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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (5/12)

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1203

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7891	MEMO	MATLOCK TO STONE RE EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING <b>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</b>	1	10/11/1985	B1
7892	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE CONVERSATION WITH STANISLAV MENSHKOV: PRIVATE CONTACTS AND GENEVA MEETING <b>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</b>	8	10/12/1985	B1
7893	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7892 <b>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</b>	8	10/12/1985	B1
7894	PAPER	EUROPEAN VIEWS OF THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING <b>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</b>	2	ND	B1

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JMC 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

October 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN L. STONE  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR  
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: European Perceptions of the Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

I found your memorandum of September 23 an excellent summary of European attitudes toward the November meeting and the U.S. and Soviet approaches to it. It tracks well with our own sense here that Gorbachev's style will ultimately lose much of its attractiveness as people find he is not prepared to tackle the hard questions of East-West relations any more than his predecessors were. I think his recent visit to France and his inability to field credibly the many questions he faced there on human rights lend further support to this view. Indeed, it may be that the whole Soviet pre-Geneva propaganda effort peaked early with the Time interview and is now on a downward curve.

When compared to the early Soviet public relations effort, I can understand why some Europeans may have found U.S. statements to appear reactive or even defensive. I think this perception will change over the coming weeks as the administration draws greater public attention to its own view of the November meeting - a positive, forward-looking view offering constructive, concrete proposals.

In this regard, USIA has recently begun preparing a weekly summary of European public attitudes for the inter-agency working group I chair to help coordinate our pre-Geneva public diplomacy efforts. I think these reports can be a most useful tool in gauging the success of our efforts, and I look forward to reviewing them each week.

As you note in your memo, the specific programming suggestions coming out of Europe fit well with ideas already under consideration, and I fully agree with the notion that what we need is "constant, positive" reiteration of U.S. views.

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BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

**United States  
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Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

*cc sent 9/27  
Consolidated  
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Sommer  
CSbb 9/30*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Jack Matlock  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Senior Director for European  
and Soviet Affairs  
National Security Council

FROM: Marvin L. Stone *MLS-*  
Deputy Director

SUBJECT: European Views of The Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

Attached, for your information, is a summary of responses to a cable sent to all European Posts earlier this month, asking for local opinion on the upcoming meeting between the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev.

We are factoring it into USIA planning for the meeting. I welcome your thoughts on its implications.

attachment

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(UNCLASSIFIED when removed from the attached document)

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*Cxs 7/1/02*

JP  
Draft memo <sup>3</sup>  
to Stone thinking  
him + community-

J&M

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUROPEAN VIEWS OF THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

On September 5, USIA cabled a questionnaire to all European Missions and a handful of selected Missions in other parts of the world asking for an assessment of local views on Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and of U.S. and Soviet preparations for the November meeting between Gorbachev and the President. Missions were asked to characterize media treatment of the November meeting, public attitudes, Soviet "public diplomacy" efforts, and views of Gorbachev as a Soviet leader. Response was excellent: twenty-nine of about thirty-two European Missions replied to the cable, as well as Brasilia, Tokyo, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi. Most reports were dated September 13 or later.

European Views of Gorbachev

Generally speaking, Europeans see Gorbachev as vigorous, intelligent, and highly motivated, but little different from his predecessors in the policies he advocates and the positions he represents, however much better the arguments might be packaged. Gorbachev's Time interview received widespread play, but few Europeans read anything into it beyond a change in style. Gorbachev is nonetheless widely perceived as being a potentially formidable negotiating partner, as well as a serious challenge to the President in a one-on-one encounter.

Views of The November Meeting

After an initial surge of interest following the announcement of the November meeting between the President and the General Secretary, media attention has receded in most countries to a steady but lower level, often overshadowed by domestic events such as elections or more immediate international episodes such as "l'affaire Greenpeace" in France. Few Europeans have high expectations for the meeting with respect to significant concrete results, but most are encouraged by the fact that we and the Soviets are at least planning to talk to one another. Initial optimistic hopes for a significant outcome of the meeting have also been tempered by more realistic expectations. In some smaller countries (Denmark, Portugal), the feeling persists that relations between the superpowers go on over their heads and that there is nothing they can do about it.

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### Views of The U.S. and Soviet Approaches

Europeans remain suspicious of the Soviets and positive toward the U.S., but there is a widespread perception that the U.S. is being defensive in its preparations for the meeting and in conducting the U.S.-Soviet relationship overall. We are seen as reacting to Soviet initiatives -- almost always negatively -- rather than presenting positive alternatives and as pushing an anti-Soviet line as opposed to actively promoting our own positions. In some countries this view takes the form of open criticism of the U.S. "hard line" as a mishandling of the Public aspects of the meeting. Few Missions credit Soviet propaganda with playing a large role in fostering these perceptions and opinions. //

### Soviet "Public Diplomacy"

Few European Missions report that local Soviet missions are making extraordinary efforts to press their agenda for the Geneva meeting. Almost all U.S. Missions believe that their Soviet counterparts are conducting business as usual, although "business as usual" has recently come to mean more Western-style activities such as television appearances and press conferences.

### Programming Suggestions

Programming suggestions tended to call for products already under consideration -- Worldnets, Presidential speeches, interviews, pamphlets, Wireless File stories, by-liners, etc. -- and strongly emphasized that the negative perceptions of the U.S. approach to the meeting and relations generally must be countered. Public diplomacy should be tough but forthcoming, positive, not defensive, and above all, show flexibility and willingness to consider Soviet offers. Undue haste in rejecting even patently propagandistic Soviet gestures gives the impression of negativism, however much the actual nature of the Soviet offer is recognized. Constant, positive, medium-visibility reiteration of U.S. views and positions by high-level spokesmen is the key to a successful approach to the meeting. Programming materials should continue to draw attention to the Soviet record as opposed to Soviet rhetoric: release of additional information on Soviet chemical warfare, ASAT, and SDI-type programs was suggested as being particularly useful.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Eyes Only  
Mensikov  
10/12/85  
✓

MATLOCK

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NLRR POB-114/3 #7892BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 12, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*SUBJECT: Conversation with Stanislav Menshkov: Private  
Contacts and Geneva Meeting*Very interesting!*

Menshikov came in at 11:00 and we had a conversation which went on for over four hours, with several interruptions. (The interruptions occurred because he had to cash some traveller's checks; I drove him out to the American Express office near Bethesda (the nearest one we could find open), and then took him to lunch at a Chinese Restaurant at H and 18th.) Our conversation was reasonably orderly, despite the interruptions, but neither of us took notes. I will group his observations by topic, even though the comments in some cases were interspersed in our conversation in a different order. Both of us made clear at the outset, and reiterated occasionally, that we were not speaking on the basis of instructions but were conveying informally our own personal views of the various topics that came up.

Private Channel:

Menshikov began the conversation by saying that he had no specific message, but that Gorbachev had taken note of the President's comment to Shevardnadze about the need for more direct and private communication. Gorbachev agreed, but wondered what we had in mind: specifically how did we want to arrange it and what did we want to talk about? Menshikov added that this was an important matter not only for the period leading up to the Geneva meeting, but could be useful during the meeting itself. He said that when Gorbachev was in Paris, there was an arrangement whereby just after each meeting, personal representatives of each met privately to discuss the preceding session, seek clarification of points not clear, and exchange views on what might be covered at the next session. (He did not name the persons involved, but I inferred that it was either Alexandrov or Zagladin on the Soviet side and possibly Verdrine on the French.)

He then said that he did not expect precise answers or specific proposals. However, if I had any comments that might guide their thinking, he would convey them to Zagladin orally on Monday, and that Zagladin would pass them on, also orally, to Gorbachev. He added that there would be a Central Committee plenum Tuesday,

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primarily to deal with issues related to the Party Congress, but also possibly for "organizational changes." This means that both Zagladin and Gorbachev will be tied up Tuesday, and Zagladin leaves for the SI meeting in Vienna on Wednesday. However, he thought he might have some sort of reaction next week.

I told him that I thought the President felt that private consultations could be useful across the board of the various issues facing us. Frankly, we are having some problem determining just what Gorbachev's aims are, and this makes it difficult to make sure that our own moves are given the connotations we intend. The President wants their meeting in Geneva to achieve as much as it can, yet it seems to us that the Soviet approach is still largely propagandistic. But we don't want to jump to negative conclusions. The President genuinely wants to start solving some problems, and if some private consultation will help, he is all for it. As for the idea of having representatives consult quietly between sessions in Geneva, I said that this was an interesting idea and that I would pass it on to you, but refrained from either encouraging or discouraging it. Menshikov said that he understood perfectly, and indeed was not making a concrete proposal, only floating an idea.

Menshikov then asked whether we could use Dobrynin as Kissinger had; this had worked in the past and they were not sure why we opposed it now. (He added that he was not arguing for this arrangement; he only wanted to be in a position to explain why we did not find it satisfactory.) I told him that I doubted that we could accept Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor. For us it was a matter of reciprocity and of insuring that the communication is as direct as possible. The principle of reciprocity would require us to insist that Hartman have the same access to Soviet decision makers as Dobrynin does with ours. But we also see utility in having persons who occupy roughly comparable positions in the decision-making process on each side talk directly. This could speed up communication and permit greater frankness, informality and confidentiality.

[NOTE: I did not at the time know of Gorbachev's letter -- which was delivered to Woessner after Menshikov had left. He did not refer to it directly, but I believe his question about Dobrynin stemmed from his knowledge that they were likely to make this proposal and also realized that it probably would not be acceptable to us.]

Menshikov asked who on our side might be in a position to conduct such a dialogue. I told him that this had not been decided; that we would try to find an appropriate counterpart if Gorbachev is interested and indicates whom he would like to use. I added that, in my personal view, there are several U.S. officials who might be used. Regarding arms control, Nitze is the obvious candidate. As for the other issues, persons like Ridgway, Palmer and myself are sufficiently close to the policy-making process

and sufficiently discreet to be used in the process if so designated. Menshikov commented that "for some reason" some Soviet officials were negatively disposed toward Palmer, but he didn't know why or whether the view was held strongly enough to make any difference. (I told him that any negative view of Palmer is quite mistaken; he is honest, discreet and genuinely committed to solving problems if we can.)

Menshikov also asked how such contacts could be arranged logistically, in order to minimize the number of persons who are witting. I suggested that, if the idea was approved on both sides, Geneva might be an appropriate locale since officials on both sides have good reasons to visit there periodically in advance of the meeting. He agreed that this seemed the most workable arrangement.

As we were discussing these matters, Menshikov apologized for the snafus in the past. Regarding the Scowcroft mission last year, he said that Zagladin thought he had it wired, but that when Gromyko was approached, he put the kabosh on it. Gromyko also turned down the proposal for special representatives on arms control. Chernenko, he said, was unwilling or unable to assert himself on these matters, but "things are different now." Gorbachev, he claimed, understands the utility of direct communication and is eager to do something. Gromyko is now out of the picture. Though Gorbachev works closely with Shevardnadze and will doubtless keep him in the loop personally, they both understand that these communications cannot work through the MFA bureaucracy.

Before we parted, Menshikov asked how we should communicate if Gorbachev decides to name someone for an authorized contact. I told him that, so far as I am concerned, it would be all right just to telephone me and suggest that someone meet a specified person at a specified time and place. I would then undertake to get a prompt reply as to whether it is possible and if so who would come. I gave him both my office and home telephone numbers. Regarding possible contacts during the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, he suggested that we might consider using Dwayne Andreas' apartment there. I told him that we considered Andreas reliable and discreet and that I would pass on the idea.

#### The Issues

Most of our conversation was devoted to a tour d'horizon of the various issues before us. In the interstices, Menshikov made several comments regarding Soviet actions and motivations for recent actions. I will describe these first, then summarize his comments on the issues. (Mine followed our usual talking points, except as noted.)

Current Soviet Assessment

I asked Menshikov early on what Gorbachev's aims are for the meeting. He said, without hesitation, "He wants to achieve something. Something significant. But we wonder what the President wants." I assured him that the President was dead serious about making as much progress as possible, but that we really felt we were getting conflicting signals from them.

Menshikov observed that "some may think" that, because Gorbachev is likely to be around for a long time, he is playing a waiting game, but we should understand that this is not the case. He knows a lot needs to be done and is not the sort to procrastinate; this is contrary to his entire nature. I replied that, as a matter of fact, Arbatov's people were putting out just such a rationale: that Gorbachev is in a position to outwait the President and deal with his successors. I cautioned that this would be a major and fundamental mistake on their part, since any American President who might be inclined to settle for less than President Reagan simply wouldn't be able to deliver. Menshikov said that he hoped we did not consider Georgy Arbatov as an authoritative spokesman. I said that, as a matter of fact, we thought of him more as a propagandist than a policy maker. Menshikov said, "Then you have an accurate picture. That is precisely his role."

Menshikov said that Shevardnadze had been pleased with his meeting with the President (not that he liked everything said), and had reported his favorable impression of the President to Gorbachev and the Politburo. Gorbachev's answers to Dan Rather's questions in Paris were designed to convey this to us, and they hoped we noticed. [I don't have a transcript at hand, but Menshikov said that Gorbachev said twice that the meeting left a good impression.]

In response to Secretary Shultz's private comments to Shevardnadze in Helsinki (about the need to improve the atmosphere and minimize the rhetoric) orders have gone out to the Soviet media not to criticize the President personally. (Menshikov added that this was very sensitive and that he should under no circumstances be quoted as saying it.) He added that if we see an exception or two it will be because not everyone got the word; if, however, attacks resume we will know that the orders have been changed.

Arms Control

Menshikov's approach to these issues, as to the others, was not in the spirit of debating, but of questioning as to whether this or that approach would work. His more significant comments were as follows:

SDI: Gorbachev knows that the President will not "give up" SDI, and this is not required. But he must have some assurance, other than verbal ones, that SDI will not be used to complement a US first strike capability. Defining the line between research and the rest might be one possibility, he suggested (to which I gave no encouragement), but there could be other approaches. The main thing is that Gorbachev has to persuade the Soviet military that SDI is not a threat. (Menshikov implied, but did not directly state, that Gorbachev is not really persuaded that it is a threat -- at least not for a decade or so. He accepted my comments about the Soviet program and the absurdity of their accusing us of breaking agreements when they were doing the same research without demur.)

START: The Soviets know that much of their present proposal will not be acceptable to us. It is a negotiating position, and a conscious effort was made to include elements which will accord with the President's position. These include cuts up to 50% -- a major change in the Soviet position -- as well as limits on warheads and the principle of sublimits. We should consider these as "building blocks" from which we can pick and choose and rearrange to our liking. The important thing is to use some of them.

The Soviets recognize that we are particularly concerned about the heavy ICBM's. These can be cut, and cut substantially, if we go about it in the right way. We have to start with agreeing on some elements: e.g., 50%, etc., and then work toward the others. If we start with focussing on the heavies, the Soviet military will freeze the process. They don't want to give up anything. We have to use the negotiations to ratchet the numbers into the proper relationship.

When I pointed out the retrograde elements in the Soviet proposal, particularly the inclusion of all types of nuclear weapons in the same category, our INF weapons but not theirs, counting carrier-based aircraft, etc., Menshikov said, in effect, that they had no expectation of reaching an agreement on this basis. It is simply a negotiating ploy. Obviously, he said, if we can reach a separate agreement on INF, this question will be removed from START. As for the rest, it is negotiable.

Menshikov observed that he really couldn't predict what the Soviets would agree to as a bottom line. The important thing is that Gorbachev is in a mood to negotiate, and if the U.S. wants to proceed, it will make another proposal, using some elements of the Soviet proposal, so Gorbachev can present this as acceptance of some elements of the Soviet position and thus keep things moving.

INF: Menshikov claimed that the offer to negotiate with the British and French was not designed to "split the Allies" as had been alleged. (He observed that they knew well what the British and French positions are.) Instead, it was designed as a

preliminary move to justify reaching a deal with us on INF. When I expressed some skepticism, he explained that Gorbachev could justify a deal with the U.S. if the offer to negotiate some time in the future with the British and French was on the table. That would provide a rationale for excluding British and French systems from START (he admitted that they are strategic systems, and that they are not dedicated to NATO defense). A deal with the US would be possible if some compensation for British and French systems is permitted. I told him that I personally thought this is a non-starter; I didn't see how we could allow any compensation. He said that this could be the ultimate sticking point, then. It was the major thing they had against the walk-in-the-woods formula. He then explained that they are prepared to wait for negotiations with the British and French until after we have achieved radical reductions, in the order of 50%, but that they feel they will have no negotiating leverage at that time unless there is some compensation now for the British and French systems.

However, he said repeatedly that a separate deal on INF is possible, and he wondered if we should not think about the possibility of coming up with a general formula that could be agreed to at the Geneva meeting. He implied that this could be the "major achievement" Gorbachev is looking for. He also stated that some formula that would produce a moratorium on further NATO deployments in return for a reduction of the SS-20's could be very attractive. [I listened, but gave no encouragement to this idea. It is in fact an element in an idea Glitman has been thinking about.]

#### Nuclear Testing:

Menshikov pressed hard on this issue, claiming that Gorbachev had overruled the Soviet military on the issue and therefore had a lot at stake. He said that the main object is to get a handle on unbridled "modernization" in the future. (I, of course, pointed out the one-sided impact at present.) He observed that the Soviet position on verification is not set in concrete; much more could be done here if we approach it in the framework of a goal of eliminating testing sometime in the future. Without that, they just don't see the point, and feel that any threshold is going to be harder to verify than a CTB. Also, he said, if the U.S. is willing to discuss ways to limit qualitative improvements from some point in the future (i.e., implicitly allowing for completion of current programs), this would be well received and could lead to some progress on the testing issue. [I gave him no encouragement that movement is possible in this area unless we tackle the verification issue first; his argument is that they just cannot agree to that without at least a commitment to try to negotiate something more. But he did ask several questions regarding our current proposal, which still seems not to be thoroughly understood.]

#### Terrorism

Menshikov raised the issue, asking whether the President would be interested in some agreement to cooperate in this area. I said I thought he would, depending of course on the nature of the proposal. He replied that he thought Gorbachev would be interested. [We did not pursue the matter further; the Soviets have been leery of this in the past, but it is possible that their attitude is changing. The kidnapping of their people in Lebanon may have had some impact on their thinking; I also note that they have made a remarkably favorable public statement regarding our interception of the Egyptian aircraft -- probably considered "payment" for our public statements when their people were kidnapped, but also possibly indicative of some change in policy.]

### Regional Issues

I pointed out to Menshikov that there are many issues other than arms control which are on the agenda, and gave the standard pitch regarding the importance of the regional ones. He asked which ones might be good candidates for some constructive discussion at the Geneva meeting. I said that, of course, Afghanistan would be high on our list, and asked what the Soviet aim is there. Menshikov said simply, "We want out. Are you willing to help?" I said that depended upon what "help" meant, but yes, we would do what we reasonably could to make it easy for them -- meaning that we would give whatever commitments they needed that we would not use Afghanistan to their detriment if they left. He asked if we could accept Babrak Karmal, and I said it wasn't up to us to accept or reject him; we wanted no role in choosing the Afghan government. That had to be done by the Afghans, and in a way that the refugees could return.

### Bilateral Issues

Menshikov said that they had noted the President's comments on expanding contacts. To my surprise, he said that this had made a favorable impression, and he thought Gorbachev would be attracted by such ideas as expanding student exchanges and the like. [We shall see.]

### Human Rights

I made clear to him the importance of this issue. He said that we could expect some movement, but it was still difficult for them. He noted their private negotiations with the Jewish leaders, and said that emigration would rise somewhat as the result of that, but not to expect to much right now. As for divided spouses, he was sure this could be solved if the President made a private appeal to Gorbachev. "Everyone has to admit you have a legitimate interest in these cases," he said. As for Shcharansky, he felt that a deal could be struck if the proper "trade" could be arranged. I made clear to him that, without movement in this area, a lot of other things were going to be hung up.

Trade

He asked if there could be any discussion of trade at the Geneva meeting. I said that we didn't exclude the possibility, but frankly what could be done would be heavily dependent on solution of the human rights problems. If they want to talk about this directly and privately, fine. We'll try to specify what we mean. If they don't want to talk about it, we'll try to respond appropriately to private moves on their part. He said he would check out the question and see if there is interest.

Future Summits

Menshikov asked if the President would like to establish a regular pattern of meetings in the future. I told him I had not heard the President discuss the matter and did not know how he felt about the question. He said that some officials were saying that regular meetings would be a good idea. I allowed that this is possible, but reiterated that I really did not know how the President regarded the question.

COMMENT:

I don't have time tonight to provide detailed commentary, but Menshikov is either engaged in a massive disinformation effort, or else the folks in the Central Committee Secretariat are really casting about for ways to "achieve something" at the meeting.

Just after we parted, I learned that TASS had accepted the interview. This is really unprecedented. Maybe the guy over there is more serious than we suspected.

We now have the letter proposing Dobrynin for a channel. I would suggest that we accept with the proviso that Hartman will deliver our messages and ask for an interlocutor to be designated. (I would suggest Ridgway or Armacost for Dobrynin.) Then, if Zagladin sends a message requesting a private meeting, we should respond on that track as well. Should keep everybody happy so long as the key players are kept informed.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

October 12, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Conversation with Stanislav Menshkov: Private  
Contacts and Geneva Meeting

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDO-114/3 79893

BY CH NARA DATE 10/30/07

Menshikov came in at 11:00 and we had a conversation which went on for over four hours, with several interruptions. (The interruptions occurred because he had to cash some traveller's checks; I drove him out to the American Express office near Bethesda (the nearest one we could find open), and then took him to lunch at a Chinese Restaurant at H and 18th.) Our conversation was reasonably orderly, despite the interruptions, but neither of us took notes. I will group his observations by topic, even though the comments in some cases were interspersed in our conversation in a different order. Both of us made clear at the outset, and reiterated occasionally, that we were not speaking on the basis of instructions but were conveying informally our own personal views of the various topics that came up.

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primarily to deal with issues related to the Party Congress, but also possibly for "organizational changes." This means that both Zagladin and Gorbachev will be tied up Tuesday, and Zagladin leaves for the SI meeting in Vienna on Wednesday. However, he thought he might have some sort of reaction next week.

I told him that I thought the President felt that private consultations could be useful across the board of the various issues facing us. Frankly, we are having some problem determining just what Gorbachev's aims are, and this makes it difficult to make sure that our own moves are given the connotations we intend. The President wants their meeting in Geneva to achieve as much as it can, yet it seems to us that the Soviet approach is still largely propagandistic. But we don't want to jump to negative conclusions. The President genuinely wants to start solving some problems, and if some private consultation will help, he is all for it. As for the idea of having representatives consult quietly between sessions in Geneva, I said that this was an interesting idea and that I would pass it on to you, but refrained from either encouraging or discouraging it. Menshikov said that he understood perfectly, and indeed was not making a concrete proposal, only floating an idea.

Menshikov then asked whether we could use Dobrynin as Kissinger had; this had worked in the past and they were not sure why we opposed it now. (He added that he was not arguing for this arrangement; he only wanted to be in a position to explain why we did not find it satisfactory.) I told him that I doubted that we could accept Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor. For us it was a matter of reciprocity and of insuring that the communication is as direct as possible. The principle of reciprocity would require us to insist that Hartman have the same access to Soviet decision makers as Dobrynin does with ours. But we also see utility in having persons who occupy roughly comparable positions in the decision-making process on each side talk directly. This could speed up communication and permit greater frankness, informality and confidentiality.

[NOTE: I did not at the time know of Gorbachev's letter -- which was delivered to Woessner after Menshikov had left. He did not refer to it directly, but I believe his question about Dobrynin stemmed from his knowledge that they were likely to make this proposal and also realized that it probably would not be acceptable to us.]

Menshikov asked who on our side might be in a position to conduct such a dialogue. I told him that this had not been decided; that we would try to find an appropriate counterpart if Gorbachev is interested and indicates whom he would like to use. I added that, in my personal view, there are several U.S. officials who might be used. Regarding arms control, Nitze is the obvious candidate. As for the other issues, persons like Ridgway, Palmer and myself are sufficiently close to the policy-making process

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and sufficiently discreet to be used in the process if so designated. Menshikov commented that "for some reason" some Soviet officials were negatively disposed toward Palmer, but he didn't know why or whether the view was held strongly enough to make any difference. (I told him that any negative view of Palmer is quite mistaken; he is honest, discreet and genuinely committed to solving problems if we can.)

Menshikov also asked how such contacts could be arranged logistically, in order to minimize the number of persons who are witting. I suggested that, if the idea was approved on both sides, Geneva might be an appropriate locale since officials on both sides have good reasons to visit there periodically in advance of the meeting. He agreed that this seemed the most workable arrangement.

As we were discussing these matters, Menshikov apologized for the snafus in the past. Regarding the Scowcroft mission last year, he said that Zagladin thought he had it wired, but that when Gromyko was approached, he put the kabosh on it. Gromyko also turned down the proposal for special representatives on arms control. Chernenko, he said, was unwilling or unable to assert himself on these matters, but "things are different now." Gorbachev, he claimed, understands the utility of direct communication and is eager to do something. Gromyko is now out of the picture. Though Gorbachev works closely with Shevardnadze and will doubtless keep him in the loop personally, they both understand that these communications cannot work through the MFA bureaucracy.

Before we parted, Menshikov asked how we should communicate if Gorbachev decides to name someone for an authorized contact. I told him that, so far as I am concerned, it would be all right just to telephone me and suggest that someone meet a specified person at a specified time and place. I would then undertake to get a prompt reply as to whether it is possible and if so who would come. I gave him both my office and home telephone numbers. Regarding possible contacts during the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, he suggested that we might consider using Wayne Andreas' apartment there. I told him that we considered Andreas reliable and discreet and that I would pass on the idea.

### The Issues

Most of our conversation was devoted to a tour d'horizon of the various issues before us. In the interstices, Menshikov made several comments regarding Soviet actions and motivations for recent actions. I will describe these first, then summarize his comments on the issues. (Mine followed our usual talking points, except as noted.)

### Current Soviet Assessment

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I asked Menshikov early on what Gorbachev's aims are for the meeting. He said, without hesitation, "He wants to achieve something. Something significant. But we wonder what the President wants." I assured him that the President was dead serious about making as much progress as possible, but that we really felt we were getting conflicting signals from them.

Menshikov observed that "some may think" that, because Gorbachev is likely to be around for a long time, he is playing a waiting game, but we should understand that this is not the case. He knows a lot needs to be done and is not the sort to procrastinate; this is contrary to his entire nature. I replied that, as a matter of fact, Arbatov's people were putting out just such a rationale: that Gorbachev is in a position to outwait the President and deal with his successors. I cautioned that this would be a major and fundamental mistake on their part, since any American President who might be inclined to settle for less than President Reagan simply wouldn't be able to deliver. Menshikov said that he hoped we did not consider Georgy Arbatov as an authoritative spokesman. I said that, as a matter of fact, we thought of him more as a propagandist than a policy maker. Menshikov said, "Then you have an accurate picture. That is precisely his role."

Menshikov said that Shevardnadze had been pleased with his meeting with the President (not that he liked everything said), and had reported his favorable impression of the President to Gorbachev and the Politburo. Gorbachev's answers to Dan Rather's questions in Paris were designed to convey this to us, and they hoped we noticed. [I don't have a transcript at hand, but Menshikov said that Gorbachev said twice that the meeting left a good impression.]

In response to Secretary Shultz's private comments to Shevardnadze in Helsinki (about the need to improve the atmosphere and minimize the rhetoric) orders have gone out to the Soviet media not to criticize the President personally. (Menshikov added that this was very sensitive and that he should under no circumstances be quoted as saying it.) He added that if we see an exception or two it will be because not everyone got the word; if, however, attacks resume we will know that the orders have been changed.

#### Arms Control

Menshikov's approach to these issues, as to the others, was not in the spirit of debating, but of questioning as to whether this or that approach would work. His more significant comments were as follows:

SDI: Gorbachev knows that the President will not "give up" SDI, and this is not required. But he must have some assurance, other than verbal ones, that SDI will not be used to complement a US first strike capability. Defining the line between research

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and the rest might be one possibility, he suggested (to which I gave no encouragement), but there could be other approaches. The main thing is that Gorbachev has to persuade the Soviet military that SDI is not a threat. (Menshikov implied, but did not directly state, that Gorbachev is not really persuaded that it is a threat -- at least not for a decade or so. He accepted my comments about the Soviet program and the absurdity of their accusing us of breaking agreements when they were doing the same research without demur.)

START: The Soviets know that much of their present proposal will not be acceptable to us. It is a negotiating position, and a conscious effort was made to include elements which will accord with the President's position. These include cuts up to 50% -- a major change in the Soviet position -- as well as limits on warheads and the principle of sublimits. We should consider these as "building blocks" from which we can pick and choose and rearrange to our liking. The important thing is to use some of them.

The Soviets recognize that we are particularly concerned about the heavy ICBM's. These can be cut, and cut substantially, if we go about it in the right way. We have to start with agreeing on some elements: e.g., 50%, etc., and then work toward the others. If we start with focussing on the heavies, the Soviet military will freeze the process. They don't want to give up anything. We have to use the negotiations to ratchet the numbers into the proper relationship.

When I pointed out the retrograde elements in the Soviet proposal, particularly the inclusion of all types of nuclear weapons in the same category, our INF weapons but not theirs, counting carrier-based aircraft, etc., Menshikov said, in effect, that they had no expectation of reaching an agreement on this basis. It is simply a negotiating ploy. Obviously, he said, if we can reach a separate agreement on INF, this question will be removed from START. As for the rest, it is negotiable.

Menshikov observed that he really couldn't predict what the Soviets would agree to as a bottom line. The important thing is that Gorbachev is in a mood to negotiate, and if the U.S. wants to proceed, it will make another proposal, using some elements of the Soviet proposal, so Gorbachev can present this as acceptance of some elements of the Soviet position and thus keep things moving.

INF: Menshikov claimed that the offer to negotiate with the British and French was not designed to "split the Allies" as had been alleged. (He observed that they knew well what the British and French positions are.) Instead, it was designed as a preliminary move to justify reaching a deal with us on INF. When I expressed some skepticism, he explained that Gorbachev could justify a deal with the U.S. if the offer to negotiate some time in the future with the British and French was on the table. That

would provide a rationale for excluding British and French systems from START (he admitted that they are strategic systems, and that they are not dedicated to NATO defense). A deal with the US would be possible if some compensation for British and French systems is permitted. I told him that I personally thought this is a non-starter; I didn't see how we could allow any compensation. He said that this could be the ultimate sticking point, then. It was the major thing they had against the walk-in-the-woods formula. He then explained that they are prepared to wait for negotiations with the British and French until after we have achieved radical reductions, in the order of 50%, but that they feel they will have no negotiating leverage at that time unless there is some compensation now for the British and French systems.

However, he said repeatedly that a separate deal on INF is possible, and he wondered if we should not think about the possibility of coming up with a general formula that could be agreed to at the Geneva meeting. He implied that this could be the "major achievement" Gorbachev is looking for. He also stated that some formula that would produce a moratorium on further NATO deployments in return for a reduction of the SS-20's could be very attractive. [I listened, but gave no encouragement to this idea. It is in fact an element in an idea Glitman has been thinking about.]

Nuclear Testing:

Menshikov pressed hard on this issue, claiming that Gorbachev had overruled the Soviet military on the issue and therefore had a lot at stake. He said that the main object is to get a handle on unbridled "modernization" in the future. (I, of course, pointed out the one-sided impact at present.) He observed that the Soviet position on verification is not set in concrete; much more could be done here if we approach it in the framework of a goal of eliminating testing sometime in the future. Without that, they just don't see the point, and feel that any threshold is going to be harder to verify than a CTB. Also, he said, if the U.S. is willing to discuss ways to limit qualitative improvements from some point in the future (i.e., implicitly allowing for completion of current programs), this would be well received and could lead to some progress on the testing issue. [I gave him no encouragement that movement is possible in this area unless we tackle the verification issue first; his argument is that they just cannot agree to that without at least a commitment to try to negotiate something more. But he did ask several questions regarding our current proposal, which still seems not to be thoroughly understood.]

Terrorism

Menshikov raised the issue, asking whether the President would be interested in some agreement to cooperate in this area. I said I thought he would, depending of course on the nature of the

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proposal. He replied that he thought Gorbachev would be interested. [We did not pursue the matter further; the Soviets have been leery of this in the past, but it is possible that their attitude is changing. The kidnapping of their people in Lebanon may have had some impact on their thinking; I also note that they have made a remarkably favorable public statement regarding our interception of the Egyptian aircraft -- probably considered "payment" for our public statements when their people were kidnapped, but also possibly indicative of some change in policy.]

### Regional Issues

I pointed out to Menshikov that there are many issues other than arms control which are on the agenda, and gave the standard pitch regarding the importance of the regional ones. He asked which ones might be good candidates for some constructive discussion at the Geneva meeting. I said that, of course, Afghanistan would be high on our list, and asked what the Soviet aim is there. Menshikov said simply, "We want out. Are you willing to help?" I said that depended upon what "help" meant, but yes, we would do what we reasonably could to make it easy for them -- meaning that we would give whatever commitments they needed that we would not use Afghanistan to their detriment if they left. He asked if we could accept Babrak Karmal, and I said it wasn't up to us to accept or reject him; we wanted no role in choosing the Afghan government. That had to be done by the Afghans, and in a way that the refugees could return.

### Bilateral Issues

Menshikov said that they had noted the President's comments on expanding contacts. To my surprise, he said that this had made a favorable impression, and he thought Gorbachev would be attracted by such ideas as expanding student exchanges and the like. [We shall see.]

### Human Rights

I made clear to him the importance of this issue. He said that we could expect some movement, but it was still difficult for them. He noted their private negotiations with the Jewish leaders, and said that emigration would rise somewhat as the result of that, but not to expect too much right now. As for divided spouses, he was sure this could be solved if the President made a private appeal to Gorbachev. "Everyone has to admit you have a legitimate interest in these cases," he said. As for Shcharansky, he felt that a deal could be struck if the proper "trade" could be arranged. I made clear to him that, without movement in this area, a lot of other things were going to be hung up.

### Trade

He asked if there could be any discussion of trade at the Geneva meeting. I said that we didn't exclude the possibility, but frankly what could be done would be heavily dependent on solution of the human rights problems. If they want to talk about this directly and privately, fine. We'll try to specify what we mean. If they don't want to talk about it, we'll try to respond appropriately to private moves on their part. He said he would check out the question and see if there is interest.

Future Summits

Menshikov asked if the President would like to establish a regular pattern of meetings in the future. I told him I had not heard the President discuss the matter and did not know how he felt about the question. He said that some officials were saying that regular meetings would be a good idea. I allowed that this is possible, but reiterated that I really did not know how the President regarded the question.

COMMENT:

I don't have time tonight to provide detailed commentary, but Menshikov is either engaged in a massive disinformation effort, or else the folks in the Central Committee Secretariat are really casting about for ways to "achieve something" at the meeting.

Just after we parted, I learned that TASS had accepted the interview. This is really unprecedented. Maybe the guy over there is more serious than we suspected.

We now have the letter proposing Dobrynin for a channel. I would suggest that we accept with the proviso that Hartman will deliver our messages and ask for an interlocutor to be designated. (I would suggest Ridgway or Armacost for Dobrynin.) Then, if Zagladin sends a message requesting a private meeting, we should respond on that track as well. Should keep everybody happy so long as the key players are kept informed.



JM-C 23

7747

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for C. William Verity, Jr.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins forwarding the State Department's draft text of a congratulatory message to C. William Verity, Jr. I have reviewed and concur with the text. Also attached for your information are background materials on the matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Anne Higgins at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Anne Higgins

- Tab A Draft Presidential message to C. William Verity, Jr.
- Tab B Martin to Platt memo of October 3 requesting draft message.
- Tab C Matlock to Martin memo suggesting message be drafted.
- Tab D Higgins to Martin memo requesting NSC review and advice on proposed Verity message.
- Tab E Ryan to Higgins memo requesting message be sent to Verity.
- Tab F Invitation to President and Mrs. Reagan to attend dinner honoring Verity.



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7747

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for C. William Verity, Jr.

We have reviewed and concur with the State Department's draft Presidential message at Tab A honoring C. William Verity, Jr.

Attachment:

Tab A Draft Presidential Message





S/S 8529646 27

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 7747

October 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Message - October 17 Dinner Honoring  
C. William Verity, Jr.

In response to your request of October 3, we are forwarding a suggested message from the President to C. William Verity, former co-chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, on the occasion of his receipt of the Citizen Exchange Council's annual award.

*Nicholas Platt*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As Stated.

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Dear Bill:

I want to offer my sincere congratulations and best wishes upon your receipt of the Citizen Exchange Council's annual award. Your record as a leader of the American business community has been an outstanding one. I am very grateful for your service to this Administration as a member of the Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives and as chairman of the PSI Advisory Council. Your work, as co-Chairman of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, to encourage mutually beneficial, non-strategic trade between the U.S. and the Soviet Union deserves particular mention. I support these efforts and believe that such trade can bring us important economic benefits as well as assist us in attempting to establish a more constructive U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship.

Ronald Reagan



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7747

October 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message - October 17 Dinner  
Honoring C. William Verity, Jr.

The President wishes to send a message of tribute to C. William Verity, Jr., former co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, who is being honored at a dinner benefitting the Citizen Exchange Council on October 17 in New York. Mr. Verity will receive CEC's annual award in recognition of his work toward encouraging better U.S.-Soviet relations through trade. He is a personal friend of the President and served on the original Task Force on the Private Sector Initiatives program and was Chairman of the PSI Advisory Council. Soviet Ambassadors Dobrynin and Troyanovsky will be "distinguished guests" at the dinner. Please have a draft message prepared and submitted to my office by Friday, October 4.

  
William F. Martin  
Executive Secretary





ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SIGNED

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Tribute to  
C. William Verity, Jr.

We think it would be helpful for the President to send a message of tribute to C. William Verity, Jr.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at TAB I to State.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Judyt Mandel *JM* and Bud Korengold *BK* concur.

Attachments

- TAB I Memo to Platt
- TAB II Memo from Higgins
- TAB III Memo from Ryan
- TAB IV Letter from Citizen Exchange Council



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN, NSC


SUBJECT: Presidential Message for Tribute to WILLIAM VERITY  
by the Citizen Exchange Council, NYC, OCTOBER 17

I would appreciate NSC review and advice on the attached request from Fred Ryan.

The President and First Lady were invited to attend the above event, but this was declined. Fred Ryan has asked that a message be sent -- though one was not specifically requested. As you know, Bill Verity, former head of ARMCO Steel, is a friend of the President and served on the original Task Force on the Private Sector Initiatives program and then as first Chairman of the PSI Advisory Council.

This event honors Verity's efforts to further US-USSR relations through his service as Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, 1973-1984. The Citizen Exchange Council, which is sponsoring this event, was set up in 1962 to promote better US-USSR relations (Averill Harriman is the Honorary Chairman.). USSR Ambassadors Dobrynin and Troyanovsky will be there as "distinguished guests." No messages have been sent to the Council in past years.

If NSC feels a message would be helpful at this time, my staff will be happy to assist -- but I think State ought to provide the initial draft because the text would focus solely on Verity's efforts to promote trade relations with the USSR over the last ten years and not on his PSI involvement.

Charles A. Donovan   
(for) ANNE HIGGINS

(ck)



Oct. 17  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1985


MEMORANDUM FOR: ANNE HIGGINS  
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter - October 17 Dinner Honoring  
C. William Verity, Jr.

We would like to request a Presidential letter be prepared in response to the attached correspondence.

As you know Mr. Verity is a long-time supporter and personal friend of President and Mrs. Reagan, so there is much that can be said in the letter. We would like, however, for the letter to include something about Mr. Verity's outstanding efforts on behalf of the President's private sector initiatives program. He served on the original Task Force on PSI, the subsequent Advisory Council on PSI, and will be appointed to our newly created Board of Advisors (this appointment will not be announced until sometime in October).

Please have the letter sent to Nancy Wilson, room 134. She will arrange delivery to the appropriate person.

Thank you for your assistance.



11/19/85



# Citizen Exchange Council

18 East 41st Street  
New York, NY 10017 (212) 889-7960

June 14, 1985

## Dinner Honoring C. William Verity, Jr. October 17, 1985

The Honorable W. Averell Harriman  
*Honorary Chairman*

Robert H. Knight  
*Chairman*

Jane K. Lombard  
*Chairman, Citizen Exchange Council*

- scheduling*
- Benefit Committee**  
 Mr. Robert O. Anderson  
*Atlantic Richfield*  
 Sandra Carter  
*Sandra Carter Productions*  
 The Honorable Gerald R. Ford  
 Mr. Michael V. Forrester  
*Shearman & Sterling*  
 Mr. James H. Giffen  
*Merrator Corporation and  
The US-USSR Trade and Economic Council*  
 Mr. Claus M. Halle  
*The Coca Cola Export Corporation*  
 Mr. Amory Houghton, Jr.  
*Corning Glass Works*  
 The Honorable Juanita M. Kreps  
 Mrs. Paul Laxalt  
 Mr. Richard D. Lombard  
 Mr. John J. Murphy  
*Dresser Industries*  
 Mr. William F. Ragan  
*Ragan & Mason*  
 Mr. Burnell R. Roberts  
*Mead Corporation*  
 Mr. David Rockefeller  
 Mr. Laurance S. Rockefeller  
 Mr. Robert V. Roosa  
*Brown Brothers Harriman*  
 Ruth A. Roosa  
 Mr. Erwin A. Salk  
*Salk, Ward and Suik*  
 Mr. Alexander B. Trowbridge  
*National Association of Manufacturers*  
 Grace Kennan Warnecke

List incomplete

- Distinguished Guests**  
 His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin  
*Ambassador of the USSR to the United States*  
 Mrs. Dobrynin  
 His Excellency Oleg A. Troyanovsky  
*Permanent Representative of the USSR  
to the United Nations*  
 Mrs. Troyanovsky

- Contributors**  
 American Express Philanthropic Services  
 Archer Daniels Midland Foundation  
 Corning Glass Works Foundation  
 The Honorable C. Douglas Dillon  
 Mr. David Rockefeller  
 Mr. Laurance S. Rockefeller  
 Mr. Robert C. Seamans  
 United Telecommunications  
 The Honorable Thomas J. Watson, Jr.

Dear Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan:

The Board of Trustees of Citizen Exchange Council and I are pleased to announce that C. William Verity, Jr., will receive CEC's annual award in recognition of his work toward encouraging better U.S.-Soviet relations through trade.

Bill was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ARMCO, Inc. from 1971 to 1982. He remains on the Board as Chairman of the Executive Committee. Until 1984, Bill served as Co-Chairman of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council. His interest and efforts in working for better trade relations between the two countries led to his selection as CEC's honoree.

Bill will receive his award at a dinner benefiting Citizen Exchange Council on October 17, 1985. The black tie dinner will be held at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The Benefit Committee and I want very much to make the evening a success; we hope you will plan to come. Formal invitations will be mailed in August, but I wanted to be sure you had enough advance notice to save the date. Your presence will be meaningful to Bill and your contribution a valuable asset to CEC's program.

Founded in 1962, CEC is nonpolitical and nonprofit. Its primary purpose is to promote better understanding between citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union. All proceeds from the dinner will be used to expand CEC's educational programs.

I hope you will agree to help with this special project — and help to make the evening special for Bill.

Sincerely,

Robert H. Knight

/cb  
Enclosures

"Trade brings immediate benefits to both parties in the form of jobs, improved living conditions — a better life. Throughout history, trade has been a builder of bridges. It forges understanding of each other's cultures. It requires negotiations. It allows for the shaking of a hand — as one's word."

C. William Verity, Jr.

md



The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_ 39

7928

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Received SS

File

OCT 16 11 0 52

October 15, 1985

MATLOCK

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Memo from Sam Pierce

Issue

To review the attached memo from Sam Pierce.

Facts

Sam Pierce has just returned from a trip to the Soviet Union during which he renewed the US/USSR Agreement on Housing and Other Construction.

Discussion

Sam's memo provides a full readout on his impressions from the trip. He found his Soviet hosts extremely cooperative, and feels that there are areas in which we can learn from Soviet construction techniques. He concludes that it should be possible to negotiate further construction agreements of benefit to both countries.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>
<u><i>RC</i></u>	_____

That you read the attached memo from Sam Pierce.

*We should give him his meeting.  
RR*

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Pierce

cc Vice President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

**SIGNED**

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Memo to the President from Secretary Pierce

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding a memo from Secretary Pierce on his recent trip to the Soviet Union. Pierce renewed the US/USSR Agreement on Housing and Other Construction, which provides for a technical exchange program through June, 1989.

*SRS* Steve Sestanovich and *Jm* Judyt Mandel concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *h*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Pierce

**CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM**

Date: October 3, 1985 Number: 175569CA Due By: --

Subject: Memo from Secretary Pierce to the President regarding the renewal of the US/USSR Agreement on Housing

	Action	FYI		Action	FYI
<b>ALL CABINET MEMBERS</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>CEA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vice President	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>CEQ</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
State	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>OSTP</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Defense	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justice	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Commerce	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>McFarlane (ORIG &amp; INAL)</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Svahn</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HHS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Chew (For WH Staffing)</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HUD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Energy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Chief of Staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
UN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
			<b>Executive Secretary for:</b>		
<b>GSA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>DPC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>EPA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>EPC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>NASA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>OPM</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>VA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>SBA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**REMARKS:**

The attached is forwarded for appropriate action.

Thanks.

**RETURN TO:**

Alfred H. Kingon  
Cabinet Secretary  
456-2823  
(Ground Floor, West Wing)

Don Clarey  
 Ed Stucky  
 Rick Davis

Associate Director  
Office of Cabinet Affairs  
456-2800 (Room 129, OEOB)



THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20410

Received SS

1985 OCT -3 PM 7:47

September 30, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I returned last week from the Soviet Union where I completed the renewal of the US/USSR Agreement on Housing and Other Construction you called for in 1984. The Protocol I signed provides for a cooperative technical exchange program through June, 1989, in six working areas with a total of 18 projects. Involved with HUD are GSA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Science Foundation and the Forest Service.

My Soviet counterpart, Sergey V. Bashilov, Chairman of the USSR State Building Committee (GOSSTROY), is seen as an influential person in the Soviet government, with construction a large component of their national budget. He is a member of the Council of Ministers and Candidate Member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. I would like to give you an oral report at your convenience this week, but some key points are summarized here for your review.

I had two goals for the trip, both of which were fulfilled. One was insuring we benefit as much as the Soviets from the Agreement. Their focus is on massive concrete structures, with design ideas generally behind us. However, in our site visits we saw that we can learn from them in several areas such as hydropower dams, wastewater technology, and building in earthquake prone areas and cold regions.

The second goal was to encourage the inclusion of commercial activities under the Agreement, first proposed by the Soviets at a preparatory meeting in May. Consequently, I took with me six key representatives of US industry.

It is worth noting the Soviets went to great pains to be cooperative, making arrangements on short notice for meetings requested by our businessmen. We expect several commercial ideas to be followed up by the Soviets. Some of the industry representatives anticipate follow up meetings with the Soviets, and two of their processes have already been written into our Protocol.

I consider the trip to have been very successful.


The importance the Soviets placed on the signing of this Agreement was indicated by the sustained high-level attention they gave to us and the coverage by the state-controlled media. We got brief, but solid, straightforward reports in the national papers, Pravda and Izvestia, and the international English-language Moscow News, and most important, the signing ceremony was given nationwide TV coverage.

My sense, both from the high level of attention and cooperation given us by the Soviets and from the site visits we made in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa, is that solving their housing needs is central to their long range goals.

With so much housing stock devastated in WWII, the construction sector has been central to the Soviet economic plans and government budget allocations. They have done well in volume and poorly in quality. Their building deficiencies have affected the whole of Soviet life, and now there is a political level of awareness of the need to do better. While there is some defensiveness about their material accomplishments, given widespread poor manufacturing and construction practices, they are frank about their shortcomings. Consequently, they are open to innovation and international cooperation in this area and this Agreement is important to them.

WWII, with its 20 million death toll affecting every Soviet family, had an impact on the physical environment and the psychological character of Soviet society that cannot be overestimated. People everywhere, young and old, are genuinely fearful at the prospects of war and attach great importance to their past heroic defense of the motherland. Patriotism is deep in all sectors, with much pride taken in the rebuilding of their cities.

Years of Soviet political propaganda seem not to have daunted the desire of Soviet technicians and citizens to work with their American counterparts. These kind of cooperative exchange agreements seem to tap a part of Soviet society we appear to miss in most of our official channels. My general impression, both from the frankness of discussion of their internal problems and the businesslike and cooperative attitude in negotiations, is that housing and other construction are areas in which it is certainly possible to reach agreements beneficial to both countries.

Respectfully,  
  
Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.

cc: Honorable Donald T. Regan

FILE 44

RECEIVED 30 SEP 85 21

TO MCFARLANE FROM STEVENS, TED

DOCDATE 20 SEP 85

KEYWORDS: USSR  
MP

MCO

STEVENS, TED  
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: NOTE TO MCFARLANE FM SEN STEVENS RE PRES MTG W/ GORBACHEV

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 03 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SABLE

STEINER

HALL

SMALL

THOMPSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DR )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Km</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>10/8</i>	<i>10/12</i>	
	<i>C</i>	<i>10/15</i>		<i>Jm, KS, SS, WH</i>

DISPATCH *[Signature]* W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

45

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1985

*Reader*

Dear Senator Stevens:


Thank you for forwarding the letter that your wife recently received from Women for a Meaningful Summit. I appreciated the opportunity to review their ideas on possible areas of agreement in Geneva.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

*Buel*

Robert C. McFarlane



The Honorable Ted Stevens  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Letter for Senator Stevens

Attached at Tab I is a letter from you to Senator Ted Stevens thanking him for providing you with materials from a group calling itself Women for a Meaningful Summit. The material was originally sent to Mrs. Stevens, and the Senator asked that it be brought to your attention.

According to the group's letter (Tab A), a delegation of prominent American women is planning to go to Geneva while the President is there in November to lobby for, among other things, a "comprehensive test ban treaty" involving the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. A copy of the organization's detailed statement of objectives is attached at Tab B.

Ron Sable, *R.S.* Karina Small, and Steve Steiner concur. *Steve*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Senator Stevens.

Approve  \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I	Letter to Senator Stevens
Tab A	Letter from Women for a Meaningful Summit
Tab B	Statement from Women for a Meaningful Summit
Tab C	Endorsement and Participation Form - Women for a Meaningful Summit





7791  
SEP 25 1985  
Sue  
47

September 20, 1985

Mrs Ted Stevens  
Us Senate Sh522  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mrs Stevens:

The leaders of the Superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union - will hold an historic Summit Meeting in Geneva, Switzerland November 19th - 20th, 1985. This Summit, the first between US President Ronald Reagan and a Soviet leader, USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, in this decade, is a most significant opportunity for the US and USSR to reverse the arms race and improve relations and cooperation between the two nations. Both leaders will be challenged to strengthen their nations' mutual security - and the security of all nations - by immediately resuming negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to end all nuclear explosions.

Prominent women and women's organizations have joined in ad hoc coalition, urging President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to seize this opportunity and take real, concrete steps to reverse the nuclear arms race. On behalf of the coalition, Women for a Meaningful Summit, we would like to invite you to join us and a national delegation of prominent women traveling to Geneva from November 17th - 21st to personally express this important message.

The delegation will convey this message to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in the following ways:

- \* meetings with the Superpower leaders and/or senior members of both governments, at which time the enclosed Statement and petition, which have been endorsed internationally, will be formally presented;
- \* smaller delegation visits with ambassadors of other nations which have Geneva consulates;
- \* a series of issue and press briefing sessions with national and international media;
- \* briefing and information exchange sessions with delegations of prominent women from other nations; and
- \* the "tying" of The Ribbon at a symbolic Geneva landmark.

Vera Kistiakowsky  
Vera Kistiakowsky

LaDonna Harris  
LaDonna Harris

Pat Schroeder  
Hon. Patricia Schroeder

Coretta Scott King  
Coretta Scott King

Helen Caldicott  
Hellen Caldicott

Betty Bumpers  
Betty Bumpers

Bella Abzug  
Bella Abzug

Barbara Boxer  
Hon. Barbara Boxer

Jane Alexander  
Jane Alexander

Frances T. Farenthold  
Frances T. Farenthold



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## STATEMENT

We call upon United States President Ronald Reagan and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to approach the November Summit Meeting in Geneva as a most significant opportunity to reverse the arms race and improve relations and cooperation between the two nations.

As women and members of the world community, we look to this Summit for substantive results. We speak for our children and future generations. It is unconscionable that spending on the arms race consumes more and more of the world's resources, while basic human needs go unmet. We view the increasing militarization of the world and the threat of an arms race in space as unacceptable.

The United States and the Soviet Union should together proclaim verifiable, mutual moratoriums on the testing of nuclear warheads on earth and the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space.

We urge the United States and the Soviet Union to pledge to resume, immediately upon the adjournment of the Summit, negotiations with Great Britain for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is a realistic goal because the framework for such a Treaty, including plans for verification, has already been established. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can prevent the build-up of dangerous new weapons and create a climate for eventual nuclear disarmament.

The Summit is an opportunity for both leaders to show their true concern by implementing the above recommendations, and using alternative approaches to peacefully obtain global security.

9/85



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ENDORSEMENT & PARTICIPATION FORM

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_ Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_ City/State: \_\_\_\_\_

Zip Code: \_\_\_\_\_ Phone: (o) ( ) \_\_\_\_\_ (h) ( ) \_\_\_\_\_

A. ENDORSEMENT OF STATEMENT

- \_\_\_ 1) I will endorse the Statement:
  - \_\_\_ a) as an individual (with organization listed for identification purposes only)
  - \_\_\_ b) as an individual (without organization affiliation)
  - \_\_\_ c) for my organization
- \_\_\_ 2) I am unable to endorse the Statement

B. GENEVA DELEGATION

- \_\_\_ 1) I will be a member of the Geneva delegation
- \_\_\_ 2) I am unable to be a member of the Geneva delegation

C. MEDIA

- \_\_\_ 1) I am available to represent the delegation for the press (check appropriate letters):
  - \_\_\_ a) radio \_\_\_ b) television \_\_\_ c) print
  - \_\_\_ d) local \_\_\_ e) national
- \_\_\_ 2) I am unavailable to speak with the press

D. FUNDRAISING

- \_\_\_ 1) I am able to make a tax-deductible contribution to Women for a Meaningful Summit. Amount enclosed: \$ \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_ 2) I can help raise monies the following way(s):
  - \_\_\_ a) suggest individuals who may contribute
  - \_\_\_ b) use my name on fundraising invitations
  - \_\_\_ c) hold a fundraising meeting in my home or office
- \_\_\_ 3) I am unable to assist with raising monies

Please return this form by October 1, 1985 to Women for a Meaningful Summit, 1201 16th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20036; 202/822-7492. This form needs to be on file for public use of your name with the Statement.

7791

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

FRP

Bud -

Sen. Stevens asked that  
this be brought to your  
attention.

Sam J.

Staff to  
Marty  
Sable  
Stemmy  
Smully

SEEN