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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/11/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON (APPROVED/DISAPPROVED)
SEPTEMBER 1985 (2/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1105

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7813	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 13 NSC MEETING R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	3	9/6/1985	B1
7804	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE S-W-M BREAKFAST ITEM: RANGE OF ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	9/10/1985	B1
7805	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE BILLINGTON'S LETTER: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY FOR GENEVA R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	6	9/13/1985	B1
7806	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	9/14/1985	B1
7807	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE BILLINGTON'S LETTER R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	9/5/1985	B1
7808	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MARTIN RE LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN WHITE HOUSE MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 27, 1985 R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	9/18/1985	B1
7809	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7808 R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	9/18/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SEPTEMBER 1985 (2/6)

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1105

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7810	GUEST LIST	LUNCHEON MEETING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SUGGESTED GUEST LIST PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3	1	ND	B3
7811	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LUNCH FOR SOVIET SPECIALISTS PAR 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	9/17/1984	B3
7812	GUEST LIST	LUNCHEON MEETING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS SUGGESTED GUEST LIST PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3	1	ND	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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JH 1

SYSTEM II
90900

S

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 10, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANAE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for September 13 Meeting

State has sent over (Tab A) a proposed "agenda" for a September 13 "NSC Meeting." Since no formal NSC meeting will be held, I believe the proposed agenda is not relevant at this time.

Bob Linhard concurs.

Attachment:

Tab A Platt-McFarlane Memo with Proposed Agenda

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/19/12*

2

National Security Council
The White House

System # II
Package # 90900

25 SEP 6 4:30

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>X</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>staff</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Action: Matlock
Concur: Leinhard

Rec'd 9/10 1130 3

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8590900

RECEIVED 09 SEP 85 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 06 SEP 85



DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/19/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: PROPOSED AGENDA FOR SEP 13 NSC MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 10 SEP 85 STATUS S FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LINHARD

PEARSON

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8590891 NSCIFID (C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90900

September 6, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Agenda for September 13 NSC Meeting

Our preparations for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November are moving ahead but we have reached a point where we need to begin careful consideration of how we might exploit Soviet interests in the Geneva meeting to advance our arms control agenda. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's meetings this month with the President and Secretary Shultz provide an opportunity to begin detailed communication with the Soviet leadership on arms control questions.

In addition, we need to consider ways to seize and maintain the initiative in our public diplomacy on arms control issues.

The September 4 SACG concluded that these matters should be discussed at an NSC meeting on September 13, which would also seek the views of Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman on the particular situations and requirements for their negotiating groups. Time permitting, we believe it would also be useful to review other arms control issues, such as nuclear testing, MBFR, CDE and chemical weapons. The Department welcomes the NSC meeting and proposes the attached agenda.

Bonckmley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 714/3 7/25/13

BY CU NARA DATE 10/31/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

5

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PROPOSED AGENDA: SEPTEMBER 13 NSC MEETING

- I. Discussion of Soviet objectives and possible moves before the November meeting.
- II. Discussion of U.S. arms control concerns and objectives.
- III. Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms: Status and Prospects for Progress
 - A. Defense and Space
 - B. START
 - C. INF
- IV. Brief review of other arms control subjects, as appropriate:
 - A. Nuclear Testing
 - B. MBFR
 - C. CDE
 - D. Chemical Weapons

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Platt-McFarlane: Draft NSC Agenda

Drafted by:EUR/SOV:BBurton *BB*
9/5/85 (0129P) ext. 20821

Cleared by:EUR:MPalmer
EUR/SOV:MParris
S/ARN:MStafford
PM/SNP:SCoffey
S/DEL:Amb Kampleman
 Amb Tower
 Amb Glitman
P:WCourtney *wc*

} *BB*

108

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 7

7129

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

September 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: S-W-M Breakfast Item: Range of Issues in
Preparation for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev

Defense put this item on the agenda. You might wish to make the following points if it comes up:

- Staff level coordination efforts are well advanced with participation of all departments.
- Substantive issues continue to be worked in the normal process, but we are going to have to move things along smartly so we will be prepared for quick decisions if required.
- Re public diplomacy, we will be developing a coordinated effort to get ahead of the power curve.
- All can help by giving us a few days to ponder upcoming speeches and statements. We must stay firm on the key issues, but at the same time avoid what may seem gratuitous slaps at the Soviets at this time. Otherwise, the President could be eventually blamed if the meeting's results fail to match the desires of some observers.

Bob Linhard concurs.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FD6-114/3#7804
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 11, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Letter to Dr. Armand Hammer

Armand Hammer sent you and the President copies of John Bryson's photojournal book, "The World of Armand Hammer" (Tab II). At Tab I is a letter from you thanking Hammer for the book and noting that the other copy has been forwarded to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Dr. Hammer
Tab II Book
Tab III Letter from Hammer to McFarlane

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Armand:

Thank you for sending me a copy of John Bryson's photojournal book about your global travels, adventures and meetings. I look forward to reading it.

I have also given a copy of the book to the President and Mrs. Reagan.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Dr. Armand Hammer
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
10889 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 1600
Los Angeles, California 90024

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 6896

85 SEP 3 P 4: 34

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>1</u>	<u>STAFF TO</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Matlack</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Staff to JFM
6896
11

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD · SUITE 1600

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

(213) 208-8800

SEP 3 1985

ARMAND HAMMER
CHAIRMAN AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bud:

It was heartwarming to speak to you about the outrageous article in the New York Post by "Errors and No Facts". I hope you were able to obtain a copy to show to President and Mrs. Reagan.

I am sending you herewith my first copies of John Bryson's photojournal book, "The World of Armand Hammer" about my trips during the last three years. One copy is for you and the other for President and Mrs. Reagan. I would be very happy if you would see that the President and Nancy receive their copy.

With warmest regards,



AH:fa
Encls.

WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JFH07
Billington's Lb. 12

~~Not for system
Eye Only~~

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
CIS 6/9/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 13, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Billington's Letter: Further Thoughts on Strategy for Geneva

*Bud,
This looks very promising.*

*I agree
I'll share
with
Shutty*

Flowing out of the meetings this week and our previous discussion, here are some thoughts about how to structure our public and private approach to the Geneva meeting:

1. We must regain the public diplomacy offensive by mid-October, and reach a peak as the President goes into the meeting in November.
2. To be and seem serious, we need to lay the private groundwork (with the Soviets) during the Shevardnadze meetings.
3. We should be prepared to present first to the Soviets, then to the public a comprehensive vision of the future, stated in as positive terms as possible, which shifts the focus to our strengths and Soviet weaknesses.
 - a. The greatest Soviet weakness (in world public opinion) is their policy of building, then using military force. It is what underlies all the other problems.
 - b. We have to get this point across to them, and not be deflected by other issues in concentrating on it. The point to them should be the hard-headed one that it is dangerous and it won't work -- not that it is immoral (the latter point is for the public).
 - c. Proceeding from this issue leads naturally into a discussion of the virtues on both sides of an evolving posture based more on defense, both conventional and nuclear.
 - d. Simply talking to the Soviets about it is, of course, not enough. We need an eye-catching proposal that we can put out in public -- discuss it with Shevardnadze in some (perhaps not complete) fashion, then make it part of the President's "vision" in his UN address.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3#7805
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

e. Another basic Soviet weakness, as seen by everybody, is their closed society. We can exploit that best by making positive proposals which have the effect of opening the closed society or forcing the regime to defend its indefensible stance on the matter.

4. Though a proposal to deal with the use of force in practical terms would help put matters in the proper context, we also need a more striking public -- and private -- enunciation of our arms control goals. This need not (indeed should not) embody "concessions" but should be a redefinition of what we have been saying all along, but presented in a way that it seems new, and captures the heart of the President's vision.

5. These can then be buttressed by additional proposals in the area of cooperation, communication, contact and dialogue. Some of Jim Billington's ideas are relevant here. It would fit the vision as steps which promote understanding and peaceful interaction. Some should be very ambitious, and not seem trivial or belittling.

6. All of the above is easier said than done. Whether it really works will depend on whether we can come up with a coherent package soon enough. As a very tentative, and purely illustrative, first stab, I would envision it as having elements like the following:

a. Propose that the U.S. and Soviet Union commit themselves not to use their own military forces or support military intervention of other outside powers in civil struggles in other countries, with the proviso that any forces now engaged in such struggles will be withdrawn within 18 months, at which time the pledge will become operative. (Obviously, it would have to be worded so that it does not impinge upon the right to collective self defense against external aggression, and would be dependent upon strict agreed definitions of what constitutes a civil struggle and what constitutes support to interventionist surrogates.)

We may find in trying to draft this one that it is too tricky to work. Certainly, I have no illusions that the Soviets would agree to the sort of conditions which would be acceptable to us. But if we could find a way to phrase it, such a proposal could give us a lot of high ground. After all, they are fighting in Afghanistan and we don't have our own troops in combat anywhere. We would be saying, if you knock it off, we will not be constrained to counter you militarily -- which I believe in fact gets at the nub of the matter.

b. On strategic arms, translate our current proposals into numbers -- or figures which can be easily grasped, concentrating on the degree of reductions. This need not contain anything radically new, but we need something to capture imaginations. For example, 50% reduction in warheads over a seven year period,

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with a commitment to negotiate another 50% reduction in the decade which follows. The more ambitious the reduction seems, the better. The further out the commitment, the less practical -- but the better it will look in headlines. (Obviously, a lot of thought must be given to the precise figures used, and the time periods; my point is that we have to make it simple and ambitious.)

c. On INF (which we should not neglect, given European attitudes), I believe Mike Glitman has some ideas which deserve careful thought.

d. On defense and space, we should stress the point that we take the commitment to avoid an arms race in space seriously. The most dramatic step to avoid such a race would be a radical reduction of ballistic warheads which use space. Then a discussion of the desirability of using space for defense, not offense could follow. Then, if we could find a responsible formula which would convey the nub of how we might achieve an agreed transition with protection to both sides, it would round out our position on this issue,

The objective of b, c and d, taken together, would be to move the terms of the debate away from the perceived and false proposition that SDI is the enemy of nuclear reductions. We need to find a way to demonstrate in relatively simple terms why this is not so. In other words, on this as well as the other issues, we need more than a critique of the Soviet position; we need to state our case in positive, practical terms.

I agree

e. Regarding communication, the basic thrust should be that we are two very different societies which must learn to live with each other in peace. Anything which breaks down the barriers to communication and bolsters confidence will contribute to a peaceful world in the future. We must break the barriers which keep our peoples from sharing their thoughts, hopes and dreams -- and the riches of the cultural life in both countries. We must no longer be content with trivial steps; the problem is too deep for them to have much effect. So far as contacts are concerned, we could propose some dramatic things:

-- A massive exchange of undergraduate students. As a start, at least 5,000 each way for a year of study in the other country.

Good ✓

-- A substantial increase in exchange professors: from the score or so at present to a few hundred, at least.

Good ✓

-- Regular mechanisms for exchanging views in the media, such as:

Good ✓

-- Annual TV messages by the leaders of both countries;

-- At least an hour each month of televised discussion

by officials of each government on TV in both countries.

-- Regular exchanges or articles in the print media -- specified numbers and frequency.

✓ -- Establishment of cultural centers in our respective countries, including libraries, exhibition space and facilities for the performing arts, all with uncontrolled access.

✓ -- A massive expansion of "sister-city" relationships, with at least one "people-to-people" visit each year, each way. Goal: 100 cities paired within a year.

f. Some new "cooperative" projects:

-- Peaceful use of space: already proposed, no response. We should flesh out and include this in the public presentation.

-- A joint "environmental preservation" project along the rim of the Bering Sea could have possibilities. As you will recall, Robert O. Anderson was pushing this last year; State was cautious but not totally negative; I don't know what sort of problems Defense might see in it -- there are doubtless some. Although it could have considerable symbolic value, I am inclined to think we don't have time to staff it properly.

✓ -- A proposal to cooperate in developing microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction might be a relatively safe one which has Soviet interest (Velikhov has mentioned it to me) and could serve a dual purpose: the massive introduction of microcomputers into Soviet society -- if they ever let it happen -- could do a lot to open up the flow of information and to bring real pressures to bear on centralized controls. But the offer would seem magnanimous: help in solving one of their real and acknowledged problems.

-- Some CBM's could also be worked in, either here (as cooperative measures) or as adjuncts to arms control.

7. What is excluded: I have omitted trade and human rights from the above. I have done so because I believe this should, for a time at least, be handled very privately. The message should be: we expect some meaningful changes; you know what they are. If you move there, we will take a careful look at what we can do to promote peaceful trade, and you will see some meaningful movement. If you want more details, we can talk about it privately. The important thing, however, is what happens. And there should be no illusion that we will consider the meeting a success if there is not some significant movement in this area.

8. Shevardnadze meeting: I believe the President could lay the private groundwork for the public enunciation of his vision by

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telling Shevardnadze at the outset that he is dissatisfied with the state of preparations for the Geneva meeting. He has reviewed the preparations, and while he has no problem with anything, it seems to him much too cautious. He can talk a bit about the enormous responsibility he and Gorbachev have, and why he thinks we need major steps to get the two countries on a more positive course.

This would lead him into presenting some of the ideas above, and allow him to set the context for discussion. He would not debate the ideological points but go right to his agenda, describing it and the rationale for it.

9. The public diplomacy follow-up: We should subtly shift our current presentation by putting increasing stress on what the President wants to achieve; if asked why we have "lowered expectations" we should explain that we have done so because the Soviets have not yet been willing to engage us on the concrete issues sufficiently for us to judge that they will be constructive, but that we want to make the most out of the meeting that we can.

In his October 24 speech, the President would set forth the high points of his proposals. We could then make sure that every day something is done to keep them in the public eye. Then, on the eve of his departure, he could do a TV address to the nation in which he conveyed his vision of the future, making clear that he can't do it alone, and if progress proves difficult, it is not because he failed to reach out and offer a less threatening and more cooperative future.

9. To conclude, I believe we risk allowing ourselves to be maneuvered into a position whereby the Soviets are defining the agenda for the public, unless we formulate our policies in forward-looking, positive terms. The Soviets doubtless calculate that they are putting the pressure on what they believe to be our weakness: our need to bring our people along on any policy in a free and open debate. It is not really a weakness, however, unless we act as if it is. And we are acting as if it is so long as we confine ourselves largely to criticism of the Soviet positions -- however valid this criticism may be. The public wants to be given hope that problems can be solved -- or at least alleviated. To say they are insoluble may be true, but sounds like defeatism, which is not the way Americans address problems.

Our basic national strength is our democracy. We have to use this creatively and mobilize its virtues behind a creative and visionary (in the best sense) policy. We should not act as if we are afraid our people can be hoodwinked (although, of course, some can be), but go forward with a positive message. The greatest asset we have is our President, who has an unparalleled capacity to lead the nation when he sets an ambitious course. So let us not get bogged down in debating every secondary and tertiary issue, but help him find a positive message which can

rally the nation behind him as he goes to Geneva, and protect his leadership if Gorbachev is unable to respond.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to organize two very small groups to work up some concepts along these lines in the regional issues and bilateral areas. I could provide the interface with the Lehman/Linhard group for the arms control component. Don Fortier and Steve Sestanovich could be helpful on the regional issues side, plus perhaps Peter Rodman from State. On the bilateral, informational and contacts side of things, I believe I should work with Walt Raymond, Mark Palmer and perhaps one of Charlie Wick's people. (Individually, these are not quite as sensitive as some of the others, but we will need to draw on specialist advice.)

If you agree in principle, I will provide a precise list of the people to be involved for your approval before proceeding (and of course would welcome your suggestions). What I have in mind is, in effect, three discrete groups: (1) regional issues; (2) bilateral, information and communication, and (3) arms control (identical with the one being organized by Lehman and Linhard). A very small group (say, one from each of the three subgroups) would then assemble the components for principals.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Billington Letter

19

A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20

Eyes Only System
Outside the System
to: Jack Matlock.
Jack. This is
imaginative. We need
some "new" ideas. Please
review personally w/o
coord and give me
your thoughts.
Sud
9-4-85

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR 606714/3 #7006

BY AV NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE WILSON CENTER

SEP 4 1985

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, *Director*

September 3, 1985

The Hon. Robert C. McFarlane
Secretary, National Security Council
The White House, Washington, D.C.

Dear Bud,

Thanks for your letter of August 19. Let me just make a few points that I can amplify if anyone is interested (I enclose a more general talk prepared at the request of some congressman a month ago.)

(1) The summit will occur in one of those rare moments of Russian history when some changes in policy are about to occur, but the direction has not yet been made clear (It will have to be made clear by the time of the Party Congress in February 1986). Gorbachev basically wants a deal at the strategic level (more to end uncertainty than to avoid expence); but must be sure that in the absence of a deal, he can sustain the image of American bellicosity to justify more Soviet build-up.

(2) This rare situation gives the President a greater ability to affect Soviet development than a foreign leader usually has (greater than any American President since Eisenhower). Although we cannot exercise a very great influence, let alone a decisive one, on their choices, this is a unique time of opportunity for America (the only country by which they can measure themselves, and a special love-hate object for them) to help set the agenda for the new Soviet leadership of the post-Stalin era.

(3) The summit should, therefore, be approached not just with the caution appropriate for such a meeting, but also with a certain boldness and some new ideas to seize the agenda (as Eisenhower did with his "open skies" proposal). This is important to capture the imagination of our allies as well as to affect the internal debate in the USSR -- and it is important because the new Soviet leadership may well be planning some major surprises at the summit themselves. Having deflated expectations in advance and not tipped their hand, they have provided an ideal set-up for some major new proposal to dominate the headlines if they can get their act sufficiently together by then.

(4) I would suggest two objectives for the summit that may not seem called for at first sight:

(a) impress privately on Gorbachev that the old essentially Stalinist tactics of using military power for political advantage while dividing opponents are dangerous and at a dead-end. One must be tough without being provocative on the big strategic questions; but also simple and persistent in insisting that he recognize publicly that peaceful coexistence must be a permanent condition in a pluralistic world and not just a tactical phase in a continuing world struggle. Gorbachev is a protege of Suslov, the arch-ideologist; and he must be directly confronted with this key point

which was perhaps too much evaded at the Nixon-Brezhnev summits.

(b) suggest privately - but be prepared to go public rapidly if the ideas are rejected out of hand - some altogether new approaches. If the administration has some in the strategic field, they should be suggested here. If not (or in addition), it is important to suggest other kinds of initiative so that the arms negotiations do not bear the full burden of US-Soviet relations (and our bona fides is not always made dependent on showing good will in this area).

Among the initiatives that might be considered are:

- (I) An imagination-catching new collaborative undertaking such as
 - a joint Soviet-US Mars expedition
 - a major Siberian-Alaskan development project
(to be done in the private sector, but requiring government support and coordination)
 - a major joint diversion of arms expenditures into development in some area where both the US and the USSR are presently involved

- (II) A new forum or two to broaden the dialogue between leadership groups in both countries and to bring some new and younger voices into the forum on the Soviet side (where a handful of regulars have been allowed scandalously to dominate bi-lateral links). Possibilities include:
 - a bi-national commission to discuss global prospects for the year 2,000 (perhaps to include other nations as well) thereby encouraging the Russians to think of a rational rather than an ideological future.
 - a high-level, bi-national group to discuss sub-nuclear crisis situations in the presently less well-defined areas of super-power involvement particularly in the Third World.
 - possibly the establishment of a "warm line" alongside the presently-existing "hot line" to discuss crises in such areas.

- (III) A dramatic new form of popular exchange between the two countries -- that would send a message of hope to the new generation in the USSR even if the initiatives were rejected by Gorbachev:
 - an immediate massive increase in student exchanges and other professional exchanges - on a randomized, regional basis and with such large numbers that they cannot simply be confined to the old political warhorses on the Soviet side.
 - a massive exchange of sister city delegations for relatively long periods of time (There are parallel cities in both countries, and a great deal to be gained in opening up the eyes of a new Soviet generation to alternate possibilities.)
 - a proposal that we "open the skies" again with television, offering each other one hour a month to explain ourselves to the other nation on nation-wide television. Don't take no for an answer in this sphere, and suggest as a fall-back that each nation do a television series on the culture of the other nation


September 3, 1985

23

(not going up to the present) and show it on the other nation's television for criticism (offering an hour for rebuttal). This is more important than it may appear, because it is flattering to their national pride at a time when nationalism is resurgent and should be encouraged into cultural rather than militaristic channels. It is also important because our administration is widely perceived there as opposing Russian and not merely Soviet Communist aspirations.

I could also suggest some ways of talking about current crisis spots and human rights; but you will already have vast files on these subjects. Let me know if you want anything more. With best wishes for all your important work.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long tail.

James H. Billington

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
THE WILSON CENTER
WASHINGTON D.C. 20560

James H. Billington/Director

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, \$300



POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
651

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Secretary, National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C.

42

DECLASSIFIED

JFM07
25

NOT FOR SYSTEM

NLRR #06-114/3 #7807

BY Cl NARA DATE 10/30/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

September 5, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Billington's Letter

I must leave in 30 minutes on a speaking trip to Nashville, but I wanted to pass on my initial reaction to Jim Billington's letter. I will send more careful thoughts tomorrow or Saturday morning.

1. The Soviet Scene: I think Jim is absolutely right about the possible opportunities presented by the present situation in Moscow. (I have mentioned similar thoughts to you and John before.) In brief, I believe we are in a better position to drive a reasonable deal than we have been for years, and that whatever opportunity may exist this fall could dissipate rapidly after the November meeting if we do not seize it. Gorbachev's Time interview reinforces this view on my part; with all his obvious posturing for PR effect, underneath seems to be a message to the effect that "I need some relaxation of tension. But I cannot let it happen if you make it obvious that you are forcing my hand."

Maybe Gorbachev is unable or unwilling (or both) to close on anything acceptable to us. That we cannot know at this point. But we will have the worst of both worlds if we don't test his willingness realistically in advance of the meeting. If he is unable or unwilling to accommodate a reasonable approach on our part, then we need to demonstrate this in order to protect our interests and our alliances following November.

2. Our position: Nothing wrong with it, BUT we risk exposing the President to blame for failure if we don't come up with something that seems more innovative. We need a two-track approach: more dynamism in our public presentation of what we want, and more activation of our private diplomacy.

We can only do this if we have a clear feel for what precisely the President wants to come out of the meeting. Does he want to try for a conceptual "breakthrough" in handling the offensive/defensive weapons issues? If so, there are both risks and opportunities. To what degree do we tie this to regional issues, and if we link them, which regional issues should be linked? Where does human rights fit? Do we want to use the trade/hr linkage to provide some carrots?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

26

3. Billington's ideas: Some are good and some are questionable. I'll have a more precise reaction in my next memo. But in general, I believe that standing alone such proposals would fall short of what would catch the public eye or be workable with the Soviets. By this I mean that the good ones have the best chance of working -- both in a public diplomacy sense and with the Soviets if combined with something in the arms control area. Intellectually it is accurate to say that arms control should not be seen as the make-or-break issue, and we should continue to make that point. But realistically, I believe we should recognize that both our own and Allied publics -- and the Soviets as well -- are likely to see them in that light. Therefore, without some breakthrough in an important arms control issue, the rest is likely to seem secondary at best and diversionary at worst.

If you and John can make some time tomorrow or Saturday (or for that matter Sunday!) to go over some of these thoughts, I would welcome the opportunity.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

September 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: List of Participants in White House Meeting with Shevardnadze on Friday, September 27, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding a suggested list of participants for the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

I believe it is important to keep our group at the meeting itself as small as possible, and consistent with the composition of our group for the Gromyko meeting last year. (List attached at Tab II.) Since Shevardnadze is bringing only four persons, including his interpreter and notetaker, it is simply bad form to exceed this number in a major way. It also implies lack of confidence in the President by his staff -- an impression we should definitely not leave with the Soviets inadvertently. I have added the Vice President to State's suggested list and dropped Nitze and Ridgway. If Don Regan is not included (Baker did not attend last year), then perhaps Nitze or Ridgway could be added. However, even our minimal list is considerably larger than the Soviet list (7 to 5).

As for the lunch, here we have more flexibility. If we have 24 places, we should allocate at least eleven to the Soviets (leaving it to them to choose), which would give 13 for us. State's suggested list looks OK for our side.

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Robert C. McFarlane
Tab A Suggested List of Participants
Tab II Gromyko Meeting List of Participants
Tab III State Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7809
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: List of Participants in White House Meeting
with Shevardnadze on Friday, September 27, 1985

Please find at Tab A a suggested list of participants in the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Attachment:

Tab A Suggested list of Participants

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CJS NARA, Date 6/19/02



PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE
SEPTEMBER 27, 1985
SUGGESTED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Pre-Brief

9:00 am - 10:00 am - Oval Office

Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room/Cabinet Room

US Participants

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants (eleven to be selected by Soviets, probably including following)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreter)
Mr. A.S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko



LIST OF PARTICIPANTSPRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, OFFICIAL MEETING AND LUNCH
WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKOFriday, September 28, 19849:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. -- Briefing -- Oval Office

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Weinberger (will attend briefing only)
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. -- Official Meeting -- Oval Office

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. -- Lunch -- State Dining Room, White House

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Edwin Meese III
James A. Baker, III
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Ambassador Vasiliy Makarov, Chief Aide to Mr. Gromyko
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, USSR Embassy
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov, USSR Embassy
Ambassador Albert S. Chernyshov, Mr. Gromyko's Staff
Vladimir B. Lomeyko, Press Spokesman for Mr. Gromyko

II



7515 36
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 17, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Participation in White House Meetings
with Shevardnadze, Friday September 27, 1985

Please find attached the State Department's suggested participation in the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Talking Points, briefing materials and biographic materials are being sent separately.

R. McFarlane
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated

31:10
DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CVJ NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

Drafted: EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEdelman *EE*
9/16/85 x9806 0351P *296*

Cleared: EUR: RRidgway *RR*
EUR: JWilkinson *JW*
EUR/SOV: MRParris *MP*
EUR/SOV: BBurton *BB*
S: JBenton *JB*

CET for

38

Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 PM

US Participants

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon For Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. A. S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

September 18, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: List of Participants in White House Meeting with
Shevardnadze on Friday, September 27, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature forwarding a suggested list of participants for the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

I believe it is important to keep our group at the meeting itself as small as possible, and consistent with the composition of our group for the Gromyko meeting last year. (List attached at Tab II.) Since Shevardnadze is bringing only five persons, including his interpreter and notetaker, it is simply bad form to exceed this number in a major way. It also implies lack of confidence in the President by his staff -- an impression we should definitely not leave with the Soviets inadvertently. I have added the Vice President to State's suggested list and dropped Nitze and Ridgway. However, even our minimal list is larger than the Soviet list (8 to 6).

As for the lunch, here we have more flexibility. Since the Soviets wish to send only seven persons, we have room for more, though it looks one-sided if we let the disproportion become too large. As it is, it is 13 to 7.

^{JM} Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Robert C. McFarlane
Tab A Suggested List of Participants
Tab II Gromyko Meeting List of Participants
Tab III State Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3# 7809
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: List of Participants in White House Meeting
with Shevardnadze on Friday, September 27, 1985

Please find at Tab A a suggested list of participants in the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Attachment:

Tab A Suggested list of Participants

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/19/02

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE
SEPTEMBER 27, 1985
SUGGESTED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Pre-Brief

9:00 am - 10:00 am - Oval Office

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room

US Participants

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst to the Foreign Minister A.S. Chernyshov
Minister-Counselor O.M. Sokolov
P.R. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM A.S. Chernyshov
Mr. P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov

LIST OF PARTICIPANTSPRESIDENT'S BRIEFING, OFFICIAL MEETING AND LUNCH
WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKOFriday, September 28, 19849:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. -- Briefing -- Oval Office

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State Shultz
 Secretary of Defense Weinberger (will attend briefing only)
 Robert C. McFarlane
 Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
 Jack F. Matlock, NSC
 Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. -- Official Meeting -- Oval Office

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State Shultz
 Robert C. McFarlane
 Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
 Jack F. Matlock, NSC
 Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Gromyko
 First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
 Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
 Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker
 Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. -- Lunch -- State Dining Room, White House

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State George P. Shultz
 Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
 Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
 Edwin Meese III
 James A. Baker, III
 Michael K. Deaver
 Robert C. McFarlane
 Admiral John M. Poindexter
 Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
 Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt
 Jack F. Matlock, NSC
 Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
 First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko
 Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
 Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker
 Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
 Ambassador Vasiliy Makarov, Chief Aide to Mr. Gromyko
 Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, USSR Embassy
 Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov, USSR Embassy
 Ambassador Albert S. Chernyshov, Mr. Gromyko's Staff
 Vladimir B. Lomeyko, Press Spokesman for Mr. Gromyko



1515
United States Department of State 45

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 17, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Participation in White House Meetings
with Shevardnadze, Friday September 27, 1985

Please find attached the State Department's suggested participation in the President's meeting and luncheon with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Talking Points, briefing materials and biographic materials are being sent separately.

R. McFarlane
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated

83:10
DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *CJS*

NARA, Date *6/9/02*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

46

Drafted: EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEdelman ^{SS}
9/16/85 x9806 0351P ^{1 206}

Cleared: EUR: RRidgway ^{OK 296}
EUR: JWilkinson ^{P 9W}
EUR/SOV: MRParris
EUR/SOV: BBurton ^{SS/10}
S: JBenton ^{CET for}

47
Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 PM

US Participants

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon For Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. A. S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko

Chron
~~MATLOCK~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1984

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt *Bob*

REQUEST: Luncheon

PURPOSE: To review state of U.S.-Soviet Relations

BACKGROUND: It would be useful for the President to discuss the state of U.S.-Soviet Relations with a group of specialists from outside the Government before his meeting with Gromyko.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None with this specific group

DATE & TIME: September 22, 1984; 1:00 P.M.

LOCATION: Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: See attached list

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President greets guests and invites informal discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations during lunch

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be supplied

MEDIA COVERAGE: None; staff photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

LUNCHEON MEETING ON US-SOVIET RELATIONSSuggested Guest List

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Meese
Mr. Baker
Mr. Deaver
Mr. McFarlane
Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State
Amb. Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Robert Gates, CIA
Dr. Jeremy Azrael, State
[REDACTED] CIA
Robie Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
William Hyland (Editor, Foreign Affairs)
Walter J. Stoessel, (former Ambassador to Moscow)
Dr. James Billington (Wilson Center)
Dr. Nina Tumarkin (Russian Research Center, Harvard)

FOIA(b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/3#7810
BY RW NARA DATE 4/13/11

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Lunch for Soviet Specialists

As the President prepares for his meeting with Gromyko, he might find it useful to host a lunch to provide a means for discussing some of the broad issues with some outside specialists, along with a few from inside the Government who do not normally have access to him. Assuming that the maximum at table will be twenty, I would recommend the following guest list:

Senior Government Officials and Staff Members:

- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary Shultz
- Mr. Meese
- Mr. Baker
- Mr. Deaver
- Mr. McFarlane
- Mr. Burt
- Amb. Hartman
- Mr. Matlock

"Outsiders":

- (1) Persons who have dealt with Gromyko directly

- Gen. Scowcroft
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Brookings)
- William Hyland (Editor, Foreign Affairs)
- Walter J. Stoessel (former Ambassador to Moscow)

- (2) Academic specialists knowledgeable on Soviet psychology

- Dr. James Billington (Wilson Center)
- Dr. Nina Tumarkin (Russian Research Center, Harvard)
- Dr. Olin Robison (President, Middlebury College)
- Dr. Richard Pipes (Harvard Univeristy)

Jack also considered Suzanne Massey, but thinks Tumarkin is better for this group.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRN F06-114/3#7811
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

2

(3) Government Officials

Robert Gates, CIA
Jeremy Azrael, State

[REDACTED]
Mark Palmer, State

This makes a total of 23, so that three could be considered alternates or as replacements for any you consider inappropriate. The list is a bipartisan one, since both Brzezinski and Robison are active Democrats (though I have not noted either very active in the campaign). You should also be aware that Dick Pipes has publically criticized the President's invitation to Gromyko (in a TV interview). Nevertheless, I believe it would be useful for the President to hear his observations.

I sum, I would suggest making Azrael, [REDACTED] and Palmer alternates, and including the others in the initial invitations.

Recommendation:

That you approve the Schedule Proposal at TAB I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Schedule Proposal

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FOIA(b)(3)

LUNCHEON MEETING ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Suggested Guest List

The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary Shultz
 Mr. Meese
 Mr. Baker
 Mr. Deaver
 Mr. McFarlane
 Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State
 Amb. Arthur A. Hartman
 Jack F. Matlock, NSC

Gen. Brent Scowcroft
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
~~Helmut Sonnenfeldt~~ (Brookings)
 William Hyland (Editor, Foreign Affairs)
 Walter J. Stoessel (former Ambassador to Moscow)
 Dr. James Billington (Wilson Center)
 Dr. Nina Tumarkin (Russian Research Center, Harvard)
~~Dr. Olin Robison~~ (President, Middlebury College)
~~Dr. Richard Pipes~~ (Harvard Univeristy)
 Robert Gates, CIA

~~Attendees~~

Dr. Jeremy Azrael, State
 [REDACTED] CIA
 Robie Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Per RCM

Per RCM
Per RCM

FOIA(b)(3)