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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/12/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (6/12)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 12

YARHI-MILO

1204

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7895	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PAPERS ON THE SOVIET UNION: THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WORLD <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7896	PAPER	THE WARSAW PACT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT <i>PAR 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	5	ND	B1
7897	PAPER	THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE <i>PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	4	ND	B1 B3
7898	PAPER	SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	3	ND	B1
7899	PAPER	THE SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *Carolyn J. Cleveland*
SUBJECT: Suggested Response to Letters to the President

We have reviewed and concur with the draft response at Tab A to two letters of support to the President on the eve of his Geneva meeting with Gorbachev.

Tab A Draft response
Tab B The President's radio address of Sept. 28
Tab C Letters to the President

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1985

AVH192D

Thank you for your message to President Reagan and for offering him your thoughts and suggestions in connection with the upcoming Geneva Summit. Your expression of goodwill as these talks approach is much appreciated, and the President welcomes your good wishes for the Summit's success.

In his radio address to the Nation on September 28, the President discussed the posture of the United States going into the November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Because of your interest in U.S.-Soviet relations, I am enclosing a transcript of the President's broadcast remarks.

With the President's best wishes,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ass/Coro/

DRAFT AVH-192^D (~~D~~) *Comments Re Geneva Summit (General)*

Thank you for your message to President Reagan and for offering him your thoughts and suggestions in connection with the upcoming Geneva Summit. Your expression of goodwill as these talks approach ^{is} ~~are~~ much appreciated, and the President welcomes your good wishes for the Summit's success.

In his radio address to the Nation on September 28, the President discussed the posture of the United States going into the November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Because of your interest in U.S.-Soviet relations, I am enclosing a transcript of the President's broadcast remarks.

With the President's best wishes,

ENCL. Copy of 9/28/85 Radio Address to the Nation

Put on HOLD October 25, 1985

4

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 28, 1985

RADIO ADDRESS
OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

12:06 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, during the past week we've been working hard to advance the Middle East peace process and to try to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. I met with our good friend President Mubarak of Egypt and I'll be holding discussions this coming week with another longtime friend of the United States, King Hussein of Jordan. I hope to talk to you more about the Middle East next week. But today, let me speak about our efforts to build a more constructive and stable long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

Both Secretary Shultz and I met with the new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze this past week. These meetings covered a broad global agenda, including the four major areas of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue: human rights, regional and bilateral issues, and security and arms control matters. This enabled us to discuss at the most senior levels the key issues facing our two nations. I told the Foreign Minister I'm hopeful about my upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and I put forward some new ideas as well as my plans and expectations for that meeting.

The Soviet Foreign Minister indicated that Mr. Gorbachev also is looking forward to these discussions. Furthermore, we agreed to set up a series of senior level discussions between our experts in preparation for the Geneva meeting. Let's be clear, however, that success will not come from one meeting. It must come from a genuine, long-term effort by the leadership of the Soviet Union as well as ourselves. The differences between us are fundamental in political systems, values and ideology as well as in the way we conduct our relations with other countries.

The United States must and will be forthright and firm in explaining and defending our interests and those of our allies. I went over with Mr. Shevardnadze Soviet actions in various parts of the world which we feel undermine the prospects for a stable peace and I discussed with him the need for the Soviet Union to work with us seriously to reduce offensive nuclear arms. The weapons exist today and there's no reason why real reductions cannot begin promptly.

Finally, I emphasized the need for a more productive Soviet response to our efforts in Geneva to begin a U.S.-Soviet dialogue now on how to fashion a more stable future for all humanity if the research in strategic defense technologies, which both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are conducting, bears fruit. Mr. Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet negotiators will present a counterproposal in Geneva to the initiatives we've taken there. We welcome this. It is important that the counterproposal address our concerns about reductions and stability just as we've sought to address Soviet concerns.

MORE

(OVER)

And we hope it'll be free of preconditions and other obstacles to progress. We're ready for tough but fair negotiating. You, the people, can distinguish diplomatic progress from mere propaganda designed to influence public opinion in the democracies.

All too often in the past, political and public opinion, and sometimes government policy as well, have taken on extreme views of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We have witnessed sometimes a near euphoria over a supposed coming together, at other times a feeling that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may somehow be at the brink of conflict.

By holding to the firm and steady course we set out on five years ago, we've shown that there is no longer any reason for such abrupt swings in assessing this relationship. Our differences are, indeed, profound. And it is inevitable that our two countries will have opposing views on many key issues. But we've intensified our bilateral dialogue and taken measures, such as the recent upgrading of the crisis hot line, to ensure fast and reliable communications between our leaders at all times.

Above all, I emphasized to the Foreign Minister, and will do so with Mr. Gorbachev, that the overriding responsibility of the leaders of our two countries is to work for peaceful relations between us. So, what we're engaged in is a long-term process to solve problems where they're solveable, bridge differences where they can be bridged and recognize those areas where there are no realistic solutions and, where they're lacking, manage our differences in a way that protects Western freedoms and preserves the peace. The United States stands ready to accomplish this.

Much more must be done, but the process is underway. And we will take further steps to show our readiness to do our part. With equal determination by the Soviets, progress can be made. We will judge the results as Soviet actions unfold in each of the four key areas of our relations. And I will be reporting to you further as preparations for the November meeting proceed.

Until next week, thanks for listening and God bless you.

END

12:11 P.M. EDT

21


~~DOX~~
PH-1921

Margaret J. Fertschneider
7600 Santa Ynez Avenue
Atascadero, California 93422

Sept. 17, 85

Dear Pres. Reagan,

I want to wish you well on your summit meeting in Nov. This will be the most important thing you have done in your presidency. The outcome will not only be important to the rest of your administration but for many years to come. You have an opportunity to make history and to be the most significant Pres. since George Washington. Washington & his contemporaries forged a new nation with a philosophy that totally new to the world.



7
That idea was that all men
(and women) are created equal &
born with certain inalienable
rights. You could give us a
world with another new philosophy.
That nuclear war is no
longer an acceptable activity
for civilized nations and we
invite Russia & other nations
to reject nuclear war and begin
a planned, orderly, verifiable
disarmament of nuclear weapons!

I feel there are many indications
that Russia is beginning to see
the need for a change. They
realize they have so much to
lose & much to gain. Good luck
to you

Sincerely,
M. Fests



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 9, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Suggested Response to Letters to the President

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Anne Higgins forwarding a draft response to two letters of support to the President on the eve of the Geneva meeting with Gorbachev.

Steve Steve Steiner, *Jm* Judyt Mandel, *WR* Walt Raymond and Bud *AK* Kozengold concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Anne Higgins
- Tab A Draft response
- Tab B The President's radio address of Sept. 28
- Tab C Letters to the President



MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/3/85
TO: Carl Cleveland / NSC

ACTION:

- Review/Approval
- Recommendation
- Information Copy
- Draft Reply
- As we discussed

DATE ACTION NEEDED:

COMMENT: Draft from reply on
general expressions of support/comments
re Geneva Summit. Quick
turnaround helpful.

CHARLES A. DONOVAN *CAD*
Presidential Correspondence
Room 94, OEOB - x7610



cc: Pending File

RECEIVED 30 SEP 85 22

TO MCFARLANE

FROM ZEMTSOV, ILYA

DOCDATE 19 SEP 85

Matlock list

KEYWORDS: USSR

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM INTL RESEARCH CENTER ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
RE BOOK / THE PRIVATE LIFE OF THE SOVIET ELITE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 04 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

SM
MANDEL

HALL

THOMPSON

COMMENTS

REF# 15 - 253

LOG

NSCIFID

(DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Rm</i>	<i>4 10/8</i>	<i>La Ling</i>	<i>10/12</i>	
<i>C</i>	<i>10/15</i>	<i>Mcfarlane spd</i>		<i>Jm, SE, Ju</i> <i>WH</i>

DISPATCH

J. W. H. P.

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 15, 1985

Dear Professor Zemtsov:

Thank you once again for sharing one of your excellent publications with me. I found your earlier work, Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms, most informative and look forward to reading The Private Life of the Soviet Elite. I'm sure it will offer unique insights as we approach our meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Professor Ilya Zemtsov, Director
International Research Center
on Contemporary Society
24 Harav Agan St.
P.O.B. 687
Jerusalem, 91006 Israel

12

7794

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARIANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Correspondence From Professor Ilya Zemtsov

Ilya Zemtsov, a Soviet emigre now living in Israel, has sent you a copy of his latest book, The Private Life of the Soviet Elite. Attached at Tab A is a draft response to Mr. Zemtsov.

ERS Steve Sestanovich and Judyt *JM* Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter thanking Professor Zemtsov.

Approve *h*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Letter to Professor Zemtsov
- Tab B Letter from Professor Zemtsov
- Tab C The Private Life of the Soviet Elite

7794 13



Jerusalem

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

The Office of the Director

Director: Prof. I. Zemtsov, Ph.D., D.Sc.

Date ..September.19,.1985

Ref. No. 15-253

Mr. Robert D. McFarlane

National Security Advisor to the President
National Security Affairs
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane,

It is a great honor for me to send you my new book The Private Life of the Soviet Elite.

I very much appreciated your positive evaluation of the book I sent to you previously: Lexicon of Soviet Political Terms.

I would be happy if you could find the time to look through it, and share with me your opinion which would be of great value to me.

Respectfully yours,

Professor Ilya Zemtsov

VA/Jm.

JMC 14

8244

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

ACTION

October 16, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Background Paper for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A is the fourth in a series of weekly papers on the Soviet Union that we are doing for the First Lady. It concerns drug abuse in the USSR and was prepared by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to James G. Rosebush at Tab I forwarding the paper to the First Lady.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to James G. Rosebush
- Tab A "Drug Abuse in the Soviet Union"

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CWS* NARA, Date *7/1/02*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES G. ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Background Paper for the First Lady

Attached at Tab A is the fourth in a series of weekly papers we are putting together for the First Lady as background reading on the Soviet Union. It deals with drug abuse in the USSR and was drafted by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the paper to the First Lady.


Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A "Drug Abuse in the Soviet Union"

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 7/1/02



CS 7/1/02

18

DRUG ABUSE IN THE SOVIET UNION

Narcotics abuse in the USSR is still a relatively minor problem by Western standards: alcohol remains the drug of choice there. The illegal cultivation and use of hashish and heroin has long been a tradition in Central Asia and the Caucasus, however, and the youth in major cities throughout the country are increasingly experimenting with both. There is also some evidence that soldiers returning from Afghanistan are bringing drug habits back with them. In response, the authorities have increased the legal penalties for such activities and are issuing public warnings about the drug danger--all the while proclaiming that drug abuse and addiction are capitalist rather than Soviet problems.

* * * *

In international forums, Soviet officials routinely insist that there is no narcotics problem in the USSR, that the number of addicts there is a mere 2,500 (out of a total population of 275 million). The Soviet representative on the UN Narcotics Commission has even claimed that the USSR has not registered a single case of heroin, cocaine, LSD, or amphetamine addiction in the past decade. For domestic audiences, however, officials have recently had to concede that things are rather different. Prior to his appointment as foreign minister, for example, Eduard Shevardnadze told law enforcement personnel in Georgia that "Drug addiction, which ruins people's health and brings about their moral degeneration, is not being fought with sufficient vigor by us."

The exact size of the USSR's current drug problem is unknown: few statistics are published and the 2,500 figure represents only those addicts who have voluntarily entered a treatment program, certainly a tiny fraction of all drug users. The roots of the Soviet drug problem and its recent growth are better known--the same social problems which drive many Soviet citizens to drink are driving others to drugs. Because of peculiarly Soviet conditions, however, the pattern of drug abuse in the USSR is different than in the West. Tight controls on and shortages of prescription medicines mean that pills are seldom available. Consequently, Soviet citizens are more likely to turn to hashish, cannabis, or heroin, which can be grown in the wild or smuggled in from abroad. Much comes from Central Asia and the Caucasus, where hashish has been used for centuries, but expanded trade with the West and the war in Afghanistan have also opened up new channels for smuggling in these and other drugs.

In response, the Soviet authorities have taken a number of steps:

- In 1965, they established a special drug detoxification hospital in the Caucasus and subsequently set up others elsewhere in the country.
- In 1974, Moscow significantly tightened the existing laws on the possession, use, and sale of illicit drugs, setting up special five-year-long programs for those who volunteered for treatment and mandating long prison sentences for those who did not.
- In 1981, Moscow launched a media campaign on the drug problem, reporting numerous horror stories but still providing few facts.
- And in 1984, republic-level officials convened special conferences to discuss how to combat drug abuse locally.

To date, the Soviets have not tried many of the steps common in the West. They have not established a methadone support system for addicts, nor developed a comprehensive drug education program, nor even initiated a special program to combat drug smuggling beyond routine airport checks of foreign travelers.

As a result, the rising tide of drug abuse has not been stemmed. Western correspondents now in Moscow report that it is as easy to obtain drugs there as in any major American city. To the extent that this trend continues, it represents one more potentially insoluble problem for Gorbachev to face.

Drafted:PGoble, INR/SEE
10/9/85, 632-3230
Wang#3735S

JM-C
20

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Proposed NSDD on Geneva Themes and Perceptions

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a draft NSDD (Tab A) on public themes and perceptions for the November meeting with Gorbachev. The President has already approved the themes and perceptions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Draft NSDD

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: NSDD on Themes and Perceptions for the Gorbachev Meetings

Issue

Whether to approve the proposed NSDD at Tab A.

Facts

You recently reviewed and approved a package offering our current thinking on how best to approach the November meetings with Gorbachev. We believe it will be useful to distribute the themes and perceptions portions of that package as guidelines for use in public discussion of the Geneva meetings.

Discussion

The Soviets have waged a major propaganda campaign to focus public attention in the run-up to Geneva on questions of arms control, particularly our strategic defense initiative. We consider it important that key government agencies understand clearly our own approach to the meetings and that this understanding be reflected in public discussion of Geneva.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you approve the attached NSDD informing key government offices of our approach to the Geneva meetings.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed NSDD

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 7/1/02

23



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA:
THEMES AND PERCEPTIONS (U)

It is important that all agencies have a clear understanding of what I consider key themes that need to be emphasized as we approach my November 19-20 meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. I will be emphasizing the opportunity that the Geneva meetings provide to address a variety of important issues in a businesslike and constructive manner. For their part, the Soviets are trying to focus public attention almost exclusively on arms control, particularly my strategic defense initiative, while virtually ignoring a host of regional and bilateral issues that separate us. (S)

To help ensure that my message reaches as wide an audience as possible, I urge all government officials who will be discussing the Geneva meetings in public forums to draw from the attached themes and perceptions. (S)

ROAD TO GENEVA AND BEYOND

Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation

Theme: BUILDING A SAFER WORLD

Basic Messages:

- We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence through armed intervention and subversion.

That is why we are proposing negotiated settlements, withdrawal of outside forces, and international efforts to build economies and meet human needs.

- We have the mandate and opportunity to reduce the danger of nuclear war by drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

That is why we are proposing radical, verifiable and balanced reductions of offensive nuclear weapons and are pursuing research to identify defensive technologies - which threaten no one.

- We must defend human rights everywhere, since countries which respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war.

That is why we insist that the Helsinki accords and other international commitments be observed.

- We must establish better communication between our societies, since misunderstandings make the world more dangerous.

That is why we are proposing dramatic increases in people-to-people exchanges, programs to share information, and enhanced cooperation in meeting human needs.

- The meeting in Geneva marks a new phase in this process. Our efforts to reach these ambitious goals will continue.

28

PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENEVA MEETING

Working for a Safer Future

The President seeks to build the foundation for peaceful and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. This will require a long-term, sustained effort. It must be based on the principles of fairness, reciprocity and honest fulfillment of all agreements.

Soviet Behavior: The Roots of Tension

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies is an underlying cause of Soviet-American and world tension. The President is determined to defend the United States and its Allies. The USSR must cease using arms and force to expand its influence if tensions are to diminish.

Leading from Strength

The President's hand is strong: he has reversed the decline in American strength and has a robust economy, a united public and strong alliances behind him. He is able to defend us whatever the Soviets do. But he wants more: he wants to lower arms levels, reduce tensions and create a more cooperative relationship with the USSR.

Promoting Democratic Ideals

The President will speak out for democracy, freedom, justice and decency everywhere since these values are the surest foundation of a just and peaceful world in the future. He does not attempt to impose our political or economic system on others, but will insist that the Soviet Union also refrain from attempts to dominate others.

Probing Soviet Intentions

We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it. The Geneva meeting will determine whether there has been a change in Soviet policy or only in Soviet style.

Realistic but Determined Effort

The President is preparing seriously for the meeting in Geneva. He has no illusions about the profound differences in our philosophies and societies but will go the extra mile for enduring peace and a safer world. He will bring creative and ambitious ideas to the meeting. His efforts will not end when the Geneva meeting is over. He is in this for the long haul.

Jay-C
27

8263

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet Union in the World

Attached is the next group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet Union's international position.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the papers to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve Bill Martin's sending copies of the papers to Secretary Shultz and Don Regan.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
 - Tab A The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist Movement
 - Tab B The Soviet Union and Western Europe
 - Tab C Sino-Soviet Relations
 - Tab D The Soviets in the Third World
- Tab II Memorandum - Martin to Platt
- Tab III Memorandum - Martin to Chew

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/1/02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet Union in
the World

You have previously read four groups of papers on the Soviet Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, and Gorbachev's domestic agenda. The attached group looks at the Soviet Union's international position.

The first paper (Tab A) deals with Eastern Europe and the international communist movement. Soviet leaders view control of the contiguous countries of Eastern Europe and East Germany as essential not only to their security but also to the maintenance of their rule at home. The Warsaw Pact command, which is totally under the control of Soviet officers, is used both as a counterforce to NATO and as an instrument for controlling the East European countries. The Soviets have also tried to unify control over the East European economies through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but this effort has been less successful than the military integration achieved through the Warsaw Pact Command.

Outside Eastern Europe Moscow maintains relations with some 80 nonruling communist parties and tries to assert a leading role among them. These parties vary greatly, however, in their willingness to support Soviet policies, and disunity within the world communist movement promises to remain a fact of life.

The second paper (Tab B) deals with Western Europe. Here the Soviets employ a variety of approaches, ranging from direct threats to blandishments. Image building and style play a large role, particularly now that Gorbachev has become General Secretary. The Soviets continue to court the European left and work to establish privileged dialogues with certain West European

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7895✓ AS NARA DATE 11/30/07~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

states, particularly France and Italy. They have promoted greater economic ties with Western Europe, which have so far weathered periods of strained political relations. On arms control issues the Soviets try to encourage European fears of an arms race in space and promote regional discussions of arms problems which exclude U.S. participation.

While the Soviets often seem preoccupied with Western Europe and the U.S., China looms as a major factor - and significant potential long-range threat. In addition to the major ideological and tactical disputes which led to the open Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960's, there were major border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops in 1969. These have fostered Soviet fears of the potential for alignment among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

However, the Sino-Soviet relationship has improved somewhat in recent years. Trade, for example, has increased and regular political consultations have been established. Some gradual improvement of relations is likely to continue, but there seems little likelihood that the two countries will become allies in the foreseeable future (Tab C).

Soviet entree into the developing world as a whole has largely been through arms sales. Arms account for some two thirds of Soviet exports to the non-communist developing world, with most going to the Middle East and North Africa. Soviet successes in the developing world, however, have not kept pace with the early advances of the 60's (Cuba) and 70's (particularly Ethiopia and Angola). Many nations have become disillusioned with the Soviet economic model and the Soviets' inability to provide significant financial assistance, and several Soviet protoges are beset by significant military resistance (Tab D).

Recommendation

OK No

That you read the attached papers as background for your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.

Attachments:

- Tab A The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist Movement
- Tab B The Soviet Union and Western Europe
- Tab C Sino-Soviet Relations
- Tab D The Soviets in the Third World

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

THE WARSAW PACT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Moscow and Eastern Europe

Soviet leaders see the maintenance of the Warsaw Pact military alliance and the continued existence of pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe as a priority second in importance only to the preservation of communist rule in the USSR itself. Eastern Europe plays a critical role in Soviet calculations, serving both as a security buffer between the USSR and NATO, and as an extension of Russian domination and influence westward.

Moscow has used the existence of the "socialist commonwealth" and its "fraternal allies" in Eastern Europe to buttress its claims about the legitimacy of communist rule at home and abroad. The suppression of popular challenges to Soviet-style dictatorships--in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1956, 1970, 1976, and 1981)--has undermined the value of such claims abroad.

Nationalist ideas have influenced the East European regimes themselves to varying degrees, and fostered challenges to Soviet authority that have been somewhat more successful. At one extreme, the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Albania have never been under Moscow's control, and have pursued independent policies for decades.

The remaining six regimes, while under more effective Soviet domination, have all at one time or another carried out internal or external policies that departed from Soviet wishes. Romania's President Ceausescu has pursued a relatively autonomous foreign policy since 1964, while maintaining strict dictatorial rule at home. Several other regimes--Hungary, the GDR, and even Bulgaria--have also taken cautious steps in recent years to distance themselves from Soviet foreign policy positions. Nevertheless, all must be sensitive to Moscow's outlook and the pressures that the Soviets can apply.

The basic lessons of the past 40 years of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe appear to be:

- Moscow will not tolerate the overthrow of a communist regime, and will use military force where necessary to preserve or reestablish communist rule.
- Moscow will tolerate--though with great reluctance--some independence on the part of these communist regimes, and will not use force simply to bring such a regime back into line.
- Moscow will continue efforts to impose its will on these countries, even if this means provoking counteractions stemming from nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe.

Early indications are that Gorbachev is trying to restore tighter Soviet control over Eastern Europe after several years of slack reins resulting from leadership turnover in Moscow. He has pressured General Jaruzelski, for example, to crack down even harder on domestic opponents of the Polish regime.

The Warsaw Pact

The Soviets see the Warsaw Pact both as a means of enhancing their own security and as a mechanism for preserving communist rule in Eastern Europe. To Moscow, these two goals amount to the same thing.

The seven countries making up the Warsaw Pact officially are equal in its policymaking bodies, including its highest organ, the Political Consultative Committee, which is composed of the top party leader from each country.

During peacetime, the national armies remain under the formal control of their respective regimes, but the Warsaw Pact's unified command and staff coordinate bloc military policies and oversee training. This unified command is dominated by Soviet officers, and operates in effect as an extension of the Soviet General Staff. In wartime the Soviet Supreme High Command would assume direct command of the Pact's combined armed forces.

The Soviets also exercise considerable control over East European weapons procurement, and seek to ensure that all Pact armies are equipped with weapons of standard design. Despite considerable pressure from Moscow, the East Europeans have chronically failed to devote the resources necessary to stay in step with Soviet military modernization programs. Even the more advanced East European army units are typically five to 10 years behind their Soviet counterparts, and some units are still equipped with World War II vintage tanks.

These growing disparities between Soviet and East European forces, as well as among the East Europeans themselves, undercut Soviet efforts to achieve Pact-wide uniformity and frustrate their attempts to prepare the Warsaw Pact as a whole to conduct combined operations against NATO.

Soviet leaders apparently perceive most of the Warsaw Pact armies as dependable, at least in the initial stages of an East-West war.

- They probably regard the Bulgarians and the Germans as their most reliable allies, with the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians next in line.
- Soviet confidence in the reliability of the Polish armed forces is more open to question. As the second-largest Warsaw Pact army, however, the Poles are still expected to carry out important offensive missions on their own in the event of war.

- The Soviets undoubtedly rate the Romanians as the least dependable member of the Pact. Romanian forces are not subject to wartime Soviet command and control, and they do not participate in major Warsaw Pact combined exercises.

Integrated Economies

The Soviets have long favored increased economic integration with Eastern Europe to accomplish several goals:

- Enhance bloc cohesion as well as their own hegemony;
- Constrain the pull of East European trade toward the West;
- Reduce block vulnerability to Western economic leverage;
- Increase the economic return to the USSR from intrabloc trade.

Most of the East European regimes resist Soviet efforts to strengthen the powers of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), Moscow's primary mechanism for controlling their economies through joint planning.

The Soviets are running certain risks in putting pressure on the East Europeans to tie their economies more closely to the USSR, and must calculate the trade-offs involved in trying to curtail East European dealings with the West. The Soviets recognize that the East Europeans need to trade with the West in order to shore up their economies, satisfy consumer expectations, and thereby preserve domestic political stability. They also recognize the value of such East-West trade for technology acquisition, which can be transferred back to the Soviet Union. Moscow has been unwilling, moreover, to sacrifice its own trade with the West, or pay too high a price in subsidies to the East Europeans to promote economic integration.

The Soviets have moved in the last few years to reduce their subsidies to the East European economies and improve their terms of trade. In return for Soviet-supplied oil and other raw materials, Moscow wants the East Europeans to raise the quality and increase the volume of their exports to the USSR--chiefly food, consumer goods and machinery.

The Soviets have pledged to maintain oil deliveries to all CEMA countries at their present level through the end of the decade. Falling Soviet oil production puts their ability to keep their word in doubt, however, and they failed to keep a similar pledge during the first half of the 1980s. Moscow has also made it clear that such deliveries will hinge in part on East European investment in Soviet extraction and delivery projects, including the construction of another natural gas pipeline from northwest Siberia to Eastern Europe. Again, however, Moscow must strike a balance between meeting its own needs and jeopardizing political stability in Eastern Europe.

The International Communist Movement

Outside Eastern Europe the CPSU recognizes and maintains relations with some 80 nonruling communist parties. More than a third are illegal or restricted from participating in local electoral politics.

While retaining their Leninist organizational structure and authoritarian style, several nonruling parties in Western Europe, India, and Japan have evolved into mass parties attracting broad electoral support and winning parliamentary representation. These in particular assert their independence from the CPSU on a range of issues, both to establish national identities and better to resist direct Soviet pressure.

The nonruling parties vary greatly in their dependency on the CPSU and their willingness to support Soviet policies. Nevertheless, all of them, including even the largest and most independent, seemingly feel a need to retain ties to the CPSU and remain within the international movement, bound by an ideological vision in which the eventual triumph of "peace, freedom and socialism" is secured by the weakening and eventual destruction of Western democratic values and institutions. Even when little else is agreed on, this shared vision provides the basis for political cooperation with Moscow against the West, particularly the United States.


At the same time, it is those parties' conviction of Moscow's readiness to subordinate the needs of the international movement -- or rather the needs of foreign communists -- to the dictates of Soviet foreign policy which keeps them determined to oppose Moscow's efforts to reassert leadership of the movement.

The issues which divide the Soviets and the large foreign parties are often expressed in terms of ideological conflict, e.g., a struggle between the proponents of "orthodoxy" and "revisionism." On the issue of autonomy, these parties vehemently insist on the right to define their own interests and pursue them with their own tactics. The Soviets, for their part, insist that the interests of any single party must be subordinated to the common interests of the movement, and that as the senior member of that movement, they have the major voice in defining what these common interests are. Moscow thus continues to attempt to assert its leading role among all parties and to ignore in practice its rhetorical endorsement of diversity and separate roads to socialism.

Consequently, disunity within the world communist movement promises to remain a fact of life. Formation of a new international center is highly unlikely; indeed, Moscow's incurable propensity for meddling in other parties' internal affairs argues the likelihood of more defections by smaller nonruling CPs and aspiring socialist groups. Thus the movement seems condemned to perpetual fragmentation and polemics. But as long as the Soviet party considers the movement important to the interests and future of the Soviet

state, it will never abandon efforts to keep foreign communists harnessed to its cause -- and will always find some who will go along willingly and tactics to persuade others.

Prepared by:

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FOIA(b)(3)



THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPEImage-building

Image and style play a major role in Soviet relations with Western Europe. In his public appearances Gorbachev has gone to considerable lengths to stress Moscow's commitment to peaceful coexistence and arms control. His remarks on relations with Western Europe have portrayed the Soviet Union--in contrast to the US--as a historical and geographic member of the community of Europe, and have encouraged pan-European approaches to East-West problems.

An equally important dimension of Moscow's image-building in Europe, however, emphasizes the USSR's strength and resolve. The Soviets like to take advantage of opportunities to remind the West of its vulnerabilities at the same time they tout their interest in preserving the status quo in Europe. This dual approach is illustrated by Soviet efforts gradually to erode Western rights in Berlin while keeping individual issues below the crisis threshold.

When a crisis did develop, however--the killing of Major Nicholson--Gorbachev demonstrated clearly that his interest in improving ties with Western Europe would not deter the tough side of the Soviet image. The Soviets stubbornly denied any responsibility in the affair, despite the risk of undermining efforts to promote their sincerity in resolving European security issues.

Cultivating The Left

The Soviets have placed a high priority on building support within the European left, particularly on security issues. In this regard, although the Soviet Union neither started nor controls the West European peace movement, it has skillfully exploited it by providing propaganda support and some organizational and financial support via Communist parties and covert activities. At present, the peace groups are in disarray in the wake of NATO's success in following through with INF deployments, and have grown increasingly wary of Soviet meddling in the movement. Moscow has attempted to revitalize the movement around the SDI issue, but has thus far been largely unsuccessful in arousing the peace activists.

Moscow's prospects for ties with other elements of the European left appear brighter. European socialists are for the most part sympathetic to the Soviet position on SDI, and Gorbachev's meeting with SPD leader Brandt suggests that Moscow may seek to nurture ties with other Western European socialist parties.

Moscow's most promising opportunity for improving influence with the left, however, is provided by the decline of Eurocommunist parties, which have criticized Soviet foreign policy in the past.

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The French Communist party has reverted to a pro-Soviet stance, and the split in the Spanish Communist party has rendered the Eurocommunist faction ineffective. In Italy, where Communists have recently suffered a poor showing at the polls, the traditional Eurocommunist party leadership may be willing to take some steps toward patching up their rift with Moscow in order to bolster their party's status. If Gorbachev is able to project a more benign image in foreign policy, and if he continues already visible efforts to promote better inter-party relations, the Soviets will improve their prospects for European Communist support on security issues and for assistance in mounting future disarmament campaigns.

Special Bilateral Relationships

In their efforts to divide the West the Soviets have historically sought to establish privileged dialogues with certain West European states. The French have long had a special relationship with the USSR, which Moscow nurtures in an effort to encourage Paris' independence from NATO. Gorbachev's first visit to the West as General Secretary was to Paris this October.

Moscow's special relationship with France underwent serious strain as a result of President Mitterrand's tough line toward the Soviets, but in past months Moscow has moved to improve contacts at various levels. The Soviets probably believe they can capitalize on French criticism of SDI and recent signs that Mitterrand will stress French independence in Western councils to bolster his declining popularity.

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Gorbachev also views Italy as an important country for improved ties. Gorbachev's motives in targeting the Italians are unclear. Soviet remarks directed at Italy have repeatedly raised the problems that COCOM restrictions cause for the expansion of already sizable Soviet-Italian trade. The Soviets may believe that Italy's economic problems provide an opportunity to undercut Western unity on high-technology restrictions by tempting Rome with improved trade.

In the first months of Gorbachev's tenure there were signs that Moscow was reconsidering its hard-line policy toward the FRG, and that the new leadership realized its harsh propaganda and attempts to isolate West Germany were at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive, in their impact on the Kohl government's domestic support. Now, however, it appears Gorbachev will be continuing Moscow's policy of isolating West Germany, even as it improves ties with other West European governments. As in the INF campaign, Bonn has been the chief target of Soviet criticism for its support of SDI. Moscow has used favorable West German statements on SDI research to paint the Kohl government as Washington's stooge. Indeed, Soviet anti-German statements since Gorbachev's accession have placed renewed emphasis on claims that Bonn far exceeds its West European neighbors in its willingness to knuckle under to the United States.

Nonetheless, it seems clear from SPD leader Brandt's recent visit to Moscow that Gorbachev is as interested as his predecessors in maintaining a privileged dialogue with the SPD. Moreover, recent SPD electoral successes may have persuaded the Soviets that Kohl is vulnerable. Although Moscow is likely to try to avoid overt attempts to manipulate German politics--which have backfired in the past--it may have decided to hold off any improvement in Soviet-West German relations until after the 1987 federal elections.

Economic Ties

Moscow has been successful in building substantial economic ties with Western Europe, touting its reliability as a trading partner (in alleged contrast to the US) and capitalizing on differences among the Allies in their enthusiasm for strict controls on technology. Since West European trade has helped to satisfy one of Moscow's key security objectives--the acquisition of high technology--the Soviets have attempted to insulate their commercial ties from even the most vehement conflicts over political or security issues. This is most apparent in their economic ties with West Germany. Although they have occasionally threatened to tie economic relations to Bonn's stand on security issues, they have proven unwilling to sacrifice the benefits of trade with the FRG--even during the height of the anti-INF campaign.

In the energy field, the USSR has substantially increased its hard-currency earnings from sales of oil and gas to Western Europe since the mid-1970s, when the West Europeans first turned to the USSR to diversify their energy sources (see chart). The Soviets and West Europeans have undertaken a number of large joint projects, of which the most notable is the Siberia-to-West Europe natural gas pipeline. Contracts on these projects often call for future delivery of gas and oil from the Soviets in return for advance sales of Western equipment or technology.

Arms Control and SDI

During NATO discussion of the neutron bomb issue and INF negotiations, the Soviets conducted a major campaign to exert pressure on the US to make concessions. With the start of INF deployments Moscow probably believes that it lost a major battle on disarmament, but is still far from losing the war. The Soviets probably believe they have reason to take comfort in how close they came to preventing deployments and the extent of the pressure which was brought to bear on NATO governments. Indeed, the final Dutch decision on INF deployment has yet to be made, and while the Soviets do not appear willing to make major concessions to prevent the deployment of 48 more cruise missiles, they no doubt will continue to apply propaganda and diplomatic pressure in an effort to achieve at least a symbolic victory in the Netherlands.

Although the Soviets undoubtedly see further opportunities to exploit European concerns over INF, they have shifted their efforts toward encouraging West European concerns over a space arms

race. Since spring of last year, the Soviets have conducted a major campaign to encourage public and governmental opposition to SDI by claiming that Washington's plans undermine the ABM Treaty and threaten all prospects for US-Soviet arms control. Moreover, Moscow has sought to fan suspicion in Western Europe that SDI is really aimed at defending the continental US, and that the US is seeking unilateral security at the expense of its allies.

A major theme of the Soviet campaign has been to decry the sincerity of the US commitment to the Geneva talks. By holding progress on INF and strategic weapons hostage to progress on space weapons, Moscow no doubt hopes to bring pressure on SDI from Washington's NATO Allies.

Apart from the Geneva talks, Moscow has sought to engage the West Europeans in a variety of arms control forums, with the underlying objectives of accentuating the differences between US and West European perspectives on strategic security issues and cultivating a European security dialogue that diminishes the US role. The Soviets returned to the MBFR negotiations in 1984 despite their walkout at START and the INF talks, and placed propaganda emphasis on their participation in the newly established Conference on Disarmament in Europe. They have tabled draft treaties at both forums in attempts to appear forthcoming. Their proposals offer little substantive progress and are clearly an effort to capitalize on the Allies' interest in less stringent accords than the United States would accept--thereby putting the onus for lack of progress on Washington. In this same vein, the Soviet Union calls for US pledges of no first use of nuclear weapons and periodically proposes nuclear-weapons-free zones.

Moscow will use its full range of tactics in the months ahead to try to exploit differences within NATO on arms control. It clearly would like to reinvigorate the West European peace movement, and has launched a "broad front" strategy, dropping the traditional Soviet demand that peace groups give unerring support to the Soviet policy line. The Soviets now are encouraging their supporters to form broad political coalitions, even if some elements criticize the USSR. Such efforts may foreshadow a major diplomatic and propaganda offensive against US arms control policies and targeted to coincide with the Dutch INF deployment decision, the US decision on continued observance of SALT II restrictions, and the President's meeting with Gorbachev--all scheduled for November.

Prepared by:

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Sino-Soviet relationship is beset by suspicions and obstacles, but nevertheless has altered significantly in recent years. Trade has grown steadily; new consulates and border crossings are to be opened; a wide range of cultural, sports, and official exchanges has been instituted; the foreign ministers now routinely meet at the UNGA in New York and will begin to exchange formal visits. However, mutual trust has not been created and the two countries still confront each other across a long, heavily militarized border.

Background

The Sino-Soviet alliance forged in 1950 did not long survive Stalin. By the end of the decade, bitter disputes had erupted over Chinese risk-taking against the US (in the Taiwan strait), over ideology, and over Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program. By 1963, the USSR and China broke openly over the Soviets' agreeing to a test-ban treaty with the US. The major armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese units on the Ussuri border in 1969 contributed directly to China's responsiveness to US overtures during the 1970s.

Whatever nostalgia for the alliance of the '50s may remain, years of animosity have left Moscow abidingly suspicious of China. For the Soviet leadership, China ranks, after the United States, as the major strategic threat. As such, it is also, after the United States, the major Soviet political target. Moscow pursues detente tactics vis-a-vis Beijing in the same way that it does with the US, as part of a politically motivated adversary relationship.

--Military Issues. The China threat is particularly relevant to Soviet military leaders, who tend in any event to think in terms of worst-case scenarios. Some may even see China as the primary threat because it borders on the USSR and because its command and control appear much less stable than those of the US and NATO. Evidence to that end is the fact that the USSR directs roughly equal strategic intelligence efforts against both China and the US, despite the tremendous gap in the real threat each represents.

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--Ideology. Within the limits set by history and threat perception, Soviet China watchers nevertheless consider China a socialist country, albeit one that has seriously strayed from the proper path (that China is socialist was publicly conceded by Brezhnev and has been repeated by each subsequent General Secretary). Most of these observers believe that because of its socialism, China has a residual susceptibility to Soviet influence, and Soviet example and technology have special relevance for China. They are likely to interpret signs of factionalism in the Chinese leadership as evidence of the existence of pro-Soviet elements favoring a more orthodox form of socialism.

Soviet Approaches

--Tactics. In bilateral dealings with China, the Soviets have tended toward incremental tactics, hoping that small steps toward increased trade, cultural and other exchanges will encourage the putative pro-Soviet groups in China and be interpreted internationally as evidence that the barriers between the two countries are breaking down. Moscow calculates that an accumulation of these small steps will undermine Chinese hostility and that this will impact on the US, Japan, and other western countries inclined to support China.

--Strategy. This approach then is to lead eventually to a sidelining of the basic strategic issues Beijing cites as the "three obstacles" to normalized relations: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet support of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the USSR military build-up in Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border.

--Third World Competition. Early in the dispute, Moscow sought to compete head-on with China in every arena, particularly in the third world. Aid programs, for example, were structured in part for their effect in countering Chinese aid offers. In recent years, both sides have been selecting their targets more carefully, without trying to compete everywhere. For the USSR this has meant focusing attention on key Asian countries such as North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. But the fact that Moscow views its relations with these countries as an element in its management of the China problem complicates efforts to reduce tension or resolve disputes with China.

--Diplomacy. An added complication is the fact that Moscow prefers patience in diplomacy to premature concessions and is under no immediate pressure to settle with Beijing. It therefore addresses the "three obstacles" only peripherally.

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Soviet support of the UN-sponsored indirect negotiating process for Afghanistan and of Hanoi's pretensions to "negotiating flexibility" in regard to Cambodia have no doubt been called to Beijing's attention. As for the Sino-Soviet border itself, Moscow's flexibility is limited by military priorities. It has proposed discussion of confidence-building measures and of the border itself, along lines utilized in the European Helsinki talks, but given no hint of being prepared for any meaningful force reduction.

Coloring the entire Soviet approach is a deep-rooted suspicion of China's potential for alignment with Japan, South Korea, the US and/or NATO. Moscow has welcomed the recent restraint of both China and the US in not talking publicly about a strategic alignment, but still fears this may be an ultimate and secret aim. Even if China were to drop its insistence on one or another of the "obstacles", the Soviets might themselves reintroduce at least Afghanistan and possibly Cambodia, because of Chinese assistance to what Moscow sees as pro-Western resistance forces in those countries.

Calculated Progression

Despite the obstacles, there has been some progress in the relationship in recent years. Trade is scheduled to total nearly \$15 billion through 1990, a doubling of the current annual rate. (The five-year total is however roughly equal only to last year's PRC trade with Japan.) Negotiations are underway to open consulates in Shanghai and Leningrad and several new border crossings. China and the USSR now have institutionalized semi-annual consultations at the deputy foreign minister level; the foreign ministers meet routinely at the UN General Assembly and have agreed to exchange formal visits; and there is to be a continuing exchange of visits by Deputy Premiers. This year, for the first time in decades, a Soviet trade union delegation and a parliamentary group visited China. We expect this slow process of detente will continue for the foreseeable future, without ever quite reaching the point the two sides describe as "normalization of relations".

A fairly dramatic move, such as an agreement for confidence-building measures along the border or even resolution of a part of the border dispute itself can nevertheless not be ruled out. Following this year's resumption of trade union ties, possible low-level Chinese attendance at next February's Soviet party congress would be a step toward a "restoration" of party ties. Such gestures would be designed in part for their impact upon the US, each side trying to gain leverage there through a threat of improved relations.

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THE SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Soviet interest in the developing world dates to the early years of the Bolshevik regime when Lenin and his adherents envisaged communist revolutions freeing the region from colonial domination. Preoccupation with domestic affairs in the 1920s and 1930s confined active Soviet promotion of revolutions to propaganda incitement and subversion, and it was not until the mid-1950s that Moscow began exploiting opportunities for influence in the developing areas systematically as state policy.

Those efforts have since paid off in a vastly expanded material and physical presence and in a network of political/military alliances. Even though the record is also marked by setbacks and outright failures, the Kremlin continues to view the third world as important in the long-term pursuit of its global ambitions. Soviet decisiveness in capitalizing on Portugal's withdrawal from its colonial empire and the overthrow of the Ethiopian monarchy in the 1970's graphically testify to this perception.

Priority and Methods

While Moscow has long been sensitive to developments in areas close to Soviet borders, Soviet efforts to cultivate clients in the third world have not been limited to any region; rather, the search for opportunities is global. Major Soviet programs have been as far flung as the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South Asia. Development of Soviet ties with regional states tends to follow a consistent pattern. The USSR works to:

- develop economic, commercial and cultural ties and translate the influence they afford into political support for Soviet programs, interests, and policies internationally;
- protect, consolidate and expand whatever assets they have or can develop in client states;
- obtain or expand access to military and naval facilities and/or deny such assets to the West, and
- assiduously cultivate elements sympathetic to the Soviet Union with a view to their eventual coming to power locally.

While ideology takes second place to political pragmatism here, it nevertheless colors the entire Soviet approach. Moscow consistently cultivates a broad spectrum of left-oriented groups -- not just local communists -- to develop a broad base of influence capable of weathering local transitions of power. The USSR has in the past extended generous military aid to "progressive" regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, all of which openly persecuted local communist parties. And even while expanding ties with nonaligned states such as Jordan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Argentina, and Peru, none

of which regularly supports Soviet diplomatic positions, the USSR simultaneously cultivates the leftist elements in those countries.

Surrogates also play a large role, not only as channels for shipment of arms and assistance, but also in providing ground forces in special situations. Intervention by such intermediaries offers the advantages of less risk of confrontation between the superpowers, greater acceptance by the local population, and less stigma of Soviet involvement. The Cubans have been key players in this context. The 20,000 to 30,000 Cuban troops that have been in Angola for 10 years have protected the Soviet political/military investment there. The injection of Cuban combat troops to bring a pro-Soviet regime to power in Angola, and later to save one in Ethiopia, was a bold new departure at that time. Its success may well have been a factor in the decision a few years later to invade Afghanistan.

Arms Largesse

Moscow's main entree into the third world has been through military aid. Because of its continuing high rates of military production and its large backlog of war materiel in reserve units, the USSR is uniquely able to offer large amounts of new or late-model used weaponry. Arms aid also creates a continuing dependence on Soviet equipment, spare parts, and advisers which may long outlast the original client-patron relations (e.g., Egypt). In some circumstances, arms agreements foster cooperation in political and diplomatic areas as well. Arms sales now account for as much as two-thirds of total Soviet exports to the non-communist third world and also bring in some \$7-\$8 billion a year in much-needed hard currency. (The third world arms market, however, has softened significantly for all sellers in the last three years. Soviet arms revenues have declined sharply since 1982, and indications are that they will slide still further unless the USSR lowers prices and liberalizes financial terms.)

Most Soviet arms have gone to the Middle East and North Africa and now include sophisticated weapons systems. The Soviets have delivered over \$4 billion in arms to Syria since the summer of 1982 to offset losses sustained by Damascus in its confrontation with Israel at that time. Other top customers are Libya (agreements of nearly \$15 billion since 1970, with deliveries of over \$2 billion in 1982-84); India (agreements of nearly \$12 billion since 1960, with deliveries of over \$2 billion in 1982-84); Angola (agreements of \$3 billion in 1982-84 and deliveries of nearly \$2 billion); Ethiopia (nearly \$2 billion since 1981, with over half delivered). The Soviets also provide an extensive advisory and technical presence in Africa and the Middle East, as well as more modest numbers to Latin America (Peru, Nicaragua), and are currently training more than 50,000 third world students in the USSR.

Economic Pragmatism

In contrast to military largesse, Soviet economic aid is on a far smaller scale. After the big, indiscriminate splurge of the late 1950's/early 1960's, it is now down to a considerably reduced level,

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structured for maximum exposure with minimal input and designed to survive political shifts, yet to be competitive with western donors. Less than 1/10 of 1 percent of Soviet GNP goes into the effort.

Given its limited commitment of resources, the USSR prefers to concentrate on big, noticeable projects bedded in a long-term development format, and to tie the venture to purchase of Soviet equipment. Its programs have generated a sizeable expansion of Soviet-third world trade as well as expanded markets for Soviet capital goods. And the USSR gets a healthy hard-currency return for its technical services as well, such as for training technicians.

On balance, however, the Soviet record on economic aid has been poor. Even if they had the will, the Soviets do not have a broad range of quality goods to compete in this area with the developed countries of the west. They account for less than three percent of all international aid flowing to non-communist regimes. Local disillusionment with the Soviets as partners in economic development is likely to remain the major impediment to Moscow's future influence in the third world. This, combined with the Soviet reputation for heavy-handed interference in the affairs of many clients, has encouraged many LDC leaders to be wary of too close entanglement with Moscow.

Soviet Clients and Conterinsurgencies

Several of Moscow's third world clients now face insurgencies which force the Soviets to greater efforts to protect the investments already made. In Angola, the UNITA movement now controls roughly one-third of the country and poses a continuing threat to the Soviet-backed MPLA regime. Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia is challenged by insurgent groups in Eritrea, Tigre and the Ogaden. In Afghanistan, five years of Soviet military campaigns have failed to subdue the mujahidin. Opposition to the Sandinistas poses a growing problem for Nicaragua's regime. All these insurgencies have led to increasing demands on Moscow for more military/economic aid.

The variety, intensity, and persistence of these insurgencies suggest that the USSR has no ready solution to the problem. It will probably have to devote even more resources in the next few years to defending its clients against domestic challenges. And if these insurgencies show signs of succeeding, the Soviets will be faced with the choice of upping their already heavy commitments or seeing their clients overthrown.

The Soviet Alternative

The Soviet friendship treaties signed since 1971 with the non-communist world -- Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and India -- codify Moscow's growing web of third world ties. (The Soviets also have a similar treaty with Vietnam. The treaties with Egypt and Somalia, agreed upon in 1971 and 1974 respectively, were subsequently abrogated.) While most of these agreements imply some Soviet commitment to the security of the signatory country, the ambiguous formulas do not bind the

Soviets to act in critical circumstances. For the USSR, however, the treaties have symbolic value as a formalization of their presence in the third world.

Nevertheless, the treaties do not necessarily translate into greater Soviet influence. Once a regime's fundamental security needs are satisfied and the USSR fails to provide the economic aid needed by the new regime, the attraction of the Soviet model tends to wear thin. Moscow has discovered that no gains in the third world can be counted permanent since they depend on being able to remain identified with a client's interests indefinitely, and on the client's remaining forever convinced of the advantage of Soviet patronage. Even a substantial physical presence has not guaranteed the USSR lasting gains--witness the history of Soviet-Egyptian relations.

One enduring example of third world reluctance to identify closely with the strategic goals of the USSR is the continuing aversion to the Soviet scheme for an Asian collective security arrangement. When Brezhnev first proposed it in the late 1960s, he had no takers outside the communist bloc. Moscow has met with a similar response in its recent version of the scheme, floated again during Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to Moscow.

Prospects

The question arises whether the Soviets are prepared to content themselves with gains already achieved, acquiesce in reverses suffered, or expand their third-world role indefinitely. Certainly they have taken fewer initiatives to project Soviet power in the last several years, concentrating rather on consolidating existing gains. On the other hand, the types of opportunity plentiful in the mid-to-late 1970's have not been available either. Presumably the growing cost of maintaining key clients is also a factor in Soviet calculations. There is, however, no sign that the USSR is scaling back on commitments nor any evidence of a deliberate shift intended to reduce East-West tensions over regional problems. At most, Moscow is advising clients to preserve ties with possible Western aid donors while still pursuing and expanding those with the USSR.

There are also limits on Soviet prospects imposed by evolution within the third world itself. The area's ideological fascination with Marxism, socialism, or leftist theories has not over time translated easily into an identity of view with Moscow or sympathy with Soviet institutions. Indeed, greater third-world exposure to the realities of the USSR and socialism has definitely not worked to Moscow's advantage. The growth of self-confidence within the LDCs (the Islamic and oil/mineral rich states in particular) now manifests itself in a less deferential attitude toward not only the Soviet but all foreign models. And the blatant Afghanistan example of what "disinterested fraternal assistance" can mean is plain to all third-world states. In short, the kind of lasting "organic" relationships with the third world, made up of interwoven benefits

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and dependencies, shared cultural values, and open communications seem beyond the reach of the Soviet Union of this generation. But that, of course, will never stop the Soviets from trying.

Prepared by:
I. Kulski
Department of State

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev

Attached for Secretary Shultz is a copy of the latest group of
background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It
deals with the USSR's international position.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist
Movement
Tab B The Soviet Union and Western Europe
Tab C Sino-Soviet Relations
Tab D The Soviets in the Third World

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID L. CHEW

SUBJECT: Background Papers for the President's Meeting with Gorbachev

Attached for Mr. Regan is a copy of the latest group of background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It deals with the USSR's international position.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist Movement
- Tab B The Soviet Union and Western Europe
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