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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/13/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (6/10)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 13

YARHI-MILO

1304

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8008	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SOVIET DESIRE FOR JOINT DOCUMENTS: HARTMAN'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON NOVEMBER 14 <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
8009	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET DESIRE FOR JOINT STATEMENT: HARTMAN-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING NOVEMBER 14 <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	11/15/1985	B1
8010	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE 11/14 HARTMAN-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	11/15/1985	B1
8011	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE <i>PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	11/13/1985	B1 B3
8012	MEMO	GATES TO MCFARLANE RE "DOMESTIC STRESSES ON THE SOVIET SYSTEM" <i>PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	11/6/1985	B3
8013	PAPER	"DOMESTIC STRESSES ON THE SOVIET SYSTEM" <i>D 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	55	11/5/1985	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Matlock

SYSTEM I
9225

Chom

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Handwritten notes:
Hartman's
Meeting

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Soviet Desire for Joint Documents: Hartman's Meeting with Shevardnadze on November 14

George Shultz has sent you a memorandum describing Art Hartman's conversation with Shevardnadze yesterday, when the latter expressed "astonishment" that we are unwilling to proceed to draft a communique to be issued following your meeting with Gorbachev. It is clear that the Soviets very much want some type of joint document to carry home.

While a traditional type of communique is not in our interest, and we should continue to resist Soviet desires on this point, we may find that it will be useful to us to issue some sort of joint statement, provided the Soviets agree on a sufficient number of concrete matters that a commitment from them serves our interest. We should decide this only at the meeting, and use the Soviet desire for a document as leverage: that is, imply to them that if they want a document so much, then it is up to them to come up with sufficient content to make it worthwhile.

This way, you can make the call on the spot. In any event we would have separate statements describing the talks as a whole, plus perhaps signing of the exchanges agreement. Then, if the Soviets come across with some things in our interest, there could be a joint statement listing them.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	
—	—	That you read the Memorandum at Tab A from Secretary Shultz

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/3 #8008
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

November 15, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Desire for Joint Statement: Hartman-Shevardnadze Meeting November 14

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a Memorandum which reports on the meeting Art Hartman had with Shevardnadze yesterday. Not surprisingly, Shevardnadze made quite an issue out of our position that there will be no joint communique. Art considers this clear evidence that the Soviets badly want some sort of joint document to emerge from the meeting.

Assuming that if we get agreement on a sufficient number of concrete items, we are not adverse to formulating it into some form of a joint document (not, of course, a communique in the traditional sense), I believe we can use the Soviet eagerness for a document as some modest leverage. It is also my understanding that this is not counter to the President's wishes, since there would still be separate statements dealing with the meeting as a whole, and any joint statement would be confined to those specific actions on which both sides have agreed.

I have drafted a cover memorandum to the President on these assumptions. You should, of course, amend it if it does not reflect your thinking.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve *[initials]*

Disapprove *M*

Handled orally

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Secretary Shultz's Memorandum to the President of November 15.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3#8009
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

9225

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

November 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz ^{GPS}

SUBJECT: 11/14 Hartman-Shevardnadze Meeting

Art Hartman spent two hours this morning with Shevardnadze reviewing where we stand on the eve of your meeting with Gorbachev. The main thing Art came away with was that the Soviets badly want a final document of some sort in Geneva.

The document issue came up when Art presented our proposed language on the new exchanges initiatives. When he would not be pinned down on whether we expected the language to be included in a communique, Shevardnadze expressed "amazement" that there could be any question on this issue. He claimed to have a report from Dobrynin that a joint document had already been agreed except for a few details. (Shevardnadze was presumably referring to our having accepted on Monday for consideration some new Soviet ideas on specific issues in a joint document.) Shevardnadze complained that it would be a "waste of time" for you and Gorbachev simply to go to Geneva and say you had agreed to meet again. In the end, Shevardnadze acknowledged our right to refuse to accept a joint document, but made clear that he and Gorbachev personally felt that one was desirable.

Art reminded Shevardnadze of my repeated warnings that we remained to be convinced of the necessity or desirability of a final document. Art speculated that you and Gorbachev might make a final decision on how the meeting should be recorded only in Geneva. Shevardnadze was clearly not comfortable with this prospect.

It is clear from Shevardnadze's discomfiture how much importance the Soviets attach to a final document in Geneva. Dobrynin, probably pandering to the mood in Moscow, has apparently fueled expectations in the Kremlin by overstating our willingness to consider a document. I will use my Friday session with Dobrynin to be sure he knows our position on a final document and to underscore our continued seriousness as Geneva draws nigh.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

NLRR F06-114/3 #8010

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



~~SECRET~~

ACTION

November 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Draft National Intelligence Estimate

The CIA has provided an advance draft of a National Intelligence Estimate concerning domestic stresses on the Soviet system (Tab I). Essentially it covers in greater detail the points [REDACTED] made in the meeting of CIA analysts with the President Wednesday. You may wish to glance through it for further details.

FOIA(b)(3)

JL
John Lenczowski concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached draft NIE if time allows.

Approve *JF*

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Draft NIE

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR #06-114/3 #8011
BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/11

5
FOIA(b)(3)

National Intelligence Council

NIC #05472-85/1

6 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

FROM: Robert M. Gates
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-85, "Domestic Stresses
on the Soviet System"

Rond -

1. The DCI has instructed that I make available to you the uncoordinated draft of the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-85, "Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System," so that its themes can be of use in preparations for the meeting between the President and Gorbachev.

2. Please be reminded that this draft does not represent coordinated national intelligence. So far it is only the product of the National Intelligence Officer/USSR and select analysts of CIA/SOVA. Since we have not previously tackled this range of internal Soviet problems, it is more than usually difficult to anticipate final agency positions. I anticipate that some will take the position that this draft exaggerates the depth of Soviet internal difficulties and their constraining impact on Soviet foreign and military behavior. Others may feel that these Soviet problems make it more likely than this draft judges that the Gorbachev regime will compromise on security issues to achieve a relaxed and predictable course for East-West relations. Nevertheless, while dissents may be vigorous, I doubt they will be radically at variance with this draft.

3. We plan to submit a coordinated draft for approval by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on 14 November and to publish the NIE shortly thereafter.

[REDACTED]

Robert M. Gates

Attachment

cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/3 #8012
BY RW NARA DATE 7/13/11