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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name	MATLOCK, JACK: FILES			Withdrawe JET 4/1			r 3/2005
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7967 MEMO			RLANE RE MEMO TO M KENNETH ADELMAN	1	11/12/1985	B1	
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7974 PAPER		IET THEMESAN GENEVA TALKS	ID US COUNTERSON	4	ND	B1	1
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7968 MEMO		LOCK TO MCFAR M SECRETARY W		1	11/12/1985	B1	
	R	3/8/2011	F2006-114/3				

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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7970 MEMO	SAME	E TEXT AS DOC #7	968	1	11/12/1985	B1	
	R	3/8/2011	F2006-114/3				
7971 MEMO	SAME	E TEXT AS DOC #7	969	2	11/4/1985	B2	B3
	PAR	1/28/2008	NLRRF06-114/3				
7972 MEMO	SAME	E TEXT AS DOC #7	967	1	11/12/1985	B1	
	R	3/8/2011	F2006-114/3				
7975 PAPER	SAME	TEXT AS DOC#79	974	4	ND	B1	
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7973 MEMO		OCK TO MCFARL T COMMUNIQUE	ANE RE SOVIET	1	11/12/1985	B1	1 [°]
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Box Number	13		RHI-MILO			
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7978 PAPER	NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS/OLD U.S. PROPOSALS	2	ND	B1		
	R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3					
7979 PAPER	SALT II AND THE DECLINE OF DÉTENTE	2	ND	B1		
	R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3					
7980 PAPER	SOVIET RESPONSE TO SDI	2	ND	B1		
	R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3					
7981 PAPER	U.S. ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION	N 3	ND	B1		
	R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3					
7982 PAPER	U.S. SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY	2	ND	B1		
	R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3					
7983 PAPER	LINKAGE	2	ND	B1		
	R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3					

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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System II

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

November 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB / JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

NSC Meeting on Regional/Bilateral Issues, Wednesday, November 13, 1985 -- 1:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing background on the NSC meeting scheduled for November 13, 1985, at 1:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum includes a proposed agenda at Tab A. The list of participants and the talking points for your use will be provided in a separate package.

Per your instruction, this NSC meeting is designed to serve as a final review of the major issues between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the bilateral, regional and human rights areas. We would anticipate that you would begin this session with an introduction highlighting to the President that the focus of this session will on bilateral, human rights and regional issues in our relationship with the Soviet Union. You might then turn to Secretary Shultz, who will follow with a review of the key Soviet-American issues in these areas and delineate our objectives for the meetings with Gorbachev.

Recommendation

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President Tab A Proposed Agenda Tab B List of Participants

SECRET Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED NLRRFD6-614/3#7963 BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/1



MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE:	November 13, 1985
LOCATION:	Cabinet Room
TIME:	1:00 p.m 2:00 p.m.
FROM:	ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To review bilateral and regional issues for your Geneva meeting with General-Secretary Gorbachev.

II. BACKGROUND

Today's session will focus on the bilateral, regional and human rights issues between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. We will hold the remaining arms control issues for a future session.

-- Regional Issues

While public attention has focused on the arms control aspects of our relationship, the Soviet use of force outside Soviet borders lies at the root of our problems. We are particularly concerned with the Soviet tendency to employ military force, directly or through surrogates, in their conduct of foreign policy. In the 1970s our efforts to develop an understanding with the U.S.S.R. was severely impaired by Moscow's unrelenting pursuit of unilateral advantage. Your proposal in your UNGA Address was directed at this problem.

We will look to our own strength, as well as closer cooperation with our Allies and friends, to defend our interests. We will make it clear to Gorbachev that we will continue to pursue such policy as necessary--in Central America, the Middle East, Africa or elsewhere. Further, we will not foreswear the right the lend assistance to democratic elements when they appeal to us to resist aggression. At the same time we are seeking to expand our dialogue with the Soviet Union on regional issues. As you know, this year we have had discussions on the Middle East, Southern Africa, Afghanistan and Asia.

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-- Bilateral Issues

SECRET

It may be possible to complete several negotiations on issues such as exchanges and consulates in time for our November meeting. If the Soviets are not forthcoming on these issues, we are prepared to continue our discussions in the future. The important thing is to get agreements which can stand up to the test of time and are firmly grounded on each side's interests.

In addition to the negotiations on an exchanges agreement, resumption of air service and opening consulates in Kiev and New York, you proposed to Shevardnadze that we undertake a series of more ambitious projects. The Soviets have indicated that they will respond favorably to some of these, and have proposed that we co-sponsor a major international project to build a prototype thermo-nuclear power plant.

-- Human Rights

The Human Rights situation in the Soviet Union has, if anything, deteriorated since Gorbachev took power. However, there have been recent indications that the Soviets may be prepared to move on some of the outstanding cases. We understand, for example, that Mrs. Bonner-Sakharov has been given permission to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment.

We want to emphasize to Gorbachev that we consider human rights an integral part of our relationship and an area where the Soviets can do much to improve relations at a low cost to themselves. Some of these points are best made privately with Soviet interlocutors, to give them the opportunity to adjust their practices without being seen as backing down under U.S. pressure.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab B.





3

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity in the Cabinet room prior to the meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject highlighting the main issues, followed by George, who will provide a review of the key Soviet-American bilateral and regional issues. Following a 40-minute discussion, I will make some concluding remarks.

> Prepared by: Tyrus W. Cobb/Jack Matlock

-

Attachment

Tab A Agenda Tab B List of Participants



5

-

November 13, 1985, 1:00 p.m.-2:00 p.m., Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: National Security Meeting -- Regional/Bilateral Issues

PARTICIPANTS:

The President The Vice President Secretary of State Shultz Secretary of Treasury Baker Secretary of Defense Weinberger Attorney General Edwin Meese Mr. Donald T. Regan Mr. Robert C. McFarlane Dr. Alton Keel, OMB Director Willam J. Casey, CIA Admiral William J. Crowe, CJCS Mr. David L. Chew Mr Craig L. Fuller Admiral John M. Poindexter Ambassador Jack F. Maťlock Dr. Tyrus C. Cobb

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: TYRUS C. COBB

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSC Meeting on November 13, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to pertinent agencies, forwarding an agenda for the NSC meeting on Regional and Bilateral issues for Geneva. The meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, November 13, at 1:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room.

Jack Matlock.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memo at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Meno to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL

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CONEIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. DONALD GREGG MR. ALTON KEEL Assistant to the Vice President Associate Director for for National Security Affairs National Security and

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT Executive Secretary Department of State MR. ALTON KEEL Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs Office of Management and Budget

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency

COL. DAVID R. BROWN Executive Secretary Department of Defense CAPTAIN JOHN BITOFF Executive Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting -- Regional/Bilateral Issues (C)

There will be a National Security Council meeting in the Cabinet Room on Wednesday, November 13, at 1:00 p.m., on Regional and Bilateral issues for Geneva. (C)

The focus of this meeting will be on bilateral issues, regional concerns, and human rights. (C)

Villist F. Martin Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A Agenda

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED NLRR FD10-1143#7965 BY RW NARA DATE 3/8

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CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING Wednesday, November 13, 1985 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. Cabinet Room

AGENDA

I. Introduction

II. Regional/Bilateral Issues

III. Discussion

IV. Conclusion

Robert C. McFarlane (5 minutes)

Secretary Shultz (10 minutes)

All Participants (40 minutes)

Robert C. McFarlane (5 minutes)

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR F 06-114 3#7967

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

SECRET

ACTION

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE JACK F. MATLOCK FROM:

Memorandum to (the President from Kenneth Adelman SUBJECT:

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to you from Ken Adelman forwarding a paper to the President setting forth responses we have used to counter Soviet claims about our arms control positions. I have read the paper and think it largely duplicates much of what the President has been reviewing in connection with his recent interviews and other public statements. Under the circumstances, I see no need to forward it to the President. It may, however, provide useful input for the public diplomacy effort.

Sven Kraemer, Bob Linhard, and Don Fortier concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you not forward the paper to the President at Tab II.

Approve

Disapprove

Memorandum to Robert McFarlane from Kenneth Adelman Tab I Tab II Paper for the President from Kenneth Adelman

SECRET Declassify on: OADR



10

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Soviet Themes and US Counters on Geneva Talks

Attached is a paper on the above subject for the President's weekend reading.

Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment As stated

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11

SOVIET THEMES -- AND US COUNTERS -- ON THE GENEVA TALKS

SRET

The Soviets are concentrating on certain major themes in support of their positions. This paper outlines responses we have used. Many of the Soviet themes (e.g., SDI program aims at a first strike capability and will lead to Soviet responses and further arms race) parallel Soviet themes used earlier against the United States INF deployments.

1. <u>Soviet Charge:</u> The United States is violating the January Shultz-Gromyko accord on interlinking of the three negotiations--space, nuclear strategic weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

This includes the charge that we are refusing to discuss "preventing an arms race in space" despite the January agreement on discussing space and nuclear issues "in their interrelationship." The Soviets have asserted that agreement on START would be impossible without a ban on "space-strike arms." Gorbachev reiterated this linkage in his <u>Time</u> magazine interview.

Background: The Soviets appear no longer to insist that there can be no progress on START or INF unless space issues are resolved. However, they are still linking <u>agreement</u> on reductions in strategic offensive arms to United States agreement to abandon its SDI and ASAT programs. They are no longer tying an INF agreement to SDI, which is positive from our point of view. It should be noted that the January agreements used words designed to "paper over" substantive differences.

Response: The interrelationship of nuclear and space arms, including the offense-defense relationship, is a key element of our position in the Geneva negotiations. For example, we have asked the Soviet Union to begin even now to discuss how we would jointly manage a transition to a more defense reliant posture, should effective defenses prove out. Moreover, we are open to ASAT limits that are verifiable and in the United States interest, but have found none. The January agreement does not mean that agreements, in the interest of both nations, in some areas should be held hostage to agreement in other areas. Secretary Shultz refuted this linkage at the time and we have done so consistently ever since.

2. <u>Soviet Charge</u>: The intent of SDI violates the ABM Treaty. Such a program, once started, would not, or could not, be stopped.

In <u>Time</u>, Gorbachev charged, "...if billions and billions of dollars had already been spent on research, then nobody is going to stop because all that money had been invested in SDI."

SEGRET

<u>Response</u>: The ABM Treaty in no way limits research; it doesn't even mention it. Our research program is tailored to be fully consistent with the Treaty. If the research proves effective defenses feasible, cost effective and survivable, we would consult and negotiate with the Soviets on how the security of <u>both</u> sides might be strengthened by phased introduction of defenses.

We will judge defensive technologies by demanding criteria:

- -- A defensive system must at a minimum be able to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces to deny him confidence in achieving his objectives;
- -- It must be sufficiently survivable to fulfill its missions even with determined attacks against it; and,
- -- It must be able to maintain its effectiveness at less cost than it would take to develop offensive counter-measures to overcome it.

If the research is successful in meeting these criteria we could move forward toward strengthening deterrence and enhancing stability by reducing the role of ballistic missiles and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one. Our ultimate objective is a world free of nuclear arms--an objective to which all can agree. If the research is not successful we would not proceed with defenses, and, with close Congressional scrutiny and broad public debate certain, could not proceed.

The United States has terminated many defense systems which proved ineffective, such as the Skybolt Stand-off Air-to-Surface Missile and the DIVAD anti-aircraft gun, as well as major national non-military programs such as the supersonic transport. (The Soviet Union has also terminated programs such as the SS-10 heavy ballistic missile and the BOUNDER intercontinental bomber.)

3. <u>Soviet Charge</u>: SDI prepares the way for a United States first strike capability and for space weapons to strike terrestrial targets.

<u>Response</u>: The United States does not seek a first-strike capability. The research program as presently structured could not result in one. Finally, while one cannot envision all potential future technology developments, it is unrealistic to believe that the United States could obtain one through SDI.

Technologies being studied under the SDI program have, even in theory, little or no potential to attack targets on the ground. Space-based technologies selected specifically take advantage of the absence of atmosphere in space; most systems based on them could not penetrate the atmosphere to hit groundbased targets. Soviet treatment of the "first strike" issue is misleading. In their lexicon, any United States weapon, new to their force planning is defined as destabilizing and a "first strike" system. They have even applied this to the space shuttle.

4. <u>Soviet</u> <u>Charge</u>: SDI will require Soviet responses and thus accelerate the arms race and preclude offensive reductions.

In <u>Time</u> Gorbachev said "In the opinion of our experts (and, to my knowledge, many of yours), this (elimination of nuclear weapons) is sheer fantasy. However even on a much more modest scale, in which the Strategic Defense Initiative can be implemented as an antimissile defense system of limited capabilities, the SDI is very dangerous. This project will, no doubt, whip up the arms race in all areas, which means that the threat of war will increase."

<u>Response</u>: If defenses were sufficiently cost-effective, i.e., if it were less expensive to augment defenses than to take counter measures (such as increasing offensive forces) against them, there would be no incentive to increase offensive forces.

Since such cost effectiveness is a key United States criterion for SDI, the United States would proceed with defenses only if they prevented, rather than produced, an arms race.

If effective defenses prove feasible, we would hope for a jointly managed transition to a more defense-reliant world. Both sides would obviously wish for a regime in which each could assure its own survival and not depend on the forebearance of the other.

Reducing offensive weapons is in the interest of both sides today and for the future, independent of whether effective defenses prove feasible. Such reductions were the centerpiece of our position before SDI, and are still the first priority.

5. Soviet Charge: United States Allies oppose SDI.

Background: Most Allies support SDI research. Even those Allied governments that have not explicitly supported research have moved to facilitate it, by authorizing participation of their industrial sectors. This does not mean that they necessarily "hope" for its success. Allies have expressed reservations on possible deployments because:

- -- for the British and French, it impacts on their deterrents;
- -- United States commitment to Allied defense could be seen as lessening, even though this is not the case;

-- the likelihood of conventional war could increase if the Soviets have defenses against nuclear weapons, unless Allies substantially increased their conventional forces which they are not inclined to do.

<u>Response</u>: Our Allies understand the military context of SDI. They support both the long-term goal of finding a more effective alternative for preventing war and the near-term goal of hedging against similar Soviet programs. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following the meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, 1984 (and in similar statements by other Allies since):

-- <u>First</u>, the United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet deployments;

-- <u>Second</u>, SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for consultations and negotiations;

-- <u>Third</u>, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and

-- Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

9037

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506



ACTION

November 12, 1985

DECLASSIFIED NLRR Fold-114/3#7968 BY RW NARA DATE 3/8

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCH Memorandum from Secretary Weinberger SUBJECT:

Attached at Tab I is a memo to you from Secretary Weinberger asking that you forward the memorandum at Tab II to the President. I have reviewed the memorandum, which was prepared for Secretary Weinberger by General Perroots of DIA. It focuses on probable Soviet initiatives at Geneva, and largely duplicates material which has already been presented to the President. Under the circumstances I see no need to forward it.

Judyt Mandel, Walt Raymond, Steve Steiner, Bud Korengold, and Johnathan Miller concur. NOT AVAILABLE

RECOMMENDATION

That you not forward the memorandum at Tab II to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

attachments:

Memorandum from Secretary Weinberger Tab I Tab II Memorandum from Perroots to Weinberger

✗ In view of the fact that Cap Weinberger will not be in Geneva, I think as a courtesy we should probably forward his memorandum. Of course it could be caveated by the NSC.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

November 6, 1985

14

Memo For_ Bud McFarlane

Bud--

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
I believe you will find interesting the attached DIA memo. I would appreciate it if you would forward it to the President.

Cap Weinberger

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

> DECLASSIFIED IN PART NLRR FO6-114-3#1769 BY CU NARA DATE 1/20/08 BY CU NARA DATE 1/20/08

9037

S-432/DIO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Expected Soviet proposals/issues at the summit - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(5) Our intelligence holdings and analyses indicate that the Soviets can be expected to raise at or just prior to the summit a variety of proposals and issues which at first glance may not seem related. These proposals and issues, which are listed in the enclosure, are all designed to pressure the US into concessions on arms control, notably on SDI. At the summit itself Moscow can be expected to focus almost exclusively on arms control.

(s) In these presummit days the Soviets are trying to project the image that the summit will only be successful if it results in some type of arms control agreement or presidential commitment to conclude such an agreement. The Soviets can be expected to adopt the same posture at the summit. If the Soviets do not succeed in getting a US arms control commitment, they will portray the summit as a failure because of US intransigence and US determination to gain strategic superiority.

(8) Possibly through repackaging an all encompassing arms control proposal that ostensibly provides for deep cuts in nuclear arms, Moscow will seek at the summit, if not an outright US pledge to abandon SDI, at least a US concession that could lead to such an abandonment. Several Soviet tactics, moreover, such as getting the US to reaffirm the ABM Treaty or getting the US to accept additional "principles" to guide superpower relations or prevent nuclear war, would be aimed at this goal. Moscow's overriding objective at the summit, although by no means the only one, is to eliminate US SDI efforts. Soviet suggestions to increase Jewish emigration, to release some Soviet dissidents, or to resume grain purchases from the US, are similarly designed to create a climate conducive to US concessions on arms control.

(s) DIA is, of course, already providing intelligence support on several of the above issues to ISP. My staff is now preparing background material for your use before the summit that will elaborate with appropriate intelligence data and analysis on each of these Soviet gambits.

(H) Coordination within OSD is not required.

Enclosure: Expected Soviet Proposals/ Issues at the Summit (S) 1 Cy

Summed H Ferrot

LEONARD H. PERROOTS Lieutenant General, USAF Director

BZ , 733

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EXPECTED SOVIET PROPOSALS/ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT (U)

1. Arms Control

A. "Agreement in principle" on future of nuclear and space talks

B. 50% cut in "strategic" weapons delivery vehicles

C. Phased reduction of INF missiles

D. Extension of SALT Interim Restraint arrangement

E. Allegations of US arms control violations

F. Verification measures beyond national technical means (possibly along lines of proposal by non-aligned states)

G. Reiteration of moratoria and freeze proposals

- Moratorium on research development, testing, and deployment of "space-strike arms"

- Freeze "strategic" offensive arms at current levels

- Halt US INF and Soviet "countermeasures" deployments

- Ban on cruise missiles

- Moratorium on nuclear testing

H. Agreement on no-first use of nuclear weapons

I. Nuclear and chemical weapon free zones

2. Basic Principles Agreements

A. For guiding superpower relations

B. For prevention of nuclear war

3. Soviet Human Rights "Concessions"

A. Offer of increased Jewish emigration

B. Greater flexibiity in treatment of dissidents (possibly relaxation of Sakharov exile)

4. Soviet "cooperation" on regional and other issues

- Nicaragua

- Middle East
- Counter-terrorism
- Grain purchases from US

SECRET





DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN PART NLRR +06-11 + NOV 1985 BY CU NARA DATE !

S-432/DIO

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Expected Soviet proposals/issues at the summit - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(5) Our intelligence holdings and analyses indicate that the Soviets can be expected to raise at or just prior to the summit a variety of proposals and issues which at first glance may not seem related. These proposals and issues, which are listed in the enclosure, are all designed to pressure the US into concessions on arms control, notably on SDI. At the summit itself Moscow can be expected to focus almost exclusively on arms control.

(8) In these presummit days the Soviets are trying to project the image that the summit will only be successful if it results in some type of arms control agreement or presidential commitment to conclude such an agreement. The Soviets can be expected to adopt the same posture at the summit. If the Soviets do not succeed in getting a US arms control commitment, they will portray the summit as a failure because of US intransigence and US determination to gain strategic superiority.

(8) Possibly through repackaging an all encompassing arms control proposal that ostensibly provides for deep cuts in nuclear arms, Moscow will seek at the summit, if not an outright US pledge to abandon SDI, at least a US concession that could lead to such an abandonment. Several Soviet tactics, moreover, such as getting the US to reaffirm the ABM Treaty or getting the US to accept additional "principles" to guide superpower relations or prevent nuclear war, would be aimed at this goal. Moscow's overriding objective at the summit, although by no means the only one, is to eliminate US SDI efforts. Soviet suggestions to increase Jewish emigration, to release some Soviet dissidents, or to resume grain purchases from the US, are similarly designed to create a climate conducive to US concessions on arms control.

(s) DIA is, of course, already providing intelligence support on several of the above issues to ISP. My staff is now preparing background material for your use before the summit that will elaborate with appropriate intelligence data and analysis on each of these Soviet gambits.

(H) Coordination within OSD is not required.

Enclosure: Expected Soviet Proposals/ Issues at the Summit (8) 1 Cy

Summed H Cent

LEONARD H. PERROOTS Lieutenant General, USAF Director

BZ,03

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EXPECTED SOVIET PROPOSALS/ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT LUT

1. Arms Control

A. "Agreement in principle" on future of nuclear and space talks

B. 50% cut in "strategic" weapons delivery vehicles

C. Phased reduction of INF missiles

D. Extension of SALT Interim Restraint arrangement

E. Allegations of US arms control violations

F. Verification measures beyond national technical means (possibly along lines of proposal by non-aligned states)

G. Reiteration of moratoria and freeze proposals

- Moratorium on research development, testing, and deployment of "space-strike arms"

- Freeze "strategic" offensive arms at current levels

- Halt US INF and Soviet "countermeasures" deployments

- Ban on cruise missiles

- Moratorium on nuclear testing

H. Agreement on no-first use of nuclear weapons

I. Nuclear and chemical weapon free zones

2. Basic Principles Agreements

A. For guiding superpower relations

B. For prevention of nuclear war

3. Soviet Human Rights "Concessions"

A. Offer of increased Jewish emigration

B. Greater flexibility in treatment of dissidents (possibly relaxation of Sakharov exile)

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- 4. Soviet "cooperation" on regional and other issues
 - Nicaragua
 - Middle East
 - Counter-terrorism
 - Grain purchases from US

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NLRR F010-114 3#7970

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/

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ACTION

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCIT

SUBJECT: Memorandum from Secretary Weinberger

Attached at Tab I is a memo to you from Secretary Weinberger asking that you forward the memorandum at Tab II to the President. I have reviewed the memorandum, which was prepared for Secretary Weinberger by General Perroots of DIA. It focuses on probable Soviet initiatives at Geneva, and largely duplicates material which has already been presented to the President. Under the circumstances I see no need to forward it.

Judyt Mandel, Walt Raymond, Steve Steiner, Bud Korengold, and Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you not forward the memorandum at Tab II to the President.

Approve_____

Disapprove

attachments:

Tab IMemorandum from Secretary WeinbergerTab IIMemorandum from Perroots to Weinberger

In view of the fact that Cap Weinberger will not be in Geneva, I think as a courtesy we should probably forward his memorandum. Of course it could be caveated by the NSC.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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November 12, 1985

DECLASSIFIED NLRR F. DC4-114/3#7972 BY ADD NARA DATE 3/8/1/

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President from Kenneth Adelman

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to you from Ken Adelman forwarding a paper to the President setting forth responses we have used to counter Soviet claims about our arms control positions. I have read the paper and think it largely duplicates much of what the President has been reviewing in connection with his recent interviews and other public statements. Under the circumstances, I see no need to forward it to the President.

Sven Kraemer, Bob Linhard, and Don Fortier concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you not forward the paper to the President at Tab II.

Approve Dis

Disapprove

Tab IMemorandum to Robert McFarlane from Kenneth AdelmanTab IIPaper for the President from Kenneth Adelman

SECRET Declassify on: OADR



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Soviet Themes and US Counters on Geneva Talks

Attached is a paper on the above subject for the President's weekend reading.

Kenneth L. Adelman

Attachment As stated



DECLASSIFIED SYSTEM II NLRR F06-114/3 # 1975 91136 BY CN NARA DATE 10/31/07 SOVIET THEMES -- AND US COUNTERS -- ON THE GENEVA TALKS

The Soviets are concentrating on certain major themes in support of their positions. This paper outlines responses we have used. Many of the Soviet themes (e.g., SDI program aims at a first strike capability and will lead to Soviet responses and further arms race) parallel Soviet themes used earlier against the United States INF deployments.

1. <u>Soviet Charge:</u> The United States is violating the January Shultz-Gromyko accord on interlinking of the three negotiations--space, nuclear strategic weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

This includes the charge that we are refusing to discuss "preventing an arms race in space" despite the January agreement on discussing space and nuclear issues "in their interrelationship." The Soviets have asserted that agreement on START would be impossible without a ban on "space-strike arms." Gorbachev reiterated this linkage in his Time magazine interview.

Background: The Soviets appear no longer to insist that there can be no progress on START or INF unless space issues are resolved. However, they are still linking agreement on reductions in strategic offensive arms to United States agreement to abandon its SDI and ASAT programs. They are no longer tying an INF agreement to SDI, which is positive from our point of view. It should be noted that the January agreements used words designed to "paper over" substantive differences.

Response: The interrelationship of nuclear and space arms, including the offense-defense relationship, is a key element of our position in the Geneva negotiations. For example, we have asked the Soviet Union to begin even now to discuss how we would jointly manage a transition to a more defense reliant posture, should effective defenses prove out. Moreover, we are open to ASAT limits that are verifiable and in the United States interest, but have found none. The January agreement does not mean that agreements, in the interest of both nations, in some areas should be held hostage to agreement in other areas. Secretary Shultz refuted this linkage at the time and we have done so consistently ever since.

2. <u>Soviet Charge</u>: The intent of SDI violates the ABM Treaty. Such a program, once started, would not, or could not, be stopped.

In <u>Time</u>, Gorbachev charged, "...if billions and billions of dollars had already been spent on research, then nobody is going to stop because all that money had been invested in SDI."

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<u>Response</u>: The ABM Treaty in no way limits research; it doesn't even mention it. Our research program is tailored to be fully consistent with the Treaty. If the research proves effective defenses feasible, cost effective and survivable, we would consult and negotiate with the Soviets on how the security of <u>both</u> <u>sides</u> might be strengthened by phased introduction of defenses.

We will judge defensive technologies by demanding criteria:

- -- A defensive system must at a minimum be able to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces to deny him confidence in achieving his objectives;
- -- It must be sufficiently survivable to fulfill its missions even with determined attacks against it; and,
- -- It must be able to maintain its effectiveness at less cost than it would take to develop offensive counter-measures to overcome it.

If the research is successful in meeting these criteria we could move forward toward strengthening deterrence and enhancing stability by reducing the role of ballistic missiles and by placing greater reliance on defenses which threaten no one. Our ultimate objective is a world free of nuclear arms--an objective to which all can agree. If the research is not successful we would not proceed with defenses, and, with close Congressional scrutiny and broad public debate certain, could not proceed.

The United States has terminated many defense systems which proved ineffective, such as the Skybolt Stand-off Air-to-Surface Missile and the DIVAD anti-aircraft gun, as well as major national non-military programs such as the supersonic transport. (The Soviet Union has also terminated programs such as the SS-10 heavy ballistic missile and the BOUNDER intercontinental bomber.)

3. <u>Soviet</u> Charge: SDI prepares the way for a United States first strike capability and for space weapons to strike terrestrial targets.

<u>Response</u>: The United States does not seek a first-strike capability. The research program as presently structured could not result in one. Finally, while one cannot envision all potential future technology developments, it is unrealistic to believe that the United States could obtain one through SDI.

Technologies being studied under the SDI program have, even in theory, little or no potential to attack targets on the ground. Space-based technologies selected specifically take advantage of the absence of atmosphere in space; most systems based on them could not penetrate the atmosphere to hit groundbased targets. Soviet treatment of the "first strike" issue is misleading. In their lexicon, any United States weapon, new to their force planning is defined as destabilizing and a "first strike" system. They have even applied this to the space shuttle.

4. <u>Soviet</u> Charge: SDI will require Soviet responses and thus accelerate the arms race and preclude offensive reductions.

In <u>Time</u> Gorbachev said "In the opinion of our experts (and, to my knowledge, many of yours), this (elimination of nuclear weapons) is sheer fantasy. However even on a much more modest scale, in which the Strategic Defense Initiative can be implemented as an antimissile defense system of limited capabilities, the SDI is very dangerous. This project will, no doubt, whip up the arms race in all areas, which means that the threat of war will increase."

<u>Response</u>: If defenses were sufficiently cost-effective, i.e., if it were less expensive to augment defenses than to take counter measures (such as increasing offensive forces) against them, there would be no incentive to increase offensive forces.

Since such cost effectiveness is a key United States criterion for SDI, the United States would proceed with defenses only if they prevented, rather than produced, an arms race.

If effective defenses prove feasible, we would hope for a jointly managed transition to a more defense-reliant world. Both sides would obviously wish for a regime in which each could assure its own survival and not depend on the forebearance of the other.

Reducing offensive weapons is in the interest of both sides today and for the future, independent of whether effective defenses prove feasible. Such reductions were the centerpiece of our position before SDI, and are still the first priority.

5. Soviet Charge: United States Allies oppose SDI.

Background: Most Allies support SDI research. Even those Allied governments that have not explicitly supported research have moved to facilitate it, by authorizing participation of their industrial sectors. This does not mean that they necessarily "hope" for its success. Allies have expressed reservations on possible deployments because:

- -- for the British and French, it impacts on their deterrents;
- -- United States commitment to Allied defense could be seen as lessening, even though this is not the case;

-- the likelihood of conventional war could increase if the Soviets have defenses against nuclear weapons, unless Allies substantially increased their conventional forces which they are not inclined to do.

Response: Our Allies understand the military context of SDI. They support both the long-term goal of finding a more effective alternative for preventing war and the near-term goal of hedging against similar Soviet programs. Our common understanding was reflected in the statement issued following the meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, 1984 (and in similar statements by other Allies since):

-- <u>First</u>, the United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet deployments;

-- <u>Second</u>, SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for consultations and negotiations;

-- <u>Third</u>, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and

-- Fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 SYSTEM II 91169

November 12, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Soviet Draft Communique

This is the draft Sokolov gave Palmer yesterday.

As I noted in Profs, it might be well to discuss our tactics in this regard with Secretary Shultz.

As I see it, the options are:

1. Sit on their draft and not reply in general, but continue to discuss these items of interest to us.

2.) Tell the Soviets that we consider an overall document unlikely, and therefore will be discussing in future only those items which seem possible to agree upon separately.

3. Exchange further language.

I would recommend the first option.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss the matter with Secretary Shultz so that clear instructions can be given as to how we should proceed.

Approve CM

Disapprove ____

NLRRF06-11434

NARA DATE 3 8 U

BYRW

Attachments:

Tab A Soviet Draft Communique

SECRET/SENSITIVE Declassify on: OADR

SOVIET DRAFT

JOINT US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

By mutual agreement, President of the United States of America Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev held meetings in Geneva on November 19 and 20, 1985. Attending the meetings were:

On the American side: George P. Shultz, US Secretary of State;

On the Soviet side: E. A. Shevardnadze, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had a useful, comprehensive and frank exchange of views on the fundamental issues of US-Soviet relations and the current international situation. Agreement was reached on some issues and remaining differences were defined more precisely. In this connection both sides reaffirmed the importance of a sustained dialogue based upon goodwill and expressed their readiness to bolster such a dialogue through practical deeds aimed at improving their relationship.

> DECLASSIFIED/20/0450) NLRR FUG 114/3 #7976 BY _____ NARA DATE (0/30/07

Acknowledging differences in the socio-political systems of the United States and the Soviet Union and in their approaches to international problems, both sides recognize their over-riding mutual concern and obligation to preserve peace.

The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU declared that the US and USSR will strive to overcome the present tension in their relatioship, to reduce the danger of conflict and to move toward a more constructive international environment in which all countries are free to prosper and to compete peacefully.

The two sides confirmed the need to adhere to universally recognized norms of international law, international commitments and agreements, including the UN Charter and the Final Act of the Helsźnki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Ι.

The United States and the Soviet Union recognize their special responsibilities for maintaining peace and avoiding confrontation. They discussed all aspects of the key security issues. The two sides agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union will base their relations on the fact that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any U.S.-Soviet conflict could have catastrophic consequences,

-2-

they underlined the importance of preventing any war between them, conventional or nuclear. Consequently, they will not seek military superiority or infringe in any other way upon the legitimate security interests of each other.

To demonstrate their resolve to do everything possible to prevent nuclear war and, ultimately, to eliminate all nuclear arms everywhere, both sides agreed to take practical measures to reach agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strenghthening strategic stability which is the agreed objective of the US-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

[NST guidelines language here]

Each side noted its policy of refraining from undercutting existing strategic offensive arms agreements to the extent that the other side exercises comparable restraint and provided that the other side actively pursues arms reduction agreement in the Nuclear and Space Weapons Talks. This policy serves the interest of maintaining strategic stability. In this connection, each side emphasized the need for strict compliance with arms control agreements in all areas.

The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to strictly abide by the provisions of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

-3-

The sides agreed to study the question of establishing centers to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation [in the context of resolving the issues under consideration at the Geneva talks, within the framework of the talks themselves, or in the SCC]. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernization of the US-Soviet hotline.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USA and the USSR to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, <u>inter alia</u> by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The USA and the USSR reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the Agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-4-

They view positively the practice of regular US-Soviet consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future.

-5-

In the context of discussing security problems the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favor of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an international convention on this matter.

The two Sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all the aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They also agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical veapons.

The two sides emphasized the importance they attach to the Vienna [HEFR] negotiations [on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe] and expressed their willingness to work for positive results at the negotiations.

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and noting the progress made there, the two sides expressed their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the Conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a concluding document which would both give specific expression and maximum effect to the principle of the non-use of force and include mutually acceptable confidence-building measures in the military field. In reviewing the key problems of the <u>contemporary</u> <u>international situation</u> President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, proceeding from the recognition of the vital importance of the developments in Europe to international peace and stability, reaffirmed the importance of achieving the goals established in the Helsinki Final Act, and enhancing the process of building security and cooperation in Europe.

-6-

II.

The two sides expressed their concern over the continued existence of tension and military conflict in certain areas of the world. Bearing in mind the existing differences between them in the approaches to regional problems and also recognizing the fact that the continued existence of tension pose a threat to their interests and the interests of international security, the USA and the USSR consider it irportant to act in such a manner so as to exercise mutual iertraint and contribute to peaceful political settlement of conflict situations on the basis of strict respect for the right of countries and peoples to free independent development.

The sides discussed the circumstances in which acts of violence and terrorism arise. The two leaders condemned terrorism and agreed to seek ways to reduce this growing threat to the international community.

Recognizing that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agreed to hold such exchanges on a regular basis. They also agreed that regional The President and General Secretary discussed the state and prospects for <u>bilateral cooperation between the United States</u> <u>and the Soviet Union in various areas</u>. The two sides expressed their intention to expand cultural, educational, scientific and technical exchange programs and people-to-people contacts and to develop trade and economic ties between the two countries.

The two leaders also noted with satisfaction that, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific and are working [have worked out] out steps to implement them.

They acknowledged that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations on [have concluded] a civil aviation agreement. The two leaders expressed their desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement at an early date. In this regard, an agreement was reached on the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev, respectively.

The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CHSU attended the signing of the Agreement on Contacts and Exchanges in the Scientific, Educational and Cultural fields. (If the signing takes place.)

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The two sides noted with satisfaction the growing number of useful exchanges between the two countries. They agreed on the utility of recent visits by heads of ministries and departments e.g., in the fields of agriculture, housing and environmental protection.

Both sides agreed to contribute to the preservation of the environment -- a global task -- through joint research and practical measures. In accordance with the existing US-Soviet agreement in this area, consultations will be held next year in Moscow and Washington on specific programs of cooperation.

The two leaders agreed on the advisability of new cooperative initiatives as follows: a joint program of cancer research, ... [Soviet side will provide additional initiatives from U.S. list]. They decided to instruct appropriate representatives and-organizations in each country to examine these initiatives from a practical standpoint.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to initiate a new program of international cooperation to build a pilot thermo-nuclear reactor. Other countries are being invited to participate in this project.

-8-

The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU set forth their respective views of principle on the issues of ensuring the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Mindful of the fundamental differences in their social systems and ideologies, and also of the fact that their ideological competition will continue, both sides nonetheless will conduct their affairs so as not to allow this to be an obstacle to improved relations.

Both sides agree that the questions involving individual citizens can and will be considered and resolved in the spirit of cooperation and without interference in the internal affairs of either of the two sides.

٧.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev believe that the understanding on a number of decisive problems reached as a result of the talks in Geneva will give a constructive political impetus to the development of stable relations between the US and the USSR. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed their resolve to achieve in the shortest possible time concrete results in all of the areas discussed. This will contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations, to the strengthening of international security and to the betterment of the world situation as a whole. The two leaders intend to facilitate bilateral contact at various levels, inter alia, by regularizing the practice of meetings between the Secretary of State and Soviet Foreign Minister.

The President and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to meet again in the nearest future to review progress and coordinate the follow-up measures aimed at reaching the said goals.

The President of the United States thus accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. For his part, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCH

SUBJECT:

Presidential Gift for Geneva

Attached at Tab I is a letter from Lyn Nofziger to Kathleen Osborne forwarding a copy of Classic Russian Idylls, a book of photographs taken in the Soviet Union by Proctor Jones. As Nofziger notes, the President has seen the book and telephoned the author to say how much he enjoyed it. In addition, Nofziger forwards a letter from Proctor Jones to the President (Tab II) suggesting the book may be appropriate as a gift for Gorbachev in Geneva.

The book is indeed excellent and would demonstrate to Gorbachev that sensitive, non-political books about the Soviet Union are published in the United States. Although gifts have long since been chosen for the President and First Lady formally to present to the Gorbachevs, I think this would be an excellent item for the First Lady to present informally to Mrs. Gorbachev at tea. 404 Steve Sestanovich and Judyt Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at Tab III to Bill Martin forwarding the book and a suggested letter of acknowledgment to James Rosebush.

Approve

Disaprove

That you sign the letter to Lyn Nofziger at Tab IV advising him of our recommendation on the book.

Approve_____

Disapprove

attachments:

Tab	I	Letter from Lyn Nofziger to Kathleen Osborne
Tab	II	Letter from Proctor Jones to the President
Tab	III	Memorandum - Martin to Rosebush
	Tab	A Classic Russian Idylls
	Tab	B Draft letter of acknowledgment
Tab	IV	Letter to Lyn Nofziger

LYN NOFZIGER

17 October, 1985

Ms. Kathleen Osborne Personal Secretary to the President The White House Washington, DC 20500

Dear Kathy:

Several months ago I sent you a copy of the enclosed book for the President. He was kind enough to call Proctor Jones personally to tell him how much he'd enjoyed the book.

Mr. Jones has since sent another copy of the book with the thought in mind that the President take it with him to the summit to present to Mr. Gorbachev.

There is also a letter in the book from Proctor Jones to the President.

As far as sending the book to the summit is concerned, I will trust your good judgment.

Sincerely, LYN NOFZIGER

1526 Eighteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 332-4030

Proctor Jones 3401 Sacramento Street San Francisco, CA 94118 U.S.A. (415) 922-9222

August 21, 1985

The President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

You honored me with a telephone call relative to my book Classic Russian Idylls.

I am forwarding some copies of this book to you, thinking that you may find this an appropriate gift for Mr. Gorbachev at Geneva.

Respectfully,

Mm. me.

Proctor Jones

P.S. I wanted to tell you that the elevator which you use in the White House was constructed in my grandfather's factory in Cleveland, the W. S. Tyler Co. The last time I saw it I noticed that Mrs. Kennedy had lined it with some sort of combed plywood. I think if the plywood is removed you will find a beautiful ornamental bronze elevator enclosure, which may add greater pleasure to your ups and downs.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM TO JAMES G. ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Gift for Mrs. Gorbachev

Attached at Tab A is <u>Classic Russian Idylls</u>, a book of photographs taken in the Soviet Union by Proctor Jones. Jones sent the President a copy of the book several months ago, and the President telephoned him to say how much he enjoyed it.


Jones has recently written to the President suggesting the book as a gift for Gorbachev at the Geneva meeting. NSC considers this an excellent idea, since such a gift would demonstrate to the Gorbachevs that sensitive, non-political books on the Soviet Union are produced in the United States.

Formal gifts for the Gorbachevs have long since been chosen, but we think the book would be an excellent item for the First Lady to present to Mrs. Gorbachev at tea.

Should the First Lady decide to present the book, we have attached at Tab B a draft letter of acknowledgment to the author.

attachments:

Tab AClassic Russian IdyllsTab BDraft letter of acknowledgment



Photographed and Edited by PROCTOR JONES

DONALD M. KENDALL **GERARD PIEL**

DRAFT LETTER TO PROCTOR JONES

Dear Mr. Jones:

Thank you for your recent letter to the President. We both thought your idea of presenting a copy of <u>Classic Russian Idylls</u> to General Secretary Gorbachev was excellent. Your sensitive treatment of their country demonstrates first hand to the Soviets that Americans can and do appreciate the beauty of the Soviet Union, regardless of our political differences.

Although a formal gift for the General Secretary has already been prepared, I look forward to presenting a copy of your book personally to Mrs. Gorbachev.

With best wishes.

Mr. Proctor Jones 3401 Sacramento Street San Francisco, Ca. 94118

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Dear Lyn:

Many thanks for forwarding Proctor Jones' book and his letter to the President.

We all think that presenting the book to Gorbachev is an excellent idea. Although formal gifts for the General Secretary and his wife have already been selected, we are recommending that the First Lady present the book informally to Mrs. Gorbachev. at tea.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. Lyn Nofziger 1526 18th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

SYSTEM II 91170

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1985

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MORARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President which analyzes Gorbachev's typical approach to many of the general questions which may come up at the Geneva Meeting, and provides suggested talking points for countering them.

I think this is an excellent analysis and consider the suggested responses pertinent and effective.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Shultz Memorandum to the President

SECRET Delcassify on: OADR

By_C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

George Shultz has forwarded the memorandum at Tab A which analyzes Gorbachev's typical approach to a number of the questions which may arise during your meetings with him and suggests appropriate responses.

I believe that this is an excellent treatment of this subject and recommend that you read it. We will work the talking points into the material for your meetings.

Recommendation

No

OK

That you read the Memorandum from Secretary Shultz at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary George P. Shultz

Prepared by: Jack F. Matlock

SECRET Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED White House Guidelines, August 28 __ NARA, Date. By.

SYSTEM II 91170

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

George P. Shultz 43

SUBJECT:

What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

My meeting last week in the Kremlin with Gorbachev provided us with our most detailed look yet at the new Soviet leader. I was struck in our conversation by the curious blend of new and old in Gorbachev. He displayed the intellectual quickness and articulate debating skill which have impressed other western leaders. At the same time he showed us the blunt, sometimes browbeating style characteristic of so many of the older generation of Soviet leaders.

Substantively, he trotted out many of the old Soviet negotiating ploys and fell back repeatedly on many of the old stereotypes about the United States which we heard so often from the older leaders. While some of this undoubtedly represented a tactical approach to put me on the defensive, there is no question that Gorbachev and his younger colleagues really share much of this old "collective wisdom." It is also clear that however much Gorbachev represents the "new Soviet man," he and his colleagues are not about to squander the legacy of Soviet power and influence bequeathed to them by Brezhnev, Andropov and the old guard. The question is whether they are ready to deal with us on the basis of real equality.

Since Gorbachev will undoubtedly put forward many of these same points in your conversations in Geneva, I have had my Soviet experts examine parts of our conversation to give you a flavor of what to expect. They have extracted key statements Gorbachev made to me and prepared points which you might draw on in responding to Gorbachev. In every case, I think the best response is to rebut his point forcefully and then reiterate our concrete proposals for addressing the problem in question. If Gorbachev rejects our ideas, you should press him to put forward a practical means of resolving our differences.

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NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS/OLD U.S. PROPOSALS

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Gorbachev Statements

Our side has tried to signal a desire to improve relations and the only response we get from you is that you call this "propaganda." If we do something and make suggestions, you say it is propaganda and we are weak. If we don't, you say we are intransigent.

The Administration is sticking with old positions. This will not lead to an improvement in Soviet-American relations on the basic issues.... The U.S. should think of making new proposals and not sticking with old policies. You should understand that the Republican Administration can't leave office with only old proposals. You can't continue to wrap these up as if they were new.

Analysis

It is a standard Soviet negotiating tactic to disparage U.S. arms control ideas as nothing new. At the same time they will repeatedly call on the U.S. to explore the so-called "new ideas" embodied in their proposals when there is in fact little if anything novel. The approach is designed to put pressure on the U.S. to come forward with further concessions, before the Soviets reveal any further compromises. The best way to get beyond such a semantic debate is to call a spade a spade and agree to probe those elements in which both sides have some interest.

Response

-- There's some question about just how "new" your proposals are; for example, Soviet calls for a moratorium on nuclear testing have been around for years. Back in the 1960s, we accepted one of those proposals, and you took advantage of it to prepare the ground for the most concentrated nuclear test series in history.

-- I have to be candid. A lot of your proposals look pretty empty to us. We cannot accept declarations of benign intent or calls for freezes which give you unilateral advantages.

-- You and I should get beyond these declarations and secondary matters, and get to work on the heart of the problem -- deep reductions in real systems that are dangerous to stability.

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-- When we have found positive elements in your proposals, we have said so. I stated in my UN speech last month that we found seeds worth nurturing in your Geneva counterproposal. We responded within a month. Have you said anything similar about our latest offer? When will we see a new move from you?

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-- And as for new ideas, we're still waiting for a positive response from you on the many ideas we've put forward in arms control and other areas -- to name a few, confidence-building measures, people-to-people exchanges, resolution of regional conflicts, human rights.

-- We don't expect you to take all of these ideas as proposed, but we do expect a fair hearing and a constructive response.

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SALT II AND THE DECLINE OF DETENTE

Gorbachev Statement

We know full well that SALT II had been buried and was long dead before the events of Afghanistan. ... There was a process at work in U.S. society, a deep distrust. The SALT II Treaty was buried because scientific achievements had come along which required that the U.S. drop the restraints in the Treaty ... the invasion of Afghanistan was used as the excuse. ... The Administration should not be so tied to the military-industrial complex, which just chews up money and programs by the billions. ... The Soviet Union wishes to know the desires of the Reagan Administration: does it wish to improve relations ... or complete its eight years in office with no change and therefore not disappoint the military-industrial complex.

Analysis

At several points in the meeting Gorbachev referred to the influence of the political right in the Republican party. He cited what he called the Administration's ties to the military-industrial complex and its support for American military superiority over the Soviet Union. Like other Soviet leaders he took pride in what he saw as his insight into our political life. To demonstrate his "knowledge" of the U.S. political scene, for example, Gorbachev cited the Hoover Institute study "America in the Eighties" whose conservative defense and social programs he alleged have been totally adopted by the Administration. In fact, Gorbachev's knowledge, undoubtedly based on material from Ambassador Dobrynin, reflected a shallow perception of the dynamic of American politics. You will want in your comments about your domestic agenda to give Gorbachev a more sophisticated appreciation of our political process.

Response

-- As you acknowledged to Secretary Shultz, both our countries have sectors of society that are concerned with national defense. They push us in that direction. Within limits, I welcome their concern with our national security. In any case, that's a fact of life.

-- But to say these sectors are the arbiters of public views toward the Soviet Union is far off the mark. The American people have no animosity towards the Soviet people. They want nothing more than peaceful relations with your country, and relief from the defense burden. They have no desire for endless confrontation and competition. -- But they also have a deep-seated mistrust of the Soviet government's objectives and purposes -- and that's the result of Soviet actions, not plots by American defense contractors or political currents.

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-- The fact is, we hoped detente would bring about a new period of restraint on your part. It did not.

-- Beginning in the mid-1970s, we saw a string of Soviet military interventions in the Third World. You kept building up your military forces against the U.S. and our Allies. It was these events, not defense contractors or American political factions, that damaged our relations.

-- Everything that caused so much harm to our relations in the 1970s is still happening. You are still building up your nuclear arms. You or your allies are still engaged in the conflicts of the 1970s.

-- You and I have an opportunity to make a new start. Frankly, that's going to require some very concrete steps on your part. We're willing to do our share.

-- I have made specific proposals to deal with all these problems. If you don't like them, I'd be glad to hear some fresh, concrete thinking from you.

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SOVIET RESPONSE TO SDI

Gorbachev Statement

If you want superiority through your SDI, we will not help you. We will let you bankrupt yourselves. But we also will not reduce our offensive missiles. We will engage in a build-up that will break your shield. We don't want war, but neither are we going to allow unilateral advantage. Therefore, we will increase nuclear arms. But we are patient and we still have hope.

Analysis

Stopping the SDI program was Gorbachev's primary theme in his conversation in Moscow. At several points during the conversation he attacked your recent decision on ABM reinterpretation. He and his colleagues are undoubtedly motivated by fear of U.S. technological capability and by the threat they perceive SDI eventually posing to the massive Soviet offensive strategic arsenal assembled at great cost during the 1970's and 1980's. Your meeting provides an opportunity to explain the potential benefits of SDI, if it proves feasible, and to determine where Gorbachev draws his bottom line on strategic defense.

Response

-- You are very aware of political developments in the U.S. and Europe, so you should know that SDI has strong public support, not just in my country but in others as well.

-- The reason it has this support is that people believe, as do I, that if there is a better way to preserve peace and maintain security than by making each other nuclear hostages, we have a duty to look into it.

-- It's hard to understand why you object so strenuously to our research program, when you know very well that you are doing the same kind of research, and when you have long placed a very high military premium on strategic defense.

-- There is nothing obscure about our research program and our objectives. Both have been well publicized. It's a different case with the Soviet strategic defense program. You have acknowledged that the Soviet Union is also engaged in fundamental research. But what are your objectives? What do you plan to do with the knowledge gained?

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-- We have made no secret of the potential difficulties of a transition to greater reliance on defenses. We have tried hard to engage you on this in Geneva. Let me ask you what you plan to do if your own research proves that you can develop and deploy an effective strategic defense. Are you planning to discuss a joint, cooperative transition with us?

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-- In the last analysis, we have an historic opportunity here; a chance to get a grip on the technology at an early date and see if can turn it to the task of securing peace and stability. That's going to require hard thinking by both our countries. We're willing to engage in this process. What about you?

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U.S. ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION

Gorbachev Statement

Gorbachev said that the U.S. was full of illusions. First, that the U.S. believed the Soviet Union was less economically powerful and therefore would be weakened by an arms race. Second, that the U.S. had higher technology and, therefore, the SDI would give the U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union in weapons. Third, the Soviet Union was more interested in negotiations in Geneva than the U.S. These are all illusions ... the U.S. apparently fails to draw lessons from history.

Analysis

It was ironic that Gorbachev lectured me on our illusions about the Soviet Union even as he reiterated many standard old Soviet misconceptions about the United States. His comments reflected a standard Soviet view that no one understands the security threat which is posed by adversaries on every side. As you have said, one of the benefits of your meeting with Gorbachev will be the opportunity to air the suspicions and misconceptions which have arisen between our two countries over the years. You will want to recognize legitimate Soviet security concerns, but insist that Gorbachev must take into account the concerns of the U.S. and our allies.

Response

-- I have no doubts that you or any other Soviet leader will take the steps necessary to assure your security, whatever the cost. You can be assured that I, and my successors, will do what's necessary for the defense of America and its allies.

-- We're not trying to bankrupt you. I have never considered that an option.

-- We are proud of our technological prowess, but we know full well that the Soviet Union has a formidable ability to produce advanced arms. Indeed, that's one of the major causes of tension between us -- from our standpoint, you produce many powerful weapons that far exceed legitimate needs.

-- If all we wanted to do was bleed you in arms race, we wouldn't be negotiating in Geneva and elsewhere to lower force levels.

-- We're not seeking unilateral advantage in these talks, but rather equality. We see fair agreements as profiting both sides, not just one partner.



THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD

Gorbachev Statement

Because of our belief in our principles, we will continue to support national liberation movements. The U.S. wants us to give up but we cannot. It is a matter of principle with us. You on the other hand should give up your illusions and then we can move along together even on such questions as human rights.

Analysis

The Soviets make much of the clause in their constitution calling for support for national liberation movements. They use it to justify ideologically and pragmatically their activities in the Third World. While we do not deny the Soviets legitimate interests in the developing world -- we would like them to provide their share of economic aid -- they cannot use "their principled position" to justify intervention in the affairs of less developed counties or the use of force in unstable Third World regions. This issue goes to the heart of American disillusionment with the Soviet policy of detente, which attempted to exclude Soviet activities in the Third World from its legitimate place in our overall relationship.

Response

-- We don't accept your claim to a right either to intervene in the affairs of others or to use force to impose your system on others.

-- We don't have any obligation to accept or respect what you claim is a constitutional right to foist wars of national liberation on other peoples.

-- Your efforts to carry out your so-called principles have cost thousands of lives, driven millions of people into refugee camps, and wrecked the economies of the countries involved.

-- No other factor has done more to make the American people deeply suspicious of your ultimate objectives and worried about their own security. I can tell you that so long as you operationalize this "right" or "duty", there will never be "normal" relations between our two peoples in any meaningful sense.

-- We are not going to sit by idly. Our sympathies lie with peoples who are fighting for genuine self-determination. They are the real movements of national liberation. We are going to help them.

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-- But I want to stress this is not the way we prefer to go. It is not the way to reduce tensions between us.

-- The question is, how do the U.S. and Soviet Union go about correcting the situation?

-- I gave you my ideas about how we can clear up the five most pressing active conflicts. I've gotten no positive reaction from you, which is disappointing.

-- Perhaps you have your own ideas; if so, I'd be glad to hear them.

-- But if you don't have any fresh thoughts of your own, you should reconsider what I offered in New York.

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NLRR <u>F06-114/3</u> #7982 BY______ NARA DATE 10/30/07 U.S. SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Gorbachev Statement

Does the United States consider that its present policies of force -- exercising pressure, strength -- that these policies have brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table? If that is the type of thinking which seems to motivate people who surround the President, then no success is possible

Analysis

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The Soviets continually attack us for seeking military superiority. At the same time they insist that our relationship must be based on the principles of "equality and equal security." It is wrong in their view for the U.S. to seek any form of military advantage, but they reserve the right to maintain military force equivalent to that of all their adversaries put together. The question of what constitutes genuine equality in military forces goes to the heart of your discussions with Gorbachev on the geopolitical balance. It affects not only the NST negotiations in Geneva but other arms control negotiations such as MBFR and CDE. You will want to put our views on this core issue on the record forcefully early in your meeting with Gorbachev.

Response

-- Whenever I hear these kinds of complaints, I'm reminded of the story told to me by an American who was once in your country.

-- The American was watching your annual military parade. As the missiles and tanks rolled by, a Soviet woman turned to her, after realizing there was an American present, and said, "There, you see how much we want peace!"

-- That woman recognized that strength is a necessary ingredient of peace. Anyone familiar with your media, or who followed your treatment of this year's 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, knows that in the Soviet Union this principle is axiomatic. That's no less true for the United States than it is for the Soviet Union.

-- We think you've been trying to establish nuclear superiority for years. Now you say we are trying to get the edge. The question is what you and I are going to do about this situation.

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-- I have said many times that we do not seek military superiority. We <u>do</u> want a stable balance of forces at radically lower levels. That's what we've been trying to negotiate with you for years.

-- Our experience is that negotiations work only when both sides have incentives to reach an agreement, and that means that one side cannot outweigh the other.

-- More important, the ultimate objective must be equality; anything less will be inherently unstable.

-- Look at our negotiating proposals and you'll see that when we propose limits on Soviet systems, we put our own comparable systems on the table as well. Can you say that about the Soviet negotiating positions at Geneva?

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LINKAGE

Gorbachev Statement

Gorbachev went on to say that it had been an idea of Nixon's to call for linkage. He said this was old hat and should be put in mothballs.

Analysis

The Soviets have repeatedly rejected the concept of linkage in principle, but have in fact practiced it to the present day. For example, they have linked the opening of new Consulates in Kiev and Moscow to our agreement to a resumption of Aeroflot air service to New York. While we should expect them to continue to criticize linkage, particularly in regard to making progress on human rights, we should have no illusions that linkage will remain a political fact of life in our relationship.

Response

-- My Administration has never dwelled on linkages, and you know that.

-- But you should also recognize that linkages are a fact of political life. It is naive to think that what happens in one area of our relationship won't have an impact, for better or worse, on the others.

-- Actions by the Soviet Union in violation of international agreements -- whether that means repression of the Helsinki monitors, or building of the Krasnoyarsk radar -inevitably affect our relations.

-- When the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan, suppresses freedom in Poland or fuels conflicts in other regions of the world, Americans very naturally begin to worry about your purposes in the world, and about their own security.

-- I have never said that nothing will be solved until everything is solved. I am ready to make as much progress in all areas as possible, but I recognize that some matters will have to proceed at their own pace. The important thing is to get to work to start narrowing the differences between us. If we succeed, the linkage question will take care of itself.

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HUMAN RIGHTS

Gorbachev Statement

[Although Gorbachev did not directly rebut our position on human rights in Moscow, he has in the past responded by attacking U.S. practices along the following lines:] You talk about human rights in the Soviet Union but you ignore the terrible injustices of American society -- poverty, hunger, unemployment, crime, racial discrimination, maltreatment of your Indians. We don't have these problems in the Soviet Union.

Analysis

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While the older Soviet leadership responded to our human rights complaints by rejecting them as illegal intrusions on Soviet internal affairs, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have responded by actively rebuting our points and trying to turn the tables on us. You should be ready in Geneva to respond to an aggressive attack on our human rights record and refocus the discussion on Soviet violations.

Response

-- The United States isn't perfect. We have never made any secret that many of our citizens haven't been able to share in the prosperity enjoyed by the majority of Americans.

-- But we're working hard to change that -- and I'm proud of the record of my Administration. We've created some eight million jobs since I came into office. Our health services are making stunning improvements in such things as higher life expectancies, lower infant mortality rates, and pioneering new techniques for curing diseases.

-- I could cite figures to demonstrate how much we are spending on social programs and the considerable progress we are making. Perhaps the best demonstration, however, of the attraction of the American dream of prosperity and freedom is to point to the thousands of immigrants who want to come to our shores, sometimes at great risk when they leave their native countries.

-- We are working hard to eradicate poverty, feed the hungry, house the homeless, to find jobs for the unemployed. We will never be satisfied that we've done enough.

-- Pointing to our shortcomings, though, doesn't relieve you of yours. Human rights is a central aspect of our relationship, a matter of deep concern to all Americans. You have international obligations which you've freely assumed. In the end, there can never be much trust and confidence between our peoples when the Soviet Union ignores fundamental humanitarian principles.