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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/12/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (9/12)

**FOIA**

F06-114/3

**Box Number** 12

YARHI-MILO

1207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7921	PAPER	US-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1972-1979: AN OVERVIEW <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	5	ND	B1
7918	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/22/1985	B1
7919	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/21/1985	B1
7922	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	4	ND	B1
7923	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/29/2009 F06-114/3</i>	4	ND	B1
7920	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR STIX <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/21/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

JML

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Study on U.S. - Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding the "Overview" section (Tab A) of a study on U.S. - Soviet summits. The study was prepared by the State Department's Office of the Historian, and is attached at Tab II for your information. It appears to be a thorough piece of work, well worth reviewing as we approach Geneva.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President forwarding the "Overview" section of the summit study to the President.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A "Overview" section of summit study  
Tab II Complete summit study

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 27, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 7/1/02





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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*RR*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Study on U.S. - Soviet summits, 1972-1979

Issue

Whether to review the attached overview of U.S. - Soviet summits.

Facts

The State Department's Office of the Historian has prepared an in-depth study of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings from 1972-1979.

Discussion

As we approach your November meeting with Gorbachev I think it would be useful to review the attached summary of the State Department's summit study.

Recommendation

OK                      No

\_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_                      That you review the attached summary of summits since 1972.

Attachment

Tab A                      "Overview" section of State Department summit study.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987  
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

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UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1972-1979:  
AN OVERVIEW

Between 1972 and 1979, United States and Soviet leaders held six summit meetings. President Nixon's three summits with Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (Moscow, May 22-30, 1972; Washington, June 18-25, 1973; and Moscow, June 28-July 3, 1974) were of longer duration than the others and included extensive side trips, photo opportunities, and ceremonial aspects. A programmed informality characterized these meetings, with occasions for the two leaders to socialize in a relaxed setting.

President Ford's two summits with Brezhnev (Vladivostok, November 23-24, 1974; and Helsinki, July 30 and August 2, 1975) were arranged in response to specific circumstances--Ford's assumption of the presidency and the signing of the Helsinki Accords. Hence, they were shorter, less ceremonial, involved less socializing, and dealt with fewer issues than the previous three summits.

President Carter's summit with Brezhnev (Vienna, June 15-18, 1979) was more formal in tone than the other summits. There were opportunities for informal conversation between the two leaders at the introductory session, short luncheons and dinners, and an evening at the opera, but none in a casual setting. Most business was conducted in plenary session; Carter and Brezhnev met privately only once. The discussions were substantively wide-ranging, but Brezhnev's failing health limited the length of the sessions.

In all cases, U.S. officials anticipated constructive but limited achievements from the summits. Conscious efforts were made to insure there would be positive results from the meetings that would enhance the President's image as a world leader and build support for his policies. Extensive U.S.-Soviet negotiations preceded all six meetings, not only to set the agenda and negotiate a joint communique, but also to narrow and reconcile differences on substantive issues so that specific agreements could be announced at the summit.

Arms control was the dominant issue discussed at all the summits. Summit consideration supplemented and crystallized rather than replaced ongoing negotiations on this issue. Two SALT treaties and several other agreements and joint statements relating to arms control were completed at the meetings. A limited number of negotiating deadlocks on arms control were

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NLRR 106-114/3 #7921

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07



resolved at the summits. At the 1972 meeting, differences were resolved on several subsidiary issues; in June 1974 a threshold test ban treaty was concluded; and in November 1974 important Soviet concessions were obtained regarding SALT.

Geopolitical issues, particularly the Middle East, were also a central concern at the summits. Discussions served mainly to restate existing positions rather than break new ground. The Soviet Union raised the subject of the People's Republic of China at all of the meetings. This reflected Soviet concern over China's nuclear capability and over the resumption of Sino-American relations.

Summit discussions also focused on trade, cultural and scientific exchange, and other bilateral interests. Numerous agreements on these subjects were signed at the three summits held during the Nixon administration. Certain bilateral questions were raised at the Ford and Carter administration summits, but less emphasis was placed on them and no agreements were signed.

#### NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT MOSCOW, MAY 22-30, 1972

In 1970 the United States took initiatives which after substantial negotiations eventuated two years later in the first Moscow Summit of May 1972. Both countries had high expectations for this summit and these were largely fulfilled, at least in the short run.

The two principal achievements of the summit were the establishment of a personal relationship between President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and the signature of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I). Some last-minute negotiation on these agreements took place at the summit. Also signed in Moscow were prenegotiated agreements on the Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations, Prevention of Incidents at Sea, Cooperation in Space, Medical Science and Public Health, Environmental Protection, and Science and Technology. Of these, the Agreement on Basic Principles was of great importance to the Soviets, who saw it as a U.S. recognition of their full equality as a superpower.

Discussions at the summit also affected significant developments in Europe and the Middle East, trade expansion, and a lend-lease settlement. In subsequent years some of the roughnesses in the negotiating process before, during, and



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after this summit, particularly as they affected the SALT I agreements and the international grain trade, provided an opening for opponents of detente to criticize its viability.

**NIXON AND BREZHNEV AT WASHINGTON,  
CAMP DAVID, AND SAN CLEMENTE,  
JUNE 18-25, 1973**

The Brezhnev visit to the United States (June 18-25), undertaken more at Soviet initiative than American, took place amidst much fanfare but under the cloud of the Watergate hearings. Preparations were conducted primarily by a special interagency committee under the National Security Council's Senior Review Group, although some details were smoothed out by National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger during a May visit to the Soviet Union. Like Khrushchev's visit in 1959, Brezhnev's was marked by public demonstrations, mainly by Jewish groups critical of restrictive Soviet emigration policies. During the visit ten agreements were signed, the most important of which was an understanding on the prevention of nuclear war. In several private talks with Nixon at Camp David and San Clemente, Brezhnev also emphasized his anxiety over improving U.S.-Chinese ties, and he tried unsuccessfully to draw Nixon and Kissinger into an implied alliance against the Chinese. In their final meeting at San Clemente, Brezhnev also tried to bully Nixon into a secret deal to end the Middle Eastern conflict.

**FORD AND BREZHNEV AT VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974**

The Vladivostok meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet leader Brezhnev took place only five months after the Moscow summit, primarily because Brezhnev was eager to establish contact with the new U.S. President. The summit was more ad hoc than the three previous ones and focused almost entirely on the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Cyprus, and the Middle East were dealt with briefly but nothing of substance was achieved on any of these issues. Mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) was mentioned only in the prenegotiated joint communiqué. In part because of the groundwork laid by Secretary of State Kissinger during his October trip to Moscow and to Soviet hopes of establishing a constructive relationship with the new U.S. President, a breakthrough on SALT did take place at Vladivostok. The two

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sides reached agreement in principle and the resulting SALT accord provided the basis for the SALT II treaty later signed by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It met the demands of the U.S. Congress and the Defense Department for equal aggregates and involved significant Soviet concessions, including abandonment of their previous demand that Forward Based Systems (FBS), such as U.S. weapons based in Western Europe, had to be included in the U.S. total. Ford and Kissinger returned home feeling triumphant and claiming that they had put a cap on the arms race. Their hopes were dashed, however, by the subsequent inability of the two sides to agree upon whether such weapons as the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles were to be included in the totals agreed upon at Vladivostok.

#### FORD AND BREZHNEV AT HELSINKI, JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975

The 1975 Helsinki summit between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev took place on July 30 and August 2, 1975, immediately prior to and following the ceremonies closing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The United States gave top priority to two issues:

- Strengthening cooperation between the great powers
- Concluding a SALT II agreement

The results of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting were unsatisfactory. No substantive progress was made on SALT although the atmosphere which surrounded meetings of the two leaders was frank and cooperative. Public reaction to the meeting was strongly negative and contributed to the subsequent deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations during the remainder of the Ford administration and weakened the President's political position.

#### CARTER AND BREZHNEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 15-18, 1979

The only U.S.-Soviet summit conference held during the Carter administration opened in Vienna on June 15, 1979, and continued through June 18, with five plenary meetings as well as a private meeting between President Carter and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev. Discussions focused on the following subjects:



1. Strategic Arms Limitation treaty (SALT II)
2. SALT III and other arms control issues
3. International issues
4. Bilateral and trade issues.

The major achievement at Vienna was the signing of the SALT II Treaty on strategic arms. Other issues were discussed and positions clarified, but little movement toward specific agreements resulted. Subsequently, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the NATO two-track decision in mid-December 1979 to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces later that month removed all hopes for progress toward a rapprochement in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter asked the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty from further Senate consideration; it has still not been ratified.

Office of The Historian  
October 1985

II



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 17, 1985

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~  
(CONFIDENTIAL with Attachment)

TO: NSC - Ambassador Matlock  
FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb *BK by H*  
SUBJECT: Study on U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

I am forwarding a classified study of U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979, prepared by the Office of the Historian. It takes into account comments on an earlier draft completed in July, as well as information developed in the course of personal interviews.

Attachment:  
Study on U.S.-Soviet Summits, 1972-1979

*hrc*  
PA/HO:PClaussen:bj  
10-17-85 632-9477 0066h

*423*  
clrs - PA/HO - WZSlany  
PA - GBHigh

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CSS NARA, Date 7/1/02

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

Office  
of the  
Historian

12

United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

**Historical Research Project No. 1454**

UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS  
1972-1979

OCTOBER 1985



~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CS 7/1/02

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

System II  
91097

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JFH-C

October 22, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

To sign the attached letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Facts

We have prepared a letter to Gorbachev outlining the regional initiative you will be making in your General Assembly address.

Discussion

The attached letter responds to Gorbachev's letter of September 12 which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze delivered when you met with him September 27. In addition, it gives Gorbachev advance notice of the regional initiative you will be proposing in your speech to the UN General Assembly on Thursday.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the attached letter to Gorbachev.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

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Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR F06-114/3#7918

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 21, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Gorbachev

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a proposed response to Gorbachev's letter of September 12. I have reviewed State's original draft and have suggested some modifications (text at Tab A). I have removed a few sentences which seem unnecessarily provocative in a written communication from the President (marked on the text from State at Tab II).

Attached at Tab III is a proposed draft from Steve Sestanovich, which he feels better tracks with the final version of the President's UN address. I have not had an opportunity to review Steve's proposed text.

Since the letter is primarily designed to inform Gorbachev of the regional proposals the President will make in his October 24 U.N. General Assembly speech, it is imperative that the substance of the letter reach him by October 23.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum forwarding the letter to Gorbachev as amended at Tab A for the President's signature.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove   m  

Alternatively, that you approve the draft as originally submitted by State (Tab II).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove   m  

Or, that you approve Steve Sestanovich's proposed draft at Tab III.

Approve   m   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Modified letter to Gorbachev
- Tab II Original draft from State
- Tab III Steve Sestanovich's draft
- Tab IV Text of State Crosshatch Cable

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FD10-114/3#7919

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11



National Security Council  
The White House

System # II  
Package # 91097

15

10:00 PM

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
William Martin	<u>5</u>	<u>W.M.</u>	<u>Review</u>
John Poindexter		<u>J</u>	
Paul Thompson	<u>2</u>		
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>Los seen</u>	<u>A</u>
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>W.M.</u>	<u>D</u>
Situation Room		<u>W.M.</u>	<u>LDX</u>

I = Information    A = Action

cc  
on  
PM  
Send to State for dispatch.  
Delivery instructions should  
be to deliver at OOB  
on Wed 23 Oct.  
J

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to the meeting and to the prospect of more constructive relations. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will address the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary is a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as its unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

We both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All nations, particularly

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DECLASSIFIED (release)  
Authority NLSF 99-051 #353 SMF, 10/14/00  
BY CRJ, NARA, Date 7/1/02

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those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we have found our regional experts' discussions useful and propose to hold them on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in detail when we meet at Geneva. Even before then, however, I will put before the UN General Assembly an initiative to deal with an important groups of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America. I want you to be aware in advance of the proposal I will make.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts that did most to erode our relationship in the past. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. Of course, each of these conflicts has its own character and requirements, and we approach them with this fact in mind; other conflicts will need separate treatment altogether.

;



The peace program that I will put before the General Assembly seeks progress at three levels: internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic reconstruction.

Because these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, the starting point must be negotiations between the warring parties in each conflict; in the case of Afghanistan, this would obviously mean your own government. These talks may take different forms, but we believe that, together with improvement of internal political conditions, they are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, a second level of the process would be useful: separate U.S.-Soviet discussions, aimed at supporting the negotiating process between the warring parties. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations; needless to say, it is not for us to impose solutions. In some cases, however, it would be appropriate to consider guarantees for agreements reached. In every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and restraint on the flow of outside arms.


If the first two stages are successful, a third would then become possible: the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United State is prepared to contribute generously at this stage.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We want to strengthen these existing

mechanisms, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce them.

I feel that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation that neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts, and will offer early support for my proposal. If so, you will find us willing to do our part, and to make the most of opportunities thereby opened for progress on other critical issues.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AMB MATLOCK'S VERSION



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I would like to thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when we met in the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to my meeting with you and to the prospect of making our relations more constructive. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will be addressing the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. This anniversary provides us all with a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as the organization's unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."

At the same time we must both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All

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NLRR F06-114/3 # 1922  
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

nations, particularly those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts. In this regard, I was pleased to note in your recent letter that you thought it useful for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to seek, "wherever possible practical solutions." I believe that with the proper will on both sides, it will be possible to find such solutions.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we believe that our regional experts' discussions have been useful and have proposed that we hold such exchanges on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in considerable detail when we meet at Geneva.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts which eroded our relationship in past years. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. I have in mind a peace process that seeks progress at three levels encompassing internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and



economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. We must recognize, of course, that every regional dispute will have its own particular character and requirements. In some instances the international dimension of the problem would need to be addressed at the outset, in others the local reconciliation process would take priority.

Recognizing that these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, one step must be negotiations between the real adversaries in the conflict; as the process of negotiation moved forward, an end to violence with national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops could be envisioned.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, separate U.S.-Soviet discussions could begin. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations but would aim to support the negotiating process between the warring parties. The focus would be on ending or preventing the resumption of outside military presence.

In some cases they might offer guarantees for agreements reached, but in every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and limitation of the flow of outside arms.

If the first two stages are successful, it would make possible the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United States is prepared to contribute generously to this effort.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We agree with that assessment, want to strengthen these existing fora, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce those mechanisms.

I fear that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation which neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts. If so, you will find us willing to do our part to reduce our respective military involvement in these regions.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyeovich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DEPT OF STATE VERSION

24

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I would like to thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze when we met in the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to my meeting with you and to the prospect of making our relations more constructive. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

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At the same time we must both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7923  
BY RW NARA DATE 10/29/09



27

nations, particularly those directly involved must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts. In this regard, I was pleased to note in your recent letter that you thought it useful for Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to seek, "wherever possible practical solutions." I believe that with the proper will on both sides, it will be possible to find such solutions.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we believe that our regional experts' discussions have been useful and have proposed that we hold such exchanges on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in considerable detail when we meet at Geneva.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. As you are aware, in our view the Soviet Union's resort to direct use of force, as in Afghanistan, its use of proxies in other areas, and its willingness to take advantage of unsettled local situations to impose governments against the will of the people all contributed to the deterioration of relations between our countries in the last decade. The regimes which the Soviet Union has supported are repressive and unpopular, and have not established themselves despite outside military intervention, often including advisers, foreign troops and massive military supplies. In fact the policies of these Soviet-style regimes have given rise to indigenous opposition seeking to liberalize or overthrow them.

I have made clear on many occasions our sympathies are with freedom-loving peoples everywhere who fight for genuine self-determination. At the same time, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts which eroded our relationship in past years. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. I have in mind a peace process that seeks progress at three levels encompassing internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. We must recognize, of course, that every regional dispute will have its own particular character and requirements. In some instances the international dimension of the problem would need to be addressed at the outset, in others the local reconciliation process would take priority.

Recognizing that these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, one step must be negotiations between the real adversaries in the conflict; as the process of negotiation moved forward, an end to violence with national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops could be envisioned.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, separate U.S.-Soviet discussions begin. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations but would aim to support the negotiating process between the warring parties. The focus would be on ending or preventing the resumption of outside military presence.



In some cases they might offer guarantees for agreements reached, but in every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and limitation of the flow of outside arms.

If the first two states are successful, it would make possible the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United States is prepared to contribute generously to this effort.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We agree with that assessment, want to strengthen these existing fora, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce those mechanisms.

I fear that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions - a situation which neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts. If so, you will find us willing to do our part to reduce our respective military involvement in these regions.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow



⋮

IV

SB-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM.*

SUBJECT: Helicopter Transport for Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Don Regan forwarding a State Department request to provide Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze with helicopter transportation from John F. Kennedy airport to the United Nations on the evening of October 23. Shevardnadze's flight arrives in New York at 7:30 p.m., and Shevardnadze has accepted the President's invitation to attend a reception that evening at the UN.

I agree with State's view that it is in our interest to facilitate Shevardnadze's arrival at the reception.

*JM* Judy Mandel and *SRS* Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to Don Regan at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to Don Regan  
Tab A Memorandum from State

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CJS* NARA, Date *7/1/02*

32

I



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Helicopter Transport for Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab A is a request from the Department of State to provide Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze with helicopter transportation from John F. Kennedy airport to the United Nations on the evening of October 23. Shevardnadze's flight arrives in New York at 7:30 p.m., and Shevardnadze has accepted the President's invitation to attend a reception that evening at the UN.

NSC concurs with State's view that it is in our interest to facilitate Shevardnadze's arrival at the reception.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize helicopter transportation for Shevardnadze on October 23.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment

Tab A Memorandum from State

cc: Ed Hickey  
Chris Hicks

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By cus NARA, Date 7/1/02





Washington, D.C. 20520



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Transportation Assistance for  
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will arrive in New York at 7:30 PM on October 23, to attend the Fortieth Anniversary Ceremonies at the United Nations. Shevardnadze has accepted the President's invitation to the reception being given that evening at the UN for foreign dignitaries.

The Soviets have pointed out that in view of his late arrival, it will be difficult for Shevardnadze to make the reception. They have indicated that Shevardnadze would be prepared to fly from John F. Kennedy Airport to the UN by helicopter to meet with the President, if the U.S. could provide the means.

The Department believes that a meeting between the President and Shevardnadze would be in our interests. Accordingly, we request that the NSC authorize helicopter transportation for Shevardnadze from John F. Kennedy Airport to the UN. Shevardnadze would be accompanied by his wife, an interpreter and perhaps one additional escort.

*for Kenneth M. Quinn*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By US NARA, Date 7/1/02



~~Attlock:~~  
34

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1985


Dear Professor Stix:

Thank you for your letter of September 30 and your suggestion regarding improved communication between the American and Soviet people via television. I fully agree that greater use of television could make a significant contribution toward better understanding, and help discredit old stereotypes based on fear and lack of information.

I want to assure you that as we approach the Geneva meeting we are reviewing a variety of proposals for enhanced U.S.-Soviet communication, and President Reagan plans to present a number of creative initiatives to General Secretary Gorbachev. Your own idea will be examined seriously in preparing our overall approach to the issue and in formulating specific options.

I appreciate your contacting me.

Sincerely,

  
Robert C. McFarlane

Professor Thomas H. Stix  
Chairman, American Physical Society's  
Committee on the International Freedom  
of Scientists  
Department of Astrophysical Sciences  
Princeton University  
P.O. Box 451  
Princeton, New Jersey 08544

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 21, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to Princeton University Professor

Attached at tab A is a suggested response to a letter from Princeton Professor Thomas H. Stix. Professor Stix wrote you (Tab B) with a proposal to be presented at Geneva involving improved television communication between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Professor Stix's proposal is similar to some of the ideas already approved in our package of exchange proposals for Geneva, and I think it is worth acknowledging as a constructive suggestion. Professor Stix is also Chairman of the American Physical Society's Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists and, as such, is no doubt involved in Soviet human rights issues.

*WR*  
Judyt Mandel concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Professor Stix at Tab A.

Approve   *m*   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab A Suggested response to Professor Stix
- Tab B Letter from Professor Stix

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR FD6-114/3# 792D  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11



Princeton University

Department of Astrophysical Sciences

P.O. Box 451

Princeton, New Jersey 08544

OCT 1 1985

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30 September 1985

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Director  
National Security Council  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane,

For the many people, such as the members of our committee, who work in the area of human rights, it has been very encouraging that you -- on more than one occasion -- have named human rights as a key area for attention in US-USSR relations. Similarly, Ambassador Schifter's eloquent statement at the recent Ottawa meeting not only showed the Administration's concern for broad principles, but also its awareness and caring for oppressed individuals, case by case.

What to do: Let me offer, if I may, one personal view and one suggestion. The suggestion will appear superficially quite frivolous. But in fact, its proposal would have strong public appeal and its implementation could open up a broad new channel of interaction between the people in our two countries.

The view: One cannot reasonably expect the Soviets to be forthcoming on the human rights issue. First, they regard our criticism as foreign meddling in internal affairs. Second and more important, their bureaucrats, both big and little, are fearful of losing control. But -- can we not exploit Soviet leader Gorbachev's call for mutual trust to expand our modes of communication?

The suggestion: Instead of military might, let us challenge the Soviets to an open contest of words and pictures. Let us jointly open up television. Say, for example, that we give each other one hour per week of TV prime time. No limitations on subject matter except for incitement to violence. And, save for military security, Soviet reporters and film crews would have access to American people and places, and vice versa. Our hour might present Russian versions of "Candid Camera" or "60 Minutes" or "Meet the Press", filmed by American crews in Soviet towns and cities, or a documentary on Deng Xiaoping's China, or the Bill Cosby show, or Nova, or Bruce Springsteen, or whatever. And the Soviets could show us hospitals in Cuba, new schools in Afghanistan, or slums and prisons in America, or ice hockey in Leningrad, the Moscow Circus, the Bolshoi Ballet, or news or politics or propaganda or education or entertainment as they pleased. The challenge on both sides would be to hold audience interest and respect, to maintain credibility, to openly advocate points of view. The common challenge would be to understand one another and to work toward peace.



In considering this proposal, the following points might be noted:

- Under the aegis of a joint "open-television policy", significant advances could be achieved in the area of human rights. Nevertheless, the proposal itself would fall within your category of "matters between two countries", which area the Soviets have not rejected for the November summit talks.
- The proposal would have strong appeal to the world public. The public knows that wars are made by people, not weapons, and resents the total focus of attention on nuclear armament, rather than on concrete steps toward mutual trust.
- The exchange agreement would not be a static one-shot event. Rather, it could initiate a new mode of people-to-people interaction between our countries with long-range possibilities limited only by our creativity and joint good will.
- Soviet citizens are hungry for bona fide information about the U.S. It would not be easy for Soviet leader Gorbachev to turn aside a well publicized offer by the President to open up the air waves.
- Opening this direct channel of communication to the people of the USSR may help to alleviate their endemic mistrust of foreigners and could pave the way for expanded individual contacts and other elements of normal relations.
- Entering the "age of information", television is the appropriate arena for honest debate -- and for making friends. An "open-television" policy would bring America's considerable skills in mass communication, polling and public relations to bear on the problem of achieving a normalization of US-USSR relations together with real peace.

The two enclosures provide some background material on our committee and on my own thinking concerning human rights and US-USSR relations.

Sincerely,



Thomas H. Stix  
Professor  
Chairman, American Physical Society's Committee on the International  
Freedom of Scientists

THS/dpl

Enclosures

# In Moscow, a Hunger to Know America

By Susan Sherer Osnos

I thought I knew, from the three years I spent in Moscow in the mid-1970's, how curious most Russians are about the United States. But my previous experience hardly prepared me for what I saw this month at the Moscow Book Fair, where an exhibit of American books was overrun with people 10 hours a day. I was stunned by the Russians' voracious hunger for information about America, and I began to rethink my ideas about when and where it makes sense to boycott contacts with the Soviet Union.

"America Through American Eyes" was an exhibit of recent books about America by American authors, sponsored by the Association of American Publishers. The association had refused to participate in the annual fair for the past six years — it

*Susan Sherer Osnos is on the staff of the Fund for Free Expression, a human rights organization.*

was protesting the persecution of Andrei D. Sakharov and other Soviet writers — and our return was surrounded by controversy.

Much of it concerned the selection of the 313 books in the exhibit by a committee of writers, critics and librarians. The National Endowment for Democracy, which had provided some of the funding for the exhibit, insisted on a politically "balanced" list. The publishers' association returned its money rather than submit to censorship. Others found the list "frivolous" because it included picture books on the great houses of Los Angeles and the history of rock-and-roll.

But none of this made the slightest difference to the thousands of Russians who filed by our exhibit, most of them after waiting in line for hours. These people were starving to find out whatever they could about America.

The crowd in front of the booth was often five or six people deep. We distributed some 35,000 catalogues of the exhibit, in both Russian and English.

They are well made, and I expect they will pass from hand to hand for years to come.

By the fourth day, our presence was causing a traffic problem in the pavilion. By the fifth day, two uniformed police officers were trying to control the mayhem. But no number of officers — and there were several in plain clothes stationed right in the booth with us — could dampen the enthusiasm of the Russians waiting to see our exhibit.

They had a chance, many for the first time, to look at uncensored photographs of American life. They plied the staff in the booth with questions about America. They pored over the Sears catalogue until someone stole it. Jane Fonda's aerobic workout was a major draw, and books about American films and theater were very much in demand.

Some of these Russians were officials, but many were people in work clothes with calluses on their hands. Most of them had never had access to information that wasn't strictly con-

## Report from the Book Fair

trolled by the Soviet Government. The authorities did deny visas to several Americans and they confiscated a handful of books, but for the most part they were unable to circumscribe what went on at the fair.

On the whole, Moscow is a far more oppressive place than it was eight years ago, when I was last there, or even six years ago when the publishers' association last took an exhibit to the Book Fair. In 1979, the association organized a dinner, in a downtown restaurant, with some 40 Soviet authors, hosted by Mr. Sakharov. Such an evening is unimaginable now. Mr. Sakharov is in isolation in Gorky in

precarious health. Of those who attended the dinner, almost all are in prison or exile, or have left the Soviet Union.

It is hard these days to find Russian authors who are interested in meeting with American publishers. Many writers are lying low to avoid the kind of persecution that has been meted out to so many of their colleagues.


Some people argue that we should express our disapproval of this repression by refusing to attend the Book Fair. Sometimes and in some places, boycotts may well be justified, as in the case of the Olympic boycott that denied the Soviet Union international glory after its invasion of Afghanistan. I am convinced, however, after a week at the Moscow Book Fair, that our most powerful weapon is information — and any opportunity to provide it should be seized. By staying home, we would only have made things simpler for the organizers of the fair and left a great many security officers with nothing to do. □

AP



# physics today

JULY 1985





In the feature presentations and in many of the workshops, there was a good deal of worrying over low enrollments in physics, the relatively advanced median ages of tenured physics professors, and the problems facing small departments and departments in four-year colleges. In reporting the results of workshop discussions, groups gave high priority to restoring programs of Federal support for participation by undergraduates in physics research. They also recommended tak-

ing steps to attract college students to careers in high-school physics teaching, preparing sample guidelines for evaluation or accreditation of undergraduate physics programs, and assisting graduate students find jobs by providing better information and counseling.

In the final wrap-up talk, Harvard's Norman Ramsey, who is chairman of the AIP Governing Board, suggested that universities consider temporarily expanding the number of tenured positions in physics departments, so as to

provide slots for younger physicists now, on the understanding that departments would revert to their current size when older members retire.

At a dinner midway through the conference, Anthony P. French, president of AAPT, gave a talk entitled "Discovering Niels Bohr." French is the editor of a forthcoming centenary volume about Bohr's life and work, which is sponsored by the Education Commission of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics.

## APS human rights committee works on Soviet cases, Poland

The American Physical Society's Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists was represented last March at a reception held by AAAS at the American Museum of Natural History in New York for Argentina's president Raúl Alfonsín. For President Alfonsín, the AAAS reception was an opportunity, among other things, to urge Argentine expatriates to support the reconstruction of scientific research and science education in Argentina, which suffered badly under Peronist and military rule. It also was an opportunity for him to thank US scientists for speaking out on behalf of individuals who had been jailed, tortured or "disappeared" during his country's dark years.

The APS Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists is of course just one of many groups that have dedicated themselves to the difficult task of trying to protect victims of political abuse. Organizations such as Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch and the Committee of Concerned Scientists are much better known to the general public; even among most physicists, CIFS probably is not a household acronym.

Earlier this year, Thomas H. Stix, professor of astrophysical sciences at Princeton and associate director for academic affairs at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, took over as chairman of the committee. The views of Stix are described in the box page 73, and the work of the Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists is the subject of this story.

**Small Committees.** Like most human rights groups, CIFS concentrates almost exclusively on individual persons and does not generally address cases of discrimination against classes or groups of people. CIFS works mainly through "Small Committees"—teams of three or four people who take it upon themselves to correspond with victims of political abuse, their friends, associates and families, local authorities, and people who are in a position to intervene.

In recent years, CIFS has intervened on behalf of physicists in Argentina and Chile, it has worked with Amnesty International to protect the rights of Palestinian physicists in Israel, lodged protests with the Indian government against discriminatory treatment of Israeli physicists (see *PHYSICS TODAY*, September 1981, page 54), and taken up an investigation of Turkish physicists who were dismissed from teaching posts under the military regime. Currently, however, nearly all the individual cases handled by CIFS are in the Soviet Union, with a few in Poland. While the preponderance of Soviet cases is somewhat embarrassing to the committee, CIFS takes pains to say that this is simply the way the chips happen to have fallen.

"Because the Soviet Union imposes its repressive regime on so large a scientific community," CIFS said in its 1984 annual report, "the committee's efforts on behalf of human rights have been occupied very largely with the problems of Soviet scientists. CIFS does not wish its pro-human rights efforts to be mistakenly labeled as anti-Soviet; CIFS seriously entertains any reports of physicist human rights violations anywhere. . . ." (For full text, see *APS Bulletin*, June, page 1068.)

CIFS small committees currently are working on nearly 70 Soviet cases, and according to committee chairman Stix, all the cases are either refuseniks (Jews who have applied to emigrate) or dissidents (persons who publicly take issue with Soviet policy). Except for those who fall into one of these two categories, physicists generally are treated quite well by comparison with some other groups in the Soviet Union, and human rights activists have little or no evidence that physicists have been victims of the kind of pervasive discrimination that Jewish mathematicians are reported to have suffered from during the past 15 years.

The comparison with mathematics is instructive. According to *samizdat* (underground) documents that are generally considered well-founded in fact,

it became virtually impossible during the 1970s for Jewish mathematicians in Russia (of whom there are a large number) to publish in some of the leading journals and get promoted at the top universities. Prominent Jewish mathematicians also found it increasingly difficult to go abroad to attend professional conferences and accept awards. Furthermore, it recently has become difficult for Jewish students in mathematics—and Jews in physics and other fields as well—to attend Moscow University.

**Soviet focus.** Reports indicate that the situation of Jewish mathematicians in the Soviet Union may be improving, and by comparison with Soviet physicists, the mathematicians always have found it somewhat easier to emigrate. According to Joel Lebowitz, a mathematical physicist at Rutgers and co-chairman of the Committee of Concerned Scientists, there are two reasons for this contrast. In the first place, mathematicians have suffered discrimination at the hands of anti-Semites within the mathematical establishment—persons in positions of administrative power—who have been only too happy to let Jews go when they apply for permission to emigrate. Second, the political authorities have not considered mathematics nearly as vital to national security as physics. If a physicist wants to leave the Soviet Union, the answer is almost sure to be that the person cannot be dispensed with because of national security, and if a physicist expresses dissent, the official attitude is that a sacred national trust has been betrayed.

Members of CIFS naturally are concerned, at a time when scientific exchanges and arms-control negotiations are being resumed with the Soviet Union, that so little progress has been made on human rights. For a time it seemed that Yuri Orlov's condition was improving, and CIFS members felt they may have played some role in gaining his release from prison. But the most recent reports indicate that he is being forced to live in quarters for transient



workers in a remote Siberian village, that for a long time he was unable to get treatment for his teeth, and that his mail has been cut off since last November (see letter, page 9). The treatment of Orlov, a founder of the Russian Helsinki watchdog committee, has been particularly galling to those who recall the major concessions made by the West to achieve the Helsinki agreement.

**Polish Nuclear Institute.** The situation in Poland, another country covered by the Helsinki Accords, also has been of mounting concern to APS and CIFS during the past year. Mildred S. Dresselhaus, acting in her capacity as president of APS, sent a cable to the Polish government last summer protesting plans to put two Polish physicists on trial for political reasons. That trial was cancelled. Then, last December, Dresselhaus sent a second cable, protesting the dissolution of the Institute for Nuclear Research.

CIFS has received extensive reports on the Institute for Nuclear Research, and similar reports have appeared in the science press. The main allegations are that the Institute was dissolved for political reasons, that three new institutes were created without guaranteeing former INR staff re-employment, and that work was being made impossible for many individual physicists. It has been hard to determine, working at a distance, just how much these individuals have suffered and the extent to which important centers of learning have been destroyed. Few people in this country are in close daily contact with developments in Poland, and a large number of special factors complicate the story.

From interviews with a handful of Polish physicists at several leading US institutions, a very crude picture—something like a second-rate satellite photograph—emerges. The Institute for Nuclear Research seems to have been highly politicized since the mid-1950s, when it was treated to a large infusion of secret-service agents who had been staffing a nearby radio jamming station. Following the upheavals in 1968, there began a policy of harrasing Jews at the Institute. According to one source, when the authorities ran out of Jews to hound, they tried to brand other individuals in disfavor as Jews and to harrass them too.

On top of political grievances, staff at the Institute were perennially unhappy with a succession of Polish governments because of their preference for coal over nuclear power. Most staff members at the institute worked on applications of nuclear energy.

When Solidarity emerged in 1980, the Institute was a hotbed of political activity from the start. In 1982, a year

after the authorities declared a "state of war" and imposed martial law, the government announced the dissolution of the Institute and the reassignment or retirement of its personnel.

The most recent reports indicate that most of the staff members have found new jobs, but many individuals apparently consider their new jobs inferior, and many are resentful at having to do work outside their original fields of inquiry. The most significant physics at the Institute, in the estimation of Polish sources in this country, was done by a small theoretical team and a small experimental team, and some persons on the theory team have managed to fare relatively well, partly because of their ties with Warsaw University. At least one of them is reported to have emerged with a better job than he had at the Institute.

Warsaw University was until recently a haven of relative autonomy. There was some concern last year, when the government rejected an eminent philosopher the university senate had elected rector. But the government went on to accept the senate's second choice, Grzegorz Bialkowski, a theoretical physicist. Bialkowski was active in organizing an independent union of scientists five years ago and is reported to be a man of integrity.

In May the situation at Warsaw University and other institutions of higher learning took a sharp turn for the worse when the government proposed new academic regulations that would eliminate the democratic election of rectors and make all university personnel liable to suspension on political grounds. Faculty, students and employees at Warsaw University held a demonstration to protest the plan, and some 150 academics and Nobel Prize winners in the United States and Europe have signed an appeal asking the Polish government not to proceed with the changes.

**Cooperman's death in dispute.** The Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists has taken on a few Polish cases, but it has not always been easy to see what qualifies as a rights violation in the normal sense of the term. Even when the action is much closer to home, the facts can seem confusing and complicated, and it can be hard to decide what the relevant standards are that should be brought to bear.

One of the most troubling cases to have come to the attention of the committee concerns Edward Lee Cooperman, a physicist at California State University, Fullerton, who was head of the US Committee for Scientific Cooperation with Vietnam. Cooperman was involved in many efforts to provide scientific assistance to Vietnam following the end of the war, sometimes in

defiance of US policy and possibly in violation of US export regulations. He also befriended and sought to help Vietnamese students in the US, regardless of their backgrounds or politics.

Last year, Cooperman told his wife, friends and associates that he was receiving threats and that he feared for his life. In October he was found shot dead in his campus office. A Vietnamese refugee whom Cooperman had befriended initially denied involvement but then made a confession under questioning. He claimed that he and Cooperman had been wrestling playfully with a loaded gun, that the gun had gone off accidentally, that he left and saw a movie with a girlfriend, returned later to Cooperman's office, found that the professor had bled to death in the meantime, and placed the gun in Cooperman's hand, apparently to make the death look like suicide. The first trial of the Vietnamese immigrant ended with an acquittal on first-degree murder and a hung jury on second-degree. The second time the case went to court, the defendant forfeited his right to a jury trial in agreement with the district attorney's office, which had concluded that the jury probably would deadlock again on the second-degree charge. The judge convicted the defendant of involuntary manslaughter, but said at the time that parts of the defendant's story were implausible. The district attorney told PHYSICS TODAY that he did not believe important aspects of the defendant's confession.

Among Cooperman's friends and close associates, it is widely believed that he must have been the victim of an assassination ordered by some right-wing Vietnamese group or gang in the US. In recent years, right-wing Vietnamese groups have "taken credit" for the murders of several Vietnamese-Americans who were considered political enemies. Vietnamese expatriates physically broke up a meeting Cooperman held on one occasion to show a film about Vietnam.

James G. Enright, the chief assistant district attorney who prosecuted the case the second time, says he has been unable to find any link between the Vietnamese refugee who killed Cooperman and a Vietnamese organization. He says he contacted Vietnamese informants, but it is known to be extremely difficult to get information in the Vietnamese community because so many Vietnamese are terrified of the gangs run by expatriate leaders. Friends of Cooperman are disappointed that even the Vietnamese students who were helped and befriended by Cooperman have not come forward with evidence that might shed light on his death.

Asked whether the FBI had been of any assistance on the case, Enright said



## Stix urges physicists to express concerns to Soviet counterparts

Thomas Stix, the new chairman of the Committee on the International Freedom of Scientists, appears almost uniquely well placed to act on his leading concern, the Soviet Union's poor record on human rights. Except for the three years he spent doing military service in World War II, Stix has worked his entire adult life as a plasma physicist, and since the late 1950s he has been acquainted with leading Soviet physicists in the field, including Evgeny P. Velikhov, Vice-President for Physics and Mathematics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Roald Z. Sagdeev, director of the Institute for Space Research of the Soviet Academy. Taking note of Velikhov's apparent access to the Soviet Union's top political leadership, Stix observes that it is "rather mind-boggling to be able to send a personal message to somebody who can touch the Soviet leader."

Stix feels it is imperative for American physicists to do everything in their power to convey to Russians how strongly US citizens feel about human rights. He says Velikhov once told Melvin Gottlieb of the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory that there is no public pressure in the USSR on human rights. Stix believes that people such as Velikhov need to be told at every opportunity that without substantial Soviet progress on human rights issues, the prospects for meaningful arms control will remain bleak.

As Stix sees it, Soviet violations of human rights provide the United States with "a moral basis for the arms race." His message to Soviet counterparts, accordingly, is that it would be a good idea for the Soviet government to do something dramatic to improve its human rights record, not as "a favor to us but as a necessity for them."

When Stix talks about human rights, he uses the term in a broad sense. He refers, among other things, to the Soviet Union's "oppression of Czechoslovakia, Afghani-



STIX

stan, their invasion of Hungary, what they did to Solidarity. . . ." He does not, however, favor cutting contacts and exchanges as a means of exerting pressure on human rights. "Because of the nuclear danger," Stix says, "we have to use every means at our disposal to communicate with the Soviets."

Stix is aware that many Russians, including the dissident brothers Roy and Zhores Medvedev, argue that an inadequately controlled military-industrial complex in the United States is a prime cause of the arms race. What would Stix say if the Soviets were to complain that the profitability of American defense contracting gives them, the Russians, a moral basis for the arms race? They are "very sensitive to external threats, going back to the Mongols," Stix replies, "and then there's Hitler. They're paranoid about our weapons. But we're strongly concerned about their weapons, and we're paranoid about their totalitarian

regime and their suppression of individual freedom."

Stix has little patience with those who argue that intervention in the cause of human rights only makes adversaries angry and situations worse. But he appreciates that it is necessary to treat testimony about human rights abuses with some skepticism. In the case of Turkish physicists who have complained of their treatment at the hands of the current military regime, Stix was warned by a prominent Middle East expert at Princeton to proceed with care. The expert reminded Stix that Turkey's universities were a "literal battleground" before the military took over, that "automatic weapons fire was heard in the hall."

On the Cooperman case, Stix is inclined to agree with the general position adopted by his predecessor, Gerjuoy, but with one reservation. Stix considers the security of foreigners teaching or studying at US universities to be a legitimate concern for his committee. Individual Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Iranians and Libyans, among others, are believed to have been threatened or pressured by government security forces or terrorist groups in the United States.

Stix hedges on the question of whether CIFS would take action if asked to do so on Cooperman. He cites the committee's reluctance to get involved in situations "where we don't have solid evidence that human rights violations have occurred." In this case, he says, "the perpetrator is being punished, the physicist is dead, and allegations about a human rights violation concern the possibility of an assassination. We see this as substantially different from a situation in which a physicist clearly is being oppressed and and it is his own government that is oppressing him." While we "may think that the process of justice did not go far enough in this case," Stix says, "we have to ask what increment of influence CIFS can bring to bear." —ws

that the FBI knew a lot about Cooperman and his activities but was not of help in developing leads on the assassination theory. Apparently the FBI regarded the case as local, despite allegations that Vietnamese gangs in other states such as Hawaii might have been involved.

Immediately after Cooperman's death, Dresselhaus wrote to the president of California State University expressing distress over the death of Cooperman, whom she described as a "distinguished physicist and a highly regarded member of the American Physical Society." She offered the Society's "support and encouragement to you and your colleagues in your efforts to clarify the important aspects of this tragedy" and asked the president of California State to "let me know if we can assist you in any way."

Two days before Dresselhaus offered this help, a request from two APS

members for intervention in the Cooperman case was forwarded to Edward Gerjuoy, a University of Pittsburgh physicist who at that time was chairman of CIFS. The request was for CIFS to write a letter to the district attorney of Orange County, expressing the committee's strong interest in seeing that the case was thoroughly investigated. Gerjuoy turned it down on the ground that a letter could be interpreted as an attempt to interfere with an ongoing investigation, but he left open the possibility of intervening after the trial, if there were evidence that the investigation had been inadequate.

After the second trial ended, Cooperman's widow, Klaaske Cooperman, filed a civil suit against the Vietnamese refugee who killed her husband. Overseas, there are people who regard the Cooperman killing as comparable to other cases handled by CIFS. M. Laurent Schwartz, an eminent mathemati-

cian at France's Ecole Polytechnique, wrote a lengthy newspaper article about the "assassination" of Cooperman, which appeared in *Le Monde* on 22 February. Henri Van Regemorter, director of research at France's CNRS, wrote to Dresselhaus last November urging her to "ask all concerned authorities, in particular the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, to conduct a complete and thorough investigation."

Before Cooperman's death, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations launched an inquiry on Cooperman, and the Subcommittee currently has many of the documents from the physicist's office in its possession. The Subcommittee is interested primarily in whether Cooperman somehow managed to circumvent export regulations, and only secondarily in the suspicious circumstances of his death. —ws □




# SCIENCE

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## Human Rights and the Arms Race

After a moratorium of 4 years, bilateral exchanges are being renewed with Soviet scientists. Many people in and out of the U.S.S.R. had become dependent on the forthright support for Andrei Sakharov that the moratorium represented and, at the very least, we owe it to them to think carefully how the new opportunity for communication should be used. What is the new message that we wish to send?

Sakharov's maltreatment personalized the endemic Soviet violation of human rights. Our support for Sakharov expressed our support as well for a multitude of oppressed individuals. We looked for a restitution of Sakharov's rights as a first sign of change. The message of the moratorium—and of countless pleas, petitions, letters and telegrams—had been to convey our repugnance at human rights violations. Apparently that message was ignorable.

Somehow, some way, we must get the Soviet leadership to recognize that their continued violation of human rights provides a *moral* basis to the West for the arms race. The U.S.S.R. must assess the total economic and political cost to their hemisphere. The integrated cost has to be painfully large. Correcting the situation is not a favor to us, it is a necessity for them. That is the message that must be got across.

What would it take for us to perceive the Soviets as allies? For them to see us as friends? Invasions by the Mongols, by Napoleon, and by Hitler have sensitized generations of Russians to external threats. For us, the arrogant suppression of human rights and of individual freedom in the Soviet sphere is loathsome. We are sickened by the iron grip on the Czech people, by the annihilation of Solidarity, by the imprisonment of the Helsinki Agreement monitors, by the silencing of Sakharov.

Driven on each side by the existing fear and mistrust, there is an epic game being played out—a tragicomedy, really—in which weapons are prepared for a battle that, should it occur, will end human life. A gulag sense of ethics coupled with nuclear missiles on the Soviet side drives the West in its arms build-up, which, in turn strengthens the position of the Soviet hard-liners.

The loop is not easy for the West to break. But the Soviets could break the loop unilaterally and at minimum risk—by new policies in human rights.

In the renewal of contacts, we must

get the Soviets to recognize that the real cost of their human rights violations is hundreds of billions of rubles and dollars each year. More than any alternative, progress in this area could increase mutual trust and open pathways other than armament negotiations to resolve our differences and together restructure our priorities.

In his speech on retiring from the presidency of the American Physical Society, Maurice Goldhaber said that, after the next war, the first thing the survivors—if any—would do would be to ensure that war never happen again. Goldhaber then asked, "Can't we have a virtual war? Can we not start now on ensuring peace?"

THOMAS H. STIX

Department of Astrophysical Sciences,  
Princeton University,  
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

## Resources and Compromise

Daniel E. Koshland, Jr., proposes in his editorial "The undesirability principle" (5 July, p. 9) that "... chemical companies advocating less regulation [be required to] detail the dangers to water supplies" and "Environmentalists advocating stringent precautions [be required to] state the cost to the consumer." Even allowing for some mischievous humor, the issue is presented as mere compromise between extremes.

Do we still believe that environment is infinitely divisible by compromise each time a new claim appears? Have we banished from science application of the basic principles of ecology? And, quite apart from the hard-won principles of science, what peculiar twist of logic makes legitimate, even if for humor, this type of perversion of the public's interests, so actively espoused by every politician? Why can we not assign in our own minds, in law, and in fact the cost of industrial activity to the industry itself, foregoing those services and things whose costs cannot be accommodated? Can anyone think for a moment that environmentalists, so extraordinarily effective in bringing a quiet revolution in the American democracy, have neglected to compute and state costs to consumers and to the public at large of virtually every commercial and governmental transgression of common sense? That, indeed, is where much of the progress has been.

The law usually lags behind the scientific and technical realities. At the moment the reality is that we are causing

the biotic impoverishment of the only planet we have at a rate that is certainly unprecedented in human history and possibly unprecedented in the planet's history. Our laws and regulations and international protocols are inadequate when viewed in the context of the problem. The scientific community may be able to provide leadership, but it will not be toward continuous compromise of residual resources. Although Koshland's purpose was thoroughly wholesome and constructive, his treatment does not help the advancement of science and human affairs on what must be one of the most important issues the scientific community could be addressing.

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Rachel Carson and devotees of preserving the environment such as George Woodwell have performed and are performing a signal and invaluable service to our society. No group no matter how highly motivated, however, can expect a blank check from society. My appeal was for information, not necessarily compromise. In some cases one set of proponents may be completely right and no compromise would be indicated. In other cases both positions have merit and compromise is a logical course of action, not a dirty word. We will save the environment by showing it is worth the cost, not by pretending that we consumers are not paying ultimately, in every case.—DANIEL E. KOSHLAND, JR.

## WRITER'S WORKBENCH

I was pleased to see the favorable mention of AT&T's UNIX WRITER'S WORKBENCH software in the article by Joseph Raben (26 Apr., p. 434). It was unfortunate, however, that its development was attributed solely to me. Lorinda Cherry of AT&T Bell Laboratories developed the original programs that I augmented to create the WRITER'S WORKBENCH system. Her name should also have been mentioned.

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JM-C 48

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Helicopter Transport for Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab I is a request from the Department of State to provide Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze with helicopter transportation from John F. Kennedy airport to the United Nations on the evening of October 23. Shevardnadze's flight arrives in New York at 7:30 p.m., and Shevardnadze has accepted the President's invitation to attend a reception that evening at the UN.

I agree with State's view that it is in our interest to facilitate Shevardnadze's arrival at the reception.

*J.M.* Judyt Mandel and *S.P.S.* Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve State's request to provide helicopter transportation for Shevardnadze from Kennedy Airport to the UN.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment

Tab I Memorandum from State

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CIS NARA, Date 7/1/02





Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 19, 1985


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Transportation Assistance for  
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will arrive in New York at 7:30 PM on October 23, to attend the Fortieth Anniversary Ceremonies at the United Nations. Shevardnadze has accepted the President's invitation to the reception being given that evening at the UN for foreign dignitaries.

The Soviets have pointed out that in view of his late arrival, it will be difficult for Shevardnadze to make the reception. They have indicated that Shevardnadze would be prepared to fly from John F. Kennedy Airport to the UN by helicopter to meet with the President, if the U.S. could provide the means.

The Department believes that a meeting between the President and Shevardnadze would be in our interests. Accordingly, we request that the NSC authorize helicopter transportation for Shevardnadze from John F. Kennedy Airport to the UN. Shevardnadze would be accompanied by his wife, an interpreter and perhaps one additional escort.

  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CJS NARA, Date 7/1/02