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Ronald Reagan Library

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Withdrawer

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MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (1/12)

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13

ID Doc Type		Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
A	MEMO	MATLOCK TO WILLIAM MARTIN, NSC 8510057 [10]	1	12/20/1985	open 05/14/2007
В	NOTE	FROM MARTIN [11]	1	ND	"
C	MEMO	DANA ROHRABACHER TO THE PRESIDENT, RE RUSSIAN TRIP [12-14]	3	12/18/1985	4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

December 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Presidential Letter to the Israeli Knesset

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed Presidential letter (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to the Israeli Knesset in response to a petition on behalf of Soviet Jews. Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum to the President forwarding the letter for his signature.

Sestanovich, Mandel, Raymond and Covey concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ____ Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Presidential Letter

Tab B Letter from Israeli Knesset

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Letter to Israeli Knesset

Issue

Response to the letter from members of the Israeli Knesset of October 23, 1985.

Facts

Seventy-three members of the Israeli Knesset have sent you a signed Petition on October 23, 1985, urging you to raise the problem of Soviet Jewry with General Secretary Gorbachev at last month's meeting in Geneva.

Discussion

Your response (Tab A) expresses your deep personal concern over the plight of Soviet Jews. It notes that you have raised the question with General Secretary Gorbachev and you believe that as a result of the discussions, Mr. Gorbachev has a better understanding of our concerns in this area.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the letter to the Israeli Knesset.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to the Israeli Knesset

Tab B Letter from the Israeli Knesset

Red 27- 15

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Dear Members of the Knesset:

Thank you for your impressive petition on behalf of your Jewish brethren in the Soviet Union, and for your expression of support for the efforts the United States has been making to help end their suffering. Let me reaffirm my own deep personal concern over the plight of Soviet Jewry.

I raised our concerns over human rights and Soviet Jewry with General Secretary Gorbachev at last month's meeting in Geneva. I made clear to him that the American people have an abiding interest in human rights. I believe that, as a result of our discussions, Mr. Gorbachev has a better understanding of our concerns and of the importance we attach to progress in this area. The Soviets can have no doubt that human rights will continue to be an important factor in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thank you again for your support, and rest assured that we will not be deterred from this vitally important cause.

Sincerely,

Members of the Israeli Knesset Israeli Knesset Jerusalem Israel

Washington, D.C. 20520

-LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

December 17, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

73 members of the Israeli Knesset have sent President Reagan a petition urging him to raise the problem of Soviet Jewry with General Secretary Gorbachev at last month's meeting in Geneva (copy at Tab 2). Given the intense interest in this issue of such a large number of Israeli leaders, we believe that an acknowledgment from the President would be appropriate. A proposed reply is at Tab 1.

Micholas Platt Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Proposed response from the President

Tab 2 - Knesset petition

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

NARA, Date 7202

Dear Members of the Knesset:

Thank you for your impressive petition on behalf of your Jewish brethren in the Soviet Union, and for your expression of support for the efforts the United States has been making to help end their suffering. Let me reaffirm my own deep personal concern over the plight of Soviet Jews.

I raised our concerns over human rights and Soviet Jewry with General Secretary Gorbachev at last month's meeting in Geneva. I made clear to him that the American people have an abiding interest in human rights. I believe that, as a result of our discussions, Mr. Gorbachev has a better understanding of our concerns and of the importance we attach to progress in this area. The Soviets can have no doubt that human rights will continue to be an important factor in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thank you again for your support, and rest assured that we will not be deterred from this vitally important cause.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Excellency No. Gonald W. Reagan the President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

Your forthcoming summit meeting with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbochev, stands in the forefront of Jewish and world attention.

For the past seventy years, our Jewish brethren in the Soviet Union have been persecuted mercilesly and cast into prison because of their struggle to immigrate to their ancient homeland, Israel and to be united with their families.

The only real solution to the tragedy of the Jewish people in the Soviet Union is a binding monitorable agreement, granting them the right to repatriation in Israel, and terminating the national religious and cultural suppression to which they are subjected. Any agreement concluded with the Soviet Union that does not ensure the release of Soviet Jewry, will not be consistent with the principles and values of the free world.

Mr. President, we deeply appreciate the stand which you have taken consistently, that the solution of the problem of Soviet Jewry is a condition for the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We members of the Knesset of the State of Israel support you in your stand and in your efforts. We appeal to you as Fresident of the United States, as the leader of the free world, and as one whose policy is guided by the principles of liberty and human freedom to give strong expression to those principles during your forthcoming talks with Mr. Gorbochev.

Respectfully yours,

23 october 1985

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The office of the standar of the standard o

הוד פעלתנו פר רונלד וו. דייגן נשיא ארצות הברית של אפרוקה



כבוד הנשיא,

פגישור הקרובה עם פנהיג ברית - הפועצורל פילאל גורבציוב עופדת בפרכו תשופת הלב של העם היהודי בישראל ובעולם.

אחינו היהודים בברית - הפועצורב ברית בנדפים על ציואר ופושלכים לבירות כלא וה בשבעים שנה על שאיפתם לעלות לפולד יכם העופקה, ישראל ולהתאחד עם בני פשפחותיהם.

הפננרון האפיתי לטראגדיה של העם היהודי בברות- העועצות יהיה אך ורק הסכם מחייב ובר פיקוח אשר יעניק לו את הזכות לרפטריאציר עבריות - העוצעית , ויפקיק את דיכויו הלאוני, הדת והתרבותי בה. העולם שוחר החופש יעשר ז שקר בנתשו אם יגיע להסכפים עם ברית- הפועצות פבלי שיפתור את שאלת חרותם של היהודים בה.

כבוד הנשיא, אנו פוקירים ועיצריכים ארל עפרתף אותה הבעת בעקבוות שפתרון בעיור כ העם היהודי בברית - הפועצור כ הוא תנאי להיווצרות אווירה של אפון הדדי בין ארצורכ -הברות ובין ברות-העועצות .

כנייא ארצות- הברות , כפנהוג גדוכ כנייוא ארצות- הברות, כסנוות העפוקרי של העולם הדפוקרטי וכפי שהאפונה העפוקרי בעקרונות החופש וזכויות האדם היא נר לרגר וו אנו חברי הכנסת בעדינת ישראל פחזקים ארב אנו חברי הכנסת בעדינת ישראל פחזקים ארב ידיך בעפרתך ובאפונתך ובטוחים, כי יקבה ביטוי נאפן בשיחותיך עם פר גורבצ'וב'.

בכבוד ובהוקרה

ירושלים, ח' בחשון, התשפ"ו To END Hillel Shlomo

Glazer-Faasa Miriam

4.75 Meridor Dan

the principles of liberty and human servaum so your strong expression to those principles during your forthcoming talks with Mr. Gorbochev.

Respectfully yours,

בכבוד ובהוקרה

23 october 1985 ירושלים, ח' בחשון, הונשפ"ו 50m-157.1 Waldman Eliozer Hillel Shlomo Glazer-Faasa Miriam Cohen Geula Daram Uzi Landau Uzi 7kt in 25x 8/00 Bar-On Mordechai Ben-Meir Dor אפירה סרטני Meridor Dan Afric Jacques Sartari Amira -31/c nin) molle בניפין בן-אליעור Agcohen Menaham Ben-blieger Binyamin Druckman Haim אורה נמיר Namir Ora Alillots Inle DNA 1'175 Ber-Elisar Eliahu Hammer Zerulur Eilan Rafael Shafat Granot Elazar Gershon (-20) 100 Grupper Perach אפל נסראלדין Pinchasi Raphael nav Weiss Sherach Harish Michael OGNA Nahmias Sharon Lynn Wriel" Shalita Benny Daranishe Abed Elwahak Abuhatzeira Sharan Sarid yossi olil OPLE Lici/ Kulas Eliezer Grad Kara Solodar Edna Zickon Dan Shamai Yaakov . Latel 3 ... WW/S 600

Granot Elazar Gilan Majaet Shafal yershon Den-Oussar Guahu Fammer zerulun Finchasi Raphael Abuhatzeira Afiaron Shalita Benny Sarid Yossi Kulas Elieger Grad Para Goldstein Pinhas Shamai Yaakov Ticken Dan Harel sharon अद्राम्त Gitan Michael Weinstein Ariel Amorai Adiel Peretz Ytzhak Neemam Ywal Speiser Eliahu Virshubsky Mordechai Eli Ovadio Katz Oz Mercham Edri Paphael Olmert Ehud חוד דנינו Darino David Cohen Yigal fridor yoran Cohen-Avidor Meir Porush Menahem Amar Shlomo Shapira fraham Reisser Michael Magen David

Q

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK MATLOCY

SUBJECT:

Rohrabacker Memo on Russian Trip

The attached memo is very representative of an American's "first impressions" of the Soviet Union. The judgements, however, are too sweeping and sometimes contradictory. It would be wrong, for example, to conclude that because the Soviet Union is economically backward in consumer areas, it cannot sustain a heavy and continuing military building program, as this report implies. Finally the impressions ignore the complexities of Soviet history and social development and the perspective of the ordinary Soviet citizen, difficult though it may be to assess them. That said, the points on human rights are valid and important. In sum, while we do not concur with the substance of some of the points made, we believe this represents a good summary of thoughtful "first impressions" by a politically astute observer. These comments are noted at the bottom of Chew's incoming memorandum (Tab I).

Mandel, Sestanovich and Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response at Tal	I.
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Approve	-	Disapprove	
pp10.0	-	220app20v0	

Attachment

Tab I

Chew referal with memorandum

The attached memo is very representative of an American's "first impressions" of the Soviet Union. The judgements, however, are too sweeping and sometimes contradictory. It would be wrong, for example, to conclude that because the Soviet Union is economically backward in consumer areas, it cannot sustain a heavy and continuing military building program, as this report implies. Finally the impressions ignore the complexities of Soviet history and social development and the perspective of the ordinary Soviet citizen, difficult though it may be to assess them. That said, the points on human rights are valid and important. In sum, while we do not concur with the substance of some of the points made, we believe this represents a good summary of thoughtful "first impressions" by a politically astute observer.

William F. Martin Executive Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Dana Rohrabacher

SUBJECT:

Russian Trip

I just returned from two weeks in the Soviet Union. I visited Leningrad, Minsk and Moscow, and also Tablisi and Batumi in Soviet Georgia. I was one of 12 American young political leaders, politically astute men and women.

Our trip was under the auspices of the American Council of Young Political Leaders (ACYPL), which is an exchange program with young political leaders of many nations, <u>now</u> including the Soviet Union (the exchange with the Soviets was cancelled after the invasion of Afghanistan.)

The following are a few of the observations of our delegation:

- -- First and foremost, the delegation believes the Soviets are anxious to cut a deal with the United States. They gave our delegation first-class treatment. Our delegates, who well understand serious negotiations, believe America has tremendous leverage at this time. The Soviets rightfully believe the trend of history is in our direction.
- -- Our current leverage seems to flow from the backwardness of Soviet society and the potential our technology gives us to change the status quo. SDI is one example of this, but the prospect of great American technologically generated economic and industrial leaps also haunts the Soviets.
- The Soviet people are living and working the way Americans did decades ago. While computer scanners are now commonplace in most American supermarkets, abacuses are still widely used in Soviet retail stores. Soviet consumer goods are shoddy at best. Women's brassieres, for example, are a matter of discomfort and embarrassment for Soviet women. We found nothing to buy. Nothing.
- -- If peace can be maintained, our delegation believes the Soviet Union will be left so far behind the West as to become irrelevant. The Soviet Union isn't about to fall apart or undergo a revolution, but as a viable threat it can be bypassed.

- -- The repression in the U.S.S.R. is very real and hangs like a fog bank over the entire society. The people never acknowledge the fog, and at times, it's hard to see it. The clique running the show -- and it is a show -- calculate every move to bolster a false facade. Cunning is too gentle a word for what they are doing.
- Thanks to the U.S. Embassy, we were able to meet secretly with several refusniks, Jews persecuted for asking to immigrate. The stories of these victims are heart-breaking and enough to curdle the blood of any American. The delegation unanimously suggests that America remain firm in its commitment to human rights. The poor souls we met look to America, to us, as their only hope.
- The delegation hopes you will ask Christian groups to get more involved in speaking out for believers in the U.S.S.R. We also suggest that anyone, government or business, dealing with the Soviet Union in the future be provided with a short list of incarcerated Soviet citizens. If Americans express concern about individual cases, it will help. Our citizens should suggest, as one desperate refusnik pleaded, that America cares about this issue and "there can be no peace without freedom."
- -- Several of us attended a Baptist church service. Billy Graham is either blind or a fool. The reason the church he visited was full was that legally active churches are almost non-existent in the Soviet Union. No new churches are built. Religious repression is real. This repression suggests at least some Soviet leaders are still dedicated enough to communist ideology to take the time and effort -- and to pay the public relations price -- to grind religious believers down.
- -- Within the ancient walls of the Kremlin are ancient and very beautiful churches. It is an abomination: religious shrines in the heart of an atheist empire that makes it a point to stamp out religion.
- -- Communism has tried to replace faith in God with Marxist-Leninist slogans, which are drapped over buildings. Instead of a "new man," what has developed is a massive alcohol problem.
- -- The anti-alcohol campaign is making progress. Bottles of vodka were around, but the public boozing is restrained all over the country. A trip by Nancy to discuss our anti-drug campaign in relation to the anti-alcohol campaign would be a PR bonanza.
- -- The excessive use of alcohol isn't the only practice we should expect Gorbachev to discredit. The new Soviet bosses will likely try to distance themselves from the "failed"

policies of the past" by attacking Breshnev, or at least his people. During our negotiations, the Soviet delegation went so far as to suggest former Soviet arms negotiators had been less than honest with the Soviet people about the arms situation. Once in passing, the Soviet discussion leader actually admitted the U.S. had reason for concern because, over the last decade, the Soviet Union had developed a "modest lead in strategic weapons." We did not follow up, but the admission was astonishing.

- -- The Soviet flexibility on Afghanistan was also apparent. Privately several young Soviet leaders were positive about a deal in which the U.S. would agree never to station U.S. military in Afghanistan if the Soviets withdrew from that bloody conflict.
- -- Our delegation followed your example of killing the opposition with kindness, while remaining firm on issues of contention. We believe frequent and wide-ranging contact between our people can do nothing but benefit the United States and the cause of peace.
- The Democrats, as well as the Republicans, came away from the Soviet Union with a reinvigorated love for our country and everything for which it stands: freedom, human dignity, truth, good will, and integrity. Even the Democrats could see the obvious failure of socialism. People there just don't work because there is no incentive to do so. This lethargy is the order of the day from top to bottom. The U.S.S.R. is a land of tyranny, deprivation and incompetence. When we landed in Vienna, it was as if we'd been on a trip to another planet, an evil empire.
- -- Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. is on this planet and it has vast military power, so we must make certain the peace is maintained. Thanks to SDI and your strong leadership these last 5 years, we now have a window of opportunity to deal with our adversaries. Republicans and Democrats in the delegation all believe America is now dealing from a position of strength.
- -- The delegation was wined and dined and entertained in grand fashion. The Soviets clearly are anxious to build a "spirit of Geneva." If we remain firm, they will respect us and true progress may be possible. Smiles and expressions of good will, however, are not enough. Now is the time to pursue "deeds not words."

copy: National Security Council Pat Buchanan

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REFERRAL

SYSTEM I LOG NUMBER: 10057

ACTION OFFICER: DUE: 20 Dec. 1985 We Prepare Memo Martin to Chew Prepare Memo Martin to Elliott Prepare Memo								
		ENCES/COMMENTS*	~	DUE:	NOON - 27	D Wec 1985		
	*PHONE to	o action officer at ext.	2119					
		Burghardt		Lehman		Sable		
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		Grimes		North		Tillman		
		Hughes		Platt		Wigg		
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

December 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCKS

SUBJECT:

Meeting with the President and Secretary

Baldrige on December 23

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President concerning Monday's meeting with Secretary Baldrige. He will be reporting to the President on his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev during his December 9 - 11th visit to Moscow.

Also attached are suggested talking points for the President (Tab A).

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I outlining for him the purpose and sequence of events for Monday's meeting with Secretary Baldrige.

Approve	-	Disapprove	
Attachments:			

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

DATE: December 23, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will report on his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting will give Secretary Baldrige the opportunity to brief you on the outcome of his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev which he had during a December 9 - 11 visit to Moscow.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President, The Vice President, Malcolm Baldrige, John Whitehead, Donald T. Regan, Donald R. Fortier, Jack F. Matlock

IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Briefing Discussion

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

18

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

Baldrige Meeting with Gorbachev

- o How did your Moscow visit go?
- O Did you get a feel that the Soviets might start some movement in the human rights area?
- O How much pressure are you getting from our business community on Soviet trade issues?
- o Thanks for the read-out.

TALKING POINTS -- MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF COMMERCE ON HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

- -- How did your Moscow visit go?
- -- Did you get a feel that the Soviets might start some movement in the human rights area?
- -- How much pressure are you getting from our business community on Soviet trade issues?
- -- Thanks for the read-out.

FILE MAHOCH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1985

NOTED

MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

DATE: December 23, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

Secretary of Commerce Baldrige will report on his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

II. BACKGROUND

This meeting will give Secretary Baldrige the opportunity to brief you on the outcome of his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev which he had during a December 9 - 11 visit to Moscow.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President, The Vice President, Malcolm Baldrige, John Whitehead, Donald T. Regan, Donald R. Fortier, Jack F. Matlock

IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Briefing Discussion

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points

cc: Vice President

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

Baldrige Meeting with Gorbachev

- o How did your Moscow visit go?
- O Did you get a feel that the Soviets might start some movement in the human rights area?
- o How much pressure are you getting from our business community on Soviet trade issues?
- o Thanks for the read-out.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



December 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK MATLO

SUBJECT:

Meeting with the President and Secretary

Baldrige on December 23

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President concerning Monday's meeting with Secretary Baldrige. He will be reporting to the President on his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev during his December 9 - 11th visit to Moscow.

Also attached are suggested talking points for the President (Tab A).

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I outlining for him the purpose and sequence of events for Monday's meeting with Secretary Baldrige.

Approve	 Disapprove	

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM:

SUBJECT:

WILLIAM F. MARTING BUGUN
Letter 1 Letter to Mesars. Pan and Beiderman in Response to

their Letter to the President Concerning the

Plight of Soviet Jewry

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Messrs. Pan and Beiderman, concerning the plight of Soviet Jewry.

Attachments:

Letter to Messrs. Pan and Beiderman Tab A

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S #	8533629
DATE	December 11, 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

REFERI	ENCE:				
	TO:	President Reagan	FROM:	Mr. Pan and Mr.	Beiderman
	DATE:		SUBJECT	: Reagan-Gorbache	V
	Me	eeting: Soviet Jewry			
	WHITE	HOUSE REFERRAL DATED:		NSC #	
		THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF S		CTLY	
ACTIO	N TAKE	<u>N:</u>			
	X	A draft reply is attac	hed		
		A draft reply will be	forwarded		
		A translation is attac	hed		
		An information copy of	a direct	reply is attache	đ
	-	We believe no response cited below	is neces	sary for the reas	on
		Other	•		*

REMARKS:

for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

2

Dear Messrs. Pan and Beiderman:

I am replying to your October 2 letter to President Reagan requesting that he raise the plight of Soviet Jewry during his discussions with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. I regret the delay in this response.

The U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet persecution of its Jewish population. These measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have strongly called for the Soviets to comply with their commitments in that agreement. We have made it unequivocally clear in virtually every high-level meeting with Soviet officials that their persecution of Jewish cultural activists and those wishing to emigrate is a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Secretary Shultz underlined our enduring commitment to Soviet Jewry in his recent speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Luis Pan and
Mr. Bernardo Beiderman,
Argentine Committee for the Defense of
the Jewish Minority in the USSR,
Paraguay 1535 (1061),
Buenos Aires, Argentina.

In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

Sincerely,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LSNO. 118055 EL/MM Spanish

Argentine Committee for the Defense of the Jewish Minority in the U.S.S.R. Paraguay 1535
(1061) Buenos Aires, Argentina

Buenos Aires, October 2, 1985

Mr. Ronald Reagan President of the United States of America Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

We are appealing to you through Mr. Frank Ortiz, Ambassador of the United States in Argentina, to include the situation of the Jewish minority in the Soviet Union on the agenda of your forthcoming talks with Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva.

You are well aware of the nature of the problem, the circumstances that surround it, and the methods used to deny exit visas to thousands of Jewish citizens of Soviet origin. This committee, made up of Jewish and non-Jewish Argentine citizens representing the widest spectrum of the cultural, university, scientific, religious, artistic, and political life of our country, has been struggling for years—together with similar committees in Latin America and throughout the world—to create a climate of international opinion which will lead the U.S.S.R. to significantly change the policy it has followed until now on this issue.

18

Although it is true that in the 1970's several thousand Jews obtained exit visas, in the past five years that constitutional right has been systematically violated. It is likely that this year, just as in 1984, absolutely no visas will be issued. At no time and in no case have the Soviet authorities given a reason for their behavior.

The Soviet State thus violates not only its own laws but also the letter and spirit of the international agreements it has signed—the Helsinki agreement of 1975 and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, among others—by virtue of which the signatory countries undertook to respect the right of all their citizens to enter and leave their respective countries freely.

The virtual state of internment of the members of the Jewish minority in the Soviet Union contrasts openly with the constitutional recognition of a Jewish minority--among the 100 or more which make up the U.S.S.R.--and the existence for several decades of the Jewish Republic of Birobidzhan.

The denial of visas would be no more than a clearly cruel and illegal administrative act, if it were not accompanied, in all the cases, by the loss of jobs by the [visa] applicants, their expulsion from teaching posts and laboratories, and, in the majority of the cases, their imprisonment. Many of those who wish to emigrate have been waiting for a visa for over 10 and even 15 years.



Thus excluded even from the national and international scientific community, the "refusniks" become classless citizens, forced to depend for their very subsistence on the help of relatives and friends, and to perform clandestine, sporadic, low-paying work. The strict prohibition, under pain of arrest and conviction, against teaching and learning Hebrew, the closing of the synagogues, and the suppression of any cultural expression (press, books, magazines, theater, courses, conferences, painting exhibits) constitute an unequivocal attempt to destroy the Jewish identity. To reverse this situation, the U.S.S.R. has only to observe its own laws.

The problem, which for many years has been an important item on the agenda of the White House and in the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, has lately reached an incontrovertible level of seriousness when this and other typical attacks against Soviet Jews are cloaked under the handy "slogan" of "anti-Zionism" as a cover-up for anti-Semitism, one of the heinous crimes which, along with the horror of the Nazi genocide, led to the decision to create the United Nations in 1945.

We are sure that you, Mr. President, will know how to interpret the meaning of our letter and many others in the same vein that you have received or will be receiving from around the world in the next few days. The problem of human rights does not end at the geographical borders of any country, or in

the realm of one particular race, or in the color of people's skin, or in the sphere of a specific religion since, by its very nature, its scope, and implications, it is the responsibility of all mankind.

We hope that your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev will further the cause of world peace and respect for human rights everywhere.

[Signature]

Bernardo Beiderman Vice President [Signature]

Luis Pan President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Letter to Messrs Pan and Beiderman in Reponse to

their Letter to the President on the Plight of

Soviet Jewry

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Messrs. Pan and Beiderman, concerning the plight of Soviet Jewry. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley

Tab A Letter to Messrs. Pan and Beiderman

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 24, 1985

Mostok

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLEY KELLEY

FROM:

SUBJECT:

WILLIAM F. MARTINGHOUND Burgion
Lett-Letter to Mr. Fred Everett and Ms. Ruth McLaulin

in Response to their Letter to the President

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response (TAB A) prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Everett and Ms. McLaulin, concerning the Geneva meeting.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Letter to Mr. Everett and Ms. McLaulin

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

	TO:	President Reagan FROM: Mr. Fred Everett	_
٠	DATE:	October 16, 1985 SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev	_
	Me	eting	_
	WHITE	HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: Oct. 24, 1985 NSC # 357360	
		THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE	

ACTION TAKEN:

REFERENCE:

Σ.	A draft reply is attached .
	A draft reply will be forwarded
	A translation is attached
	An information copy of a direct reply is attached
	We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
	Other

REMARKS:

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Dear Mr. Everett and Ms. McLaulin:

Reagan regarding his November 19-20 summit meeting in Geneva with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. We appreciate your comments and "solution" as we move forward in our efforts to build the foundation for a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I regret the delay in this response.

The basis for this summit was set by the firm and realistic policies the President has pursued toward the Soviet Union. For 40 years, the behavior of the Soviet Union has complicated our hopes for peace and the growth of freedom. Through the reestablishment of our political, economic, and military strength and the reinvigoration of our alliances, we were able to establish a dialogue with the Soviet Union based on realism and strength.

The President called for a fresh start in U.S.-Soviet relations. We have now made that start. In Geneva, the two leaders had an intensive and frank examination of all the issues on our basic four-part agenda: arms control, regional

Mr. Fred Everett and
Ms. Ruth McLaulin,
4220 Fairgreen Terrace,
Marietta, Georgia.

where he stands and discussed areas of mistrust and suspicion.

The joint statement issued at the end of the meeting frankly recognized that our systems and policies are vastly different.

The competitive nature of our relationship will continue.

Nevertheless, President Reagan and General Secretary

Gorbachev agreed they share an overriding responsibility to
ensure this competition remains peaceful and to work together
to strengthen peace. The two leaders also agreed to meet again
and to set up a regular process of summit meetings, in addition
to meetings of senior officials of both countries. This new
high-level dialogue will provide a framework for intensifying
discussions and solving problems.

The meetings in Geneva were characterized by a great deal of give-and-take. On arms control, the President reaffirmed his commitment to securing deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive systems. At the same time, he outlined his goal of moving deterrence toward a greater reliance on defense and away from the threat of nuclear retaliation. The purpose of the Strategic Defense Initiative is to determine whether strategic defenses are feasible. The President made clear the United States, was not prepared to restrict research legal under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

We were pleased that the two sides were able to agree on a number of important points relating to arms control in the

coint statement:

- --In the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, both sides agreed to the principle of 50 percent reductions in nuclear arms and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.
- --We agreed to study the feasibility of risk reduction centers.
- --We agreed to enhanced cooperation in support of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
- --Both sides endorsed the concept of an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons and agreed to experts' meetings on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.
- -- We emphasized the importance of achieving positive results at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna.
- --Both sides reaffirmed the need for a document at the Stockholm Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression to the principle of non-use of force.

With regard to human rights, the President stressed to

Mr. Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of

law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. He pressed for

greater Soviet adherence to international agreements, such as

the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviets agreed in the joint statement, to the importance of resolving numeritarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

On regional issues, the President stressed that in addition to seeking a safer and more stable strategic environment, the United States and the Soviet Union need to work together to end dangerous regional conflicts. The President raised the Soviet Union's continuing intervention, both directly and through proxies, in Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, and Cambodia. He urged an intensified consultative process on regional conflicts. Both sides agreed to regularize the process of discussions by experts of both sides and at the foreign minister level.

In bilateral relations, President Reagan and Soviet

General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and strengthening people-to-people contacts. In this connection, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign

Minister Shevardnadze signed a new exchanges agreement in Geneva. The two leaders also reviewed progress in a number of other bilateral areas, including the civil aviation agreement, our new agreement on air safety in the Northern Pacific, expanded people-to-people exchanges, and the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York. Although these steps are modest, we believe they demonstrate we can work together to resolve problems to our mutual benefit.

Pernaps the most important result of the Geneva meeting was that it allowed both leaders to discuss their differences in a candid and private setting. As the President said at the conclusion of the meeting, the talks also provided an opportunity to explore common concerns in all four areas of our relationship. Where there are differences, we believe they are now better understood. Where shared concerns exist, there is now a more solid foundation for dealing with them. In the end, both leaders agreed that real confidence must be built on deeds, not just words. The Geneva meeting was a very worthwhile beginning to what we hope will be a productive process of resolving problems through concrete action.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 24, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

COMMENT / RECOMMENDATION

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 357360

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 16, 1985

TO:

PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM:

MR. FRED EVERETT

4220 FAIRGREEN TERRACE MARIETTA GA 30067

SUBJECT: OFFERS SOLUTION TO ESTABLISH WORLD - WIDE

PEACE

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO: AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

> SALLY KELLEY DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

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Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.

Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).

Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.

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October 1t. 1988

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC USA

General Secretariet Mikhail Gorbachev The Kremlin Moscow, Soviet Union

Gentlemen:

What is to the problem of nuclear, chemical, and biological armaments -- a problem of civilization threatening proportions?

- Suppose the United States invited 25,000 Russian citizens ("Guest Inspectors") to the United States with freedom of movement and unrestricted access to any research facility (public or private), any production plant, or any military compound...
 - Suppose the Soviet Union invited 25,000 American citizens ("Guest Inspectors") to the Soviet Union with freedom of movement and unrestricted access to any research facility, any production plant, or any military compound...
- Suppose "all" nations of the world -- NATO Alliance, Warsaw Pact, China, Third World, etc., exchanged "Guest Inspectors" with the United States, the Soviet Union, and each other...
- If this were accomplished, what is the probability that any nation could complete research, production, and deployment of any nuclear, chemical, or biological armament without detection by visiting Guest Inspectors?

We submit the above plan with full appreciation of the current state of world affairs, the difficulty of the task at hand and no expectation for immediate implementation. But, what are the benefits?

1221 ... Cotinett in 1997,

> You, as World Leaders, would frame the debate -- focus world discussion on this global problem and the proposed solution.

This "Formula" is fair, equitable -- verifiable.

You would put any nation hostile to world peace on the diplomatic defensive.

Then accomplished you will have established the framework - COLE BUT DEACE.

Defense expenditures could be reduced (over time) by 50%.

The energies of the people you serve and people everywhere could be directed to humanitarian endeavors.

he we know the distance between the entrenched positions of East and West is substantial. We know the road to enduring peace is long and fraught with difficulties. We know that perfect solutions do not always fit an imperfect world. But, as responsible World Leaders you must share your vision and propose a "real" solution. SALT Treaties and START Talks are illusions. There is "no" room on our ever shrinking world for these armaments. The spectre of global elimination demands more than illusions! Unless this problem is effectively resolved, what is the probability that someday, somewhere, the superpowers, the secondary powers, the third world powers, or some terrorist group will initiate an attack using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons? How long can 50,000 nuclear weapons and untold chemical and biological weapons be scattered across the face of the earth before a deranged leader or some demented kamikaze terrorist gains access and decides to perpetrate the unthinkable? How long can civilization gloss over the realities of this frightful predicament? It is time for great leaders to show the way!

As fellow inhabitants of this world we all share, we have but one request on behalf of all mankind -- let serious discussions between World Leaders be focused on a "real" solution. LET THE DIALOGUE BEGIN!

Sincerely,

Fred Everett

4220 Fairgreen Terrace Marietta, GA 30067 USA Ruth McLaulin 370 Ridgewater Drive


Marietta, GA 30067 USA

Ruth J. Mc Lawlin

F.S.

...and while you are addressing nuclear, chemical, and biological armaments, you may also wish to consider our proposed colution for conventional military icross.

- Suppose the United States limited its military manpower to that required for legitimate "defensive" purposes -- 1,000,000 men and women...
- . Suppose the Soviet Union limited its military manpower to that required for legitimate "defensive" purposes -- 1,000,000 men and women...
- . Suppose "all" nations of the world -- NATO Alliance, Warsaw Pact, China, Third World, etc., joined with the United States and the Soviet Union in limiting their military manpower to that required for legitimate "defensive" purposes...
- It is the intent of this proposal that the number of military personnel for each nation be established by of military personnel per 250 population and that Guest Inspectors monitor compliance.
- Suppose the United Nations was vested with broad peacekeeping powers and the muscle to effectively intercede in local conflicts...
- . If this were accomplished, what is the probability that any nation, however large or small, could impose its will upon any other nation?



HOW WOULD THE "FORMULL" WORK!

- The world has a current population of approximately 4,000,000,000 people.
- Each nation of the world would be permitted to station Guest Inspectors in every other nation on the basis of "1 Guest Inspector per 10,000 population" in the host country.
- Canada, for example, would be permitted to station approximately 397,500 Guest Inspectors (4,000,000,000 minus their approximate population of 25,000,000 divided by 10,000) around the world as follows:

NATION	APPROXIMATE POPULATION	CANADIAN GUEST INSPECTORS
China Soviet Union United States United Kingdom All Other Nations	1,000,000,000 250,000,000 250,000,000 50,000,000 2,425,000,000	100,000 25,000 25,000 5,000 242,500
TOTAL	3,975,000,000	397,500

Due to cost and relative size not all nations would choose to send a "full complement" of Guest Inspectors to each and every nation around the world. The decision to "send" Guest Inspectors would be optional -- the decision to "receive" Guest Inspectors would be required.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1985

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SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTA

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Letter to Mr. Fred Everett and Ms. Ruth McLaulin in Response to their Letter to President Reagan

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed response (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Mr. Fred Everett and Ms. Ruth McLaulin, concerning the Geneva meeting. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for your signature.

Sestanovich, Mandel, Kraemer, Steiner and Raymond concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley

Tab A Letter to Everett and McLaulin

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM:

SUBJECT:

WILLIAM F. MARTINIUM Buguer

Letter to " Letter to Ms. Inna Belyaev Concerning her Family's

Unsuccessful Efforts to Emigrate from the Soviet

Union

We have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State to Ms. Inna Belyaev, in response to her letter to the President, concerning the unsuccessful efforts of her family to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft Letter to Ms. Inna Belyaev

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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DATE	December	€,	1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR:	Mr. Robert C. McFarlane	
	National Security Counc	il
	The White House	

REFER	ENCE:		
	TO:	President Reagan FROM: Ms. Inna Belyaev	
	DATE:	November 11, 1985 SUBJECT: Soviet Emigration	
		*	
	WHITE	HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: Nov. 15, 1985 NSC \$ 360285	
		THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
ACTION	TAKEN	<u>!:</u>	
	X	A draft reply is attached	
		A draft reply will be forwarded	
		A translation is attached	
		An information copy of a direct reply is attached	
		We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below	
		Other	

REMARKS:

Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED (CLASSIFICATION)

Dear Ms. Belyaev:

I am replying to your letter of November 11 to President
Reagan regarding the unsuccessful efforts of your family to
obtain Soviet visas to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

We, too, are concerned over the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to respect basic human rights, such as freedom of movement. We are particularly dismayed in light of its commitment in the Helsinki Final Act "to deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family."

The U.S. Government has consistently encouraged Soviet authorities to adopt a more favorable attitude toward Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. Unfortunately, the Soviets have not been responsive to our efforts, labelling them as "interference" in their internal affairs. They further reject U.S. attempts to represent individual Soviet citizens seeking to emigrate to a third country, such as Israel. In short, U.S. influence on Soviet emigration practices and decisions remains extremely limited.

Ms. Inna Belyaev, 1059 Wildwood Avenue, Daly City, California.

-

We will continue to exercise what influence we have. In raising the subject of human rights at the Geneva meeting, President Reagan stressed to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that respect for the individual and the rule of law is as fundamental to peace as arms control. In this regard, the President pressed for greater Soviet adherence to international agreements such as the Helsinki Accord. The Soviets agreed in the Joint Statement to the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in a cooperative spirit.

We have included the Malamis/Kapmar family name on the Department of State's list of Soviet Jews who have been repeatedly denied permission to emigrate. We present this list periodically to high-level Soviet officials to emphasize the deeply felt belief of the American people and government that Soviet Jews should not be forced to stay in the Soviet Union against their will. The Malamis/Kapmar family name will remain on this list until their case is resolved favorably.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

NOVEMBER 15, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF: ANNE HIGGINS

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 360285

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1985

TO:

PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM:

MS. INNA BELYAEV

1059 WILDWOOD AVENUE DALY CITY, CA 94015

SUBJECT: SEEKS VISA ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILY WHO WISH TO

LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO: AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

> SALLY KELLEY DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

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WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

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Mr. & Mrs. Vadim Belyaev 1059 Wildwood Avenue Daly City, CA 94015

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 19, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTYN

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOC

SUBJECT:

Letter to Inna Belyaev Concerning her Family's

Emigration from the Soviet Union

I have reviewed and concur in the proposed draft letter (Tab A) prepared by the Department of State, in response to Ms. Inna Belyaev's letter to the President, expressing her concern over the unsuccessful efforts of her family to obtain exit visas from the Soviet Union. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Sally Kelley for your signature.

Sestanovich, Covey, Mindel and Raymond concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Sally Kelley

Tab A Draft Response to Ms. Belyaev

Tab B Incoming Correspondence