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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON (APPROVED/DISAPPROVED)
SEPTEMBER 1985 (5/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1108

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7847	MEMO	MATLOCK TO TAFT RE PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA MEETING: PROPOSALS TO BROADEN THE AGENDA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	9/24/1985	B1
7848	MEMO	MATLOCK TO GATES RE PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA MEETING: PROPOSALS TO BROADEN THE AGENDA	2	9/24/1985	B1
7849	REPORT	REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: CONCEPT PAPER	4	ND	B1
7850	REPORT	NEW INITIATIVES: CONTACTS, COMMUNICATION, AND COOPERATION	1	ND	B1
7851	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS RE GENEVA	2	ND	B1
7852	PAPER	POSSIBLE INITIATIVES	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7853	PAPER	SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME COMMON TRAITS BY MATLOCK R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	8	ND	B1
7854	MEMCON	PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	3	ND	B1

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7847

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT
Deputy Secretary of Defense

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Preparations for Geneva Meeting: Proposals to
Broaden the Agenda (S)

Bud McFarlane and I have been discussing a strategy to put forward publicly the main elements of our four-part agenda as we prepare for the Geneva meeting. We are concerned that the public seems to be focussing on the Soviet agenda (SDI) to the exclusion of other items on our broader agenda. While we must continue to deal with the key arms control issues, we need a strategy to call public attention to the other problems. We also feel that the President needs to go into the meeting with Gorbachev with a positive program of his own. (S)

The proposals in the Tabs are designed to gain the high ground in two major areas: use of force in regional disputes, and bilateral contacts and communication. They are designed to highlight Soviet weaknesses and to put them in a position of having to explain why U.S. proposals are not acceptable. If we decide to implement these approaches we would see the sequence of events as follows:

- 1) Lay groundwork for making the proposals in the meetings with Shevardnadze this week, but not make actual concrete proposals.
- 2) Plan to make the regional proposal by diplomatic channels next week or shortly thereafter, then follow it with a speech by the President on the subject.
- 3) Plan to make the proposals on contacts and communication over the next couple of weeks, and have a presidential speech on the subject a week or so before his UNGA address.
- 4) Wrap it all together, along with a public formulation of our arms control proposals, in the UNGA address.
- 5) Have the President give, on the eve of his departure for Geneva, a TV address to the American people (which might also be carried on EURONET), in which he would set forth his vision of what the future of U.S.-Soviet relations could be like if Gorbachev is willing to engage us in a constructive way. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
Declassify on: OADR

Bud asked me to share this with you and Secretary Weinberger. It is very close hold at present, and should not be disseminated further. However, we would appreciate any thoughts you or the Secretary may have on the overall strategy. (Bud will be discussing with George Shultz tomorrow). (S)

Attachment:

- Tab A Regional Conflicts and U.S.-Soviet Relations:
Concept Paper
- Tab B New Initiatives: Contacts, Communication and
Cooperation
- Tab C Talking Points
- Tab D Possible Initiatives

5

10

TAB II

12

TAB A

7561

~~Nautilus~~
File
JM-C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES G. ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Background Paper on Soviet Psychology

Attached at Tab A is the first in a series of papers we are preparing for the First Lady as background reading on the Soviet Union. It deals with some common traits of Soviet Russian psychology. An additional paper will be provided each week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the paper at Tab A to the First Lady.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A "Soviet Russian Psychology: Some Common Traits"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *CJS* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

NLRR F06-714/3 #7553

BY CIS NARA DATE 10/20/67SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
SOME COMMON TRAITS

Yes, they lie and cheat. And they can stonewall a negotiation when it seems in their interest to strike a deal. They have a sense of pride and "face" that makes the proverbial oriental variety pale in comparison. Yet, in private, with people he trusts, the Russian can be candid to a fault -- grovelling in his nation's inadequacies -- and so scrupulously honest that it can be irritating, as when he makes a big deal over having forgotten to return a borrowed pencil.

Do these contradictions stem from ideology and politics? To a degree, certainly. The lying, cheating and stonewalling, even the exaggerated sense of pride, often serve an obvious political or ideological purpose. But that is not the whole story, for these traits have deep roots in Russian culture and society.

Now when we talk about the "psychology" of a nation or ethnic group, we need to bear in mind that we are not talking about the psychology of every individual in that group. By no means every Russian, or every Soviet official, fits a stereotype. They exhibit as much individual variety as any other people. Yet there are certain psychological characteristics which are more common, and more characteristic, in one society than in another. What we are concerned with here are some which differ from those most common to Americans and explain in part frequently observed behavioral differences.

The "Truth": Reality or a Convenient Fiction?

Lying is endemic in every society. But societies differ in how the phenomenon is regarded. All societies I know of excuse it under certain circumstances. Who would reproach a wife who comforted her husband after he had delivered a dull after-dinner speech by telling him, "It was a very thoughtful talk, dear, and I'm sure those idiots who dozed off just had too much to drink before dinner?" We would call it a white lie; not the truth, but meant well.

The Russians have many more categories of the "excusable" lie than we typically do. There is, for example, the lie which is not so much meant to deceive as to salvage the pride of the liar. Most Russians would feel that it is a social faux pas to confront another person with an embarrassing fact, and that it is understandable if the other person denies the fact and concocts an alternate, fictional explanation, since he is only trying to save face, not to deceive. They even have a separate word for this sort of lie, to distinguish it from one made with deliberate intent to deceive.

In 1976, President Ford made a direct appeal to Brezhnev to turn off the microwave signals being directed at the American Embassy in Moscow. We then supplied the Soviets with the technical data we had that proved conclusively the existence of the microwave

radiation and even pinpointed the sources. Subsequently, Gromyko had the gall to state to our Ambassador in a face-to-face meeting that he could assure us, officially and on behalf of the Soviet Government, that no microwaves were being directed at our Embassy.

Gromyko, of course, knew that we knew he was lying, and that there was no way this "assurance" was going to diminish our confidence in the hard facts we had gathered with our own instruments. So why did he do it? I suspect that his reasoning went something like this: "They know very well that we will not admit to this. They are just trying to put us on the spot, and gain an advantage. We'll show them we are not so weak that they can push us around." (In fact, somewhat later the microwave signals were turned off, but without any admission that they ever existed.)

In addition to condoning lying to save face, Russians expect it from governments and official authorities. Lying for reasons of state is not so much excused as simply accepted as a fact of life. They know their own authorities lie to them, and assume that every other government does the same. This is why Russians have never understood why Watergate brought an end to Nixon's presidency. To them, the charges against President Nixon seemed so trivial -- a very mild form of what they assume all government officials do as a matter of course -- that they simply could not accept that these charges could have been the real reason for his resignation. (Given to conspiracy theories, most Russians seem convinced that Nixon was removed by an anti-Soviet cabal because he tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union.)

These typically Russian attitudes toward telling the truth are mingled with a much more purposeful and cynical view of the "truth" which the communist regime introduced. As a calculated instrument for establishing and maintaining control of the population, the communist authorities introduced an elaborate and pervasive system not merely to control information, but to shape the perception of reality by distorting and misrepresenting facts which tended to undermine the political line of the moment. Communist Party professionals were trained on the proposition that the truth is what the Party says it is at a given moment, and many of those who adapted to this requirement seem over time to lose the ability to distinguish between the Party line and reality. Psychologically, the Party line becomes reality for them. Professor Leszek Kolakowski, a former Polish Communist who broke with the regime some 20 years ago and now lives in England, has described this phenomenon as follows:

[The truth of Stalinist totalitarianism] consisted not simply in that virtually everything in the Soviet Union was either falsified or suppressed -- statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally even Lenin's texts) -- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what was politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is

"correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again they themselves began to believe or half-believe them. The massive corruption of the language eventually produced people who are incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.

To a great extent this form of perception seems to survive, in spite of the fact that the omnipresence of ideology has been somewhat restricted recently. When Soviet leaders maintain that they have "liberated" Afghanistan, or that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that they mean what they say. To such an extent have they confounded linguistic ability that they are incapable of using any other word for a Soviet invasion than "liberation," and have no sense at all of the grotesque distance between language and reality. It takes a lot of courage, after all, to be entirely cynical; those who lie to themselves appear among us much more frequently than perfect cynics."

Whether it is a case of lying to themselves or of conditioned cynicism, the ability of many Russians (and not only communist officials) to change their version of the truth when so instructed by authority can be breathtaking to an outsider. When the "line" is changed abruptly, many seem to wipe the previous position from their consciousness and blithely assume it never existed. One encounters such habits even in the trivia of everyday life.

Once, while visiting Moscow some years ago, I had dinner in a restaurant with several other Russian speakers. The waitress apparently did not spot us as foreigners, and when we ordered extra bottles of mineral water (it was a sultry summer day) she simply said abruptly. "We're out." This was a little hard to believe, because while most foods are scarce, mineral water rarely is in Soviet restaurants. So we protested and pressed her for an explanation, and she repeated her denial several times and finally terminated the conversation with a curt, "We're out of it, and that's that."

As the waitress walked away from our table, she was intercepted by the maitre d' (who knew we were foreigners), and a few words were exchanged. A couple of minutes later, she appeared with two chilled bottles, which she placed on our table, offering no explanation. I observed naively, "Thanks, I thought you were out."

Her reply was instant and accusatory, "Of course we have mineral water. Why do you think we live worse than you?" It was as if her statement less than five minutes earlier had never been made, and my gentle reference to it was taken as an affront to her national pride. What right did I, a foreigner, have to think that such a simple commodity would be unavailable! And if I had

chosen to remind her of her previous statement, she doubtless would simply have denied ever having said it.

Ends and Means

Some of the attitudes described above are connected with another difference in the typical Russian and the typical American ethical system. By and large, Americans believe that good ends do not justify bad means. Most Russians feel that proper ends justify whatever means necessary.

An emigre Russian professor recently conducted a survey comparing Russian and American attitudes on this subject, placing it in a completely non-political context. He asked the same question to a sample group of persons born in the U.S. and to a group of recent emigres from the Soviet Union. The question was, "If you have a good friend who is having trouble passing a course at school, is it right for you to give him answers during an exam?" The great majority of Americans said it was not right; the Russians, by a comparable majority, said it was.

It is easy to see how this attitude can be exploited by the political authorities. If they can present the objective of a given action as a laudable one, their people are likely to accept whatever means are claimed necessary to achieve it.

The Soviet handling of the KAL shoot-down illustrates many of these factors. A deeply embarrassing incident, first denied, then -- when denial was no longer possible -- a concocted story meant to be exculpatory, particularly in the eyes of the Russian people. The authorities could rely on the Russian propensity to justify means to a "necessary" end if they could be convinced that KAL 007 was a "spy plane" which threatened their security. And the larger tragedy of it all is that most Russians probably believed the concoction, because to disbelieve it would mean that they, as a nation, are aggressive brutes with no respect for human life -- an image the direct opposite of the one the Russians have of themselves and the one the regime, with all its instruments of disinformation, cultivates.

Compromise and Principle

Americans tend to see the willingness to compromise as a value in and of itself. Russians, on the other hand, tend to view it as a fault and a sign of moral weakness. The morally "correct" behavior is to stand firm on your principles and either prevail or go down fighting.

This does not mean that Russians do not understand bargaining. Anyone who has haggled with the peasants in an open-air market or dealt with their grain purchasers can testify to their innate ability to negotiate a price. But if a principle is involved, that is another matter.

Of course, none of us likes to think that we ever compromise on our principles. The real difference between Russians and Americans is that the former impute a "principle" to a much broader category of issues than we would. The communist line is always described as a "principled" line. Counting British and French nuclear systems in any INF agreement is a matter of "principle." For a long time, paying more than 6% on borrowed funds was also one, with the result that the Soviets would knowingly pay a higher price than market on a contract so that the supplier could provide a lower nominal interest rate. In real terms, the lower rate was an illusion, and they knew it, but the "principle" itself was important enough to them to insist upon it.

The underlying Soviet attitude toward compromise explains in part some of their foreign policy blunders. They probably genuinely expected the rest of the world to see their withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations in 1983 as a noble defense of principle, even if it was a principle the outsiders did not agree with. They must have realized very quickly that it was an error but once they had taken the step, they had to readjust their "principles" before they could correct it. Thus the maneuvering in advance of the Geneva meeting last January, and the insistence at that time that the renewed negotiations be characterized as entirely new.

In actual practice, the Soviet attitude toward compromise is related more to its public presentation than to the act itself. Like the peasant woman in the market who wants to move her onions before she takes the train back to her village, Soviet leaders can be quite realistic in judging when it is in their interest to strike a deal and when they may be better off without one. If they are interested in a deal, however, they will wish to position themselves so that they can present it to their own people as a triumph of some principle. This partially explains their habit of seeking general agreements in principle before negotiating details. The agreement in principle, as it were, legitimizes the detailed bargaining which must follow and the result can be portrayed as a successful embodiment of the principle, rather than a craven compromise.

If, however, the Soviet leaders are unable to adjust their "principled" position to accommodate a deal, they may refuse to conclude the deal at all, even if it is in their interest. Immediately after the Trade Act of 1974 was passed with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, the Soviets very privately showed a willingness to reach a deal. They offered an emigration figure of at least 50,000 a year, but on condition that there would be no public acknowledgement that there was a deal. Everything fell apart when there were leaked stories in Washington about this; the Soviets drew back, refused further negotiation and have never since been persuaded to resume bargaining on the issue.

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Pride, Face and Status

The Russians have only themselves to blame for the widespread criticism their actions evoke, and the fear and derision they inspire in outsiders. It is doubtless too much to expect them to understand this -- though some of their intellectuals do. Some criticism they can take -- but only in private. They usually do not mind the fear, because it is testimony to their importance and, furthermore, has important political uses. It is really the derision that sends them up the wall. And their skins are so thin on this subject, that they often see insult where none is intended.

Gorbachev's opening monologue to Baldrige in May provided several examples of this. "We recognize that you are a great country and have great achievements," he claimed, "but you ignore what we have achieved. You won't treat us as equals." Subsequently, he complained that even when they pay good hard cash for our grain, which we are anxious to sell, we make statements that they cannot feed their own people, while we never make such statements about Western Europe, which imports more food per capita than the Soviet Union.

Distorted and self-serving as Gorbachev's statements were, they probably represented genuine feelings. Underlying them is a deep inferiority complex bred of many factors: an awareness of their technological backwardness and lower living standards; a basic (though probably subconscious) sense of their political illegitimacy; a recognition that their system has failed to fulfill its promises to provide a better life for their people; and a feeling that they have been systematically denied their rightful recognition and "place in the sun."

Never mind that they have usually stimulated by their own actions and behavior the treatment which they resent. The fact is probably that their skins are thin precisely because they know in their hearts that the criticism, and much of the derision, is well founded. A Russian-speaking American diplomat who served in Moscow in the 1930's tells the following story. Despite the Stalinist atmosphere of the time, he managed to acquire a number of Russian friends, and at their meetings they would speak freely of many of their country's problems. Once, however, the diplomat was called on in a gathering which included foreigners to discuss the current situation, and he alluded gently to some of these problems. Afterwards, some of his Soviet acquaintances came up and told him with indignation, "We thought you were our friend!" He protested that he was, indeed, a friend and pointed out that he had said nothing which was not true. "Of course it's true." the Soviets replied. "But if you were our friend, you wouldn't tell the truth about us."

It is hard to imagine a Chinese or a Frenchman making a statement like that. But then, they have a rock-steady foundation of national and cultural self-confidence to rely on. The Russian psyche, in contrast, teeters on the sand of self-doubt.

The Other Side of the Coin

Having said so much about contrasts in Russian and American attitudes, a word may be in order about some similarities. We are not poles apart in everything.

In private, and away from a politically-charged environment, a Russian is typically gracious and remarkably open -- if he likes you and considers you sincere. Five or ten minutes after a chance meeting -- say in a train compartment or on a park bench -- he is likely to tell you the story of his life and elicit yours, and respond with spontaneity and candor. In this respect Russians are much less reserved than most West Europeans, and are quick to notice that Americans have the same trait.

Nor do they allow the xenophobic strain in much of their thinking -- and much of the propaganda -- to affect personal ties with individuals. West Germans often are amazed by the warmth and hospitality shown them by Russians when they visit the Soviet Union, given Russian memories of World War II. Many Germans have told me that they are treated better in Leningrad than in Paris by the man on the street.

For all their sensitivity to criticism in public, Russians expect it in private, so long as it does not seem gratuitous or damaging to their sense of national dignity. In fact, the foreigner who tries to curry favor by praising everything Soviet earns only their contempt; such praise is considered insincere, and often patronizing and condescending to boot. (Of course, they like praise of those things they are genuinely proud of, such as their heroism in World War II, Shostakovich's music or Voznesensky's poetry, but not of the things they know very well do not merit praise.)

Their deepest contempt, however, is reserved for those foreigners who try to ingratiate themselves by running down their own country. This the Russians simply do not understand -- in their eyes the foreigner should stand up for his country just as a Russian would for his own -- and if he does not do so, he is considered morally defective. This attitude, of course, does not prevent them from using such persons for propaganda purposes, but Russians, official or otherwise, really have no respect for them.

This attitude applies in particular to members of communist parties in Western Europe and the U.S. In 1976 we sponsored a major exhibition on American life in Moscow to mark the Bicentennial of American Independence. It was an election year, and one section of the exhibit had a real voting machine and the Soviet visitors were encouraged to go in and cast a mock ballot. The slate used was taken from New York and the American Communist Party was on the ballot.

Almost nobody voted the CP slate (if memory serves, there were perhaps three or four votes for the communists out of thousands cast). Almost all Soviet visitors voted for either Ford or Carter. Our American guides conducted a bit of exit polling at the exhibit, asking visitors how they had voted. Once and a while they would ask why the visitor had not voted for the communists. Sometimes that question only elicited a discreet shrug, but several Soviet visitors were brutally frank, making statements like, "If I were an American, do you think I'd vote for those clowns?" or "Do you think I want America to have a mess like we have here?" So much for Marxist "proletarian solidarity"!

Unfortunately, these appealing Russian traits of personal openness and candor are all too often submerged under the repressive lid of the police state. But when the regime tries to suppress these traits, it is moving against, rather than with, the Russian cultural tradition. Whenever the lid is slightly raised, the traditional behavior spurts forth, all the more vehemently for having been constrained.

* * * * *

The contradictory pull of the various urges, hang-ups and ideological imperatives at work in Soviet Russian minds and emotions tends to make Soviet behavior not only unpredictable to the outsider, but unpredictable for Russians themselves.

Michael Vozlensky, a former member of the Soviet elite who defected in the early 1970's and has written a classic work on the Soviet ruling class, commented recently that those who think the Soviet leaders operate in accord with a careful plan of action have it all wrong. "Everything is decided ad hoc," he maintained. "They don't know themselves what they are going to do next. But they will always claim that they had it in mind all along."

He may be right.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

September 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Background Paper on Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is the first in a series of papers on the Soviet Union that we are doing for the First Lady. It concerns Soviet/Russian psychological traits. We will provide an additional paper each week until the President's November 19 and 20 meetings with Gorbachev.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to James G. Rosebush at Tab I.

Approve *JFM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to James G. Rosebush
- Tab A "Soviet Russian Psychology:
Some Common Traits"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

29 J4-

7373
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Revised List of Participants in White House Meeting with Shevardnadze, Friday, September 27, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding a revised suggested list (Tab A) of participants for the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The revised list was provided to the State Department by the Soviet Embassy.

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Robert C. McFarlane
- Tab A Revised List of Participants
- Tab II State Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *GW* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Revised List of Participants in White House
Meeting with Shevardnadze on Friday, September
27, 1985

Attached at Tab A is a revised suggested list of participants in the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Attachment:

Tab A Revised Suggested List of Participants

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 6/19/12

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE
SEPTEMBER 27, 1985
SUGGESTED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Pre-Brief

9:00 am - 10:00 am - Oval Office

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room/Cabinet Room

US Participants

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst to the Foreign Minister A.S. Chernyshov
Minister-Counselor O.M. Sokolov
P.R. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister ShevardnadzeUS Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM A.S. Chernyshov
Mr. P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov

United States Department of State

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Washington, D.C. 20520



September 20, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PARTICIPANTS IN SHEVARDNADZE MEETING

The Soviet Embassy gave the Department on September 18 a list of Soviet officials to accompany Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in his September 27 meeting and lunch with the President. An unofficial translation is attached (Tab 1).

Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov, who delivered the list, requested our corresponding list as soon as possible. The Department has forwarded to you a suggested list of U.S. participants in the meeting and the White House lunch (Tab 2). When this list is approved, we will inform the Soviet Embassy of the U.S. participants.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By COS NARA 6/19/02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial Translation

List of Soviet Participants in the Meeting of E. A. Shevardnadze with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz

Meeting with Reagan of September 27 in Washington

- Korniyenko, G.M. (First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs)
- Dobrynin, A.F. (Ambassador to the United States)
- Chernyshov, A.S. (Ambassador and Assistant to the Foreign Minister)
- Sokolov, O.M. (Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy)
- Palazhchenko, P.R. (Interpreter)

Lunch hosted by the President of September 27 in the White House

The same composition as in the conversation with the President, plus

- Isakov, V.F. (Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Suggested List of US Participants

Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 PM

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By C/S NARA, Date 10/19/02

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Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Revised List of Participants in White House Meeting with Shevardnadze, Friday, September 27, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding a revised suggested list (Tab A) of participants for the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The revised list was provided to the State Department by the Soviet Embassy.

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Robert C. McFarlane
- Tab A Revised List of Participants
- Tab II State Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 29, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Revised List of Participants in White House
Meeting with Shevardnadze on Friday, September
27, 1985

Attached at Tab A is a revised suggested list of participants in the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Attachment:

Tab A Revised Suggested List of Participants

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CVJ NARA, Date 6/19/02

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Add-on

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE
SEPTEMBER 27, 1985
SUGGESTED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Pre-Brief

9:00 am - 10:00 am - Oval Office

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room/Cabinet Room

US Participants

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst to the Foreign Minister A.S. Chernyshov
Minister-Counselor O.M. Sokolov
P.R. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

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The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister ShevardnadzeUS Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM A.S. Chernyshov
Mr. P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 20, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PARTICIPANTS IN SHEVARDNADZE MEETING

The Soviet Embassy gave the Department on September 18 a list of Soviet officials to accompany Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in his September 27 meeting and lunch with the President. An unofficial translation is attached (Tab 1).

Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov, who delivered the list, requested our corresponding list as soon as possible. The Department has forwarded to you a suggested list of U.S. participants in the meeting and the White House lunch (Tab 2). When this list is approved, we will inform the Soviet Embassy of the U.S. participants.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Unofficial Translation

List of Soviet Participants in the Meeting of E. A. Shevardnadze with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz

Meeting with Reagan of September 27 in Washington

Korniyenko, G.M.	(First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs)
Dobrynin, A.F.	(Ambassador to the United States)
Chernyshov, A.S.	(Ambassador and Assistant to the Foreign Minister)
Sokolov, O.M.	(Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy)
Palazhchenko, P.R.	(Interpreter)

Lunch hosted by the President of September 27 in the White House

The same composition as in the conversation with the President, plus

Isakov, V.F.	(Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy)
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DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Suggested List of US Participants

Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 PM

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/19/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

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September 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from William Casey

The attached Martin/Rixse memorandum (Tab I) forwards the President's response to a September 24 letter from DCI Casey.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo for signature

Tab A Letter from DCI Casey



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Mr. Casey's September 24 letter to the President

Mr. Casey's letter of September 24 advises that he has received a copy of a film produced by Armand Hammer for the Soviets on the subject of Ronald Reagan. The President has seen the letter, which includes an outline of the film's contents. The President agrees with Mr. Casey's judgment that there is no need for him to view the film.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Letter from DCI Casey

44

00 A

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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24 September 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President,

We have given you a 6 minute film on Shevardnadze and will be giving you a 15-20 minute tape on Chairman Gorbachev and a shorter one on Raisa Gorbachev.

Bill McSweeney, Armand Hammer's man in Washington, gave me a 4 hour and 52 minute tape on Ronald Reagan which Hammer's film company put together for the Soviets.

I have the film but I think the attached table of contents of "The Ronald Reagan Profile" will give you more than you need to know about it.

Respectfully yours,



William J. Casey

Attachment

RONALD REAGAN PROFILE

<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>TAPE #</u>	<u>LENGTH</u>	<u>ENTIRE/EXCERPTS</u>
1. March 3, 1981	Walter Cronkite Special	01	25m	excerpts
2. November 19, 1981	Reagan on Reagan	1	28m	entire
3. November 26, 1981	Ronald Reagan: At Home on the Ranch	2	59m	entire
4. January 27, 1982	A Conversation with the President	26	8m	excerpts
5. July 26, 1982	The Lawmakers	17	7m	excerpts
6. September 18, 1982	Jack Anderson	1A	18m	excerpts
6A. January 21, 1983	Students and Leaders: Conversations with the White House	--	10m	excerpts
7. September 5, 1983	Address to the Nation on Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner	437	17m	entire
8. September 26, 1983	Speech before UN General Assembly	550	29m	entire
9. January 16, 1984	Speech on Improving Relations with the USSR	877	27m	entire
10. January 25, 1984	Third State of the Union Address before Joint Session of Congress	1136	17m	excerpts
11. January 29, 1984	President Reagan's Address Announcing His Candidacy for Reelection	1137	5m	entire
12. October 21, 1984	The Second Reagan/Mondale Presidential Debate	2996	7m	excerpts
13. January 20, 1985	Official Swearing in of President Reagan	3370	1m	excerpts
14. February 6, 1985	State of the Union Address	3372	12m	excerpts
15. June 24, 1985	The First Lady, Nancy Reagan	4083	13m	excerpts
16. January 20, 1981	Ronald Reagan's America	--	9m	excerpts

292m = 4 hrs. 52 min.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's Lunch with Shevardnadze:
Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation of the President's lunch with Shevardnadze on September 27, 1985.

RECOMMENDATION

that you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CW*
6/19/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Lunch with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS: United States
The President
Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Secretary Baker
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane, NSC
Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Colonel Robert E. Linhard, NSC
Charles Z. Wick, USIA
Mrs. Eugenia Arensburger, Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador and Assistant to the Foreign
Minister Albert S. Chernyshov
Counselor to the Foreign Minister
Sergei P. Tarasenko
Head of Public Affairs at the Foreign
Ministry Viktor B. Lomeiko
Minister Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister Counselor Viktor Isakov
Mr. Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

DATE, TIME Friday, September 27, 1985; 12:15 - 1:15 P.M.
AND PLACE: State Dining Room, The White House (U)

Following some initial exchanges devoted to Hurricane Gloria and its effects on the travel of the participants, The Vice President mentioned that he was making a trip to China soon and solicited Shevardnadze's view of the situation there. (C)

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7854
BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

Shevardnadze mentioned that he had met with the Chinese Foreign Minister yesterday, who had described the changes that were going on in China. He characterized them as a generational change, and said that they were for the better. They extended mutual invitations to visit. In general, he would characterize Soviet-Chinese relations as undergoing gradual improvement, step-by-step. The Soviets, he said, want an improvement. He asked if the Vice President would be making a long trip. (S/S)

The Vice President said he would be staying four to five days. (C)

Shevardnadze asked when the Vice President was in China as Ambassador. (U)

The Vice President replied that he was there in 1974 and 1975. At that time our relations were better with the Soviet Union than they were with China. (U)

Secretary Shultz observed that, in developing their economy, the Chinese want to create more stability around their borders. They want modernization. (U)

Shevardnadze said that the Chinese Foreign Minister had told him that China is still a developing country. It is good that the U.S. and China are developing normal relations. (U)

The Vice President replied that an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations is also to be welcomed. (U)

Shevardnadze remarked that in relations with some countries there is an accumulation of distrust. It takes some time to remove this. (S)

Secretary Shultz observed that the idea of economic development is not well understood. But in the last few years, the U.S. economy has developed more rapidly than most in the world. It has happened for the same reason that applies when poorer countries like China have developed rapidly: the presence of incentives. (C)

The President then spoke of his visit to a Chinese farmer on a state farm. He had described how his life had improved since he had gained the right to farm a private plot. (U)

Secretary Shultz asked whether Shevardnadze thought the President and Gorbachev could reach agreement in November on things like expanded student exchanges and greater cooperation in medical research, such as cancer research, as the President had suggested. (S)

Shevardnadze replied that some of the matters were under discussion and that we should keep working on such ideas. (S)

The President called attention to Lincoln's portrait in the room, and exchanges followed with references to the American Civil War and the Civil War in the Soviet Union. (U)

Shevardnadze remarked that in Lincoln's time, U.S.-Russian relations had been good, and in fact had usually been good in our history. (U)

The President said this reminded him of the story of a wife who recalled to her husband how, when they were first married, they sat very close in the car, often with her head resting on his shoulder. The husband answered, "Well, dear, I haven't moved." (U)

The remainder of the conversation was devoted to stories and anecdotes reflecting the various ethnic groups which are present in the two countries. (U)

The lunch concluded with Shevardnadze thanking the President for his hospitality and toasting his health, and the President toasting the health of his Soviet guests. (U)