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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA

F06-114/3

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YARHI-MILO

1306

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|--|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 8017 | MEMCON | PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i> | 6 | ND | B1 |
| 8018 | MEMO | MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SOVIET QUOTATIONS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i> | 1 | 11/17/1985 | B1 |
| 8019 | MEMO | USSR QUOTES AND SOURCES <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i> | 4 | ND | B1 |
| 8020 | MEMO | SAME TEXT AS DOC #8018 <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i> | 1 | 11/17/1985 | B1 |

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JM-C

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

November 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's October 24 Meeting with Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation from the President's October 24 meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.

attachment:

Tab I Memorandum of conversation: the President and Shevardnadze

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 7/2/02

SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

TIME: October 24, 1985 4:00 - 4:45 p.m.

PLACE: Waldorf Astoria

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

Soviet Side

President Reagan
Secretary Shultz
Chief of Staff Regan
Assistant to the
President McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
DAS Palmer
Interpreter Zarechnak

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Ambassador Dobrynin
Deputy Foreign Minister Kompleklov
Assistant to the FM Chernishev
Assistant to the FM Tarasenko
Interpreter N. Uspenskiy
Interpreter P. Palaschenko

The President welcomed Shevardnadze and they chatted together informally while two waves of press took pictures and tried to get them to answer questions.

The President then opened the meeting proper by stating that we had limited time today. We have been discussing a variety of issues in advance, and hoped that we could reach agreement on at least some of the lesser issues. We need to go on to the more vital questions, but he regretted that we had been unable so far to settle any of the lesser issues.

Shevardnadze said he would like first of all to thank the President for this meeting. He knew how tight the President's schedule was. They considered this meeting to be another demonstration of the President's personal attitude toward the meeting next month. There is little time left. In terms of practical preparations, finalizing an agenda and final positions, we need to work more intensively in the coming weeks. There really is very little time left. He would be

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/3 #8017
BY AV NARA DATE 10/30/07

speaking in purely practical terms the next day with Secretary Shultz and other representatives of the United States. They would review what has been done already on preparations including the main documents and main positions. Also they need to cover what General Secretary Gorbachev put forward in his message to the President.

The President said yes, that he had received Gorbachev's letter. We appreciate the arms control proposals which they have made. We are giving them careful study in Geneva and here; we are doing this with great care and we will be prepared to respond to them. Some things in their proposals present difficulties.

The President continued that we need to get at the overall things which affect our relationship. We need to get on to overall matter of peace. We need some understandings. Then arms control will be a simple matter.

Shevardnadze said that he agreed with the President that probably this was the main problem; this is the issue of security or in a different form arms control. This needs to play a decisive role in the Summit meeting and the Soviet side is prepared in this regard. These are complex questions. Problems have accumulated over many years. It is difficult at one meeting to resolve all of them. But the Soviets do not exclude the possibility of progress as far as fundamental questions are concerned. They have some general ideas which they would be prepared to discuss with the Secretary the next day. This would include language with regard to security problems and arms control.

Shevardnadze continued that the President knew the Soviet proposals. They had been outlined in the Gorbachev message and all of them were on the table in Geneva. They tried not only to put forward proposals, but had also already taken practical steps, unilateral steps. These included their moratorium on nuclear explosions affective until January first; also the cessation of the deployment of medium range weapons in Europe and their statement that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It was not a simple thing for them to take these steps.

Shevardnadze said that both sides have an interest in making progress on the major arms control questions. This included banning of space strike weapons. They also had a proposal for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. The third group was medium range weapons -- here they have several

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compromise proposals. Speaking frankly they had difficulty in understanding steps the United States had taken in response. The U.S. position was not clear. He would repeat that they understand these matters require careful study but with little time left both sides should accelerate their efforts so that the Summit can have a positive effect.

Shevardnadze continued that we also have bilateral, regional, and Stockholm confidence matters to consider. In this group of questions a certain convergence of views is emerging. At the same time they had noted that some members of the administration had been toughening their positions, for example in Stockholm and in the cultural exchanges talks. He mentioned this as there is very little time left and we need to use it in the most effective way.

Shevardnadze noted that last time he had seen the President he had said that all peoples and governments are looking forward to this meeting in Geneva with Gorbachev. They have no right to disappoint the world. Given mutual desires he believes we can develop positive things for the Summit which would make world public opinion more comfortable. However, he could not avoid saying that they fail to understand some of the statements of some in the administration with regard to a so-called Soviet threat and statements that there is a need for a new interpretation of past agreements which are the basis for the present strategic stability. It appears to the Soviet side that such actions are not conducive to preparations for a successful Summit.

The President said that some of the things we have suggested we would like to do even before Geneva. As a result of his earlier meeting with Shevardnadze, Ambassador Hartman had given Shevardnadze a list of things we could do. The main thing the President wanted to say is that he stands fully behind them. But the Soviet side seems to be dragging its feet. If we could move on this thing it would be an indication that both sides are serious about making settlements.

Shevardnadze responded that he had met Ambassador Hartman just a few days earlier. With regard to all of the matters which Hartman had raised with him, the leadership of the Soviet Union had same day been given instructions to do preparations. These were important matters, though they were not the most important. The next day he would have an opportunity to review things with the Secretary. Maybe there would also be a need for a second stage before the Summit. It would be good if Secretary Shultz could come to Moscow. The Soviet side would

be pleased to welcome him before the Summit to review both organizational and substantive problems. We could also have final discussions on language.

The President said that we were planning on the Secretary making this trip.

The Secretary noted that he had told Dobrynin that we were ready to go ahead.

The President said that with regard to dates, he understood it would be early November.

Shevardnadze said yes, the first ten days of November.

The Secretary noted that Dobrynin had mentioned that November 4 and 5 would be convenient.

Dobrynin noted that another possibility would be November 11-12.

The Secretary said that the 4th and 5th would be better given everything that is underway here. The next day they had a couple of hours to identify what needs to be done so that in Moscow they can move things along as the President had said we wanted to. We would be prepared to be responsive.

Shevardnadze said that we need initial impulses for the various delegations. So far as the Soviets are concerned, they will do this.

The Secretary said that the President already had been giving impulses to him, Bud, Roz, Jack and others. They all felt thoroughly prodded.

Shevardnadze said that they also were being given impulses.

The Secretary said there was one minor matter but it could cause great consternation if not handled well. Their invitation is a news item. So they needed to agree on how and when to make this known publicly. He had suggested to Dobrynin that they might do this the next day following his meeting with Shevardnadze, but there might be other ways.

Shevardnadze said that this depended on all of us, and that it was fine with him to do it the next day. He said in conclusion that Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership had asked him to give the President best greetings on behalf of the

Soviet government.

The President stated that he appreciated these greetings and looked forward to his meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.

The President then asked Shevardnadze to remain behind alone for a few minutes. The rest of both sides delegations left the room.

The tete-a-tete began at 4:30 and continued until 4:45.

D. Zarechnak was the interpreter on the U.S. side.
N. Uspenskiy was the interpreter for the Soviet side.
The mode of interpreting was consecutive.

The President indicated that he realized that the subject of human rights was considered to be an internal affair by the Soviet side, but he wished to point out that in the U.S. system of government, anything that the two sides would agree to would need to be ratified by the Congress, which in turn would need to see if it had public support. This is an important part of the structure of the U.S. Government.

The President continued that the U.S. side was not attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, but it would be easier for the Congress to ratify some matters if it saw that there was movement on some humanitarian issues. The President said that he was referring to those rights of human beings which were agreed to in Helsinki, such as family reunification. He indicated that he knew of one woman in the U.S. whose husband was in the Soviet Union, and they had not seen each other for four years.

The President indicated that the U.S. is unique in that Americans come from every corner of the world - either they themselves have come from other countries, or their parents or grandparents have. Americans are of many different backgrounds - Irish, Italian, Russian, etc. They have strong feelings for the lands of their heritage and about the denial of rights which they feel occurs for some people in those lands.

The President said that now, before the Summit, something ought to be done in the area of humanitarian deeds. He stressed that deeds were necessary, not just words. There were some people who were not permitted to emigrate. Their names were both

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 6 -

nationally and internationally recognized.

The President indicated that his son is a free-lance journalist and he had visited Moscow for the May Day celebration and had met two Soviet men who were denied permission to emigrate. One of them was the husband of the woman whom he had just mentioned.

The President said that if some action was taken on these issues, in connection with names that had been transmitted by Ambassador Hartman and perhaps would be mentioned tomorrow morning, it would be easier to reach agreement on other issues.

Shevardnadze replied that the President had mentioned this issue at their last meeting. He wished to assure the President that everything which had been mentioned by the Secretary of State, by the President and by Ambassador Hartman was being given very serious study. Such issues were always seriously studied, even without special request. The Soviet Government places no barriers to such requests if they do not involve security matters. That is the main thing. So the Soviet side would see if the emigration of these individuals was legal, and if it was, they would be permitted to leave. If it was not, the Soviet side would explain why such permission was not possible.

Shevardnadze said that he had explained to Ambassador Hartman that the U.S. side should not think that people in the Soviet Government had hearts of stone. All requests for emigration were taken to heart.

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9906

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

November 16, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Baldrige Request for Appointment with President

Secretary Baldrige has requested an appointment for 20-30 minutes with the President to report on his trip to Moscow.

I believe that it would be desirable for the President to receive Baldrige and hear first hand of his talks in Moscow.

Danzansky, Sestanovich, Mandel and Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Schedule Proposal
- Tab A Note from Alfred H. Kingon and Background Material

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Meeting with Secretary of Commerce Malcolm
Baldrige.

PURPOSE: To report on his meeting with Secretary
General Gorbachev on December 10, 1985

BACKGROUND: Secretary Baldrige visited the Soviet Union
and was granted a meeting with Secretary
General Gorbachev on December 10, 1985.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President has met before with Secretary
Baldrige.

DATE & TIME: December 16 or 17.
Duration 20-30 minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Donald T. Regan, Robert C.
McFarlane, Admiral John M. Poindexter,
Jack F. Matlock.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Report on his meeting with Secretary General
Gorbachev.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None required.

MEDIA COVERAGE None.

PROPOSED "PHOTO": The President and Secretary Baldrige sitting
across from each other.

RECOMMENDED BY: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1985

NOTE FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: ALFRED H. KINGON *R*

Would you please handle
the attached request from
Secretary Baldrige.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1985

NOTE FOR ALFRED H. KINGON

Helen Robbins called from Embassy Brussels this morning to request meeting with the President for Secretary Baldrige. The Secretary wants 20-30 minutes to report to the President on his Moscow meetings. Requests meeting early in the week (Monday or Tuesday).

9:00 am

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Matlock~~
Cham File 8402

November 17, 1985

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE (e, 11)

SUBJECT: Soviet Quotations

Issue

Whether to review the attached quotations attributed to Soviet leaders.

Facts

You asked your staff to try to verify the authenticity of the quotations attached at Tab A.

Discussion

We asked the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research to check the authenticity of the quotations, which were drawn from a secondary source by Professor Albert Weeks of New York University. Following a thorough investigation the State Department was able to verify only five of the sixteen quotations. In the other 11 cases, the researchers were either unable to locate the quotations in the sources referenced or found them to be inaccurate. In dealing with the Soviets it is probably more useful to cite Soviet actions, which speak volumes in themselves, than to make references to quotations from past Soviet leaders. In many cases the current Soviet leaders will be unwilling to concede the accuracy of the quotations, and in others they are likely to claim that the quotations were taken out of context or misinterpreted. Their actions, however, cannot be so easily denied.

Recommendation

OK AA No
— —

That you review the quotations cited above as accurate.

Attachment:

Tab A List of Quotations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
NLRR F06-114/3 #8018

QUOTES AND SOURCES

1. Andropov: "Marxism-Leninism is the textbook for achieving Socialist world revolution and the building of a new society in every country of the world."

Source: Yuri Andropov, Izbranniye Rechi i Stat'i, Politizdat, Moscow, 1979, p. 73.

2. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky; Chief Soviet General Staff 1952-1961; "In the present era, the struggle for peace and for gaining time presumes, above all, the steady strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and of the entire Socialist camp."

Source: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 1st and 2nd eds, translated by Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., N.Y., 1975, pp. 185 and 431.

3. Leonid Brezhnev 1970: "We seek to paralyze the forces of imperialism in Europe and to smash their aggressive plans. This means not only to contract the radius of activity of imperialism, but to inflict on it such defeat that it will be felt everywhere throughout the world."

Source: Leonid I. Brezhnev, op. cit. supra, Vol. 2, p. 9.

4. Leonid Brezhnev: "...detente, in fact, creates favorable conditions for the struggle between the two systems [and for altering the correlation of forces in favor of Socialism.]"

Source: Leonid I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom (Leninist Course), Politizdat, Moscow, 1976, p. 485. The phrase in brackets should have been bracketed originally to indicate a different Soviet source: Radio Moscow lecture by S. S. Vishnevsky, August 29, 1973. Moreover, the most extended discussion by Brezhnev of the "detente-creates-favorable-conditions" for global class struggle and a Soviet victory in it can be found in Brezhnev's political report to the 25th Party Congress, February-March 1976.

5. Leonid Brezhnev; Prague, 1973: "Trust us comrades, for by 1985, as a consequence of what we are achieving by means of detente, we will have achieved most of our objectives in Western Europe... a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that by 1985, we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to."

Source: William Beecher (from British intelligence), The Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1977, quoted in Brian Crozier, Strategy of Survival, Arlington House Publishers, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1978, p. 76. There is a dispute among specialists as to the authenticity of this quote. Yet authentication has come from other sources than Mr. Beecher or Mr. Crozier: e.g., Gen. Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, p. 112, has a similar quote from Brezhnev that Gen. Sejna heard directly from the Soviet leader when the former was on a high-level visit to Moscow in 1966. Brezhnev is supposed to have made the observation quoted by Beecher at a secret Pact leaders' meeting in Prague in 1973.

6. S. S. Lototsky, "...the armed forces, the population, the whole Soviet nation, must be prepared for the eventuality of nuclear rocket war."

Source: Soviet Army; Progress Publishers; Moscow 1971; p. 332.

7. Marshal A. A. Grechko; Soviet Minister of Defense 1967-1976; 1974: "Any war waged by the imperialists on the USSR or other Socialist states will be unjust and reactionary. When waged by the USSR or other Socialist states against imperialism, any war is just and progressive, for it would be the continuation of revolutionary policy."

Source: Marshal A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, Soviet Military Thought No. 12 (USAF trans.), pp. 100ff.

8. Marshal A. A. Grechko: "No compromise is possible between the Communist and bourgeois ideologies, and conflict between the two is inevitable."

Source: close approximation: In A. S. Milovidov, et al., The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1972, p. 216.

9. Boris N. Ponomarev; Communist Party Secretary: "Violence in itself is not an evil. It depends on what it's purpose is. In the hands of Socialists, it is a progressive force."

Source: B. N. Ponomarev, Real Socialism and Its International Significance, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pp. 14-15.

10. Andrei Gromyko, 1978: "Detente in no way, however, means the freezing of the objective processes of historical development. In no way does it eliminate the existence of class antagonisms within capitalist states, between the people's interests and those of world imperialism, and between the two social systems, nor does it reduce the ideological confrontation."

Source: A. A. Gromyko, Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoi Vneshnei Politiki Izbranniye Rechi i Stat'i (In the Name of the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy Selected Speeches and Articles), Politizdat, Moscow, 1978, p. 472.

11. Premier Alexei Kosygin, 1978: "Russia and its allies will control the high seas, space, and most of the world's landmass by the early 1980's."

Source: Premier Alexei Kosygin to Imelda Marcos of the Philippines, quoted in Newsweek, July 24, 1978.

12. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov; Chief of the Soviet General Staff; 1979: "The Soviet Union has military superiority over the U.S. Henceforth, the United States will be threatened. It had better get used to it."

Source: Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, to visiting U.S. Congressmen in 1979, quoted by Dr. Alvin J. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, 1981, p. 166. In personal conversation with Rubinstein, Dr. Weeks was told that several Congressmen heard this remark and that it was reported in the U.S. press.

13. General Major A. S. Molovidov, 1980, to Dr. Y. A. Zhdanov in "Questions of Philosophy," a Soviet Journal, October 1980: "Marxist-Leninists decisively reject the assertions of certain bourgeois theoreticians who consider nuclear missile war unjust from any point of view."

Secondary Source: War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks. Edited by Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, 1983; National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 111 East 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, p. 14.

14. Pravda, 1955: "We cannot be intimidated by fables that in the event of a new world war, civilization will perish."

Source: Pravda, Mar. 27, 1955.

15. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky: "Under conditions where nuclear rockets are used... that side which manages during the first days of the war to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory naturally acquires the capability for more effectively using the results of its nuclear attacks and disrupting the mobilization of the enemy. This is especially important with respect to European theatres of operations with the relatively small operative depth."

Source: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 1st and 2nd eds, trans. by Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., N.Y., 1975, p. 312.

16. "On the Communist side, nuclear war will be lawful and just -- the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind to destroy imperialism. It will resolve not specific limited political interests, but a crucial historical problem, one that affects the fate of all mankind."

Source: B. A. Byely, et al., eds, Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 (based on Russian 5th ed of 1968), p. 45.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 12, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Soviet Quotations

In a recent meeting the President asked his staff to try to verify several quotes attributed to Soviet leaders. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President advising him which quotations were successfully traced.

Speechwriters' research contacted Albert Weeks, author of the book from which the quotes were taken, and was given the references at Tab A. We forwarded this information to the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which attempted to verify each of the specific citations. State's detailed findings are at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I informing him which quotations could be verified.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

TC Ty Cobb, *WR* Walt Raymond, and *MS* Judy Mandel concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Original list of quotations with references from Albert Weeks
- Tab II State Department findings

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/3#8020
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

Soviet Quotation Verifications

1. The source could not be located.
2. We did not find the quote in the Garthoff's first edition of the book. We telephoned the editor of the Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc. edition of the book who confirmed the inclusion of the quote in their third edition on page 185. o.k. } /
3. The citation is located in Leninskim Kursom, volume 2, in Russian. o.k.
4. The first source was located but the citation was not present. The passage in Brezhnev's political report to the 25th Party Congress, February-March 1976, that is most likely the one referred to reads: "Detente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle."
5. The citation appears in the secondary source Strategy on Survival.
This frequently cited quotation has never been authenticated. Soviet media have denied the quotation whenever it has been used.
6. The source could not be located.
7. The source was located and the citation was not present.
8. The source was located and the citation was not present.
9. The source could not be located.
10. The source was located and the citation was present. o.k.
11. The source was located and the citation was present. However, it is not a direct quotation of Kosygin but is what Mrs. Imela Marcos is reported as stating what Kosygin said. It would not have been likely that Kosygin said it in these terms.
12. The 1985 edition of the source was located but the citation is incorrect. The citation in the 1985 edition of Dr. Rubenstein's book is not a direct quotation. It reads:

"Ogarkov reiterated that the USSR was not seeking nuclear superiority and noted that the United States did not seem reconciled to the Soviet Union's attainment of nuclear parity, but instead yearned for the old days of its former nuclear superiority, which, he added, was a thing of the past, as the United States would have to learn to accept."
13. The citation is unsubstantiated because it cites itself as a secondary source and fails to give a primary source.
14. The citation was found in "Current Digest of the Soviet Press" in English. The citation was in the Pravda source in its correct form. o.k.

15. Garthoff's first edition of the source was located and the citation was essentially correct; Garthoff's edition has a slightly different translation than the quote on your list. 19
o.k.

16. The source was located. The first sentence of the citation is out of context and inaccurate. The second sentence is essentially correct and in context. The full paragraph from which the first sentence is taken reads:

"The social, class content of nuclear missile war and its aims will be determined by politics. The new world war will be, on one side, the continuation, weapon and instrument of criminal imperialist policies being implemented with nuclear missiles. On the other side, it will be the lawful and just counteraction to aggression, the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind to destroy imperialism, its bitterest enemy, the source of destructive wars."

Wang 3976S

JM-C
20NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Larry Speakes forwarding a proposed letter to Charles Wick acknowledging the services of VOA and America magazine staff in preparing the Russian language version of the President's October 31 interview with Soviet journalists.

RECOMMENDTION

That you forward the attached memo to Larry Speakes.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Larry Speakes

Tab A Proposed letter from Larry Speakes to Charles Wick



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY M. SPEAKES

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick

Attached at Tab A is a proposed letter to Charles Wick acknowledging the outstanding work of USIA staff in preparing Russian language versions of the President's written and oral interviews with Soviet journalists. On two successive nights the USIA staffers worked until after 3 a.m. to prepare timely, accurate translations of the President's comments. They have truly earned the attached letter of thanks.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed letter to Charles Wick

A

24

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Charlie:

I wanted to let you know that two offices in USIA provided magnificent support for the President's October 31 interview with Soviet journalists. When we decided to give the Soviets a Russian language version of the President's written and oral responses, VOA and America magazine took on the task with very short notice and under considerable time pressure.

The written questions were initially translated by the State Department, but we needed to edit the State draft and reproduce it in professional fashion. VOA's USSR division head, Mark Pomar, with Nataluiya Clarkson and Ivan Hrapunov, helped with the editing. Then we turned to the America magazine staff, which not only provided final editing but reproduced the entire text on their A-Tec system. The final product was professionally printed.

We were not surprised by the quality of the VOA and America work, but when you consider that America did not get the text until 8 p.m., and the final version had to be turned over to the Soviets the following morning, we think their efforts deserve special mention. America editor Bob Poteete, along with Ilya Suslov, Edward Lyakovich, and Michael Mikkalo, worked through the night to complete the task.

Not satisfied with that performance, the two staffs undertook the next evening to translate, edit, and print the President's oral answers to TASS questions. This was another all night operation with an even shorter deadline. The transcript was available at 5 p.m. and had to be in Soviet hands by 9 a.m. The VOA staff, bolstered by Barbara Cummins, prepared the translation and shuttled the answers to America, which edited, typed and printed the final version. The America staff was augmented by Leonard and Elena Cox and Michael Mackenzie, but basically the same crew worked through another night.

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-2-

Both written and oral responses were prepared in the highest professional manner. Your staff pitched in to help with exceptional good grace and humor, taking on an extremely important task under very tight constraints. They saved the day, and their performance should not go unnoted.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Larry M. Speakes
Principal Deputy Press Secretary

Charles Z. Wick, Director
United States Information Agency
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

20

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 26, 1985

Dear Mr. Corwin:

Thank you for your letter to the President of November 15 and your interesting account of experiences in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. You have witnessed and participated in some truly historic world events.

I would also like to thank you for your words of support for the President on the eve of his departure for Geneva and his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. It is support like yours which has made our policy toward the Soviets - based on realism, strength and dialogue -- a successful one.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Edward J. Corwin,
200 Central Park South,
New York, N.Y. 10019

JP

245

Do letter

from me -

Thanking you
John

CORWIN *20A*
National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION |
|----------------------------------|-------------|----------|--------------|
| Bob Pearson | <u>1</u> | <u>P</u> | _____ |
| William Martin | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| John Poindexter | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Paul Thompson | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Wilma Hall | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Bud McFarlane | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| William Martin | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>2</u> | _____ | <u>staff</u> |
| Situation Room <i>Metlock</i> | _____ | _____ | _____ |

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

Inf: Metlock

From Kathy Osborne

21

Edward J. Corwin, 200 Central Park South, New York, NY 10019
(212)246-2982

- 1. Rem - Jm i
- 2. Last mat love

November 15, 1985

Mr. President:

I join all Americans wishing you maximum progress toward current objectives. I pray in the enclosed electronic ~~open~~^{yl} letter to you, based on a lifetime of exposure to Russians, that your initiative of on-going Summit dialogue will become a turning point. It may open the historic epoch of


C O - E V O L U T I O N

which will gradually reduce ideological and socio-economic differences.

Ultimately, the co-evolution will bring to all mankind lasting peace, human freedom and the pursuit of happiness.

God bless you.

Admiringly,



The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

~~OPEN~~ LETTER TO RONALD REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

I was born in what was then the Russian far east, now China. As an eight year-old child, I witnessed the Russian revolution. Then I grew up in Poland, watching closely the first three decades of the Soviet neighbors' communist developments.

In 1938, I came to the U.S. and was enrolled in a sales class at IBM, of which Tom Watson, Jr. was elected president. He became the builder of IBM's greatness, then the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. I am proud and grateful for our continuing friendship.

In 1939, I went to work for IBM in Poland. As a reserve officer of the Polish cavalry, I was literally on the frontier line when Hitler attacked at dawn on September 1st. I remained in close quarters fighting throughout the entire Polish campaign. Two weeks after Hitler announced victory, the commander of the last still-fighting regular Polish forces accepted honorable capitulation.

Fifty-two months of captivity in Germany gave me the time to compare and think about the freedom of life in America, the Nazi dictatorship, and even talk directly about contemporary conditions with Soviet soldiers working across the barbed wire from my prison camp.

In February 1945, I escaped and after a recapture was thrown together with other escapees including Soviets and G.I.'s. We faced the same uncertain fate.

Since I spoke fluent Russian, I talked a lot with Soviets, mostly about life in America. Before we parted, their leader told me: "You think you are a wise man, but you are stupid--none of us believe your fantasies about your land of freedom and opportunity; we were warned at our army schools that when we meet foreign soldiers speaking Russian, passing for privates, they will be in fact specially trained propaganda officers. But you shared with us the food you stole from Germans. Don't despair--one day we will come to America and we will liberate your people from the yoke of capitalism."

These Russian soldiers were so thoroughly brainwashed that they let me go on for two months and laughed openly when we parted. But they were friendly, helpful, real comrades in arms and warm human beings. We became true friends.

In a few short years, the dogmatic dictatorship of the Communist party subjugated adjoining countries. Then came the Iron Curtain, the Berlin Wall, the Cold War, the crushing of peoples' uprisings in Poland and Hungary.

And yet in 1959, Khrushchev visited the U.S. Tom Watson selected me to tell Khrushchev in Russian live on NBC and CBS the story of the first IBM disc storage computer. Earlier that day at the open lunch in the IBM cafeteria, Khrushchev made the historic speech proposing that our two nations c o - e x i s t, and I quote "in peace and without war." As host, Tom Watson gave an historic, moving response. I sat next to a young man, who I was sure was the closest confidant of Khrushchev. We

talked intensely and in an open manner. He laughingly asked me never to reveal his name, since the "aparatziki" will prove me a liar and convince everyone that our conversation is my fantasy. But we agreed, and I surmise this reflected Kruschov's thoughts, that co-existence could work if our divergent ideologies and systems will gradually evolve to let plain human goodness dissipate suspicions and fears and equalize the socio-economic patterns of our two different worlds.

And the same Kruschov later unleashed the arms race and the Cuban crises. Then came the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Yet detente went on. I traveled twenty five times into Iron Curtain countries and talked to people of all levels, from prime ministers to pedestrians. Many asked if the U.S., being stronger at that time, would start another world war. But most were afraid to talk and be denounced for associating with an American. However, they were eager for our technology and I sold them an earlier generation IBM computer, the first behind the Iron Curtain.

On that weekend in Warsaw, I joined tourists visiting the former Summer Royal Palace. The guide talked in English and completely ignored a plainly dressed middle-aged Russian couple. I volunteered to interpret for them. I wore a cheap, local coat. When we were leaving, I asked: "What do the Russian people think--will Poland suffer a third world war?" The man, taking me for a fearful Polish citizen, smiled self-assuredly. "Don't worry, my brother. The Americans don't have the guts to start a war. We don't need to start it. We need to become stronger while America rots inside. American women will fight against

men. Young people will fight against any authority, American armed forces will decay in numbers and morale. Our army will grow in strength and discipline. Maybe in ten years, we shall serve Americans an ultimatum and they will have to gently submit to our brotherly guidance and ideology."

The next day, in the lobby of my hotel, I nearly bumped into my man. He looked even more self-assured in his bemedalled tunic of a Soviet general, flanked by two smartly attentive officers.

I was startled. The man, who the day before confirmed my fears that Soviets rely on subversion to destroy the fabric of our nation, was in fact a Soviet general. I realized that no amount of basic goodness of the plain Russian people can stop the power-hungry Communist drive for world domination.

As we all know, America rebounded from the malaise of the '60's, and woke up to the subversive and well-orchestrated process of the destruction of our society.

The long-range goals of communism were being cleverly disguised by negotiations. Salt I and Helsinki were hailed as proof of Moscow changing directions, only to become an opportunity to cheat and violate the agreements.

The suspicions grew and the hate campaign intensified on both sides.

With the growing Soviet nuclear superiority came the fear of physical, nuclear annihilation.

And so, after the initial cooperation which gave birth to the United Nations, after the attempts at co-existence, after actual confrontations, there is now a growing conflict of current objectives. A conflict aggravated on both sides by a limited feel for philosophy, history, psychology and sensitivity of the two adversary worlds.

The world will know in a few days if the Summit became merely a contest between the negotiators, each claiming a victory. I met you, Sir, I looked into your eyes on two occasions, and I strongly feel that the driving force of President Reagan, his motive, is the love of his people. He sacrifices his health and shortens his life not to earn a place in history, but to serve America in the best way he can. What we read about Gorbachev conveys the image of a dedicated Communist who has a record of caring for his people and effectiveness in overcoming the obstacles the bureaucracy creates for the well-being of the Soviet nations.

This Summit may become an historic turning point offering to both leader an opportunity to look into each other's eyes and examine their ultimate motives, and hopefully find greater common goals than current adversary targets.

Of course, to keep their power, the leaders will certainly convey to their constituencies the images of hard negotiators, but in their personal encounter, they may honestly pledge to seek a way for a better future.

Let us pray that the two men holding the destiny of the world in their hands value the survival and lasting happiness of mankind more than the

passing glory of a victory in a current contest. Let us hope that these two men will begin an on-going Summit dialogue, as suggested by you, President Reagan.

Such dialogue will generate a desire to look for good features in the adversary system. Such dialogue will permit us to learn more about the soul of each nation. Based on the growing knowledge, the present and future leaders of the two super powers may seek a mutual co - e v o l u t i o n conceived by love, hope and resolve to equalize the differences and thus eliminate the roots of future conflicts among nations. Co-evolution is a long road. It may take generations and time to encompass all nations. But it is the only road for mankind to go on toward a happier existence.

God bless you.

Admiringly,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Edward J. Corwin". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Edward J. Corwin

cc: His Excellency Thomas J. Watson, Jr.

~~Muller~~

9459

~~FILE~~ 34

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY M. SPEAKES

FROM:

WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT:

Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick

Attached at Tab A is a proposed letter to Charles Wick acknowledging the outstanding work of USIA staff in preparing Russian language versions of the President's written and oral interviews with Soviet journalists. On two successive nights the USIA staffers worked until after 3 a.m. to prepare timely, accurate translations of the President's comments. They have truly earned the attached letter of thanks.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed letter to Charles Wick

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Letter of Acknowledgment to Charles Wick

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Larry Speakes forwarding a proposed letter to Charles Wick acknowledging the services of VOA and America magazine staff in preparing the Russian language version of the President's October 31 interview with Soviet journalists.

RECOMMENDTION

That you forward the attached memo to Larry Speakes.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Larry Speakes

Tab A Proposed letter from Larry Speakes to Charles Wick

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Charlie:

I wanted to let you know that two offices in USIA provided magnificent support for the President's October 31 interview with Soviet journalists. When we decided to give the Soviets a Russian language version of the President's written and oral responses, VOA and America magazine took on the task with very short notice and under considerable time pressure.

The written questions were initially translated by the State Department, but we needed to edit the State draft and reproduce it in professional fashion. VOA's USSR division head, Mark Pomar, with Nataluiya Clarkson and Ivan Hrapunov, helped with the editing. Then we turned to the America magazine staff, which not only provided final editing but reproduced the entire text on their A-Tec system. The final product was professionally printed.

We were not surprised by the quality of the VOA and America work, but when you consider that America did not get the text until 8 p.m., and the final version had to be turned over to the Soviets the following morning, we think their efforts deserve special mention. America editor Bob Poteete, along with Ilya Suslov, Edward Lyakovich, and Michael Mikkalo, worked through the night to complete the task.

Not satisfied with that performance, the two staffs undertook the next evening to translate, edit, and print the President's oral answers to TASS questions. This was another all night operation with an even shorter deadline. The transcript was available at 5 p.m. and had to be in Soviet hands by 9 a.m. The VOA staff, bolstered by Barbara Cummins, prepared the translation and shuttled the answers to America, which edited, typed and printed the final version. The America staff was augmented by Leonard and Elena Cox and Michael Mackenzie, but basically the same crew worked through another night.

Both written and oral responses were prepared in the highest professional manner. Your staff pitched in to help with exceptional good grace and humor, taking on an extremely important task under very tight constraints. They saved the day, and their performance should not go unnoted.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Larry M. Speakes
Principal Deputy Press Secretary

Charles Z. Wick, Director
United States Information Agency
400 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20547

JMF
38

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Sally Kelley forwarding a State Department draft response to Pawlo Dorozhynsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine. We have reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to reflect that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We recommend that a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress be included among the suggested enclosures.

Steve ^{SS}Sestanovich, Judyt Mandel, Bob ^{RS}Linhard, Gerald ^{AM}May, Steve ^{SS}Steiner, and Sven Kraemer ^uconcur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I for Sally Kelley.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

| | |
|-------|---|
| Tab I | Memorandum to Sally Kelley |
| Tab A | State Department draft response |
| Tab B | State's suggested enclosures |
| Tab C | letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan |
| Tab D | letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President |
| Tab E | tasking to State |

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Response to Organization for Rebirth of Ukraine

Attached at Tab A is a State Department draft response to Pawlo Dorozhynsky of the Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine. We have reviewed the draft and suggested some minor changes to reflect that the Geneva meeting has already taken place. We recommend that a copy of the President's November 21 address to Congress be included among the suggested enclosures.

Attachments:

- Tab A State Department draft response
- Tab B State's suggested enclosures
- Tab C letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to Patrick Buchanan
- Tab D letter from Pawlo Dorozhynsky to the President
- Tab E tasking to State

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UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

S/S # 8532253

DATE November 15, 1985

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: Mr. Patrick Buchanan FROM: Mr. P. Dorozhynsky

DATE: 10/4/85 SUBJECT: Reagan-Gorbachev

Meeting

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 10/31/85 NSC # 858145

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached
- A draft reply will be forwarded
- A translation is attached
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
- Other

REMARKS:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

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SUGGESTED RESPONSE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dear Mr. Dorozhynsky:

I am replying to your October 4 letter to President Reagan regarding preparations for the November 19-20 meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva.

The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev ^{should be viewed as} [is] part of our continuing efforts [to] construct a more stable and productive relationship with the Soviet Union. The Geneva meeting could ^{lead to new opportunities} [mark a moment of opportunity] in our relations. At the same time, we have no illusions about the difficulties of this task or the continuing differences between our two countries. Above all, we recognize that the ^{ultimate} success of the meeting in Geneva depends on Soviet willingness to work responsibly with us. If they are ready to meet us halfway, progress should be possible in all areas of our bilateral relationship.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union is based on the three principles of realism, strength, and dialogue. Over the past five years, we have applied these principles in an effort to

Mr. Pawlo Dorozhynsky, Chairman,
Central Executive Committee,
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine, Inc.,
P.O. Box 4 Cooper Station,
New York, New York 10276.

build a more constructive relationship sustainable over the long term. Fundamental U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are addressed in our four-part agenda: arms control, regional issues, economic and other bilateral issues, and human rights.

The U.S. Government has consistently condemned Soviet unwillingness to respect basic human rights. These measures are contrary to the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. We have strongly called for the Soviets to comply with their commitments in that agreement. We have made it unequivocally clear in virtually every high-level meeting with Soviet officials that their human rights violations are a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet relations. We will continue to insist the Soviets live up to their international commitments, including the Helsinki accords.

President Reagan [has announced his intention to] discussed the full range of issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations, including human rights, during his November meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. As we prepare for that meeting, we welcome your views.

I am sending the enclosed material in the belief that you will find it of interest.

Sincerely,

Enclosures.

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The President's Strategic Defense Initiative

March 1985

**United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.**

Arms Control, Strategic Stability, and Global Security



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the North Atlantic Assembly, San Francisco, California, October 14, 1985.

My talk this morning is about our relations with the Soviet Union, a central issue for the Western democracies. But before I start on that, I want to say something about terrorism, because terrorism is the war we're fighting right now.

Terrorists and the regimes that support them aim to shatter our ideals and our principles, undermine our democratic life, and pull down civilization itself. We've learned some lessons in the few days just past. The event isn't over, but still while it's fresh in our minds, let me tell you three points that stand out in my own mind.

- First, it tells us something about terrorists—that they're animals, cowardly animals. These are not guerrillas. These are not fighters for some liberation movement. They select the helpless to torture and murder. They lack the guts to do battle, just as they lack the guts to seek justice and peace by negotiation. That's the first lesson. [Applause]

- It tells us that we must take action. If free peoples do not move against the terrorists, no one will stop them. We must have the courage to act without violence, if possible, but recognizing that violence sometimes cannot be avoided. If our dedication to that principle paralyzes us, all our principles will be in jeopardy. That's a little more sobering lesson, so I notice you didn't

clap. But it's an important lesson. We have to be ready to act.

- And, third, it tells us that the democracies must stand together in our own cause. Our nations are the founders and the defenders of the rule of law. The terrorists know and seek to turn that against us. They insist that we be rigorous in granting due process to the enemies of the rule of law, and, as they do, they seek to instill fear—the fear that anyone who captures and brings to justice a terrorist becomes a target of terrorism.

We must stand for the rule of law, but we must not let fear turn it into a key to the jailhouse door. If we of the democracies stand together against this scourge, we will defeat it, and our ideals and values will thrive and be safe. I think we are now starting to do that.

Arms Control

I have a lengthy statement here that deals principally with the arms control matters being discussed in Geneva right now. I know it is too long, but it is an effort to pull together in one place where we are and they are, so we can see just what the issues are. So I ask you to bear with me and take it as a compliment, as you run out of patience, that we have thought, the President has thought, that this audience was the appropriate one to lay out in a rather painstaking way just what this is all about as we see it.

For 40 years, the Western democracies have wrestled with the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. As

legislators, you know firsthand that democracies love peace and really do not like spending money on defense. But you also know how precious freedom and democracy are and, therefore, how important it is that we defend the values that we hold dear. We democracies know that freedom has enemies in this world. But we also know that the purpose of our defensive strength is peace. Therefore, we all conduct foreign policies whose aim is a more positive and constructive relationship between East and West.

Nearly 2 years ago, President Reagan offered the Soviet Union a challenge to begin building a more constructive relationship. He said:

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union . . . If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace.

Since that time, we have made a start. The Geneva and other arms control negotiations are underway. We have initiated a process for discussing ways to defuse regional tensions and manage our competition peacefully. We have urged the Soviet Union to take practical steps to fulfill its international commitments on human rights. We have advanced ideas for expanding contact and interchange between our two societies, to fashion the network of bilateral ties that is a necessary feature of any productive relationship between two countries. These are steps forward, but much more needs to be done. One of President Reagan's major goals when he meets next month with General Secre-



Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA

Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.

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CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Mr. Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

October 4, 1985

*Likewise -
can you
do me a
draft answer.
PJT*

Dear Mr. Buchanan:

In preparation for the upcoming summit between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, we believe your office may find the enclosed letter to the President of interest.

Among the many concerns we share for the future welfare of the United States and the world, we feel that sound defense policy and human rights issues to be the most important. As we hope our President will not compromise on SDI research, we inherently trust President Reagan to dynamically defend the rights of those unable to speak for themselves held captive by Mr. Gorbachev, as he has so courageously done on the issue of abortion.

We commend and applaud your continuing efforts in support of human rights, and of our President. Keep up the good work!

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Pawlo Dorozhynsky

P. Dorozhynsky

Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine



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Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) Inc. USA

Office Address: 140-42 Second Ave., Room 23, New York, N.Y. 10003
Mail Address: Cooper Sta. P.O. Box 4, New York, N.Y. 10276 U.S.A.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

October 4, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

We wish to share with you several most urgent considerations for inclusion in the agenda of your summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. The executive board of ODWU, representing our branches nation-wide, fully supports your "peace through strength" and strategic defense initiatives. We also believe that arms reduction must be based on verifiable agreements.

We respectfully ask you to share with Secretary Gorbachev the grave concerns of Americans who pray daily not only for the welfare of these United States of America, but also the welfare and freedom of the captive nations and people of Central and Eastern Europe, who are our natural allies. The following are among the vital concerns we request you to share:

1. In discussing the establishment of a European nuclear-free zone, we petition that the proposal be made that the territories of the western Soviet republics -- Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic countries -- be included into this zone. This proposal would greatly benefit the vital interests of the United States of America and those of our NATO allies.

If accepted, nuclear weapons will be removed from the immediate borders of European countries greatly decreasing risk of surprise attack. If rejected, the people of the western Soviet republics and the European countries dominated by the USSR would know that the U.S.A. and not the USSR is defending their interests.

Whatever Secretary Gorbachev's response, one may consider publicizing this proposal after the summit for its propaganda value to our NATO allies and our own citizens.

2. We urge you to appropriate significant time to the questions of human rights and non-compliance of the Helsinki Accords by the the Soviet Union. Among the many violations, the most flagrant are:

a) The people of Ukraine and other enslaved republics are not free to exercise their religious beliefs. Ukrainian has been banned as a liturgical language. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church were "banned" and forcibly included into the Russian Orthodox Church, and the followers of the Ukrainian churches are severely persecuted for their beliefs. Mr. J. Terelya and Rev. Y. Budzijnowsky of the Ukrainian Catholic Church are but few among the numerous examples of such persecution.

We implore you to request the immediate and general amnesty for and release of all clergy and believers who are incarcerated for their religious practices and beliefs, the return of children taken away from their parents because of the latter raising them in accordance with their religious beliefs, and the removal of the illegal and unjust prohibition of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and other denominations in the Ukrainian SSR.

b) The continued Soviet government policy of "merging of nations" to the attempt of bringing up the "soviet man" is, in reality, the policy of russifying the people of national republics. This is the liquidation of their culture, language and their separate, distinct ethnic and historically national identities. The effect of such policy is evident in the continued increase of schools and publications in the Russian language at the expense of Ukrainians and other non-Russians. Although 75% of Ukraine is Ukrainian, a mere 25% of available books are in Ukrainian.

The official Soviet census of 1970 and 1979 revealed that the rate of increase of the Russian population in the Ukrainian and other western Soviet republics is three times higher than the rate of increase of their native populations. This result is achieved by the deportation and forced resettlement of the western non-Russian population into Siberia and the USSR's northern regions. Such policy is nothing more than ethnocide and cultural genocide, which are in violation of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords.

Please request the release of V. Chornovil, Yu. Badzio and others who are illegally sentenced for opposing the policy of russification, and those imprisoned who strive for human rights.

c) The government of the Soviet Union creates extreme difficulties in maintaining contact between relatives who live in the USSR and those living in the West, and blocks any emigration of Ukrainians who would like to unite with their relatives in the West. Please request that all restrictions be lifted on the reunion of families, and on free emigration for all people regardless of nationality, religion or political beliefs.

We respectfully urge you to raise the question of the sick prisoners of conscience Yu. Shukhevych, D. Shumuk and others whose relatives in the West requested these prisoners' release to their

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custody for medical treatment, but their continued requests are denied by Soviet authorities. If there is no intervention on their behalf, they will meet their death in prisons, forced labor camps or internal exile, as happened recently to V. Stus, O. Tykhy, V. Sokolov, Yu. Lytvyn and V. Marchenko.

We hope that you will keep these most urgent matters in mind during the summit meeting with Secretary Gorbachev.

d) The members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring group, who were honored by your proclamation of September 21, 1982, are all imprisoned for their attempt to make the government of the Soviet Union live up to the Helsinki agreements. For their peaceful action all members of this group were sentenced to long terms of prison or internal exile. Some of them, such as 80 year-old Oksana Meshko and the wounded WW II veteran, and poet, M. Rudenko, are severely ill and need immediate medical treatment not available in the remote labor camps or areas of exile. Please request their expeditious release to their families' care in the Ukrainian Republic or to the care of the Ukrainian community in the West.

3. We also ask that you raise the issue of establishing an American Consulate in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. This would provide needed protection for those Americans who wish to visit their relatives in Ukraine. The Consulate would also provide counsel to those desiring to travel to the West. This strategically-placed consulate would serve United States interests in many beneficial ways.

4. Kindly consider also the illegal jamming of Voice of America and Radio Liberty short and medium-wave broadcasts. This violates ITU Conventions as well as the intent of the Helsinki Final Act to engender more free dissemination and exchange of information. The inspiration, encouragement and information provided by these broadcasts are invaluable to those behind the iron curtain, and are perhaps the most cost effective tool we have to offer in promulgating hope for freedom, sharing truth, news and free thoughts otherwise proscribed by repressive communist regimes.

If Secretary Gorbachev is so confident in his system of government, then he should not feel threatened by alternative information sources and be compelled to jam these broadcasts.

Mr. President, as you know, the United States is the world's last hope for preserving and promulgating liberty and freedom. The Soviet Union is dedicated to world conquest and oppressive domination, not just of nations but of its peoples. It is at war with the world, even if some choose not to acknowledge that war. It is indeed an evil empire dedicated to the destruction of every individual's God-given rights, which they would replace with Kremlin-given "rights" of privilege -- which they may or may not choose to grant.

Those enslaved by Moscow's tyranny look to us to speak for them where they cannot, to pray for them where they cannot, and to defend them where they cannot. Those future generations that risk being born into the fruits Secretary Gorbachev's labors will either come to bless us for having had the courage to resist tyranny, or curse us along with Secretary Gorbachev for having helped establish it.

Let us not disappoint those who depend on us. We call upon you, Mr. President, to continue your courageous and highly moral convictions without compromise. We implore you to remember to speak for and defend those who cannot themselves act.

We pray that God will grant you the health, strength, wisdom, tools and guidance that will both arm and shield you at the summit, and facilitate your every success.

Please feel free to contact me, should you or your staff require any further information, or if I can be of any service.

Sincerely,

Pawlo Dorozhynsky

P. Dorozhynsky

Chairman, Central Executive Committee
Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine

8532253

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 31, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 858145

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4, 1985

TO: PATRICK BUCHANAN

FROM: MR. P. DOROZHYNKY
CHAIRMAN
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF
O. D. W. U.
POST OFFICE BOX 4 COOPER STATION
NEW YORK NY 10276

SUBJECT: SDI

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

*rec'd 5/5-1
10-15 10:50 AM*

358145 51
F0006-09

ID # _____

sg

**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

- O - OUTGOING
 - H - INTERNAL
 - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 / 1 /

Name of Correspondent: P. Dorozhynsky

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: SDI

| ROUTE TO: Office/Agency (Staff Name) | ACTION | | DISPOSITION | | |
|---|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------|------|--------------------------|
| | Action Code | Tracking Date YY/MM/DD | Type of Response | Code | Completion Date YY/MM/DD |
| <u>PLKOJE</u> | ORIGINATOR | <u>1/85/10/28</u> | | | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> |
| <u>99DOS</u> | Referral Note: <u>D</u> | <u>1/85/10/31</u> | <u>AN</u> | | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> |
| | Referral Note: | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> | | | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> |
| | Referral Note: | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> | | | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> |
| | Referral Note: | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> | | | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> |
| | Referral Note: | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> | | | <u> 1 / 1 / </u> |

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
 - C - Comment/Recommendation
 - D - Draft Response
 - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
 - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
 - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
 - S - For Signature
 - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
 - B - Non-Special Referral
 - C - Completed
 - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 - Code = "A"
 - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.