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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (1/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1502

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8111	MEMO	FORTIER TO WEINBERGER RE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/3/1986	B1
8112	MEMO	FORTIER TO SHULTZ RE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/3/1986	B1
8113	MEMO	DEGRAFFENREID TO POINDEXTER RE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION FOR IIASA <i>D 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	2/25/1986	B1
8118	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO CHANCELLOR BRUNO KREISKY <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	3/20/1982	B1
8114	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO POINDEXTER RE IIASA <i>P 11/5/2009 F06-114/4</i>	2	1/31/1986	B1
8115	MEMO	INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS-CONTINUED SOVIET INTEREST <i>D 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1 B3
8124	CABLE	102152Z DEC 85 <i>D 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	2	12/10/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (1/8)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 15

YARHI-MILO

1502

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8116	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO POINDEXTER RE SHULTZ MEMO ON UNGA REGIONAL INITIATIVE <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	3/6/1986	B1
8117	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE IMPLEMENTING YOUR UNGA "REGIONAL INITIATIVE" <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8119	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE IMPLEMENTING YOUR UNGA REGIONAL INITIATIVE <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	3	3/5/1986	B1
8120	REPORT	AFGHANISTAN <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8121	REPORT	CAMBODIA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8122	REPORT	AFRICA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	2	ND	B1
8123	REPORT	NICARAGUA <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Letter from Charles Percy

Attached at Tab I is a letter to former Senator Percy, who recently wrote you (Tab A) to forward a letter from Noel I. Smith (Tab B). Smith advocates that the President visit Soviet war memorials as part of his planned travel to the Soviet Union in 1987. We have assured Percy in our response that we will keep the suggestion in mind as we plan for the President's trip.

SRS Steve Sestanovich, *H* Judyt Mandel and *R.S.* Ron Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to former Senator Percy at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to former Senator Percy
Tab A Letter from Percy
Tab B Letter from Noel Smith

2



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Percy:

Thank you for your correspondence of January 29 which forwarded a letter from Noel I. Smith. Mr. Smith wrote to suggest that President Reagan make a special effort to acknowledge Soviet sacrifices in World War II during his planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1987.

I appreciated the opportunity to review Mr. Smith's comments. I would like to assure you that in planning for the President's trip we will bear in mind the importance of recognizing the contributions of the Soviet people to the war effort.

Thank you for contacting me on Mr. Smith's behalf and for your own kind words of support and encouragement.

Sincerely,

Senator Charles Percy
Charles Percy & Associates, Inc.
Suite 907
1660 L St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

4

A

FEB 11 1985 5
1404

CHARLES PERCY
& ASSOCIATES, INC.
International Relations & Trade Consultants

Charles H. Percy
President

January 29, 1986

Admiral John Poindexter
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Admiral Poindexter:


First, let me congratulate you on your assumption of awesome responsibilities at a critical time in the history of our country. You are extraordinarily well-equipped to fulfill these responsibilities and I stand ready to offer any assistance that I can.

I have received the attached letter from a former constituent and supporter that I feel holds merit. No doubt there has been thinking along these same lines in the White House, but I would only like to emphasize that on every visit to the Soviet Union, particularly when I have visited the Leningrad cemetery, I was told repeatedly of the "20 million of the flower of our youth that were killed in World War II with conventional weapons --- think what it would be with nuclear weapons"!

The 40th anniversary of "D" Day does give us another opportunity to bring this to public attention, particularly considering that an improving climate exists now for relations between our two countries.

I have acknowledged Noel Smith's letter but I know that he would appreciate an acknowledgement from your office.

Warmest personal regards,


Charles H. Percy

CHP/pmt
att

4



NOEL I. SMITH
245 South Park Road
La Grange, Illinois 60525

ESS. w
Underscore - 1
CIT. P. Percy

January 2, 1986

Mr. Charles Percy
Charles Percy & Associates
Suite 907
1660 L Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Percy:

This is to request your advice about the development of an idea related to US/Russian relations, and how to go about presenting that idea for serious consideration by the Executive branch of our government. It may be particularly appropriate at this time in view of the New Year's exchange messages of Messrs. Reagan and Gorbachev.

The recent US national focus on the 40th anniversary of D-day demonstrated how our feelings can be stirred and our attention focused by war memorial events. Strong feelings of common identification and patriotism were evinced by President Regan's visits to memorial sites in Europe and the attendant reminders of the individual and national sacrifices represented by the thousands of American lives lost in the remembered events.

A corresponding American recognition of the enormous losses suffered by Russia in World War II (the millions of lives lost and devastation of homelands) could foster understanding between the US and Russia. It could help Americans understand the Russian viewpoints on defense, national security and armaments, and would demonstrate to the Russians that we appreciate their national experience and concerns.

Specifically, I would suggest that President Reagan, perhaps as part of one of the prospective summit conferences, visit major Russian memorials to their war dead of World War II, e.g., in Leningrad and Moscow. These visits would be more than merely placing a wreath at a tomb in a usual ceremonial gesture. Hopefully, it would include

8

Mr. Charles Percy
January 2, 1986
Page Two

speeches, news coverage and recollection of historical facts, acknowledging the losses experienced by the Russian people in World War II, in the manner of the President's European visit for the D-day observances. Such a visit could be of value in promoting basic understanding, appreciation and a sense of solidarity between the Russian and American peoples. That could in turn contribute to the political foundations necessary for effective agreements on various specific matters of critical importance to us all.

I would appreciate your comments on this concept and your suggestions for its potential implementation.

I appreciate your years of service to our state and country and enclose a contribution toward retirement of your campaign debt.

Sincerely,



Noel I. Smith

NIS/pm
Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0939

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*March 86
Chroy*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 3, 1986

9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: The International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) (U)

Thank you for your letter of 31 January. I share your concern
over the recent appropriation of funds for IIASA. (C)

Current practice necessitates a State Department review of all
National Science Foundation (NSF) plans to fund IIASA. State's
review is to be based on foreign policy considerations. Such
foreign policy considerations should include a complete national
security review. Thus, I have asked Secretary Shultz to forward
any NSF IIASA funding proposals through the NSC to DOD and the
intelligence community for further review and comment before a
decision is made by Secretary Shultz. A copy of my memorandum to
Secretary Shultz is attached. (C)

For the record, you should know that the NSC Staff at no time
expressed the view that there are "no security considerations"
relevant to IIASA funding. A request by U.S. IIASA officials was
received to review the situation to determine whether organiza-
tional changes at IIASA warranted a change in U.S. Government
funding policy. The NSC Staff simply forwarded this request to
Bud McFarlane who determined that a review was not warranted.
The sponsors were then informed of the determination. (C)

Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Memorandum to Secretary Shultz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/4 #8111
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: The International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (U)

Without support from the Administration, funds for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) were added to the Fiscal Year 1986 National Science Foundation (NSF) appropriation. In 1982, the President ceased US funding for IIASA because of hostile intelligence threat and reciprocity considerations. Consistent with current practice, however, any NSF proposals to fund IIASA projects are to be sent to the Department of State for foreign policy review and approval. (C)

Secretary Weinberger has recently expressed concern about the continuing security and intelligence aspects of IIASA, the same concerns which led to the 1982 decision to end US funding for the Institute. Therefore, I would appreciate your sending any NSF proposals for IIASA funding to the NSC for appropriate interagency review and recommendation prior to any approval action. (C)



Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 20, 1982

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Thank you for your letter of December 4, 1981, concerning the United States' support for the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). I have given it careful consideration. I regret to inform you, however, that our position has not changed. The United States Government cannot extend support for IIASA beyond 1982.

My decision was based on several factors, including how best to apportion the limited funds available for international scientific cooperation. I am aware that a serious effort has been made by the IIASA Council to find some suitable accommodation to our budgetary constraints. However, we have concluded that the scientific interests of the United States are more productively served by other programs.

Moreover, Mr. Chancellor, I would be less than frank if I did not also tell you that our problems with IIASA go beyond budgetary and scientific considerations. We have long been concerned about the balance of technology exchanges at IIASA. The Soviets and Eastern Europeans have used IIASA to obtain access to Western scientists, techniques, and data banks beyond what normally would be approved on a bilateral basis without providing anything comparable in return from their side. Thus, the element of reciprocity, vital to any cooperative program beneficial to East-West understanding, is lacking and has been for some time.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8118

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

Moreover, the recent espionage case involving a Soviet staff member of IIASA, which is troublesome in and of itself, also raises questions about whether the representatives of all Member states are faithful to the Institute's open and scientific purpose. These problems are particularly of concern to us now in light of the current Soviet-sponsored oppression in Poland.

I do appreciate your sharing your views on this subject with me, and I regret that we could not have been more in accord on this matter.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Dr. Bruno Kreisky,
Chancellor of the
Republic of Austria
Vienna

SECRET

15



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

0939

31 JAN 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
 Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
 Washington, DC 20500

Dear John:

(U) It has just come to my attention that the conference report language accompanying PL 99-160, the FY 86 appropriation for HUD and the Independent Agencies, included \$500,000 for the resumption of funding of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) through the National Science Foundation (NSF).

(C) The Administration ceased funding IIASA in 1982 due to serious concerns about security, reciprocity, and scientific quality. This decision was the subject of a letter to Secretary of State Haig dated 15 September 1981 and signed for the President by National Security Advisor Richard Allen. I am not aware of any review of that decision, nor is there any change in the situation which would justify it's reversal.

(U) Despite the withdrawal of funding, US membership in IIASA continued with private financial support. The current U.S. member of IIASA, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, felt encouraged to ask for a resumption of U.S. funding after a January, 1984 meeting with NSC staffers Jack Matlock, Ty Cobb, and Bill Martin. I have just been advised that the American Academy states that the outcome of the meeting "was that the NSC representatives agreed there was no security issue arguing against U.S. involvement in IIASA." We think this conclusion is unwarranted and had we been represented at the January 1984 meeting, we would have so stated. Neither the Department of Defense nor the CIA were represented at the meeting.

(S) The Soviets remain highly interested in IIASA. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

This data collection effort is of such importance to the Soviets that they created the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Applied Automated Systems (IAS or VNIIPAS) for the collection of information in these data bases. Dzherman Gvishiani, chairman of the IIASA Council since its founding in 1972, is also the Director of VNIIPAS.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/4-8114

BY RW NARA DATE 11/5/09

Classified by: Multiple Sources
 Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

X38175

SECRET

(S WN NF NC OR) The research program currently being considered under IIASA's Program on Technology, Economy and Society is also of particular interest to the Soviets. This research program covers technologies with a high military potential (see Tab A).

FOIA(b)(1)

(C) IIASA remains a source of militarily critical information for the Soviet Union. U.S. membership, even with private funding, should be reviewed.

FOIA(b)(1)

(U) I'd be glad to talk about this, if you wish, at your convenience.

Sincerely,



Attachment

SECRET

File 1404
~~Matlock~~ 20 ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1986


Dear Senator Percy:

Thank you for your correspondence of January 29 which forwarded a letter from Noel I. Smith. Mr. Smith wrote to suggest that President Reagan make a special effort to acknowledge Soviet sacrifices in World War II during his planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1987.

I appreciated the opportunity to review Mr. Smith's comments. I would like to assure you that in planning for the President's trip we will bear in mind the importance of recognizing the contributions of the Soviet people to the war effort.

Thank you for contacting me on Mr. Smith's behalf and for your own kind words of support and encouragement.

Sincerely,



John M. Poindexter

Senator Charles Percy
Charles Percy & Associates, Inc.
Suite 907
1660 L St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter from Charles Percy

Attached at Tab I is a letter to former Senator Percy, who recently wrote you (Tab A) to forward a letter from Noel I. Smith (Tab B). Smith advocates that the President visit Soviet war memorials as part of his planned travel to the Soviet Union in 1987. We have assured Percy in our response that we will keep the suggestion in mind as we plan for the President's trip.

SRS Steve Sestanovich, *JM* Judy Mandel and *R.S.* Ron Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to former Senator Percy at Tab I.

Approve 7

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Letter to former Senator Percy
- Tab A Letter from Percy
- Tab B Letter from Noel Smith

FEB 11 1986 22
1404

CHARLES PERCY
& ASSOCIATES, INC.
International Relations & Trade Consultants

Charles H. Percy
President

January 29, 1986

Admiral John Poindexter
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Admiral Poindexter:

First, let me congratulate you on your assumption of awesome responsibilities at a critical time in the history of our country. You are extraordinarily well-equipped to fulfill these responsibilities and I stand ready to offer any assistance that I can.

I have received the attached letter from a former constituent and supporter that I feel holds merit. No doubt there has been thinking along these same lines in the White House, but I would only like to emphasize that on every visit to the Soviet Union, particularly when I have visited the Leningrad cemetery, I was told repeatedly of the "20 million of the flower of our youth that were killed in World War II with conventional weapons --- think what it would be with nuclear weapons"!

The 40th anniversary of "D" Day does give us another opportunity to bring this to public attention, particularly considering that an improving climate exists now for relations between our two countries.

I have acknowledged Noel Smith's letter but I know that he would appreciate an acknowledgement from your office.

Warmest personal regards,


Charles H. Percy

CHP/pmt
att

NOEL I. SMITH
245 South Park Road
La Grange, Illinois 60525

*ES: no
unclassified
CIT P. 100* 23

January 2, 1986

Mr. Charles Percy
Charles Percy & Associates
Suite 907
1660 L Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Percy:

This is to request your advice about the development of an idea related to US/Russian relations, and how to go about presenting that idea for serious consideration by the Executive branch of our government. It may be particularly appropriate at this time in view of the New Year's exchange messages of Messrs. Reagan and Gorbachev.

The recent US national focus on the 40th anniversary of D-day demonstrated how our feelings can be stirred and our attention focused by war memorial events. Strong feelings of common identification and patriotism were evinced by President Regan's visits to memorial sites in Europe and the attendant reminders of the individual and national sacrifices represented by the thousands of American lives lost in the remembered events.

A corresponding American recognition of the enormous losses suffered by Russia in World War II (the millions of lives lost and devastation of homelands) could foster understanding between the US and Russia. It could help Americans understand the Russian viewpoints on defense, national security and armaments, and would demonstrate to the Russians that we appreciate their national experience and concerns.

Specifically, I would suggest that President Reagan, perhaps as part of one of the prospective summit conferences, visit major Russian memorials to their war dead of World War II, e.g., in Leningrad and Moscow. These visits would be more than merely placing a wreath at a tomb in a usual ceremonial gesture. Hopefully, it would include

Mr. Charles Percy
January 2, 1986
Page Two

speeches, news coverage and recollection of historical facts, acknowledging the losses experienced by the Russian people in World War II, in the manner of the President's European visit for the D-day observances. Such a visit could be of value in promoting basic understanding, appreciation and a sense of solidarity between the Russian and American peoples. That could in turn contribute to the political foundations necessary for effective agreements on various specific matters of critical importance to us all.

I would appreciate your comments on this concept and your suggestions for its potential implementation.

I appreciate your years of service to our state and country and enclose a contribution toward retirement of your campaign debt.

Sincerely,



Noel I. Smith

NIS/pm
Enclosure

25

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Percy:

Thank you for your correspondence of January 29 which forwarded a letter from Noel I. Smith. Mr. Smith wrote to suggest that President Reagan make a special effort to acknowledge Soviet sacrifices in World War II during his planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1987.

I appreciated the opportunity to review Mr. Smith's comments. I would like to assure you that in planning for the President's trip we will bear in mind the importance of recognizing the contributions of the Soviet people to the war effort.

Thank you for contacting me on Mr. Smith's behalf and for your own kind words of support and encouragement.

Sincerely,

Senator Charles Percy
Charles Percy & Associates, Inc.
Suite 907
1660 L St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

~~Malloch~~ 20
1553
✓

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 5, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

*Carol Cleveland
for*

SUBJECT: Correspondence from Jerral Parris

Attached at Tab A is the Department of State's draft response to a letter from Jerral Parris to Linda Chavez. The NSC has reviewed and concurs with the draft, with changes as noted in the text.

Attachments:

- Tab A Draft response from State
- Tab B Tasking memo to State
- Tab C Correspondence from Mr. Jerral Parris

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SUGGESTED REPLY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dear Mr. Parris:

I am replying to your December 16 letter to Ms. Linda Chavez requesting information regarding U.S.-Soviet cultural exchanges.

President Reagan has stated on numerous occasions, most recently in his November 14 address to the nation on the eve of his departure for Geneva, his support for increased U.S.-Soviet ~~people-to-people~~ ^{in a variety of fields.} exchanges. Such programs provide both American and Soviet citizens an excellent opportunity for direct contact with each other, ^{can help dispel misconceptions and foster greater mutual understanding}

In their Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the Geneva Summit meeting, President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts between our two countries. That statement calls for ^{expanded} new forms of cooperation in several fields, including science, education, medicine, and sports.

Mr. Jerral D. Parris,
3845 Riviere DuChien Road,
Mobile, Alabama.

In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a General Exchanges Agreement in Geneva. This agreement provides for resumption of educational, performing artist, cultural, and publications exchanges. It covers both official government-to-government exchanges and the facilitation of exchanges between private groups in the United States and counterpart organizations in the Soviet Union. As in the past, the United States Information Agency (USIA) has responsibility for activities under the General Exchanges Agreement.

We welcome your interest in the U.S.-Soviet exchange process. ^{new} ~~An~~ office ^{has been} ~~is being~~ established ^{at the United States Information Agency} to coordinate ^{the new programs under} the new exchanges initiatives agreed to in Geneva. Should you wish to contact that office directly, the address is: Office of the Special Coordinator for U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, 400 C Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20547. For information on activities covered by the General Exchanges Agreement, you should contact the U.S. Information Agency, also located at 400 C Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

You may also wish to be in touch with an established organization involved with U.S.-Soviet exchange programs. For a list of such organizations, you may write to the Institute for Soviet-American Relations and request their handbook. The Institute's address is 1608 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

We appreciate your support for U.S.-Soviet exchanges and wish you every success in your efforts.

Sincerely,

S/S # 8600015

DATE 25 FEB 1986

29

1553

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: VADM John M. Poindexter
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: Linda Chavez FROM: Mr. Jerral D. Parris
DATE: December 16, 1985 SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet cultural
exchanges

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: January 3, 1986 NSC # 371980

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached
- A draft reply will be forwarded
- A translation is attached
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
- Other

REMARKS:

Tom Collins
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

30

8600015

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL

JANUARY 3, 1986

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 371980

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED DECEMBER 16, 1985

TO: LINDA CHAVEZ

FROM: MR. JERRAL D. PARRIS

3845 RIVIERE DU CHIEN ROAD

MOBILE AL 36609

SUBJECT: REQUESTS INFORMATION ON PRESIDENT'S CURRENT
EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR YOUTHS

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

35084401203

ID # 371980

31

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

F0005-01

- O - OUTGOING
 - H - INTERNAL
 - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

8600015

Name of Correspondent: Jerral D Parris

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Requests information on President's current exchange program for youths

8 5 0 8 4 4 J I 2 J 4

ROUTE TO: Office/Agency (Staff Name)	ACTION Action Code	TRACKING Date YY/MM/DD	DISPOSITION	
			Type of Response Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>PLKUSE</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>85/12/30</u>		<u>1 1</u>
<u>99DOS</u>	D	<u>86/01/03</u>		<u>1 1</u>
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		<u>1 1</u>		<u>1 1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Social Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 - Code = "A"
 - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OE0B).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2580.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 4800 _____

Prime Subject Code: EQ 005.01 Secondary Subject Codes: _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

<u>Code</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>Form</u>
<u>C</u>	_____	<u>Time:</u> _____	<u>P-</u> _____
<u>DSP</u>	_____	<u>Time:</u> _____	<u>Media:</u> _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
 - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 - n - 3 - Ron
 - n - 4 - Dutch
 - n - 5 - Ann Reagan
 - n - 6 - Ronnie
 - n - 7 - Ronnie

- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 0 - Unknown
 - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 - n - 2 - Nancy
 - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence**
- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 - n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Bulkpackage
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

8 5 0 6 4 4 3 1 2 0 5

Jerral D. Parris
3845 RIVIERE DU CHIEN ROAD
MOBILE, ALABAMA 36608

071980

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16 December 1985

8600015

Ms Linda Chavez
Deputy Assistant to the President
Second Floor-West Wing
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Ms Chavez,

I am a member of Optimist International, a viable organization sixty years in existence with 200,000 members. The organizations efforts are predicated on promoting youth.

The question has arisen as to whether or not the organization should volunteer itself to help President Reagan implement his exchange program? The International Board will render a decision in January, 1986.

I would like to accomplish two things at this juncture:

- (1) If President Reagan solicits the Optimist support, will he call our Optimist International President (James E. Attarian) and tell him personally?
- (2) Will you please send me information and status of the current exchange format? I will forward this information to our Board of Directors. This information will form some of the criteria upon which they render a decision.

If President Reagan chooses to call our International President, a follow-up letter covering the conversation would be greatly appreciated.

Respectfully yours,


Jerral D. Parris - Optimist

850344J1206

(November 18, 1985

Board of Directors
Optimist International
21018 Victory Boulevard
Woodland Hills, CA 91367

Attention: Mr. James E. Attarian, President

Gentlemen:

There has been considerable discussion recently within our local Optimist club as to whether Optimist International could or should volunteer the organization and its membership to administer the student and professional exchange program with the Soviet Union which has been proposed by President Reagan at the Summit Conference. Obviously Optimist International has never undertaken a project of such magnitude; however, for various reasons, including those which are hereinafter set forth in this letter, Optimist International may be particularly suited to administer such a program in this country.

Some of the pros and cons of such an undertaking which we perceive are as follows:

Pro:

1. This Presidential initiative seeks to make a better world for our youth to live in.
2. The grass roots support which would be exhibited by the Optimist Clubs' participation can contribute to the success of the exchange program.
3. Optimist International is an existing viable organization and creation of yet another government agency would not be required.
4. The Optimist could take part in the formulation of the format under which the exchange program is to be conducted and the Optimist ideals would thereby become manifest on a much broader scale.

350344J1.207

Optimist International
November 18, 1985
Page Two

Cons:

- 1. This involvement could be considered in some quarters as political.
- 2. The Optimist Club members' ability to perform on such scale is unknown.

We would very much appreciate an expression from the Board of Directors of its opinion as to whether involvement of Optimist International in this exchange Program is feasible and in the Board's opinion, desirable.

This request is submitted by the undersigned individually and not in their capacity as Optimist members.

Yours very truly,

8 5 0 6 4 4 J I 2 0 8

James B. Rvals Jr.
James Harris
Basil B. King
Clayton W. Winters, Ph.D.
W.M. McKee
W. W. ...
James Cunningham
William B. ...
James ...
Michael ...
John ...
James ...
Bill ...

of freedom is not only our duty as Americans, it is essential for success at Geneva.

That is why we must and will speak in Geneva on behalf of those who cannot speak for themselves. We are not trying to impose our beliefs on others. We have a right to expect, however, that great states will live up to their international obligations.

Despite our deep and abiding differences, we can and must prevent our international competition from spilling over into violence.

Thirty years ago in Geneva, President Eisenhower, preparing for his first meeting with the then Soviet leader, made his Open Skies proposal and an offer of new educational and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union. He recognized that removing the barriers between people is at the heart of our relationship.

I have hopes that we can lessen the distrust between us, reduce the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a more "Open World."

If Soviet youth could attend American schools and universities, they could learn firsthand what spirit of freedom rules our land, and that we do not wish the Soviet people any harm. If American youth could do likewise, they could talk about their interests and values and hopes for the future with their Soviet friends.

And how about Soviet children watching 'Sesame Street'?

They would get firsthand knowledge of life in the U.S.S.R., but most important they would learn that we are all God's children with much in common.

Imagine if people in our nation could see the Ballet Ballet again, while Soviet citizens could see American plays and hear groups like the Beach Boys.

And how about Soviet children watching "Sesame Street?"

Why shouldn't I propose to Mr. Gorbachev at Geneva that we exchange many more of our citizens from fraternal, religious, educational, and cultural groups? Why not suggest the exchange of thousands of undergraduates each year, and even younger students who would live with a host family and attend schools or summer camps? We could look to increase scholarship programs, improve language studies, conduct courses in history, culture, and other subjects, develop new stu-



By Vance Maxwell, USA

ter cities, establish libraries and cultural centers, and, yes, increase athletic competition.

If we must compete, let it be on the playing fields and not the battlefields.

In science and technology we could launch new joint space ventures and establish joint medical research projects. In communications, we would like to see more appearances in the other's mass media by representatives of both our countries.

Such proposals will not bridge our differences, but people-to-people contacts can build genuine understandings for peace in both countries.

After all, people don't start wars, governments do. We do not threaten the Soviet people and never will. We go without libraries, but with hope — hope that programs can be made on our entire agenda.

Governments can only do so much: Once they get the ball rolling, they should step out of the way and let people get together to share, enjoy, help, listen and learn from each other, especially young people.

Finally, we go to Geneva with the sober realization that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat in human history to the survival of the human race, that the arms race must be stopped.

It is not an impossible dream that we can begin to reduce nuclear arsenals, reduce the risk of war, and

build a solid foundation. It is not an impossible dream that American and Soviet grandchildren can grow up together in America's and the Soviet Union's homes, work and play, music, television, sports, and they compete.

These, then, are the ingredients for peace: the steady expansion of our world's peoples, support for Africa, and Latin America, and a broadening of our relationship that can diminish the danger of nuclear war. We can do it. We can do it. We can do it.

While it would be naive to expect a permanent peace, we can establish a permanent dialogue for peace and optimism, and we go to Geneva with that optimism. Both Nancy and I have given us to serve in the world. I have placed in us. I have placed in us. I have placed in us. I have placed in us.

I received a letter from a young man in Louisiana recently. He wrote me and told me how much he enjoyed my book, "The Heart of the Matter." He said he was a Christian and that he was a member of the church. He said he was a member of the church. He said he was a member of the church.

And I could only say to him, "I am glad to hear that." I am glad to hear that. I am glad to hear that. I am glad to hear that. I am glad to hear that.

When I first accepted the invitation to come to Geneva, I was told that it was a very important meeting. I was told that it was a very important meeting. I was told that it was a very important meeting. I was told that it was a very important meeting.

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OPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL.

JAMES E. ATTARIAN,

1985-86 PRESIDENT, OPTIMIST INTERNATIONAL

21018 VICTORY BOULEVARD, WOODLAND, HILLS, CA 91367

November 27, 1985
"BE A STAR"

Mr. James B. Ryals, Jr.
Post Office Box 8175
Mobile, Alabama 36689

Dear Jim:

This will acknowledge and thank you for your letter of November 18, 1985, regarding a student and professional exchange program between the United States and the Soviet Union and the possibility of Optimist International sponsoring such a program.

I regret the inability of the Board of Directors to give consideration to your proposal at its November 21-22 meeting due to the restriction of time. However, I have referred your letter to the International Activities Committee to study all the ramifications of such a program and to report its findings to the Board.

We sincerely appreciate the interest and concern expressed by you and the other individuals whose signature appears on your proposal.

Sincerely,


James E. Attarian
President

JEA:sab

cc: Hugh H. Cranford, Executive Secretary, OI
Fernand Rondeau, Chairman, Activities Committee, OI
Tom Waters, Director of Activities, OI

35004401210



Optimist International Board of Directors, 1985-86

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MICHEL CLOUTIER Wife Colette Member Op-
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B. GLENN JOHNSON Wife Betty Member Op-
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4126 McIntosh St Regina SK S4S 2K8
Cng: 306-677-4828 Res 306-928-3716



E. B. (BILL) LEAL Wife Fern Member Optimist
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713-652-0884 Res 713-488-0311



GLENN D. SPARESUS Wife Glana Member
Optimist Club of Des Plaines Illinois 1827 Wicks
Ave Des Plaines IL 60018 Bus 312-678-6820
Res 312-676-4381



RALPH WALLER Wife Joyce Member
Breakfast Optimist Club of Fort Worth Texas
1458 Carver's Circle Fort Worth TX 76112 Bus
817-978-1878 Res 817-457-0264



AL YANTE, JR. Wife Shirley Member Op-
timist Club of Bessmer City Louisiana 234 Ave N
Bessmer City LA 70017 Bus 504-699-1287 Res
504-748-3222

Past Presidents of Optimist International

- William H. Harrison, 1919-21, Louisville, KY
- Cyrus Crane Wilkins, 1921-22, St. Louis, MO
- Jack Martin, 1922-23, San Francisco CA
- James Chilton, 1923-24, St. Louis, MO
- Sherman Rogers, 1924-25, New York, NY
- Leo F. Nohl, 1925-26, Milwaukee WI
- Oscar A. Smith, 1926-27, Corona Del Mar CA
- C. Edd Hall, 1927-28, Oklahoma City OK
- Worlington Wood, 1928-29, Springfield, IL
- Nicholas F. Nolan, 1929-30, Dayton, OH
- Robert J. Sutherland, 1930-31, Madison, WI
- Helmes A. Sporb, 1931-32, Los Angeles CA
- David W. Onan, 1932-33, Minneapolis MN
- V. Ernest Field, 1933-34, Indianapolis IN

- Henry Schaffert, 1934-35, Washington DC
- Walter J. Pray, 1935-36, Indianapolis, IN
- Earl G. Stanzas, 1936-37, St. Louis, MO
- William J. Tamblin, 1937-38, Toronto, ON
- Dr. F. Fern Petty, 1938-39, Los Angeles CA
- Thomas F. O'Keefe, 1939-40, 890 Grosse Pointe Woods MI
- John N. Free, 1940-41, Wichita, KS
- Eldon S. Dummitt, 1941-42, Lexington KY
- R. Carter Tucker, 1942-43, Kansas City MO
- Theodore F. Peirce, 1943-44, Los Angeles CA
- Dr. Joseph W. Seay, 1944-45, Falls Church VA
- Carl C. Donough, 1945-46, Portland, OR
- William H. Pierce, 1946-47, 408 N Zengs Blvd (Box 4495)
Dallas TX 75208

* DECEASED

club world



Fishing-American Style

Ed LaBuy shares the secrets of many years of fishing with young European and Turkish visitors at a picnic held by the Optimist Club of Oakland, California.

The idea to have the picnic came about because of the proximity of the International Summer Camp, a program which brings kids around the age of 11-12 together for summer camps in the U.S. and abroad. The program springs from the belief that this age group is at the ideal stage to widen their horizons and learn about the positive, exciting possibilities that abound in the world.

The idea of a picnic was a huge success with donations from McDonald's, a local bakery, and the club members themselves. Ten, eleven and thirteen-year-olds from Turkey, Brazil, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Greece played together, took boat rides, fished, had a great meal, and learned a little about Optimism. Optimist families also played host to some of the kids for a weekend.

Participants at the Optimist picnic left with the conviction that optimism and international goodwill indeed make good partners. /

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 4, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Letter to Linda Chavez

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley forwarding the Department of State's draft response to a letter from Jerral Parris to Linda Chavez. I have reviewed and concur with the draft, with changes as noted in the text.

Judyt Mandel *JM* and Steve Sestanovich *SRS* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Sally Kelley at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley
Tab A Draft response from State
Tab B Tasking memo to State
Tab C Correspondence from Mr. Jerral Parris

~~SECRET~~

Matlock
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Chow*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6 March 1986

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SR/S*

SUBJECT: Shultz Memo on UNGA Regional Initiative

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a paper on pursuing the UNGA "regional initiative" in discussions with the Soviets. This makes sense (and is timely given the President's ASEAN visit), but it has gained extra impetus within State from fears of a showy Soviet initiative on Afghanistan that would throw us and the Pakistanis off balance. So far this has not materialized.

Beyond familiar points for the on-going series of bilateral talks on regional issues, the paper recommends two specific approaches:

° That, when he sees Shevardnadze, the Secretary raise elements of a "specific peace plan" for Afghanistan, challenging the Soviets to show whether they are really interested in a negotiated outcome. This would include a six-month withdrawal timetable, "direct talks on reconciliation" and other ideas.

° That we approach Thailand, and later the rest of ASEAN, about a negotiating proposal on Cambodia that the foreign ministers would raise with the President in Bali. They'd ask him to press it on the Soviets; we would then urge the Soviets to press it on Hanoi.

These approaches could be effective, but obviously timing, tone, and details are crucial to ensuring that our friends understand what we're doing. In the current environment, with the Soviets trying to feed Pakistani fears that some sort of superpower deal is in the works, a "specific peace plan" for Afghanistan might be misunderstood. The NSC staff has made sure that cables on consultations with the Paks reflect this necessary caution. (Shultz's paper, unfortunately, reflects earlier, less refined thinking in the Department on this subject.) On Cambodia, we also have to assure consistency with our MIAs policy.

The attached memo to the President describes the paper and alerts him to some of the problems. If you wish, we can prepare points for you to use in following up with Shultz, or draft a memo from Rod McDaniel back to State, detailing some of our concerns.

SR/S Burghardt, *SR/S* Childress, *SR/S* Matlock, *SR/S* Ringdahl, and *SR/S* Tahir-Kheli concur.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/4 #8110

BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

TAB

I

~~SECRET~~

1801 43

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

WASHINGTON

NLRR FD6-114/4 #8117

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Implementing Your UNGA "Regional Initiative"

George Shultz has sent you some thoughts about how to keep alive the "regional initiative" you presented to the UN last October.

This is a good idea: it could help to highlight both the importance of regional conflicts in US-Soviet relations and our commitment -- unlike the Soviets -- to pursue diplomatic solutions where possible. We want international recognition that to end these wars groups like UNITA, the Afghan resistance coalition, and the Nicaraguan opposition must play a role.

As the State Department paper makes clear, each region needs different handling. We have proposals on the table for Central America, but the Soviets obviously should play no part in them. And our regular discussions with the Soviets on southern Africa (one round is underway this week) should also stay very low-key.

George is, however, proposing specific approaches in two cases -- Afghanistan and Cambodia -- and, although these break no new ground, my staff will work closely with his on the details. The absolutely essential thing is to make sure that our friends -- Pakistan, the Afghan resistance, the South-east Asian governments -- understand and support what we're doing. This is especially important now, when some friends are wondering about how their concerns fit into US-Soviet relations. We have seen Soviet disinformation efforts to frighten the Pakistanis that a super-power deal is being cut on Afghanistan. For this reason, it would be very unwise to give Zia the idea that we want to set up separate negotiations with Moscow on this issue. As for Cambodia, State hopes to use your ASEAN meeting in Bali to re-raise a plan for "proximity" talks; we'd urge Moscow to support the idea with Vietnam. Here again, we'll have to be careful to avoid misunderstandings in the region (and to assure consistency with our broader policy and with domestic concerns over MIAs).

I'm sure George agrees with these points. With your approval, I'll take these matters up with him in greater depth.

Recommendation

OK No

___ ___ That I follow up with Shultz along the above lines.

Prepared by:
Stephen Sestanovich

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

44

TAB

A

45

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 5, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Implementing Your UNGA Regional Initiative

As you know, the Soviets have never formally responded to the regional initiative you announced at the UN last October, perhaps hoping that their silence will make the initiative fade away. I believe we should disabuse them of such a notion. My people have taken a fresh look at how to build on your initiative and have developed a package of proposals for diplomatic actions tailored to each of the regions mentioned in your UN speech.

The initiatives would serve a number of important purposes:

- o Keeping regional issues on the public agenda (which the Soviets clearly wish to avoid) between now and the next summit;
- o Maintaining diplomatic pressure on Moscow to live up to its declarations of support for political solutions;
- o Testing Soviet readiness for a serious diplomatic process;
- o Reinforcing our friends and allies in the regions and driving wedges between Moscow and its clients where we can;
- o Demonstrating your support for political solutions to these problems, which will be important in countering criticism from the Soviets and in the Congress as we increase our support for the freedom fighters.

The Soviets seem to be taking a more activist approach to some of their Third World involvements. So far, this has mostly entailed military support for their clients. However, as we have seen on arms control, Gorbachev can also make the bold diplomatic stroke and Soviet initiatives on regional questions are possible. We should position ourselves now so the Soviets have to respond to our moves, not the other way around. A synopsis of our ideas follows below; detailed proposals are being forwarded separately to the NSC.

All of the ideas outlined below require consultation and

SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8119

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

46

collaboration with our friends and allies in the region; I would like your approval for us to move forward.

Afghanistan

Our goals are to protect Pakistan from increased Soviet pressure, present a negotiating position that will test Soviet intentions and provide a sound basis for a settlement, and neutralize a possible Soviet "peace offensive." To these ends, when I next meet with Shevardnadze, I will outline a specific peace plan, encompassing: a six-month withdrawal of Soviet troops in three equal phases; Soviet acceptance of the already negotiated guarantees agreement; Soviet exploration of political reconciliation inside Afghanistan (perhaps including direct talks with the resistance); development of an international monitoring mechanism and; international consultations on an economic reconstruction mechanism for post-war independent Afghanistan. To heighten pressure on the Soviets we should, at an appropriate point, make this plan public and seek to build support for it in the UN and elsewhere.

Cambodia

Our objective is to utilize the lead role of the ASEAN countries to pressure Vietnam to withdraw its troops and pursue a negotiated settlement. The core of our effort would be a renewed ASEAN proposal for negotiations and a request by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to you at the Bali meeting in April to raise Cambodia with the Soviets. In agreeing to the ASEAN request, we would agree to participate in guarantees of a settlement, along with other interested states, after the parties directly involved have come to terms. We would also indicate that we are prepared to play a major role in the rehabilitation of Cambodia after a settlement, and to normalize relations with Vietnam.

Africa

Our goal on Angola is to deter Soviet military escalation, and thereby to support those in the MPLA who favor a political solution. We do this by our aid to Savimbi and by showing that Soviet escalation is risky. In talks with the Soviets in March we will stress the costs of their escalation, caution that support for a military solution will be futile and will harm U.S.-Soviet relations, and press the Soviets to recognize the military stalemate and hence the need for a political solution. On the Horn, we will explore Soviet views and assess whether political developments in the Sudan might offer new openings with Ethiopia.

Nicaragua

We want to discourage Soviet meddling, while demonstrating our interest in a political solution based on national reconciliation. In experts' talks in May we will ensure they understand our determination and the limits of our toleration, keep discussion of diplomatic efforts focused on the issues of importance to us, and seek to place the Soviets and their friends in the position of obstacles to political solutions. Specifically, we will offer to resume dialogue with the Sandinistas if they meet with the armed democratic opposition, and to respond to internal and external policy changes in Nicaragua as they occur. If, as expected, the Soviets are unresponsive, we will seek to use this with the Congress and the Contadora countries to attempt to build support for our strategy, including aid for the armed opposition.



Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S
REGIONAL INITIATIVE

The Secretary has sent a memorandum to the President on this subject. A detailed description of the Department's proposals is attached.

BMcKully
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CSS NARA, Date 7/2/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

AFGHANISTAN

Of all the conflicts cited in the President's regional initiative, Afghanistan received the most attention at the Geneva Summit. We have identified five elements of a possible approach to the Soviets which builds on the existing UN negotiating political framework. These elements are also essential to the successful implementation of a comprehensive agreement, and are consistent with the President's regional initiative.

Secretary Shultz would raise these points privately at the next meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Our initiative has four objectives: (1) to preserve and bolster our political position, while protecting the Pakistanis from increased Soviet political and military pressure; (2) to present a credible negotiating position that will test Soviet intentions and provide a sound basis for a potential settlement; (3) to neutralize any possible Soviet "peace offensive" on Afghanistan and; (4) to underscore our commitment to a peaceful settlement under the President's regional initiative.

We intend to consult with the Government of Pakistan on this proposed five-point initiative, with our usual understanding on Afghanistan matters that we will only proceed if they agree. We will also wish to discuss with them how an initiative of this sort might best be presented. Assuming that the Pakistan Government agrees, we will also wish to consult with the Afghan resistance alliance. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union may be preparing a "peace offensive" on Afghanistan, so our initiative will be timely and important.

Withdrawal: We should continue to press for Soviet troop withdrawal as the key to a settlement. We would propose a phased withdrawal in three equal tranches at two month intervals, with the full withdrawal of all combat forces and military advisors to be completed six months after the signing of a comprehensive peace settlement. This element could become part of our public posture at some point. If we can establish the six-month timeframe solidly in the public mind, it will be more difficult for the Soviets to argue later for a more extended timetable.

-2-

Guarantees: We would urge the Soviet Union to match the USG acceptance of the guarantees document negotiated at Geneva.

Direct talks on Self-Determination: Internal political reconciliation is an essential precondition for the successful implementation of Soviet withdrawal, and the first element in the President's regional initiative. We would suggest to the Soviets that they seriously address the central problem of political reconciliation inside Afghanistan by exploring a means for all Afghans to participate in an agreed framework for governing their country. If the Pakistanis agree, we could add the suggestion that the Soviets consider talking directly to the resistance as a first step in devising such a process.

Monitoring mechanism: Given the degree of distrust and suspicion existing among the parties, a neutral, objective monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with the terms of an agreement is an essential component. We would propose that talks begin, possibly under the leadership of the UN, on development of an international monitoring mechanism. By raising this now and providing specific proposals, e.g., an international observers group composed of Islamic nations, we would begin to build international and regional support for an effective monitoring mechanism.

Economic Reconstruction: In line with the President's regional initiative, a proposal for international consultations on the creation of an economic reconstruction mechanism for post-war Afghanistan would add some incentive for a peaceful resolution of the current struggle and highlight our willingness to make a tangible contribution to this effort.

After we have consulted with Pakistan, we will want to consider what elements of this approach to incorporate in our public position, and when and how best to do them.

CAMBODIA

In implementing the President's regional initiative on Cambodia, it is crucial that we support the ASEAN countries in their dual policy of keeping pressure on Vietnam to withdraw its forces and pursuing negotiations for a peaceful settlement. The approach outlined below involves the ASEANS directly in our dealings with the Soviets.

The core of this effort would be a request by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to the President at the Bali meeting in April to raise Cambodia with the Soviets. In order to implement this approach, we would:

- o Arrange with the ASEANS, before the Bali meeting, to have them renew their proposal for "proximity talks" or develop another formula for getting negotiations started. Our first approach to this end would be with the Thai, to ensure that Bangkok does not misinterpret our move as a policy shift away from concern for its security.
- o By prearrangement, the Ministers would ask the President to carry this proposal to the Soviets and to urge them to persuade Vietnam to enter talks based on ASEAN's proposal.
- o In agreeing to the ASEAN request, the President would commit the U.S. to participate in guarantees of a settlement, along with other interested states, after the parties directly involved had come to terms. He would also indicate that we would be prepared to play a major role in the rehabilitation of Cambodia after a settlement, as well as normalizing relations with Vietnam.
- o We would follow through on the ASEAN request, probably first through a letter from the President to Gorbachev, then in regional discussions, then at the Summit.
- o To lessen the chances of an immediate negative reaction from the Soviets before we have a chance to approach them, in announcing what happened at Bali, we and the ASEANS would note only that they have asked us to raise Cambodia with the Soviets.

As this initiative develops, we will have to work closely with the ASEANS, modifying the proposal, if necessary, to meet their concerns. We will also have to bring China into the process at an early stage, due to its large stake in resisting Vietnam and supporting Thailand.

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As we work with ASEAN in pursuing negotiations, we must also keep in mind the other track of the ASEAN policy and do our part to keep pressure on Hanoi. Thus, we need to ensure that we are not seen as wavering in our continued denial of normal diplomatic and economic relations to Vietnam, and we must continue our moral and material support for the non-communist Khmer resistance.

This initiative will improve our political position in the region but will probably not persuade the Soviets to put effective pressure on Vietnam. The Soviets and especially the Vietnamese pay a high cost for the continued occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's consequent isolation. Yet, the Soviets have too much a stake in their military bases in Vietnam and in their rivalry with China to jeopardize their relations with Vietnam. Vietnam is also unlikely to view the political costs of occupation in Cambodia as too high.

Nevertheless, the fact that we are working with ASEAN to inject new life into the negotiating process in the context of the Summit may put additional pressure on the Soviets. The stick of prospective U.S.-Soviet collusion, combined with the carrot of normalized relations with the U.S., may make a negotiated settlement slightly more attractive to Hanoi. In any case, if the Soviets do reject this initiative, we will have solidified our support for the ASEANs by involving them directly in the process and we may have preempted or blunted a potentially disruptive Soviet "peace offensive."

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AFRICA

From all indications Soviet policy in Angola and Ethiopia is designed to support the parties and political leaders whom Moscow has been building up for over a decade. The Soviets have shown no real interest in working with us to resolve regional conflicts in Africa, although they pay lip service to the idea of peaceful settlements. While we do not at this stage expect the Soviets to engage in a cooperative effort to resolve conflicts in southern Africa and the Horn as called for in the President's regional initiative, we can pursue more limited objectives that would follow up the initiative by:

- maintaining diplomatic pressure on the Soviets;
- engaging the Soviets in a further exchange on the requirements for regional settlement;
- preventing, if possible, the situation in Angola from worsening; and
- strengthening the hands of those who prefer a negotiated solution in southern Africa.

We will pursue these objectives when Assistant Secretary Chet Crocker next meets his Soviet counterpart, Vasev, in early March. We intend to use this meeting again to challenge the Soviets to take concrete steps to reduce conflict in southern Africa, and to explore current Soviet views on political developments in the Horn.

Angola

In a meeting in Paris last May, Chet Crocker pressed Vasev to go beyond mere lip service and to join us in working to resolve the problems of southern Africa through negotiations. Vasev showed little flexibility on Cuban troop withdrawal, even an indication of Soviet differences with the Angolans on this point. They discussed Angolan reconciliation, but the Soviets indicated that they see Savimbi himself as the problem. They prefer to probe for ways of splitting UNITA and neutralizing Savimbi.

Chet will raise the high level of Soviet support for last fall's MPLA offensive against UNITA as a dangerous development and will urge the Soviets to reduce their military involvement

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in the region. Chet will make the point that Soviet support for a military solution in Angola is incompatible with a cooperative approach toward regional problems. He will be able to point to the growing support for Savimbi in the U.S. and to stress the broader implications of Soviet activities in southern Africa for the tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations. He will also challenge the Soviets to recognize that a military solution in Angola is not possible, that the President has pledged support to Savimbi and that the USSR should think seriously about promoting political reconciliation in Angola. To the extent the Soviets are seen by the MPLA as hesitating in their support for a military push on Savimbi's headquarters, the hand of those in the MPLA who favor negotiations will be strengthened.

Ethiopia

Last year, Vasev took the initiative with Crocker in raising the Horn of Africa on the side of the southern Africa meeting. This year Chet intends to follow up that precedent by probing for current Soviet views on the region. While Chet does not intend to get into a formal discussion, we believe that an informal exchange will not only give us a better perspective on Soviet views; but could also increase Mengistu's suspicions about ultimate Soviet designs in the Horn of Africa when he hears about the discussion. We might also want to follow-up with the Soviets if a new moderate government in the Sudan were to be interested in trading Sudanese support for Eritrean rebels for an end to Ethiopian aid to rebels in the south of Sudan.

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NICARAGUA

In Nicaragua, as elsewhere, the essential first step in implementing the President's regional initiative would be measures toward national reconciliation, including talks between the Sandinistas and the armed democratic resistance. We made such talks the center of our recent proposal to the Contadora countries. When we hold our next experts' talks with the Soviets on Central America/Caribbean issues this May, we will make clear that national reconciliation is the key to progress in Nicaragua. We will ensure the Soviets understand that their continued meddling in Central America carries a price in our bilateral relations, and recognize our determination to resist their encroachments. We will keep discussion focused on the issues of importance to us and place the Soviets and their friends in the position of nay-sayers to peaceful solutions. Specifically, we will repeat our offer to resume dialogue with the Sandinistas if they meet with the armed democratic opposition and to respond to internal and external policy changes in Nicaragua as they occur.

In line with the President's initiative, during our experts' talks we could also outline subsequent steps we would be willing to take with the Soviets once the internal Nicaragua talks were on track. Soviet willingness to discuss national reconciliation as we define it would constitute Soviet acknowledgment that the democratic armed opposition was a legitimate factor in Nicaragua -- a considerable achievement for our political objectives.

The Soviets pay lip-service to Contadora; but, as we saw in our regional experts exchange last fall, are unwilling to accept the Contadora points about internal democracy and pluralism as being equally important as security arrangements. It is therefore likely the Soviets would reject our efforts to promote Sandinista-UNO talks and would insist instead that U.S.-Sandinista talks begin without "preconditions." We could use Soviet rejection of this essential element of Contadora to political advantage in our regional diplomatic efforts.

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