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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/12/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (11/12)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 12

YARHI-MILO

1209

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7930	MEMO	KATHY OSBORNE TO MCFARLANE RE ROY BREWER	1	10/11/1985	B6
7931	MEMO	TRANSCRIPT OF ROY BREWER TAPE SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN	6	ND	B6
7932	MEMO	PURNELL TO MARTIN RE BACKGROUND TAPES FOR THE FIRST LADY D 4/13/2011 F06-114/3; R 8/17/2011 M08-125/2 #7932	1	10/25/1985	B1 B3
7933	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPERS ON THE SOVIET UNION: THE SOVIET VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	ND	B1
7934	PAPER	SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3	4	ND	B3
7935	PAPER	SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	7	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Matlock

8507

*JHC
FILE*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 23, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Interview with BBC Radio

The President has agreed to do an interview on October 29 with a BBC Radio journalist to allay fears in Britain that we are not serious in seeking arms reductions. To prepare for this interview, which will be given extraordinary prominence both in the United Kingdom and worldwide, we need a list of talking points that would be useful to make during the 15-20 minute interview. We need this by noon, October 25.

We also expect to receive in the near future written questions which the BBC has agreed to provide in advance, although the interview will be oral. As soon as those are received, we will forward them to you with a request for draft replies.

William F. Martin

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Letter from Ambassador Price



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON, ENGLAND

September 30, 1985

CHARLES H. PRICE II
AMBASSADOR

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Last May my Embassy sent a request to the White House asking that you take part in an interview with BBC radio. The interview was to have dealt with your aspirations for a more peaceful world and how you seek to lower the level of East-West tensions. The broadcast would have been heard throughout the United Kingdom as well as worldwide. For whatever reason the request was turned down.

I believe that such an interview would provide you with an opportunity to share with BBC listeners around the world what you hope to achieve in the arms control arena and how you believe US-USSR relations can be most effectively approached.


As I have mentioned on previous occasions, there is here in the U.K. and Europe a mood of suspicion and anxiety about our commitment to meaningful arms reductions and our willingness to engage in productive talks with the Soviets both at the arms control negotiations and at your forthcoming November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. A statement from you in your own words would, I believe, go far to easing these concerns and dispelling mistrust. So far, the pre-Summit limelight has shone mostly on Moscow's new leadership. The BBC request offers us a unique opportunity to shift that focus in your direction with words aimed directly at our European partners.

I therefore urge that you reconsider the BBC request. Should you agree, the BBC would like the interview to take place at the earliest possible occasion, preferably this week or next. It would last no longer than 15 or 20 minutes, and they assure us that they would give the interview extraordinary prominence to assure maximum possible exposure.

I was with Bud this past Saturday when he briefed the Prime Minister on your meeting with Shevardnadze and the contents of the Gorbachev proposal. We obviously have our work cut out for us, and this BBC radio interview I believe will be most helpful.

Carol joins me in sending you and Nancy our love and very best.

Sincerely,



October 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM A. MARTIN

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Presidential Interview with BBC Radio

The President has agreed to do a taped interview with a journalist from BBC Radio to allay fears in Britain that we are not serious in seeking arms reductions. Although this will be an oral interview, the BBC has agreed to send written questions in advance. The interview will be given extraordinary prominence both in the United Kingdom and worldwide. Prompt and careful back-up support from the State Department will be essential.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at Tab I to the State Department.

Approve lm Disapprove _____

Ed Djerejian *ED* and Robert Korengold *RK* concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Memo to Platt
Tab II Letter from Ambassador Price

JH-e
5NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 24, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Roy Brewer

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Kathy Osborne forwarding a suggested response from the President to Mr. Roy Brewer (Tab A). Brewer is an old friend of the President's, and Kathy asked NSC (Tab II) to prepare a response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to Kathleen Osborne.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to Kathleen Osborne
Tab A	Response to Roy Brewer
Tab B	Kathleen Osborne's memo to you
Tab C	Mr. Brewer's correspondence



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO KATHLEEN OSBORNE

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to Roy Brewer

As you requested in your note of October 11, attached at Tab A is a letter to Mr. Roy Brewer for the President's signature.

Attachment

Tab A Suggested response to Roy Brewer
Tab B Your note of October 11
Tab C Mr. Brewer's correspondence

8



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Roy:

Good to hear from you, and thanks for the tape. Between going to meetings and preparing the tape itself I know you put in a lot of time. I appreciate your effort.


I think the meeting you attended on the 29th was particularly interesting, and I'm glad you were able to be there.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Mr. Roy M. Brewer
4230 Jubilo Drive
Tarzana, California 91356





6307 13

Roy M. Brewer
4230 Jubilo Drive
Tarzana, California 91356



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

October 3, 1985

Ms. Kathy Osborne
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Kathy:

I am enclosing herewith a tape which I prepared. I hope it reaches you in time. I do not have a copy of it so if the President wants to keep it, perhaps you could have it copied. If not, just send it back at his convenience.

Thank you for your co-operation, as always.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Roy M. Brewer

RMB/en

Enclosure

7932
JW-C 20NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 25, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JON R. PURNELL *J.P.*

SUBJECT: Background Tapes for the First Lady

Attached are the CIA background tapes on Mrs. Gorbachev prepared for the First Lady. The three tapes are identical in content, but each is for a different type of video system. We received no written background material with the tapes, and CIA tells us none was prepared.

Kathy Reed of Don Regan's office called just after you did and indicated that the First Lady is really interested in written background material, not the tapes. I am sending along the tapes, however, per our earlier conversation.

Ambassador Matlock has been in New York since the tapes were received and has not had an opportunity to view them.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the tapes to Mr. Rosebush.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to James G. Rosebush
Tab A Background Tapes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR M08-125/2#7932
BY lw NARA DATE 8/17/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES G. ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Background Tapes for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A are three video tapes on Mrs. Gorbachev for the First Lady. They are identical in content, but each is designed for a different type of video system. We did not receive any written background material with the tapes.

Attachment

Tab A Video tapes on Mrs. Gorbachev

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 7/1/02

JW-C
22NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~TOP SECRET~~

October 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: Soviet view of
National Security

Attached is the next group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet view of national security.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the papers to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve Bill Martin's sending copies of the papers to Secretary Shultz and Don Regan.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Soviet Strategy and Strategic Thinking

Tab B Soviet National Security Decision-Making

Tab II Memorandum - Martin to Platt

Tab III Memorandum - Martin to Chew

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 25, 1987
By CXS NARA, Date 7/1/02



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of
National Security

You have previously read five groups of papers on the Soviet Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, Gorbachev's domestic agenda, and the USSR's international position. The attached group discusses the Soviet view of national security.

The first paper (Tab A) deals with Soviet strategic thinking. It points out that Americans have a common tendency to attribute their own views and values to other peoples, and have often made the mistake of assuming that Soviet strategic thinking is like their our own. The Soviets, they would reason, face the same overwhelming nuclear threat as the United States and, as rational people, presumably see that threat much as Americans do.

The Soviets, however, come from a vastly different historical tradition, in which the princes of tiny Muscovy built a powerful autocratic state through centuries of military expansion. While Americans see military power as an unpleasant but necessary means of preserving freedom, the Soviets view it as the way to maintain and expand their authority. The basic aims of Soviet military power are to ensure the survival of the political system and enhance its ability to project power abroad.

The Soviets appreciate full well the tremendous destruction that would accompany any nuclear exchange. At the same time they continue to believe in the possibility of victory in nuclear war, and through the 1970's believed that the trend of worldwide political and military forces was moving in their favor.

Recent developments, however, particularly SDI research and the new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense, are worrisome factors for the Soviets. They have the potential to undermine the offensive pillars of Soviet strategy.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7933BY CV NARA DATE 10/30/07

Actual national security decision-making in the Soviet Union (paper at Tab B) is in the hands of a small circle of top leaders. The Politburo itself is the top forum in which all national security decisions are discussed and decided. It is, however, in one of the Politburo's committees, the Soviet Defense Council, that most of the detailed discussion of national security decisions is thought to take place.

The Defense Council is comprised of both civilian and military leaders who deal with political or military and technical policy. Gorbachev, like his predecessors, is its chairman. We do not know its exact composition, but likely members include the heads of the KGB, State Planning Committee, and Military-Industrial Commission and the Commander of Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet General Staff acts as its secretariat, coordinating the flow of information to the Council.

The Defense Ministry, particularly the General Staff, seems to exercise predominant influence over the formulation of defense policy - to a degree unparalleled in the West. Military information is not shared with civilian agencies, and there is no nucleus of civilian specialists who can offer alternative views to those of military planners.

Rumors of civilian dissatisfaction with the military's near monopoly on technical expertise occasionally surface. This dissatisfaction is undoubtedly fed by the system's inability since the late Brezhnev years to come to grips with serious security-related questions like U.S. arms control proposals. Instead, an aging leadership has been locked in a transition power struggle which nearly paralyzed its ability to act decisively.

Gorbachev has moved quickly to remove members of the old guard to help reinvigorate the Soviet system. It remains to be seen, however, whether he wants to challenge seriously the traditional system of national security decision-making, with its heavy emphasis on the military and tightly controlled channels of information, or make available to the leadership a greater variety of informed civilian opinion.

24

A

7934
27

SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING

Underlying all the destructive weapons and forces are ideas about strategy. From the mid-1960's well into the 1970's, many influential Americans believed--despite persuasive evidence to the contrary from Soviet military writings and agent sources such as Colonel Penkovsky--that soviet strategic thinking had to be very much like our own. In our familiar American tendency to attribute our own views and values to other peoples and their leaders, we tended to believe that, because we and the Soviets both faced the awesome problem of nuclear weapons, and we were both basically sensible peoples, we had to think about management of this problem in roughly the same way. Maybe the Soviets weren't quite as sophisticated as we with all our think tanks and academic journals, but they would more or less follow our lead in strategic thinking.

Today, while this mistaken "mirror imaging" of our views on the Soviets persists in some circles, we know a lot better. The manner and size of the Soviet strategic and other force buildups of the last twenty years showed that the Soviets thought differently than we about strategy and military power, including nuclear power. Study of the Soviet buildup, of Soviet military exercises and command structures, of their military writings (including very sensitive documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and military thinking. It underscores some important differences from our own.

This shouldn't have been surprising to us. After all, the Soviets are coming from a different place in geography, in history, and in political culture. Although now a global military superpower, at least in nuclear terms, Soviet Russia remains a continental superpower and, like Tsarist Russia, places a high store on dominating its continental periphery. The influence of history and political culture is often misunderstood as follows: Having been frequently invaded by Europeans and Asiatics over the centuries, Russians are seen as pathologically insecure; hence they feel the need for massive military power. There is some truth in this, but the essence is different. First of all, growing from a small principality in Muscovy, Russia has spent much more time invading and conquering than being invaded and conquered. The Russian state was built by the autocratic princes of Moscow, not by the merchants of the more westward-looking cities, such as Novgorod. For this reason, Kremlin rulers have from Medieval times to the present seen their security, indeed the legitimacy of their rule, to rest upon as much control over people, their own and those around them, as they could get. These attitudes toward political power have also shaped Russian and Soviet thinking about strategy and military power.

Americans tend to think of military power as an unpleasant but necessary means of preserving live-and-let-live conditions in a sometimes dangerous world. The Soviets think of military power as a means of preserving and expanding their authority. This makes their strategy both very defensive and very offensive at the same time.

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BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/11

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The structure, or architecture, of their strategy and their overall military forces displays this quality. The basic aims of Soviet military power in war, and also in peace, are to assure the survival of the political system at home and to enhance the projection of its power in the surrounding world. Hence the Soviets have been engaged in strategic, air, civil, and ABM defense from the beginning of the nuclear era. We had strategic defenses in the 1950's, but gave them up in the 1960's, in favor of the deterrent "balance of terror" concept based on nuclear offensive forces.

The second basic mission of Soviet military strength is to project power into the surrounding regions of Eurasia, especially Europe, but also in East Asia and southward toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Hence the enormous land combat forces, with their accompanying air and nuclear power, far more than they would need to retain control of East Europe or to deter attacks. By contrast, the US and NATO have seen our general purpose forces as a heavy trip wire to release the nuclear deterrent or as a means of dealing with very limited contingencies outside of Europe.

The Soviets see their long-range nuclear offensive forces as a deterrent, as we do. But to a much greater extent, they have also regarded these forces as long-range artillery support for backing up the other two primary missions of their forces: strategic defense of the homeland, through counterforce attacks on US nuclear forces and their command and control; and dominance of the Eurasian periphery, through attacks on nearby enemy forces and their bases.

In their thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the Soviets have never made the distinction between deterrence and warfighting capabilities that have been characteristic of US thinking. Nor have they discarded the notion of victory in nuclear war despite the assertion of Soviet leaders that nuclear war should not occur (which they believe) and cannot be won (which they do not believe).

Even when, in the 1950's and early 1960's, they had too little nuclear force to implement their view, the Soviets developed and held to the notion that real deterrent power had to be real warfighting power as well. This is because they believed that they had not only to deter attacks on them, but as far as they could, to encourage acceptance of their aims around the world short of a major war. This required nuclear warfighting strength. Moreover, they believed that nuclear war could actually occur, and, if it did, it would have to be fought for rational political and military aims, despite the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons. This is why they have developed a comprehensive array of counterforce nuclear weapons, such as the SS-18 against our silos and SS-20s against Eurasian military targets, and homeland defenses, including civil defense.

Soviet political and military leaders appreciate full well that any large nuclear war would be horribly destructive for their country and potentially lethal for their system. This has not, however, nullified their belief in the possibility of victory in nuclear war. For one thing, the ideology on which their system rests prevents that belief from being discarded. For them to really

believe that the handiwork of humans, such as nuclear weapons, could write the end to Soviet and even human history would mean that Marx and Lenin were wrong in a fundamental respect. More important, however, the Soviets have never believed that nuclear war, even a very large scale war, was likely to take the form of a mindless exchange of massive attacks on cities. Rather they have tended to believe that a major nuclear war would involve attacks of varying intensity and timing on a wide range of military targets, after which one side or the other would quit or collapse, but societies as such could survive, especially if they provided for active and civil defense.

Over the years they have built up offensive and defensive capabilities for this kind of nuclear war. Moreover, as their capabilities have grown, their concept of a major war between the superpowers has evolved as has their concept of victory. This evolution continues, and we are trying to track it in their military exercises and literature. What appears to be happening is a growing Soviet belief that their powerful nuclear forces, along with their general purpose forces, can enforce a different kind of victory by deterring US use of nuclear weapons at least on a large scale, while general purpose forces, supported if necessary by the required nuclear strikes, can conquer Europe and perhaps other regions nearby. The US would have to accept the result rather than be destroyed in a massive exchange. But the US would be reduced to a secondary power, while the USSR would emerge preeminent.

The key to this kind of thinking lies in the combination of all Soviet forces: strategic nuclear, general purpose and homeland defense. The Soviets do not separate them into distinct categories quite the way we do. In combination, they could allow victory in a large scale, general, but still not absolutely all-out nuclear conflict. The Soviets do not see this outcome as certain by any means; but it is a possibility that the design of their forces and strategies can make more probable if it ever comes to a war.

In the meantime, the Soviets believe that this overall force combination, along with increasing ability to project power at a distance, e.g., into the Third World, enhances the image of the USSR as a superpower and enhances their "persuasiveness" (i.e., ability to intimidate) vis-a-vis neighboring countries. Power projection into the Third World, which includes military deliveries, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, as well as military bases and forces, has become a fourth pillar of the Soviet strategic architecture, along with strategic defense, Eurasian dominance, and long-range nuclear strike.

From another perspective one can say that Soviet strategy has been designed over the past forty years to defeat American strategy in war and also in peacetime power politics. Historically, the US has relied on long-range nuclear sanctions plus relatively weaker forward forces to protect its exposed allies near the USSR. The USSR has built forces to dominate over the regions where US allies are located while also negating the credibility of US long-range nuclear guarantees. Desiring to avoid any war or major test of

strength, the Soviets have hoped that this combination would gradually demoralize the US and its allies in peacetime, leading to the erosion of our security commitments, the collapse of our alliances and the replacement of the US by the USSR as the predominant world power.

In the late 1970's the Soviets developed a detectable confidence that trends in the "correlation of forces", by which they mean political as well as military forces, were moving in a direction favorable to this prognosis. In the 1980's, however, the US and its allies have been more determined to resist these trends, undermining Soviet confidence that this is the way things will go. On the contrary, they now see factors that could--not necessarily will--turn these trends around.

From a strictly military point of view, the most worrisome new factors, other than the increase of US defense efforts and renewed commitment to global security, lie in the combination of SDI and the new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense the US is pursuing. All sources of information indicate how concerned the Soviets are about SDI. Interestingly, Soviet marshals write even more eloquently about their concern over the new conventional defense technologies. Together they challenge the primacy of the twin darlings of Soviet military power: the long-range ballistic missile and the tank. If the US and NATO actually develop and deploy such capabilities, they will undermine the offensive pillars of the Soviet strategic architecture. The USSR may be no less secure in the strictly military sense, as a result, but it will be less capable of casting an intimidating shadow over its neighbors. This is why Soviet propaganda, diplomacy, and arms control policy are trying to stop SDI and other US defense programs and, more generally, to encourage the US to return to the behavior and strategic doctrines we exhibited in the 1970's, which the Soviets found quite comfortable. Because Soviet superpower status rests so heavily on offensive military power combinations, the loss of this edge, so the Kremlin fears, will negate Soviet superpower status and ultimately undermine the legitimacy of Kremlin rule itself.

In the end, the challenge of the USSR to Western security and values stems more from the nature of its system than from the content of its strategies and military thought. If the rulers of the Soviet Union could somehow be brought to relent in their determination to control everybody they can reach, at home and abroad, their marshals and generals--who are intelligent and rational men--could readily come up with military strategies and force postures which would allow the USSR to be a secure and constructive participant in the world community. For that to happen, however, they have to be shown that the strategies they have followed patiently for thirty years will not work.

Prepared by:
[REDACTED]
CIA

FOIA(b)(7)



~~TOP SECRET~~

Soviet National Security Decision-Making

Introduction

Decision-making in the USSR is the prerogative of a small circle of leaders, who act largely in private and who generally focus on discrete issues rather than on broad debates over priorities or strategies. Indeed, the absence in the USSR of independent players--such as the press and Congress--or public debate creates a situation more akin to that in a large American corporation.

Mikhail Gorbachev, as General Secretary and de facto head of the Politburo, is "primus inter pares" in the decision-making hierarchy. However, as compared with Stalin's day, when the Politburo served primarily as an enforcer of the dictator's will, power has become more deeply and evenly balanced within the leadership. Today, the Politburo in many ways represents a collective, oligarchic body.

- Stalin dominated the Party and State bureaucracies in a ruthless fashion. His authority was unquestioned, and he intervened in a detailed way in all aspects of defense policy.
- However, by the time Leonid Brezhnev assumed the mantle of the top Party position, the authority of the General Secretary had been considerably diluted. Brezhnev sought to solidify his power by "buying off" the imperial potentates heading the major institutions in Soviet society. This gave rise to a more collegial, consensus style of leadership. Under Brezhnev, the Politburo was transformed from a group of personal associates and sycophants to the dictator, to a supreme "executive committee" representing all the principal power groups--the Central Party apparatus, the military, the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the military-industrial complex.
- This strategy of providing each of the claimants more of the resources and authority they desired worked well in Brezhnev's early years. However, as economic conditions became more stringent and resource constraints more pronounced, this strategy became more difficult to implement. Further, the dispersion of authority from the General Secretary to the bureaucratic chieftains led to a certain immobilism in Soviet society, particularly in decision making. Bold initiatives gave way to

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At the seeming apex of his power, Brezhnev's physical strength was waning. By 1977 his declining health led to periods of lackluster leadership, and it apparently affected his role as decision maker during the crises in Afghanistan and Poland. When Andropov was General Secretary, his illness and weakness appeared to contribute to the inept handling of the Soviet shutdown of the KAL.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR FOI-14/3 #7935
 BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

incrementalism; caution and aversion to risk-taking came more and more to characterize the leadership's approach. The propensity of Soviet leaders to stress the maintenance of their personal positions promoted a "fear of the alternative" and produced a tendency to "muddle through."

- This conservatism led to an inability to deal imaginatively with a number of issues confronting the leadership, including reform of the domestic economic management structure and responses to your numerous arms control initiatives.

The Politburo. Organizationally, the Politburo is the top forum in which all national security questions are discussed and decided and serves as the highest policy-making organ in the USSR. Under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko it resembled a board of directors or parliamentary-style cabinet in that the interests of all key Soviet institutions were represented. (Politburo members wear at least two hats, holding other important jobs in the central or regional party and government apparatuses.) The Politburo meets every Thursday to hear presentations and adopt decisions on the agenda topics selected by the Party's permanent staff, the Secretariat.

The General Secretary has a significant degree of leeway in presenting an issue and formulating a consensus. During Brezhnev's tenure, votes were seldom taken. Brezhnev's style seemed to be to wait for a consensus to develop, then declare that a decision had been reached. The net effect of these procedures was to concentrate enough authority in the presiding officer's hands to move most Politburo business fairly expeditiously, though not enough to allow the General Secretary to override the wishes of a Politburo majority on an important matter.

Defense Council. By far the most important of the permanent Politburo committees is the Soviet Defense Council. In practice, this is believed to be where most of the detailed discussions on national security questions--including key decisions on arms control--take place.

The Defense Council's present form was apparently devised to ensure access by the senior military leadership to high-level political/military policy deliberations; to provide a top command unit capable of timely and coordinated response on strategic decisions in a crisis; and to serve in peacetime as a standing body which can be quickly and easily transformed into an agency for national command and control in wartime.

The Defense Council is made up of both civilian and military leaders who deal with questions of political or military and - technical policy. Each of the General Secretaries--Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and now Gorbachev--has been identified as its Chairman. Other possible Defense Council members include the heads of the KGB, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the head of the Military-Industrial Commission, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact joint forces.

While the military thus does not dominate the Defense Council, the General Staff (in particular, its Main Operations Directorate) apparently acts as its executive secretariat, coordinating information for presentation to the Defense Council. Even if the Chief of the General Staff is not actually a member of the Defense Council, he is in effect its executive secretary.

Secretariat: The most important and direct supporting role in the Politburo decision-making system belongs to the Central Committee Secretariat, the body charged with the day-to-day administration of the party apparatus. This executive staff of the Party not only formulates recommendations on policy issues within the competence of its approximately 20 departments, but also coordinates and channels much of the input of other agencies, such as the Foreign Ministry and KGB. Headed by the "General Secretary," the nine other Secretaries oversee virtually every aspect of Soviet domestic and foreign policy (ironically, except defense policy). The Central Committee apparatus also serves as a primary source of the staff aides who assist in formulating policy statements, memoranda, information briefs, and the like.

During Times of Crisis

The Politburo can, of course, meet any time and any place with less than full membership when pressing issues or crises arise. For instance, during the 1973 Middle East crisis there were at least seven and probably eight Politburo-level meetings called during October 4-27. The Politburo also met several times in lengthy sessions between Brezhnev's summit meetings with foreign leaders. And when Brezhnev returned to Moscow from trips abroad, the Politburo often went into session at the airport or the next day to hear the General Secretary's report.

The Pivotal Role of the Military in Soviet National Security Policy Making

In the Soviet Union the Ministry of Defense, in particular the General Staff, seems to exercise a predominant influence over the formulation of defense policy. To a degree unprecedented in the West, the uniformed military controls the mechanisms through

which defense spending is supervised, strategy developed, force deployment patterns analyzed and developed, and operational planning implemented.

In a system that is so highly compartmentalized, defense plans and policies tend to be developed in relative isolation from other centers of power. Several factors contribute to this inordinate military influence:

- Monopoly on Information: Military information is tightly controlled in the USSR and coordination with civilian agencies is generally prohibited. Only the Defense Ministry maintains a data base on weapon characteristics, force deployment schemes and doctrinal intricacies. While specific agencies--weapons design bureaus, for example--will have access to certain highly restricted data, no other agency will have control over the full range of intelligence and operational information.

- Expertise: Only the uniformed military possesses the expertise to undertake complex examinations of weapons systems and to define "threat" scenarios. Unlike the United States, in the USSR there is no group of "civilian defense intellectuals" resident at leading academic centers or think tanks with the expertise to challenge assumptions produced by the General Staff. Further, there are no civilians in the Defense Ministry; strategy formulation and management of the armed forces is in the hands of the military. This contrasts with the situation in this country, where the concept of "civilian control" places considerable authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- Power of the First Draft: The General Staff is composed of a large, highly professional officer corps with years of experience in the national security field. No other agency maintains a staff anywhere near as large or expert as the General Staff. This staff has control of the manner in which national security issues are selected and planned and alternatives developed. In effect, with the "choices" circumscribed by alternatives conceived by one institution, the "options" considered by the national command authorities in the USSR will be much narrower, much less comprehensive and more parochial than those presented to you. Finally, the absence of an interagency review process and a central coordinating mechanism, such as our NSC, gives undue influence to the views of the General Staff.

- Congruence of Views between Political and Military Leaders: The views of the General Staff likely find fertile ground in the minds of the USSR's top leadership. Unlike Western societies, where conflict between military and civilian viewpoints is common, these groups in the USSR share a common domestic and foreign policy perspective. Further, Soviet society has itself become increasingly militaristic, with the economy run essentially on a war-mobilization basis and enormous preferences accorded to the "military-industrial complex." As one observer stressed, "It's not a question of whether or not there is a military-industrial complex in the USSR; the Soviet Union is a military-industrial complex." That is not to say that debates over investment, for example, do not exist. What is different, however, is that rather than a "guns versus butter" trade-off, in the USSR the competing factions argue over "guns versus oil drilling rigs."

- One-Dimensional Power: The Soviet Union's superpower status is primarily a reflection of its military strength. Given the USSR's relative weakness in other areas, the unusual historical reliance on and fascination with military power should be no surprise. It is not the universal appeal of a Marxist ideology, not the attractiveness of the Soviet model of development, and definitely not the quality and scope of economic aid that permits Moscow to enjoy the status of a global power. The military tool seems to be the only thing that has worked among the Kremlin's foreign policy instruments. Further, in a society characterized by inefficiency and corruption, the military stands as one sector that has remained relatively unscathed by charges of malfeasance and nonproductivity (the KGB is another noteworthy example). As the poet Max Hayward noted, perhaps with some overstatement, "In the Soviet Union, nothing works--except the military, and it works damn well." The point is that as long as the ruling stratum perceives that advances domestically and in the international arena are the product of the military machine, the view of the uniformed military is likely to get more than a sympathetic hearing.

Significance of the Military Influence:

The pivotal role of the military has major implications for Soviet national security programs, particularly on arms control.

-- On Arms Control

Most of the detailed discussion on arms control probably takes place in the Defense Council which, as already noted,

is made up of probably half a dozen top party and government officials with national security responsibilities. While the civilian component is clearly larger, the General Staff's role as secretariat for the Council offers the military an institutional advantage in shaping arms control policy. The General Staff arranges Council meetings and keeps the roster of officials who attend. It also has de facto control of coordination for the actual negotiations and, in effect, acts as gatekeeper.

The Soviets systematically examine arms control issues on political, military, economic, and diplomatic grounds, but most of the interagency haggling on this score probably occurs within the Defense Council. Considerable expertise by now has been built up within a select group in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of course, but the military jealously guards its prerogatives here. You may have heard the anecdote from the SALT I negotiations regarding a highly technical, informal discussion between an American official and a group of Soviet military and civilian representatives. When the discussion touched on sensitive weapons characteristics, the Soviet General drew the American aside and stated that this was a subject with which the Soviet civilians present really didn't need to become involved!

This dominant role of the military also produces security analyses based on "worst-case" threat perceptions. Given the lack of alternative threat scenarios, those arguing for a reallocation of investment away from the defense sector have to make their case in the face of the military's most dire predictions. On arms control it ensures that the definition of an acceptable compromise will be one that would leave the Soviet Union in an indisputable position of advantage. President Ford drew attention to this key factor when he noted that in his discussions in Vladivostok with Brezhnev, no progress was made until they agreed to meet in a smaller session--and thereby excluded two Soviet Generals from the meeting.

National Security Decision-Making under Gorbachev: A Prognosis

Under Andropov there were rumors of civilian dissatisfaction with the General Staff's near monopoly of technical expertise, and reports that the party leader wanted to increase the input of civilian technical experts into the arms control process. "Think tanks," such as Arbatov's USA-Canada Institute, will probably undertake more sensitive politico-military analyses as Gorbachev seeks to expand his sources of national security advice. We can expect that the General Secretary will expand his own limited staff of foreign and defense policy experts and call more often on the Central Committee's International Department for independent advice. He may also look more to the KGB. (Gorbachev quickly promoted the head of the KGB to full Politburo membership after he came to power.)

There are indications that Gorbachev is prepared to deal decisively with the "immobilism" in Soviet policy making. He has bounced many of the "Old Guard" from their positions of power and prestige--including Foreign Minister Gromyko, Premier Tikhonov, Defense Industry tsar Romanov, State Planning Committee head Baybakov, and others. In their place Gorbachev has promoted younger, more technically competent individuals. More importantly, for the most part they are loyal to the new General Secretary and possess only modest power bases of their own. For example, four men allied with Gorbachev have been promoted to full membership in the Politburo since his accession to the General Secretaryship. Perhaps significantly, the Minister of Defense, Marshal Sokolov, has been awarded only candidate Politburo membership.

Gorbachev is off to a fast start. It remains to be seen, however, whether personnel changes alone will be sufficient to reinvigorate Soviet policy making, or whether Gorbachev will have to consider serious reforms in the system itself. If he opts for reform, he is sure to spur the opposition of entrenched bureaucratic elements that would stand to lose power or prestige as a result of change. Their opposition could well derail, or at least effectively slow, even the best intended efforts for change.

Prepared by:
Tyrus Cobb, NSC

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev

Attached for Secretary Shultz is a copy of the latest group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet view of national security.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Soviet Strategy and Strategic Thinking
Tab B Soviet National Security Decision-Making~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 7/1/02

4



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID L. CHEW

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev

Attached for Mr. Regan is a copy of the latest group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet view of national security.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A Soviet Strategy and Strategic Thinking
Tab B Soviet National Security Decision-Making~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADRDECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By CIS NARA, Date 7/1/02

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43NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Request to Travel to Speak at Davidson College, N.C.
on December 12, 1985

I have been invited to a speak on U.S.-Soviet Relations at Davidson College in North Carolina on December 12, 1985.

All costs will be covered by the College.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: 10/25/85

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: JACK F. MATLOCK

2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): To Speak at Davidson College, NC
on December 12, 1985

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Davidson/Washington

DEPARTURE DATE o/a 12/11/85 RETURN DATE 12/13/85

TIME _____ TIME _____

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:

GOV AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR _____ XX POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:

TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____ TOTAL TRIP COST _____

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER Davidson College

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____

Davidson College would pay for transportation costs.

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO _____

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: _____

13. APPROVALS:

July
45

8538

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Note to Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Bill Martin to John Hilbold transmitting NSC approval of a draft letter from the President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented during his September visit. We made some minor adjustments to the text, as indicated at Tab A, primarily to reflect the President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.

Judyt *JM* Mandel concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached Martin to Hilbold memorandum forwarding the draft letter to Shevardnadze.

Approve *ECM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Martin to Hilbold memorandum
- Tab A Approved text for Presidential letter
- Tab B Original draft



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN E. HILBOLD

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter from the President to Shevardnadze

The NSC has reviewed the draft text of a letter from the President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented during his September visit. We have made some minor suggestions, included in the draft at Tab A, primarily to reflect the President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.

Attachments

- Tab A NSC suggested text for Presidential letter
- Tab B Original draft

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A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC Draft Letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

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B

October 18, 1985

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated meeting with you at the White House on a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries, and I look forward to my upcoming conference with General Secretary Gorbachev and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

RR

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

RR:CMF:JEH:AVH

DISPATCH THRU STATE VIA NSC.

OK

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ID # 357149

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AG

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: Edward A. Shevardnadze

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Thank you for gifts on occasion of his visit with the President.

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>GA HILB</u>	ORIGINATOR <u>8511018</u>	<u>1/1</u>
<u>WS MART</u>	Referral Note: <u>C 8511022</u>	<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1/1</u>

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
 Code = "A"
 Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

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857149

ID 8501023 A INITIALS JEH

LOGGED 850930 ARRIVAL 850930 PRESENT 850927
ARRIVAL FORM P PRESENTED PERSONALLY

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY AND MRS.
NAME EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE

TITLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA

INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY
CATEGORY 9999
MISCELLANEOUS - N.E.C.

DESCRIP A SAMOVAR, 10" WIDE X 14" TALL, AND MATCHING TRAY, 12" X 16", BOTH
WITH A LACQUERED FLORAL AND FRUIT DESIGN.

FLAG RARE

DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WORKING VISIT WITH THE
PRESIDENT.

TOTVALU RARE GIFTS B

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

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ID 8501023 B INITIALS JEH

LOGGED 850930 ARRIVAL 850930 PRESENT 850927
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DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY AND MRS.
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CITY MOSCOW
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA

ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY

CATEGORY 0999
HOUSEHOLD - N.E.C.

DESCRIP A LACQUERED BOX, 6 1/2" X 4" X 1 1/2" DEEP, MEDIEVAL SCENE PICTURED
ON TOP, BLACK SIDES WITH DECORATIVE PAINTED GOLD BORDER AND SOLID
RED INTERIOR.

VALUE 000400
APPR SIAMESE IMPORTS, MANHASSET, NY.

DISP WH RESIDENCE; FOR OFFICIAL USE/DISPLAY

DESIG AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WORKING VISIT WITH THE
PRESIDENT.

TOTVALU RARE GIFTS B

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Week Ending Friday, October 4, 1985

National Historically Black Colleges Week, 1985

Proclamation 5370. September 27, 1985

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

The one hundred and two historically black colleges and universities in the United States have contributed substantially to the growth and enrichment of the Nation. These institutions have a rich heritage and tradition of providing high quality academic and professional training, and their graduates have made countless contributions to the progress of our complex technological society.

Historically black colleges and universities bestow forty percent of all degrees earned by black students in the United States. They have awarded degrees to sixty percent of the black physicians, sixty percent of the pharmacists, forty percent of the attorneys, fifty percent of the engineers, seventy-five percent of the military officers, and eighty percent of the members of the judiciary. Throughout the years, these institutions have helped many underprivileged students to develop their full talents through higher education.

Recognizing that the achievements and aspirations of historically black colleges and universities deserve national attention, the Congress of the United States, by Senate Joint Resolution 186, has designated the week of September 23 through September 29, 1985, as "National Historically Black Colleges Week" and authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of September 23 through September 29, 1985, as National Historically Black Colleges Week. I ask all Americans to observe this week with appropriate

ceremonies and activities to express our respect and appreciation for the outstanding academic and social accomplishments of the Nation's black institutions of higher learning.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-seventh day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and tenth.

Ronald Reagan

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11 a.m., September 30, 1985]

Note: The text of the proclamation was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on September 28.

Meeting With Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Radio Address to the Nation. September 28, 1985

My fellow Americans:

During the past week we've been working hard to advance the Middle East peace process and to try to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. I met with our good friend President Mubarak of Egypt, and I'll be holding discussions this coming week with another longtime friend of the United States, King Hussein of Jordan. I hope to talk to you more about the Middle East next week. But today let me speak about our efforts to build a more constructive and stable long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

Both Secretary Shultz and I met with the new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze this past week. These meetings covered a broad global agenda, including the four major areas of the U.S.-Soviet dialog: human rights, regional and bilateral

M

issues, and security and arms control matters. They enabled us to discuss at the most senior levels the key issues facing our two nations. I told the Foreign Minister I'm hopeful about my upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and I put forward some new ideas as well as my plans and expectations for that meeting.

The Soviet Foreign Minister indicated that Mr. Gorbachev also is looking forward to these discussions. Furthermore, we agreed to set up a series of senior level discussions between our experts in preparation for the Geneva meeting. Let's be clear, however, that success will not come from one meeting. It must come from a genuine, long-term effort by the leadership of the Soviet Union as well as ourselves. The differences between us are fundamental in political systems, values, and ideology as well as in the way we conduct our relations with other countries.

The United States must and will be forthright and firm in explaining and defending our interests and those of our allies. I went over with Mr. Shevardnadze Soviet actions in various parts of the world which we feel undermine the prospects for a stable peace, and I discussed with him the need for the Soviet Union to work with us seriously to reduce offensive nuclear arms. These weapons exist today, and there's no reason why real reductions cannot begin promptly.

Finally, I emphasized the need for a more productive Soviet response to our efforts in Geneva to begin a U.S.-Soviet dialog now on how to fashion a more stable future for all humanity if the research in strategic defense technologies, which both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are conducting, bears fruit. Mr. Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet negotiators will present a counterproposal in Geneva to the initiatives we've taken there. We welcome this. It is important that the counterproposal address our concerns about reductions and stability just as we've sought to address Soviet concerns. And we hope it'll be free of preconditions and other obstacles to progress. We're ready for tough but fair negotiating. You, the people, can distinguish diplomatic progress from mere propaganda designed to influence public opinion in the democracies.

All too often in the past, political and public opinion, and sometimes government policy as well, have taken on extreme views of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We have witnessed sometimes a near euphoria over a supposed coming together, at other times a feeling that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may somehow be at the brink of conflict.

By holding to the firm and steady course we set out on 5 years ago, we've shown that there is no longer any reason for such abrupt swings in assessing this relationship. Our differences are indeed profound and it is inevitable that our two countries will have opposing views on many key issues. But we've intensified our bilateral dialog and taken measures, such as the recent upgrading of the crisis hotline, to ensure fast and reliable communications between our leaders at all times.

Above all, I emphasized to the Foreign Minister, and will do so with Mr. Gorbachev, that the overriding responsibility of the leaders of our two countries is to work for peaceful relations between us. So, what we're engaged in is a long-term process to solve problems where they're solvable, bridge differences where they can be bridged, and recognize those areas where there are no realistic solutions, and, where they're lacking, manage our differences in a way that protects Western freedoms and preserves the peace. The United States stands ready to accomplish this.

Much more must be done, but the process is underway, and we will take further steps to show our readiness to do our part. With equal determination by the Soviets, progress can be made. We will judge the results as Soviet actions unfold in each of the four key areas of our relations. And I will be reporting to you further as preparations for the November meeting proceed.

Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 12:06 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House.