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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/12/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (1/10)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 12

YARHI-MILO

1211

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7947	MEMO	MARTIN TO PLATT RE LETTER FROM SENATORS LUGAR AND PELL <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7948	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER FROM SENATORS LUGAR AND PELL <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	10/23/1985	B1
7949	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPERS ON THE SOVIET UNION: THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7952	PAPER	SOVIET IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	ND	B1
7953	PAPER	SOVIET AIMS IN DEALING WITH THE UNITED STATES <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	5	ND	B1
7950	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7951	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/12/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (1/10)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 12

YARHI-MILO

1211

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7954	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUGGESTED REPLY <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~Matlock~~

FILE 1
8248

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1985


Dear Senators Lugar and Pell:

Thank you for your letter of October 10 informing me of Senate resolution 227. I fully agree that an effort to immunize the world's children would be an excellent way for the United States and Soviet Union to work together toward a common goal.

I have asked the Department of State to look into the logistics of implementing such a program, and I can assure you that your plan will receive every consideration as we prepare specific proposals to discuss in Geneva.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,


for Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
The Honorable Claiborne Pell
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8240

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 1, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter from Senators Lugar and Pell

Attached is a letter from Senators Lugar and Pell advising the NSC that Senate resolution 227 calls on the United States and Soviet Union to undertake a joint effort to immunize the world's children from a variety of deadly diseases by 1990. The Senators further suggest that the President propose such a joint effort to General Secretary Gorbachev when they meet in Geneva. We would appreciate the Department of State's looking into the feasibility of such a program and your recommendation as to whether it would be realistic to include such a proposal in Geneva.

William F. Martin

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Letter from Senators Lugar and Pell
Senate Resolution 227
Senate report accompanying resolution 227

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/3 #7947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY AV NARA DATE 10/30/07

RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA, CHAIRMAN

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CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MARYLAND
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
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DANIEL J. EVANS, WASHINGTON

CLAIBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE
PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
EDWARD ZORINSKY, NEBRASKA
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT
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JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS

JEFFREY T. BERGNER, STAFF DIRECTOR
GERYLO B. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

10/11/85
White
OCT 11 1985 3

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 10, 1985

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

On the premise that U.S.-Soviet relations would benefit from constructive collaboration in non-competitive areas, the Foreign Relations Committee recently approved the attached resolution, calling for a joint U.S.-Soviet effort to achieve, through existing multilateral agencies, a comprehensive program of worldwide child immunization by 1990. The Committee's report on the resolution, also attached, discusses the costs and implications.

We anticipate that the full Senate will act on the resolution later this month.

As planning proceeds for the forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, we suggest that you consider including this potential cooperative measure as an item on the summit agenda.

Sincerely,



Claiborne Pell
Ranking Member



Richard G. Lugar
Chairman

Calendar No. 337

99TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**S. RES. 227**

Urging a joint United States-Soviet effort to achieve worldwide disease immunization by 1990.

[Report No. 99-148]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 24 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 23), 1985

Mr. PELL (for himself and Mr. LUGAR) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

OCTOBER 4 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 30), 1985

Reported by Mr. LUGAR, with amendments

[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic]

RESOLUTION

Urging a joint United States-Soviet effort to achieve worldwide disease immunization by 1990.

Whereas six diseases—measles, diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, tuberculosis, and polio—each year ravage the children of the world, killing some five million and leaving an equal number disabled;

Whereas the medical technology now exists to immunize the world's children against these diseases at an estimated cost of \$5 per child—a total cost of \$500,000,000 for the one

hundred million children born in the developing countries each year;

Whereas medical studies estimate that such immunization could reduce child mortality around the world by as much as one-half;

Whereas reduced child mortality is crucial to attaining levels of economic development associated with reduced population growth;

Whereas in the 1960's and 1970's the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated effectively together and with other nations in a United Nations program which, by 1980, ended the scourge of smallpox throughout the world;

Whereas responsible scientists now believe that a concerted international program could achieve immunization of all children on Earth against all major diseases by 1990; and

Whereas recent international efforts to assist the famine-stricken people of Africa demonstrate a powerful impulse among the people of the developed nations to direct resources toward people less fortunate: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved, That—*

- 2 (1) the United States and the Soviet Union should
- 3 immediately undertake a formal commitment to initiate,
- 4 using their own resources and those of other donors
- 5 and appropriate multilateral agencies, a joint effort to
- 6 bring the benefits of immunization to all children of the
- 7 world by the year 1990;

1 (2) *this joint effort should be accompanied by the*
2 *initiation of studies to anticipate the demographic ef-*
3 *fects of such increased immunization;*

4 (2) (3) *this joint world immunization effort should*
5 *be undertaken in a spirit of common dedication to a*
6 *transcending humanitarian purpose, and with the prac-*
7 *tical hope that such constructive collaboration may also*
8 *serve as a model for further superpower cooperation.*

Calendar No. 337

99TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 227

[Report No. 99-148]

RESOLUTION

Urging a joint United States-Soviet effort to achieve
worldwide disease immunization by 1990.

OCTOBER 4 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 30), 1985

Reported with amendments

A JOINT UNITED STATES-SOVIET EFFORT TO ACHIEVE
WORLDWIDE DISEASE IMMUNIZATION BY 1990

OCTOBER 4 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 30), 1985.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. LUGAR, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. Res. 227]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the resolution (S. Res. 227) urging a joint United States-Soviet effort to achieve worldwide disease immunization by 1990, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the resolution as amended do pass.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Senate resolution is to urge that the United States and the Soviet Union "immediately undertake a formal commitment to initiate, using their own resources and those of other donors and appropriate multilateral agencies, a joint effort to bring the benefits of immunization to all children of the world by the year 1990."

BACKGROUND

Each day around the world, 40,000 children die—1,500 per hour, 25 per minute, 15 million each year. The horror of pervasive child death by poverty and disease is real. But so too is the world's ability to diminish this continuing scourge. As many as half of these children could now be saved through the basic preemptive remedy of immunization against the six major diseases—measles, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, tuberculosis, and polio.

The international community's collective ability to exterminate a disease through immunization was demonstrated in the successful worldwide campaign waged against smallpox in the 1960's and

1970's, which totally ended that scourge by 1980. Continued progress against disease, however, is by no means inevitable. Although childhood death rates in poor countries were reduced by one-third in the two decades from 1950 to 1970, the 15 years since 1970 have seen virtually no further gain.

Yet remarkable progress has come within reach. Immunization technology has advanced such that, given the political will and the resources, all children in the world could be immunized against the six major diseases by 1990. Nor are the necessary resources beyond the capacity of the developed nations to provide. According to informed estimates, a multi-disease immunization program would require only about \$5 per child—a few cents for the vaccine, the remainder for necessary costs of transporting vaccine in a "cold chain" and the administration of injections. Thus, with 100 million children born in the developing countries each year, a full global immunization program, once underway, would require little more than \$500 million annually. Initial costs would, of course, be somewhat higher due to the need to "catch up" with the many children not yet immunized.

Two examples provide some perspective on the current catastrophic rate of child death from immunizable diseases. In El Salvador, child fatalities from immunizable disease have continued to occur at a greater rate than total war fatalities.

In India, the chemical disaster in Bhopal recently killed an estimated 2,000 people. More children die from immunizable diseases in that country each day.

Nor does saving children around the world offer only a short-term gain, accompanied by the long-term liability of an inexorably expanding population. In the short run, a decline in child mortality obviously results in population expansion. But reduced child mortality is crucial to attaining the level of economic development associated with reduced rates of population growth. Thus, ending the six major diseases represents a huge step toward reducing human misery around the world, not only immediately but also in the long term.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On September 1, during a Senate delegation meeting in Moscow with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, Senator Pell broached the concept of a joint United States-Soviet world immunization effort as a cooperative superpower measure that could serve mankind while helping to create a basis for improved East-West relations.

On September 24, Senator Pell, on behalf of himself and Senator Lugar, introduced Senate Resolution 227 urging creative diplomacy to bring about such a joint superpower initiative. On that same day, the Committee on Foreign Relations met and voted unanimously to report the resolution favorably with an amendment calling for studies of the demographic consequences of expanded immunization efforts.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The goal of achieving worldwide disease immunization by 1990 was recently affirmed by Congress in fiscal year 1986 Foreign Assistance Act.

The Pell-Lugar resolution reaffirms this goal and suggests that cooperation in this sphere might provide a model for cooperation in other areas. Accordingly the resolution states:

That the United States and the Soviet Union would immediately undertake a formal commitment to initiate, using their own resources and those of other donors and appropriate multilateral agencies, a joint effort to bring the benefits of immunization to all children of the world by the year 1990; * * * and

That this joint world immunization effort should be undertaken in a spirit of common dedication to a transcending humanitarian purpose, and with the practical hope that such constructive collaboration may also serve as a model for further superpower cooperation.

A joint United States-Soviet world immunization effort would draw upon the superpowers' strength in technology and resources. Unlike development activities, immunization efforts do not have an inherent geopolitical dimension: they involve no vested or strategic interest in any particular Third World regime. Immunization requires only that politically neutral medical teams enter those countries in need and do the job. Existing multilateral agencies, which are already involved, could administer much of this worldwide program, and other nations and private organizations would be called upon to contribute resources. The thrust would come from the superpowers acting in constructive partnership.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SIGNED

October 23, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter from Senators Lugar and Pell

Attached at Tab I is a suggested response to a letter from Senators Lugar and Pell concerning Senate resolution 227. The resolution urges a joint U.S.-Soviet effort to achieve worldwide disease immunization by 1990. The Senators suggest that you consider putting the resolution on the President's agenda for discussion with Gorbachev in Geneva.

In principle I think the idea is a fine one, and it parallels some of the suggestions we have already worked into our exchanges proposals for joint medical cooperation. I would suggest tasking State to look into the feasibility of the proposal with an eye toward including it in our exchanges package.

RS Ron Sable and Steve ~~Danzansky~~ concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Lugar and Pell at Tab I.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

That you forward the Martin/Platt memorandum at Tab II tasking State to look into the Senators' proposal.

Approve *JFM* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Senators Lugar and Pell
Tab II Martin/Platt memorandum
Tab A Letter from Senators' Lugar and Pell
Tab B Senate Resolution 227
Tab C Senate report accompanying resolution 227

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 06-114/3 #7948

BY *AN* NARA DATE 11/30/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

November 1, 1985

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

REQUEST: Meeting with the President.

PURPOSE: To review preparations for the President's meeting in Geneva with General Secretary Gorbachev.

BACKGROUND: This meeting will serve as an opportunity to discuss with the President the materials that have been prepared for his meeting with Gorbachev.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE & TIME: Thursday, November 7
DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan, Mr. McFarlane, ~~Jack Matlock~~, and others as appropriate.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Meeting with the President.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

PROPOSED "PHOTO": None

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Jack F. Matlock

Prepared by:
Tyrus Cobb

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506ACTION

October 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT:

Meeting with the President in preparation for his
meeting with GorbachevRecommendation

That you authorize Bill Martin to forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I to Fred Ryan requesting time with the President for a meeting on Thursday, November 7, for preparation for his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

Approve

 m

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal for Fred Ryan

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

November 1, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Background Paper for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A is the sixth in a series of weekly papers on the Soviet Union that we are doing for the First Lady. It concerns health conditions in the USSR and was prepared by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to James G. Rosebush at Tab I forwarding the paper to the First Lady.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to James G. Rosebush
Tab A "Health Conditions in the USSR"

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By *CWS* NARA, Date *7/1/02*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES G. ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Background Paper for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A is the sixth in a series of weekly papers we are putting together for the First Lady as background reading on the Soviet Union. It deals with health conditions in the USSR and was drafted by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the paper to the First Lady.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A "Health Conditions in the USSR"

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 7/1/02

CAS 7/1/02

16

HEALTH CONDITIONS IN THE USSR

Free health care is guaranteed to every citizen of the USSR by law. The quality, level of attention, and actual cost vary greatly in practice, however. As one Soviet put it, "Medicine is free, but not everyone can afford it." And the incidence of epidemics throughout the country, increasing morbidity rates, declining life expectancy for Russian males, and rising infant mortality give quite a different gloss to the claims of Soviet propagandists.

Double Standards

When extolling the virtues of the USSR's medical system, Soviet propagandists proudly point to doctor/patient and per capita hospital bed ratios higher than those in most western countries. Behind the statistics is a reality which has no true counterpart in the West. The average Soviet doctor is only trained at the level of a western paramedic; the number of beds per capita may be high, but many of them are in hallways or cafeterias; and the quality of health care has actually deteriorated over the past few decades.

All Soviets may be equal but their health care comes in two distinct categories: that which is available to the public at large, and that which is reserved for the elite. The first system consists of public polyclinics and hospitals which are notorious for poor food and sanitary conditions, less qualified doctors, limited bed space and shortages of medical supplies. Indeed, their patients are expected to turn to the black market to obtain needed medications. But the facilities are free and open to everyone.

The elite facilities, on the other hand, are important enough to warrant a special branch of the medical administration. They draw on the upper crust of medicine in the USSR and are the only part of the health care system comparable to that in the West. These facilities, sometimes called "Kremlin Clinics", cater only to the senior levels of the party, government and intelligentsia--access to them is a major perk of being in the elite. They provide access to the best trained medical personnel, the imported drugs and supplies usually unavailable to the masses, and as much as an estimated seven times the food allowances of the public facilities.

Traditional Problems

Many of the USSR's public health difficulties are rooted in conditions that predate the revolution. Sanitation in the Soviet Union in general has not kept pace with the advances of modern society. Epidemics of salmonella, cholera and the like occur frequently and often cause widespread loss of life in the affected areas before they are arrested. Even cases of leprosy and bubonic plague sometimes turn up in the more rural parts of central Asia. One figure has it that 70% of the diseases which strike the armed forces, like typhoid and hepatitis, are caused by polluted water. Additionally, endemic

alcoholism takes its toll--one western analyst estimates as many as three-quarters of a million people die each year from over indulgence. The number of birth defects caused by maternal alcohol abuse, as well as from smoking and industrial pollution, has begun to alarm Soviet health authorities.

Soviet Made Problems

The bureaucracy and centralized planning system of the Soviet Union also have their effect on health care. The starting pay for a Soviet doctor is about 115 rubles (\$146) per month, well below the 185 rubles per month paid to the average worker. A hospital or polyclinic aide's pay is even lower. Hence, private payment for services as basic as changing linen or bed-pans is common. The low prestige of the medical profession as a whole turns away more ambitious students. It is indicative of its status--and that of Soviet women--that 70% of Soviet doctors are women; only specialists are accorded high pay and rank, and practically all of them are males.

The low quality of training available for the average doctor results in frequent misdiagnoses. Poor nursing skills and a general disregard for sanitation, complicated by the absence of such items as disposable syringes, account for the infections suffered by one-third of all post-operative patients. Furthermore, the compulsion to fill quotas and meet plan goals results in widespread falsification of hospital records and doctored statistics.

Despite a heavy propaganda emphasis on the special health care provided for children, the quality of Soviet obstetrical medicine borders on primitive, while care for premature infants is practically nonexistent at most facilities. Meanwhile, a lack of sex education and scarcity of contraceptives has meant a general recourse to abortions to avoid unwanted pregnancies--to the point where they outnumber live births four to one. On the other hand, Soviet children are conspicuously well cared for and accorded much loving attention in the country's numerous creches and child care facilities.

Specialized Success

Whatever its deficiencies may be, the centralized nature of the Soviet medical establishment does allow for excellence in some areas of care. Emergency medical treatment in urban areas tends to be quite good, though occasionally slow, with special cardiac units and an emphasis on treating the patient at home. Most doctors consider house calls a regular duty. There are special advanced institutions of international repute for treatment and research in the fields of micro and eye surgery, as well as gerontology, cancer and cardio-vascular ailments. (Access to these institutions is limited primarily to those with influence, however.) Also, though resourcefulness, patience and stamina may be required, no Soviet citizen has to worry about the costs of major operations, long-term hospital stays or insurance plans.

The Results of Soviet Socialized Health

Of late, the Soviet press has become increasingly frank about the deficiencies of the much touted medical system. The government recently announced a two billion dollar per annum five year plan for improving the overall health and working conditions of the Soviet people. Authorities evidently have been stung by the evidence of a declining life expectancy, now down to 62 years for Russian males, and a 25% increase in the infant mortality rate over the past decade. (The current infant mortality figure is estimated to be three times that of the United States.) Not only are these problems an international embarrassment, but they impact directly on the labor supply. They also encourage the public to resort more and more to the black market, bribery, and even faith healers for medicine and health services.

Prepared by:
J. Lifflander
Department of State

JM-C
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: Soviet View of
the United States

Attached is the next group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet view of the United States.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the papers to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve Bill Martin's sending copies of the papers to Secretary Shultz and Don Regan.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
 - Tab A Soviet Image of the United States
 - Tab B Soviet Aims in Dealing with the United States
- Tab II Memorandum - Martin to Platt
- Tab III Memorandum - Martin to Chew

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *7/1/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of
the United States

You have previously read six groups of papers on the Soviet Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, Gorbachev's domestic agenda, the USSR's international position, and the Soviet view of national security. The attached group examines the Soviet view of the United States.

As discussed in the paper at Tab A on the Soviet image of the United States, the Soviets see the U.S. as their main rival for influence in the world and the greatest single threat to their security. Concern about the U.S. is reinforced by the traditional Russian "fortress mentality" (born of the experience of numerous foreign invasions across open frontiers) and by the works of Marks and Lenin, with their portrayal of a hostile capitalist world bent on destroying socialism.

Soviet views of the U.S. are also colored by a deep historical sense of inadequacy in the face of western economic and technological development. The Kremlin's felt need to "catch up" with the West economically flows out of this tradition, and the American standard of living serves in many ways as the model for the Soviet future.

American military preeminence since 1945 is also a major factor in Moscow's attitude toward the United States. Moscow's leaders tend to equate military power with political power. They feel they have been living under a U.S. political/military shadow since World War II, with the Cuban missile crisis being perhaps the most graphic expression for them of this U.S. predominance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR ROB-114/3 #7949
BY OKS NARA DATE 10/31/07

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Despite efforts in recent years to develop a core of U.S. specialists in the Soviet Union, Soviets in general have little understanding of the American political system. Democratic traditions are alien and, in some cases, incomprehensible to them, and they have particular difficulty understanding the role of an independent legislative branch of government. This does not stop them, however, from trying to lobby Congress on behalf of Soviet foreign policy positions.

Soviet aims in dealing with the United States (paper at Tab B) are essentially threefold: to contain American military capabilities, enhance their own international reputation, and promote the transfer of needed goods and technology. Militarily, the Soviets expend enormous resources to meet the perceived U.S. military threat. At the same time, they see the value of negotiating to try to contain further western military development.

Moscow realizes that its competition with the United States is dangerous, but also feels that it enhances the USSR's international image. It perceives the mere fact of frequent contact with the world's leading power as an achievement.

Economically, the Soviets were optimistic in the 1960's that western technology might help boost their sagging economy. For a variety of reasons, however, including the American linkage between trade and human rights, Soviet hopes were never realized. Today Soviet trade with the United States is limited to a relatively narrow range of items, including agricultural products and some non-sensitive computer equipment. The leadership would like to see this trade continued and even expanded. At the same time the Soviet people have long since learned to cope with economic hardship and shortages, and western imports clearly are not a matter of economic survival for the Soviet Union.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES

Since the end of the Second World War, the Soviets have been preoccupied with the United States. Reflecting their own aspirations, ambitions and fears, they see the US as the Soviet Union's primary rival and as a military threat. At the same time, the US is viewed as the model for the Soviet future. Though the image in some ways resembles a love-hate relationship, it is rooted in an exaggerated respect for US capabilities--political-cultural as well as military and economic. The Soviet understanding of the American political process, though often faulty, has grown increasingly sophisticated over the years, and is notably respectful of the power and authority of the President.

Conflicting Impressions

The Kremlin leaders see the United States as their main rival for influence in the world political arena, and as the primary threat to their nation's security. This image is part of a larger outlook shaped by Russia's historical experience and geographic circumstances. The facts of Russian history and geography, and particularly repeated invasions across open land frontiers, have instilled a siege or fortress mentality. Fear of encirclement is hereditary for rulers of this heartland power. Concern for security is a constant preoccupation. This helps explain why the Russians have traditionally maintained large military forces. Given the military predominance of the US in the postwar period, Moscow's neurotic concerns about the danger from without naturally fixed on the US.

This suspicion of the outside world has been reinforced by the Soviet leaders' commitment to the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. Though the ideological component may have weakened over the years, it continues to color the views of the leadership. The Kremlin continues to proclaim a fundamental hostility to the West and assumes that the antagonism is mutual. The United States, as the leading capitalist power, is assumed in turn to be hostile toward socialism and to consider the USSR its key exponent. Driven by a deep-rooted fear of the historic force destined to replace them, capitalists are said to be consumed with a fundamental, irreconcilable hatred of the Soviet Union and seek to "crush socialism". Virtually all US leaders are seen to be so committed, even though their policies admittedly may vary. What makes this abiding hostility bearable is the faith, based on the same ideological doctrine, that "capitalism is a society without a future," as Brezhnev put it at the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

Moscow's suspicion of the outside world also reflects deep inner doubts regarding Russia's adequacy in the face of its menacing environment. Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia's leaders have been obsessed with their country's economic inferiority. Such doubts were especially worrisome with respect to military capabilities. Moscow's inability to sustain the economic base needed to maintain adequate military forces led to disastrous defeats during much of the 19th Century and World War I, despite enormous manpower advantages. More recently, economic inferiority continues to belie the promises of a more productive and better life under socialism.

To help stimulate economic performance, the Kremlin has long been urging the Soviet economy to "catch up" with the West, especially the United States. In 1957, Khrushchev launched a campaign to match the US in the production of milk, butter, and consumer goods. For the Soviet leaders, clearly, the US is the standard of comparison, the land which embodies the material prosperity and technological capabilities to which the Soviet leaders aspire. If they can only overtake and surpass the US, they will have overcome their own sense of inadequacy. Thus their great pride in the early Soviet space accomplishments--and their equally great frustrations when the US put the first man on the moon.

The traditional Russian self-image has been one of a backward, second-rate power, expecting to be treated as such, and resentful of that fact. Thus it was that Khrushchev admitted to having been taken aback when President Eisenhower greeted him at National Airport on his 1959 visit to the US. As he wrote in his memoirs, here was the President of the greatest capitalist power in the world bestowing honor on the representative of a country which has always been viewed as "unworthy or, worse, infected with some sort of plague." Given such a mental framework, the Soviet insistence on equality takes on a special meaning; it is a reflection of the basic Soviet uncertainty about their acceptance in the international community.

Thus, even today, while proclaiming the Soviet Union to be the harbinger of a new, highly-productive socio-economic order, and a power on the world stage equal to the US, the Soviet leaders still doubt their own claim. The tension between self-image and reality helps explain their highly ambivalent/neurotic attitude toward the West, especially the US, which is at once feared and envied, regarded with contempt, and the standard against which Soviet accomplishments are measured.

US as World Leader

The prime reason for this sensitivity to the US and its policies has been the predominant role these have played in world affairs. Since 1945, the US has been the preeminent military power--the only country capable of directly threatening the national survival of the USSR. Furthermore, America's combined military and economic primacy secured for Washington a pervasive political influence. Its longstanding preeminence in the United Nations--whose very location in New York bears witness to the fact--testified to the recognition of America as a world leader.

Soviet political strategists have long equated military power with political influence (e.g. Stalin's famous quip "how many divisions has the Pope?"). Throughout the postwar period, the Soviets have had to operate under the shadow of American military preeminence. Even though US military forces have never been used directly against the USSR, they deeply affected the international political environment. Many in Moscow undoubtedly argued that superior strength, not equity, had for many years allowed the US to build military bases close to the Soviet border while denying similar advantages to the USSR. The October 1962 missile crisis drove this point home. Compelled to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, Soviet leaders made no secret they considered continued military weakness to be politically intolerable, and the major USSR military expansion program of the postwar period was underway by 1964. The current arms competition, therefore, reflects Moscow's drive for military--hence political--parity with (and, where achievable, superiority over) the US.

US preeminence, however, also reflects American economic/technological/scientific achievements which, the Soviets recognize, have political significance. Not only are US grain exports, credits, computers, and technical assistance sought by many (including the USSR) but America's reputation as the most prosperous and advanced economic power in the world is seen as having a great psychological impact. The US economy, Khrushchev noted, "by its volume and productivity acts on the psychology of literally the entire Western world."

This gives special urgency to the Soviet program of catch up which is necessary both to compete with the US and to disprove Western claims that a socialist economy is inferior to that of capitalism. By creating an efficient economy and improving the well-being of the Soviet people, the Soviets believe the arguments of Western commentators can be refuted.

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By improving living standards, said Khrushchev, "the minds of undecided peoples" around the world would be strongly influenced. Then "we will enter the open seas in which no comparisons with capitalism will anchor us."

US scientific and technological preeminence, however, is more than just a source of psychological advantage/political leverage. USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov wrote that "states which do not create a sufficiently powerful and technical potential of their own" face a grave choice: "either they fall behind... or they tie themselves firmly to a country which possesses such a potential." This could result, he said, in "domination," "subjugation" and even "economic slavery" by which a less advanced country loses part of its economic and even its political independence. The tone of this language--either compete with the United States or walk in its shadow--is reminiscent of Stalin's 1934 call for Russia to catch up economically with the advanced industrial countries. "Either we do it," he said, "or we will be crushed." The frequent reference to the danger of breakout by the advanced US military economy is based on precisely such concerns. When Chernenko compared the Strategic Defense Initiative to the Manhattan project, such worries may well have been in the back of his mind.

Understanding American Politics

As a products of very different historical experiences and political traditions, which spawned autocratic, collectivist institutions and political practices making loyalty to the Tsarist state the overriding consideration, the Russians poorly understand the American system. American political values and democratic traditions are alien and in some respects, incomprehensible to the Russian people. This is especially true of their leaders. A striking example of Soviet blindness on this score came during a 1978 visit by a Senatorial delegation to the USSR when Senator Ribicoff of Connecticut told then Politiburo member Romanov that some Democrats in the Senate would oppose President Carter and vote against a new SALT II treaty. Romanov asked in astonishment, "But can't you discipline them?"

Nor did the Soviets ever understand Watergate. Former Ambassador Harriman reported in 1976, after a visit to Moscow, that Brezhnev still did not understand why Nixon was forced to resign. For a Soviet leader, the notion of abuse of executive power is virtually a contradiction in terms. To suggest that the chief executive does not have authority to engage in covert operations, cover up, or use intelligence agencies for his own

political purposes is to suggest something unnatural. The Soviet political heritage has not been one to sensitize the average Russian to the requirements of a constitutional system. The only explanation that made any sense in Moscow at the time was that President Nixon was the victim of a political cabal of disgruntled Democrats, ultra-right, anti-Soviet elements, newspaper publishers and other inveterate Nixon-haters unhappy with his policy of detente.

Blind to constitutional notions regarding the separation of powers and limited government, the Soviets are equally deaf to US concerns regarding human rights. The Soviet Constitution does include mention of many of the same political rights and liberties found in the Bill of Rights (and some new ones including the right to work, to an education, to housing). But although lip-service is given to the rights of the individual to freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of fair trial, the Russian political heritage places prime value on protecting the interests of the state. Soviet obtuseness in this regard was demonstrated by the deputy procurator general of the USSR who in a 1977 article in the New York Times, suggested that according to the US Criminal Code, if Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov were an American citizen he might well find himself behind bars for advocating and abetting the destruction of the regime. Even a leading Soviet jurist seems unable to grasp that political criticism and dissent are not regarded as equivalent to treason everywhere.

Despite this inherent lack of comprehension, many Soviets have in recent years nonetheless acquired a sophisticated working knowledge of American political life. Through the diligent efforts of Ambassador Dobrynin and his staff, an active corps of Washington-based journalists, and the studies conducted by party-directed academic institutes, the Soviet leaders have become considerably more knowledgeable. The US-watchers have concentrated especially on the policy process--on relations between the Congress and the Executive.

Reflecting their own lack of experience with an independent legislative body, the Soviets have always tended to regard the President as the main political actor. Despite their increasing awareness of the limits to executive power, they still tend to think that the President can always get what he wants--after all even President Carter, who they saw as vacillating and weak, got his way on the Panama Canal treaty. Carter's failure to secure ratification of the SALT II treaty was interpreted, therefore, more as a lack of will on the part of the President than the result of broadly-held Congressional reservations and doubts.

The role of the Congress has been a source of continuing confusion to the Soviets. Though they have become increasingly knowledgeable regarding the mechanics of Capital Hill operations, the Soviets tend to dismiss congressional debate as basically a ruse to beguile and deceive public opinion. Indeed, until comparatively recently, the Soviets regarded the authority of the Congress with disdain, especially in the area of foreign policy. The passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in 1974, despite the vigorous opposition of the President and important elements in the business community "ruling circles", came as a great surprise to Moscow.

Though now more attentive to the potential role of the Congress, Kremlin attention is still focused on the White House. The overall Soviet judgement regarding the primacy of the President has been confirmed by the Reagan Presidency. Soviet commentators make frequent mention of the President's ability to win Congressional support for virtually all of his defense programs, including SDI (despite worries about the deficit), his continuing popularity in the opinion polls, his effectiveness in gaining support from the NATO allies on many contentious issues. That political effectiveness combined with his ideological conservatism, warrants, in Soviet eyes, treating him with great, albeit grudging respect as a formidable adversary.

Drafted by: MSchwartz
Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET AIMS IN DEALING WITH THE UNITED STATES

Moscow's objectives vis-a-vis the US are essentially three: to contain the growth of US military power, enhance the international reputation of the USSR, and promote the transfer of needed US goods and technology. In pursuit of these objectives, the Soviets have demonstrated considerable flair in using the open political processes of the West. Nevertheless, the results of their efforts have been uneven. Moscow has rarely been able to push the US to alter basic defense commitments or policies. On the other hand, the Soviets have been able to use their relationship with the US to reinforce their international standing and reputation. Trade and economic transfers have been of only limited importance despite Soviet interest in special US commodities such as grain, and high-tech products.

Containment of US Military Capabilities

Given its enormous military capabilities, the USSR today is decidedly less fearful of external enemies than at any time in its history. The Kremlin leaders nonetheless remain extremely anxious about the nuclear and conventional military strength of their main rival. Paradoxically, however, the Soviets have felt compelled to use or threaten military force almost exclusively against socialist regimes--East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China, and Poland, as well as Afghanistan. Yet it is the strategic capability of the United States which, if ever unleashed, could imperil the physical, let alone political, survival of the USSR.

The Soviet leaders have expended enormous energies and resources to maintain forces adequate to meet any possible US military challenge. In order to reduce the danger they believe confronts them, they have sought in parallel to contain the development of US defense capabilities through negotiations. And they consistently seek, directly and indirectly, to dissuade the American political leadership from undertaking development of new weaponry.

In support of such efforts, the Soviets have demonstrated some skill in manipulating the open political systems of the US and its NATO allies. Kremlin leaders by now well understand that the political processes of the Western democracies offer promising possibilities for directly influencing Western public opinion and even policy decisions. In his TIME interview, Gorbachev observed that in preparing for their upcoming meeting, "neither the President nor I will be able to ignore the mood in our respective countries or that of our allies." The TIME interview itself, as well as his more recent

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BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

performances in France, clearly show Gorbachev's interest in shaping the "mood" of Western opinion. In recent years, the Soviets sought to effect the outcome of the 1983 West German elections, to dissuade European governments from deploying the Pershing and cruise missiles, and are currently engaged in a major public relations effort to influence the Dutch decision on INF deployment and US arms control policy at the Geneva NST talks, especially regarding SDI.

As part of the effort, much Soviet energy and attention has been devoted to lobbying the US Congress. Impressed by the impact of Congressional opposition on the policies of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, and particularly the Congressional inclination to give increasingly careful scrutiny to military appropriation bills, the Soviets have intensified their cultivation of both House and Senate. In 1974, the parade of representatives from the Soviet Embassy actively lobbying on Capitol Hill against the Jackson amendment led one observer to describe the scene as a "spectacle... suggestive almost more of a platoon of out-of-town shoe manufacturers worried about tariff protection than of emissaries from America's most deadly rival."

The diplomats are now more discreet but just as active, and are often joined by Soviet journalists and visiting academicians. In addition to visiting Washington, the ubiquitous Georgiy Arbatov of the USA Institute spoke at meetings in San Francisco, Philadelphia, and New York and was on an ABC-TV show in the first half of September. Meanwhile, Andropov and Gorbachev did their part by meeting with influential congressional delegations visiting Moscow (inter alia those headed by Pell, Byrd and O'Neill).

Despite these endeavors, the Soviets do not appear particularly satisfied with their accomplishments. They have found American audiences largely unresponsive to their message, the American political environment basically hostile, and no political constituency in the United States especially sympathetic to Soviet interests. Not only is the American Communist Party weak, with no representation in the Congress in recent memory, but the "left" as a whole is feeble. Though heartened by activities of the anti-war movement and of individual congressmen in support of the nuclear freeze movement, Soviet observers have learned to have little faith in the consistency of the Congress or the public at large on foreign policy issues.

The Soviets also actively court the NATO allies--in the more immediate hope of generating pressure on Administration policies than of dividing the West Europeans from the US. Gorbachev's recent trip to France was designed to exploit

Mitterrand's stance on SDI in the hope this might increase pressure on the President before the November meeting. The most recent Soviet arms control positions--and possibly even their SS-20 deployments--were shaped with an eye to influencing the Dutch decision on INF deployment due November 1. In addition to lobbying European policymakers, Moscow targets former government leaders, opposition officials, media, trade union and cultural figures and even former NATO military officers, but after the failure of their massive anti-INF campaign, the Soviets have learned not to expect significant results.

Enhancement of the USSR's Reputation

Despite the risks involved, Moscow sees its world-wide military-political competition with the US as enhancing the USSR's standing as a world power; the very fact of frequent contact and negotiation with the world's major power adds to its stature. President Nixon's state visit to the Soviet Union in 1972 was interpreted as symbolic acknowledgement of the USSR's special role in world affairs. As Soviet President Podgorniy declared when toasting President Nixon; "This is the first visit by a President of the United States of America in the history of relations between our countries. This alone makes your visit... a momentous event."

Despite speculation in Washington that Brezhnev might call off the summit in response to American bombing of Haiphong Harbor, the Soviet leadership never seriously considered cancellation. Even more gratifying than the visit itself were the agreements signed in Moscow in which the US explicitly acknowledged the "special responsibility" of the USSR (along with the US) for preserving world peace and controlling international tensions, and endorsed the principle of equality, as well as the notion of peaceful coexistence. According to defector Arkady Shevchenko, this was "the most powerful boost to the Soviet egos.... Nothing would sound better to the Soviet leadership suffering for years under an inferiority complex."

US participation in arms control negotiations with the USSR for some 30 years is also interpreted as tacit acceptance of the USSR's equality of status. The first leaders to engage in this activity of course saw in the negotiation process an opportunity to shape the international strategic environment in which they at the time were at a serious disadvantage. Discussions with Western diplomats and arms control experts, especially in formalized settings such as summit conferences, also helped propel the post-Stalin Soviet Union onto the world's diplomatic stage and cement Moscow's international standing. From the 1963 signing of the Partial Test-Ban

Agreement through the mid-1970s when agreements were concluded on a host of arms control issues, Soviet diplomats basked in the satisfaction of the USSR having the right "to have a say," in former Foreign Minister Gromyko's phrase, "in settling any question involving the maintenance of international peace."

Trade and Technology Transfer

By the late 1960s, the notion had emerged in Moscow that trade with the West generally, and the US in particular, could help Brezhnev revitalize the sagging Soviet economy--without confronting the risks of large-scale economic reforms. For a variety of reasons having to do in part with congressional concerns about Jewish emigration (which resulted in denial of most-favored-nation status and limits on credits available to the USSR), as well as the difficulties the Soviets have had in assimilating Western technology, the results of these efforts to tap Western resources have been relatively minor.

Soviet reliance on US grain has dropped considerably since the 1960s. In 1979, grain from the US amounted to approximately 70% of total Soviet grain imports; today the figure is roughly 40%. Argentina and the European Community now supply much of the USSR's grain imports--and this year the USSR for the first time has failed to meet its minimum wheat purchase requirements under the Long-Term Grain Agreement.

Economic transfers, on the whole, tend to be limited to specific requirements. In addition to agriculture, the Soviets remain interested in such American products as computer technology and software, as well as equipment that will help break bottlenecks in the energy and agro-industrial sectors. Needless to say, the Soviets also spend considerable resources to acquire modern, military-related technologies.

Nevertheless, there is no imperative domestic need to acquire Western goods. The Soviet economy, it is true, remains weak, particularly in the consumer goods sector--housing, clothing, consumer durables, and the variety of food supplies, but this is nothing new. The Russians have had long experience with doing without and making do. And Gorbachev's economic programs to stimulate production still promise to yield returns. Western imports clearly are not a matter of survival.

The November Meeting

But a number of domestic factors will condition Gorbachev's approach to the November meeting in Geneva, as well as his ability to achieve his three major objectives there. The Soviet military leadership, for example, will tend to resist

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significant reductions of their arsenals in any trade-off with the US. The Party as a whole, which takes great pride in Moscow's new-found status as a world power, would also look askance at any major reduction of Soviet military power. Moscow's military power and international prestige are truly popular at home. This helps explain why, though the word peace is always on their lips, arms control for the Russians has always been, as one informed observer once put it, "an unnatural act."

Moscow's oft-noted inferiority complex helps explain the Kremlin's neurotic worries about any slights to national sovereignty, real or imagined. Concern regarding sovereignty underlines its bitter reaction to US human rights demarches. Washington's public criticism of Soviet policy toward its dissidents or emigration are all seen as a crude intrusion into Soviet domestic affairs, an attempt to treat the USSR as a second-class power.

Clearly more self-assured than his predecessors, Gorbachev has been willing to speak directly to the issues of Jewish emigration and family reunification, but he too insists that Moscow's treatment of its own citizens remains a domestic matter. Thus he is unlikely to do more at Geneva than make a few show-case gestures by releasing some dissidents and allowing a small number of Jews to emigrate.

Drafted by: MSSchwartz
Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev

Attached for Secretary Shultz is a copy of the latest group of
background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It
deals with the Soviet view of the United States.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Soviet Image of the United States
- Tab B Soviet Aims in Dealing with the United States

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 7/1/02



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID L. CHEW

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Meeting with Gorbachev

Attached for Mr. Regan is a copy of the latest group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet view of the United States.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Soviet Image of the United States
- Tab B Soviet Aims in Dealing with the United States

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White House Guidelines, August 28/1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev's Letter on Private Channel

You will recall that you mentioned to Shevardnadze during your private conversation on September 27 that it might be useful to establish a direct and unofficial channel of communication between you and Gorbachev. Gorbachev responded in a letter dated October 12 (Tab B), in which he named Dobrynin as his interlocutor. Obviously, what the letter implies is that the Soviets would like to reactivate the arrangement which Kissinger used -- a special channel through Dobrynin.

Such an arrangement is not in our interest since it gives Dobrynin access to our decision makers while denying us access to theirs. It also would mean that we rely entirely on Dobrynin to interpret and explain our positions to his government, which of course is not a desirable thing to do.

I suggest, therefore, that you reply to Gorbachev -- in a letter George Shultz or I could deliver to him personally -- that we of course will use Dobrynin to the same degree that they use Hartman. In other words, if they want to do things through established channels, fine. But if we use their man, they have to use ours.

Recommendation

OK No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

- Tab A Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
- Tab B Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FO6-114/3#7950

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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Ltr to Gorb PC
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

This is in reply to your letter of October 12, 1985, concerning the possibility of a confidential exchange of opinions on a non-official basis. My reasons for mentioning this possibility to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were twofold.

First, it seemed that there could be some intrinsic value in exchanging opinions informally and privately without the constraints imposed by official formality. But I also wished to resolve certain ambiguities in how we communicate. From time to time in recent months Soviet officials have approached American officials or private citizens who are in touch with senior officials in our government and have offered comments which, they suggest, represent your views. Naturally, I have paid close attention to these comments since I take your opinions very seriously and wish to do the utmost to understand them with full clarity. However, the comments received in this manner have not always been consistent and thus I have difficulty determining to what degree they in fact represent your views. It therefore seemed worthwhile to seek a clarification.

I judge from your reply that you consider established channels adequate for communication between us. That is agreeable to me. Consequently Secretary Shultz will continue to look forward to receiving Ambassador Dobrynin at the State Department. Similarly, we will expect that Ambassador Hartmann will enjoy corresponding access to you in Moscow.

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NLRR 206-114/3 47951
BY CAJ NARA DATE 10/30/07

I hope that the meetings Secretary Shultz has in Moscow will lay the groundwork for a productive meeting between us in Geneva. I am very much looking forward to meeting you there and continue to hope that we will succeed in setting relations between our two contries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Mosocw



Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

The Soviets have responded to our suggestion of a special channel of communications between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev by nominating Ambassador Dobrynin. Gorbachev's letter of October 12 is attached at Tab 2.

The Department believes that we should respond symmetrically by nominating Ambassador Hartman as our Moscow point of contact. The draft Presidential response at Tab 1 makes the point that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should be part of the process.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Authority: NLSF-91-051 #361, CJS
BY: CJS, NARA, Date 7/1/02
7/25/00
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DECL:OADR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I enjoyed once again the opportunity to talk with Foreign Minister Mr. Shevardnadze during his visit to New York for the UN 40th Anniversary ceremonies. We had a good, if brief, chat, and he and George Shultz had the opportunity to continue their more extensive discussions.

I would like in this letter to respond to your letter of October 12 on the question of channels of communication between us. I fully agree that it is important that we be able to communicate confidentially and rapidly on matters of concern to us and to the entire world.

We will be happy to work with Ambassador Dobrynin here in Washington. He should deal directly with Secretary Shultz, who will inform me immediately of any messages the Ambassador may convey. I will also continue to use Ambassador Hartman in Moscow to convey my thoughts on these most delicate and weighty matters directly to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who, I am confident, will relay them directly to you.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7954
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

Strictly confidential

Unofficial translation

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NUS 99-051 #303 SMT 10/16/08
BY: CJS, NARA, Date: 7/11/02

October 12, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Our Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has informed me in detail about his conversation with you in Washington on September 27.

While there exist substantial differences in the positions of the two sides regarding concrete issues, which surfaced also in the course of that conversation and which I shall not touch upon in this letter, we deem it important that you, like us, proceed from the objective fact that we all live on the same planet and must learn to live together. It really is a fundamental judgement.

Here I would like to give you my answer only to one specific question you raised during the conversation with Eduard A. Shevardnadze, namely with regard to a confidential exchange of opinions between us bypassing, should it become necessary, the usual diplomatic channel. I am in favor of this. Indeed, there may arise the need to contact each other on matters on whose solution depend both the state of Soviet-American relations and the world situation as a whole.

On our side to maintain the confidential liason with a person who will be designated by you for this purpose is entrusted to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

His Excellency Ronald W. REAGAN
The President of the United States of America,
The White House

JFK
43NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

November 1, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK / TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: President's November 9 Address to the Soviet People

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Bill Martin to David Chew forwarding the draft Presidential speech to the Soviet people. We have agreed that the President will deliver this address Saturday, November 9 as an expanded radio talk that will be broadcast through VOA to the Soviet Union. We are coordinating with USIA/VOA so that the President's talk can simultaneously be broadcast to the USSR in Russian and other languages.

The principal drafter of this speech is Greg Guroff, who recently returned from a three-year stint as our Cultural Affairs Officer in Embassy Moscow. Greg has a unique "chustvo" (feel) for what will play well to a Soviet audience. The speech is laden with aphorisms and stresses the theme of people-to-people communications. It is short on the specifics of our arms control proposals and regional initiatives, themes which we feel are less appropriate for this address. This draft is somewhat longer than the ten minutes we have currently allotted, but we feel that we should provide the speechwriters with this longer version initially. We also feel, however, that this is one address that the speechwriters should confine their work to minor editing -- Greg and we have a better feel for what will make the greatest impact on a Soviet audience.

Recommendation

That you review the draft address to the Soviet people at Tab A and authorize Bill Martin to send the memorandum to David Chew at Tab I, forwarding this preliminary address to the Soviet Union.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum, Martin to Chew
Tab A Draft Address

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White House Guidelines, August 21, 1987
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CHEW

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: President's November 9 Address to the Soviet
People

Attached at Tab A is the NSC/State-approved draft Presidential address to the Soviet people slated to be given on November 9. This speech has been written with a particular eye to how we can make the most impact on the Soviet audience.

Attachment

Tab A Draft speech

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By C/S NARA, Date 7/1/02

DRAFT SPEECH FOR THE PRESIDENT TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE

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Draft #7 (11/1)

Good evening, dear (uvazhaemie) listeners! In a few days, I will meet with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. I hope that from that meeting will come a more realistic and constructive mutual understanding between us. But government communications are often formal and press reports often do not convey what people actually mean. Even though I recently was interviewed by representatives from TASS, Izvestiia, Pravda and Novosti--which many of you may have read--I am delighted to take this opportunity to speak directly and personally to you, the citizens of the Soviet Union, not only as President of the United States and a proud citizen of my country, but also as a husband, a father, and a grandfather who shares with you sincere wishes that our children and their children will live and prosper in a world of peace.

As we are not well acquainted, perhaps I should begin my talk by saying a little more about myself. Addressing you all tonight this way feels very natural, because one of my very first jobs was as a radio broadcaster. I grew up in a small town in the heartland of America, where the values of family and friends, and of concern for one's neighbors and hospitality to strangers were shared by all--values you also share.

While I was growing up I worked as a life guard. Then I took a broadcasting job, handling sports programs for a local radio station. After that, I went to Hollywood. I became the head of our professional actors guild. which makes me the only

Back then I had no intention of engaging in national politics. But America is a great country because it provides an opportunity for each of its citizens to engage in the political life of the country.

And though many years separate me from my early days in the Midwest--including eight years as Governor of California, many years in national politics, and five years as President, I have not forgotten those values I learned as a boy, nor have my fellow Americans. We still prize family, friends, hospitality, and concern for our fellow men.

Now, much has been written in your press about America's intentions and desires. I have to disagree with much of that. The American people are a peace-loving people. Their government reflects their desires. We do not threaten you or your country and never will. We are devoted to finding nonmilitary solutions to problems we face. The American people are a tolerant people, slow to anger, but staunch in defense of their liberties, and, like you, their country. Almost unique among great nations, the United States and the Soviet Union have never fought a war against each other. And it is my deep conviction and fervent desire that we never shall.

More than once in the past, our two nations have joined together to oppose a common enemy. When the American colonies were seeking their independence from the British crown, the Russian government provided assistance to those distant colonists. A century and a half later, we joined together to

defeat the common enemy of Fascism/Nazism.

Even before we entered the war, we began to supply massive quantities of food and equipment to those such as yourselves who fought against the tyrants. America was called the arsenal of democracy, and we provided to the Soviet Union over 11,000 aircraft, nearly 5,000 tanks, more than a quarter of a million vehicles including jeeps, trucks and armored cars, thousands of tons of food and other supplies. I am told that if you look hard enough you can still find some old Studebakers around the Soviet Union.

Americans will never forget the valor and pain, and at last, the joy of victory and hope for the future, that our peoples shared during that long awesome struggle. I remember President Roosevelt's admiration and praise for the Soviet people's heroism of in their struggle against our common enemy. How can any of us alive at the time forget the terrible year of 1941 when the Nazi army was turned back at the gates of Moscow, the courage of the people of Leningrad during the 900 day siege, the inspiration that the defense of Stalingrad gave to our people, or the thrill after so many years of struggle and suffering of our historic meeting on the Elbe?

American men fought for four years on all fronts and many lie buried in Northern Africa, Europe, Burma, China, the Pacific islands, and even at the bottom of the sea. Some are buried on Soviet soil--in the Hero City of Murmansk where they had brought precious supplies through the treacherous convoy route.

Yet after that victory, the American people gave generously to help rebuild wartorn countries, even to former enemies, because we had made war on a vicious ideology and leadership, not on a people. Moreover, we signalled our desire for peace by rapidly demobilizing. At the end of 1945, we had a armed force of 12 million, but by the beginning of 1948 we had reduced that number 10 times, to less than 1.2 million.

Much has happened in Soviet-American relations since those days, but we should not forget that when fascism threatened the world, we found the will to join forces and face that common enemy. I can only hope that now when we face as other challenges, we will not be found wanting.

We need now to join once again to defeat a common enemy that threatens our very existence--that is offensive nuclear weapons. I have said many times before and will say it again to you: a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought. I have dedicated myself to ridding the world of these weapons and we are dedicating our resources to finding a reliable defense against them.

Mankind is on the threshold of a new era. We now have the capability of exploring our solar system. Let us devote our efforts to exploring and learning, rather than building weapons of destruction. Let us probe the cosmos, eradicate disease, preserve our environment, feed the world's people--these are the tasks we should undertake jointly, not the perpetuation of weapons of destruction.

Our negotiators and yours are working intensively in Geneva, to find a way to reduce and ultimately eliminate these weapons. I am pleased that the pace of those talks seems to be picking up, and that the Soviet Union responded to our original programs. We studied that response carefully, and replied as quickly as we could, agreeing where we were able. These are complicated negotiations, and we are committed to making major breakthroughs. To get satisfactory results will take long, hard work. But then nothing of value, nothing that lasts, comes without hard work. As the Russian proverb goes, you can't pull the fish out of the pond without laboring.

As I have said, Americans are peace-loving people. We do not threaten anyone. I do not need to tell you about the enormity of suffering that war brings--that would be like carrying coals to Newcastle [in Russian: You don't carry your own samovar to Tula]. But the American people also understand the horrors of war. As I said, I am a father and a grandfather. What parent wants his child to have to go to war? Not one. I know that you agree. I want to say to my children and grandchildren that I have been involved in making this world a bit safer for you and yours.

Our nations share many fundamental traits. We admire your frankness, courage and openness, as well as your traditional values of family, friendship and hospitality. But, we should not lose sight of the fact that we live under very different systems. We do not seek to change your system. The

people of the Soviet Union must choose their own system, as we must choose our own, but we also must learn to live together in peace.

America was established by those who sought freedom from the repression and limitations of the old European order. They were pioneers and settlers who pushed back the frontiers and built a nation. They came from all continents, all cultures, all religions, all races, but with one dream--to build a home where they and their children could live in freedom.

Yes, America is truly a land of immigrants. We come from all over the world. Each of the peoples who sought freedom here has made its own contribution. We are proud of the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Jews, the Armenians, and others who have come to our shores. Here are representatives of nearly every nationality of the Soviet Union: people who have contributed to their new land, but remain proud of their origins and their cultures. They are united by their love of their new country but maintain contact with and follow events in their former homelands.

From our earliest days, we Americans asserted the rights of the individual and our Constitution protects those rights. We have lived under one Constitution for nearly 200 years, modifying it as we have expanded our freedoms. We are often a confusing people for outsiders to understand. Our government is elected by the people, but is not above the people or above the law. We have an intricate system of checks and balances in which each branch of the government keeps the others in line.

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For outsiders the welter of voices on the American political scene is often disconcerting, but it is our way and our strength. But no one should mistake our freedoms for weakness.

We believe that truth is to be found in the arena of debate and discussion. [Russian proverb: Truth does not burn in the fire, or drown in the water]. It is often uncomfortable for elected officials, because one of our proudest institutions is a free press. I know because the press criticizes me, and sometimes it hurts, but that is their role--to keep us honest, to raise those difficult questions, and to force officials to be accountable to the people. We favor this open dialogue not only among Americans, but among all peoples.

America was founded not only in the name of Americans but in the name of mankind. We believe that freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of the press are, as our Declaration of Independence written 209 years ago, says: inalienable rights of all men.

We are committed to international law and international organizations. We not only are host to the United Nations, each year we cover (?) percent of the United Nations budget. When we adhere to international agreements, we expect to abide by them and we expect others to do so as well. Even an agreement which we have not formally ratified, such as the SALT II agreement, we have nonetheless agreed not to undercut its terms as long as the Soviet Union practices similar restraint. We signed the Helsinki Accords ten years ago. Those Accords

obligate the signers, among other things, to respect human rights in their own countries, to permit their citizens freedom of speech and travel, and to improve communication among the peoples of the signatory nations. Our citizens expect us and the other signatories to abide by them. We stand prepared to accept criticism for our shortcomings, but we insist on the right to hold others to the same standards.

Some leaders complain that we intrude into their domestic affairs when we try to hold them to these standards, but this is not the case. We are asking the world's leaders simply to abide by what they have committed themselves to in these accords. But be assured that our citizens will criticize us as well if we fall down on the job.

As the two strongest nations in the world, we owe it to the rest of humanity to use our influence to seek peaceful settlements to local and regional conflicts. The American people expect no less of their government and no less of me as their President. We have met with representatives of your government to seek means of preventing the escalation of these regional conflicts--whether they be in Afghanistan, or Southeast Asia, Africa or Latin America. We are prepared to continue working directly with the Soviet government on all of these regional issues.

We ought also to join forces against another sickness that is afoot in the world. We accept the competition of ideas and the right of one people to criticize the acts of another, but there is no place in the political discourse of a civilized

world for political assassinations, terrorist bombings, and other mindless acts of violence.

Terrorists and assassins have deprived us of many of the greatest leaders of the twentieth century--Mahatma Gandhi, John F. Kennedy, Indira Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Anwar Sadat and many others. This is too high a price for civilization to pay and we must unite to stop it. I call upon you the Soviet people and your government to join us in concerted actions against terrorism and ensure that no country on the face of the globe will offer succor or comfort to terrorists.

We also need to do much more to foster a great expansion and deepening of contacts and communication between the peoples of both countries--particularly our young people. Especially because our societies are so different, we need this increase in contacts to foster mutual understanding. And here our young people are critical for they are our future. I am committed to expanding contacts in all areas where there is mutual interest.

We have much to learn from each other. Americans have long been enriched by Russian culture. The works of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Gorky and Pasternak are an integral part of any American university's literature curriculum. The plays of Chekhov are standard fare for any repertory theatre. What would an American orchestra do without the works of Chaikovsky, Rachmaninov, Prokofiev and Shostakovich?

I hope that there will soon be a time when American audiences are again thrilled by the beauty and grace of the Bolshoi Theatre and the Moiseev Dance Ensemble. I know that

many American authors from James Fenimore Cooper, Mark Twain and Jack London, to Ernest Hemingway and William Faulkner are extremely popular in the Soviet Union. And I hope that once again Soviet audiences will soon be able to experience first hand the best that American culture has to offer. But perhaps even more important, I hope to see a time when Soviet and American artists will be able to travel freely back and forth between our countries to cooperate and create together.

As you see, I am an enthusiast for efforts to expand the contacts between our two great societies. We should open a direct dialogue between our nations, whereby the leaders of each country would present the views of their governments to the peoples of the other through the medium of television. I am convinced that if more of your citizens came to visit the United States you would come to know that our people want peace as fervently as you do, for as all of you know, it is better to see something once than hear about it a hundred times.

Let me conclude by saying that I look forward to the meeting in Geneva and to the opportunity to tell General Secretary Gorbachev of our sincere desire for peace and for an end to the arms race. Although this will be my first meeting with the General Secretary, I have had two businesslike and productive meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and my top cabinet officers have a continuing dialogue with members of your government.

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My Secretary of State, George Shultz, has met regularly with Mr. Shevardnadze, in Helsinki, New York, Washington, and he is just back from Moscow. In addition, our countries are ably represented in each other's capitals--you by the very able Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and we by one of our most senior and talented professional diplomats, Ambassador Arthur Hartman.

I hope our exchange in Geneva will be fruitful and will lead to future meetings to discuss and resolve our mutual problems. We seek peace not only for ourselves, but for all those who inhabit this small planet.

I am reminded that we share borders with three countries--Mexico, Canada, and the Soviet Union. We pride ourselves on our friendly relations and open borders with our two North American neighbors. I and the American people look forward to the day when that narrow chain of islands stretching from Alaska to the Eastern shore of Siberia will symbolize the ties between our two great peoples, not the distance between us.

Everything has a season [in Russian: everything has a time], and let us hope as we approach the Christmas and New Year's season, that this will be the season for peace.

Thank you for welcoming me into your homes.