recent proposal to the Contadora countries. When we hold our next experts' talks with the Soviets on Central America/Caribbean issues this May, we will make clear that national reconciliation is the key to progress in Nicaragua. We will ensure the Soviets understand that their continued meddling in Central America carries a price in our bilateral relations, and recognize our determination to resist their encroachments. We will keep discussion focused on the issues of importance to us and place the Soviets and their friends in the position of nay-sayers to peaceful solutions. Specifically, we will repeat our offer to resume dialogue with the Sandinistas if they meet with the armed democratic opposition and to respond to internal and external policy changes in Nicaragua as they occur.

In line with the President's initiative, during our experts' talks we could also outline subsequent steps we would be willing to take with the Soviets once the internal Nicaragua talks were on track. Soviet willingness to discuss national reconciliation as we define it would constitute Soviet acknowledgment that the democratic armed opposition was a legitimate factor in Nicaragua -- a considerable achievement for our political objectives.

The Soviets pay lip-service to Contadora; but, as we saw in our regional experts exchange last fall, are unwilling to accept the Contadora points about internal democracy and pluralism as being equally important as security arrangements. It is therefore likely the Soviets would reject our efforts to promote Sandinista-UNO talks and would insist instead that U.S.-Sandinista talks begin without "preconditions." We could use Soviet rejection of this essential element of Contadora to political advantage in our regional diplomatic efforts.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8150
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

30

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 1801

95 MAR 6 4 7: 36

URGENT

ACTION OFFICER: SESTANOVICH

DUE: NOON TODAY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3854

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- INFORMATION
- McDaniel
 - Pearson
 - Secretariat
 - Rodman
 - Lehman
 - _____
 - Poindexter (advance)
 - Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

WS 7/3/02

~~SECRET~~

Return to Secretariat

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JM-CNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 13, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Art Hartman

Art will be in Washington through May 20 and has requested a meeting with the President. He would also like a separate meeting with you to review recent developments in Moscow.

RECOMMENDATION

That you schedule an appointment with Art Hartman.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

3/13

Jack Matlock,

This was given to the President yesterday at the ceremony for awards to scientists. I'm was one of the attendees.

Would this have any ~~any~~ public diplomacy advantages for us?



DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/4 #8151

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Bridge Across The Bering Strait

This is really a non-starter. I do not doubt that a bridge is technically feasible (but I would question an estimate of \$1 billion cost, which seems much too low).

However, apart from the symbolism, what would it link? There are very few people on either side of the Bering Strait -- a few thousand eskimos on each side and maybe a trader or trapper or two. No road or rail system connects the bridgeheads with the interior of either country.

It is easier for the eskimos to cross by kayak than by bridge.* As for the rest of us, the only way we could get a vehicle to either side of the bridge would be by air or sea (in summer). I can't see that anyone needs a bridge there, and if one were built it probably couldn't be used for about 8 months of the year.

Even if we both had road systems connecting these points to the interior, it would be cheaper -- by several orders of magnitude -- to move people and whatever cargo they might have (walrus tusks, polar bear skins and rancid blubber?) by air.

In sum, Lin may be a crackerjack civil engineer, but he apparently failed to study geography and economics.

**Actually, we have occasionally made representations to the Soviets requesting freedom of Eskimo movement between Little Diomed and Big Diomed -- which they have refused to permit.*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/4#8152

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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SYSTEM II
90187 ADD/ON
JMC

SECRET

March 13, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: DAVID G. WIGG *DW*

SUBJECT: Matlock Comments on Adelman's Paper for the President

I wish to bring to your attention some thoughts on Jack Matlock's comments on the substance of Ken Adelman's paper for the President on Soviet defense spending. Jack argues that CIA figures show both a slowdown in Soviet spending followed by a resurgence that seems to parallel SALT Treaty activity. He also argues that relative Soviet civilian technological backwardness will limit future Soviet defense spending.

Jack's comments are, in my view, misleading and require additional qualification. Namely:

- o There continues to be considerable controversy within the National Security Community over estimates of Soviet defense spending. Depending on who one believes -- CIA, DIA, private estimates -- the numbers vary a great deal. I used to play a role in developing such estimates and I know how shaky the methodologies are. Jack understates the tentativeness of the CIA numbers and does not mention other estimates.
- o Even if one accepts the estimates showing a slowdown in the growth of defense spending, there is agreement on the point that is relevant: that defense took an ever growing share of Soviet GNP throughout the period in question (1976-82) as Soviet economic growth slowed markedly. Thus, they made the painful choice to increase their defense burden. Further, some experts argue that any slowdown in growth that may have occurred is more likely tied to resource constraints and mastering the great quantity of more sophisticated military technologies Moscow had stolen from the West with the advent of detente beginning in the early 1970's. (To my knowledge, no serious analyst has argued effectively that a possible slowdown is linked to SALT Treaty activity).
- o Finally, Jack's argument that Soviet concern over relative technological backwardness in the civilian economy vis-a-vis the U.S. dampens defense spending is unsupported by evidence. The Soviets are painfully aware that the

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

only thing that makes them a "superpower" is their monstrously expensive defense sector. For propaganda purposes over the years, they have periodically compared overall civilian production in certain sectors (e.g., steel) with that of the U.S. because of their very large output of relatively poor quality products. But they base civilian industrial activity on their own internal perceptions of output and productivity needs (after defense takes what it needs) and on what technologies may be available to help solve their problems -- not on any aggregate measure of technological relativity vis-a-vis the United States. Nor have they claimed any kind of competition over relative civilian technological advantage because they know only too well it is nonsense.

cc: Don Fortier
Rod McDaniel
Ron Lehman
Henry DeGraffenreid

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*PKs recalled
Declassified
Action assigned
to*

3/14/69
SYSTEM II
90187

42
8154

JM-C

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March 10, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Adelman Paper on Economic Benefits of Arms Control
for the Soviet Union

Ken Adelman has sent over a brief paper on the subject mentioned for the President's weekend reading. It has the virtue of brevity, but I believe that it is rather thin in substance and am not sure that it will be particularly enlightening for the President.

My own view of Ken's main points is as follows:

1. Have arms control agreements in the past caused the Soviets to divert resources from the military? We really cannot say. It is clear that arms control agreements have not caused any lowering of the overall military effort, and Soviet expenditures have grown with or without agreements. However, we do not know whether Soviet spending would have been even higher if there had been no agreements. For example, the latest CIA estimates are that in the 1976-1982 period the growth rate was 2% as compared with an annual rate of 4% and higher in the preceding period. Then, in the early 80's, the 4% rate was resumed. I am not totally certain of the validity of these figures, but if they are accurate they would indicate that the growth rate of military expenditures was moderated during a period following the signature of Salt I, and continued until it was clear that SALT-II would not be ratified.

2. The current economic situation differs from that earlier in that overall Soviet economic expansion is slowing down and the reduced annual growth rate squeezes the funds available for increments to the Soviet military budget. They will doubtless continue to increase it every year, but it is more and more difficult to think of increments above 4% -- particularly since the technological backwardness of the economy as a whole is growing compared with the U.S., and this places additional constraints on how much more can be devoted to military spending without pushing the economy even further behind.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

3. Gorbachev's main economic incentive is to avert strong pressures for radical increases in military spending, which could make shambles of his domestic program eventually. SDI is a factor here, but only one factor. Equally worrisome to the Soviets (maybe even more worrisome) are emerging technologies for conventional weapons and other new technologies such as stealth. They know that if they try to match us in these fields they will always be behind so long as we don't give up trying. The thrust of their policies is to convince us to stop trying. This has both a military and an economic rationale.

Danzansky and Linhard concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you not send the Adelman memo to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

OR, ALTERNATIVELY,

If you decide to send it, that you send it with the cover memorandum at TAB I which makes some of the points above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: ACDA Paper on Economic Benefits of Arms Control
for the Soviet Union

Ken Adelman has forwarded a paper for your review on the economic benefits of arms control for the Soviet Union. It is attached at Tab A.

In connection with the points that Ken makes, I think it important to bear in mind that we really cannot say whether arms control agreements have caused the Soviets to divert resources from the military. While there has certainly not been any lowering of the overall Soviet military effort as a result of arms control, the latest CIA estimates show Soviet military spending dipping from a 4% annual growth rate in the early 70's to 2% in the period 1976-82. It jumps back to 4% after 1982. If these figures are accurate they could mean the Soviets moderated spending after signing SALT I and resumed the higher pace when it became clear SALT II would not be ratified.

At the same time it is important to remember that Soviet economic expansion is now slowing down, and the country's growing technological backwardness places additional constraints on planning the military budget. Gorbachev's main economic incentive is to avert pressure for radical increases in military spending which could thwart his economic program. In this context SDI is a concern for the Soviets as are emerging conventional weapons technologies. The thrust of Soviet policies has been to convince us to stop our programs so they won't have to play an expensive game of catch up.

Attachments:

Tab A ACDA paper on economic benefits of arms control for the Soviet Union

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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TIME STAMP

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SYSTEM II
90187

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED]

DUE: 3/10

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Prepare Memo _____

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

FYI

FYI

Burghardt

Levine

Sachs

Cannistraro

Linhard

Sestanovich

Childress

Mahley

Sigur

Cobb

Major

Small

Covey

Mandel

Sommer

Danzansky

Matlock

Soos

deGraffenreid

May

Stark

Djerejian

Menges

Steiner

Dobriansky

Miller

Tahir-Kheli

Donley

North

Teicher

Douglass

Platt

Thompson

Grimes

Pugliaresi

Tillman

Hughes

Raymond

Wigg

Kraemer

Reger

Wright

Laux

Ringdahl

Lenczowski

Sable

INFORMATION McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Lehman

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

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OR CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

CS 7/3/02

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Return to Secretariat

National Security Council
The White House

System # 11

Package # 90187

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>stuff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS _____ Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Staffing Instructions
 action: JFM
 concus: REL
 SLD

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

March 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Economic Benefits of Arms Control for the
Soviet Union

Attached is a paper on the above subject for the President's
weekend reading.



Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment:
As stated

Economic Benefits of Arms Control for the Soviet Union

The argument is often made that the Soviets are interested in arms control because of its economic benefits.

There is a grain of truth in this proposition to the extent that the Soviets succeed in using the arms control process to limit U.S. defense spending and place bounds on U.S. strategic modernization. Arms control, in this sense, provides a measure of predictability on future U.S. forces which helps the Soviets better manage and plan their future military requirements.

Soviet activities during the past fifteen years, however, do not provide much support for the argument that the Soviets have used arms control to divert resources from the military. Past agreements have not prevented the Soviets from deploying large numbers of new or modernized strategic weapon systems. Since the early 1970s, these improvements have significantly increased the capability of Soviet strategic forces. The Soviets have negotiated arms agreements that permitted them to proceed with the key elements of their military programs, while providing a degree of predictability with regard to U.S. forces.

Soviet strategic programs receive the highest resources priority and the Soviets have been willing to spend what they deemed necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. In the past, any savings from arms control agreements probably have had a negligible impact on the overall Soviet economy.

The Soviets may see greater economic value in the current arms control process because of SDI, and because the Soviets probably are uncertain about their capability to offset future U.S. programs.

The Soviets probably see the principle economic value occurring over the longer term because deep reductions probably would not produce significant savings for some time and because the costs of responding to SDI probably would not accrue until the late 1990s.

Despite Gorbachev's claim that the Soviet countermeasures to SDI would be effective and less costly than SDI, Soviet attempts to counter SDI would require new, and probably substantial, expenditures. Moreover, the Soviets would have great difficulty in determining whether a large-scale force expansion and countermeasures would be sufficient to offset U.S. defenses and permit the Soviets to continue to accomplish their military missions. Therefore, the Soviets may be faced either with undertaking large, expensive increases in deployed strategic capabilities with uncertain prospects for success, or affecting an agreed, regulated limitation on both strategic offensive and defensive forces.

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At the same time, the Soviets may face greater constraints on their ability to increase their strategic commitment than in the past. Significant expansion could (1) reduce growth in investment which is critical to modernizing their industrial base, and/or (2) curtail growth in the production of consumer goods which is an important factor in the Soviet drive to improve labor productivity.

Moreover, the increasing modernization of the Soviet strategic posture itself confronts the Soviets with new resource burdens. The weapons systems of the 1980s and 1990s require more advanced technology and greater operating skill. They see the prospects of effective U.S. strategic defenses as greatly compounding the problem. The mass production of high technology items like modern air defense systems may prove difficult for the Soviets. Furthermore, the move we see the Soviets making toward a greater reliance on mobility is costly in terms of support equipment, trained personnel, and operating expenses.

There is no indication, however, that economic problems will force the Soviets to forego or significantly constrain key strategic programs in the near term. The Soviets already have made a substantial resource commitment to developmental programs that will result by the mid-1990s in improved intercontinental nuclear attack forces -- land-and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The Soviets appear well-postured to handle their strategic objectives through the next five years or so.

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JM-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 14, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD R. FORTIER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Alleged U.S. Responsibility in Palme Assassination

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Elliott Abrams in response to Abrams' memo of March 11 (Tab II). Abrams asks if we can protest Soviet accusations that the U.S. is responsible for the deaths of such world leaders as Aldo Moro, Indira Gandhi, Tancredo Neves and Olof Palme. In response we note that State protested these outrageous and irresponsible accusations to Soviet Charge Sokolov on March 4 and suggest that we may raise it again in Secretary Shultz's March 15 meeting with Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Steve ^{SAS}Sestanovich, Peter ^{PS}Sommer, Walt ^{n.a.}Raymond and Vincent ^{VC.}Cannistraro concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Fortier/Abrams memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Fortier to Abrams memorandum
- Tab II Memorandum from Abrams

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NLRR F06-114/4#8156

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ELLIOTT ABRAMS
Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs

SUBJECT: Alleged U.S. Responsibility for Palme
Assassination (U)

I fully agree with you that we need to make it clear to the Soviets that these outrageous charges are irresponsible and damaging to our bilateral relationship. In this regard I was pleased to learn that the Department of State protested directly to Soviet Charge Sokolov on March 4. The Department may wish to consider a further protest during Secretary Shultz's March 15 meeting with Nikolay Ryzhkov. (C)

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

II



United States Department of State
1972

Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

TO: NSC - Mr. Fortier
FROM: ARA - Elliott Abrams
SUBJECT: Moscow Blames U.S. in Death of Palme

I know we have not achieved the full blessings of detente, but I was quite suprised at the attached Moscow Television Service item. It blames the U.S. in the deaths of Palme, Gandhi, Moro, and even Neves.

Can we protest this kind of garbage?

I send this to you in part because it seems to mee that the President should be aware of the kind of trash the Soviets are sending out.

Attachment

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

RW 3/9/11

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NLRR FOI 114/4 #8160
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

U.S. 'DISPLEASURE' 'COMMON FACTOR' IN LEADERS' DEATHS

LD062113 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1545 GMT 6 Mar 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valentin Zorin]

[Excerpt] The world press is continuing to publish materials related to the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The investigations into this murder by the Swedish authorities have thus far found no trace of the criminals, although a computer photograph [fotorobot] compiled on the evidence of witnesses has been distributed today.

But as the recently received facts show, it is not a question of the actions of an individual murderer but of a carefully planned plot worked out in fine detail.

Attempting to elucidate whom Olof Palme disturbed in retrospect, the Swedish press recalls that strong disagreements first arose around the personality of the deceased prime minister when he expressed sharp condemnation of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and participated in a mass protest demonstration in Stockholm in 1968. Numerous fresh facts also are adduced. It is particularly recalled that Olof Palme was subjected to crude attacks a year ago, only a year ago, on the part of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Burt. The cause for Washington's displeasure at that time was the Swedish Government head's criticism of Washington's policy with respect to Nicaragua.

In considering the circumstances of the eminent statesman's death, I thought of certain circumstances which I would like to share with you, comrades.

The world has witnessed the violent removal of a number of eminent figures from the political arena over the past few years. Each of these evil deeds is significant in its own right. But if one correlates them, then a most significant chain of events emerges. I will name a few of these terrorist acts:

The murder in Delhi of one of the most prominent statesmen of the past few decades, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Her policy, as is known often aroused sharp criticism from Washington. The tragic death of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who had irritated Washington through his desire to set up cooperation with the Italian Communist Party. The death in August 1981, in an aircraft disaster, of the leader of the Panamanian revolution, Omar Torrijos, who led the Panamanian people's struggle against Yankee imperialism for the right to control the Panama Canal. Friends of General Torrijos -- the remarkable writers Graham Greene and Gabriel Garcia Marquez and also his brother -- have openly accused the U.S. CIA of organizing the aircraft disaster. Also included on this list is the name of Chilean President Salvador Allende, a politician who aroused Washington's special, I would say paranoid, hatred.

And here is the most recent report, just received from the Brazilian capital. Investigations are under way there involving the group of doctors who operated on Tancredo Neves, elected to the post of president of Brazil in the spring of 1985. Neves' impending accession to the post of president caused much unease on the banks of the Potomac, insofar as he had spoken during the preelection campaign of the need to fight U.S. economic and political dominance in Brazil.

As has now become known, the operation, which was carried out on Neves on the eve of his accession to the presidency, took place in most suspicious circumstances. In particular, 18 people were in the operating theater at that time, of whom only half were doctors. Tancredo Neves thus died on the operating table without having occupied the post to which he was elected by the people of Brazil.

The circumstances of the tragic deaths of those whom I have named are different. The common factor is only that each of them was a figure who had aroused the displeasure of Washington.

There are no facts at this time which permit one to say definitely as to who put together the plot against Olof Palme. But, agree with me that the chain of events which I have recalled provides food for thought.

ARBATOV ON LATEST REAGAN SPEECH, SUMMIT PROSPECTS

PM061211 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 2 Mar 86 p 9

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by Marilo Ruiz de Elvira in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow -- Question: What message did Mikhail Gorbachev intend to convey in his policy report to the CPSU congress?

Answer: The message -- though addressed to two different audiences -- is that we cannot continue as at present, that we must change the way we think and behave. For our people this means that we must change, change our social relations, and the way we work within the party and government. For the outside world it means that we have reached a point of no return. If we continue to behave as we have behaved for years, the result will be frightening.

Question: What is the conclusion?

Answer: That despite all the difficulties and problems, we live in the same world, are extremely interdependent, and are in danger. In fact we face many dangers and we can only tackle them if we unite. So, like it or not, we must work together. We can do nothing on our own, and neither can the North Americans or the Europeans.

Question: What are these dangers?

Answer: The danger of war, the arms race, the possibility of the world's irreparable split between rich and poor nations, and the despair of the developing countries, whose situation is worsening daily.

Question: How can a greater degree of security be attained?

Answer: Gorbachev has formulated a new concept of security. Security cannot be built by means of weapons, military organizations, or military technological methods. It would be a miracle. Nowadays security is a political problem that can only be solved by political means. Otherwise the result will be that we will have more weapons and less security.

Question: But the United States cannot be blamed entirely for the cold war. Has the USSR not made mistakes too?

Answer: Nobody is perfect, of course, and if history gave us the chance to live again undoubtedly we would act differently, do other things... but that is a luxury that history does not grant us. It is time not to concentrate on who is more or less to blame but to decide what must be done now. Lenin said on a certain occasion that there are different kinds of mistakes.