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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON (APPROVED/DISAPPROVED)
SEPTEMBER 1985 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1107

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7834	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE POSSIBLE DEAL TO FREE SHCHARANSKY <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	9/23/1985	B1
7835	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHEVARDNADZE MEETING: HUMAN RIGHTS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	3	9/23/1985	B1
7836	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA MEETING PROPOSALS TO BROADEN THE AGENDA <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	9/23/1985	B1
7837	REPORT	REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: CONCEPT PAPER <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	4	ND	B1
7838	REPORT	NEW INITIATIVES: CONTACTS, COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7839	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS RE GENEVA <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7840	PAPER	POSSIBLE INITIATIVES <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7841	MEMO	ISSUES IN THE SDI BY THOMAS JOHNSON <i>D 11/2/2007 F06-114/3 R 6/23/2010 M08-125/2</i>	5	9/23/1985	B1
7842	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7841 <i>D 11/21/2007 F06-114/3 R 6/23/2010 M08-125/2</i>	5	9/23/1985	B1
7843	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PREPARING FOR GORBACHEV <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	9/23/1985	B1
7844	MEMO9	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PREPARING FOR GORBACHEV <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7845	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PREPARING FOR GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	4	9/19/1985	B1
7846	TALKING POINTS	DRAFT TALKING POINTS: PRESIDENT REAGAN--GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	8	ND	B1

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The President

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2 Ben-Zion Street
Jerusalem 95423
Israel

12 November 1985

Dear President Reagan,

I address this letter to you, on the eve of your departure for the Geneva Summit, to wish you success in your untiring efforts to advance the cause of human freedom through the release of Prisoners of Conscience and the free emigration of Soviet Jewry.

A great responsibility rests on your shoulders, Mr. President. That last remnant of East European Jewry, the survivors of the Nazi Holocaust - which destroyed the large majority of European Jews - is being imprisoned forty years after the end of the Holocaust, its leaders languishing in Soviet prisons and forced-labour camps. You, Mr. President, have been given the opportunity to pry open the iron gates - to end the last exile of the Jewish People on the continent of Europe. Mr. President, this task bears a historic importance that far transcends the politics of the moment. Your success in this endeavour, the out-pouring of the hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews that would follow your success and their emigration to their ancient homeland - the Land of Israel - would be an important chapter in the long history of the Jewish People, that began so long ago with the Exodus from Egypt, and the progress of the human race.

My husband, Anatoly Shcharansky, has strikingly demonstrated the courage and resolution shown by Soviet Jews in the face of tyranny and persecution. He is a symbol of the Jewish resistance to Soviet oppression and of the cultural renaissance of Jewish life in the Soviet Union. Daily, he defends his moral integrity in the face of unimagined pressures. Mr. President, he has suffered enough. His plight is intrinsically connected with the fate of the Soviet Jewish community as a whole. His immediate release is the one concrete step that could signal a change in the direction of Soviet policy. His release would unite an unjustly divided family and allow us to build a normal home in Jerusalem.

I am confident that you are equal to the tasks that lie before you. The hopes of thousands go with you.

Respectfully yours,

Avital Shcharansky
Avital Shcharansky

Mr. Ronald Reagan
The President of the
United States of America

Copy of Letter to Sec. Gorbachev

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Jerusalem, 12 November 1985

His Excellency
Mr. Michael Gorbachev
Secretary-General
C. P. S. U.

Mr. Secretary-General,

The global issues on the agenda of the Geneva Summit, important as they are, should not be allowed to over-shadow an issue in which your personal intervention can prevent the continued suffering of an innocent man, unjustly imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit.

My husband, Anatoly Shcharansky, has demonstrated time and time again the ability of the human spirit to withstand physical torture and psychological terror, to emerge victorious in the face of unimagined pressures. You, Mr. Secretary-General, as head of the system that confines him, are directly and personally responsible for his continued suffering, for our continued separation, for the fact that Anatoly and I are unable to raise a family and build a normal home together. Your responsibility demands that you act vigorously for his release.

The release of Anatoly, Mr. Secretary-General, would signal a new and human approach to the problem of that last remnant of Eastern European Jewry trapped within the borders of the Soviet Union. Anything less, Mr. Gorbachev, would be a betrayal of those basic human values on which all civilization is based.

Mr. Secretary-General, the suffering of my husband Anatoly, and the suffering of the Jews of the Soviet Union must be brought to an end. Apathy and indifference in the face of my appeal and the appeals of others can only be interpreted as a conscious decision on your part to prolong their suffering.

Your responsibility is great. I hope that a response of conscience will be forthcoming.

Sincerely,

Avital Shcharansky

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 23, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Possible Deal to Free Shcharansky

I have been informed by State that negotiations for a trade of Shcharansky and a German held by the Soviets (Kraus) for three persons held by the West Germans may be nearing closure. The Germans had offered two persons in the trade and the Soviets asked for a third. The Germans have agreed to a third in principle, but are offering a different person from the one the Soviets requested. Vogel expects to have an answer tomorrow.

If the deal is struck, it is likely that the prisoners will be exchanged in West Berlin next Monday. (This has a certain plausibility, since Gorbachev may want to get it out of the way before he goes to France.)

State informed me further that Rick Burt had recommended that, when and if Shcharansky is released, he have him brought to his residence in Berlin where he could receive a telephone call from the President, and have a photo op. Advance arrangement would also be made to bring Avital to Berlin to meet him.

I think it is a bad idea to involve the President directly, since it may make it harder to solve some of the other human rights cases, particularly since it is the Germans who are providing the trading material. (I have no objection, of course, to bringing Avital to meet him, if and when we are sure it will come off.)

I doubt that State will support Rick's idea of the telephone call, but in case they do, I wanted you to be aware of the situation.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Shevardnadze Meeting: Human Rights

As you know, we have been working on an approach to encourage greater Soviet responsiveness on human rights issues that would involve a linkage with possible loosening of our foreign policy controls (not strategic controls) on oil and gas exploration and production equipment and technology. Roz Ridgway obtained George Shultz' agreement to give this approach a try, and she and I went over the ground with Mac Baldrige who was also supportive. As you know George raised it with the President during the NSC on Friday. I think it would now be appropriate for you to clear the concept with the President so George can use it in his discussions with Shevardnadze. The President could then refer to them in his own talk with Shevardnadze.

I recommend you tell the President that: We have been working on ways to make the Soviets more responsive on human rights issues. The tie between US-Soviet trade and the levels of Soviet emigration has been a fact of life for over a decade, and we believe there may be some room to use this connection to improve Soviet human rights performance. In addition, we may have some increased leverage at this time since Gorbachev is now making the major decisions for the new Five Year Plan. None of us have any interest in allowing the Soviets to obtain strategically-controlled products, but there is a range of items -- principally oil and gas exploration and production equipment and technology -- where we have instituted restrictions for foreign policy reasons that might offer a good area for tradeoffs. In fact the specific reason for their imposition by the Carter Administration was Soviet repression of human rights activists, i.e. Shcharanskiy. George and Mac Baldrige both believe this approach is worth trying. If you agree, George could suggest we might be interested in such an approach this week with Shevardnadze. He would use the talking points attached at Tab A.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss with the President, and if he agrees, you authorize Shultz to use the talking points at Tab A in his private meeting with Shervardnadze.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Human Rights Talking Points

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HUMAN RIGHTS TALKING POINTS

-- I KNOW THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN INTERESTED IN INCREASING TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES AND YOU HAVE STATED YOUR VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE TOO ARE INTERESTED IN INCREASING TRADE, BUT THE ISSUE IS HISTORICALLY INTERTWINED WITH EMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- PRINCIPLES ARE INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES. WE DO NOT EXPECT EITHER SIDE TO GIVE THEM UP, NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT MERELY DWELLING ON OUR DIFFERENCES WILL GET US ANYWHERE.

-- IT STILL SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR EACH OF US TO DO THINGS IN THESE AREAS RECOGNIZING THAT FOR BOTH SIDES, THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING OUR RELATIONSHIP IS SHAPED AND DEEPLY AFFECTED BY WHAT WE DO IN PRACTICE. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US EACH TO MOVE IN THESE AREAS, ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO US, ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO YOU.

-- JUST TO SPECULATE A BIT, PERHAPS YOUR SIDE COULD ALLOW SOME OF THE MORE PROMINENT DETAINED INDIVIDUALS TO GO ABROAD, CLEAR UP THE CASES OF SEPARATED SPOUSES AND AMERICAN CITIZENS THAT CANNOT LEAVE, AND MOVE ON JEWISH EMIGRATION. THIS COULD BE DONE UNILATERALLY, WITHOUT FANFARE OR EFFORTS ON OUR SIDE TO TAKE CREDIT. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE PENTECOSTALISTS IN OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO.

-- ON OUR SIDE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW SOME MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

-- THE PROCESS COULD ULTIMATELY GO QUITE FAR IN REMOVING THE BASIS FOR OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND IN REMOVING YOUR COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT ON TRADE. IF THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING HERE, IT WOULD BE WELL TO SEE THE FIRST TANGIBLE EVIDENCE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THIS FALL. WE WILL BE WATCHING, AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND.

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Eyes Only

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Preparations for Geneva Meeting; Proposals to Broaden the Agenda

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Bud

Following your approval of my earlier memorandum, commenting on Jim Billington's suggestions, I convened two very close-hold groups over the weekend to work out some ideas regarding the sort of proposals we could make to give greater emphasis to the regional issue and bilateral elements of our agenda, and thus diminish the almost exclusive focus on SDI which has developed as a result of Soviet tactics.

Attached are concept papers covering these two areas. The first, on regional issues, was worked by Steve Sestanovich, Mark Palmer, Peter Rodman and Eric Edelman from State. The one on contacts and communication was worked by Bud Korengold, Mark Palmer and Max Robinson from State. I believe that both provide sound and imaginative approaches.

If these approaches are approved in principle, I would see the sequence of events as follows:

- 1) Lay groundwork for making the proposals in the meetings with Shevardnadze this week, but not make actual concrete proposals.
- 2) Plan to make the regional proposal by diplomatic channels next week or shortly thereafter, then follow it with a speech by the President on the subject.
- 3) Plan to make the proposals on contacts and communication over the next couple of weeks, and have a presidential speech on the subject a week or so before his UNGA address.
- 4) Wrap it all together, along with a public formulation of our arms control proposals, in the UNGA address.
- 5) Have the President give, on the eve of his departure for Geneva, a TV address to the American people (which might also be carried on EURONET), in which he would set forth his vision of what the future of U.S.-Soviet relations could be like if Gorbachev is willing to engage us in a constructive way.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

This, I realize, is a very ambitious scenario, and will require a lot of fast work. Still, I believe it is doable if we get a rapid go-ahead to proceed with the preparations. Therefore, I would recommend that you authorize us to proceed to make plans along these lines, which require the following:

- 1) Drafting appropriate talking points for the meetings this week (some suggestions are attached);
- 2) Setting times (on a close-hold basis) for the public appearances required;
- 3) Formulating the concrete proposals and drafting the speeches.

Palmer has forwarded copies of the papers at Tabs I and II to Secretary Shultz for his consideration as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve proceeding with a "regional conflict initiative" as outlined in Tab I.

Approve *rcm* Disapprove

Other or comment:

2. That you approve proceeding with the initiatives in the bilateral contacts area, as outlined in Tab II.

Approve *rcm* Disapprove

Other or comment:

Attachments:

Tab I - Regional Conflicts and U.S.-Soviet Relations: Concept Paper

Tab II - New Initiatives: Contacts, Communication and Cooperation

Tab A - Talking Points

Tab B - Possible Initiatives

cc: Adm. Poindexter, *Don Fortier*

14

I

Regional Conflicts and US-Soviet Relations:
Concept Paper

In preparation for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, we have sought to emphasize the importance of a broader agenda than arms control alone, without seeming to make our objections to Soviet conduct a pretext for avoiding serious negotiation of strategic issues. This goal goes beyond preparations for the meeting in Geneva: we want the Soviets and the public to see that a fundamental improvement in relations is possible only if the problems created by Soviet Third World activities in the late 70's are dealt with.

Basic Concept

A major Presidential initiative to advance these goals would have the following form:

-- First, a proposal for cease-fires and negotiations among the warring parties in the key countries where Soviet (or proxy) involvement has created the greatest Western concern -- Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, the Horn, Southern Africa.

-- Second, with the opening of such negotiations, a separate set of Soviet-American talks to eliminate each side's military presence in the country and its role in the flow of arms into the area of conflict.

These two levels of talks, if successful, would lay the basis for a third element of a long-term solution -- the reintegration (with American assistance of some sort) of these countries into the international economy.

Advantages

The critical test for any such proposal is whether it can be seriously presented and defended in public: does it clarify US policies without creating any unmanageable opportunities for the Soviet side? From this point of view, the above formula has several important advantages.

- 1) Unlike global approaches that are sometimes put forward (e.g. the Basic Principles of 1972 or other "codes of conduct"), this plan deals with concrete cases that are known to have worsened US-Soviet relations.
- 2) It can be presented as a realistic approach that tries to get at the underlying conflicts that have drawn the superpowers in, rather than simply trying to negotiate US-Soviet agreement from the top down.
- 3) By requiring negotiations among warring parties, it legitimates the freedom fighters that oppose pro-Soviet regimes. Here

the plan follows the pattern of the President's March proposal on Nicaragua. It reflects the interest he has taken in such liberation struggles.

4) The proposal also follows directly from the President's recent statements about Soviet "intentions." The great uncertainty created by more expansive Soviet conduct during the 70's was precisely that it was based not on traditional inter-state ties but on creating new, repressive Communist regimes.

5) The timing of the plan would allow the President to say that it builds logically on the US-Soviet regional discussions that grew out of his 1984 UNGA proposal. By improving understanding of each side's position, these have cleared the ground for a serious initiative.

6) Finally, the main measure of seriousness will be what the proposal offers the Soviets. In fact, it seems to offer them a version of something they have long wanted -- discussion of the US global presence. This version, however, protects us by making talks contingent on (and separate from) political negotiations that their clients almost certainly cannot accept. It also limits the talks to specific areas. These features make it hard for the Soviets to accept without detracting from the plan's credibility.

Possible Complications and Objections

We would have to deal with some obvious difficulties in the initiative.

1) Some would find its scope one-sided -- why not add the Middle East, or the Philippines? Is South Africa itself included? The first point would be answered on grounds of realism: our focus is on problems that have most damaged relations by raising the most extreme fears about Soviet purposes. The Philippines is not yet such a problem. The Middle East also has a different place in US-Soviet relations; its conflicts do not fit the pattern of this initiative. Including South Africa might increase the appearance of comprehensiveness; the SAG would certainly resent it, but calling for dialogue wouldn't alter our basic orientation there.

2) The appearance of condominium is a possible, but superficial, objection. We ought to repeat ceaselessly that the plan's goal is to keep the superpowers out. Keeping their discussions separate from the internal talks would strengthen this point.

3) Some affected allies or friends would worry that their interests might be slighted. Pakistan may be the most serious case of this, but couching the proposal in broad terms would probably make it much less unsettling than an initiative limited simply to Afghanistan. In any event, full pre-briefing on the plan would be necessary.

4) Certain on-going mediation processes might also seem to be undercut by the plan. (For example, Angola-Namibia.) We should emphasize that the strength of the approach lies in its broad applicability; implementation may vary, case by case. At the same time, we would note that existing process have not brought peace, and this initiative can add to the incentives that other approaches have tried to create.

5) A call for cease-fires and negotiation may appear somewhat empty in the absence of any mediation mechanism. We might consider spelling out the kinds of structures that could play this role. The existence of Contadora in Central America has been invaluable; comparable (not necessarily parallel) devices should be considered in other regions, as well as the involvement of recognized impartial outsiders. (In some cases, our European allies might play a role.)

6) Finally, resources should not be over-promised. Proposals dressed up as a "Marshall Plan" for this or that area arouse suspicions that they are empty grand designs, not likely to be funded. The plan's emphasis must be on reintegration into the world economy, with resources from diverse sources, not on a US aid program. (We can note, of course, our commitment to the Kissinger Commission's aid levels, Ethiopian relief, etc.)

Implementation

The sequence for presenting this approach to the Soviets, and publicly, should be as follows:

1) A discussion of the problem with Shevardnadze. The President's presentation would be firm: we must find a way to restrain the use of force, particularly by the superpowers, in regional disputes. Otherwise, the U.S. will be constrained to act more forcefully itself.

2) A formal proposal by diplomatic channels a day or two before a Presidential speech on the topic.

3) A major Presidential address on the overall problem with an announcement of our proposal.

4) Further mention of the proposal, as part of our four-part agenda, in the President's UNGA address.

5) On the eve of the President's departure for Geneva, a televised Presidential message to the American people which would set forth his "vision" of what the meeting could accomplish if Gorbachev is willing to build a more constructive relationship.

Soviet Responses

Rejection is most likely, but the Soviets might also counter with a re-worked proposal, either redefining the areas (e.g., adding

the Middle East), turning it inside-out (superpower talks first, local ceasefires later), or proposing one case at a time. They would be most tempted to accept in Cambodia, given their client's military strength and our own difficulties with a Khmer Rouge role.

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II

NEW INITIATIVES: CONTACTS, COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION

As part of a program to emphasize the four areas of our agenda with the Soviets, we should develop a forward-looking set of proposals for a massive expansion of contacts and exchanges with the USSR. This will focus attention on one of the greatest Soviet weaknesses: its closed society.

The approach is best summed up in the speech the President gave last year to the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, namely, that "nothing is more worthy of our attention than finding ways to reach out and establish better communication with the people and the government of the Soviet Union."

Focus will be on three areas:

- Working cooperatively now on today's toughest human problems.
- Opening up our societies to each other.
- Preparing our next generations for better understanding and a more just and secure peace.

Specifically, the new initiatives would range over a wide spectrum, from joint consultations on stemming terrorism and drug abuse to vastly increased educational, television and youth exchanges, bolstered tourism and sister-city programs, an invitation to a Soviet cosmonaut to ride our space shuttle and even an offer of National Football League highlights to Soviet television.

To maximize the chance that the Soviet Union will give serious consideration to our ideas, we must present them officially to the Soviets before we announce them publicly. The President could lay the groundwork in his meeting with Shevardnadze, and we could follow up with specific proposals in diplomatic channels over the next couple of weeks. Then, about mid-October the President could deliver a speech on the subject.

Under Tab A is a set of suggested talking points for the President to prepare the ground with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. He would reaffirm his hope that agreement will be reached in Geneva on matters already on the table but stress his desire that he and Gorbachev can seize this historic chance to chart an even more ambitious cooperative program for the sake of future generations.

Under Tab B you will find an outline list of possible initiatives. If approved in principle, we will proceed to staff them in detail with an eye to making formal proposals over the next two weeks.

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A

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TALKING POINTS

-- We hope to make progress in Geneva on all of the problem areas we have been discussing.

-- But we also have an historic opportunity to increase dramatically our constructive dialogue in areas which offer hope for better understanding and more fruitful cooperation.

-- I have been impressed with General Secretary Gorbachev's dynamic new style of leadership and I welcome his stated desire for change. I hope that, together, in Geneva we can translate that desire on both our parts into concrete agreements to our mutual benefit.

-- I know that we have a number of items on the agenda already where we hope and believe such agreement is possible. But personally, I would like to do more.

-- In all honesty, I think our bureaucracies have not been imaginative enough in preparing for this meeting in Geneva. I have asked mine to go back to the drawing boards, to look beyond our current problems toward the long-term future, to think boldly of other ways in which our nations can increase cooperation and mutual understanding.

-- I want us to move vigorously toward the kind of relationship about which Secretary Gorbachev has spoken, where we will both be able to spend more of our time, money, and attention on building our economies and a better life for our people.

-- The sort of things I have in mind are:

- greatly increasing our exchanges of students and young people;
- sharing know-how on computer education in the classroom;
- joining together to find cures for cancer and other diseases;
- seeking your help in vastly increasing our Russian language capabilities;
- establishing a pattern of more consultation and contact between our military people;
- having more Soviet citizens coming to this country and more of our citizens going to yours; and
- increasing our contacts in sports.

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7839

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-- I have instructed our people to come up with some ideas along these lines and we will be passing them along in diplomatic channels.

-- We have a long way to go in improving communication between our societies, but this is fundamental to ensuring the peace over the long run.

-- I hope you will also be thinking about more ambitious ways for us to tackle this problem and I will welcome your specific ideas.

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POSSIBLE INITIATIVES

People to People Exchanges

A massive exchange of undergraduate students. As a start, at least 5,000 each way for a year of study in the other country.

An ambitious annual or summertime "Youth Exchange" program involving at least 5,000 secondary-school age youths who would live with families in the other country and either attend school or engage in cooperative summer camp projects with their local counterparts.

A substantial increase in exchange professors: from the score or so at present to a few hundred at least.

A massive expansion of "sister-city" relationships, with at least one "people-to-people" visit each year, each way by city officials or delegations and an accompanying effort to increase general tourism between participating cities. The program could begin with 50 pairings the first year.

Creation of a Soviet-American scholarship program similar to the Rhodes Scholars that annually would send 10 of the best and brightest students from each country to study at a distinguished university of the other.

Increased Consultations

Inauguration of regular bilateral consultations about cooperative efforts to halt terrorism. These could be on the model of the regional consultations already underway.

Joint, regular consultations about efforts to combat alcoholism and drug trafficking. Mrs. Reagan could make this offer to Mrs. Gorbachev.

Expansion of regular contacts and consultations between our military services.

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7840

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

Wider Information Exchange

Establishment of national out-of-embassy cultural centers and libraries in each other's countries, with uncontrolled access. The Soviets have cultural centers in many nations, as do we. But we have none in the USSR and they have none here.

Inauguration of regular media exchanges. Soviet columnists writing once a month in American journals and American writers given similar regular space in Soviet publications. Regular TV discussion shows, say at least an hour a month, between American and Soviet journalists and/or officials. Annual TV addresses by the leaders of our two countries to the people of the other. More exchange of radio programs coupled with an end to Soviet jamming of U.S. broadcasts.

Facilitation of Soviet satellite transmissions to America via "Gorizont" and WORLDNET broadcasts to the Soviet Union.

Increased access for books and publications of one country in the other, including establishment of an American book store in the Soviet Union similar to Soviet book stores here.

Nomination of two distinguished educators or other public figures, one American, one Soviet, to undertake a major study of ways that we can increase mutual understanding by promoting the study of each other's language in our respective countries. Former Senator Charles Percy of Illinois would be a possible candidate as would a President of a major U.S. university.

Cooperation in Science and Space

An invitation to a Soviet cosmonaut to fly on a future U.S. space shuttle mission. (The Soviets have informed us that they are not interested in renewing the Space Cooperation Agreement. However, we should continue to press on the issue and eventually make public our proposal.)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

An offer to establish jointly staffed medical research institutes in both countries to tackle major medical problems faced by both countries such as alcohol/drug abuse, cancer, AIDS and to develop increased cooperation in organ transplants.

A dramatic offer to help the Soviet Union develop microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction. This is a well-established Soviet interest, would encompass technology that the Soviets could buy anyway on the open market and could have the rebound effect, to our advantage, of appearing to be magnanimous while simultaneously opening up the flow of information in the Soviets' own tightly controlled society.

Sports Cooperation and Exchanges

An offer of an hour-long version of the NFL's best game each week to Soviet TV. British television carries just such a transmission weekly, with appropriate explanations, and has a viewership of millions.

An offer of a similar transmission of the best pro basketball game of the week.

A proposal to send a pair of American football or baseball teams for a series of exhibition games and workshops in the Soviet Union.

A proposal for joint sponsorship of an annual Washington to Moscow or Moscow to Washington sporting "Great Race". It could be open to entrants from any country and could be for cars, bicyclists, light planes or other vehicles. The Paris-Dakar auto race is one model.

A dramatic increase in binational sporting competitions across the entire sporting agenda, all to be jointly televised.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

7841 24
23 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Issues In The SDI

I. TECHNICAL STATUS

The SDI Organization itself has both felt and exerted strong pressures to plan early tests of systems components and to give priority to concepts which putatively can be deployed earlier. Associated with this attitude has been a public campaign to establish an aura of rapid progress on all fronts in key SDI technologies, and hence a vague but pervasive expectation of the possibility of early deployment. This campaign is entirely explicable given the hostile atmosphere in which the SDI has had to compete for funds, particularly if one accepts the postulate (which has the status of law within the program) that only impressive large-scale technology demonstrations will ensure congressional support.

Unfortunately, the facts do not reinforce this sense of rapid progress toward early deployment. For instance: the biggest single success of the past two years, the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), had been planned for several years by the Army; the experiment was fully designed before President Reagan even took office. For instance: the Navy's MIRACL laser was transferred to the Air Force, moved to White Sands, and recently accomplished there a (well publicized) kill demonstration not significantly different from the one it did at the San Juan Capistrano test range in 1978. It is true that the beam quality of MIRACL was improved markedly in the past two years, but that improvement finally brings it up to the design criteria it was supposed to have had in 1978; during the same time, the Air Force's Sigma laser (same power as MIRACL, but of the design type planned for extrapolation to very high-power) failed completely to meet beam quality criteria and was quietly abandoned. For instance: the Army's Airborne Optical Adjunct has continued to make progress in design of multi-channel infrared tracking systems; but it too is behind original expectations, and is a program several years old. More importantly, work with passive IR techniques has now convinced most SDI workers (and, in a formal report, the Army Science Board reviewing the work) that use of such sensors to discriminate decoys from re-entry vehicles is not likely to work.

Further specific instances will be quoted in support below. The general view is that very little in the way of new technology has actually been developed, although a great many paper studies have been performed. Most of these paper studies have revealed the problems associated with continental BMD to be more difficult than had previously been thought. In short, in many areas the "progress" has actually been negative. Boost phase defense provides a good example of this.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO8-125/2 # 7841

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

29
23 September 1985

1. Boost Phase. The Fletcher panel emphasized the importance of boost phase for two reasons: the high leverage of killing missiles rather than RVs, and the necessity of multiplying kill probabilities over several levels of defense in order to produce a 99% effective system. The panel clearly favored Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) for this task. More careful studies since have shown that none of the currently available candidates is likely to come close to this mission, a result well understood in the Foster study.* Thus, DEW priorities have been changed within SDIO to reflect the fact that lasers are now expected to play a role in boost-phase kill only in the distant future, if at all.

Within the DEW part of SDIO, only one technology to address boost-phase kill remains in the main line of priorities; all others have been "re-scoped" and officially declared "back-ups." The remaining priority project is ground-based, induction LINAC free-electron lasers (FELs). The project was recently advanced from basic research level to second priority in DEW on the basis of an experimental result at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) last Spring, in which 40% of the electron beam energy was converted to one centimeter microwave radiation at powers of megawatts. In fact, until May of this year, a ground-based FEL boost-phase killer did not exist even as a concept. In this respect, progress has been tremendous: great expectations have been raised by great extrapolation. But the LLNL result, although certainly an impressive piece of physics and a great advance in FEL milestones, remains very far from meeting even the closest parameters of an FEL weapons system. The wavelength demonstrated at LLNL is 10,000 times longer than that proposed for an FEL weapon; the accelerator must be scaled up a factor of six in energy, while increasing a factor of ten in brightness (a longer accelerator --six times as long--increases the difficulties in simply maintaining brightness, far less improving it); the light beam of the laser must be perfectly trapped by the electron beam, a process not yet demonstrated or even studied experimentally; and the mirrors must be protected from destructive harmonics of the laser light. But even if the laser does work, it will not be 40% efficient, or anything close to that: that number leaves out the efficiency involved in creating the electron beam in the first place; and LLNL concedes that one micron radiation from the e-beam will be much less efficient than one centimeter radiation. Los Alamos estimates that their FEL will operate at 2-3%, and considers FELs' low efficiency a problem to be overcome in design, rather than an asset. Finally, the LLNL design for a boost-phase FEL killer is for an impressive-sounding 100 megawatt laser. But this power can easily be seen (using LLNL's own parameters) to be too low by a factor of ten to thirty to accomplish boost-phase kill against the SDIO's official responsive threat (that is, the threat in the timescale on which FEL could be deployed).

Thus, for boost-phase the only DEW remaining in SDIO's main line is a promising technology with far to go to demonstrate fundamental physics, and much farther yet to reach weapon-scale engineering.

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23 September 1985

This leaves small rockets (either with HE charges or hit-to-kill) in satellites as the only contender remaining active for boost-phase. The systems architecture studies recently completed typically plan to deploy over 60,000 of these rockets on over 12,000 satellites, about 5% of which would actually be engaged in the boost-phase battle. This notion has been carefully critiqued before (since 1962) and always found wanting; it has great problems of cost, command-and control, complexity, effectiveness and countermeasures, but the key difficulty has always been survivability. Edward Teller and his Livermore staff analyzed this system during the High Frontier studies (of which Teller was originally part; he resigned over this issue) and demonstrated that it was unworkable because the killer satellites can be effectively attacked. This analysis, in fact, resulted in the "Teller Dictum," that large, expensive space platforms are always cheaper to shoot down than to protect.

The Teller Dictum, of course, applies to all space battle stations, not just KEW ones. Consider only the most likely option: Soviet attack of the defensive system with direct-ascent rockets carrying nuclear weapons (or, cheaper, some of which carry nuclear weapons). Within three years the Soviets will already have more than 3500 such missiles without expending any additional funds at all. Suppose that we now spend \$100 billion to put up a 90% effective (SDI optimistic number) boost-phase layer. This layer will neutralize 90% of the Soviets' total investment in ICBMs, which is greater than \$200 billion. Hence, on a cost-effectiveness basis, the Soviets can afford to expend about \$300 billion to buy additional interceptor missiles, and they only have to succeed in knocking down between 5% and 10% of our satellites. Their cost effectiveness leverage is gigantic. No system proposed by or studied by SDIO can stand up to such an attack. Note that this argument does not apply to the critical sensor satellites of a generic SDI, because these satellites are cheap enough to proliferate at many altitudes and small enough to be effectively hidden in space.

Summary: Boost-phase kill is still interesting, but no current proposal seems credible in addressing its critical difficulties. Major breakthroughs in several areas will be necessary.

2. Mid-course ICBMs spend about 3 minutes in boost-phase, and warning and decision time must be subtracted from that. But they spend over twenty minutes in mid-course, with warning and decisions accomplished. The difficulty is that we must discriminate RVs from decoys in the midcourse: this has been the central problem of BMD since the late 50s. If one can identify the RVs uniquely, one might kill them by a variety of means. The HOE demonstrated this, and SDI studies have come up with other promising KEW concepts.

Discrimination remains an unsolved problem, but the most promising thing about "new technology" is that it offers new ways of discriminating. Indeed, many new and interesting ideas have been proposed and superficially studied in the last year or two. Most of them, and all the best ones, involve some form of "active" discrimination: one actually illuminates or perturbs the decoy cloud rather than passively watching it. Many such techniques involve DEWs. Unfortunately, the SDIO has selected neutral-particle beams in space as its central discrimination technology. Such beam generators would be large and expensive, hence subject to the Teller Dictum. And the neutral beam demonstration program is expanding so rapidly it will soon absorb the funds for more ingenious prospects, which are funded at very low levels as it is.

23 September 1985

A further part of the problem is that mid-course battle management is the most stressing part of the overwhelming software problems accurately summarized by Professor John Parnas in his letter of resignation as an SDIO consultant. This doesn't mean that the problem is intractable: discrimination techniques which allow direct identification and homing by interceptors (without keeping track of all the decoys separately) have been proposed. The intractability arises from the form in which the problem is currently posed.

In summary: Mid-course discrimination is the key problem. Solving it will certainly make it possible to breakup structured attacks and defend most military targets; this is also a necessary step in constructing a true continental defense. Many new solutions may be possible using novel technology or even nuclear weapons. The current SDIO is not vigorously encouraging and exploiting these solutions: its current mainline approaches are, at best, unpromising.

3. Terminal. We can now do hard-point terminal defense using interceptors with small nuclear weapons. This is the only BMD technology which has ever demonstrated any military effectiveness; it is by far the least technologically stressful problem in SDI. It is also the one area in which we have totally given up R&D, apparently for political reasons.

Non-nuclear terminal kill, on the other hand, is one of the most difficult of SDIs challenges. It is extremely unlikely that a solution to the problem will be available within the next decade, and quite possible that no solution will be found. The essence of the problem is that incoming RVs are capable of executing extremely sharp turns (ours have done 250"G turns and better), much faster than any interceptor can follow. Our engineering has never been able to reduce to zero the miss distance between interceptors and non-maneuvering RVs in clear skies; the possibility that we will solve this problem in the realm of the real responsive threat --maneuvering RVs and nuclear environments --seems remote. We can, on the other hand, probably track and kill RV's just outside the atmosphere, as the Army's ERIS program is designed to do, but only if we can first solve the discrimination problem, since the decoys will be present in full effectiveness until the RVs pass down through about 100km altitude.

4. Conclusion. The SDI must be thought of as precisely what the President specified, an R&D program. We do not yet know with any confidence how to accomplish military BMD missions that were not already essentially in hand three years ago. We must protect and nurture the innovative parts of the SDI program to give us the highest chance of finding these options. There are many promising things to work on, particularly in mid-course discrimination and associated kill mechanisms.

II. Soviet Responses and Domestic Politics

1. Terminal Defense The Soviets now have the only program in state-of-art R&D in terminal defense using nuclear weapons. Their SA-12, which begins deployment soon, will probably have significant anti-SLBM capability, and possibly some anti-ICBM as well. Since they are fully-tooled with essentially open production lines, they hold a lead-time-to-deployment advantage over the U.S. of about 6-8 years (CIA/Army estimate) in proliferating such defenses outside the Treaty. To the extent that we convince them that SDI will produce an effective national defense, we provide them with a strong incentive to break the ABM Treaty and cash their defensive advantage now.

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23 September 1985

The most critical part of this problem is that we have no prototype state-of-art terminal system against which to test our penetration aids; so we can have no confidence of defeating Soviet defenses if they proliferate. We should have an operational prototype at Kwajalein.

2. Domestic A strong R&D program has been publicly endorsed even by SDI critics; so have hard-point terminal and even the President's concept of total damage denial. In fact, three of the SDI's most effective scientific critics (Richard Garwin, Sidney Drell and W. K. H. Panofsky) signed a document supporting these things. The problems arise from the perceptions of a rush to deploy an imperfect system, or to demonstrate publicly the elements of an imperfect system.

The solution is to emphasize the R&D nature of the program, and to avoid demonstration projects. This does not mean canceling large-scale experiments, but it suggests that they be restricted to actual useful experiments, focused on the most serious technical problems. This focusing will have a far more salutary effect in Congress than any big demonstrations, which actually detract from the SDI's credibility.

3. Geneva There are several ways in which we can bargain seriously and to advantage in Geneva. We cannot hurt the essential R&D of SDI by reaffirming the ABM and Outer Space Weapons Treaties. We can certainly bargain over (and afford to give up) several different kinds of space-based demos and even kinds of space-based battle stations, for instance space chemical lasers above certain powers. Whether this would be verifiable is not a matter of concern to us: we don't think such things are workable anyhow. But the Soviets are still worried about them, and this would allow us to place the verification shoe on the Bear's foot for a change. We can demonstrate good faith and gain much public leverage by bargaining for a range of space-based technologies individually. We should also ask the Soviets to specify what their frequent references to space-based "strike weapons" actually refer to. It's likely there is something here we could use to advantage too.

III. Management

The SDIO is sorely lacking in staff, both in size and facilities. It also lacks the power to keep the Services from using its funds to satisfy their own prerogatives; this problem is actually getting worse.

Most critically, the SDI lacks a unified doctrine on political, military and arms-control issues, and the SDIO has demonstrated itself incapable of producing one. The OSD level board currently advising LGEN Abrahamson has been totally ineffective in resolving any of these issues. A Presidential-level Advisory Board is clearly required.



THOMAS H. JOHNSON
Director, Science Research Laboratory

23 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM08-175/2 #7842

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

23 September 1985

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THOMAS H. JOHNSON
Director, Science Research Laboratory

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Preparing for Gorbachev

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President with suggestions regarding the treatment of SDI at the Geneva meeting with Gorbachev along with suggested talking points (Tab A).

I believe that the Secretary's views should be passed to the President, but feel that it is premature to burden him with suggested talking points at this stage, since they will doubtless have to be revised to reflect developments in the interim. Also, the substance deals with the central issues of SDI and arms control which are being worked in our special study so we can recommend that the President not make any decisions nor endorse these approaches now with the Secretary.

ls Ron Lehman and *BS* Bob Linhard concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove *J*

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Suggested Talking Points

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Preparing for Gorbachev

Issue

Suggestions regarding the treatment of SDI at your November meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.

Facts

George Shultz has sent you a memorandum giving his thoughts on how the SDI issue should be handled during your meeting with Gorbachev. He has also attached suggested talking points, but I believe the latter do not require close attention at this time since they will doubtless require extensive revision to take into account developments between now and your November meeting. These are complex and controversial issues. The approach discussed by the Secretary and other approaches are being considered in a sensitive study being prepared for you.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you read the Secretary's Memorandum at Tab A, but not yet make any decisions or endorse the approaches in conversations with the Secretary.

Attachment:

Tab A Secretary's Memorandum

-41

TAB A

National Security Council
The White House

42
EYES ONLY

System # II
Package # 90956



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Route to:
Jacks Matlock
Ron Lehman (share with Bob Lind)
Hold close - don't acknowledge that
you have it. J

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NLRR Feb 11/13 #7845

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

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SYSTEM II
90956

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1985

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MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Preparing for Gorbachev

Early this week I gave you my views on the attitude we should take toward your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. And I put down my thoughts on organizing our approach to the American people and our allies.

This memo is about substance. That means arms control. We have a wide range of issues on the agenda and we do not want to encourage the perception that arms control is the be-all and end-all at Geneva. The reality, however, is that the meeting will not be seen as a success without some progress in that area.

Media and Congressional attention to the arms control issue at Geneva is building up fast. As usual, it is not helpful and distorts the reality. But we should not let it distort our preparations.

As always, the Soviets are saying that arms control negotiations can go nowhere unless we make unilateral concessions. It's the same old line:

- In the 1970's they said no progress was possible unless we abandoned the cruise missile.
- Then they said no progress was possible if we deployed PII's and GLCMs in Europe.
- When we did deploy, they said no progress until we dismantled them.
- Then MX was designated as the obstacle to progress.
- Now, of course, SDI is supposed to be the mortal enemy of arms control.

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So the debate at the moment, in the press and on the Hill, is over whether we should "bargain away" SDI in order to get substantial offensive cuts on the Soviet side.

This, of course, is nonsense. We have to resist it. There can be no question of our deviating from going ahead with SDI. Only if a strategic defense system is seen to be deployable within the next decade or so, and only if our will to deploy it is proved credible, can we expect to change the basis of global security and stability for the better.

But even our own internal debate -- especially as it appears in the press -- seems to assume that the choice we face is either to go full speed ahead with SDI without reference to Geneva or to somehow "bargain it away."

That's not the way we should define the question.

As I see it, the point is (1) how to ensure that we get the full benefit of SDI's enormous potential -- not only in terms strategically significant to our security, but in negotiations as well; and (2) what is the best way to ensure that SDI becomes a permanent fixture of our strategic posture, and not another costly program under perpetual attack by the media and voted on by Congress every few months, under constant threat of emasculation or cancellation.

There is one key reality that we must face: SDI will not be deployable before the end of your Administration.

So at the time in 1989 when we must hand over the SDI program to your successors in office it will be a fact that:

- the research program will not yet have achieved the necessary criteria of effectiveness;
- effective deployed defenses will still be a long way off;

And, as circumstances develop, it may well be that:

- the program then will be under attack by Congress and the media for its cost, for its alleged violations of the ABM treaty, and for having undermined the traditional arms control regime based on the concept of deterrence through the threat of massive destruction.

-- and the Soviets could be well into a program of offensive buildup designed to saturate our defenses.

We want to avoid this situation. We want to protect SDI against its enemies and ensure that it will be a sustained program over the next several decades. To do so, we need to shape it so that by 1988 it will be in the form of a legacy that your successor will want to honor and be able to sustain.

And this, in turn, will depend upon whether SDI is part of an arms control process which the Soviets are locked into or is a "U.S.-only" program going forward while arms control efforts are going nowhere.

So the best way to keep SDI alive and widely supported may be to demonstrate that it is the key to real arms reductions heading toward a future of no nuclear weapons.

This suggests that we need to use the enormous leverage provided by the SDI program now, while it is at its maximum, to produce an agreement serving our goals of reducing the risk of war by radically reducing the number and effectiveness of offensive nuclear weapons. This is what Margaret Thatcher advocated in her September 12 message to you -- "We would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future."

The agreed reductions would in no way foreclose but would facilitate a jointly managed, phased transition to greater reliance on defenses.

Our approach also would include these aspects:

- The ABM Treaty would be retained.
- The deep cuts would have to be tailored to be strategically significant. Numerical reductions alone would not necessarily solve the problem.
- We would demand that the Soviets come into compliance with all existing arms control treaties.
- SDI research, with the development and testing permitted by a fully clarified ABM Treaty, would

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continue to preserve the long-term option of SDI deployment and to hedge against Soviet non-compliance with the agreement.

Admittedly, this approach seeks to get the best of both worlds for us: SDI goes forward as the wholly new development that it is but at the same time we use it to try to get the kind of real reductions in offensive weapons that have been sought for years.

So by proceeding to research SDI and holding its deployment over the Soviet's heads, we provide it with the best chance for long-term existence and effectiveness -- yet at the same time making the most of it in terms of short-term progress and increased Congressional and allied support.

This is the context of the attached talking points, prepared in the format of something for your use with Gorbachev at Geneva.

Attachment:

Tab 1 - Draft Talking Points: President-Gorbachev

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NLRR 10-114/3 # 7846

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

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DRAFT TALKING POINTS: PRESIDENT-GORBACHEV

- There is an almost universal tendency to put particular weight on today's issues and tomorrow's newspaper headlines. I should like to begin by discussing with you the longer term issue, the issue that will require increasing collaboration between our two countries into the twenty-first century. I refer to the total abolition of nuclear weapons. That has been the stated goal of both our countries for many years. The question is what practical steps are required to bring it about.
- I would welcome your views; I am prepared to set forth mine.
- The prime requirement to the achievement of that goal is cooperation between our two countries. But we alone cannot bring it about; at some time we will need the cooperation of France, of England, of China, and strict adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by others.
- But still more will be needed. One cannot excise from men's minds the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear missile systems.

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resolution. These should be dealt with in a manner which does not prejudice but instead will assist in constructive movement toward the long-range goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- When our Ministers met here in January of this year, there was agreement that the issues in the Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiations should be resolved in their interrelationship.

-- Specifically, we believe the key lies in the interrelationship between, on the one hand, strategically significant reductions applied to offensive nuclear forces, and, on the other hand, limits applied to defense and space arms.

-- In our view, strategically significant reductions in offensive capabilities, particularly in those capabilities that could effectively weaken the retaliatory power of the other side, would undoubtedly have a radical impact on defensive needs.

-- Let me be clear that we do not see intrinsic merit in a strategic relationship that stresses offense over defense. In the context of an agreement providing for strategically significant reductions in the offensive capability of both sides, however, the need for defensive capabilities on

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either side would be greatly diminished. But both sides will undoubtedly be continuing research and permitted testing and development of both offensive and defensive arms.

- Should either side's research demonstrate new defensive systems to be feasible and beneficial, the optimum way in which an arms race in space could be prevented and that on earth terminated would be for the sides, after consultation, to agree to a jointly managed, phased transition to greater reliance on defenses, in conjunction with agreed further reductions in offensive nuclear arms.
- This would provide the most expeditious way to a more stable strategic interrelationship between us as we move toward our already mutually agreed ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the earth. We should not now foreclose the possibility of such an approach eventually being found practical and useful to both sides.
- In the meantime, it would appear wise for the sides to agree to deep and strategically significant reductions in the number and effectiveness of offensive nuclear forces, while also agreeing not to develop, test or deploy new

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defensive systems in a manner inconsistent with a clarified understanding of the ABM Treaty.

- Truly deep -- and continuing -- reductions in numbers and effectiveness of offensive nuclear arms would be an essential element of this course.
- I would like to provide some additional thoughts about this approach to resolving our immediate nuclear and space issues.
- The essence of this approach would be an agreement of indefinite duration providing for strategically significant reductions in offensive nuclear arms, both strategic and longer-range INF, and an agreement not to develop, test or deploy new defensive systems or components in contravention of a clarification of the ABM Treaty to which both sides can agree. Such a clarification of the ABM Treaty would provide a basis for the resolution of our current differences over compliance with that treaty.
- The strategically significant reductions in offensive nuclear arms and the stringent limits on defensive systems would be mutually contingent.

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- With regard to strategic arms, we have in mind, as a first step to be implemented over ten years, reductions in ballistic missile warheads by each side to about 50% of the highest level currently possessed by either side; that is to a level of about 4500 warheads of which no more than 3000 would be ICBM warheads.
- In this context, we could agree to stringent associated limits on air-launched cruise missiles, as well as associated limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles at a level of about 1500.
- In this regard we have taken into consideration some of the suggestions as to reductions and percentage limitations that your negotiators in the strategic arms group provided during negotiations in Geneva.
- With regard to longer-range INF missile systems, we envisage, again as a first step implemented over ten years, deep cuts in ceilings on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads, to equal levels of about 600 warheads globally and about 300 warheads in Europe.
- The final arrangement would require negotiation and agreement on a number of ancillary issues. For example, in order to enhance stability in the strategic relationship

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between us during this agreement, we should negotiate: constraints on warhead size, throwweight and launchweight of new ICBMs; limits restricting new ICBMs to single RVs; and provisions for defined operational areas and for shelters for mobile or transportable ICBM systems.

- Such provisions would reduce the effect of prompt counterforce capabilities of both sides in a manner which would diminish the necessity of deploying defensive capabilities and would enhance the verifiability of compliance with the limitations on mobile systems.
- In the context of such offensive arms reductions, we would be prepared to agree to an arrangement in the defense and space arms area whereby neither side would undertake development, testing or deployment of new defensive systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty, so long as neither side has cancelled the scheduled offensive arms reductions.
- Both sides would retain the right to pursue research. We would envisage discussion between the sides to produce an unambiguous clarification of the demarcation line between research that is permitted and development that is verifiably prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

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- We would also need to come up with a clear demarcation between ABM radars, interceptor missiles and launchers, and non-ABM radars, interceptor missiles and launchers.
- Further reductions in offensive nuclear arms would continue after the initial ten-year period unless either side decided that the situation at that time made such further reductions inadvisable.
- As I mentioned previously, I remain committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a goal you have said you share. I continue to believe the best approach to achieving this goal is through a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses.
- [-- Accordingly, the package proposal I have outlined today includes a proposal that, in mutually clarifying our commitment to the ABM Treaty, we reach a common understanding acknowledging the right of either side to propose amendments to the Treaty in the future pursuant to Article XIV, under procedures outlined in Article XIII. Since proposing such amendments would be the manner in which either side would initiate a proposal for an amendment authorizing a cooperative transition, this common understanding would explicitly recognize that we are preserving that option as provided by the ABM Treaty.]

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- The framework I have outlined today provides for a mutually acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms issues; takes account of the interrelationship between strategic, intermediate-range, and defense and space arms; addresses concerns important to the United States; and addresses those concerns that the Soviet side has described as of great importance to it.
- If acceptable to you, it could provide guidelines for our negotiating teams to work out an effective and durable agreement when they return to their work here in Geneva at the beginning of the new year.

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