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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON FEBURARY 1986 (5/6)

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YARHI-MILO

1412

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8097	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PEARCE/GREEN INITIATIVE--- APPOINTMENT REQUEST <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	2/25/1986	B1
8098	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PEARCE/GREEN INITIATIVE ON RENUNCIATION OF WAR <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	10/2/1985	B1
8099	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PEARCE/GREEN INITIATIVE ON RENUNCIATION OF WAR <i>R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8100	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE WORLDWIDE BRIEFING PAPER <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	2/25/1986	B1
8101	MEMO	CASEY RE "WORLDWIDE BRIEFING" <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8102	PAPER	WORLDWIDE BRIEFING <i>R 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4</i>	16	1/30/1986	B1

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- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Jane

1464

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 24, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request for Travel to Middlebury College  
on March 11, 1986

I have been invited by Middlebury College to participate in a Panel Discussion to be held at Middlebury on March 11, 1986. The subject will be "US-USSR Relations and Gorbachev's First Year."

All travel and accomodation expenses will be covered by Middlebury College.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: 2/24/86

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): TO PARTICIPATE IN A PANEL DISCUSSION  
ON US-USSR RELATIONS AND GORBACHEV'S FIRST YEAR-TO BE HELD AT  
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE ON MARCH 11, 1986

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):  
WASHINGTON/BURLINGTON/NEW YORK/WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE DATE 3/11/86 RETURN DATE 3/13/86  
TIME \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:  
GOV AIR \_\_\_\_\_ COMMERCIAL AIR XX POV \_\_\_\_\_ RAIL \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:  
TRANSPORTATION \_\_\_\_\_ PER DIEM \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ TOTAL TRIP COST \_\_\_\_\_

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:  
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO XX

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): \_\_\_\_\_

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_

*File* ~~FILE~~ 3  
ID 8509252

NSC/S PROFILE UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED 15 NOV 85 16

TO MCFARLANE FROM CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM  
CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM

DOCDATE 11 NOV 85  
08 NOV 85

KEYWORDS: USSR  
MP

SPEECHES

*Mallory*

SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM UNIV OF TEXAS RE APPT REQUEST W/ PRES ON  
3 - 4 APR / US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: *25 charged w/ secretariat*  
20 NOV 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~MANLOCK~~  
*Mandel*

SESTANOVICH  
SMALL

~~MANDEL~~  
*Mandel*

HALL  
THOMPSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DR )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>MW</i>	<i>4 2/20</i>	<i>Lo J...</i>	<i>2/22</i>	
	<i>C 2/24</i>	<i>McDaniel Sgd</i>		<i>Jm, Jr, Se Ks, MW</i>

*[Handwritten signature]*

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


February 24, 1986

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security AffairsSUBJECT: University of Texas Symposium on U.S.-Soviet  
Relations

William H. Cunningham, President of the University of Texas at Austin, has invited the President to speak at a symposium on U.S.-Soviet relations April 3 (Tab A). U.T. Professor Robert German, a former director of the State Department's Office of Soviet Affairs, followed with a letter to Bud McFarlane (Tab B), in which he noted that high level Soviet officials, including Andrey Gromyko, have also been invited.

The purpose of the symposium, as described in the material at Tab C, is to look at "what went right" in U.S.-Soviet relations in the period since 1945. The organizers want to avoid what they term "the familiar litany of charges raised by both sides."

While we consider it unlikely that Gromyko will accept the invitation, the symposium should nonetheless be an excellent forum for a high level foreign policy statement. We have checked the President's schedule, and he will not be available. If the Vice President's schedule allows, he might find this an attractive home-state venue for a statement on U.S.-Soviet relations.

  
Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

## Attachments:

Tab A Letter to the President from William  
Cunningham  
Tab B Letter to Bud McFarlane from Robert German  
Tab C Background information and tentative symposium  
schedule

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 7/2/02

NOV 14 1985



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

P. O. Box T · Austin, Texas 78713-7389

November 8, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Next spring, on April 3 and 4, 1986, The University of Texas at Austin will be sponsoring a symposium on the future state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. I would like to invite you, Mr. President, to open the symposium with a keynote address on the morning of Thursday, April 3.

The symposium will have as its theme an examination of two fundamental questions: how it is that we have managed to avoid a third world war over the past forty years, and what policy inferences for the future can be drawn from that experience. To take part in the panel discussions that are to follow the keynote session, we are inviting distinguished participants--officials, former officials, academics, and journalists--from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Should Soviet participation not materialize, the symposium will be held with American participants only.

We expect public interest in the symposium to be high. To accommodate a large audience, it will be held in the auditorium of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, on the campus of The University of Texas. The auditorium has a seating capacity of one thousand; you may recall that you spoke there to an overflow audience during the campaign of 1980.

Your dedicated efforts to improve the chances for a just peace lead me to hope that you would be interested in addressing a forum dedicated to that theme. It would be an honor and a pleasure to welcome you once again to The University of Texas.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "William H. Cunningham".

William H. Cunningham  
President

-----







LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

Drawer Y • University Station • Austin, Texas 78713-7450 • (512) 471-4962

November 11, 1985

*Thompson*

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

Next spring, on April 3 and 4, The University of Texas at Austin will be sponsoring a symposium on the future state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dr. William H. Cunningham, President of the University, has addressed the enclosed invitation to President Reagan to open the symposium with a keynote address on the morning of April 3, 1986. I am writing to request your assistance in bringing Dr. Cunningham's invitation to the attention of the President.

Permit me to provide additional background on the symposium. While it has University-wide sponsorship, it will be one in a series of conferences which the Visiting Tom Slick Professorship of World Peace organizes each year on a topic of current international importance. The concept and preliminary plans were developed by Professors Walt and Elspeth Rostow when they were on a USIS-sponsored visit to Moscow in May 1984.

We are tentatively entitling the symposium "The Future of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations: Lessons from Forty Years without World War." Since the widespread predictions in the late 1940s of the early inevitability of another world war have not materialized, it is arguable that some things must have been done right over the past forty years; the symposium title reflects our desire to explore this hypothesis more precisely and to extract policy inferences for the future.

Because of the desirability of bringing both American and Soviet insights and perceptions to bear on the consideration of these crucial issues, we envisage a joint symposium and have invited Soviet participation. President Cunningham has extended an invitation to Andrey Gromyko, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to serve as keynoter for

*Jack Macbleck*  
9252 1

8

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
November 11, 1985  
Page 2

the Soviet side. That invitation was transmitted through Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, whom Dr. Cunningham also invited to participate in the symposium and to serve as Soviet keynoter if Chairman Gromyko should be unable to attend.

To serve as panelists in the discussions that are to follow the keynote session, we are inviting from the American side distinguished officials, former officials, academics, and journalists. Through Dr. Georgiy Arbatov we have invited the Soviet side to provide panelists and have suggested a similar mix of expertise. In several conversations with Soviet officials, we have received a measure of encouragement for proceeding with the symposium, although we do not yet have a firm commitment for Soviet participation. In our last conversation with Dr. Arbatov, he promised a tentative response in November--presumably, after the forthcoming summit meeting. We are encouraged to believe that there will be Soviet participation; however, because of the intrinsic importance of the subject matter, the symposium will in any case take place as scheduled.

I am enclosing a tentative outline that will give a better idea of the concept and proposed structure for the symposium. As stated in Dr. Cunningham's letter to the President, the symposium will be held in the auditorium of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, where the President spoke to an overflow audience on April 24, 1980. We would anticipate another capacity crowd for the symposium, and we are hopeful that the President would find attractive the idea of a return visit to Texas in the spring of 1986, to make what would undoubtedly be a major policy address.

Let me express my appreciation in advance for your courtesy in transmitting the invitation to the President, along with my hope that you will be disposed to recommend acceptance.

Yours sincerely,



Robert K. German  
Tom Slick Professor of  
World Peace

Enclosure

11-11-11



10

The Future of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations:  
Lessons from Forty Years Without World War

A Symposium Scheduled for April 2-4, 1986  
The University of Texas at Austin

THEME: The theme of the symposium is to extract inferences from the record of the past forty years which might rule out or at least postpone indefinitely the nuclear exchange which would open World War III. Since the purpose of the meeting is to isolate what went right during this period, the familiar litany of charges raised by both sides needs to be avoided. With this in mind, although our major themes are familiar - the arms race, balance of power, the Third World - we are not anticipating the usual discussion of these topics.

SPONSORSHIP: The symposium is being sponsored by the University of Texas at Austin. Funding is coming from the University through the Tom Slick Chair in World Peace. Support will also be forthcoming from the private sector. Co-chairmen of the University organizing committee are Robert K. German, Distinguished Visiting Tom Slick Professor of World Peace, and Elspeth Rostow, Stiles Professor in American Studies and Government, both of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin.

PARTICIPATION: As more valuable insights may emerge from joint reflection on the issues before the symposium, an equal number of participants is being invited from the United States and the Soviet Union. Should participation from the Soviet side not prove possible, the symposium will be held with American participants only.

Members of the public will be invited to attend the keynote session, the panel discussions, and the concluding session. Publication of the proceedings, in English and Russian, is anticipated.

DATE: April 2-4, 1986

PLACE: The Lyndon B. Johnson Auditorium at the University of Texas at Austin.

11/11/85

TENTATIVE PROGRAM

Wednesday, April 2, 1986

Participants arrive. Hospitality rooms available at hotel.

Thursday, April 3, 1986

9:00 a.m. Welcome, President of the University of Texas at Austin, Dr. William Cunningham

9:15 a.m. Keynote Addresses. Invitations have been extended to a distinguished American and a distinguished Soviet official to deliver keynote addresses, which will set the stage for the substantive sessions to follow. The desired emphasis in the keynote addresses will be on the major achievements of the past forty years as they relate to the avoidance of World War III.

First Panel

Arms and Technology

10:15 a.m. It is assumed that the nature and scale of weaponry have had significant bearing on forty years of non-nuclear exchange. The purpose of this panel is to explore the relationship more precisely. The topics that the panel might address include: (a) What evidence is there that the nature of weaponry has, by itself, acted as a major explanation for the forty-year peace? (b) To what extent has nuclear proliferation reduced - or possibly augmented - the chance of a permanent peace? (c) What have been the successes in the arms/technology field over the forty year period, and how crucial, if at all, have efforts at arms control been for the preservation of peace? (d) What are the policy inferences that could be drawn from all this?

12:00 noon Lunch - no program

Second Panel

The Stability of US/USSR Relations  
With Respect to Europe and the Northern Pacific

1:30 p.m. Topics the panel might address include: (a) What has made possible the periods of detente during the past forty years? (b) How have European and Japanese attitudes (e.g., toward arms and arms control) made stability easier--or more difficult? (c) How important have the non-military components of the US-USSR bilateral relationship (trade, competitive ventures) been for stability, and how have those components been affected by European and Japanese attitudes? (d) What major crises have been avoided--and how? (e) Have we advanced in the field of crisis-avoidance? (f) What lessons can be drawn from this analysis?

3:15-3:30 p.m. Coffee break

Third Panel

The Third World and the Preservation of Peace

3:30 p.m. Topics the panel might address include: (a) What examples can be cited of effective third world - or third country - initiatives which have deflected possible crises? (b) To what extent can the avoidance of conflict be attributed to effective crisis management on the part of the US and the USSR? (c) Have North/South tensions been relieved over the forty year period? (d) Is demography working for or against the preservation of peace? (e) To what extent does international terrorism threaten stability? (f) Are "codes of conduct" for dealing with Third World trouble spots desirable (or feasible)?

7:15 p.m. Evening reception

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Friday, April 4, 1986

Concluding Session

- 9:00 a.m.            Lessons from Forty Years of History
- 9:15-9:45            A Soviet View
- 9:45-10:15          An American View
- 10:15-10:30        Coffee Break
- 10:30-12:30        General Discussion - All participants

Adjournment no later than 1:00 p.m.





*Murphy*

15

1472

*FILE*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 25, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

*Carol Cleveland for.*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed Presidential letter of greetings (TAB A), as amended, to the Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry on the occasion of their 10th Annual Washington Lobby, which is scheduled for February 27-28, 1986.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 24, 1986

I am pleased and honored to extend warmest greetings to the members of the Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry gathering for your 10th annual Washington Lobby and to those attending your group's rallies throughout the nation.

Your organization was formed in <sup>following</sup> ~~response to~~ the arrest of Anatoly Shcharansky ~~and the Aystematic persecution of so many other Soviet Jews.~~ Mr. Shcharansky's recent release is a hopeful sign, and you can take the pride in having had a significant impact on that happy outcome. ~~But I know its favorable settlement will spur you on to yet further achievements for you will not rest here, and that the release of Anatoly Sheharansky will only spur you on to renew your efforts in behalf of human rights.~~

to support  
of the  
human  
rights  
Soviet  
Jews  
and  
of  
their  
rights

Still,  
there  
remains  
much to  
be done,  
and I am  
sure you  
will not  
flag in your  
~~support~~  
efforts to  
call attention  
to continued  
human rights  
abuses.

The creed of your organization parallels that of our beloved Republic: veneration for independent thought, for conscience and for the God-given rights of man. You have my solemn pledge that this Administration will continue to work with you and so many others to secure these rights for all who suffer persecution.

Nancy joins me in sending you a hearty Mazel Tov and our best wishes for the future.

**COPY**  
**from ORM**

February 21, 1984

208260  
4610  
480  
MIA  
C01  
Bernstein

*My of*  
I am delighted to send my warm greetings to all those gathered for the Eighth International Student Solidarity Day of the Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry.

This event presents a welcome opportunity for me to reaffirm my Administration's commitment to the cause of liberty and religious freedom for Soviet Jews. International Student Solidarity Day serves as an inspiring display of your overriding concern for the fundamental human rights of others.

The cause you are pursuing has earned the widespread respect and support of the American people.

Recognizing that Soviet Jews are subject to inhumane restrictions and discrimination, America has consistently sought to improve their situation. We have repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to adopt humane and flexible attitudes toward the issues of emigration, freedom of worship, religious discrimination, and other questions involving basic human rights. Though we suffer from no illusions regarding their policies, we will continue to pursue those worthy goals.

You have my strong support and best wishes for success for all your efforts in building a solidarity of concern for the plight of Soviet Jews.

To Marshall Breger to hand-carry to event.

RR:Wells:ck

cc: K. Osborne/D. Livingston/B. Kimmitt, NSC/CF

EVENT: FEB. 22-23



37732218

## B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations

1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036  
(202) 857-6560

February 3, 1986

Mr. Max Green  
Associate Director, Office of Public Liaison  
Old Executive Office Building, Room 196  
Washington, D.C. 20500

*Feb. 25 / 27*  
*Assign to SR4*  
*see '84 message attach*

Dear Mr. Green:

It is my pleasure, on behalf of the student coalition for Soviet Jewry (SCSJ) to invite President Reagan to extend to SCSJ his personal greetings on the occasion of their tenth annual Washington Lobby for Soviet Jewry, which is scheduled for February 27-28, 1986.

SCJS organized and lobbied for the first time in 1977, after Anatoly Shcharansky's arrest. At that time, the entire lobby was made up of thirteen undergraduates from Brandeis University. Today, the lobby has grown to include in their efforts hundreds of students nationwide. This year, we anticipate 600-800 participants. Students who attend do so at their own personal expense, sacrificing school time and personal funds for the cause of human rights. In addition to the lobbying activities in Washington itself, there will be rallies held simultaneously on campuses across the nation, as well as visits to district offices of members of Congress.

SCSJ remains today an organization run by undergraduate volunteers at Brandeis University. The coalition is both bipartisan and non-denominational. The International Office of the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations provides SCJC with partial funding and professional staff assistance. This year the students have selected Senators Arlen Specter and Frank Lautenberg, and Congressmen Hamilton Fish and Sander Levin as their Honorary Chairman.


In recognition of his long record of support of Soviet Jewry and human rights in general, it would be a highlight of this year's tenth anniversary lobby if our program could begin with a written letter of greetings and support from the President.

It is my understanding that B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations International Director Larry Moses has already provided you with materials regarding the lobby. However, I have taken the liberty of enclosing for your review a booklet prepared for last year's lobby.

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Thank you for your consideration of this request. I look forward to your reply,  
and to working with your office on this and other future projects.

Sincerely,



Gregg H. Goldstein  
Communications Liaison

GHG:pc  
Encl.



STUDENT COALITION FOR SOVIET JEWRY

Students for Congressional Action
JCAB
202 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 898-8265

Washington Office - BBHF
1640 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 857-6560

International Student Solidarity Day
Coordinating Center
Usdan Suite 148
Brandeis University
Waltham, Massachusetts 02254
(617) 647-2178

Honorary Chairmen
Senator Paul Simon
Senator John C. Danforth
Representative Steve Bartlett
Representative Robert Garcia

Honorary Executive Committee
Father Robert F. Drinan
Elie Wiesel
Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg
Alexander Lerner
Yosef Mendeleovich
Avital Shcharansky
Eduard Kuznetsov
Alexander Slepak
Jerry Goodman
Glenn Richter
Rabbi Stanley A. Ringler
Lynn Singer
Eric Mattenson
Neil Kriz

Supporting Organizations
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
American Mizrahi Women
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
B'nai B'rith International
Hadassah
Jewish Student Projects
Jewish War Veterans
National Council of Jewish Women
North American Jewish Youth Council
Pioneer Women
National Federation of Temple Youth
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
United Synagogue Youth
University Services Department of
American Zionist Youth Foundation
Workmen's Circle
Young Israel Youth
Zionist Organization of America

Office of Public Liason
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

January 25, 1986

To Whom It May Concern,

I am writing to you on behalf of the Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry, a national organization of college students committed to action on behalf of persecuted jews in the Soviet Union. The organization was founded in response to the arrest of Anatoly Shscaransky. Since that time, the coalition has come to the forefront of the Student effort to aid Soviet Jews.

Each year the SCSJ sponsors an International Student Solidarity Day for Soviet Jewry. The highlight of this effort is our annual Washington Lobby. During the Lobby, approximately 800 students from East Coast colleges meet in the capitol for extensive briefings on the current situation, a number of meetings with government officials and also constituent meetings with U.S. Senators and Representatives. This year our honorary chairmen are Senators Specter and Lautenberg and Representatives Levin and Fish. The goal of the lobby is to heighten awareness of the issue and to increase activity on behalf of these oppressed people.

This year we are again coordinating our tenth national lobbying effort, to occur on February 27, 1986. In addition to our traditional activities, we are also arranging to send specially briefed lobbyists to meet with key representatives of various national professional organizations and federal agencies. These meetings are meant to address the issues of our cause with the hope of stimulating action by a new spectrum of people, and supporting encouraging, as well as learning from, those already involved in the effort.

Toward these ends, we would like to arrange a meeting between an appropriate representative of your office, and a small group of our special lobbyists. We would like to discuss the current situation and pertinent issues of our cause. Also, we would like to explore various actions which your organization could take to help alleviate the plight of Soviet Jews. We would be available to meet at your office anytime between 2 and 5 p.m. on Thursday, February 27th. I would appreciate your advising me as to the feasibility of these arrangements at your earliest convenience. I can be reached at the Massachusetts address above.

page 2 of 2

In closing, I must emphasize that now, more than ever before, the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union necessitates our response. While emmigration has dropped to a new low, persecution and harrassment has increased. We need your help to ease this burden, to fight for this noble cause.

Thank you for your time and consideration of this matter. We look forward to your positive response in the near future.

Sincerely,

Andrew Josef, Coordinator  
Special Lobbying Effort

Enc/

Students for Congressional Action  
JCAB  
202 South 36th Street  
Philadelphia, PA 19104  
(215) 898-8265

Washington Office — BBHF  
1640 Rhode Island Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
(202) 857-6560

International Student Solidarity Day  
Coordinating Center  
Urban Suite 148  
Brandeis University  
Waltham, Massachusetts 02254  
(617) 647-2178

**Honorary Chairmen**  
Senator Paul Simon  
Senator John C. Danforth  
Representative Steve Bartlett  
Representative Robert Garcia

**Honorary Executive Committee**  
Father Robert F. Drinan  
Elie Wiesel  
Hon. Arthur J. Goldberg  
Alexander Lerner  
Yosef Mendeleovich  
Avital Shcharansky  
Eduard Kuznetsov  
Alexander Slepak  
Jerry Goodman  
Glenn Richter  
Rabbi Stanley A. Ringler  
Lynn Singer  
Eric Mattenson  
Neil Kritz

**Supporting Organizations**  
American Jewish Committee  
American Jewish Congress  
American Mizrahi Women  
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith  
B'nai B'rith International  
Hadassah  
Jewish Student Projects  
Jewish War Veterans  
National Council of Jewish Women  
North American Jewish Youth Council  
Pioneer Women  
National Federation of Temple Youth  
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations  
United Synagogue Youth  
University Services Department  
American Zionist Youth Foundation  
Workmen's Circle  
Young Israel Youth  
Zionist Organization of America

### THE STUDENT COALITION FOR SOVIET JEWRY

The Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry (SCSJ) was founded in response and protest to the arrest of Anatoly B. Shcharansky on March 15, 1977. Thirteen undergraduates from Brandeis University bought bus tickets to Washington, D.C. They discussed with their congressmen the Shcharansky case and others like it in order to get Congress actively involved in the issue of Soviet Jewry.

That initial lobbying effort has become an annual event involving students in colleges across the U.S. The SCSJ Ninth Annual Washington Lobby for Soviet Jewry (1985) included approximately 800 student lobbyists from 40 states and 175 congressional districts. Foreign students also played a vital role by meeting with officials at their embassies.

The scope of the Lobby extends beyond Capital Hill. in a special lobbying effort reaching critical government agencies such as the Departments of State and Commerce, as well as international organizations.

International Student Solidarity Day for Soviet Jewry (ISSDSJ) is a program organized at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) for those unable to join the Lobby in Washington. On that day marches, seminars, speakers, rallies and other programs are held at schools all over the world, including the U.S., Israel, England, France and South Africa.

Student activity, however, is not limited to the Lobby. Each campus is urged to become involved in this issue of basic human rights. The Annual Washington Lobby for Soviet Jewry is just one program of the Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry. Other activities include marches, concerts, speakers, films, "adopt-a-refusenik" and letter-writing campaigns. The goal of these activities is to educate and involve students in constructive activism for this increasingly complex issue.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 25, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

**SIGNED**

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to the Student Coalition  
for Soviet Jewry

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed Presidential letter of greetings (TAB A) with noted changes, to the Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry on the occasion of their 10th Annual Washington Lobby, which is scheduled for February 27-28, 1986. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Anne Higgins for your signature.

Judy *na* Mandel and Jock *je* Covey concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Memorandum at TAB I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

TAB I Memorandum to Anne Higgins  
TAB A Draft Letter  
TAB B Incoming Correspondence

24

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

RECEIVED

FEB 24 P 5: 25

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

1472

ACTION OFFICER:

Matlock

DUE:

12NOON Feb 25

Prepare Memo For President

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew

Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier

Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

Prepare Memo McDaniel

to Higgins

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

PHONE\* to action officer at ext.

5112

FYI

FYI

FYI

Burghardt

Levine

Sachs

Cannistraro

Linhard

Sestanovich

Childress

Mahley

Sigur

Cobb

Major

Small

Covey

Mandel

Sommer

Danzansky

Matlock

Soos

deGraffenreid

May

Stark

Djerejian

Menges

Steiner

Dobriansky

Miller

Tahir-Kheli

Donley

North

Teicher

Douglass

Platt

Thompson

Grimes

Pugliaresi

Tillman

Hughes

Raymond

Wigg

Kraemer

Reger

Wright

Laux

Ringdahl

\_\_\_\_\_

Lenczowski

Sable

\_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION  McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Lehman

\_\_\_\_\_

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

1472 25

OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES

REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE - COMMENTS

To: ✓ RODNEY McDANIEL - NSC

MAX GREEN - OPL

**RUSH**

Date Due: FEB. 25

Date of Event: FEB. 27

Subject: STUDENT COALITION FOR SOVIET JEWRY -  
Tenth Annual Washington Lobby

Requested by: Organization

Background:  
No request last year, but a message was sent in 1984 for their 8th meeting (copy attached).

TELEPHONE CLEARANCE TO x2941 WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

Signature: ANNE HIGGINS *Anne Higgins*

Date: 2/24/86

Presidential Messages  
Old Executive Office Building  
Room 18  
(202) 456-2941

Your Recommendation/Comments:

Signature:

Date:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 25, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Pearce/Green Initiative - Appointment Request

Terry Pearce and Tom Green have written to you (Tab I) to press their private initiative for key world leaders to make a public statement renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy by the year 2,000." We have repeatedly advised Pearce and Green that such sweeping declarations are meaningless if not supported by concrete actions, and we see no indications that the Soviets (or others) take the proposal seriously.

In view of Pearce and Green's close personal ties with a friend of the President, however, we forwarded their plan to the Oval Office back in October (Tab II). Secretariat records indicate it is still with the President.

Pearce and Green claim in their letter that Bud McFarlane suggested in December that the President intended to "follow up" on the initiative after the first of the year, and that they should meet with you at that time. Frankly, I question whether Bud would have encouraged them to such a degree.

According to their letter, the pair will be in Washington this week. They want to meet with you to review the proposal.

Attachments:

Tab I Letter from Pearce and Green  
Tab II Pearce/Green Initiative package of October 2, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR FOIA-114/4 #8097  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

2/18 27

N. Terry Pearce    B. Tom Green  
2349 Spanish Trail  
Tiburon, California 94920  
(415) 435-9663  
(415) 381-1598

February 14, 1986

Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter  
National Security Advisor  
National Security Council  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Admiral Poindexter:

Congratulation on your appointment. Our initial conversation with Kay confirmed that strong personal values will continue as a mark of the office.

In December, Bud let us know through Wilma Hall that he had reviewed with you the history and recent activity regarding the initiative to create the first Global Goal. He indicated the President intended to follow up on the initiative after the first of the year, and suggested that to assist you, Ambassador Matlock arrange a meeting for us to hear your views, report the current status, and review our short-term plan to assure its consistency with your thoughts and those of the President. While Jack has been responsive to our inquiries, a date for the meeting has not yet been secured.

Last week, we initiated a contact with Gorbachev to confirm his continued interest in the plan, and to make clear again the distinction between broad Declarations of intent and a specific commitment to a concrete goal. We expect additional feedback on those points next week, prior to the convening of the Party Congress.

We appreciate the complexity of your schedule, and suggest the week of February 24 for a review, as we will be in the east at that time and should have further information.

We are looking forward to seeing you, and will call Florence on Wednesday, February 19, to confirm a time.

Best regards,



B. Tom Green



N. Terry Pearce

cc: Ambassador Jack Matlock ✓

SAC  
S

7849

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM.*

SUBJECT: Pearce/Green Initiative on Renunciation of War

Terry Pearce and Tom Green continue to press their private initiative for key world leaders to make a public statement renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy by the year 2,000." We have, of course, repeatedly advised Pearce and Green that such sweeping declarations mean little if not followed by concrete actions, and we have seen no indication that the Soviets (or others) take the proposal seriously.

In view of Pearce and Green's close personal ties with friends of the President, however, we have agreed to forward their plan to the President. Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President transmitting the text of their proposal (Tab A) and outlining our reservations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Pearce/Green proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRRF06-114/4 #8098  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

29

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Pearce/Green Initiative on Renunciation of War

Issue

Whether to read the attached private peace initiative.

Facts

Terry Pearce and Tom Green, close friends of Al Schwabacher, have been pressing a private peace initiative for key world leaders, including yourself and General Secretary Gorbachev, to make a public statement renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy by the year 2,000."

Discussion

We have advised Pearce and Green that such sweeping public declarations mean little if not followed by concrete actions, and we see no indication that the Soviets (or others) take the proposal seriously. We have told Pearce and Green, however, that we will call it to your attention.

Recommendation

OK                      No

\_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_                      That you review the attached proposal.

Attachment

Tab A                      Proposal from Terry Pearce and Tom Green

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/4#8099  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13

30

TOM GREEN      TERRY PEARCE  
2349 Spanish Trail  
Tiburon, California 94920 U.S.A.  
415/435-9663    415/381-1598

September 12, 1985

Mr. Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

The attached memorandum updates you on the private initiative for the joint televised U.S./Soviet Declaration, acknowledged in your letters of February and April of last year. The initiative was encouraged early on by friends of yours and is now strongly supported. The Soviets have recently been responsive, and want to discuss it before the Summit. It is time to take the next step.

This is a plan to inspire and engage the global population in the same way you have inspired and engaged the American people. First, you have clearly stated our goals, and then pressed for the specific actions to meet those goals.

One leader, one nation will not meet global challenges alone. But one leader will begin. This plan calls for uncommon statesmanship with minimal risk. It will clearly establish our leadership, form a new context for U.S./Soviet relations and point a new direction for the youth of the world, consistent with our values as Americans.

The plan is practical, well-advanced, can be done now, and it will work.

God bless.

With deepest respect,

Tom Green

Terry Pearce

TG:TP:jl

Enclosure



September 12, 1985

Mr. President:

This memorandum summarizes and evaluates the private initiative for a joint Declaration we first discussed in January of 1984. Early encouragement for the work came from Holmes Tuttle, Al Schwabacher and Nancy Cooke de Herrera of Los Angeles, and contact with your staff has been primarily through Jack Matlock and me.

Implementation thus far has been carried out, without publicity, by two American businessmen through private channels, with selected government officials of the U.S., USSR, and the PRC fully informed. Responses have now been received.

The plan's purpose is to create a substantial shift in the international political climate through a dramatic, catalytic action: a joint, concurrent televised forceful statement by you and General Secretary Gorbachev, he from Moscow, you from Washington, declaring your personal commitments and that of your people to the goal of ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2000. Under the plan, you will speak to the people of the United States and then directly to the Soviet people. Gorbachev will speak to his country, then to ours directly. You will both then address the world's population, inviting other national leaders to join in the commitment.

The plan's proponents claim strong support from the PRC will follow immediately, and assume an equally positive response from Prime Minister Gandhi, who is also aware of this plan, though in less detail. The statement will have an impact exceeding Anwar Sadat's 1976 speech to the Knesset and President Nixon's trip to China in 1972, as it will be on a global scale.

This plan is distinct in substantive ways:

1. It sets a goal for the future. It does not require a renunciation of force now, but rather suggests a commitment to create conditions, by a specific time in the future - the year 2000 - when force will not be necessary to settle international differences.
2. It reverses the normal approach of diplomacy. Rather than focusing first on negotiating the specific methods (arms control, regional conflicts, human rights, etc.), it first defines the destination for all such specific actions.
3. The goal is global in scale. It, therefore, requires the cooperation of you and Secretary Gorbachev. This would be the first Declaration of a global goal.

4. It applies worldwide television in a dramatic way never used for statesmanship. Implementation will result in your direct access to the Soviet public and to a world audience.
5. It is a private initiative. It does not bear the burden of a government proposal. The United States and the Soviets could suggest implementation of this non-governmental plan.
6. It has had no publicity.

Progress

The plan was presented privately to Chernenko in February, 1984 and was backed up by a presentation to Dobrynin in April. Private delivery to Chairman Deng was accomplished in February, 1984 and backed up through the PRC Embassy here, in April, 1984. In December, 1984, the sponsors distributed clarifications to all three governments in response to questions and comments, and also added India, again through private businessmen, with Dobrynin, Zhang and me informed.

In February, 1985, and again in May, the plan and its amendments were channeled to Gorbachev, along with an indication approved by our office of our interest in their response.

The PRC responded with support, most recently through Ambassador Han in July of 1985.

The Soviet Embassy last month indicated to the plan's sponsors they would be interested in discussing the plan in preparation for the Summit.

Timing

It is suggested a rare opportunity is present now, and the opportunity is perishable, primarily because:

- The United States can now begin this drive for permanent peace based on justice from a position of strength. The nation currently has the strong leader and stability and power to match its will. This condition will last at a minimum through your term, long enough to test the willingness of the Soviets to move in concrete ways toward the goal.
- The captivation of the Soviet youth with Western culture is strong now, and could change. Your personal appeal to that generation, not yet party members, to work toward the goal, could accelerate the pace of cooperation dramatically.
- Gorbachev is currently trying to rally his people to new domestic production. He may not be willing to make this commitment later, should he be successful in his ever-broadening media campaign. This initiative may have particular appeal to him at this time.

Support

The plan has been exposed to very few Americans, all who are deeply respected and are from a wide spectrum in business, academics and politics from both sides of the aisle. They are realists and it has their support.

Risks

The plan's initiators claim, with some reason, that risks are minimal. No change in position or specific action is required by us or the Soviets, although some of the agreed-to specifics on the agenda for the Summit could be announced as evidence of our intent. Expectations may be raised in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and our political system may be more responsive to such expectation. However, the time remaining in your term is adequate to gauge the Soviet responsiveness and to prevent any action which would jeopardize our security.

Proponent's Recommendation

They recommend we acknowledge to the Soviets our receipt of this initiative, initiate discussion, and schedule the Declaration after the Summit, from Moscow and Washington.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION

Assessment

- No change in policy or specific action is required. In fact, such a commitment will allow any inconsistent actions of the Soviets to be showcased more effectively.
- No abandonment of our preparations to use force if and when necessary in our present circumstances is required.
- The plan has been successfully delivered to the USSR and the PRC and remains without publicity.
- It is supported by a few highly-respected individuals and is well-documented in its theory.
- The risks are minimal.
- The outcome of the plan is based on the assumption that the Soviet leadership wants to reduce tensions, at least temporarily. Such an assumption may not be valid and this Declaration could give rise to a propaganda campaign.
- It is a strong move in a new direction - a demonstration of our commitment to our values.
- Our allies will strongly support the action.
- It might accomplish a breakthrough in the international political climate. The rewards would be immeasurable.

Recommendation

This plan calls for unparalleled statesmanship, and we have an opportunity to take the lead; and it is possible such a commitment could induce positive concrete action by the Soviets. There is enough indication of potential success to pursue the plan further, to determine the plan's technical feasibility and the support of our allies. It strongly reflects our values. It would be a clear signal to the world that something worthwhile has been stated that will last beyond changes in leadership.

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment - Sample text (highlighted portions to be common to Soviet and American statements).

DRAFT

The President of the United States of America's Speech, November 1985

As announced earlier, our regularly scheduled program has been rescheduled to permit a special address by the President, the topic of which has not been announced. No one here knows what the President will be speaking about, or why he has chosen 10:00 in the morning to do so. We have just learned that with him in the Oval Office are his wife Nancy, their children and closest friends, Vice President Bush, former Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon, House Speaker O'Neill, and Senator Dole - obviously a remarkable and historic gathering. The President is about to speak.

Ladies and gentlemen, from the Oval Office in the White House, The President of the United States...

(over, please...)

The President of the United States of America speech, November 1985.

"My fellow Americans, today it is my privilege to report to you on the most significant turning point in human history: the time when the world has chosen to move to end war between nations...to move beyond the use or threat of mass destruction as an acceptable means of resolving our conflicts as nations. I am speaking to you at this time of day and with these other representatives of our nation because right now, simultaneously, General Secretary Gorbachev and representatives of the Soviet government are addressing the people of the Soviet Union.

Our two nations, and in fact all nations, have vast differences. We do not embrace their form of government; they do not embrace ours. Without being blind to the real differences between people, we know the people of all nations have common human interests. We all inhabit the planet, breathe the same air and cherish our children's future.

This growing interdependence, combined with the real and increasing threat of mutual extinction, and the contributions by millions today and throughout history toward the goal of peace, create the conditions in which the time is right, NOW, to commit to an end to armed conflict. No nation, no leader alone, can produce world peace. Many have tried and it has not been achieved. For the first time in human history it is now time for the world to focus on and commit to ending the use of national force.

Accordingly, in concert with General Secretary Gorbachev for the Soviet Union, and using the power heretofore used by our Presidents to declare war, I hereby declare and commit the United States of America to the goal of ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2000. We invite all nations of the world to join in this commitment.

Fellow Americans, peace between nations is possible. There will be risks. We will need strong defense along the way. We will maintain our freedom and security. It will not be easy, and with your support and that of the world's people, in the next 15 years we will develop an effective, non-violent means of resolving our conflicts as nations. We will realize conditions where war and the threat of war are obsolete as instruments of national policy, and then eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

In a few moments, Secretary Gorbachev will be directly addressing you stating his country's commitment to us and to the world, and I will be directly addressing his nation on your behalf. Then this evening I will be speaking to you and a joint session of Congress about specific actions agreed to at the summit and being taken today to produce peace between nations and about the role each of us can play in this shared journey.

It is our tradition in America to give thanks for our past and to look forward with new vision to our future. Three years ago on Thanksgiving, we recalled the words of a famous hymn, 'Oh God of love, Oh King of Peace, make wars throughout the world to cease.' God willing, this dream will now become real. Thank you, good day, and God bless you."

JM-C  
31

0821

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 25, 1986

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: CIA Worldwide Briefing Paper

You asked me to review DCI Casey's "Worldwide Briefing" on the Soviet arms buildup and Soviet involvement in regional conflicts around the globe. It is a worst case view of Soviet capabilities and intentions, in which some of the figures presented and assertions made are open to question. I also believe that as a "net assessment" it gives inadequate weight to U.S. strengths in some of the areas discussed.

The paper does serve to highlight the importance of Soviet behavior in the developing world as a major obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations - a theme we must continue to stress with the public. One question which it does not address is that of the domestic pressures on Gorbachev which could possibly lead to a modification of some of the policies described. Since this has not happened yet, it is well to bear in mind that the pattern described by the DCI is still the reality and modifications in it are no more than possibilities which may well not materialize. Our task is to act so as to maximize the pressure on the Soviets to restrain their aggressive activity, while offering the possibility of reduced tension if they do so.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the DCI acknowledging receipt of the paper.

Sestanovich, deGraffenreid, Kraemer, Ringdahl, Burghardt, Mandel, Major, Raymond, Sigur and North concur. Their specific comments are noted in the paper. *na, mt, CS, ma, PL, m.a, n.a.*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to DCI Casey at Tab I.


Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to DCI Casey
- Tab II McDaniel to Rixse memorandum forwarding memorandum to DCI
- Tab III "Worldwide Briefing"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/4 #8100  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CIA "Worldwide Briefing" (U)

I recently received a copy of your "Worldwide Briefing" on the Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests. I have reviewed it with interest and found many of the facts and trends cited there disturbing. In particular, as you point out, we have yet to see any clear sign that the Soviets are changing their policy of using military force to exploit regional conflicts. (C)

I think the paper provides abundant examples which can be used to keep public attention focused on Soviet behavior in the developing world - a major obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR FDG-114/4#8101  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. RIXSE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: CIA "Worldwide Briefing"

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to DCI Casey commenting on the CIA's "Worldwide Briefing" paper recently forwarded to the NSC.

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to DCI Casey

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997  
By CW NARA, Date 7/2/02

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III

WORLDWIDE BRIEFING

Intelligence must not only report developments around the world as they occur. It must also step-back to discern patterns, linkages, and strategies that may work to endanger the United States and its interests. During 1985, the pattern of challenges and threats to our strategic interests broadened, sharpened and intensified.

The main thrust still comes from the Soviet Union, which is increasingly posing a many dimensioned global challenge to the United States and the Free World. This threat resides:

- (1) in the military might the Russians are piling up on the Eurasian land mass,
- (2) in its ~~steady acquisition~~ <sup>continuance (w.R.)</sup> of geopolitical bridgeheads in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and
- (3) in the development, linking and use of these bridgeheads for growing Soviet naval and air operation and to further enlarge the Soviet geopolitical position.

The Soviets continue the modernization and expansion of their military forces both conventional and strategic. The conventional weapons threat from the Warsaw Pact countries was the first element of this threat to emerge. It has been intensified in recent years and has now progressed to the point where the Pact enjoys ~~huge~~ <sup>significant (w.R.)</sup> military advantages, and is now developing more exotic arms for the future.

DECLASSIFIED / RE / (D) (S) (D)  
NLRR F06-114/4 #8102  
BY CN NARA DATE 1/23/08

DCI says Soviets are 10 feet tall.  
Sounds like a budget defense document.  
And this after 5 R.R. Years? (W.R.)

In the European Central Region, the Pact maintains a three-to-one advantage in tanks and artillery, and more than two-to-one in armored vehicles and aircraft.

While NATO has historically had the qualitative edge in military weapons, this edge is eroding.

The newest Soviet tanks are at least the equal of those in NATO's arsenal. In some aspects, such as firepower and armor protection, they are superior.

The fielding of more self-propelled artillery is boosting the maneuverability, survivability, and tactical nuclear firepower of Soviet ground forces. Soviet bridging equipment to cross the rivers of Europe is so good that our army has reverse engineered to field models of Soviet design.

Soviet aircraft are among the world's finest. Newer fighters and fighter-bombers have improved performance, larger payloads, and better avionics--though the latest US aircraft still maintain leads in sortie rate and avionics.

The Soviets have developed and used in Afghanistan fuel-air explosives which inflict massive destruction without crossing the nuclear threshold.

We know that the Soviets are working to acquire the technology to develop aircraft and cruise missiles employing stealth features, and remotely piloted vehicles for acquiring and attacking armored vehicles. At the same time they are developing their own anti-tank warheads with increased penetration ability, precision guided munitions with enhanced accuracy, conventional explosives with enhanced destructiveness, and a new generation of fighters, some with multiple target look-down/shoot-down capability.

The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest chemical warfare capability--with an agent stockpile nearly three times larger than ours. They continue to replenish existing stocks and maintain an active research and development program. The Soviet armed forces are trained and equipped to operate on battlefields contaminated by nuclear and chemical weapons.

These Soviet developments add up to a dominance in land warfare which requires the West to count on its maritime reinforcement capability to counter and on its strategic forces to deter.

Some of the Soviets' greatest strides have been in submarine production. In the last three years, they have introduced three new types of nuclear attack submarines which are quieter, faster and able to dive deeper. They have also launched a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, and in their naval deployment and naval exercises have brought US-Soviet competition into Atlantic and Pacific waters where until now we have enjoyed a near monopoly.

The second element of Soviet military power to emerge is its strategic force and over the last 10 years it has at least caught up and probably surpassed ours. By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems. The number of deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand over the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s.

The Soviets are protecting their missile force by making much of it mobile. They have already deployed their first new mobile ICBM and will soon begin deploying a second.

While all may be true and good intelligence targets for collection - there is a "net assessment" element that weaves in the text which almost characterizes us as profoundly inferior. (W.R.)

Follow-on missile programs--with improved accuracy, greater throw weight potential and probably more warheads--will begin flight-testing in the 1986-90 time period.

Major improvements are also under way in Soviet ballistic missile submarines and bomber forces.

We expect the Soviets to complete improvements to their operational ABM defenses at Moscow by 1987. This provides them with all the components necessary for a much larger, widespread ABM defense, including transportable engagement radars, above-ground launchers, and a new high-acceleration short-range interceptor.

The distinction between missions for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and ABMs is becoming increasingly blurred as the result of technology improvements to SAMs such as the SA-X-12. That system's capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles gives it the potential to function in a missile defense role.

The Soviets have long been working on technologies basic to our own Strategic Defense Initiative. Their work on directed-energy and kinetic-energy weapons goes back many years with more than 10,000 engineers involved.

We estimate that between 1980 and 1983, the cost of the Soviet space program nearly doubled. The costs of their military space activities alone are about the same as those for their strategic offensive forces. Soviet space systems are likely to be an integral part of any strategic missile defense system the Soviets might develop and deploy.

The five-year plan which Gorbachev will soon propose to the Party Congress will call for an 80 percent increase in the investment in machine building.



There will also be ambitious goals for high tech support industries. This will include the microelectronics and computers essential for developing the more complex weapons systems the Soviets plan for the next decade. We believe the current high level of military spending will continue to grow at the rate that has prevailed for the past ten years.

Even at a time of economic difficulty and a reordering of domestic priorities, Soviet defense programs have been protected. For example, during the next five year plan we expect ICBM production to increase substantially over the 1981-85 plan, submarine production to be up about 20-25 percent, and tank production to jump well over 50 percent. There will be some 4,000 fighters and helicopters and a few hundred new strategic bombers produced during this period. While the number of aircraft are somewhat lower than in the preceding five-year period, the new aircraft will be substantially more technically advanced and capable. Thus, the prospect is for continuation of the steady 20-year expansion and modernization of Soviet strategic and conventional forces. The cumulative effect of this buildup is so great that the United States has only begun to catch up.

Because of accumulated earlier investment and defense industrial capacity, the number of weapons systems that they will be able to buy over the next five years will be substantially greater than what they acquired the past five years.

?  
(w.r.)

Despite the much increased US spending for arms of the past five years, only recently has the US begun to catch up with Soviet weapons acquisition; until then, we simply were not falling behind as fast as we had been.

The important thing is not how much the Soviets spend on arms, but the quantity and quality of arms they get for their money. When you compare US and Soviet procurement of major weapons systems, from 1974-1984, the Soviet advantage in:

ICBMs and SLBMs	is roughly about	3 times
IRBMs and MRBMs	is roughly about	6 times
Surface-to-Air missiles	is roughly about	9 times
? (w.r.) Long and Intermediate Range Bombers	is more than	50 times
Fighters	is roughly about	twice
Helicopters	is more than	twice
Submarines	is more than	twice
Tanks	is more than	3 times
Artillery pieces	is more than	10 times

The steady growth of Soviet weapons procurement from the high level of the last decade will give the Soviets a massive cumulative inventory of weapons, and they will continue to substantially modernize their forces in the next five years and buy larger numbers of weapons.

This huge military force and its continued growth may never be used against the United States or NATO--although the Soviets clearly are prepared to use it if their vital interests are threatened. The mere existence of this force not only validates the Soviet Union as a superpower, but has an intimidating effect on countries around the world helping the Soviets expand their presence, influence, and power. It represents the backdrop for an aggressive challenge being played out worldwide, but most particularly on the ground in the Third World and in the vicinity of critical sea lanes.

The Soviet Union has acquired bridgeheads in Cuba, Cambodia, South Yemen and Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Gorbachev, since coming to power, has moved sharply to strengthen the Soviet hold on these bridgeheads. In the last six months alone, he has extended a \$600 million credit to Nicaragua, \$1 billion in new economic assistance to Vietnam, and completed the supply of \$1.5 billion in military equipment to Angola. Soviet <sup>advisors (P.R.)</sup> and Cuban troops have become more active in Angola, Nicaragua, and South Yemen, and Soviet forces have been reinforced and pursued more aggressive tactics in Afghanistan. Each of these countries has become an outpost for Soviet intelligence collection, propaganda and subversion in its respective region. Several have undertaken on their own to destabilize neighboring regimes. Virtually all are strategically located either near important strategic choke points or in areas of almost certain regional conflict.

As the map indicates, the USSR now has Marxist-Leninist allies or clients spread around the globe. It has naval and air basing rights close to sea lane choke points vital to the Free World. These strategic positions which the Soviets have acquired around the world are being linked, moreover, in a growing logistic and infrastructure network.

Let me illustrate by describing the Soviet complex in the Caribbean and its links. The Soviets have created in Cuba the strongest military force in the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of our own. Even more worrisome than this military bastion on our doorstep are the growing logistic networks that the Soviets have sponsored in both Cuba and Nicaragua. In Cuba at least three, and probably more, airfields are capable of hosting Soviet TU-95 Bear heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear air-to-surface missiles....

missiles. TU-95 Bear Reconnaissance and ASW aircraft routinely fly from the Kola Peninsula in the Soviet Arctic to Cuban airfields. In Nicaragua, aircraft revetments to handle high performance fighters have been completed at Sandino airfield in Managua. The runways at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on the Atlantic coast and Montlimar on the Pacific have been extended to host MIG fighters.

Cuban construction crews are completing the new airfield at Punte Huete outside Managua, which with a 10,000 foot runway will be the largest military airbase in Central America capable of accommodating Soviet jet fighters, heavy transport aircraft, and TU-95 bombers.

There will be a short, direct sea connection between the Cuban base and its extension in Nicaragua this year when the Bulgarians complete a major port facility at El Bluff on the Caribbean coast near Bluefields.

This, in conjunction with the Pacific ports of Corinto and San Juan del Sur, where the Soviets intend to install a dry dock, will provide the Soviets with secure port facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in close proximity to the Panama Canal. In addition, a Soviet team reportedly has surveyed the construction of a second canal between the Atlantic and Pacific across the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua.

We see similar links and components of this network snaking around the globe. In the South Atlantic, Soviet naval and naval air forces operate astride Western shipping lanes. These forces depend on a growing infrastructure manned and protected by nearly 2,000 Soviet Bloc advisors, 35,000 Cuban military, and a local Angolan government army of 100,000. You will note from the map that this node is linked to the Cuban segment of the network.

The Mediterranean segment of this Soviet global network is anchored at Libya and Syria. About 6,000 Soviet Bloc advisors support facilities in those countries, which include air, naval and air defense facilities.

Similarly, this network threatens Western sea lanes in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean from bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Over 7,000 Soviet and Cuban military personnel and about a quarter million Ethiopian military support this segment, as well as Soviet Bloc personnel in South Yemen and Mozambique.

Finally, Soviet naval and air forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang in Indochina not only command the economic lifelines of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, but linked with Soviet naval and air bases in Siberia are a threat to US bases in the Philippines, so critical to our position in the Pacific Ocean. Thousands of Soviet military personnel man the infrastructure of this second largest Soviet military complex outside the Warsaw Pact.

Beyond the consolidation and linking of positions in these Soviet outposts, there is the spread of Soviet subversion--active measures, support to insurgent forces, efforts to destabilize countries friendly to the West and exploitation of economic hardship and political instability for strategic advantage. Both their outposts and this subversion is supported by a flood of weapons pouring out of the great arms depot at Nikolaev on the Black Sea to regimes and groups all over the world.

To build the foundation and further project this far-flung program, Moscow maintains an extensive military advisory presence in 29 Third World countries. This presence ranges from 5 military specialists in Benin to about 6,000 in Vietnam.

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There are something like 3,000 in Syria, about 2,000 in Ethiopia, Libya and Afghanistan, and 1,200 in Angola and South Yemen, and 800 in Mozambique. In some of these countries--Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan--Soviet officers exercise command and control and in others they have great leverage and influence.

The Soviets and their surrogates provide support to Communist or radical insurgents in some ten countries. They help some seven Socialist-oriented client regimes suppress insurrections of their own. All this involves 335,000 combat troops, over 65,000 advisors, extensive political and military training, a heavy flow of weapons, and various levels of political support. The 335,000 combat troops occupying other countries include 120,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, over 130,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia and 45,000 in Laos, and over 40,000 Cubans in Africa.

The principal Soviet targets in supporting insurgencies are:

- El Salvador and Guatemala, supported from Cuba and Nicaragua;
- Chile, in which Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union and several East European countries have been training and providing weapons for violent opposition and funding of the Communist party;
- Colombia, where three insurgent groups receive support from some combination of Moscow, Cuba and Nicaragua;
- Namibia, where weapons and military training for the insurgents of the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization comes from the Soviet Union, Libya and Cuba; and
- Sudan, Somalia, Chad, and Zaire, where Libya, Ethiopia and Cuba help insurgents.
- Yemen and Oman from time to time where the Soviets and Cubans support rebels.

some unusual choices (W.R.)  
Mozambique? Lebanon? (W.R.)

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(w.r.)? During the decade of the 70s, people all over the world were flocking to join Communist insurgencies. This has been reversed and today some half million people around the world are fighting in resistance movements against Communist regimes. In Afghanistan, there is virtually a nation in arms fighting against 120,000 Soviet troops; in Angola, Savimbi has some 60,000 fighters in all parts of Angola. In Ethiopia, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels fight the Marxist Mengistu government and the largest army in Africa with its Cuban and Soviet advisors. In Indochina, 50,000 insurgents fight 170,000 Vietnamese soldiers. In Nicaragua, 20,000 resistance fighters are in a standoff with 120,000 Sandinista troops and militia.

In this contest, the Soviets have proclaimed the Brezhnev doctrine which says once Communist always Communist. There is every indication that Gorbachev has adopted and is applying that doctrine vigorously with renewed and increased weapons and Soviet and Cuban involvement against the growing effectiveness of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, Savimbi in Angola, and the contras in Nicaragua. We are witnessing a sudden and forceful application of this doctrine in South Yemen right now. The Soviets succeeded in establishing a Marxist regime and a Russian naval and communications center in that country in the 1970s. Recently, Ali Nasser, the President of that country, began to draw away a little from the Soviets and seek some help elsewhere. Two weeks ago, the more pro-Soviet elements in his government and President Ali Nasser had a shootout and a civil war broke out between military and tribal elements loyal to the President and those loyal to the more pro-Soviet elements. The Vice President was out of the country and he flew to Moscow. The Soviets sat and watched for a few days evacuating Soviet citizens from the country.

Neighboring countries, North Yemen and Ethiopia, moved to help the South Yemen government. After a few days, it appeared that the rebels were gaining the upper hand, the South Yemen Politburo met and declared the Vice President in Moscow the head of a new government, Moscow warned North Yemen and Ethiopia not to help the government forces and Soviet fliers in MIG-21s given to South Yemen joined in pounding beleaguered government forces and Soviet transport planes started bringing in weapons for rebel forces.

Now I'd like to turn briefly to areas of great instability where US and Western political and strategic interests are at risk and which offer the potential of enormous gain to the Soviets. The Philippines, Sudan and elsewhere in southern and Central Africa are prime examples.

These soft spots may have largely indigenous causes, but they offer tempting opportunities to the apparatus I have been describing. The most critical situation is that of the Philippines where a Communist-led insurgency, the NPA, controls an increasing proportion of the country's villages and rural areas. It has shown an ability to conduct urban violence in the second and third cities, Davao and Cebu, and substantial preparation and potential for bringing violence into Manila itself. Whatever the outcome of the February election we are likely to face rising challenges to US interests in the Philippines. The Soviets have been very careful to date, dealing with Philippine establishment figures there, not openly associating itself with the NPA--but definitely in touch covertly with various revolutionary groups. If the NPA's fortunes improve, as seems likely, we can expect the Soviet role to grow. Meanwhile, political and insurgent pressures on US basing facilities are likely to grow and the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay is only 120 minutes away from our bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay.

not a given (W.R.)



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Another soft spot is Sudan. Its severe political and economic disarray is compounded by Libya's strenuous efforts to gain predominant influence there. At the moment, insurgents of the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) are supported primarily by Ethiopia. Recent reporting suggests that the Soviets may be increasing their contact with the SPLA and providing some arms assistance through the Ethiopians. We believe that East Germans and Cubans have been training Sudanese insurgents inside Ethiopia. Resulting pressures have led the Sudanese to withdraw <sup>temporarily (P.R.)</sup> from joint military exercises with us, ~~revoke access rights for US forces,~~ <sup>(P.R.)</sup> and question the future status of prepositioned US military equipment. Additionally, the Libyans have been given rights of air passage over Sudan enabling the Soviets to hook up more easily their presence in Libya and Ethiopia. US interests will be further jeopardized if radical elements pull off a successful coup in Khartoum, or if the general situation becomes one of near anarchy, or if a weak elected government should draw closer to Libya. Stronger Libyan and Soviet influence and presence in Sudan would face Egypt with a hostile force on the west and the south--and pro-Soviet elements in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen would command the southern approaches to the Suez Canal.

This combination of subversive aggression and soft spots around the world has been gravely compounded by the emergence of what we call the radical entente of Syria, Libya and Iran, all of which share the common objective of expelling the United States from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. These three states all have radically diverging interests, personalities, and style, but they share critical characteristics. They oppose nearly all aspects of US policy in the region. They want to weaken or destroy moderate Arab leadership. They are in active opposition to the US peace process. And they practice and sponsor terrorism to attain political goals.

The activities of these states are not necessarily or always directed by the USSR, but their policies serve Soviet interests by damaging both Western interests and moderate forces. The Soviets provide major military support to two of the three--Syria and Libya.

Syria is the most effective of the three. While its goals are more limited than the other two, its leadership is tactically brilliant and generally successful--qualities which hardly describe Iran or Libya.

Iran's attentions are largely consumed by the Gulf war and by Shia politics in the Gulf. But it does have broader long-term interests in propagating Shia fundamentalism in the world. Its role in Lebanon was a critical factor in stimulating the US exodus from that country in the face of unremitting Shia attack.

In Libya, Qadhafi's interests and ambitions parallel those of the USSR in so many respects that the disruptive effects are not measurably different from what they would be, with Qadhafi a total surrogate of Moscow's. No other state outside the Soviet Bloc has a geographic range of subversive activity to match that of Libya. Qadhafi's ambitions are mirrored in subversive meddling which now ranges from Chile to the Caribbean, to South Africa, across the Middle East to East Asia, Indonesia, and New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific.

Libya has significant military forces to bring to bear and its threat to its immediate neighbors of Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia is very real. Libya is the greatest stockpiler of weapons in the world with billions of dollars worth, including hundreds of T-72 tanks (far more, for example, than Poland has), and hundreds of sophisticated Soviet jets.

how many planes? (W.R.)

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Qadhafi's explicit ambitions with respect to Malta and the air and air defense weapons the Soviets have provided him to make Libya a threat to the Mediterranean sea lane.

I will not dwell in detail on international terrorism this afternoon, but I do wish to stress the relationship of the USSR and its associates to terrorism.

The USSR and its Eastern European allies support a host of Near East and other Third World terrorist groups. The Eastern European hand is the more pronounced, the Soviet hand more disguised. Their combined support takes many forms: training, arming, the providing of communications and documentation, safehaven, and so on. Many of the most notorious terrorist leaders--including Carlos and Abu Nidal--have for years circulated fairly freely in Eastern Europe.

These problems we have highlighted this morning by no means exhaust the threats that will increasingly confront the US. I can assure you that the Intelligence Community is deeply involved on a priority basis with alerting policymakers to hazards and opportunities in numerous other categories. These include, for example, developments concerning Soviet domestic problems, the Iran-Iraq war, China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, LDC debtors, nuclear proliferation, CW proliferation, BW proliferation, technology transfer, drug trafficking, oil futures, ecological problems, resource problems, and so on.

All these questions will continue to receive our close attention. But in planning US defenses and military assistance, we believe, now and in the future, the broad, linked threats that I have stressed today demand and deserve the closest attention. The backdrop of growing Soviet military power, the Soviet network of assets and facilities abroad, and Soviet promotion of disorder in the Third World are together creating an increasingly interrelated threat of growing proportions. Growing Soviet global reach, Soviet basing facilities, developing military infrastructures, Soviet military air lanes, and growing Soviet or Soviet client proximity to target countries and to sea lane choke points are all combining to confront the United States with rising challenges for the future.

We have a tendency too often to focus on specific events as they come along, and to be skeptical about drawing linkages and relationships between events. In this view of the world in 1986 and the threats awaiting us in the future, I have tried to lay out for you how US intelligence sees the challenges which our country will have to face in the years ahead. It is only through understanding these emerging patterns and relationships that the United States can shape effective strategies for meeting these challenges.

Thank you for your attention. I have with me Larry Gershwin, NIO for Strategic Programs; Doug MacEachin, Director of Soviet Affairs; George Montgomery, Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces; and Bob Vickers, NIO for Latin America. My colleagues and I will be pleased to entertain any comments or questions you may have.

Is this to be given in a forum where it will get a lot of attention?  
 If so, some of the points could probably stand a closer look.  
 Otherwise, looks fine. (SRS)