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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (3/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1504

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8132	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE ADELMAN PAPER ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL AND FOR THE USSR <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	3/10/1986	B1
8133	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE ACDA PAPER ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THE USSR <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8143	PAPER	ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8134	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE REACTIVATION OF U.S.-USSR JOINT MEDICAL/HEALTH AGREEMENT <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8135	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE REACTIVATION OF THE U.S.-USSR JOINT MEDICAL AGREEMENT <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	2/13/1986	B1
8144	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE REACTIVATION OF THE U.S.-USSR MEDICAL AGREEMENT <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	1/23/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (3/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1504

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8136	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE REACTIVATION OF THE U.S.-USSR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN HEALTH <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	5/5/1984	B1
8137	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO CASEY RE "WORLDWIDE BRIEFING" <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/10/1986	B1
8138	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE WORLDWIDE BRIEFING PAPER <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	2/25/1986	B1
8139	PAPER	WORLDWIDE BRIEFING <i>R 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	16	1/30/1986	B1
8140	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE WEINBERGER-SOKOLOV MEETING <i>R 11/5/2009 F06-114/4</i>	1	3/10/1986	B1
8141	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER WEINBERGER TO MARSHAL SOKOLOV <i>R 11/5/2009 F06-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8142	MEMO	SHULTZ TO POINDEXTER RE USSR <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	3/1/1986	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

8132
SYSTEM II
90187
JM-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

March 10, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Adelman Paper on Economic Benefits of Arms Control
for the Soviet Union

Ken Adelman has sent over a brief paper on the subject mentioned for the President's weekend reading. It has the virtue of brevity, but I believe that it is rather thin in substance and am not sure that it will be particularly enlightening for the President.

My own view of Ken's main points is as follows:

1. Have arms control agreements in the past caused the Soviets to divert resources from the military? We really cannot say. It is clear that arms control agreements have not caused any lowering of the overall military effort, and Soviet expenditures have grown with or without agreements. However, we do not know whether Soviet spending would have been even higher if there had been no agreements. For example, the latest CIA estimates are that in the 1976-1982 period the growth rate was 2% as compared with an annual rate of 4% and higher in the preceding period. Then, in the early 80's, the 4% rate was resumed. I am not totally certain of the validity of these figures, but if they are accurate they would indicate that the growth rate of military expenditures was moderated during a period following the signature of Salt I, and continued until it was clear that SALT-II would not be ratified.

2. The current economic situation differs from that earlier in that overall Soviet economic expansion is slowing down and the reduced annual growth rate squeezes the funds available for increments to the Soviet military budget. They will doubtless continue to increase it every year, but it is more and more difficult to think of increments above 4% -- particularly since the technological backwardness of the economy as a whole is growing compared with the U.S., and this places additional constraints on how much more can be devoted to military spending without pushing the economy even further behind.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

3. Gorbachev's main economic incentive is to avert strong pressures for radical increases in military spending, which could make shambles of his domestic program eventually. SDI is a factor here, but only one factor. Equally worrisome to the Soviets (maybe even more worrisome) are emerging technologies for conventional weapons and other new technologies such as stealth. They know that if they try to match us in these fields they will always be behind so long as we don't give up trying. The thrust of their policies is to convince us to stop trying. This has both a military and an economic rationale.

Alf Plot
Danzansky and Linhard concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you not send the Adelman memo to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

OR, ALTERNATIVELY,

If you decide to send it, that you send it with the cover memorandum at TAB I which makes some of the points above.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: ACDA Paper on Economic Benefits of Arms Control
for the Soviet Union

Ken Adelman has forwarded a paper for your review on the economic benefits of arms control for the Soviet Union. It is attached at Tab A.

In connection with the points that Ken makes, I think it important to bear in mind that we really cannot say whether arms control agreements have caused the Soviets to divert resources from the military. While there has certainly not been any lowering of the overall Soviet military effort as a result of arms control, the latest CIA estimates show Soviet military spending dipping from a 4% annual growth rate in the early 70's to 2% in the period 1976-82. It jumps back to 4% after 1982. If these figures are accurate they could mean the Soviets moderated spending after signing SALT I and resumed the higher pace when it became clear SALT II would not be ratified.

At the same time it is important to remember that Soviet economic expansion is now slowing down, and the country's growing technological backwardness places additional constraints on planning the military budget. Gorbachev's main economic incentive is to avert pressure for radical increases in military spending which could thwart his economic program. In this context SDI is a concern for the Soviets as are emerging conventional weapons technologies. The thrust of Soviet policies has been to convince us to stop our programs so they won't have to play an expensive game of catch up.

Attachments:

Tab A ACDA paper on economic benefits of arms control for the Soviet Union

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NLRR F06-114/4#8133
BY RWS NARA DATE 3/9/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SECRET

SYSTEM II
90187

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICER: [REDACTED]

DUE: 3/10

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI

FYI

FYI

Burghardt

Levine

Sachs

Cannistraro

Linhard

Sestanovich

Childress

Mahley

Sigur

Cobb

Major

Small

Covey

Mandel

Sommer

Danzansky

Matlock

Soos

deGraffenreid

May

Stark

Djerejian

Menges

Steiner

Dobriansky

Miller

Tahir-Kheli

Donley

North

Teicher

Douglass

Platt

Thompson

Grimes

Pugliaresi

Tillman

Hughes

Raymond

Wigg

Kraemer

Reger

Wright

Laux

Ringdahl

Lenczowski

Sable

INFORMATION McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Lehman

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

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CAS 7/2/02

SECRET

Return to Secretariat

National Security Council
The White House

5

System # 11
 Package # 90187
 DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>staff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

Staffing Instructions
 action: JFM
 concn: REL
 SID

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

March 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Economic Benefits of Arms Control for the
Soviet Union

Attached is a paper on the above subject for the President's
weekend reading.



Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment:
As stated

Economic Benefits of Arms Control for the Soviet Union

The argument is often made that the Soviets are interested in arms control because of its economic benefits.

There is a grain of truth in this proposition to the extent that the Soviets succeed in using the arms control process to limit U.S. defense spending and place bounds on U.S. strategic modernization. Arms control, in this sense, provides a measure of predictability on future U.S. forces which helps the Soviets better manage and plan their future military requirements.

Soviet activities during the past fifteen years, however, do not provide much support for the argument that the Soviets have used arms control to divert resources from the military. Past agreements have not prevented the Soviets from deploying large numbers of new or modernized strategic weapon systems. Since the early 1970s, these improvements have significantly increased the capability of Soviet strategic forces. The Soviets have negotiated arms agreements that permitted them to proceed with the key elements of their military programs, while providing a degree of predictability with regard to U.S. forces.

Soviet strategic programs receive the highest resources priority and the Soviets have been willing to spend what they deemed necessary to achieve their strategic objectives. In the past, any savings from arms control agreements probably have had a negligible impact on the overall Soviet economy.

The Soviets may see greater economic value in the current arms control process because of SDI, and because the Soviets probably are uncertain about their capability to offset future U.S. programs.

The Soviets probably see the principle economic value occurring over the longer term because deep reductions probably would not produce significant savings for some time and because the costs of responding to SDI probably would not accrue until the late 1990s.

Despite Gorbachev's claim that the Soviet countermeasures to SDI would be effective and less costly than SDI, Soviet attempts to counter SDI would require new, and probably substantial, expenditures. Moreover, the Soviets would have great difficulty in determining whether a large-scale force expansion and countermeasures would be sufficient to offset U.S. defenses and permit the Soviets to continue to accomplish their military missions. Therefore, the Soviets may be faced either with undertaking large, expensive increases in deployed strategic capabilities with uncertain prospects for success, or affecting an agreed, regulated limitation on both strategic offensive and defensive forces.

At the same time, the Soviets may face greater constraints on their ability to increase their strategic commitment than in the past. Significant expansion could (1) reduce growth in investment which is critical to modernizing their industrial base, and/or (2) curtail growth in the production of consumer goods which is an important factor in the Soviet drive to improve labor productivity.

Moreover, the increasing modernization of the Soviet strategic posture itself confronts the Soviets with new resource burdens. The weapons systems of the 1980s and 1990s require more advanced technology and greater operating skill. They see the prospects of effective U.S. strategic defenses as greatly compounding the problem. The mass production of high technology items like modern air defense systems may prove difficult for the Soviets. Furthermore, the move we see the Soviets making toward a greater reliance on mobility is costly in terms of support equipment, trained personnel, and operating expenses.

There is no indication, however, that economic problems will force the Soviets to forego or significantly constrain key strategic programs in the near term. The Soviets already have made a substantial resource commitment to developmental programs that will result by the mid-1990s in improved intercontinental nuclear attack forces -- land-and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. The Soviets appear well-postured to handle their strategic objectives through the next five years or so.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


FILE

March 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Joint Medical/Health
Agreement (C)

We have reviewed your Memorandum to Admiral Poindexter of January 23, 1986, and endorse the proposal to reactivate the two U.S.-USSR agreements in the health area-- the Medical Science and Public Health Agreement and the Artificial Heart Research and Development Agreement. (C)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/4 #8134
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 13, 1986

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Joint Medical Agreement

I have reviewed the State Memorandum at TAB II and endorse the proposal to reactivate the two U.S.-USSR agreements in the health area -- the Medical Science and Public Health Agreement and the Artificial Heart Research and Development Agreement.

WR Raymond, *SS* Seseanovich and *OH* Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmittal of the Memorandum at TAB I.

Approve *f* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- TAB I McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
- TAB II Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of January 23, 1986

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NLRR FDC 114/4 #8135
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13



Washington, D.C. 20520

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0626

January 23, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Joint Medical Agreement

In the attached memorandum of May 5, 1984 the NSC approved a proposal to reactivate the two US-USSR agreements in the health area -- the Medical Science and Public Health Agreement and the Artificial Heart Research and Development Agreement. The memorandum cautioned against initiating a joint committee meeting of the two sides and other expansion of activities under the agreements while Yelena Bonner was being denied permission to obtain medical treatment abroad. Now that the Soviets have permitted Ms. Bonner to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment, we believe it is appropriate to reevaluate that policy with a view to considering first steps toward the reinvigoration of the medical agreements.

You will recall that in his June 27 speech to the Smithsonian Institute, the President specifically cited the medical agreement in calling for expansion of activities under bilateral cooperative agreements. More recently, the joint communique at Geneva, in the context of the President's Exchanges Initiatives, called for resumption of US-Soviet cooperation in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields, with special emphasis on cooperation to combat cancer.

The State Department recommends that we now take the next step towards expanding bilateral cooperation under the health agreements in response to the Soviet decision on Ms. Bonner. However, even though Ms. Bonner has been permitted to depart the Soviet Union, we should react cautiously. We still have grave concerns about the plight of her husband, Andrei Sakharov, and about Ms. Bonner's ability to rejoin him in the USSR at the conclusion of her treatment. Additionally, it is possible that we or the public may learn additional information about Sakharov's condition during her stay in the West which would make it inadvisable to proceed with medical science cooperation.

The Department recommends that HHS be authorized to begin a three-step process to expand health science cooperation with the Soviets as originally proposed by Secretary Heckler in her

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

April 24, 1984 letter to the Secretary (also attached). The Department recommends that Dr. James Wyngaarden, Director of the National Institute of Health be authorized to accept a recent Soviet invitation to travel to the USSR. Dr. Wyngaarden could visit various biomedical research institutes to help identify topics of collaborative research, including the joint cancer research announced at Geneva. Dr. Wyngaarden will find an appropriate opportunity to inform his Soviet interlocutor that we welcome the Soviet decision to allow Ms. Bonner to leave the USSR for medical treatment. Dr. Wyngaarden will stress that further positive steps in the treatment of Andrei Sakharov and other dissident scientists would have a beneficial impact on U.S.-Soviet cooperation. We will provide suitable talking points closer to Dr. Wyngaarden's departure.

Subsequently, Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General and also the Director of HHS Office of International Health, could arrange a follow-up trip to the Soviet Union to meet with his counterparts to discuss health cooperation generally and to prepare an agenda for a Joint Health Committee Meeting.

Finally, if planning proceeds satisfactorily and if there are no further complications, the U.S. would host a Joint Health Committee meeting sometime in late 1986.

Bonckimley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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DECL:OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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VIA LDX

May 5, 1984

ACTION:EUR

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S/S

S/S-S MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL

TMC

Executive Secretary

SL

Department of State

RF (SHM)

SUBJECT: Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Cooperative
Agreements in Health (C)

In reference to your memorandum of April 30, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane, the proposal to reactivate the U.S.-USSR agreements in the health area is approved. We note, however, that it will not be desirable to hold a joint committee meeting and begin expanding cooperative activity under these agreements while Mrs. Yelena Bonner is being denied permission to obtain medical treatment abroad. (C)

Secretary Heckler can be authorized to convey our decision in principle to her Soviet counterpart when they meet in Geneva during the World Health Assembly. If she does so, however, she should also seek a brief private meeting with the Soviet Minister of Health to point out our concern over Mrs. Bonner's inability to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment abroad. She should indicate that we expect Mrs. Bonner's request to be acted on favorably, and that resolution of this problem will affect our willingness to expand cooperation in the medical area. (C)

If Mrs. Bonner is allowed to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment, a date for a joint committee meeting to plan activities under the agreements in question can be set. If she should not be allowed to leave the USSR, however, the Department should refer the question to us again, with its recommendation, before proceeding. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI 114/4 #8136

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

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14

APR 24 1984

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

After the President's speech of January 16th, in which he indicated a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union, I asked the Public Health Service to review our program of cooperation in health with the Soviet Union to see where our relations stand at present and to see if any new initiatives were possible. As a result, I believe that there are several steps we could take to promote our cooperation and for which we are asking clearance:

1. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee for Health Cooperation.

It has now been more than five years since the last formal meeting of the Joint Health Committee, and there have been no high-level contacts between senior health officials during this time. Cooperation has successfully continued at the scientist level, especially in the areas of cardiovascular research and cancer. We are finding, however, that fewer good U.S. scientists are willing to go to the Soviet Union, and without high level contacts it is difficult to identify new opportunities for cooperation where we would clearly benefit from the exchange. We would propose to schedule a meeting of the Committee, in the United States, in late 1984 or early 1985. The focus of such a meeting should be a review of the past program of activities and a discussion of how best to gradually strengthen the program, given our budgetary limitations and mutual scientific interests. We would seek to avoid a large meeting that might raise false expectations.

2. A visit to the Soviet Union this summer by the Surgeon General, Dr. C. Everett Koop.

Dr. Koop, who is also the Director of our Office of International Health, would be a U.S. Deputy Co-chairman in the event of a Joint Health Committee Meeting. The purpose of this visit would be to meet with his counterparts to discuss health cooperation generally and to prepare an agenda for a Joint Health Committee meeting. This trip could probably be scheduled for this summer.

APR 24 REC'D


3. Rescheduled visit to the Soviet Union by Dr. James Wyngaarden, Director of the National Institutes of Health.

This trip had been scheduled for last October, but was postponed because of the shooting down of the KAL airliner. Dr. Wyngaarden would visit various biomedical research institutes to help identify topics of collaborative research to be pursued under our current Agreements. He could also explore the possibility of an agreement between the National Institutes of Health and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Dr. Wyngaarden's trip would probably be rescheduled for October, 1984.

I plan to head the U.S. Delegation to the World Health Assembly, which will be held in Geneva in early May. If the necessary approvals are granted by that time, I would plan to discuss these proposals informally with my Soviet counterpart.

I would appreciate your reactions to these proposals and would welcome the opportunity for further discussion.

Sincerely,



Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

8417417

16

APR 24 1984

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

After the President's speech of January 16th, in which he indicated a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union, I asked the Public Health Service to review our program of cooperation in health with the Soviet Union to see where our relations stand at present and to see if any new initiatives were possible. As a result, I believe that there are several steps we could take to promote our cooperation and for which we are asking clearance:

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APR 24 REC'D


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I would appreciate your reactions to these proposals and would welcome the opportunity for further discussion.

Sincerely,



Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

→ FILE

March 10, 1986


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CIA "Worldwide Briefing" (U)

I recently received a copy of your "Worldwide Briefing" on the Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests. I have reviewed it with interest and found many of the facts and trends cited there disturbing. In particular, as you point out, we have yet to see any clear sign that the Soviets are changing their policy of using military force to exploit regional conflicts. (C)

I think the paper provides abundant examples which can be used to keep public attention focused on Soviet behavior in the developing world - a major obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. (C)



John M. Poindexter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR P06-114/4 #8137
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/4

WORLDWIDE BRIEFING

Intelligence must not only report developments around the world as they occur. It must also step-back to discern patterns, linkages, and strategies that may work to endanger the United States and its interests. During 1985, the pattern of challenges and threats to our strategic interests broadened, sharpened and intensified.

The main thrust still comes from the Soviet Union, which is increasingly posing a many dimensioned global challenge to the United States and the Free World. This threat resides:

- (1) in the military might the Russians are piling up on the Eurasian land mass,
- (2) in its ^{continuance (w.R.)} ~~steady acquisition~~ of geopolitical bridgeheads in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and
- (3) in the development, linking and use of these bridgeheads for growing Soviet naval and air operation and to further enlarge the Soviet geopolitical position.

The Soviets continue the modernization and expansion of their military forces both conventional and strategic. The conventional weapons threat from the Warsaw Pact countries was the first element of this threat to emerge. It has been intensified in recent years and has now progressed to the point where the Pact enjoys ^{significant (w.R.)} ~~huge~~ military advantages, and is now developing more exotic arms for the future.

DECLASSIFIED / (RE/ERASED)
NLRR F06-114/4 #8139
BY CW NARADATE 1/23/08

DCI says Soviets are 10 feet tall.
Sounds like a budget defense document.
And this after 5 R.R. years? (W.R.)

21

In the European Central Region, the Pact maintains a three-to-one advantage in tanks and artillery, and more than two-to-one in armored vehicles and aircraft.

While NATO has historically had the qualitative edge in military weapons, this edge is eroding.

The newest Soviet tanks are at least the equal of those in NATO's arsenal. In some aspects, such as firepower and armor protection, they are superior.

The fielding of more self-propelled artillery is boosting the maneuverability, survivability, and tactical nuclear firepower of Soviet ground forces. Soviet bridging equipment to cross the rivers of Europe is so good that our army has reverse engineered to field models of Soviet design.

Soviet aircraft are among the world's finest. Newer fighters and fighter-bombers have improved performance, larger payloads, and better avionics--though the latest US aircraft still maintain leads in sortie rate and avionics.

The Soviets have developed and used in Afghanistan fuel-air explosives which inflict massive destruction without crossing the nuclear threshold.

We know that the Soviets are working to acquire the technology to develop aircraft and cruise missiles employing stealth features, and remotely piloted vehicles for acquiring and attacking armored vehicles. At the same time they are developing their own anti-tank warheads with increased penetration ability, precision guided munitions with enhanced accuracy, conventional explosives with enhanced destructiveness, and a new generation of fighters, some with multiple target look-down/shoot-down capability.

The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest chemical warfare capability--with an agent stockpile nearly three times larger than ours. They continue to replenish existing stocks and maintain an active research and development program. The Soviet armed forces are trained and equipped to operate on battlefields contaminated by nuclear and chemical weapons.

These Soviet developments add up to a dominance in land warfare which requires the West to count on its maritime reinforcement capability to counter and on its strategic forces to deter.

Some of the Soviets' greatest strides have been in submarine production. In the last three years, they have introduced three new types of nuclear attack submarines which are quieter, faster and able to dive deeper. They have also launched a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, and in their naval deployment and naval exercises have brought US-Soviet competition into Atlantic and Pacific waters where until now we have enjoyed a near monopoly.

The second element of Soviet military power to emerge is its strategic force and over the last 10 years it has at least caught up and probably surpassed ours. By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems. The number of deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand over the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s.

The Soviets are protecting their missile force by making much of it mobile. They have already deployed their first new mobile ICBM and will soon begin deploying a second.

While all may be true and good intelligence targets for collection - there is a "net assessment" element that weaves in the text which almost characterizes us as profoundly inferior. (W.R.)

Follow-on missile programs--with improved accuracy, greater throw weight potential and probably more warheads--will begin flight-testing in the 1986-90 time period.

Major improvements are also under way in Soviet ballistic missile submarines and bomber forces.

We expect the Soviets to complete improvements to their operational ABM defenses at Moscow by 1987. This provides them with all the components necessary for a much larger, widespread ABM defense, including transportable engagement radars, above-ground launchers, and a new high-acceleration short-range interceptor.

The distinction between missions for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ABMs is becoming increasingly blurred as the result of technology improvements to SAMs such as the SA-X-12. That system's capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles gives it the potential to function in a missile defense role.

The Soviets have long been working on technologies basic to our own Strategic Defense Initiative. Their work on directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons goes back many years with more than 10,000 engineers involved.

We estimate that between 1980 and 1983, the cost of the Soviet space program nearly doubled. The costs of their military space activities alone are about the same as those for their strategic offensive forces. Soviet space systems are likely to be an integral part of any strategic missile defense system the Soviets might develop and deploy.

The five-year plan which Gorbachev will soon propose to the Party Congress will call for an 80 percent increase in the investment in machine building.

There will also be ambitious goals for high tech support industries. This will include the microelectronics and computers essential for developing the more complex weapons systems the Soviets plan for the next decade. We believe the current high level of military spending will continue to grow at the rate that has prevailed for the past ten years.

Even at a time of economic difficulty and a reordering of domestic priorities, Soviet defense programs have been protected. For example, during the next five year plan we expect ICBM production to increase substantially over the 1981-85 plan, submarine production to be up about 20-25 percent, and tank production to jump well over 50 percent. There will be some 4,000 fighters and helicopters and a few hundred new strategic bombers produced during this period. While the number of aircraft are somewhat lower than in the preceding five-year period, the new aircraft will be substantially more technically advanced and capable. Thus, the prospect is for continuation of the steady 20-year expansion and modernization of Soviet strategic and conventional forces. The cumulative effect of this buildup is so great that the United States has only begun to catch up.

Because of accumulated earlier investment and defense industrial capacity, the number of weapons systems that they will be able to buy over the next five years will be substantially greater than what they acquired the past five years.

Despite the much increased US spending for arms of the past five years, [?] only recently has the US begun to catch up with Soviet weapons acquisition; (w.r.) until then, we simply were not falling behind as fast as we had been.

The important thing is not how much the Soviets spend on arms, but the quantity and quality of arms they get for their money. When you compare US and Soviet procurement of major weapons systems, from 1974-1984, the Soviet advantage in:

ICBMs and SLBMs	is roughly about	3 times
IRBMs and MRBMs	is roughly about	6 times
Surface-to-Air missiles	is roughly about	9 times
? (w.r.) Long and Intermediate Range Bombers	is more than	50 times
Fighters	is roughly about	twice
Helicopters	is more than	twice
Submarines	is more than	twice
Tanks	is more than	3 times
Artillery pieces	is more than	10 times

The steady growth of Soviet weapons procurement from the high level of the last decade will give the Soviets a massive cumulative inventory of weapons, and they will continue to substantially modernize their forces in the next five years and buy larger numbers of weapons.

This huge military force and its continued growth may never be used against the United States or NATO--although the Soviets clearly are prepared to use it if their vital interests are threatened. The mere existence of this force not only validates the Soviet Union as a superpower, but has an intimidating effect on countries around the world helping the Soviets expand their presence, influence, and power. It represents the backdrop for an aggressive challenge being played out worldwide, but most particularly on the ground in the Third World and in the vicinity of critical sea lanes.

The Soviet Union has acquired bridgeheads in Cuba, Cambodia, South Yemen and Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Gorbachev, since coming to power, has moved sharply to strengthen the Soviet hold on these bridgeheads. In the last six months alone, he has extended a \$600 million credit to Nicaragua, \$1 billion in new economic assistance to Vietnam, and completed the supply of \$1.5 billion in military equipment to Angola. Soviet ^{advisors (P.R.)} and Cuban troops have become more active in Angola, Nicaragua, and South Yemen, and Soviet forces have been reinforced and pursued more aggressive tactics in Afghanistan. Each of these countries has become an outpost for Soviet intelligence collection, propaganda and subversion in its respective region. Several have undertaken on their own to destabilize neighboring regimes. Virtually all are strategically located either near important strategic choke points or in areas of almost certain regional conflict.

As the map indicates, the USSR now has Marxist-Leninist allies or clients spread around the globe. It has naval and air basing rights close to sea lane choke points vital to the Free World. These strategic positions which the Soviets have acquired around the world are being linked, moreover, in a growing logistic and infrastructure network.

Let me illustrate by describing the Soviet complex in the Caribbean and its links. The Soviets have created in Cuba the strongest military force in the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of our own. Even more worrisome than this military bastion on our doorstep are the growing logistic networks that the Soviets have sponsored in both Cuba and Nicaragua. In Cuba at least three, and probably more, airfields are capable of hosting Soviet TU-95 Bear heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear air-to-surface missiles....

missiles. TU-95 Bear Reconnaissance and ASW aircraft routinely fly from the Kola Peninsula in the Soviet Arctic to Cuban airfields. In Nicaragua, aircraft revetments to handle high performance fighters have been completed at Sandino airfield in Managua. The runways at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on the Atlantic coast and Montlimar on the Pacific have been extended to host MIG fighters.

Cuban construction crews are completing the new airfield at Punte Huete outside Managua, which with a 10,000 foot runway will be the largest military airbase in Central America capable of accommodating Soviet jet fighters, heavy transport aircraft, and TU-95 bombers.

There will be a short, direct sea connection between the Cuban base and its extension in Nicaragua this year when the Bulgarians complete a major port facility at El Bluff on the Caribbean coast near Bluefields.

This, in conjunction with the Pacific ports of Corinto and San Juan del Sur, where the Soviets intend to install a dry dock, will provide the Soviets with secure port facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in close proximity to the Panama Canal. In addition, a Soviet team reportedly has surveyed the construction of a second canal between the Atlantic and Pacific across the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua.

We see similar links and components of this network snaking around the globe. In the South Atlantic, Soviet naval and naval air forces operate astride Western shipping lanes. These forces depend on a growing infrastructure manned and protected by nearly 2,000 Soviet Bloc advisors, 35,000 Cuban military, and a local Angolan government army of 100,000. You will note from the map that this node is linked to the Cuban segment of the network.

The Mediterranean segment of this Soviet global network is anchored at Libya and Syria. About 6,000 Soviet Bloc advisors support facilities in those countries, which include air, naval and air defense facilities.

Similarly, this network threatens Western sea lanes in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean from bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Over 7,000 Soviet and Cuban military personnel and about a quarter million Ethiopian military support this segment, as well as Soviet Bloc personnel in South Yemen and Mozambique.

Finally, Soviet naval and air forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Indochina not only command the economic lifelines of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, but linked with Soviet naval and air bases in Siberia are a threat to US bases in the Philippines, so critical to our position in the Pacific Ocean. Thousands of Soviet military personnel man the infrastructure of this second largest Soviet military complex outside the Warsaw Pact.

Beyond the consolidation and linking of positions in these Soviet outposts, there is the spread of Soviet subversion--active measures, support to insurgent forces, efforts to destabilize countries friendly to the West and exploitation of economic hardship and political instability for strategic advantage. Both their outposts and this subversion is supported by a flood of weapons pouring out of the great arms depot at Nikolaev on the Black Sea to regimes and groups all over the world.

To build the foundation and further project this far-flung program, Moscow maintains an extensive military advisory presence in 29 Third World countries. This presence ranges from 5 military specialists in Benin to about 6,000 in Vietnam.

There are something like 3,000 in Syria, about 2,000 in Ethiopia, Libya and Afghanistan, and 1,200 in Angola and South Yemen, and 800 in Mozambique. In some of these countries--Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan--Soviet officers exercise command and control and in others they have great leverage and influence.

The Soviets and their surrogates provide support to Communist or radical insurgents in some ten countries. They help some seven Socialist-oriented client regimes suppress insurrections of their own. All this involves 335,000 combat troops, over 65,000 advisors, extensive political and military training, a heavy flow of weapons, and various levels of political support. The 335,000 combat troops occupying other countries include 120,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, over 130,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia and 45,000 in Laos, and over 40,000 Cubans in Africa.

The principal Soviet targets in supporting insurgencies are:

- El Salvador and Guatemala, supported from Cuba and Nicaragua;
- Chile, in which Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union and several East European countries have been training and providing weapons for violent opposition and funding of the Communist party;
- Colombia, where three insurgent groups receive support from some combination of Moscow, Cuba and Nicaragua;
- Namibia, where weapons and military training for the insurgents of the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization comes from the Soviet Union, Libya and Cuba; and
- Sudan, Somalia, Chad, and Zaire, where Libya, Ethiopia and Cuba help insurgents.
- Yemen and Oman from time to time where the Soviets and Cubans support rebels.

some unusual choices (W.R.)
Mozambique? Lebanon? (W.R.)

During the decade of the 70s, people all over the world were flocking
 (w.r.)? to join Communist insurgencies. This has been reversed and today some half
 million people around the world are fighting in resistance movements against
 Communist regimes. In Afghanistan, there is virtually a nation in arms
 fighting against 120,000 Soviet troops; in Angola, Savimbi has some 60,000
 fighters in all parts of Angola. In Ethiopia, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels
 fight the Marxist Mengistu government and the largest army in Africa with
 its Cuban and Soviet advisors. In Indochina, 50,000 insurgents fight
 170,000 Vietnamese soldiers. In Nicaragua, 20,000 resistance fighters
 are in a standoff with 120,000 Sandinista troops and militia.

In this contest, the Soviets have proclaimed the Brezhnev doctrine
 which says once Communist always Communist. There is every indication that
 Gorbachev has adopted and is applying that doctrine vigorously with renewed
 and increased weapons and Soviet and Cuban involvement against the growing
 effectiveness of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, Savimbi in Angola, and the
 contras in Nicaragua. We are witnessing a sudden and forceful application
 of this doctrine in South Yemen right now. The Soviets succeeded in establishing
 a Marxist regime and a Russian naval and communications center in that country
 in the 1970s. Recently, Ali Nasser, the President of that country, began to
 draw away a little from the Soviets and seek some help elsewhere. Two weeks
 ago, the more pro-Soviet elements in his government and President Ali Nasser
 had a shootout and a civil war broke out between military and tribal elements
 loyal to the President and those loyal to the more pro-Soviet elements. The
 Vice President was out of the country and he flew to Moscow. The Soviets sat
 and watched for a few days evacuating Soviet citizens from the country.

Neighboring countries, North Yemen and Ethiopia, moved to help the South Yemen government. After a few days, it appeared that the rebels were gaining the upper hand, the South Yemen Politburo met and declared the Vice President in Moscow the head of a new government, Moscow warned North Yemen and Ethiopia not to help the government forces and Soviet fliers in MIG-21s given to South Yemen joined in pounding beleaguered government forces and Soviet transport planes started bringing in weapons for rebel forces.

Now I'd like to turn briefly to areas of great instability where US and Western political and strategic interests are at risk and which offer the potential of enormous gain to the Soviets. The Philippines, Sudan and elsewhere in southern and Central Africa are prime examples.

These soft spots may have largely indigenous causes, but they offer tempting opportunities to the apparatus I have been describing. The most critical situation is that of the Philippines where a Communist-led insurgency, the NPA, controls an increasing proportion of the country's villages and rural areas. It has shown an ability to conduct urban violence in the second and third cities, Davao and Cebu, and substantial preparation and potential for bringing violence into Manila itself. Whatever the outcome of the February election we are likely to face rising challenges to US interests in the Philippines. The Soviets have been very careful to date, dealing with Philippine establishment figures there, not openly associating itself with the NPA--but definitely in touch covertly with various revolutionary groups. If the NPA's fortunes improve, as seems likely, we can expect the Soviet role to grow. Meanwhile, political and insurgent pressures on US basing facilities are likely to grow and the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay is only 120 minutes away from our bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay.

not a given (W.R.)

Another soft spot is Sudan. Its severe political and economic disarray is compounded by Libya's strenuous efforts to gain predominant influence there. At the moment, insurgents of the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) are supported primarily by Ethiopia. Recent reporting suggests that the Soviets may be increasing their contact with the SPLA and providing some arms assistance through the Ethiopians. We believe that East Germans and Cubans have been training Sudanese insurgents inside Ethiopia. Resulting pressures have led the Sudanese to withdraw ^{temporarily (P.R.)} from joint military exercises with us, ~~revoke access rights for US forces,~~ _(P.R.) and question the future status of prepositioned US military equipment. Additionally, the Libyans have been given rights of air passage over Sudan enabling the Soviets to hook up more easily their presence in Libya and Ethiopia. US interests will be further jeopardized if radical elements pull off a successful coup in Khartoum, or if the general situation becomes one of near anarchy, or if a weak elected government should draw closer to Libya. Stronger Libyan and Soviet influence and presence in Sudan would face Egypt with a hostile force on the west and the south--and pro-Soviet elements in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen would command the southern approaches to the Suez Canal.

This combination of subversive aggression and soft spots around the world has been gravely compounded by the emergence of what we call the radical entente of Syria, Libya and Iran, all of which share the common objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. These three states all have radically diverging interests, personalities, and style, but they share critical characteristics. They oppose nearly all aspects of US policy in the region. They want to weaken or destroy moderate Arab leadership. They are in active opposition to the US peace process. And they practice and sponsor terrorism to attain political goals.

The activities of these states are not necessarily or always directed by the USSR, but their policies serve Soviet interests by damaging both Western interests and moderate forces. The Soviets provide major military support to two of the three--Syria and Libya.

Syria is the most effective of the three. While its goals are more limited than the other two, its leadership is tactically brilliant and generally successful--qualities which hardly describe Iran or Libya.

Iran's attentions are largely consumed by the Gulf war and by Shia politics in the Gulf. But it does have broader long-term interests in propagating Shia fundamentalism in the world. Its role in Lebanon was a critical factor in stimulating the US exodus from that country in the face of unremitting Shia attack.

In Libya, Qadhafi's interests and ambitions parallel those of the USSR in so many respects that the disruptive effects are not measurably different from what they would be, with Qadhafi a total surrogate of Moscow's. No other state outside the Soviet Bloc has a geographic range of subversive activity to match that of Libya. Qadhafi's ambitions are mirrored in subversive meddling which now ranges from Chile to the Caribbean, to South Africa, across the Middle East to East Asia, Indonesia, and New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific.

Libya has significant military forces to bring to bear and its threat to its immediate neighbors of Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia is very real. Libya is the greatest stockpiler of weapons in the world with billions of dollars worth, including hundreds of T-72 tanks (far more, for example, than Poland has), and hundreds of sophisticated Soviet jets.

how many planes? (W.R.)

Qadhafi's explicit ambitions with respect to Malta and the air and air defense weapons the Soviets have provided him to make Libya a threat to the Mediterranean sea lane.

I will not dwell in detail on international terrorism this afternoon, but I do wish to stress the relationship of the USSR and its associates to terrorism.

The USSR and its Eastern European allies support a host of Near East and other Third World terrorist groups. The Eastern European hand is the more pronounced, the Soviet hand more disguised. Their combined support takes many forms: training, arming, the providing of communications and documentation, safehaven, and so on. Many of the most notorious terrorist leaders--including Carlos and Abu Nidal--have for years circulated fairly freely in Eastern Europe.

These problems we have highlighted this morning by no means exhaust the threats that will increasingly confront the US. I can assure you that the Intelligence Community is deeply involved on a priority basis with alerting policymakers to hazards and opportunities in numerous other categories. These include, for example, developments concerning Soviet domestic problems, the Iran-Iraq war, China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, LDC debtors, nuclear proliferation, CW proliferation, BW proliferation, technology transfer, drug trafficking, oil futures, ecological problems, resource problems, and so on.

Is this to be given in a forum where it will get a lot of attention?
If so, some of the points could probably stand a closer look.
Otherwise, looks fine. (SRS)

All these questions will continue to receive our close attention. But in planning US defenses and military assistance, we believe, now and in the future, the broad, linked threats that I have stressed today demand and deserve the closest attention. The backdrop of growing Soviet military power, the Soviet network of assets and facilities abroad, and Soviet promotion of disorder in the Third World are together creating an increasingly interrelated threat of growing proportions. Growing Soviet global reach, Soviet basing facilities, developing military infrastructures, Soviet military air lanes, and growing Soviet or Soviet client proximity to target countries and to sea lane choke points are all combining to confront the United States with rising challenges for the future.

We have a tendency too often to focus on specific events as they come along, and to be skeptical about drawing linkages and relationships between events. In this view of the world in 1986 and the threats awaiting us in the future, I have tried to lay out for you how US intelligence sees the challenges which our country will have to face in the years ahead. It is only through understanding these emerging patterns and relationships that the United States can shape effective strategies for meeting these challenges.

Thank you for your attention. I have with me Larry Gershwin, NIO for Strategic Programs; Doug MacEachin, Director of Soviet Affairs; George Montgomery, Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces; and Bob Vickers, NIO for Latin America. My colleagues and I will be pleased to entertain any comments or questions you may have.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: CIA "Worldwide Briefing"

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to DCI Casey commenting on the CIA's "Worldwide Briefing" paper recently forwarded to the NSC.

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to DCI Casey

CONFIDENTIAL

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By Crs NARA, Date 7/2/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Classified

*J Matlock 3/1
Eyes Only
Deinberg-Sokolov*

Matlock

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

as 7/2/02

8140

38

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

March 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Weinberger-Sokolov Meeting

I think this is a good idea.

On the modalities, I would suggest that Secretary Weinberger send a letter to Sokolov inviting him and Akhromeyev to visit the U.S. this year. (I believe it should be independent of the summit invitation. In fact, there are advantages to having this visit separate from Gorbachev's.) The letter should be delivered by our Embassy in Moscow.

Actually, I doubt that the Soviets will let Sokolov accept. The betting is that he may be replaced soon. However, as you say, the fact of the invitation could be useful to us subsequently -- and if Sokolov is replaced, the invitation could be renewed to his successor.

I am discussing this matter with Ridgway. It probably would be a good idea to suggest that the President review the text of the letter of invitation. I attach a first stab at a draft -- although Cap may prefer to do it himself. (I have repeated some language from one of the President's letters to Gorbachev.)

Attachments:

- Tab I Draft Weinberger letter
- Tab II Shultz Letter of March 1, 1986

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED *mmw*
NLRR F06-114/4 #8140
BY RW NARA DATE 11/5/09

DRAFT

Dear Marshal Sokolov:

In the spirit of the meeting in Geneva last year between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, I would like to extend an invitation to you to visit the United States this year.

I would hope that our meeting could initiate a process of increased contact and better communication between our defense establishments.

Although our views differ on many topics, better communication between our defense officials and professional military officers could serve to diminish misunderstandings and thus lower those suspicions which are not based on fact. The American people, I am sure, would warmly welcome the establishment of contact between us.

If you are able to accept this invitation, our representatives can discuss which dates would be mutually convenient.

Sincerely yours,

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4 #814
BY RW **NARA DATE** 11-5-09

National Security Council
The White House

40

System # EYES ON

Package # _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>MATLOCK</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Jack,
What do you think of this?
J

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



Dear John,

I have written to Cap Weinberger to let him know that I share his concerns about American official attendance at Soviet Armed Forces Day receptions this year. Thus, the Department earlier this month instructed all diplomatic and consular posts that sanctions against attending Soviet Armed Forces Day receptions remain in effect, and that no civilian or military personnel should attend.

At the same time, I want to share with you and Cap my strong belief that we should make a distinction between acceptance of invitations to highly visible events in honor of the Soviet military, and other contacts with Soviet defense officials that can increase our understanding of Soviet military doctrine, policies and practices -- and give them a better understanding why we view them as the threat they are.

A hallmark of the Administration's policy towards the Soviet leadership is seeking a realistic dialogue. As a result of the Geneva summit, we are working actively to expand our contacts with the Soviets in diverse fields. Several of our Cabinet colleagues have already had beneficial exchanges with Soviet cabinet-level counterparts. With regard to defense contacts, at the UNGA in October 1984, and again in Strasbourg in May 1985, the President personally endorsed a policy of greater exchanges between American and Soviet military officials. I believe it is in our national interest to begin working to implement this policy without further delay. Senior defense officials play a key role in the Soviet Union, just as Cap and his colleagues do here. I believe it is of great value to be talking with them every appropriate chance we get.

At our breakfast on February 12, you, Cap and I discussed the pros and cons of high-level exchanges with Soviet defense officials. I would like to revisit with you and Cap ways in which we might best implement the President's policy. Such exchanges would be an important element of our overall effort to improve our understanding of the perspectives of the top Soviet leadership, which is critical to our picture of Soviet policy-making.

VAdm John M. Poindexter,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs,
The White House.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/4#8142
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

An additional consideration is the delicate trilateral relationship with China. You are of course aware that the Chinese Defense Minister, Chief-of-Staff, and the heads of all their respective services have already visited the United States. Although the character of these visits differs markedly from any prospective Soviet exchanges, it is in our interest not to lose sight of the trilateral ramifications.

Thus, I would like to suggest that a meeting between Cap and Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov would be in our foreign policy interest. This could be followed up with a meeting between Admiral Crowe and his Soviet counterpart, Marshal Akhromeyev. We could begin working toward an agreement at this year's Summit to exchange visits by defense ministers and military chiefs-of-staff between the 1986 and 1987 summits. Alternatively, Cap and Admiral Crowe could invite their Soviet counterparts to Washington during this period.

My staff stands ready to work together with yours and Cap's on this matter.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

cc: Admiral Crowe

~~Malloch~~

43

1787

~~FILE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *Carol Cleveland for*
SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Don Mischer

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed letter to Mr. Don Mischer of Don Mischer Productions, Beverly Hills, California, concerning his proposal for a television production in connection with the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev later this year.

Attachments:

- Tab A Proposed Letter to Mr. Mischer
- Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cad

1787
44

AUIZ/CS/

Dear Mr. Mischer:

Thank you for your letter to President Reagan and for sharing with ^{him} your proposal for a television production in connection with the meeting planned for later this year between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. Your interest in writing is understood.

As you know, planning for this meeting is at a very early stage, and the ~~timing~~^{date} of the meeting has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, your suggestion is appreciated, and I have taken the liberty of forwarding ^{it} to appropriate officials in the White House for further review. You can be sure that it will be given consideration and that further response will be forthcoming as preparations proceed.

Again, thank you for bringing your ideas to our attention. With the President's best wishes,

cc: White House Communications (television)
NSC Public Affairs
Pete Roussel
Scheduling

45

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1986

Dear Mr. Mischer:

Thank you for your letter to President Reagan and for sharing with him your proposal for a television production in connection with the meeting planned for later this year between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. Your interest in writing is understood.

As you know, planning for this meeting is at a very early stage, and the exact timing of the meeting has yet to be determined. Nevertheless, your suggestion is appreciated, and I have taken the liberty of forwarding it to appropriate officials in the White House for further review. You can be sure that it will be given consideration and that further response will be forthcoming as preparations proceed.

Again, thank you for bringing your ideas to our attention. With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
and Director of Correspondence

Mr. Don Mischer
Don Mischer Productions
Suite 328
9350 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA 90212

178740

DON MISCHER PRODUCTIONS

December 19, 1985

9350
Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 328
Beverly Hills, California
90212
213.276.2093

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In anticipation of Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and in light of our new cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, we would like to propose a live primetime television event, a gala evening of entertainment in celebration of this historic occasion.

For several months we have been developing an entertainment special which would originate simultaneously from the United States and the Soviet Union by means of the spacebridge format. Now, with Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United States, such a cultural co-venture would certainly highlight this unique meeting and outwardly demonstrate the cohesive artistic efforts of both nations.

We already have had discussions with Gostelradio concerning such a gala evening and they have been very supportive of this idea. We have also received network interest in televising this special.

With you and Mr. Gorbachev in attendance, this event could originate from either coast of the United States, wherever this historic meeting takes place. For instance, this event could originate from the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C. or the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion in Los Angeles; while in Russia, it could originate from the Russiya or perhaps the Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

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Our goal is two hours of pure entertainment. Utilizing the spacebridge format, which incorporates the simultaneous transmission of images via large screen hook-ups here and in the Soviet Union, we would be able to present a distinguished array of artists of both nations, the finest entertainers from every area of the arts.

Some of the performances would be expressly designed to make the best use of the creative potential of the spacebridge technique. American and Soviet artists would have their first opportunity to perform together while on separate stages. The spacebridge will also have an important impact on the audiences of the two theatrical arenas as well as the viewing public of both nations as everyone will get to see and hear what is actually happening on both stages at the same time.

In addition, some of our American artists might travel to perform on the Soviet stage while Soviet artists might come here to perform. The drama and dynamic energy of the live responses and one to one interaction of the American and Soviet hosts, performers and audiences will make this a very special television event.

As a television packager, I have had the opportunity to produce and direct many event specials over the years, but I am particularly excited at the prospect of being involved in this event because of its historical and cultural significance.

I have enclosed a professional biography, but may I mention that as the producer and director of the Barbara Walters specials, I had the pleasure of working with you on the Thanksgiving special taped at your ranch in Santa Barbara in 1981 and then with Mrs. Reagan on her segment for the Barbara Walters specials the following year. In addition, I have directed "The Kennedy Center Honors" for eight years. As my biography reflects, I have an extensive background in variety television, having won Emmys for "The Kennedy Center Honors", "Motown 25", "Baryshnikov By Tharp", and "Motown Returns to the Apollo", among others.


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I will be joined in this venture by Mr. Kim Spencer of Internews who has been involved in many spacebridges, including one devoted to the memory of Samantha Smith and one with Phil Donahue to take place at the end of this month.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of this proposal. I sincerely hope that such a television event will be of interest to you and will have your support. I look forward to your comments.

Respectfully yours,



Don Mischer

DM:kp

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Ed Djerijian
Deputy Press Secretary
for Foreign Affairs

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DON MISCHER

Professional Bio

As President of Don Mischer Productions and Juniper Television Productions, Inc., Don Mischer is a well-known producer, director, and packager of television programs.

In April of 1985 he produced and directed "MOTOWN RETURNS TO THE APOLLO", a three-hour primetime special for NBC which received an unprecedented 11 Emmy nominations and won the Emmy for the best music variety comedy program of 1985. Don had previously worked with Motown on "MOTOWN 25: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND FOREVER" for NBC in 1983, the year's most successful special, winning an Emmy, a Peabody, and a Directors Guild of America Award for Outstanding Directorial Achievement. Tom Shales of The Washington Post said of "Motown 25", "The overwhelming warmth and luster of it has been brilliantly preserved by producer-director Don Mischer."

In association with MacLaine Enterprises, Don produced and directed "SHIRLEY MACLAINE: LIVE" for Showtime, and "SHIRLEY MACLAINE: ILLUSIONS" for CBS. This highly acclaimed special won three Emmys and Don received a Directors Guild Award for his efforts.

For eight years Don has directed "THE KENNEDY CENTER HONORS", a prestigious two-hour CBS special celebrating the performing arts in America. This national event, held at The White House and The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C., has honored such American artists as Lena Horne, Isaac Stern, Aaron Copland, Fred Astaire, Tennessee Williams, George Balanchine, Richard Rodgers, Henry Fonda, Leonard Bernstein, Cary Grant, Helen Hayes, Frank Sinatra and James Stewart. For his work on the Honors, Don has received three Directors Guild Awards and the Emmy in 1981 for Best Direction of a Musical or Variety Program.

Collaborating with Mikhail Baryshnikov and Twyla Tharp, Don produced and directed the premiere of the Great Performances series (PBS) in 1984 for Dance in America. "BARYSHNIKOV BY THARP WITH AMERICAN BALLET THEATRE" features three outstanding Tharp ballets and each draws upon a different aspect of Baryshnikov's genius. This Don Mischer production was made in association with WNET, New York which won Don an Emmy for Outstanding Individual Achievement in Directing in 1985.

In 1984 Don produced a pilot special for NBC called "JUMP!", featuring eight kids in an innovative dance format. Although not initially picked up for a series, "JUMP!" aired as an "impressive experiment" and prompted syndicated columnist Marvin Kitman to say "Mischer is the Balanchine of TV variety. He also has the spirit to try everything."

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Included among his other credits as producer and director are:

- THE AMERICAN FILM INSTITUTE SALUTE TO GENE KELLY (CBS)
- GOLDIE AND LIZA TOGETHER (CBS)
- AIN'T MISBEHAVIN' (NBC)
- BARBARA MANDRELL: SOMETHING SPECIAL (CBS)
- SUPER NIGHT OF ROCK N ROLL (NBC)
- MAKING TELEVISION DANCE (with Twyla Tharp) (PBS)
- THE GREAT AMERICAN DREAM MACHINE (PBS)

In a joint venture with Phil Donahue, Don produced and directed "DONAHUE AND KIDS", a one-hour NBC special dealing with children who have life threatening illnesses. Response to "Donahue and Kids" was overwhelming: New York Times, "extraordinary"; UPI, "uncommonly strong"; Chicago Tribune, "one of the most important TV hours you'll ever spend!" It won the Emmy as the Best Children's Program broadcast in 1981, and seven other major awards.

For six years, in association with Barbara Walters, Don packaged the highly successful "BARBARA WALTERS SPECIALS" (Emmy nominations in 1981 and 1982). Don was Executive Producer and Director of these ABC primetime specials which featured visits with celebrities that included John Wayne, Bing Crosby, Elizabeth Taylor, Burt Reynolds, Sir Lawrence Olivier and President Reagan.

Don has also produced and directed specials with:

- ROBIN WILLIAMS (HBO)
- BOB HOPE (NBC)
- JOHN DENVER (ABC)
- BARRY MANILOW (ABC)
- LYNDA CARTER (CBS)
- MARLO THOMAS (ABC)
- CHERYL LADD (ABC)
- DONNA SUMMER (ABC)
- GOLDIE HAWN (CBS)

NAME DON MISCHER

ADDRESS 9350 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 328
Beverly Hills, California 90212
PH: 213/276-2093

EDUCATION BA, University of Texas 1962
Sociology/Political Science
MA, University of Texas 1964
Sociology/Political Science

OCCUPATION Television Producer/Director/Packager
President, Don Mischer Productions
President, Juniper Television Productions, Inc.

ASSOCIATIONS National Academy of Television Arts & Sciences
Directors Guild of America
American Film Institute
Who's Who In America

AWARDS Six Prime Time Emmy Awards
(Sixteen Nominations)
Six Directors Guild of America Awards
for Outstanding Directorial Achievement
Peabody Award
Gabriel Award
Chicago International Film Festival Award
Ohio State Award
Golden Rose of Montreaux Award

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 10, 1986

ACTION**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Letter to Don Mischer of Don Mischer Productions

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed letter to Mr. Don Mischer of Don Mischer Productions, Beverly Hills, California, concerning his proposal for a television production in connection with the President's meeting with Secretary General Gorbachev later this year.

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to Anne Higgins for your signature.

Sestanovich and Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to Ms. Higgins at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Ms. Higgins
Tab A Draft Letter to Mr. Mischer
Tab B Incoming Correspondence