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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (1/12)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1110

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7867	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE STRATEGIC STABILITY COMMISSION <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	10/1/1985	B1
7868	MEMO	PROPOSED SDI COMMISSION <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7869	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE JORDAN PROPOSAL FOR PRE-GENEVA-MEETING CONFERENCE AT CSIS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/1/1985	B1
7870	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	10/2/1985	B1
7871	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GORBACHEV'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1985 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7872	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PEARCE/GREEN INITIATIVE ON RENUNCIATION OF WAR <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	10/2/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (1/12)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1110

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7873	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PEARCE/GREEN INITIATIVE ON RENUNCIATION OF WAR <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 3/27/2007

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (1/12)

FOIA

F01-061

Box Number 11

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
A MEMO	LEHMAN/LINHARD/MATLOCK/FORTIER/ STEINER/MANDEL/SESTANOVICH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE [5-6]	2	10/1/1985	<i>opened 05/14/2007 jk</i>

JM-e

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 1, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Strategic Stability Commission

Attached at Tab A is a hypothetical commission worked out primarily on the basis of suggestions by Tom Johnson. Clearly the orientation is more toward insuring rational acquisition and program decisions than a strategic overview. Your thoughts on reshaping the panel to serve as a forum for developing broader strategic concepts is an excellent one and would result in a somewhat different composition (E.E. Foster would not be the best chairman of such a panel--maybe Goodpaster).

The primary function of this panel could be to review and define the future role of defensive systems in a new deterrent strategy. As such it would focus its efforts on defining the optimum manner of assuring strategic stability to the end of the century and beyond. As residual tasks the panel could review the state of technical progress, the organization and management of the strategic defense program and the strategic concepts that will guide our transition from a reliance on offensive retaliation to an integrated offensive-defensive mix.

These are only preliminary thoughts. We need to get Tom down to talk with Bud, and Bob Linhard, on these ideas. As you noted, we need to have this panel in existence before November.

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed SDI Commission

PS - Tama will be here Thursday and Friday (Oct 3-4).

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/3 #7867

BY CW NARA DATE 10/31/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

2



PROPOSED SDI COMMISSION

Chairman, John S. Foster, Jr.

Vice President, TRW

Executive Secretary, Dr. LTC Thomas Johnson

Director, Science Research Lab, USMA

Scientists

Political/Government

Strategic Elite

Alvin Tribblepiece
Director, Energy
Research, DOE

Paul Nitze
Department of State

Larry Gerschwin
NIO for Strategic
Programs

John Nuckolls
Assoc. Director
for Physics, LLL

Brent Scowcroft

Al Carnesale
Academic Dean
Kennedy School

Tomithy P. Coffey
Civilian Director
Naval Research Lab

Henry Kissinger

Sayre Stevens
President, Systems
Planning Corp.

Edward Teller
LLL

Norm Augustine
Martin-Marietta
Former Chairman, DSB

Konrad Longmire
Mission Research

William Perry
Former DDR&E

John M. Deutch
Provost, MIT

Arnold Horelick
RAND

Glenn Kent
RAND (LTG/USAF-Ret)

Paul Kaminsky
COL/USAF-Ret, Former
Stealth Pgm Mgr.

Andrew Goodpaster
Director, IDA

Colin Gray
President, Institute
for Public Policy

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 71413 7/28/8

BY CU NARA DATE 10/30/07

FILE 4
7808

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

October 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Jordan Proposal for Pre-Geneva-Meeting Conference at CSIS

Joe Jordan called to say that CSIS would like to sponsor a conference for 200-300 media people, academics (and foreign diplomats if we wish), to discuss prospects for the Geneva meeting.

The date he can get the auditorium is November 4. He wonders if you would be available to come to give a presentation and take questions (total time, about one hour). The conference itself would run from 3:00 to 5:30 and they would have another "expert" (or a panel of them) follow you. He feels that they can obtain excellent media coverage.

If you are not available at this time, Joe mentioned as an alternate, doing a similar conference after the Geneva meeting, to discuss the outcome and where we go from there.

I don't know what your calendar looks like for November 4, but I think this does represent a significant opportunity to get our story out. I would appreciate guidance on what to tell Jordan. (He needs a reply soon to make the arrangements.)

RECOMMENDATION

A) That you attend the November 4 meeting at CSIS if your calendar allows. *subject to change* 3 pm

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

B) Alternatively, if you are not available on November 4, that you attend a post Geneva meeting at CSIS.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

Concur; *JFM* Johnathan S. Miller

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD06-114/3# 7809

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

call Kamant
Wilma

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 7/1/02

~~SECRET~~

System II
91004

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1 October 1985

Jack Matthews
File

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: *Ra* R. LEHMAN/*Bob* R. LINHARD/*J.M.* J. MATLOCK/D. FORTIER/
Steve S. STEINER/*by SES* J. MANDEL/S. SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: Presidential Speeches & November Meeting

Per your instructions, we have reviewed approaches to a series of speeches by the President related to his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in November. Our recommendations are as follows:

(1) There should be no major Presidential addresses prior to the UNGA speech on October 24. The UNGA Speech should be our very best effort and should not be exclusively East/West but should contain a strong statement on US/Soviet relations especially regional security, human rights, and arms control. Nothing should be scheduled which would detract from this main event.

(2) The President, however, should use the Saturday radio addresses and other media events such as press conferences (one is being considered for mid-October) to repeat again and again a few basic themes in US-Soviet relations. This weekend's address got excellent coverage and played very well (demonstrating the value of NSC drafting). Saturday addresses before and after UNGA will be very useful. The first of these could focus primarily on arms control and the second on bilateral issues, while the UNGA speech could have considerable coverage of regional and human rights issues -- UNGA being a better forum for those issues prior to the Summit than a straight US-USSR speech.

(3) Both Secretary Shultz and you will have major addresses prior to the UNGA speech. Indeed, Secretary Shultz addresses the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco on NATO issues on October 14th and you speak there on SDI on October 15th. Also, you may have an address to a Swiss association on November 1. These speeches could play a key role in setting the stage and themselves should be carefully prepared and coordinated with our other efforts.

(4) We are preparing a notional schedule of events that could drive home some of the President's messages without requiring statements on major new substance at this time. An UNGA meeting with Afghan mujahidin leaders is one example; a photo opportunity with Mrs. Shcharanskiy would be another.

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

(5) The President should be seen as actively preparing for the November meeting and should have a number of sessions with members of Congress (bipartisan) and outside experts (Camp David Lunches, etc.), all showing broad and active participation and an effort to achieve bipartisanship. To supplement the major speeches, we will be working out a schedule of events, i.e. meetings, statements, to reflect our concern with the full range of issues to be addressed in Geneva, including human rights, regional, and bilateral issues.

(6) The President should also have a solid pre-departure statement setting the stage for his meeting with Gorbachev a few days before he leaves for Geneva. Our view is that he should not do this speech from Geneva. In addition, we are looking at an opportunity for him to make a speech after he meets with the Swiss President on November 18, perhaps at the University of Geneva. This, we believe, would not be a direct US/USSR speech, but one dealing with the common Swiss, European and American heritage of democracy and freedom.

(7) The style of the President's return and the post-meeting handling will be every bit as important as the advance work. Consideration is being given now to having the President immediately address a Joint Session of Congress the day he returns. We think this is a good idea as long as the logistics can be worked out.

Recommendation

That we begin implementation of the above plan for speeches, radio addresses, and events in its basic outline.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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~~SECRET~~

JM-c 1

7309

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter of Support for Your Santa Barbara Speech

Attached at Tab A is a response to a letter received from Professor Whittle Johnston of the University of Virginia. Professor Johnston wrote to you to express his support for your August 19 Santa Barbara speech.

gib
Ray Burghardt concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Response to Professor Johnston
- Tab B Letter from Professor Johnston



9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Professor Johnston:

Many thanks for your expression of support for my August 19 Santa Barbara speech. It is particularly gratifying to know that people in the academic community will be following up on the themes of that speech.

I also enjoyed reading your column from the Roanoke Times and World News on Nicaragua. It is precisely this kind of support that enables us to pursue a principled, long-term policy in Central America.

Again, many thanks for your letter.

Sincerely,

Professor Whittle Johnston
Woodrow Wilson Department
of Government and Foreign Affairs
232 Cabell Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901



SEP 10 1985

→ JFM
cek sb
7309
9-13-85

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22901
TELEPHONE 804-924-3192

WOODROW WILSON DEPARTMENT
OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
232 CABELL HALL

Sept. 6, 1985

RCM HAS SEEN

The Hon. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

I have just received from the State Department the text of your address on August 19 in Santa Barbara. I was deeply impressed by it, and encouraged that it helps set the tone for the forthcoming Summit. I found the way you framed the central issue particularly valuable, i.e. "what kinds of change would do the most to make Soviet-American relations more stable". I shall make use of the three military and three political issues you then discussed in my own lectures and writing on this subject. I shall certainly have my many students read your speech. In its directness, specificity, and strength it gives me sober encouragement.

I have also enclosed a little piece I did some months back in the on-going debate with the local press.

Sincerely yours,
Whittle Johnston
Whittle Johnston
Professor

Stop Reds in Nicaragua

By WHITTLE JOHNSTON

I AM IN fundamental disagreement with the arguments expressed in the Roanoke Times & World-News editorial, "Nicaragua: Emotions blur facts" on April 19.

This opposition to the president's policy will, I fear, do grave damage to our nation's interests.

Let me summarize the newspaper's major points:

1. "The president is seeking authority to overthrow the government of a neighboring country with which the United States is not at war." The editorial describes this as "contrary to international law, to U.S. law and to our national principles."

2. The president's most recent proposals are "a maneuver intended to gain sanction for continuing the fighting" after 60 days. The editorial maintains that most Latin Americans see the contras as nothing more than "a surrogate U.S. force" that holds no territory and has not won "many hearts and minds outside the Reagan administration."

3. Many congressmen cast wary eyes on the president's proposals for fear that the proposals could justify another Vietnam war.

4. What the administration wants to do in Nicaragua is "ill-advised, illegal and immoral." Congress should say "No more."

Argument 1 neglects the tyrannical and aggressive action of the Sandinistas to which the president's policy is a response. Support for the Nicaraguan revolution by neighboring states and the Organization of American States (OAS) in its resolution of June 23, 1979, played important parts in the overthrow of the Somoza regime. In return for this support, the Sandinistas pledged to back free elections, political pluralism, a mixed economy and nonalignment. From the moment they acquired power, however, they have systematically violated all these pledges. The persistent goal of the president has been to hold the Sandinistas to their promises, and surely this is in accord with America's commitment to democracy and self-determination.

The most blatant aspect of Sandinista illegality has been their com-

mitment to a "revolution without borders," and the most threatening instance has been their backing of violent efforts to overthrow the democratically elected government of El Salvador.

The Salvadoran guerrillas themselves have acknowledged this support from the Sandinistas. Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, the United States was obligated to take measures to end the armed attack against El Salvador. Our aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, is in accord with these obligations.

The political manipulation by Nicaragua of the World Court over the mining as a sorry instance of how the enemies of liberty may use the institutions of liberty to undermine the prospects of liberty. America could be brought before that court only if it voluntarily accepted its compulsory jurisdiction. Eleven of the 16 justices that claimed to sit in judgment on the United States represented countries that, like Nicaragua, did not themselves accept such jurisdiction. To allow Nicaragua to sue where it could not be sued would have been a violation, not a confirmation, of the rule of law.

Argument 2 omits the widespread evidence in support of the popular base of the contra opposition. As one instance, many key leaders of the opposition (e.g. Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora) are themselves former Sandinista backers who broke with them when the Sandinistas betrayed the revolution. As another instance, Huber Matos, a seasoned Cuban freedom fighter, recently traveled with the rebel forces in Nicaragua and confirmed their mass popularity. He reported that they constantly met farmers who wanted to join their ranks.

The congressmen whose fears were cited in Argument 3 of the editorial draw precisely the wrong lesson from the Vietnam war. The president and his chief commanders have made clear, repeatedly, their concern for avoiding direct American military involvement in Central America. They see materiel and diplomatic support to indigenous Ni-

caraguan freedom fighters as essential to avoid that involvement. If such indigenous forces should collapse, however, the risk of direct American involvement would sharply increase, as Secretary Shultz made clear last Feb. 22.

Another crucial lesson we all should have learned from Vietnam is that those who rule out the role of force simultaneously undercut the prospects for negotiation. Those congressmen who have tied the president's hands can expect only one "diplomatic" outcome: negotiated capitulation.

With regard to Argument 4, the House of Representatives has acted in accord with the advice of the Roanoke Times & World-News and said "no more." On April 24, it defeated the president's proposal by 240 to 180. On April 25 it defeated a Republican alternative by 215 to 213. Had the two Virginia congressmen (James Olin, D-Roanoke, and Frederick Boucher, D-Abingdon) who voted no on the second proposal supported it, it would have passed.

The problems our nation faces will not go away because we have, once again, found in our own supposed immorality and illegality excuses for inaction. They will, on the contrary, grow and confront us in the future with dilemmas far more difficult than those from which we have sought, for the moment, to turn away.

As Undersecretary of Defense Ikle has said, the real costs of our inaction won't come at once, but "in two to three years, when the expansionist phase begins" and Nicaragua "tries to destroy democratic government in the region."

The real targets are likely to be Mexico and Panama, where dry tinder, inviting the match, lies in abundant supply. The stakes will be quite different in kind from those we now confront.

At the root of the House's failure of prescription is a failure of diagnosis. Since the threat of Lenin's revolution was first posed in 1917, Americans have been of divided mind on the appropriate response. In World War I, House's counsel of patience prevailed over Lansing's call for action, and Lenin's rule was consolidated. In World War II, Roosevelt's pursuit of appeasement overruled Churchill's plea for counterbalance, and Stalin's empire was expanded to Eastern Europe. In the 1970s, proponents of detente were ascendant over advocates of containment and the Soviet empire — now with its own blue-water navy — consolidated worldwide, from Camranh Bay to South Yemen; from Afghanistan to Nicaragua.

Unless the president is now empowered to throw back this aggression from Central America, we shall next face it on our own borders.

Whittle Johnston, formerly of Roanoke, is a professor at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.

JMC 13

SYSTEM II
91019

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Exchanges Initiatives for Geneva

Attached at Tab A is a State drafted cable on possible exchanges initiatives for Geneva. I have cleared it personally with Charlie Wick, and I think the overall package looks good. We do not, as yet, have a clearance from NASA on the invitation to a Soviet cosmonaut to ride the space shuttle (page 3) or from HHS on the establishment of jointly staffed medical research institutes (page 4).

I would appreciate your thoughts on whether we should go ahead as is, or hold off on these two proposals until we can get high level NASA and HHS clearance. Otherwise, with your OK, the package is ready to go.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached cable if you have no problem with our getting clearance after the fact from NASA and HHS.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you approve the attached cable minus the space shuttle and medical research proposals pending NASA and HHS clearance.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Draft State cable on exchanges initiatives

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By CWS NARA, Date 7/1/02

15

~~SECRET~~

EUR/SOV/SOBI:MNROBINSON:MNR
10/1/85 632-3456 {3162N}
S:GPSHULTZ

EUR:RLRIDGWAY
USIA:CZWICK
P:WCOURTNEY
NSC:JMATLOCK

| EUR:MPALMER
| EUR/SOV/SOBI:LDSELL
| EUR/SOV:MRPARRIS
| HHS:

S-D,P-EUR,USIA ONLY

PRIORITY MOSCOW

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: UR,SCUL

SUBJECT: EXCHANGES INITIATIVES FOR GENEVA

GPS
MNR
RLR MP
MRP LDS
WC JK
JM

1. AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT TOLD SHEVARDNADZE IN THEIR MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE LAST WEEK THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO GO BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES COVERED BY THE GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT AND COME UP WITH SOME BOLDER, MORE IMAGINATIVE WAYS TO INCREASE COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE AREAS FOR COOPERATION, INCLUDING EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE, DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE, MILITARY TO MILITARY, AND SPORTS AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES.

2. WE WOULD NOW LIKE TO PROPOSE TO SHEVARDNADZE A MORE COMPLETE LIST OF THE KIND OF BOLD INITIATIVES THE PRESIDENT HAD IN MIND. YOU SHOULD PROPOSE TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT WE BEGIN DISCUSSING THESE IDEAS WITH A VIEW TO ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF THEM AT GENEVA, WHEN WE ALSO HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION TO SIGN THE GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT THESE INITIATIVES ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC THRUST OF THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, BUT BUILD ON IT AND GO

~~SECRET~~

BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL EXCHANGES IT PROVIDES FOR.

3. YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR NEW IDEAS WHICH DEMONSTRATE A SINCERE EFFORT ON BOTH SIDES TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING, WORK COOPERATIVELY ON SOME OF TODAY'S MOST DIFFICULT HUMAN PROBLEMS, AND GENUINELY OPEN UP OUR SOCIETIES TO EACH OTHER. WE WELCOME THEIR IDEAS IN THIS SAME VEIN. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE EQUALLY RAPIDLY ON ALL OF THESE IDEAS. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN. WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH SEPARATE US REQUIRE BOLD NEW PROGRAMS IF WE HOPE TO BEGIN TO RESOLVE BASIC DIFFERENCES AND DRAW OUR FUTURE GENERATIONS CLOSER TOGETHER.

4. YOU CAN SHARE WITH SHEVARDNADZE THE FOLLOWING LIST OF POSSIBLE EXCHANGES, WHICH HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY NSC, USIA, DEFENSE, AND OTHER CONCERNED AGENCIES.

5. EXCHANGES INITIATIVES

. -----

. PEOPLE TO PEOPLE EXCHANGES

. A MASSIVE EXCHANGE OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS. AS A
. START, AT LEAST 5,000 EACH WAY FOR A YEAR OF STUDY
. IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY.

. AN AMBITIOUS "YOUTH EXCHANGE" PROGRAM FOR A YEAR,
. OR A SUMMER, INVOLVING AT LEAST 5,000 SECONDARY-
. SCHOOL AGE YOUTHS WHO WOULD LIVE WITH FAMILIES IN
. THE OTHER COUNTRY AND EITHER ATTEND SCHOOL OR
. ENGAGE IN COOPERATIVE SUMMER CAMP PROJECTS WITH
. THEIR LOCAL COUNTERPARTS.

. A MASSIVE EXPANSION OF "SISTER-CITY" RELATIONSHIPS,
. WITH AT LEAST ONE "PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE" VISIT EACH
. YEAR EACH WAY BY CITY OFFICIALS OR DELEGATIONS WITH
. AN ACCOMPANYING EFFORT TO INCREASE GENERAL TOURISM
. BETWEEN PARTICIPATING CITIES. THE PROGRAM COULD
. BEGIN WITH 50 PAIRINGS THE FIRST YEAR.

. CREATION OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
. SIMILAR TO THE RHODES SCHOLARS THAT ANNUALLY WOULD
. SEND 10 OF THE BEST AND BRIGHTEST STUDENTS FROM
. EACH COUNTRY TO STUDY AT A DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY
. OF THE OTHER.

. INCREASED CONSULTATIONS

~~SECRET~~

1 3

17

- . INAUGURATION OF REGULAR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON
- . COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO HALT TERRORISM. THESE
- . COULD BE ON THE MODEL OF THE REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS
- . ALREADY UNDERWAY.

- . JOINT, REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT EFFORTS TO
- . COMBAT ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE AND TRAFFICKING.

. WIDER INFORMATION EXCHANGES

- . ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL OUT-OF-EMBASSY CULTURAL
- . CENTERS AND LIBRARIES IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRIES,
- . WITH UNCONTROLLED ACCESS.

- . INAUGURATION OF REGULAR MEDIA EXCHANGES, WITH
- . SOVIET COLUMNISTS WRITING ONCE A MONTH IN AMERICAN
- . JOURNALS AND AMERICAN WRITERS GIVEN SIMILAR REGULAR
- . SPACE IN SOVIET PUBLICATIONS. REGULAR TV DISCUSSION
- . SHOWS, AT LEAST AN HOUR A MONTH, BETWEEN
- . AMERICAN AND SOVIET JOURNALISTS AND/OR OFFICIALS.
- . ANNUAL TV ADDRESSES BY THE LEADERS OF OUR TWO
- . COUNTRIES TO THE PEOPLE OF THE OTHER. MORE
- . EXCHANGE OF RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS COUPLED
- . WITH AN END TO ALL JAMMING OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS.

- . FACILITATION OF SOVIET SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS TO
- . AMERICA VIA "GORIZONT" AND WORLDNET AND OTHER U.S.
- . BROADCASTS TO THE SOVIET UNION.

- . INCREASED PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH
- . NATION'S BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS IN THE THE OTHER,
- . INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT A BOOK STORE
- . IN THE SOVIET UNION AS AN OUTLET FOR AMERICAN
- . PUBLICATIONS SIMILAR TO BOOK STORES HERE
- . WHICH SELL SOVIET PUBLICATIONS.

- . NOMINATION OF TWO DISTINGUISHED EDUCATORS OR OTHER
- . PUBLIC FIGURES, ONE AMERICAN, ONE SOVIET, TO
- . UNDERTAKE A MAJOR STUDY OF WAYS THAT WE CAN
- . INCREASE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BY PROMOTING THE
- . STUDY OF EACH OTHER'S LANGUAGE IN OUR RESPECTIVE
- . COUNTRIES.

. COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND SPACE

- . AN INVITATION TO A SOVIET COSMONAUT TO FLY ON A ✓
- . U.S. SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION WITH A RECIPROCAL
- . OPPORTUNITY FOR AN AMERICAN ASTRONAUT TO FLY ON A

~~SECRET~~

- . SOVIET SPACE MISSION.

- . ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINTLY STAFFED MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTES IN BOTH COUNTRIES TO TACKLE MAJOR MEDICAL PROBLEMS FACED BY BOTH COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD, SUCH AS ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE, CANCER, AND AIDS, AND TO DEVELOP INCREASED COOPERATION IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTS.

- . AN OFFER TO COOPERATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MICROCOMPUTER EDUCATIONAL SOFTWARE FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL INSTRUCTION.

- . SPORTS COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES
 - . A RECIPROCAL TELEVISED EXCHANGE OF EACH COUNTRY'S BEST SPORTS COMPETITIONS, SUCH AS FOOTBALL, SOCCER, BASKETBALL AND HOCKEY.

 - . AN EXCHANGE OF AMERICAN FOOTBALL AND BASEBALL TEAMS FOR A SERIES OF EXHIBITION GAMES AND WORKSHOPS IN THE SOVIET UNION, WITH RECIPROCAL TOURS BY SOVIET HOCKEY AND SOCCER TEAMS.

 - . A PROPOSAL FOR JOINT SPONSORSHIP OF AN ANNUAL, TELEVISED WASHINGTON TO MOSCOW OR MOSCOW TO WASHINGTON SPORTING "GREAT RACE". IT COULD BE OPEN TO ENTRANTS FROM ANY COUNTRY AND COULD BE FOR CARS, BICYCLISTS, LIGHT PLANES OR OTHER VEHICLES. THE PARIS-DAKAR AUTO RACE IS ONE MODEL.

 - . A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN BINATIONAL SPORTING COMPETITIONS ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPORTING AGENDA, ALL TO BE JOINTLY TELEVISED.

B. ACTION REQUESTED

YOU SHOULD SEEK AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH SHEVARDNADZE TO MAKE THE ABOVE POINTS AND STRESS OUR DESIRE TO ANNOUNCE NEW COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS IN GENVEA WHEN THE GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT IS SIGNED.

YY

YY

YY

JM-C

19

SYSTEM II
91009

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Letter to the President

The official translation of the Gorbachev letter to the President which Shevardnadze presented to him is at Tab A. Since Shevardnadze paraphrased it for the President in almost every particular, you may not wish to burden him with it at this time, but send it later when we have drafted a proposed response. However, I have included a Memorandum to the President at Tab I if you wish to send it forward at this time.

You will note that the letter concludes with a suggestion that we work out "an appropriate joint document" for the meeting. We might consider whether it would be advantageous for us to try to do so. If we do, we should propose a draft, discussion of which could be a vehicle for smoking out Soviet intentions on some of the issues. I have asked State to think about the question and get us their recommendations.

I understand that State is working on a draft reply to the letter, though I have not seen the proposed text yet. Given the relatively short time remaining before the Geneva meeting, it may be a good idea to answer it fairly soon -- that is, next week. After consultation with State, I will convey to you my thoughts on the substance of a reply.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

OR, ALTERNATIVELY

2. That you hold the letter and send it to the President when we have prepared a draft reply.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3 #7870
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

20

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Official Translation of Letter dated September 12, 1985, from Gorbachev to the President

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Letter of September 12, 1985

Attached at Tab A is the official translation of the letter from Gorbachev which Shevardnadze handed you during your meeting last Friday.

You will note that its content is virtually identical to Shevardnadze's initial presentation to you. The one matter which was not mentioned in your meeting is the suggestion at the close of the letter that we consider "an appropriate joint document" to be issued after your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. We are now giving thought to whether this is a good idea. If you can reach agreement on some items for a future agenda, a joint communique laying out the concepts might be useful. There are also potential risks, and we will want to weigh them carefully before proceeding.

I will be forwarding to you shortly my recommendation on this point, and also suggestions for a reply.

Recommendation

OK No

That you read the letter at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Official Translation of Letter from Gorbachev, dated
September 12, 1985

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR F06-114/2 #7871
BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

22

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 117677

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations in continuation of the correspondence between us and specifically with a view to our forthcoming personal meeting.

I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has already been fairly clearly delineated. They are all very important.

Of course, the differences between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to many fundamental issues are different. All this is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military confrontation, it would be catastrophic for our countries, and for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also regard a military conflict between the USSR and the USA as inadmissible.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war and removing the threat of war is our mutual and, for that matter, primary interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use

His Excellency
Ronald Reagan,
President of the
United States of America.

Authority NLSS 97-00 / #97 S.M.F. 10/20/97
BY CAJ, NARA, Date 7/1/02
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes in the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive and stable and thus contribute to the improvement of the international climate in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

We are convinced that there are considerable opportunities in this regard. My meeting with you may serve as a good catalyst for their realization. It seems that we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such a war, and we could resolutely speak out against seeking military superiority and against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by a clearly expressed intention of the sides to take actions of a material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the sides to move in the direction of removing the threat of war. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us, I think, to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems.

What specific measures should receive priority? Naturally, those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarization of space is the only road to the most radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favor following this road unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically and not postpone decisions. It would be good to be able to count on having obtained some positive results by the time of my meeting with you.

In connection with certain thoughts contained in your letter of July 27 of this year, I would note that on several occasions we have explicitly expressed our views on the American program of developing space attack weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system. It is based not on emotions or subjective views, but on facts and realistic assessments. I stress once again--the implementation of this program will not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it and have the most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries to slow the arms race and bring it to a halt, above all in its main arena--the nuclear one. It is indeed for this and no other purpose that we have taken a number of unilateral, practical steps.

Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the standpoint of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the termination of nuclear tests would be a step in the opposite direction. This is what guided our decision to stop all nuclear explosions and appeal to the U.S. to join us in this. Please look at this issue without preconceived notions. It is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt the security of either of them.

Therefore, if there is a true desire to halt the nuclear arms race, then there can be no objections to a mutual moratorium, and the benefit it brings would be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests--albeit in the presence of somebody's observers--would be nothing else but the same arms race. The U.S. still has time to make the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

But a moratorium on nuclear tests, of course, is still not a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

In order to accomplish that, it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final analysis the outcome of these talks will be decisive in determining whether we shall

succeed in stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Regrettably, the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious concern.

We have very thoroughly and from every angle once again examined what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula--the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.

In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiations--not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but the level of nuclear confrontation would be drastically reduced, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result, strategic stability would be strengthened greatly and mutual trust would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and U.S. would, I believe, be an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear^a disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realize that such a radical solution would require time and effort. Nonetheless, we are convinced that this problem can be solved. The first thing that is needed is to have our political approaches coincide in their essence. Secondly, given such coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate

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the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of space attack weapons and a freeze of nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels, with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

In addition, major practical measures could include the removal from alert status and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as mutually undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and undertaking not to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and not to replace nuclear weapons with new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.

Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires resolution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favors a radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone no more weapons of this type, using warheads as the unit of count, than Britain and France possess.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiations has appropriate instructions, and it intends to present our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give comprehensive clarifications in the near future. We count on the positive reaction of the U.S. side and hope that it will be possible to achieve certain results at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the area of confidence-building measures and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries, together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference, should make a maximum effort to work towards successful completion of the conference. Such an opportunity, it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Secretary of State--we are in favor of making the subject matter of the Stockholm conference a positive element of my meeting with you.

Whether or not an impetus is given to the Vienna talks largely depends on our two countries. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the U.S. side would once again closely look at the possibility of first reducing Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favorable impact on the development of the all-European process as well. I see no reason why it should not be in the interest of the U.S.

In proposing practical measures concerning arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification measures. In some cases it would be national technical means, and in other cases, when it is really necessary, the latter could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures.

I have not attempted to give an exhaustive list of measures to limit arms and relax military tensions. There could be other measures as well. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the U.S. side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in a constructive way in order to build up a useful foundation, which, if possible, might also be included in the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I have paid particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing our positions closer and, better still, finding practical solutions wherever possible.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm and in Vienna, and by means of exchanges through diplomatic channels, it will be possible in the time left before my meeting with you to create a situation making for a truly productive meeting.

We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of my discussions with you at the meeting itself could be reflected in an appropriate joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our

Ministers to determine how work on such a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. GORBACHEV

September 12, 1985

JM-L 31

7849

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM.*

SUBJECT: Pearce/Green Initiative on Renunciation of War

Terry Pearce and Tom Green continue to press their private initiative for key world leaders to make a public statement renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy by the year 2,000." We have, of course, repeatedly advised Pearce and Green that such sweeping declarations mean little if not followed by concrete actions, and we have seen no indication that the Soviets (or others) take the proposal seriously.

In view of Pearce and Green's close personal ties with friends of the President, however, we have agreed to forward their plan to the President. Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President transmitting the text of their proposal (Tab A) and outlining our reservations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Pearce/Green proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3#7872

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Pearce/Green Initiative on Renunciation of War

Issue

Whether to read the attached private peace initiative.

Facts

Terry Pearce and Tom Green, close friends of Al Schwabacher, have been pressing a private peace initiative for key world leaders, including yourself and General Secretary Gorbachev, to make a public statement renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy by the year 2,000."

Discussion

We have advised Pearce and Green that such sweeping public declarations mean little if not followed by concrete actions, and we see no indication that the Soviets (or others) take the proposal seriously. We have told Pearce and Green, however, that we will call it to your attention.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ _____ That you read the letter at Tab A and, if interested, review the detailed proposal at Tab B.

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Terry Pearce and Tom Green
Tab B Renunciation of war proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/3#7873

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

55

TOM GREEN TERRY PEARCE
2349 Spanish Trail
Tiburon, California 94920 U.S.A.
415/435-9663 415/381-1598

September 12, 1985

Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

The attached memorandum updates you on the private initiative for the joint televised U.S./Soviet Declaration, acknowledged in your letters of February and April of last year. The initiative was encouraged early on by friends of yours and is now strongly supported. The Soviets have recently been responsive, and want to discuss it before the Summit. It is time to take the next step.

This is a plan to inspire and engage the global population in the same way you have inspired and engaged the American people. First, you have clearly stated our goals, and then pressed for the specific actions to meet those goals.

One leader, one nation will not meet global challenges alone. But one leader will begin. This plan calls for uncommon statesmanship with minimal risk. It will clearly establish our leadership, form a new context for U.S./Soviet relations and point a new direction for the youth of the world, consistent with our values as Americans.

The plan is practical, well-advanced, can be done now, and it will work.

God bless.

With deepest respect,

Tom Green

Terry Pearce

TG:TP:jl

Enclosure

September 12, 1985

Mr. President:

This memorandum summarizes and evaluates the private initiative for a joint Declaration we first discussed in January of 1984. Early encouragement for the work came from Holmes Tuttle, Al Schwabacher and Nancy Cooke de Herrera of Los Angeles, and contact with your staff has been primarily through Jack Matlock and me.

Implementation thus far has been carried out, without publicity, by two American businessmen through private channels, with selected government officials of the U.S., USSR, and the PRC fully informed. Responses have now been received.

The plan's purpose is to create a substantial shift in the international political climate through a dramatic, catalytic action: a joint, concurrent televised forceful statement by you and General Secretary Gorbachev, he from Moscow, you from Washington, declaring your personal commitments and that of your people to the goal of ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2000. Under the plan, you will speak to the people of the United States and then directly to the Soviet people. Gorbachev will speak to his country, then to ours directly. You will both then address the world's population, inviting other national leaders to join in the commitment.

The plan's proponents claim strong support from the PRC will follow immediately, and assume an equally positive response from Prime Minister Gandhi, who is also aware of this plan, though in less detail. The statement will have an impact exceeding Anwar Sadat's 1976 speech to the Knesset and President Nixon's trip to China in 1972, as it will be on a global scale.

This plan is distinct in substantive ways:

1. It sets a goal for the future. It does not require a renunciation of force now, but rather suggests a commitment to create conditions, by a specific time in the future - the year 2000 - when force will not be necessary to settle international differences.
2. It reverses the normal approach of diplomacy. Rather than focusing first on negotiating the specific methods (arms control, regional conflicts, human rights, etc.), it first defines the destination for all such specific actions.
3. The goal is global in scale. It, therefore, requires the cooperation of you and Secretary Gorbachev. This would be the first Declaration of a global goal.

- 4. It applies worldwide television in a dramatic way never used for statesmanship. Implementation will result in your direct access to the Soviet public and to a world audience.
- 5. It is a private initiative. It does not bear the burden of a government proposal. The United States and the Soviets could suggest implementation of this non-governmental plan.
- 6. It has had no publicity.

Progress

The plan was presented privately to Chernenko in February, 1984 and was backed up by a presentation to Dobrynin in April. Private delivery to Chairman Deng was accomplished in February, 1984 and backed up through the PRC Embassy here, in April, 1984. In December, 1984, the sponsors distributed clarifications to all three governments in response to questions and comments, and also added India, again through private businessmen, with Dobrynin, Zhang and me informed.

In February, 1985, and again in May, the plan and its amendments were channeled to Gorbachev, along with an indication approved by our office of our interest in their response.

The PRC responded with support, most recently through Ambassador Han in July of 1985.

The Soviet Embassy last month indicated to the plan's sponsors they would be interested in discussing the plan in preparation for the Summit.

Timing

It is suggested a rare opportunity is present now, and the opportunity is perishable, primarily because:

- The United States can now begin this drive for permanent peace based on justice from a position of strength. The nation currently has the strong leader and stability and power to match its will. This condition will last at a minimum through your term, long enough to test the willingness of the Soviets to move in concrete ways toward the goal.
- The captivation of the Soviet youth with Western culture is strong now, and could change. Your personal appeal to that generation, not yet party members, to work toward the goal, could accelerate the pace of cooperation dramatically.
- Gorbachev is currently trying to rally his people to new domestic production. He may not be willing to make this commitment later, should he be successful in his ever-broadening media campaign. This initiative may have particular appeal to him at this time.

Support

The plan has been exposed to very few Americans, all who are deeply respected and are from a wide spectrum in business, academics and politics from both sides of the aisle. They are realists and it has their support.

Risks

The plan's initiators claim, with some reason, that risks are minimal. No change in position or specific action is required by us or the Soviets, although some of the agreed-to specifics on the agenda for the Summit could be announced as evidence of our intent. Expectations may be raised in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and our political system may be more responsive to such expectation. However, the time remaining in your term is adequate to gauge the Soviet responsiveness and to prevent any action which would jeopardize our security.

Proponent's Recommendation

They recommend we acknowledge to the Soviets our receipt of this initiative, initiate discussion, and schedule the Declaration after the Summit, from Moscow and Washington.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION

Assessment

- No change in policy or specific action is required. In fact, such a commitment will allow any inconsistent actions of the Soviets to be showcased more effectively.
- No abandonment of our preparations to use force if and when necessary in our present circumstances is required.
- The plan has been successfully delivered to the USSR and the PRC and remains without publicity.
- It is supported by a few highly-respected individuals and is well-documented in its theory.
- The risks are minimal.
- The outcome of the plan is based on the assumption that the Soviet leadership wants to reduce tensions, at least temporarily. Such an assumption may not be valid and this Declaration could give rise to a propaganda campaign.
- It is a strong move in a new direction - a demonstration of our commitment to our values.
- Our allies will strongly support the action.
- It might accomplish a breakthrough in the international political climate. The rewards would be immeasurable.

Recommendation

This plan calls for unparalleled statesmanship, and we have an opportunity to take the lead; and it is possible such a commitment could induce positive concrete action by the Soviets. There is enough indication of potential success to pursue the plan further, to determine the plan's technical feasibility and the support of our allies. It strongly reflects our values. It would be a clear signal to the world that something worthwhile has been stated that will last beyond changes in leadership.

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment - Sample text (highlighted portions to be common to Soviet and American statements).

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DRAFT

The President of the United States of America's Speech, November 1985

As announced earlier, our regularly scheduled program has been rescheduled to permit a special address by the President, the topic of which has not been announced. No one here knows what the President will be speaking about, or why he has chosen 10:00 in the morning to do so. We have just learned that with him in the Oval Office are his wife Nancy, their children and closest friends, Vice President Bush, former Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon, House Speaker O'Neill, and Senator Dole - obviously a remarkable and historic gathering. The President is about to speak.

Ladies and gentlemen, from the Oval Office in the White House, The President of the United States...

(over, please...)

9/85:pjm

The President of the United States of America speech, November 1985.

"My fellow Americans, today it is my privilege to report to you on the most significant turning point in human history: the time when the world has chosen to move to end war between nations...to move beyond the use or threat of mass destruction as an acceptable means of resolving our conflicts as nations. I am speaking to you at this time of day and with these other representatives of our nation because right now, simultaneously, General Secretary Gorbachev and representatives of the Soviet government are addressing the people of the Soviet Union.

Our two nations, and in fact all nations, have vast differences. We do not embrace their form of government; they do not embrace ours. Without being blind to the real differences between people, we know the people of all nations have common human interests. We all inhabit the planet, breathe the same air and cherish our children's future.

This growing interdependence, combined with the real and increasing threat of mutual extinction, and the contributions by millions today and throughout history toward the goal of peace, create the conditions in which the time is right, NOW, to commit to an end to armed conflict. No nation, no leader alone, can produce world peace. Many have tried and it has not been achieved. For the first time in human history it is now time for the world to focus on and commit to ending the use of national force.

Accordingly, in concert with General Secretary Gorbachev for the Soviet Union, and using the power heretofore used by our Presidents to declare war, I hereby declare and commit the United States of America to the goal of ending war as an instrument of national policy by the year 2000. We invite all nations of the world to join in this commitment.

Fellow Americans, peace between nations is possible. There will be risks. We will need strong defense along the way. We will maintain our freedom and security. It will not be easy, and with your support and that of the world's people, in the next 15 years we will develop an effective, non-violent means of resolving our conflicts as nations. We will realize conditions where war and the threat of war are obsolete as instruments of national policy, and then eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

In a few moments, Secretary Gorbachev will be directly addressing you stating his country's commitment to us and to the world, and I will be directly addressing his nation on your behalf. Then this evening I will be speaking to you and a joint session of Congress about specific actions agreed to at the summit and being taken today to produce peace between nations and about the role each of us can play in this shared journey.

It is our tradition in America to give thanks for our past and to look forward with new vision to our future. Three years ago on Thanksgiving, we recalled the words of a famous hymn, 'Oh God of love, Oh King of Peace, make wars throughout the world to cease.' God willing, this dream will now become real. Thank you, good day, and God bless you."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

FILE 42
~~Martin~~

October 2, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Citizenship Ceremony for Walter Polovchak

We have reviewed and recommend against the proposal to host the oath of citizenship ceremony for Walter Polovchak on October 8. First, the President's schedule is very busy at this time; second, there are other events that are under consideration which would also manifest to both domestic and international audiences that we do not intend to compromise human rights and emigration issues at Geneva.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 1, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *jm*

SUBJECT:

Citizenship Ceremony for Walter Polovchak

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Ryan recommending against hosting the oath of citizenship ceremony for Walter Polovchak.

WR Walt Raymond, *NOT AVAILABLE* Steve Steiner, and *JM* Jonathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum a Tab I.

Approve *LMF*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Ryan
Tab II Backup Documents

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7658

44

MEMORANDUM

September 25, 1985

TO: WILLIAM MARTIN

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Host the Oath of Citizenship Ceremony for Walter
Polovchak

DATE: October 8, 1985

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____ Other _____
Priority _____
Routine _____

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE October 2, 1985

TO ANN BROCK

AB

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

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SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

September 18, 1985

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: LINDA CHAVEZ, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC
LIAISON 

REQUEST: For the President to Host Oath of Citizenship
Ceremony for Walter Polovchak

PURPOSE: To underscore Administration support for
U.S. as a haven for refugees and President's
commitment to human and civil rights

BACKGROUND: The Polovchak family emigrated to the U.S.
from Ukrainian S.S.R. in January 1980. When
the family decided to return to Ukraine later
that year, Walter Polovchak became a cause
celebre for the U.S. civil and human rights
movement, when he announced his intention to
remain in the U.S so he could live in free-
dom. As Walter was only twelve at the time,
a heated court fight ensued, with the Soviets
and the Polovchaks claiming that the parents
had legal custody of Walter, while Walter,
his American relatives and the Justice
Department argued that he had the right to
seek asylum in the U.S. The case has re-
ceived national attention for the past six
years.

Next month, Walter will be eighteen, and of
age to accept citizenship on his own. A
reception for him is planned in the Capitol.
A White House citizenship ceremony would
underscore this Administration's record as a
champion of those fleeing totalitarian rule.
It would also signal the American people that
the U.S. will not compromise on human rights
and emigration issues at the Geneva summit.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE: October 8 DURATION: 10 minutes

LOCATION: The Roosevelt Room

PARTICIPANTS: Walter Polovchak, Natalie Polovchak (his

46

sister) and 35 representatives of human and civil rights organizations and ethnic community leaders.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: The President enters the Roosevelt Room. The oath of citizenship is administered to Polovchak by a judge. The President congratulates Walter and makes brief remarks. Walter thanks the President and the President departs.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks

MEDIA COVERAGE: Press pool

RECOMMENDED BY: Pat Buchanan, NSC Staff

PROJECT OFFICER: Linas Kojelis, x2741

SB
41NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter of Support for Your Santa Barbara Speech

Attached at Tab A is a response to a letter received from Professor Whittle Johnston of the University of Virginia. Professor Johnston wrote to you to express his support for your August 19 Santa Barbara speech.

gib
Ray Burghardt concurs.

RECOMMENDATION


That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Response to Professor Johnston
Tab B Letter from Professor Johnston



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Professor Johnston:

Many thanks for your expression of support for my August 19 Santa Barbara speech. It is particularly gratifying to know that people in the academic community will be following up on the themes of that speech.

I also enjoyed reading your column from the Roanoke Times and World News on Nicaragua. It is precisely this kind of support that enables us to pursue a principled, long-term policy in Central America.

Again, many thanks for your letter.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Professor Whittle Johnston
Woodrow Wilson Department
of Government and Foreign Affairs
232 Cabell Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901

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B

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22901
TELEPHONE 804-924-3192

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→ JFM
ack pls
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9-13-85

WOODROW WILSON DEPARTMENT
OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
232 CABELL HALL

Sept. 6, 1985

RC/HAS SEEN

The Hon. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

I have just received from the State Department the text of your address on August 19 in Santa Barbara. I was deeply impressed by it, and encouraged that it helps set the tone for the forthcoming Summit. I found the way you framed the central issue particularly valuable, i.e. "what kinds of change would do the most to make Soviet-American relations more stable". I shall make use of the three military and three political issues you then discussed in my own lectures and writing on this subject. I shall certainly have my many students read your speech. In its directness, specificity, and strength it gives me sober encouragement.

I have also enclosed a little piece I did some months back in the on-going debate with the local press.

Sincerely yours,
Whittle Johnston
Whittle Johnston
Professor

"Roanoke Times and World News" Sun. May 31, 1979

Stop Reds in Nicaragua

By WHITTLE JOHNSTON

I AM IN fundamental disagreement with the arguments expressed in the Roanoke Times & World-News editorial, "Nicaragua: Emotions blur facts" on April 19.

This opposition to the president's policy will, I fear, do grave damage to our nation's interests.

Let me summarize the newspaper's major points:

1. "The president is seeking authority to overthrow the government of a neighboring country with which the United States is not at war." The editorial describes this as "contrary to international law, to U.S. law and to our national principles."

2. The president's most recent proposals are "a maneuver intended to gain sanction for continuing the fighting" after 60 days. The editorial maintains that most Latin Americans see the contras as nothing more than "a surrogate U.S. force" that holds no territory and has not won "many hearts and minds outside the Reagan administration."

3. Many congressmen cast wary eyes on the president's proposals for fear that the proposals could justify another Vietnam war.

4. What the administration wants to do in Nicaragua is "ill-advised, illegal and immoral;" Congress should say "No more."

Argument 1 neglects the tyrannical and aggressive action of the Sandinistas to which the president's policy is a response. Support for the Nicaraguan revolution by neighboring states and the Organization of American States (OAS) in its resolution of June 23, 1979, played important parts in the overthrow of the Somoza regime. In return for this support, the Sandinistas pledged to back free elections, political pluralism, a mixed economy and nonalignment. From the moment they acquired power, however, they have systematically violated all these pledges. The persistent goal of the president has been to hold the Sandinistas to their promises, and surely this is in accord with America's commitment to democracy and self-determination.

The most blatant aspect of Sandinista illegality has been their com-

mitment to a "revolution without borders," and the most threatening instance has been their backing of violent efforts to overthrow the democratically elected government of El Salvador.

The Salvadoran guerrillas themselves have acknowledged this support from the Sandinistas. Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, the United States was obligated to take measures to end the armed attack against El Salvador. Our aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, is in accord with these obligations.

The political manipulation by Nicaragua of the World Court over the mining as a sorry instance of how the enemies of liberty may use the institutions of liberty to undermine the prospects of liberty. America could be brought before that court only if it voluntarily accepted its compulsory jurisdiction. Eleven of the 16 justices that claimed to sit in judgment on the United States represented countries that, like Nicaragua, did not themselves accept such jurisdiction. To allow Nicaragua to sue where it could not be sued would have been a violation, not a confirmation, of the rule of law.

Argument 2 omits the widespread evidence in support of the popular base of the contra opposition. As one instance, many key leaders of the opposition (e.g. Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora) are themselves former Sandinista backers who broke with them when the Sandinistas betrayed the revolution. As another instance, Huber Matos, a seasoned Cuban freedom fighter, recently traveled with the rebel forces in Nicaragua and confirmed their mass popularity. He reported that they constantly met farmers who wanted to join their ranks.

The congressmen whose fears were cited in Argument 3 of the editorial draw precisely the wrong lesson from the Vietnam war. The president and his chief commanders have made clear, repeatedly, their concern for avoiding direct American military involvement in Central America. They see materiel and diplomatic support to indigenous Ni-

caraguan freedom fighters as essential to avoid that involvement. If such indigenous forces should collapse, however, the risk of direct American involvement would sharply increase, as Secretary Shultz made clear last Feb. 22.

Another crucial lesson we all should have learned from Vietnam is that those who rule out the role of force simultaneously undercut the prospects for negotiation. Those congressmen who have tied the president's hands can expect only one "diplomatic" outcome: negotiated capitulation.

With regard to Argument 4, the House of Representatives has acted in accord with the advice of the Roanoke Times & World-News and said "no more." On April 24, it defeated the president's proposal by 240 to 180. On April 25 it defeated a Republican alternative by 215 to 213. Had the two Virginia congressmen (James Olin, D-Roanoke, and Frederick Boucher, D-Abingdon) who voted no on the second proposal supported it, it would have passed.

The problems our nation faces will not go away because we have, once again, found in our own supposed immorality and illegality excuses for inaction. They will, on the contrary, grow and confront us in the future with dilemmas far more difficult than those from which we have sought, for the moment, to turn away.

As Undersecretary of Defense Ikle has said, the real costs of our inaction won't come at once, but "in two to three years, when the expansionist phase begins" and Nicaragua "tries to destroy democratic government in the region."

The real targets are likely to be Mexico and Panama, where dry tinder, inviting the match, lies in abundant supply. The stakes will be quite different in kind from those we now confront.

At the root of the House's failure of prescription is a failure of diagnosis. Since the threat of Lenin's revolution was first posed in 1917, Americans have been of divided mind on the appropriate response. In World War I, House's counsel of patience prevailed over Lansing's call for action, and Lenin's rule was consolidated. In World War II, Roosevelt's pursuit of appeasement overruled Churchill's plea for counterbalance, and Stalin's empire was expanded to Eastern Europe. In the 1970s, proponents of detente were ascendant over advocates of containment and the Soviet empire — now with its own blue-water navy — consolidated worldwide, from Camranh Bay to South Yemen; from Afghanistan to Nicaragua.

Unless the president is now empowered to throw back this aggression from Central America, we shall next face it on our own borders.

Whittle Johnston, formerly of Roanoke, is a professor at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia.