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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/14/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON FEBURARY 1986 (2/6)

FOIA

F06-114/4

Box Number 14

YARHI-MILO

1409

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8085	LETTER	DRAFT REPLY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	6	ND	B1
8086	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE HARTMAN CABLE <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	1	ND	B1
8087	CABLE	051543Z FEB 1986 <i>R 3/9/2011 F2006-114/4</i>	5	2/5/1986	B1

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Secret Sensitive

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ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 130006Z

RELEASER LVS

FROM/LOCATION

1. The White House Situation Room

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____
2. Paul Thompson for USADM. Poindexter

3. Paul Thompson / SANTA BARBARA
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
120036Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, REMARKS:

Eyes Only - Deliver in Sealed Envelope

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 27, 1997

By LVS

NARA, Date 7/2/02

Secret Sensitive

CLASSIFICATION

EYES ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Adm. Poinder *J*

John:

I have revised p1, para 2,
p3, para 5 (sentence "Asid from...")
in line with the
Secretary's suggestions.

I have started a translation
on a contingency basis. I can
make any changes necessary myself
on Saturday & run off a copy of
the translation. (I will have it
on disk.)

I will be back from Palo
Alto mid-afternoon Saturday.
Leave message on prof's or with
Sit Room if I need to take care
of anything over the weekend.

Jack

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *7/2/02*

DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to keep our private communications separate. Although the issues overlap, I would hope that our informal exchange can be used to clarify our attitudes on some of the fundamental questions.

I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for action to bring about a steady and -- I would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would hope that we can identify others as ripe for immediate progress. For example, some of the obstacles to an agreement on intermediate-range missiles seem to be falling away. I would also hope that rapid progress can be made toward agreement on a verification regime that will permit a global ban on chemical weapons.

Regarding arms reduction in general, I agree with you that we must make decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with regard to the capabilities on both sides. Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence that national security could be preserved without them.

Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a disarming first-strike capability could under some conditions be destabilizing. That is why we are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can be used to deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first strike strategy possible.

I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effective against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They would be ill-suited for mass destruction on earth, and if one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques. Their destructiveness can

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never approach that of the nuclear weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real problem.

Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed energy.

I do not point this out in reproach or suggest that these activities are in violation of agreements. But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible, then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.

We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have an advantage in this area.

Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18 definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capability for such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time is not substantially different from that of the more capable -- and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no nuclear capability of their own. Our forces currently have a very limited capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are improving this capability only because we cannot accept a

situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in counterforce weaponry. Even if we are required to complete all planned deployments in the absence of an accord which limits them, they will not match the number of Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.

If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange for them to meet and discuss their concerns. A frank discussion of their respective assessments and the reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings which are not based on fact.

In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50% reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Let me stress once again that we remain willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the United States and its Allies. Our proposals in November included significant movement on our part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your concerns. I hope that your negotiators will be empowered to respond to these proposals during the current round and to engage us in identifying which strategic systems are to be included in the 50% reduction.

So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be practical ways to prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have in mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies, neither of which is a part of United States strategy or planning. I honestly believe that we can find a solution to this problem if we approach it in practical fashion rather than debating generalities.

I would like nothing more than to find, by our next meeting, an approach acceptable to both of us to solve this problem. But I believe that will require two things: accelerating negotiations to reach agreement on the way to reduce offensive weapons by 50%, and discussion of concrete ways to insure that any future development of defensive systems cannot be used as a cover for a first-strike strategy or for basing weapons of mass destruction in space. Aside from these broader issues, I believe that your recent proposal brings settlement of the problem of intermediate-range missiles closer and that there are improved prospects for agreeing on effective verification measures in several areas.

Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective analyses of the causes are incompatible. There seems little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we are bound

to disagree. Instead, I would suggest that we simply look at the current situation in pragmatic terms. Such a look would show two very important facts: that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet Union. So why is it continued?

Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who can tell the people of another country they should not fight for their motherland, for their independence and their national dignity?

I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just political settlement. Of course, we support the U.N. process and hope that it will take a practical and realistic turn. However, 1985 was marked by an intensification of conflict. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.

As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We have no desire or intent to exploit a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. Such a result would have an immediate positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the way to progress in many other areas.

The problem of superpower military involvement in local disputes is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of your sharply increased military support of a local dictator who has declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally unbalanced local despot?

You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes, and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms what should be of local concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted

without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United States.

But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I made last October. Let us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations to find political solutions, while our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war materiel into the area of conflict.

Mr. General Secretary, there remain many points on which we still disagree, and we will probably never reach agreement on some of them. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the critical problems can be solved if we approach them in the proper manner. I have the feeling that we gradually are finding some additional points on which we can agree, and would hope that, by concentrating on practical solutions, we can give greater momentum to this process.

But we do need to speed up the negotiation process if this is to occur. Therefore, I hope you will instruct your delegations in Geneva, as I have instructed ours, to roll up their sleeves and get seriously to work.

When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your letter of January 14, I made a statement welcoming them. Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it is I will be responding specifically to the points you made in it.

Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.

Sincerely,

EYES ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Adm. Poinder

John:

I have revised p1, para 2,
p3, para 5 (sentence "Asid from...")
in accordance with the
Secretary's suggestions.

I have started a translation
on a contingency basis. I can
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on Saturday & run off a copy of
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I will be back from Palo
Alto mid-afternoon Saturday.
Leave message on prof's or with
Sit Room if I need to take care
of anything over the weekend.

Jack

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CVJ NARA, Date 7/2/02

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DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to keep our private communications separate. Some of the issues are of course the same, but I would hope that in this informal fashion we can continue our candid exchange on some of the fundamental issues facing us.

I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for discussion over the next few years, directed at a steady and -- I would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would like to suggest now a broad three-part agenda which I believe would serve that purpose. That is, first, to find ways to reduce and eventually eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes; second, to reach mutually acceptable agreements to reduce the level of arms, particularly those of mass destruction; and third, to take other steps which bolster confidence in dealing with each other and reduce distrust.

These are of course broad categories and they are also interrelated, for progress in one area makes it easier in the others. I also believe that history has shown that improvements in one area cannot long withstand an increase of tensions in the others. How many times in the past has an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations been reversed by actions which one or the other side considered fundamentally inconsistent with an improvement in relations? Unfortunately, this has occurred every time in the past when relations seemed to be on the road to improvement. The lesson, I believe, is clear: if we are to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past which doomed every trend toward improvement, we must take a broader view of the relationship than any single issue, however important it may be.

Without expecting to solve all issues at once, we must seek to solve problems in each of these three areas concurrently. It was with this in mind that I made my earlier suggestion regarding goals we might set before our next meeting. Finding a practical way to reduce our nuclear arsenals is certainly one of these key issues -- though by no means the only one. I am encouraged that we can agree that our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons, and that we also agree that, as a first step, these arsenals should be cut by half. I also agree that we must make decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with regard to the capabilities on both sides.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/H#8085

BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. (By such reasoning, one could "prove" that all countries involved in World War II intended to use poison gas, because they issued gas masks to their troops.) Though it may be true that, in a world totally free of nuclear weapons, elaborate defenses against nuclear attack would not be necessary, we have not yet created such a world and we both recognize the difficult goal we have set. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence that national security could be preserved without them. They could also provide insurance that no one could gain from reintroducing nuclear weapons once they were abolished.

Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a disarming first-strike capability could under some conditions be destabilizing. However, without defenses, it could be even more difficult to preserve stability. That is why we are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can be used to deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first strike strategy possible.

I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. If that is the case, you must know something of weapon types and physical phenomena unknown to us. I have asked previously for concrete examples, and would still appreciate at least some concrete hint as to what you have in mind. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effective against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They would be ill-suited for mass destruction on earth, and if one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques. Their destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real problem.

Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital

anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed energy. The Soviet Union also has deployed extensive defenses which complement its ABM capability.

I do not point this out in reproach. But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible, then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.

We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have an advantage in this area.

Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18 definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capability for such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time is not substantially different from that of the more capable -- and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no nuclear capability of their own. Our forces currently have a very limited capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are improving this capability only because we cannot accept a situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in counterforce weaponry. Even if we unfortunately are required to complete all these planned deployments in the absence of a strategic arms accord which limits them, they will not match Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.

If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange for them to meet and discuss their respective concerns. They don't have to exchange blueprints or divulge

technical secrets, but a frank discussion of their respective assessments and the reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings which are not based on fact.

In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50% reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. We remain willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the United States and its Allies. Our proposals in November included significant movement on our part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your concerns. I hope that your negotiators will be empowered to discuss them thoroughly during the current round.

So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be practical ways to prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have in mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies, neither of which is a part of United States strategy or planning. In addition, we remain committed to discuss the relationship of offensive and defensive systems, and practical ways to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons and move to a safer world.

Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective analyses of the causes are totally incompatible. There seems little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we are bound to disagree. The important question is where we go from here: how we act to reduce the level of violence in the world, particularly in those places where our own forces are involved. This is not a trivial issue. It is also not unrelated to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, for fears that military force might be used by other countries for aggressive purposes is a root cause of the buildup of nuclear arsenals.

So let us end a fruitless debate regarding the causes of the ongoing conflicts in the world and simply look at the current situation. Such a look would show two very important facts, and they are that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet Union. So why is it continued?

Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who can tell the people of another country they should not fight for

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their motherland, for their independence and their national dignity?

Would the Russian people accept a foreign army in its midst? If confronted with such a situation they would fight with all they had -- and take help from any quarter -- as they proved so valiantly in World War II. The whole world knows that. So it is all the more difficult for those of us outside of the Soviet Union to understand why the Soviet political leadership does not seem to grasp the basic facts of that tragic situation.

I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just political settlement and a practical "working formula." But I have not seen either yet. Unfortunately, 1985 was marked by an intensification of conflict, with higher casualties on both sides. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.

As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We have no desire or intent to exploit the situation in Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. The modalities used are of much less importance, so long as they lead to this result. Such a result would have an immediate positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the way to progress in many other areas.

The problem of halting superpower military involvement in local disputes, and thus a source of serious tension between our countries, is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of your sharply increased military support of a local dictator who has declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally unbalanced local despot? If that turns out to be the case, then I honestly cannot be sanguine about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations.

You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes, and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms what should be of local concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United States. It is unlikely that either of us will ever agree with the other on this point.

But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I made last October, and I consider it both fair and workable. Let us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations to find political solutions, while our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war materiel into the area of conflict.

Much of this letter deals with disagreements between us, because it is important to understand them if we are to overcome them. But I would not wish to leave the impression that I feel these are either insoluble or that there has been no progress in improving relations between our countries. On the contrary, I am convinced that the central problems can be solved if we approach them in the proper manner. And I am pleased that we gradually are finding some additional points on which we can agree.

But we do need to speed up the negotiation process and to make it more concrete and practical. Therefore, I would hope that your negotiators in Geneva will soon be in a position to respond in specific fashion to our November proposals, and that the "working formula" to solve the conflict in Afghanistan is in fact workable.

When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your letter of January 14, I made an announcement welcoming them. Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it is I will be responding to the points you made in it.

Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.

Sincerely,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0813

15
FILE

~~MATLOCK~~

February 4, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM:

RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Appointment Request with the President for
Vladimir Horowitz

We have no objection with the request for the President to meet with Vladimir Horowitz. However, we suggest that remarks for the meeting should be cleared by the NSC.

Attachment:

TAB A Speakes-Ryan Memo

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1986

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., Director of
Presidential Appointments of Scheduling

FROM: Larry Speakes

REQUEST: For the President to meet with Vladimir
Horowitz.

PURPOSE: An opportunity for the President to bid
farewell to Mr. Horowitz as he returns
to Russia for a forthcoming concert
tour.

BACKGROUND: Mr. Horowitz, 81, left Russia in 1925
and had stated that he would never
return to Russia -- that America is my
home. Considered by many to be the
world's preeminent pianist, he is
scheduled to play his first concert on
April 20 at the Bolshoi Theater. His
second concert will be at Leningrad's
Shostakovich Hall. The concerts are a
result of the renewed cultural exchanges
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
arranged at the meeting in Geneva.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: As soon as possible

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vladimir Horowitz

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Mr. Horowitz enters the Oval Office for
discussion with the President. At
conclusion of the visit, the President
presents him an appropriate memento.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be prepared by Speechwriters

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer

PROPOSED "PHOTO": To be determined

RECOMMENDED BY: Larry Speakes

0813
18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

January 29, 1986

TO: WILLIAM MARTIN
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Meeting with Vladimir Horowitz

DATE: As soon as possible

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ___ Regret ___ Surrogate ___ Message ___ Other ___
Priority ___
Routine ___

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE: February 6, 1986

TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 31, 1986

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Appointment Request with the President for
Vladimir Horowitz

I have no objections with the request for the President to meet with Vladimir Horowitz. I believe it is a good idea and will give the President the opportunity to re-emphasize his support to the recently renewed cultural exchanges between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, I would suggest that remarks for the meeting should be cleared by the NSC.

SM
Sestanovich, Mandel and Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the request at TAB I.

Approve *JRF*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

TAB I Martin-Ryan Memorandum

TAB A Speakes-Ryan Memorandum

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

February 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Upcoming Soviet UN Mission
Reduction

State has sent over suggested talking points for the press in regard to our planned action in reducing the staff at the Soviet UN Missions. It would be used on an "if asked" basis, after the action has been taken.

Notification to the Soviets is now planned for February 14.

I have no problem with the talking points, but have made a couple of minor suggestions (marked in the text). So far as U.S.-Soviet relations are concerned, the less said publicly the better, although it is important to make clear to the public and interested Congressional figures what we are doing and why.

Small, de Graffenreid and Major concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the contingency press guidance as amended and sign the memorandum at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

TAB I McDaniel-Platt Memorandum

TAB A Contingency Statement on Soviet UN Missions Press
Guidance

TAB II - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of February 4, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
by CWS NARA, Date 7/2/02

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0958

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Upcoming Soviet UN Mission
Reduction

We have no problems with the talking points, but have made a couple of minor suggestions (marked in the text). So far as U.S.-Soviet relations are concerned, the less said publicly the better, although it is important to make clear to the public and interested Congressional figures what we are doing and why.

Rodney M. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

TAB A Contingency Statement on Soviet UN Missions Press
Guidance

0958 *JU-C*
22

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

February 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Upcoming Soviet UN Mission Reduction

State has sent over suggested talking points for the press in regard to our planned action in reducing the staff at the Soviet UN Missions. It would be used on an "if asked" basis, after the action has been taken.

Notification to the Soviets is now planned for February 14.

I have no problem with the talking points, but have made a couple of minor suggestions (marked in the text). So far as U.S.-Soviet relations are concerned, the less said publicly the better, although it is important to make clear to the public and interested Congressional figures what we are doing and why.

JS *KB* *D*
Small, de Graffenreid and Major concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the contingency press guidance as amended.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I - Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of February 4, 1986



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Press Guidance for Upcoming Soviet UN Mission
Reduction

We plan soon to notify the Soviets and the UN of our decision to require a reduction in the overall size of the Soviet UN Missions by approximately 100 personnel. The date of the announcement is tentatively set for February 14. This date may still be subject to further change depending on a number of issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. A ceiling of 170 permanently assigned personnel for the Soviet UN Missions will be imposed over a two-year period, with subceilings of 10 each for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian UN Missions.

We are forwarding to you a copy of the press guidance and the contingency statement. This information continues to be sensitive, and should not be released until the news becomes public. The statement will not be issued when we inform the Soviets, but will be released only in response to press inquiries.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

AttachmentsContingency Statement on Soviet UN Missions
Press Guidance~~SECRET~~

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By Q/S NARA, Date 7/2/02

REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

On February 14, the United States Government officially informed the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and the United Nations Secretary General that the Soviet UN Missions (Soviet, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian) must be reduced in four stages over a two-year period from the current level of 275 to a staffing level of 170 permanently assigned personnel by April 1, 1988. Under this overall ceiling, there is a subceiling of ten each for the Byelorussian and Ukrainian UN Missions.

The United States Government has long been concerned about the unreasonably large size of the Soviet UN Missions. The current size of the Soviet UN Missions is not warranted by the staffing needs for official UN business. Moreover, it poses a threat to U.S. national security. Over the years, the United States Government has made clear to the Soviet authorities its concern that Soviet UN Missions personnel have engaged in inappropriate activities. The Soviet UN Missions, unfortunately, have continued to engage in activities unrelated to UN business, including espionage.

Our action is a reasonable, prudent step. We have structured the reductions in a way intended to minimize dislocations for the Soviet UN Missions. Even after the reductions are achieved, the Soviet representation to the UN will continue to be larger than that of any other country.

We have imposed this ceiling after careful consideration. It is consistent with our obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement and under international law. We do not believe this move need have a negative impact on our bilateral relations. We look forward to continuing the efforts begun by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Geneva meeting to build a more constructive foundation for U.S.-Soviet relations.

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IF NEWS LEAKS BEFORE INFORMING SOVIETS:

Q. Is it true that the U.S. is planning to require a reduction in the size of the Soviet UN Missions?

A. -- WE HAVE NO COMMENT.

Q. Why is the US taking this step now, and won't this action impair bilateral realtions with the USSR? Won't this step complicate prospects for a Reagan-Gorbachev summit?

A. -- WE SEE NO REASON WHY THIS STEP SHOULD IMPAIR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS IS NOT CONNECTED TO US-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD ON THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO HOLD A SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

Q. How did you inform the Soviets, and what was their reaction?

A. -- WE INFORMED THE SOVIETS AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME THAT WE INFORMED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. WE DO NOT WISH TO CHARACTERIZE CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS.

Q. How was the size of the reduction determined, and how will it be achieved? What if the Soviets don't cooperate?

A. -- THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS ARE LARGER THAN THE NEXT TWO LARGEST MISSIONS COMBINED [US - APPROX. 126, AND PRC APPROX. 116]. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS HAVE DOUBLED IN SIZE OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES.

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THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS DO NOT JUSTIFY 275 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MISSION MEMBERS TO CONDUCT OFFICIAL UN BUSINESS. WE BELIEVE THAT 170 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL [WITH SUBCEILINGS OF TEN EACH FOR THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MISSIONS] IS AMPLE FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. EVEN AFTER THIS REDUCTION, THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS WILL BE LARGER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

REDUCTIONS FROM THE PRESENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 275 TO 170 PERSONNEL WILL BE ACHIEVED IN FOUR STAGES BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1986 AND APRIL 1, 1988. WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIETS IDENTIFY AT EACH STAGE THOSE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN UNDER THE CEILING. WE WILL ONLY ISSUE VISAS TO FILL OR REPLACE IDENTIFIED POSITIONS UNDER THE CEILING.

WE ANTICIPATE THE REDUCTION WILL BE ACHIEVED MOSTLY THROUGH ATTRITION, AND SHOULD RESULT IN MINIMAL DISLOCATION FOR THE SOVIET MISSIONS. WE WILL MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ARE ACHIEVED.

IF THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO IDENTIFY POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN UNDER THE CEILING, WE WILL ONLY ISSUE VISAS UP TO THE PERMITTED CEILING. THE FOUR TRANCHES OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD WILL REQUIRE THE SOVIET MISSION ITSELF (EXCLUDING

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- 2 -

THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MISSIONS) TO REDUCE FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 243 TO 218 BY SEPTEMBER 1. REDUCTIONS IN TURN WILL PROCEED ACCORDINGLY: DOWN TO 195 BY APRIL 1, 1987; DOWN TO 173 BY SEPTEMBER 1, 1987; AND DOWN TO 150 BY APRIL 1, 1988. SIMILARLY, THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS MUST REDUCE FROM THEIR PRESENT SIZE OF 17 AND 15, RESPECTIVELY, TO 13 EACH BY APRIL 1, 1987, AND TEN EACH BY APRIL 1, 1988.

Q. Why are you cutting the number of Soviets at their UN Missions in New York when you have agreed to allow a new Soviet Consulate to open in New York?

A. -- The exact number of Soviets that will staff the new Consulate in New York and the date of its opening is still to be determined. The size and opening dates, however, of the new U.S. and Soviet Consulates will be strictly reciprocal. The Soviet Consulate in New York will be small. Even with the addition of Soviet Consulate personnel, there will be a major reduction in the Soviet presence in the United States when the cuts in the Soviet UN Missions are effected. With the opening of a new Soviet Consulate, the Soviets will be able to legitimately conduct cultural, consular, trade, and other bilateral activities in the New York area that are not appropriate for UN Missions. Imposing a personnel ceiling on the Soviet UN Missions should help limit the activities of the Soviet Missions to UN business.

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Q. Aren't the Soviets likely to retaliate by lowering the number of USG employees in the Soviet Union? And won't this complicate USG efforts to increase our official presence in the USSR?

A. -- WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS WILL BECOME AN ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL [279 AND 41 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL RESPECTIVELY] FOR NOW IS GREATER THAN THAT OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND CONSULATE GENERAL IN LENINGRAD [200 AND 28 RESPECTIVELY]. THERE IS NO CEILING THE NUMBER OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL IN THE USSR.

AS WE ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF OUR POSTS IN THE U.S.S.R., WE WILL ALSO BE REPLACING CERTAIN SOVIET NATIONAL EMPLOYEES WITH AMERICANS. A CONTRACT FOR MAINTENANCE WORKERS HAS BEEN SIGNED AND TWENTY-TWO CONTRACT EMPLOYEES WILL BE ARRIVING AT POST THIS YEAR. AN OMNIBUS CONTRACT FOR APPROXIMATELY 55 ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES TO FILL CLERICAL AND SUPPORT POSITIONS IN OUR EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL WILL BE AWARDED THIS YEAR. THESE CONTRACT PERSONNEL SHOULD BEGIN ARRIVING IN OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1986.

AS A RESULT, OUR OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE USSR WILL INCREASE, MAKING THE RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT. IF THE SOVIETS

IMPOSE A CEILING ON OUR DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL THAT WOULD NOT PERMIT US TO BUILD UP TO THE PRESENT SOVIET LEVEL OF 320, WE ARE PREPARED TO RECIPROCATE.

Q. Did Congressional pressure contribute to the Administration's decision, and have you briefed Congress?

A. -- WE SHARE CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT. THE DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO EXAMINE WAYS OF BETTER CONTROLLING THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT, AND IS PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS AS NECESSARY WHEN IT IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. WE HAVE ALREADY BRIEFED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON OUR DECISION.

Q. How will a reduction in the size of the Soviet UN Missions protect U.S. national security. Won't the Soviet circumvent this ceiling by tasking their Warsaw Pact allies and increasing the size of those missions?

A. -- OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT DO NOT OBLIGE US TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN A MISSION OF UNLIMITED SIZE OR TO ENGAGE IN INAPPROPRIATE OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. ~~THE~~ REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSION WILL HAVE CONSIDERABLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BENEFITS. AVAILABLE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RESOURCES WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVELY UTILIZED.

WE HAVE ~~ALSO~~ WARNED CERTAIN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THAT WE WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE WHETHER THEY

ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE SLACK BY INCREASING THE SIZE OF THEIR UN MISSIONS, AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SIMILARLY CONSTRAIN MOSCOW'S WARSAW PACT ALLIES IF WE DETERMINE THAT ANY OF THEM IS INCREASING ITS PRESENCE TO COMPENSATE FOR LOST SOVIET ASSETS.

Q. Does this ceiling apply to temporary duty personnel? If not, isn't this a way for the Soviets to circumvent these reductions?

A. -- THE CEILING DOES NOT APPLY TO TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL. THERE ARE TIMES WHEN UN MISSIONS HAVE A LEGITIMATE NEED FOR TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL. AN EXAMPLE IS DURING THE UNGA OR DURING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON A PARTICULAR TOPIC. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO ENSURE THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE. WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO USE TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO CIRCUMVENT THIS CEILING.

Q. By what right does the USG presume to determine the "reasonable size" of another country's mission to the United Nations? If the circumstances were reversed and the United Nations were in Leningrad, would not the US Mission to the UN be of similar size to that of the Soviet Mission in New York?

A. -- IN THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES RESERVED THE RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY. PERMITTING A SOVIET UN MISSION OF UNLIMITED SIZE CLEARLY WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. IN IMPOSING

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- 7 -

THIS CEILING, WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE SOVIET UNION'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD. THE CEILING WILL PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE TO HAVE THE LARGEST UN REPRESENTATION OF ANY COUNTRY, AND SHOULD BE AMPLE TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN BUSINESS.

Q: Why is the USG cutting back the ceiling of the Soviet Missions to the United Nations?

A. -- WE CONCLUDED, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS, THAT THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS [USSR, BYELORUSSIA, AND THE UKRAINE] FAR EXCEEDS THE STAFFING NEEDS THAT FLOW FROM THE CONDUCT OF UN BUSINESS. WE HAVE IMPOSED A PERSONNEL CEILING WHICH WILL ALLOW THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN-RELATED BUSINESS, BUT CUT SHARPLY THEIR MARGIN FOR ANY ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE UN AND/OR DAMAGING TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. EVEN WHEN THIS CEILING IS REACHED, THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE MUCH LARGER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY'S MISSION.

Q. Is this decision part of an ongoing USG effort to penalize the UN by imposing travel restrictions, arbitrary cutbacks in assessed contributions, and polemical criticism?

A. -- NO. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SYSTEMATICALLY WORKED FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS TO MAKE THE UNITED NATIONS RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. OUR CRITICISM HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND AIMED TOWARD THIS GOAL.

OUR DECISION IS PART OF A MAJOR EFFORT TO COUNTER ACTIVITIES BY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OR WORKING FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK WHICH ARE INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES -- E.G., ESPIONAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE IMPOSED LAST FALL TRAVEL MEASURES ON SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE-COUNTRY EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND ON CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS.

OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN, ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY, ARE IN LARGE PART A FUNCTION OF OUR DOMESTIC BUDGETARY SITUATION AND CAPABILITIES. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF THE UN BUDGET PROCESS, AND GREATER PROPORTIONAL INFLUENCE FOR MAJOR DONORS. WE ARE MAKING CLEAR TO UN OFFICIALS AND OTHERS THE IMPACT OF RELEVANT US LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE KASSEBAUM AMENDMENT AND GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS, ON OUR UN ACCOUNTS.

Q. Why does the USSR have three UN Missions?

A. -- THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST YEARS OF WORLD WAR II THAT LED TO THE SIGNING OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN SAN FRANCISCO IN JUNE 1945 INVOLVED SEVERAL TRADEOFFS BETWEEN THE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ONE TRADEOFF INVOLVED GIVING THE USSR THREE SEATS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [HENCE, THREE UN MISSIONS], IN EXCHANGE FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE

HEAVILY WESTERN MAKEUP OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS
[US, UK, FRANCE, CHINA, USSR]. IN PRACTICE, THE
THREE SOVIET MISSIONS ACT AS ONE.

Q. How did you inform the Secretary General? What was the UNSYG's reaction?

A. -- WE HAVE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON DETAILS OF CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS.

Q. How is this decision related to the 1985 moves to impose travel controls and other restrictions on Soviet and other "hostile-nation" employees in the UN Secretariat, and to require selected East European Missions and East European employees of the UN Secretariat to use the services of the Office of Foreign Missions for official travel in the United States?

A. -- THE ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO VIGOROUSLY COMBAT ESPIONAGE AND OTHER ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. WE ARE MAKING A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ENHANCE OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. THIS EFFORT INCLUDES: THE DECISION INVOLVING THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS, TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE COUNTRY EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEANS IN THIS COUNTRY USE OFM TRAVEL SERVICES FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL. EACH ACTION WAS TAKEN ON ITS OWN MERITS AND AFTER CAREFULLY WEIGHING OUR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

Q. Is this action legal? Does it conform with USG obligations under the Headquarters Agreement and the UN Charter?

A. -- LIMITING THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS TO A REASONABLE SIZE IS CONSISTENT WITH USG OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, THE UN CHARTER, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Q. What other UN missions will be affected by this decision?

A. -- NONE. WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO IMPOSE CEILINGS ON OTHER UN MISSIONS.

Q. Why are you not imposing ceilings on the PRC UN Mission and other "unfriendly" missions [Nicaragua, Iran, Libya, etc.]?

A. -- AS NOTED, WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO IMPOSE CEILINGS ON OTHER MISSIONS. THE SIZE OF OTHER COUNTRIES' MISSIONS IS NOT UNREASONABLE GIVEN THEIR STAFFING NEEDS.

Q. Why did the U.S. allow the Soviet UN Missions to grow to such an "unreasonable" size?

A. -- THROUGH THE YEARS WE HAVE MONITORED THE GROWTH AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, WE HAVE WARNED THE SOVIETS ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS. THESE MISSIONS ARE NOT SURROGATE EMBASSIES OR CONSULATES FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET MISSIONS ON OCCASION HAVE ENGAGED IN CONSULAR, CULTURAL, TRADE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS.

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WE RECENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET MISSIONS HAD REACHED A SIZE FAR BEYOND WHAT THEY NEED TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN-RELATED BUSINESS. THE NEW CEILING IS AN EFFORT TO CUT THEM BACK TO A REASONABLE SIZE. IT IS ALSO A REASONABLE, PRUDENT STEP TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE.

Q. What evidence do you have that the personnel at the Soviet UN Missions have engaged in espionage?

A. -- FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE ARE UNABLE TO MAKE PUBLIC CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ABOUT ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS.

THE LAST TIME A SOVIET UN MISSION MEMBER WAS PUBLICLY PUNISHED WAS 1983 (FIRST SECRETARY ANATOLIY MALNEV). SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAVE BEEN UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS.

Q. Do clandestine activities by Soviet UN Mission personnel continue to be a problem

A. -- WE CAN CONFIRM THAT SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. AN UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATION THAT MAKES REFERENCE TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET UN MISSION AND SECRETARIAT PERSONNEL IS ARKADY SHEVCHENCKO'S RECENT BOOK.

(NOTE: IF PRESSED ON THE NUMBER OF UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS SINCE 1983, WE CAN INDICATE THAT THE NUMBER HAS BEEN VERY LOW. IN FACT, THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSION, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO NUMBERS.)

Q. What about spying by Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies? And shouldn't their missions be similarly limited?

A. -- ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IS OF CONCERN TO US WHATEVER THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE NOTED, THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS IS WITHIN REASON. THEIR UN MISSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: BULGARIA - 24, CUBA - 56, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 20, GDR - 39, HUNGARY - 22, POLAND - 22, ROMANIA - 13. OF COURSE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR ALL HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE DECIDED THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY ^{AT THIS TIME} TO LIMIT THE MISSIONS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRIES.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Adm. Penderster

SUB: Hartman Cable

I'm not sure you were given a copy of this. I think you should look it over since Shultz may be influenced by it.

I think Art is (1) ahead of the game tactically; and (2) is advising on details that really go beyond his competence.

It would be more helpful if he were vigorously pushing the Soviets to come up with more practical responses to our proposals.

Jack

Hartman should follow your guidance. This is a lousy cable.

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 NLRR F06-114/4#8086
 BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/11

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WHSR HANDLING SLIP		TIME STAMP
Poindexter		<p>2/5</p> <p>This copy to Matlock</p>
Fortier		
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McDaniel	C	
Pearson	C	
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Linhard	C	
Lehman	C	
NSC/S		LDX/TTY APPROVAL : _____
REMARKS :		
<p>C: Copy O: Original F: FYI S: Should See</p> <p>C/H: Copy Hand Delivered C/T: Contacted via Phone</p>		

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Department of State

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NODIS

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 01985 00 OF 02 051621Z C05/05 008212 NOD318
ACTION NODS-00

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O 051543Z FEB 86 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0339

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 01985

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, UR US
SUBJECT: ACHIEVING NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS

REF: (A) STATE 25360, (B) MOSCOW 1934

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: YOU ASKED FOR IDEAS. I THINK THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED THE POINT WHERE WE SHOULD GO HARD FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH GORBACHEV AND HIS NEW TEAM. WE MAY NOT SUCCEED, BUT WE NEED TO BE PERCEIVED AS TRYING. THE PRESIDENT HAS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT OPPORTUNITY WILL BE LOST IF WE CONTINUE OUR PRESENT POLICY ON SDI. IT IS TIME TO TRADE SOME CONCESSIONS IN THIS LONG-TERM PROGRAM, WHICH WE MAY NEVER WANT TO TAKE BEYOND THE RESEARCH STAGE, FOR PROMPT AND UNPRECEDENTED CUTS IN EXISTING SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. END SUMMARY.

3. IF WE WANT SUCH CUTS, AND IN FACT IF WE WANT TO MAINTAIN ANY NEGOTIATED RESTRAINTS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS, NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE. WE FACE INCREASING

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File 114/4 #8087
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11

NODS-00

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 06 MOSCOW 01985 00 OF 02 051621Z C05/05 008212 NOD318

BUDGETARY PRESSURES WHICH WILL AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO COMPETE IN AN UNRESTRAINED OFFENSIVE (AND DEFENSIVE) ARMS RACE. OUR NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE IS DECLINING. WE HAVE A SUMMIT MEETING ON THE AGENDA WHICH MANY WILL SEE AS A FAILURE IF IT MAKES NO PROGRESS IN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL. ON THE PROPAGANDA FRONT, GORBACHEV HAS MADE AN IMPRESSIVE GESTURE WITH HIS PLAN TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE NEED A SERIOUS, PRAGMATIC RESPONSE TO MAINTAIN U. S. CREDIBILITY.

4. THE SOVIETS SAY THEY WILL NOT ALLOW CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WITHOUT A BAN ON "SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS." THEIR POSITION REFLECTS A GENUINE CONCERN. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT GOING TO MAKE THE JOB OF U. S. DEFENSES EASIER BY REDUCING THEIR OFFENSIVE FORCES -- UNLESS THEY OBTAIN SOME SATISFACTION ON THE SPACE WEAPONS ISSUE. AT THE SAME TIME, I THINK THEY WILL SETTLE FOR LESS THAN A TOTAL BAN ON ALL ASPECTS OF SDI. THEY HAVE HINTED AS MUCH BY SUGGESTING REAFFIRMATION OF THE ABM TREATY. THEY KNOW THAT A LEGAL PROHIBITION ON TERRITORIAL ABM DEFENSES ALREADY EXISTS. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT A BAN ON RESEARCH IS UNVERIFIABLE.

5. I PROPOSE THAT WE BEGIN NOW TO NEGOTIATE A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS WHICH WOULD BE ISSUED AT THE NEXT SUMMIT. OUR AIM, BUT NOT NECESSARILY OUR STARTING POSITION, WOULD BE A STATEMENT LIKE THE FOLLOWING.

DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV CONSIDERED THE ISSUES IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS.

THEY AGREED ON THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC FORCES. THEY

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RECOGNIZED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE ENTIRE WORLD ARE INSEPARABLY LINKED. MINDFUL OF THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THEY BEAR AND SEEKING TO ENSURE A STABLE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV REACHED THE FOLLOWING AGREEMENTS.

SPACE AND DEFENSE

THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE ABM TREATY OF 1972. THEY AGREED TO EXTEND THE NOTIFICATION PERIOD FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THAT TREATY OF FIVE YEARS. THEY PLEDGED TO MAKE RENEWED EFFORTS IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY AND TO ALLAY THE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS WHICH EACH SIDE HAS RAISED. THEY AGREED THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL LARGE-PHASED ARRAY RADARS FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN EARLY WARNING. THEY AGREED TO CONCLUDE AN EARLY AGREEMENT TO BAN TESTING OF ANY WEAPONS IN SPACE AGAINST LAND-BASED TARGETS OF ANY KIND.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING FRAMEWORK FOR A TREATY ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS:

- A CEILING OF 1250 BALLISTIC MISSILES PER SIDE.
- A CEILING OF 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS PER SIDE.
- NO MORE THAN 3000 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS ON EITHER ICBMS OR SLBMS.
- MOBILE ICBMS ARE PERMITTED.

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-- A CEILING OF 350 HEAVY BOMBERS.

-- A CEILING OF 1500 ALCM WARHEADS PER SIDE.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT A TREATY SHOULD PROVIDE FOR ELIMINATION OF THEIR INF MISSILES FROM EUROPE AND WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE. THEY AGREED ON A GLOBAL CEILING OF 100 PER SIDE FOR REMAINING LAND-BASED SOVIET AND AMERICAN INF MISSILES, WHEREVER LOCATED.

COMMENT

6. I THINK THAT A FRAMEWORK LIKE THIS IS ATTAINABLE. IT IS NOT PERFECT. IT WILL NOT MAKE OUR ICBMS INVULNERABLE. BUT IT WILL MAKE THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE. THE ALTERNATIVE IS NOT A PERFECT AGREEMENT -- IT NEVER IS. BUT IT MAY WELL BE NO AGREEMENT WHATSOEVER. THAT WILL MEAN SOVIET INCREASES WELL BEYOND THE 2000-PLUS WARHEADS THEY HAVE ADDED SINCE PRESIDENT REAGAN TOOK OFFICE.

7. WE GIVE AWAY SO LITTLE BY REAFFIRMING THE ABM TREATY THAT SOME UNILATERAL STEPS ARE NEEDED TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS OF OUR SERIOUSNESS. OUR OFFICAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS SHOULD STRESS:

-- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AS THE BASIS OF OUR SECURITY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

-- AGNOSTICISM ABOUT THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF SDI RESEARCH.

-- AGNOSTICISM ABOUT WHETHER A FUTURE ADMINISTRATION WILL WANT TO PROCEED WITH SDI BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE

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ABM TREATY.

-- COMMITMENT TO THE "RESTRICTIVE" INTERPRETATION OF
THE TREATY.

8. IN ANY CASE, WHATEVER ELSE WE SAY ON SDI, THE
PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE THREE POINTS IN HIS LETTER TO
GORBACHEV:

-- I HEARD YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OFFENSIVE
CAPABILITIES OF SPACE-BASED WEAPONS AT GENEVA.

-- WE ARE PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERNS
IN A WAY THAT WILL FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY THAT SPACE-
BASED SDI SYSTEMS MIGHT BE USED PREEMPTIVELY AGAINST
SOVIET RETALIATORY FORCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL
INSTALLATIONS, AND OTHER POTENTIAL GROUND TARGETS.

-- WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO REACH AN EARLY AGREEMENT
TO BAN TESTING OF ANY WEAPONS IN SPACE AGAINST LAND-
BASED TARGETS OF ANY KIND. THIS WOULD BE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER COUNTRY ON OTHER
APPLICATIONS OF SPACE-BASED WEAPONS.

9. SDI IRONICALLY HAS BOTH LED US TO POSSIBLE AGREE-
MENT AND IS AT THE SAME TIME THE BARRIER TO DEEP
REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. WE SHOULD MOVE NOW TO
ELIMINATE THAT BARRIER. WE CAN DO SO AT LITTLE COST
TO THE RESEARCH WHICH WE ARE CONDUCTING, WHILE LEAVING

IT TO OTHERS, YEARS IN THE FUTURE, TO DECIDE WHETHER
TO JETTISON THE ABM TREATY. HARTMAN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request to Participate in Conference at Stanford University on February 14, 1986

I have been invited to participate in a one-day conference on Soviet Arms Control Compliance Behavior, sponsored by the Stanford University Center for International Security & Arms Control and Global Outlook. The conference will be held on February 14, 1986 at Stanford, University.

All transportation and accomodation expenses will be covered by the University.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my participation.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

TAB A Letter of Invitation

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GLOBAL OUTLOOK

Research and Consulting on International Security

January 17, 1986

Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council Staff
Old Executive Office Building
Room 36E
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock,

You are invited to a one-day conference on Soviet arms control compliance behavior, sponsored by the Stanford University Center for International Security & Arms Control and Global Outlook. The meeting will take place beginning at 10:00 am on Friday, February 14, 1986, at Galvez House on the Stanford University campus. We will adjourn by 4:00 pm.

The conference is an expanded meeting of a working group on "Compliance and the Future of Arms Control," based at Stanford. The working group has met monthly since July of 1985 to evaluate charges that the Soviet Union is not complying with arms control agreements, and to examine in broader terms the incentives and disincentives at present for arms control compliance by both countries. The February 14th meeting will be a special effort to examine patterns of Soviet compliance behavior and, to the extent possible, specific Soviet decisionmaking on military programs and compliance where the two may pose tradeoffs.

Two images of Soviet behavior are now common in the US debate over arms control compliance. The present Administration takes the position that the Soviets habitually stretch and violate the terms of international agreements to gain unilateral military advantage. As Secretary of Defense Weinberger wrote in his November 1985 "Responding to Soviet Violations Policy" (RSVP) Report,

. . . the Soviet Union has been violating with impunity its principal arms control agreements with the United States. From the beginning, many felt that the Soviets used the arms control process to obscure their planned offensive buildup, weaving into the fabric of the SALT I and ABM Treaties the loopholes and ambiguities that they would later rely on to becloud or extenuate their violations.

A number of non-governmental scholars and analysts, on the other hand, ascribe the present compliance controversy to

circumstantial factors. Only a few among all of the charges may really be valid, in this view. There is some behavior of concern on the part of the US as well as the Soviet Union. There is no intensified pattern of Soviet cheating in recent years, only compliance issues which have not been resolved in the SCC due to the poor state of US-Soviet relations. The Soviets may on occasion stray away from a strict interpretation of their arms control obligations, but they have no intentional "violations policy." If political relations between the two countries improved, then the outstanding compliance issues could likely be resolved to mutual satisfaction.

Behind these two views of Soviet compliance behavior lie quite different assumptions about Soviet intentions in arms negotiations, Soviet decisionmaking, Soviet cost-benefit analysis, and even Russian/Soviet national character. Depending upon the image one chooses, there may be different implications for the US approach to arms negotiations with the Soviets, the type of verification measures necessary to monitor compliance, the manner in which the US responds to compliance problems when they arise, and the types of efforts the US should make to resolve the specific compliance problems which are now at issue.

In addition to examining the evidence to support or refute these two overall images of Soviet behavior, the February 14th meeting will take up the elusive question of Soviet decisionmaking for compliance/non-compliance. We will consider three specific charges of Soviet non-compliance which have appeared to the working group to be those most probably valid among the alleged Soviet violations, and those which would have the greatest significance for US security if true. These are the Abalakova radar, the SS-25 ICBM, and encryption of missile test telemetry.

Many unanswered questions surround these three charges. Which of the alternative explanations for Soviet behavior seems most likely? (e.g. the Abalakova radar was sited and oriented to avoid construction on permafrost, to avoid construction of two radar on the periphery for economic reasons, to maximize utility for SLBM early warning, because it does have space-track functions as the Soviets say, or . . .?) What sequence of decisionmaking can be envisioned to explain Soviet actions to proceed with construction of a system or engage in behavior which risks violation of agreements? (e.g. was the decision on Abalakova made as part of an overall decision on the series of Pechora-class radar, in the early-to-mid-1970s? Was there a separate decision-point involving this radar in the late-'70s or early-'80s? What military and civilian agencies in the USSR might have been involved in this decision? What arguments about interpretations of the ABM Treaty might have been raised during the Soviet decisionmaking process?)

Another interesting set of questions involves Soviet perceptions of US compliance behavior. The Soviets are alleging that the US is breaching or will break agreements, for example, in cases like the Thule and Flyingdales radars. Are these instances comparable

to US concerns about Abalakova? Is Soviet concern about potential US violations real, or does it simply reflect a tit-for-tat strategy in countering US charges of Soviet violations? Also, what are Soviet perceptions of how the US has handled the compliance issue in the past three years? What has been the Soviet perception of their incentives and disincentives to be forthcoming in the SCC or otherwise, in response to the US charges? Are Soviet views about verification capabilities and procedures evolving today?

Finally, we should not neglect a series of important current policy questions. The Administration has embraced a policy of treaty compliance, leavened by "appropriate and proportional responses" to Soviet violations. In Part II of his RSVP report, the Secretary of Defense has just recommended several "proportional responses," including declining to dismantle systems to meet SALT II MIRVed launcher subtotals as the next Incident boat comes on line, and greater encryption of telemetry from US ballistic missile tests. One of the useful functions the group could perform would be to try to project Soviet options for response to these "proportional measures," and the likelihood that the Soviets will choose any particular responses.

I hope to produce a concept paper between now and the time of the meeting, further outlining these issues. You will receive a copy a few days before the conference.


I do hope you can join us for this meeting on February 14th; it promises to be an interesting session.

As to mechanics, our project is able to cover your coach or economy class air travel expenses to attend the meeting, and provide accomodations at the Hotel California in Palo Alto. Please let my office know as soon as you can if you would like us to make your airline reservations for you and reserve hotel space. Enclosed is an expense form which you should return to Stanford with your ticket stub and hotel bill. Please let us know your flight arrival time, as we may be able to arrange airport transportation. As you probably know, San Jose airport is closer to Stanford than is San Francisco airport, and more convenient for flights from LA.

Enclosed you will find a tentative agenda for the meeting, a list of invited participants, and a map directing you to Galvez House, where all sessions of the meeting will take place. Please return the enclosed postcard, to help us with the head-count for lunch.

Please call if you have any questions. See you on the 14th.

Sincerely,



Gloria Duffy
President

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MINI-CONFERENCE ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR

FEBRUARY 14, 1986

INVITED PARTICIPANTS

Working Group Members

John Barton. Professor, Stanford Law School. President, International Technology Management Associates.

David Bernstein. Physicist. Program Staff, CISAC.

Coit D. Blacker. Soviet specialist. Assoc. Director, CISAC.

Thomas Connolly. Stanford Law School. Former staff member, Senate Intelligence Committee.

Alexander Dallin. Director of Soviet and East European Studies, Stanford University.

Hugh DeWitt. Physicist. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

Sidney D. Drell. Physicist. Co-Director, CISAC; Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.

Gloria Duffy. Project Director; Soviet/arms control specialist. President, Global Outlook.

Philip Farley. Arms control specialist. Senior Fellow, CISAC. Former Deputy Director, ACDA.

Alexander L. George. Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. Specialist on conflict and crisis management.

John Harvey. Physicist, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Former staff, US delegation, Standing Consultative Commission.

David Holloway. Soviet specialist. Senior Fellow, CISAC.

Michael Krepon. Arms control specialist. Director, Carnegie Endowment Verification Project.

Steven Kull. Psychologist. Senior Fellow, CISAC. Director, Project on the Psychology of the Nuclear Arms Competition.

John Lewis. Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. Co-Director, CISAC.

Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky. Physicist. Director Emeritus, SLAC.

William Perry. Engineer. Managing Partner, Hambrecht & Quist. Former Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.

Condoleezza Rice. Soviet specialist. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. Assistant Director, CISAC. Fellow, Hoover Institution.

Special Guests

Jeremy Azrael. Soviet specialist. RAND Corporation.

George Breslauer. Soviet specialist. Professor, UC Berkeley.

Larry Caldwell. Soviet specialist. Professor, Occidental College.

Participants, Continued

- Gregory Dalton. Occidental College
Raymond Garthoff. Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution.
William R. Graham. Acting Director, NASA. Former Chairman,
General Advisory Committee, ACDA.
Arnold Horelick. Soviet specialist. Director, RAND-UCLA Center
for the Study of Soviet International Behavior.
Michael Krepon. Arms control/verification specialist. Director,
Carnegie Endowment Verification Project.
Gail Lapidus. Soviet specialist. Professor, UC Berkeley.
Fellow, CISAC.
Jack Matlock. Soviet specialist. National Security Council
Staff.
Stephen Meyer. Soviet specialist. Assistant Professor, MIT.
William Potter. Verification/Soviet specialist.
Director, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA.
Dennis Ross. Soviet specialist. Director, Stanford-Berkeley
program on the Soviet Union.
Henry Rowen. Professor of Management, Stanford Business School.
Fellow, Hoover Institution.

TENTATIVE AGENDA

MINI-CONFERENCE ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR

FEBRUARY 14, 1986

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

- 10:00 AM MORNING SESSION GALVEZ HOUSE
- Introduction
- Two Images of Soviet Compliance Behavior:
Historical Evidence and Policy Implications
- 12:00 PM WORKING LUNCH GALVEZ HOUSE
- Watersheds in Soviet Decisionmaking:
- 1980-82 Michael Krepon, Carnegie Endowment
1974-76 Larry Caldwell, Occidental/RAND
- 2:00 PM AFTERNOON SESSION GALVEZ HOUSE
- Three Cases of Concern:
- 1) The Krasnoyarsk Radar
 - 2) Encryption of Telemetry
 - 3) The SS-25 and other ICBMs in the pipeline
 - Alternative explanations
 - Soviet calculations and intent
 - Soviet decisionmaking
 - Implications for the US
 - Possible resolutions or responses
- 4:00 PM WINE AND CHEESE GALVEZ HOUSE