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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON APPROVED /DISAPPROVED
SEPTEMBER 1985 (1/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1104

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7747	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE HIGHLIGHTS OF GENEVA COORDINATING MEETING, 29 AUGUST R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	9/3/1985	B1
7757	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO EMBASSY MOSCOW/CONGEN LENINGRAD STAFF R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	8/23/1985	B1
7748	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE BILLINGTON'S LETTER R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	9/5/1985	B1
7749	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	9/9/1985	B1
7750	MEMO	LINHARD TO MCFARLANE RE NUCLEAR TESTING: NEXT STEPS R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	3	9/10/1985	B1
7760	MEMO	LINHARD/LEHMAN TO MCFARLANE, RE DOD RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S QUESTIONS R 6/23/2010 M125/2	2	9/7/1985	B1
7751	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO SHULTZ RE BACKGROUND PAPERS ON THE USSR R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	9/10/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7752	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REGAN RE BACKGROUND PAPERS ON THE USSR <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	9/10/1985	B1
7753	PAPER	THE SOVIET UNION A COMMUNIST POWER OR A RUSSIAN IMPERIAL POWER? <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	7	ND	B1
7754	PAPER	SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME COMMON TRAITS BY JACK MATLOCK <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	8	ND	B1
7755	PAPERS	RUSSIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	8	ND	B1
7758	PAPER	USSR: A SOCIETY IN TROUBLE <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	ND	B1
7756	PAPER	DISSENT IN THE USSR <i>PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	11	ND	B1 B3
7759	PAPER	THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONALITY PROBLEM <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	4	ND	B1

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Not Sent

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90884

SECRET

September 03, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Highlights of Geneva Coordinating Meeting, 29 August

The Geneva Coordinating Group reviewed ongoing efforts for preparation of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. I briefly reviewed the most recent, and particularly inaccurate, press comments about the meeting and emphasized the need to coordinate our efforts to a much greater degree. We have set up a mechanism, chaired by Steve Steiner, which will clear all speeches having an impact on preparations for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. I anticipate that Steiner's group will be able to bring some badly needed order to the process, though some problems are inevitable.

The Public Diplomacy Plan is being developed which will work towards shifting the public debate to themes of our own choosing. We must avoid being pushed into a reactive mode by the Soviets during the run-up to Geneva. Steiner and Raymond have created a public diplomacy plan which I think will avoid this pitfall. Korengold will arrive on 3 September and will assist in the execution and fine-tuning of the plan.

I will draft a paper, following Bill Henkle's return from Geneva, integrating the three components of our preparations for Geneva; logistics, substance, and public diplomacy. When Henkle returns and after Korengold arrives we should have a much more precise strategy for allocating the resources we have available.

Finally, we discussed the announcement of the Space Command, which we will do our best to handle adroitly in the public arena. Ty Cobb noted that our public diplomacy efforts should make note of the fact that the Soviets already have a Space Command, which has been active for years.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3# 7747

BY C14 NARA DATE 10/30/07

Wnatlock

✓ 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 4, 1985

Dear Dick:

I know that the last few days have been trying ones for all of the staff in Moscow and Leningrad. I simply want to let everyone there know through you that you are not alone.


George Shultz has kept me informed about how splendidly our people in Moscow and Leningrad are coping with the disturbing news of your exposure to tracking chemicals. I cannot say I was surprised. I have seen all of you respond with equal professionalism and dedication to too many crises and challenges over the past few years for that. Your response to this one simply reaffirms my conviction that you -- and your families -- are among the best the Foreign Service, and our country, has to offer. We are terribly proud of you.

I know how anxious everyone must be in the face of so many unanswered questions. While I am encouraged by preliminary indications that any risk to which people may have been exposed is small, I have made it clear that I want these questions answered as soon as possible. As you have been informed, a highly qualified team will be in Moscow this week to begin the process. In addition, every effort will be made back here to wring as much information as we can out of the data already available. I promise that your staff will be kept fully informed as work proceeds. I need not tell you that there will be serious consequences if we determine that the Soviets have not terminated this abhorrent practice.

As we deal with this problem, I know I can count on you, Art Hartman, and your staff to continue to do the job you do so well. The months ahead may hold major opportunities for the development of our relations with the Soviet Union. The insights your people can contribute from the unique perspective of Moscow and Leningrad will be more critical than ever if we are to take full advantage of them.

Dick, let me ask you in closing to convey to all the members of the American community in the USSR that you are in our thoughts at this difficult time. Don't hesitate to let us know back here if there is anything we can do to make your task easier.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Ronald Reagan".

Mr. Richard A. Combs, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
American Embassy Moscow
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8506924

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 SEP 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: MCFARLANE

SOURCE: CHEW, D

DATE: 04 SEP 85

KEYWORDS: EPC INTL TRADE

CHEW REFERRAL

SUBJ: EPC MEMO TO PRES RE INITIATING SECTION 301 INVESTIGATIONS

REQUIRED ACTION. FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 09 SEP 85

COMMENTS:

Diane Ross

FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Received
AUG 31 1985

August 31, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General
Leningrad Staff

Issue

Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad staff regarding their exposure to chemical tracking agents.

Facts

On August 21, 1985, we issued a demarche to the Soviets which strongly protests their increasing use of potentially dangerous chemical compounds to track our diplomatic and other personnel in the USSR. The Embassy personnel have been briefed and continue to be handling the situation responsibly. A team of scientists from the National Institute of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency is on its way to Moscow to determine the extent of exposure by conducting on-site tests.

Discussion

At Tab A is a letter from you to Charge d'Affaires Dick Combs, which expresses your personal concern for the well-being of our personnel in Moscow and Leningrad. Speechwriters have cleared the text.

Recommendation

OK

No

RR

That you sign the letter to the staff of the American Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

cc Vice President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Embassy Moscow

State has forwarded a draft Presidential letter (Tab A) to the U.S. staff at Embassy Moscow and the Consulate General Leningrad. Specifically, the letter praises our Embassy personnel for having reacted with admirable calm to the news of their exposure to chemical tracking agents. At Tab I is a memo from you to the President which forwards the draft letter for his signature.

Speechwriters have cleared the text.

^{PM} Matlock, ^S Sestanovich and Small concur. ^(not applicable)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *W* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Presidential Letter



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

6694

August 23, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Embassy Moscow/ConGen Leningrad Staff

Our personnel in Moscow and Leningrad have reacted with admirable calm to the news that they have been exposed to chemical tracking agents. We are moving quickly to demonstrate that everything possible is being done to determine the extent of any risk they may face. We believe that it would be both appropriate and a major boost to Embassy/ConGen morale for the President to express his personal concern for the well-being of our people in the Soviet Union. We have attached for White House approval a draft message, which would be distributed to the staffs of the Embassy and ConGen.

Nicholas Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 ²⁴ 7757

BY Civ NARA DATE 10/31/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

Draft Presidential Letter
To Embassy/Consulate Staff

Dear Dick,

I know that the last few days have been trying ones for all of the staff in Moscow and Leningrad. I simply want to let everyone there know through you that you are not alone.

George Shultz has kept me informed about how splendidly our people in Moscow and Leningrad are coping with the disturbing news of your exposure to tracking chemicals. I cannot say I was surprised. I have seen all of you respond with equal professionalism and dedication to too many crises and challenges over the past few years for that. Your response to this one simply reaffirms my conviction that you -- and your families -- are among the best the Foreign Service, and our country, has to offer. We are terribly proud of you.

I know how anxious everyone must be in the face of so many unanswered questions. While I am encouraged by preliminary indications that any risk to which people may have been exposed is small, I have made clear that I want these questions answered as soon as possible. As you have been informed, a highly qualified team will be in Moscow ^{next} week to begin the process. In addition, every effort will be made back here to wring as much information as we can out of the data already available. I promise that your staff will be kept fully informed as work proceeds. I need not tell you that there will be ~~the most~~ serious consequences if we determine that the Soviets have not terminated this abhorrent practice.

As we deal with this problem, I know I can count on you, Art Hartman, and your staff to continue to do the job you do so well. The months ahead ^{may} hold major opportunities for the development of our relations with the Soviet Union. The insights your people can contribute from the unique perspective of Moscow and Leningrad will be more critical than ever if we are to take full advantage of them.

Dick, let me ask you in closing to convey to all the members of the American community in the USSR that you are in our thoughts at this difficult time. Don't hesitate to let us know back here if there is anything we can do to make your task easier.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

TRAVEL WORK SHEET

9

DATE: Sept 4, 1985

MAIL CHECK TO: NAME JACK F. MATLOCK

ADDRESS c/o Administrative Office, Room 397, Old Executive Office Bldg
Washington, D.C. 20506

OFFICIAL DUTY DATES: July 29 - August 1, 1985

ADVANCE RECEIVED: none EXCHANGE RATE(S):

FORM OF PAYMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CASH OR GTR: Provided by Government Transportation

LODGING WAS PROVIDED/PAID FOR BY: Provided by Department of State
(If paid by traveler, receipt must accompany claim.)

TRAVEL SCHEDULE

DATE/TIME	(PLACE) DEPARTED FROM	DATE/TIME	(PLACE) ARRIVED AT	TAXI/POV/ MISC EXPENSES	NO. MILES	AMOUNT
7/29 0750	Dep AFB MD	7/29 2225	Helsinki			
8/1 1147	Dep Helsinki	8/1 1402	Arr AFB MD			

EXPENSES

DATE	LODGING	Breakfast	MEALS Lunch	Dinner	OTHER
7/30				\$20.00	
7/31				\$20.00	

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Attach copies of all transportation stubs. Return unused tickets to Admin Office for refund from airlines when a GTR is used.
2. All expenses incurred MUST be itemized. Receipts for hotels/motels must be submitted. Receipts must be submitted for all other expenses (i.e., taxis, meals, airport parking, etc.) that are \$25.00 and over). When receipts are not obtainable, the expenditure must be explained on the Travel Voucher.

3. Always attach the original Travel Authorization to the Travel Voucher.

USE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE.

SCHEDULE OF EXPENSES AND AMOUNTS CLAIMED

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELER (Unlisted items are self-explanatory)

Col. (c) If the voucher includes per diem allowances for members of employee's immediate family, show members' names, ages, and relationship to employee and marital status of children (unless information is shown on the travel authorization.)

Complete only for actual expense travel

- Col. (d) thru (g) Show amount incurred for each meal, including tax and tips, and daily total meal cost.
- (h) Show expenses, such as: laundry, cleaning and pressing of clothes, tips to bellboys, porters, etc. (other than for meals). Complete for per diem and actual expense travel.
- (i) Show total subsistence expense incurred for actual expense travel.
- (m) Show per diem amount, limited to maximum rate, or if travel on actual expense, show the lesser of the amount from col. (j) or maximum rate.
- (n) Show expenses, such as: taxi/limousine fares, air fare (if purchased with cash), local or long distance telephone calls for Government business, car rental, relocation other than subsistence, etc.

Complete this information if this is a continuation sheet. PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES

TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION NO.

XS5H71

TRAVELER'S LAST NAME

MATLOCK

DATE 19 <u>85</u>	TIME (Hour and am/pm)	DESCRIPTION (Departure/arrival city, per diem computation, or other explanations of expense)	ITEMIZED SUBSISTENCE EXPENSES							MILEAGE RATE: NO. OF MILES (k)	AMOUNT CLAIMED			
			MEALS				MISCELLANEOUS SUBSISTENCE (h)	LODGING (i)	TOTAL SUBSISTENCE EXPENSE (j)		MILEAGE (l)	SUBSISTENCE (m)	OTHER (n)	
			BREAKFAST (d)	LUNCH (e)	DINNER (f)	TOTAL (g)								
7/29	0750	Dep Andrews AFB MD												
	2225	Arr Helsinki FIN												
7/30			8 00	15 00	20 00	43 00			43 00			43 00		
7/31			8 00	12 00	22 00	42 00			42 00			42 00		
8/1	1147	Dep Helsinki FIN												
	1402	Arr Andrews AFB MD												
		Lodging provided by State Dept.												
									SUBTOTALS ▶					
									TOTALS ▶			85 00		

If additional space is required, continue on another SF 1012-A BACK, leaving the front blank.

In compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the following information is provided: Solicitation of the information on this form is authorized by 5 U.S.C. Chap. 57 as implemented by the Federal Travel Regulations (FPMR 101-7), E.O. 11609 of July 22, 1971, E.O. 11012 of March 27, 1962, E.O. 9397 of November 22, 1943, and 26 U.S.C. 6011(b) and 6109. The primary purpose of the requested information is to determine payment or reimbursement to eligible individuals for allowable travel and/or relocation expenses incurred under appropriate administrative authorization and to record and maintain costs of such reimbursements to the Government. The information will be used by officers and employees who have a need for the information in the performance of their official duties. The information may be disclosed to appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign agencies when relevant to civil,

criminal, or regulatory investigations or prosecutions, or when pursuant to a requirement by this agency in connection with the hiring or firing of an employee, the issuance of a security clearance, or investigations of the performance of official duty while in Government service. Your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is solicited under the authority of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. 6011(b) and 6109) and E.O. 9397, November 22, 1943, for use as a tax payer and/or employee identification number; disclosure is MANDATORY on vouchers claiming travel and/or relocation allowance expense reimbursement which is, or may be, taxable income. Disclosure of your SSN and other requested information is voluntary in all other instances; however, failure to provide the information (other than SSN) required to support the claim may result in delay or loss of reimbursement.

Enter grand total of columns (l), (m) and (n), below and in item 13 on the front of this form.

TOTAL AMOUNT CLAIMED ▶ 85.00

TRAVEL VOUCHER <i>(Read the Privacy Act Statement on the back)</i>		1. DEPARTMENT OR ESTABLISHMENT, BUREAU DIVISION OR OFFICE National Security Council		2. TYPE OF TRAVEL <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TEMPORARY DUTY <input type="checkbox"/> PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION		3. VOUCHER NO.	
						4. SCHEDULE NO.	
TRAVELER (PAYEE)	5. a. NAME (Last, first, middle initial) Matlock, Jack F.			b. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		6. PERIOD OF TRAVEL a. FROM 7/29/85 b. TO 8/1/85	
	c. MAILING ADDRESS (Include ZIP Code) c/o NSC Admin Office Room 397, OEOB Washington DC 20506			d. OFFICE TELEPHONE NO. 5112		7. TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION a. NUMBER(S) XS5H71 b. DATE(S) 7/12/85	
	e. PRESENT DUTY STATION Washington DC			f. RESIDENCE (City and State)		10. CHECK NO.	
8. TRAVEL ADVANCE				9. CASH PAYMENT RECEIPT			
a. Outstanding				a. DATE RECEIVED		b. AMOUNT RECEIVED	
b. Amount to be applied						\$	
c. Amount due Government (Attached: <input type="checkbox"/> Check <input type="checkbox"/> Cash)				c. PAYEE'S SIGNATURE			
D. Balance outstanding							
12. GOVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS, OR TRANSPORTATION TICKETS, IF PURCHASED WITH CASH (List by number below and attach passenger coupon; if cash is used show claim on reverse side.)		I hereby assign to the United States any right I may have against any parties in connection with reimbursable transportation charges described below, purchased under cash payment procedures (FPMR 101-7) ▶ <i>Traveler's Initials</i>					
		AGENT'S VALUATION OF TICKET <i>(a)</i>	ISSUING CARRIER <i>(Initials)</i> <i>(b)</i>	MODE, CLASS OF SERVICE AND ACCOMMODATIONS <i>(c)</i>	DATE ISSUED <i>(d)</i>	POINTS OF TRAVEL	
						FROM <i>(e)</i>	TO <i>(f)</i>
Government Air							
13. I certify that this voucher is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and that payment or credit has not been received by me. When applicable, per diem claimed is based on the average cost of lodging incurred during the period covered by this voucher.							
TRAVELER SIGN HERE ▶ Jack F. Matlock				DATE		AMOUNT CLAIMED ▶ \$ 85 00	
NOTE: Falsification of an item in an expense account works a forfeiture of claim (28 U.S.C. 2514) and may result in a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both (18 U.S.C. 287; i.d. 1001).							
14. This voucher is approved. Long distance telephone calls, if any, are certified as necessary in the interest of the Government. (NOTE: If long distance telephone calls are included, the approving official must have been authorized in writing by the head of the department or agency to so certify (31 U.S.C. 680a).)					17. FOR FINANCE OFFICE USE ONLY COMPUTATION		
APPROVING OFFICIAL SIGN HERE ▶ Mary A. Dix Administrative Officer				DATE		a. DIFFERENCES, IF ANY (Explain and show amount)	
15. LAST PRECEDING VOUCHER PAID UNDER SAME TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION					b. TOTAL VERIFIED CORRECT FOR CHARGE TO APPROPRIATION		
a. VOUCHER NO.		b. D.O. SYMBOL		c. MONTH & YEAR		\$	
16. THIS VOUCHER IS CERTIFIED CORRECT AND PROPER FOR PAYMENT					c. APPLIED TO TRAVEL ADVANCE (Appropriation symbol):		
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICIAL SIGN HERE ▶				DATE		\$	
					d. NET TO TRAVELER ▶ \$		
18. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION							

RECEIVED 28 AUG 85 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOC DATE 28 AUG 85

Matlock 9/4

File

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES LTR TO HAMMER RE SURGERY IN JUL

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE: 29 AUG 85 STATUS X FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

RLF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(LF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Matlock</i>	<i>8/29</i>	<i>For Further Action</i>		
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>x 9/4</i>	<i>Pres for signature</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 9/4</i>	<i>signature</i>		<i>JP</i>
<i>J C</i>	<i>9/6</i>	<i>Pres sigl</i>		<i>Jm</i>

DISPATCH

h/pf

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1985

Dear Armand:

I've just heard about your surgery in July, and am relieved to learn that your recovery has been rapid. That makes two of us!

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Ron

Dr. Armand Hammer
Chairman
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
10889 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 1600
Los Angeles, California 90024



15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Received
SEP 5 1985

September 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Letter to Armand Hammer

SIGNED

Issue

Get well letter to Armand Hammer.

Facts

Armand Hammer underwent fairly serious prostate surgery in July. He is now recuperating.

Discussion

Your letter (Tab A) expresses your concern and wishes him a speedy recovery.

Recommendation

OK No
RCM _____

That you sign the letter to Armand Hammer.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Armand Hammer

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc Vice President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Armand Hammer

SIGNED

Per your request, I have drafted a Presidential letter to Armand Hammer (Tab A). I have made inquiries regarding the report that he underwent surgery in July. Hammer's staff is doing their best to minimize this and avoid any publicity.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the Presidential letter for signature.

Approve _____Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Presidential Letter to Hammer

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 6759

85 SEP 28 P 2: 25

1945

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
William Martin	2	un	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	m	
William Martin	4	un	
NSC Secretariat	5	chp	Tap Recd
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP
(Date/Time)

Done 8/30
[Signature]

Good point -
have Jack
check

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 6759

85 SEP 30 P 12: 06

1949

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	✓	
William Martin	2	un	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	3	HI	D
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

85 SEP 5 P 4: 18

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
William Martin	1	un	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	2		
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Chron File 18
9/5/85

Jack Matlock

(~~EYES ONLY~~)

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

cas 6/19/02

Send back to ¹⁹
Jack Matlock
in EYES ONLY
envelope. J

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7748

NOT FOR SYSTEM

197

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

M

September 5, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

→ JMP

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *AKM*

SUBJECT: Billington's Letter

I must leave in 30 minutes on a speaking trip to Nashville, but I wanted to pass on my initial reaction to Jim Billington's letter. I will send more careful thoughts tomorrow or Saturday morning.

1. The Soviet Scene: I think Jim is absolutely right about the possible opportunities presented by the present situation in Moscow. (I have mentioned similar thoughts to you and John before.) In brief, I believe we are in a better position to drive a reasonable deal than we have been for years, and that whatever opportunity may exist this fall could dissipate rapidly after the November meeting if we do not seize it. Gorbachev's Time interview reinforces this view on my part; with all his obvious posturing for PR effect, underneath seems to be a message to the effect that "I need some relaxation of tension. But I cannot let it happen if you make it obvious that you are forcing my hand."

Maybe Gorbachev is unable or unwilling (or both) to close on anything acceptable to us. That we cannot know at this point. But we will have the worst of both worlds if we don't test his willingness realistically in advance of the meeting. If he is unable or unwilling to accommodate a reasonable approach on our part, then we need to demonstrate this in order to protect our interests and our alliances following November.

2. Our position: Nothing wrong with it, BUT we risk exposing the President to blame for failure if we don't come up with something that seems more innovative. We need a two-track approach: more dynamism in our public presentation of what we want, and more activation of our private diplomacy.

We can only do this if we have a clear feel for what precisely the President wants to come out of the meeting. Does he want to try for a conceptual "breakthrough" in handling the offensive/defensive weapons issues? If so, there are both risks and opportunities. To what degree do we tie this to regional issues, and if we link them, which regional issues should be linked? Where does human rights fit? Do we want to use the trade/hr linkage to provide some carrots?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

20

3. Billington's ideas: Some are good and some are questionable. I'll have a more precise reaction in my next memo. But in general, I believe that standing alone such proposals would fall short of what would catch the public eye or be workable with the Soviets. By this I mean that the good ones have the best chance of working -- both in a public diplomacy sense and with the Soviets if combined with something in the arms control area. Intellectually it is accurate to say that arms control should not be seen as the make-or-break issue, and we should continue to make that point. But realistically, I believe we should recognize that both our own and Allied publics -- and the Soviets as well -- are likely to see them in that light. Therefore, without some breakthrough in an important arms control issue, the rest is likely to seem secondary at best and diversionary at worst.

If you and John can make some time tomorrow or Saturday (or for that matter Sunday!) to go over some of these thoughts, I would welcome the opportunity.

July 21

7165

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 7, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request to Participate in a Panel Discussion at
the National War College on January 15, 1986

I have been invited by the National Defense University to participate in a panel discussion with a group of students at the National War College on January 15, 1985. The topic of the discussion will be "U.S. Policy Towards the Soviet Union."

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my participation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Letter of Invitation



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

International Studies

August 15, 1985

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building (Room 368)
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

During January 1986 the students at The National War College will be studying the USSR. The final topic in this block of instruction will be "U.S. Policy Towards the Soviet Union." If your busy schedule would permit, we would like you to participate during the session in a small (two or three man) panel discussion that will examine the existing state of relations between the two superpowers and comment on prospects for future relations.

The panel discussion will take place from 8:30 to 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday, January 15, 1986. An additional follow-on seminar discussion with a small group of students is planned from 10:45 to 11:30 a.m. We hope that you would also be able to remain for this session, but would understand if you cannot spend that much time with us. If you are able to take part in the panel I will send you copies of the syllabus, readings, and questions to be discussed.

I understand that you were unable to speak at the College earlier this year due to another commitment. Hopefully, you will be able to join us in January. The students would certainly benefit from your knowledge and experience.

I also look forward to seeing you again. I very much enjoyed working with you during my first tour of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (1976-1978). In June of this year I completed a two-year tour of duty there as the Army Attache.

If you have any questions concerning the panel discussion, please call me (475-1875).

Sincerely,

Bill D. Halloran

William D. Halloran II
Colonel, U.S. Army

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Calendar
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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"Testing a"

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BY AV NARA DATE 10/30/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 9, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: RON LEHMAN AND BOB LINHARD
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing Limitations

Regarding the letter in the attached package, I would advise against sending it in its revised form. I do not believe it offers any incentive for the Soviets to engage us on the issue, and thus could do more harm than good if the intent is to encourage negotiations to improve verification. By in effect announcing that testing is a non-negotiable subject, and offering discussions only regarding information on our proposal and definition of logistical details, it is devoid of any effective "come-on" from the Soviet point of view.

Since we are under no obligation to answer Gorbachev's letter (at least until he replies to the President's long letter), I think it better to send no letter on the subject, unless we are prepared to indicate that resolution of the verification issue could lead to other things, such as ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

Regarding the Memorandum to the President, it is obviously appropriate to convey DOD's views on the issue. However, as regards the DOD analysis, while it deals with the questions asked, it does not present a full picture of the situation, since questions about the impact of various eventualities on Soviet force development are not discussed fully.

For example, assuming verifiable limitations on testing, would the impact on modernization and stockpile validation not be roughly comparable on both sides? The paper indicates uncertainties on this score, but does not really provide an analysis. Logically, I would think that degradation of confidence in a stockpile would have a greater impact on the side tempted to maintain a first-strike capability than one interested only in a retaliatory force. Would it not, therefore, be in the U.S. interest to encourage degradation of stockpiles? In addition, we must recognize that the Soviets inherently have a greater capacity to develop weapons covertly when they test. We must debate ours with Congress and the types of systems we are testing are widely known.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

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Concentrating exclusively on what we want to do, while ignoring what the Soviets can or might do can be dangerous. This was the flaw in the DOD attitude toward MIRVs in the late 60's and early 70's: they seemed to be weapons which would solve a lot of our problems, and nobody gave much thought to the fact that, once they MIRVed, the Soviets would have an inherent advantage with their heavy missiles. Now we are trying to put that genie back in the bottle, but with indifferent success so far. I think we should take care to make sure we don't make that sort of mistake again.

For the reasons mentioned above, I very much doubt that the Soviets really want a CTB. But they have maneuvered so that they have preempted the high ground with the public on this issue. We must recognize that our refusal to negotiate anything in the testing area is difficult to square with the President's proclaimed goal to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons and to find non-nuclear means to counter them. The necessity for better verification is readily understood, but refusal to negotiate on further testing limitations under an adequate verification regime is more difficult to explain.

None of this is meant as an argument for ratifying the TTBT and PNET without additional measures to improve verification, or for accepting Soviet moratorium proposals, or for jumping at a CTB. But I hate to see us leave the field to the Soviets to trumpet their "proposals" to end testing and to resume CTB negotiations, thus giving them cheap propaganda victories. I think we would be in a stronger position with the public -- and in our other negotiations with the Soviets -- if we took the position that we, too, want to limit and eventually end testing, but this depends on two conditions: adequate verification and an environment of substantially diminishing nuclear weapons stockpiles. We would, therefore, be prepared to discuss the concrete steps which would be necessary to move in that direction. Such an approach would put the monkey on the Soviet back to get serious about verification and to get serious about nuclear weapons reduction. And if they didn't, our refusal to consider further limitations on testing would be more easily defended and would seem more consistent with our other avowed goals.

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Mustlock:

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File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1985

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *Martin*

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting

PURPOSE: To discuss the upcoming visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

BACKGROUND: To discuss Soviet Foreign Minister's meeting with the President on September 27 and the agenda for the November Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

DATE & TIME: September 20, 1985 11:00AM
Duration: 60 Minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Chief of Staff Don T. Regan, CIA Director Casey, Chairman, JCS General John W. Vessey, Jr., Robert C. McFarlane, Admiral John M. Poindexter, Jack F. Matlock.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: To be provided.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer.

PROPOSED "PHOTO": Photographer's discretion.

RECOMMENDED BY: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

OPPOSED BY: None

JW
27NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for NSC Meeting, September
20, 1985Attached at Tab I is a Schedule Proposal from you to Fred Ryan
regarding the upcoming Presidential meeting with NSC members.*JM*
Jonathan Miller concurs.RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Schedule Proposal

H

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting

PURPOSE: To discuss the upcoming visit of the Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

BACKGROUND: To discuss Soviet Foreign Minister's meeting
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DATE & TIME: September 20, 1985
Duration: 60 Minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President Bush, Secretary
of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, Chief of Staff Don T. Regan, CIA
Director Casey, Chairman, JCS General John W.
Vessey, Jr., Robert C. McFarlane, Admiral
John M. Poindexter, Jack F. Matlock.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: To be provided.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer.

PROPOSED "PHOTO": Photographer's discretion.

RECOMMENDED BY: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

OPPOSED BY: None

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 10, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: BOB LINHARD *BL*

SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing: Next Steps

Need additional guidance on next steps prior to our planned 4pm meeting of the arms control support group.

Per your guidance, we have consulted Jack Matlock on the Testing package. His views are contained in the memo first under. In short, he feels that:

1. given the limited approach suggested, no letter should be sent to Gorbachev on this subject at this time; and
2. that we should note that the DoD analysis only looks a what further limitations would do to the US -- not a net assessment.

Taking Jack's second point first, DoD answered the specific questions we asked. Therefore, the memorandum for the President with the DoD response should go to the President for his use.

On Jack's first point, we have scheduled the first Arms Control Support Group meeting for this afternoon at 4pm. Our intent, as suggested in the original package, was to vet the points at Tab C of the original package -- to see if we could get to the point of being ready to (1) discuss them at the SACG on Wednesday, and (2) send the letter to Gorbachev by the weekend. Knowing Jack's view, we would recommend using the support group as planned to vet the idea -- see if the group also feels that no response is needed at this time. In short, press on and see if the support group, and the SACG, feel this is a worthwhile step or that we should simply stand pat. If the general view is that, for whatever reason, a response to Gorbachev on this is not needed now -- we can always shut down the action at that point.

Need your guidance on this soonest (prior to the 4pm support group meeting). Do you want us to change course in any way based on Jack's memorandum?

YES _____ NO _____

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7750

BY CU NARA DATE 10/30/07

Jack - We need guidance on how next to proceed. This is the cover & would like to use soon. To be totally up front with each other, wanted you to see it before it goes. Need to get it across steel by 11:30. Your views - comments -

Bob

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 9, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: RON LEHMAN AND BOB LINHARD
FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing Limitations

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Declassify on: OADR

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ACTION

September 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: BOB LITZARD / RON LEHMAN

SUBJECT: DoD Response to the President's Questions on
the Impact of Nuclear Testing Limitations

On August 14, the President sent a close-hold letter to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking a series of questions about the impact of nuclear testing limitations (current and possible) on US programs, plans, and future options. The DoD has responded. At Tab I is a short memorandum for the President providing him the DoD response (Tab A).

Our next task is to determine what the US "next step" should be in the testing area, and the President still owes Gorbachev a response to his July 28th letter offering a nuclear testing moratorium.

On August 20, Jack Matlock forwarded a proposed Presidential reply to the most recent Gorbachev letter on nuclear testing. However, based upon the strength of the DoD answers, we don't think that the response previously forwarded by Jack can be used. The bottom line, simply put, is that there do not appear to be sufficient additional U.S. options in the nuclear testing limitations area to justify calling for a special meeting of representatives to discuss ways in which our differences on this general issue can be bridged.

On the other hand, we could use the reply to make many of the excellent points suggested by Jack and cap it returning to the most recent U.S. proposal. To show some movement, but in a direction totally consistent with this proposal, we could suggest a private, confidential meeting to provide any information and better define the logistical details needed for the Soviets to positively consider taking the U.S. up on our offer of visiting the U.S. test site. We would also reiterate that we make this unilateral offer in the hope that such a step could lead to the better overall verification regime which is essential to any further movement in nuclear testing limitations.

If we were to take such a modest next step, and do it quietly, it could open the door for Soviet movement should they be looking for such an opening. Therefore, we would recommend that no public comment be made about the reply or its content at this time.

Attached at Tab B is a copy of the previously forwarded proposed reply, annotated to reflect the modifications we would suggest be made to make it track the approach suggested above.

If you agree with this approach, the next issue is how to vet the reply prior to its use. Following standing practice, we would not circulate the draft

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NLRR M08-125/2 # 7760

BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10

text of a Presidential letter for interagency review. Rather, we recommend that we use the paper at Tab C to discuss this approach with the newly formed Arms Control Support Group prior to next Wednesday's SACG meeting. Based on that preliminary discussion, we can then use the same paper to support a SACG discussion of the reply. At no time in this vetting process, either in the Support Group or the SACG, would we propose referring to or discussing either the President's close-hold tasking or the DoD response. After the SACG, we can promptly provide a clean, revised letter and the appropriate forwarding memorandum for the President's review and approval.

At the same time, we continue to review the full spectrum of arms control issues to see if there are other initiatives that we could take to achieve the benefits that Jack had hoped through his version of the draft reply. Following up on the Risk Reduction Center idea may offer one such option.

Recommendations

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding to him only the DoD response at Tab A at this time.

Approve RCM Disapprove _____

That you review the modifications we recommend to the previously drafted reply to Gorbachev (Tab B) and approve this general approach as a next step in the nuclear testing issue area.

Approve RCM Disapprove _____

That you approve the approach to vetting the revised reply using the paper at Tab C with the newly formed Support Group and then with the SACG prior to providing a final version of the specific text to the President for his review and approval.

Approve RCM Disapprove _____

Concurrence: The DoD Response, given its close-hold nature, was never put directly into the NSC system. Pending your guidance on how to treat access to this response, we have not shared this package with anyone outside of the Defense Group. Therefore, we have not provided this package to Jack Matlock for his concurrence.

We would recommend that Jack Matlock should be consulted on this issue as soon as possible.

Go ahead m

Attachments:

- Tab I -- Memorandum for the President (TS/RD)
- Tab A -- DoD Response to Questions on Nuclear Testing (TS/RD)
- Tab B -- Annotated Reply to Gorbachev (S)
- Tab C -- Paper on the Approach Taken in the Reply (S)

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Matlock: 30

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Background Papers on the Soviet Union (S)

Here are the papers you requested. They were put together by Jack Matlock with input from INR and CIA analysts. (S)

Though they are not particularly sensitive in themselves, the fact that they were used for briefing the President is, and I would appreciate your holding them closely. (S)

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachments:

- Tab A The Soviet Union: A Communist Power or a Russian Power
 Soviet Russian Psychology: Some Common Traits
 Russia's Place in the World: The View from Moscow
 USSR: A Society in Trouble
 Dissent in the USSR
 The Soviet Union's Nationality Problem

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BY AN NARA DATE 10/30/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Background Papers on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A are the six background papers on the Soviet Union prepared by my staff with contributions from State and CIA analysts.

Attachments:

Tab A The Soviet Union: A Communist Power or a Russian Power
 Soviet Russian Psychology: Some Common Traits
 Russia's Place in the World: The View from Moscow
 USSR: A Society in Trouble
 Dissent in the USSR
 The Soviet Union's Nationality Problem

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7752

BY CJ NARA DATE 10/30/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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September 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JSM***SIGNED**

SUBJECT: Background Papers on the Soviet Union

Attached for your signature are two memoranda transmitting the six background papers on the Soviet Union to Secretary of State Shultz (Tab I) and Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan (Tab II).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memoranda.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz
 Tab A Background Papers on the Soviet Union (Six)
 Tab II Memorandum to Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan
 Tab A Background Papers on the Soviet Union (Six)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CVS NARA, Date 6/19/02

NLRR F06-114/3 #7753

BY CIS NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE SOVIET UNION:
A COMMUNIST POWER OR A RUSSIAN IMPERIAL POWER?

When outsiders observe and assess Soviet actions and policies, many tend to interpret these in one of two ways, depending on their own psychological and ideological bent. One group operates on the assumption that the Soviet Union represents a new type of revolutionary power, motivated and driven by its ideology, which provides all the clues needed to determine Soviet motivations. The other group believes that the ideology is no more than window dressing and that at the core the Soviet Union is simply a continuation of the Russian Empire, committed primarily to pursuing Russian national interests. Both groups can advance powerful arguments to support their approach.

Those who see ideology as the ultimate motivation point to the obvious facts that the Soviet regime bases its entire legitimacy on its ideology and therefore cannot abandon the ideology without destroying itself. Furthermore, all actions are explained in terms of ideology, and the ideology is used to subvert other nations and provide a rationale for Soviet penetration of other countries, and if the opportunity exists, for Soviet control of them. The "Brezhnev doctrine," which holds that the Soviet Union has not only the right but the duty to prevent the overthrow of "socialism" in another country, is seen as the ultimate expression of an ideological imperative.

Proponents of the "Russian imperial" approach would concede that the Soviet regime is clothed in ideological trappings, and that the ideology is used as an instrument of foreign policy and propaganda. But they would point out that very few Soviet officials really believe it, and that the ideology is simply used, in totally cynical fashion, to advance Russian national interests. Since Lenin's pronouncements go all over the lot, citations can be found to justify any policy decision. Therefore, Soviet political leaders can decide what they want to do, without any regard to ideology, and their propaganda technicians will always find an "ideologically correct" justification.

Those who denigrate the role of ideology as a motivating force, would also point out that many key characteristics of the Soviet system simply cannot be explained by communist ideology. Take hypersecrecy, for example. This is a pronounced Russian trait, going back to the Middle Ages, and has no basis in Marxism. And -- this group would add -- how can you reconcile Marxism with a policy which outlaws the workers' movement in Poland? Doesn't the Soviet attitude toward Solidarity have more in common with nineteenth century Tsarist

repression of Polish "rebels" (who also had the support of virtually all Poles)?

The truth is that both sides of this argument have cited factors which are critical for understanding the Soviet Union, but neither offers a full explanation. Their debate is like a argument over whether brass is copper or zinc. It is both, and the Soviet Union is both an ideological power and a modern-day embodiment of Russian imperial urges. What is important is not to debate which element is predominant, but to understand how the amalgam works.

The Ideological Element

The Soviets call their ideology Marxism-Leninism, but it should be called simply Leninism. Marx, after all, predicted that the working class would revolt against the ruling bourgeoisie, establish a dictatorship of the working class (not of an individual or a small group), and after eliminating other classes, live in a state of brotherly love and cooperation, without needing a government or repressive instruments. In fact, the state itself would "wither away" and no longer be necessary. This vision, though fundamentally flawed in itself, has nothing in common with the Bolshevik Revolution and the regime it established, a regime which controls the working class rather than being controlled by it, and which built the most awesome instruments of repression in human history, along with an enormous, bureaucratic state.

It was Lenin's adaptations -- some would say distortions -- of Marxist philosophy which created the ideological basis of the Soviet state. Lenin, seeing that the "working class" in Russia was small and unorganized, postulated that a small number of intellectuals and professional revolutionaries were the "vanguard" of the working class and could act in its name. Therefore, he created an elite party which arrogated to itself the right to determine the "true" interests of the workers, and to rule the country on their behalf. And what is more, he established a structure of authority and discipline in the elite party itself so that it could be controlled from the top. This was the structure which Stalin inherited (and Mao Tse-tung borrowed for China) which provided the instrument for the most repressive regimes mankind has known.

Leninism, therefore, is simply a mechanism for seizing, consolidating and perpetuating power. The fact that it is clothed in high-sounding phrases about social betterment does not alter its essence. Nevertheless, the pretense that the goal of this power is to improve the lot of the "masses" is

better suited to propoganda than Nazi "master race" theories, which are guaranteed to turn off anyone not a member of the "master race."

The Role of Ideology

Most persons who have dealt extensively with Soviet officials, even those officially charged with propoganda, are struck by how few really believe the ideology. In private, most are frank to say that the social theories are not consistent with reality and that Soviet-style "socialism" does not work very well in terms of meeting human needs. In Soviet schools, obligatory classes in ideology are considered dull make-work, good only for cynical jokes and material for opportunists who must master the "catechism" to make a career with little work. None seem to see their ideology as offering a practical guide to policy decisions. One senses none of the revolutionary elan today which observers described in the 1920's and 1930's.

But the loss of revolutionary elan is not the whole story. The fact is that those who run the Soviet system cannot give up the ideology, whether they believe it or not. They cannot because it provides the sole source of their own legitimacy as rulers. Their power does not stem from constitutional processes; it can only be justified on ideological grounds, both to their own people and to the world at large. When so much at home seems to be either unsuccessful or inconsistent with the proclaimed ideology, it becomes important to the rulers to claim victories of the ideology abroad. Such claims have a legitimizing impact and contribute an important element to Soviet objectives which were absent from the motivations of monarchs and would be absent from those of a real constitutional republic.

Leninist ideology has, moreover, struck deeper roots than the pattern of cynical manipulation which we often observe would suggest. The fact is that so much Soviet discourse has been forced into the mold of Leninist reasoning that it affects the thinking even of those who would privately profess disbelief in its fundamental tenets. Entirely aside from its use as a propoganda tool, it provides a framework for looking at the world and analyzing developments.

Thus, Soviet citizens are inclined to interpret events in democratic countries in terms of the "class struggle," and -- paradoxically -- to assume that official statements put out by other countries are as duplicitous as those put out by their own. They tend to see other countries as ruled by elites which oppress the "masses" and deny them social services such

as free education and medical care. And while the Soviet rulers do not find clear-cut answers to policy dilemmas in the ideology, the ideology acts to define options and to channel decisions in particular directions.

The ideology is also a dandy tool for an expansionist foreign policy. Its rhetorical element promising power to the masses and economic betterment for the poor has an appeal to naive reformers and provides a cloak of benign intent to cover Soviet attempts to extend their influence and establish control over others. Its Leninist core provides a rationale to would-be dictators to gain and retain power, and a propaganda "justification" for accepting "fraternal assistance" in the form of Soviet arms and Cuban troops.

The Russian Tradition

Leninist ideology explains a lot, but it does not explain it all. The Soviet system also exemplifies a number of characteristics which are deeply rooted in the non-communist Russian past.

One of the most striking and pervasive of these involves the relationship of the state and its citizens. Russia has no tradition of individual rights or of the rule of law binding on both rulers and the ruled. All inhabitants were considered servants of the state (or of the Tsar), and virtually the sovereign's property. A ruler might be liberal or repressive, but "rights" were not inherent but rather privileges dispensed from above. And he who giveth can also take away. This is still a deep-seated Russian attitude which underlies much of the regime's behavior on human rights issues and explains why the population as a whole is relatively indifferent to them. This tradition produces an unspoken and perhaps subconscious attitude which holds that foreigners who press for the right of emigration are, in effect, out to rob the Russian regime of its property, and those who want to leave are guilty of disloyalty which smacks of treason.

Another deep-seated Russian tradition is that of hyper-secrecy, especially as regards foreigners. Western visitors to Muscovy as far back as the fifteenth century wrote about this trait, which even then was carried to absurd extremes, not only by the authorities, but by ordinary people as well. Often the secrecy stemmed from a desire to cover up weaknesses or potential embarrassments and was connected with a feeling of technological and cultural inferiority in comparison with Western Europe. Even today tourists are often harassed by ordinary citizens if they photograph buildings in disrepair or

primitive-looking open-air markets. The popular assumption seems to be that any foreigner is a potential threat, actively trying to uncover weaknesses which can be exploited in some fashion. The Communist regime exploits and fans this attitude in its "vigilance" campaigns, and the traditional attitude bolsters official resistance to intrusive verification measures of arms control agreements. As Gromyko once remarked when pressed to agree to additional confidence-building measures, "What you want is a license to spy on us."

The Russian attitude toward Western Europe has always been ambivalent. On the one hand, the material prosperity, civic spirit and (for intellectuals at least) political freedoms have been envied. But, feeling that Russia was backward in all these respects, Russians indulged in psychological compensation by telling themselves that they were spiritually superior. Historically, this took various forms, sometimes with claims that their values were more spiritual and not so materialistic as the West, and sometimes with claims that they were more devoted to the good of the whole community rather than that of the most vigorous individuals who, in the West, were held to exploit others. Communist ideology exploits this deepseated ambivalence in numerous ways, by claiming that sacrifices are required today to build a better society for tomorrow, by picturing Western societies as marked by ruthless exploitation and callousness toward the unfortunate, and by stimulating the implicit xenophobic strain in these attitudes.

Traditionally the Russians have always been suspicious of their immediate neighbors and have striven to dominate them. Muscovy grew steadily from a tiny city state in the fourteenth century to a giant empire by adding, piece by piece, the territory of its neighbors. Usually territorial expansion was "justified" by claiming that the neighbor threatened them, or might be used by another powerful state to threaten them. Sometimes the threat was real, but often it did not exist at all. But whether or not the threat really existed, the Russian people as a whole seemed persuaded by their leaders' claims.

Expansion of the Russian Empire was also justified by many on grounds of ideology and religion. For centuries, it was commonplace to speak of Moscow as the "Third Rome," in the sense that it was the successor of Rome and Constantinople as the seat of true Christianity. According to this concept, Russia had both the right and duty to spread her rule over Orthodox Christians to protect them from the Turks (and Western Protestants and Catholics.) The great writer

Dostoevsky, for example, a fierce enemy of Marxism and all forms of socialism, supported aggressive wars against the Turks to protect Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.

At first it might seem that this has little to do with atheistic communism. But in fact it does, because the "Brezhnev doctrine" is really only a secular version of the traditional Russian messianic vision. What the Communists have done in this case, as in the others, is to fuse a distorted Marxian concept with a traditional Russian one. If Orthodox Tsarist Russia had the duty to "protect" Orthodox believers by establishing its rule over them, then the communist Soviet Union has a comparable duty as regards other "socialist" states.

The Amalgam

One of the achievements of the communist regime in Russia has been to convince the Russian people in general that the Soviet system is "theirs" -- that is, authentically Russian. This is important, since even those who complain about its failures rarely consider it an alien imposition. And for many, outside criticism of the system -- even for failures they know are real -- is resented as damaging to their national pride.

Russia's communist leaders have been able to do this precisely because they grafted elements of Leninist ideology on to the tree trunk of Russian nationalist tradition, so that they are able to tap and mobilize attitudes which have deep roots in the national psyche.

The result, however, resembles not so much a plant with grafts as a chemical amalgam, with ideology and Russian traditions intermixed in an intimate and complex fashion. In this intermixture, those traditions useful to centralized, totalitarian rule have been accentuated and those traditions which do not fit it have been resisted.

The Russian Empire was well known for its secret police, forced labor camps and censorship. The Bolsheviks adopted these institutions and made them much more efficient, pervasive and oppressive.

Religion is an good example of a tradition which was not adopted, but opposed. The Russian peasantry, in particular, has traditionally been deeply religious. The Orthodox Church, however, for several centuries operated under tight state controls. The communists did two things. They waged an unremitting campaign against the practice of religion, by propagating

atheism and at the same time trying to build up the cult of Lenin and the Party as a replacement for religious belief. At the same time they utilized the Russian tradition of state control of the Orthodox Church to bring the Church under their ultimate control, which makes it possible to monitor and limit what the Church does, and when the opportunity occurs -- as with contacts with foreign religious groups and "peace" organizations -- to use it as an instrument of official policy.

Ideas of Western-style constitutional government and the rule of law penetrated the Russian intellectual class in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Russia seemed to be evolving belatedly in that direction when World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution cut this evolution short. The Revolution, however, swept away most of the educated class which espoused these ideas. Many were killed, many others were driven into emigration, and those who survived and stayed in the country were driven to the fringes of society and were further decimated in the purges of the 1930's. In their place there arose a new "upper class" which came primarily from the peasantry, a group steeped in traditional, non-Western attitudes and little touched by the influx of Western ideas.

The regime has never succeeded in extirpating either religion or Western ideals of constitutional government. By all accounts, the practice of religion is growing, particularly among the young, and the dissident movement and figures like Andrei Sakharov make clear that, while they may be down, those who strive to establish a government of limited powers subject to the rule of law are not entirely out. Up to now, however, the communist regime has demonstrated the capability of keeping the practice of religion within tolerable bounds and of preventing ideas of constitutional government from spreading to the population as a whole.

For us, the fundamental fact to bear in mind in managing our relations with the Soviet Union and dealing with its leaders is that the system and its motivations cannot be explained exclusively in either ideological or traditional Russian geopolitical terms. We are dealing with a superpower which combines, in ways unique to it, ideological and traditional attitudes, institutions and motivations. Subsequent essays will probe in more detail how this "amalgam" works out in practice.

Prepared by
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BY CI NARA DATE 10/30/07SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
SOME COMMON TRAITS

Yes, they lie and cheat. And they can stonewall a negotiation when it seems in their interest to strike a deal. They have a sense of pride and "face" that makes the proverbial oriental variety pale in comparison. Yet, in private, with people he trusts, the Russian can be candid to a fault -- grovelling in his nation's inadequacies -- and so scrupulously honest that it can be irritating, as when he makes a big deal over having forgotten to return a borrowed pencil.

Do these contradictions stem from ideology and politics? To a degree, certainly. The lying, cheating and stonewalling, even the exaggerated sense of pride, often serve an obvious political or ideological purpose. But that is not the whole story, for these traits have deep roots in Russian culture and society.

Now when we talk about the "psychology" of a nation or ethnic group, we need to bear in mind that we are not talking about the psychology of every individual in that group. By no means every Russian, or every Soviet official, fits a stereotype. They exhibit as much individual variety as any other people. Yet there are certain psychological characteristics which are more common, and more characteristic, in one society than in another. What we are concerned with here are some which differ from those most common to Americans and explain in part frequently observed behavioral differences.

The "Truth": Reality or a Convenient Fiction?

Lying is endemic in every society. But societies differ in how the phenomenon is regarded. All societies I know of excuse it under certain circumstances. Who would reproach a wife who comforted her husband after he had delivered a dull after-dinner speech by telling him, "It was a very thoughtful talk, dear, and I'm sure those idiots who dozed off just had too much to drink before dinner?" We would call it a white lie; not the truth, but meant well.

The Russians have many more categories of the "excusable" lie than we typically do. There is, for example, the lie which is not so much meant to deceive as to salvage the pride of the liar. Most Russians would feel that it is a social faux pas to confront another person with an embarrassing fact, and that it is understandable if the other person denies the fact and concocts an alternate, fictional explanation, since he is only trying to save face, not to deceive. They even have a separate word for this sort of lie, to distinguish it from one made with deliberate intent to deceive.

In 1976, President Ford made a direct appeal to Brezhnev to turn off the microwave signals being directed at the American Embassy in Moscow. We then supplied the Soviets with the technical data we had that proved conclusively the existence of the microwave

radiation and even pinpointed the sources. Subsequently, Gromyko had the gall to state to our Ambassador in a face-to-face meeting that he could assure us, officially and on behalf of the Soviet Government, that no microwaves were being directed at our Embassy.

Gromyko, of course, knew that we knew he was lying, and that there was no way this "assurance" was going to diminish our confidence in the hard facts we had gathered with our own instruments. So why did he do it? I suspect that his reasoning went something like this: "They know very well that we will not admit to this. They are just trying to put us on the spot, and gain an advantage. We'll show them we are not so weak that they can push us around." (In fact, somewhat later the microwave signals were turned off, but without any admission that they ever existed.)

In addition to condoning lying to save face, Russians expect it from governments and official authorities. Lying for reasons of state is not so much excused as simply accepted as a fact of life. They know their own authorities lie to them, and assume that every other government does the same. This is why Russians have never understood why Watergate brought an end to Nixon's presidency. To them, the charges against President Nixon seemed so trivial -- a very mild form of what they assume all government officials do as a matter of course -- that they simply could not accept that these charges could have been the real reason for his resignation. (Given to conspiracy theories, most Russians seem convinced that Nixon was removed by an anti-Soviet cabal because he tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union.)

These typically Russian attitudes toward telling the truth are mingled with a much more purposeful and cynical view of the "truth" which the communist regime introduced. As a calculated instrument for establishing and maintaining control of the population, the communist authorities introduced an elaborate and pervasive system not merely to control information, but to shape the perception of reality by distorting and misrepresenting facts which tended to undermine the political line of the moment. Communist Party professionals were trained on the proposition that the truth is what the Party says it is at a given moment, and many of those who adapted to this requirement seem over time to lose the ability to distinguish between the Party line and reality. Psychologically, the Party line becomes reality for them. Professor Leszek Kolakowski, a former Polish Communist who broke with the regime some 20 years ago and now lives in England, has described this phenomenon as follows:

[The truth of Stalinist totalitarianism] consisted not simply in that virtually everything in the Soviet Union was either falsified or suppressed -- statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally even Lenin's texts) -- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what was politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is

"correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again they themselves began to believe or half-believe them. The massive corruption of the language eventually produced people who are incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.

To a great extent this form of perception seems to survive, in spite of the fact that the omnipresence of ideology has been somewhat restricted recently. When Soviet leaders maintain that they have "liberated" Afghanistan, or that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that they mean what they say. To such an extent have they confounded linguistic ability that they are incapable of using any other word for a Soviet invasion than "liberation," and have no sense at all of the grotesque distance between language and reality. It takes a lot of courage, after all, to be entirely cynical; those who lie to themselves appear among us much more frequently than perfect cynics."

Whether it is a case of lying to themselves or of conditioned cynicism, the ability of many Russians (and not only communist officials) to change their version of the truth when so instructed by authority can be breathtaking to an outsider. When the "line" is changed abruptly, many seem to wipe the previous position from their consciousness and blithely assume it never existed. One encounters such habits even in the trivia of everyday life.

Once, while visiting Moscow some years ago, I had dinner in a restaurant with several other Russian speakers. The waitress apparently did not spot us as foreigners, and when we ordered extra bottles of mineral water (it was a sultry summer day) she simply said abruptly. "We're out." This was a little hard to believe, because while most foods are scarce, mineral water rarely is in Soviet restaurants. So we protested and pressed her for an explanation, and she repeated her denial several times and finally terminated the conversation with a curt, "We're out of it, and that's that."

As the waitress walked away from our table, she was intercepted by the maitre d' (who knew we were foreigners), and a few words were exchanged. A couple of minutes later, she appeared with two chilled bottles, which she placed on our table, offering no explanation. I observed naively, "Thanks, I thought you were out."

Her reply was instant and accusatory, "Of course we have mineral water. Why do you think we live worse than you?" It was as if her statement less than five minutes earlier had never been made, and my gentle reference to it was taken as an affront to her national pride. What right did I, a foreigner, have to think that such a simple commodity would be unavailable! And if I had

chosen to remind her of her previous statement, she doubtless would simply have denied ever having said it.

Ends and Means

Some of the attitudes described above are connected with another difference in the typical Russian and the typical American ethical system. By and large, Americans believe that good ends do not justify bad means. Most Russians feel that proper ends justify whatever means necessary.

An emigre Russian professor recently conducted a survey comparing Russian and American attitudes on this subject, placing it in a completely non-political context. He asked the same question to a sample group of persons born in the U.S. and to a group of recent emigres from the Soviet Union. The question was, "If you have a good friend who is having trouble passing a course at school, is it right for you to give him answers during an exam?" The great majority of Americans said it was not right; the Russians, by a comparable majority, said it was.

It is easy to see how this attitude can be exploited by the political authorities. If they can present the objective of a given action as a laudable one, their people are likely to accept whatever means are claimed necessary to achieve it.

The Soviet handling of the KAL shoot-down illustrates many of these factors. A deeply embarrassing incident, first denied, then -- when denial was no longer possible -- a concocted story meant to be exculpatory, particularly in the eyes of the Russian people. The authorities could rely on the Russian propensity to justify means to a "necessary" end if they could be convinced that KAL 007 was a "spy plane" which threatened their security. And the larger tragedy of it all is that most Russians probably believed the concoction, because to disbelieve it would mean that they, as a nation, are aggressive brutes with no respect for human life -- an image the direct opposite of the one the Russians have of themselves and the one the regime, with all its instruments of disinformation, cultivates.

Compromise and Principle

Americans tend to see the willingness to compromise as a value in and of itself. Russians, on the other hand, tend to view it as a fault and a sign of moral weakness. The morally "correct" behavior is to stand firm on your principles and either prevail or go down fighting.

This does not mean that Russians do not understand bargaining. Anyone who has haggled with the peasants in an open-air market or dealt with their grain purchasers can testify to their innate ability to negotiate a price. But if a principle is involved, that is another matter.

Of course, none of us likes to think that we ever compromise on our principles. The real difference between Russians and Americans is that the former impute a "principle" to a much broader category of issues than we would. The communist line is always described as a "principled" line. Counting British and French nuclear systems in any INF agreement is a matter of "principle." For a long time, paying more than 6% on borrowed funds was also one, with the result that the Soviets would knowingly pay a higher price than market on a contract so that the supplier could provide a lower nominal interest rate. In real terms, the lower rate was an illusion, and they knew it, but the "principle" itself was important enough to them to insist upon it.

The underlying Soviet attitude toward compromise explains in part some of their foreign policy blunders. They probably genuinely expected the rest of the world to see their withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations in 1983 as a noble defense of principle, even if it was a principle the outsiders did not agree with. They must have realized very quickly that it was an error but once they had taken the step, they had to readjust their "principles" before they could correct it. Thus the maneuvering in advance of the Geneva meeting last January, and the insistence at that time that the renewed negotiations be characterized as entirely new.

In actual practice, the Soviet attitude toward compromise is related more to its public presentation than to the act itself. Like the peasant woman in the market who wants to move her onions before she takes the train back to her village, Soviet leaders can be quite realistic in judging when it is in their interest to strike a deal and when they may be better off without one. If they are interested in a deal, however, they will wish to position themselves so that they can present it to their own people as a triumph of some principle. This partially explains their habit of seeking general agreements in principle before negotiating details. The agreement in principle, as it were, legitimizes the detailed bargaining which must follow and the result can be portrayed as a successful embodiment of the principle, rather than a craven compromise.

If, however, the Soviet leaders are unable to adjust their "principled" position to accommodate a deal, they may refuse to conclude the deal at all, even if it is in their interest. Immediately after the Trade Act of 1974 was passed with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, the Soviets very privately showed a willingness to reach a deal. They offered an emigration figure of at least 50,000 a year, but on condition that there would be no public acknowledgement that there was a deal. Everything fell apart when there were leaked stories in Washington about this; the Soviets drew back, refused further negotiation and have never since been persuaded to resume bargaining on the issue.

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Pride, Face and Status

The Russians have only themselves to blame for the widespread criticism their actions evoke, and the fear and derision they inspire in outsiders. It is doubtless too much to expect them to understand this -- though some of their intellectuals do. Some criticism they can take -- but only in private. They usually do not mind the fear, because it is testimony to their importance and, furthermore, has important political uses. It is really the derision that sends them up the wall. And their skins are so thin on this subject, that they often see insult where none is intended.

Gorbachev's opening monologue to Baldrige in May provided several examples of this. "We recognize that you are a great country and have great achievements," he claimed, "but you ignore what we have achieved. You won't treat us as equals." Subsequently, he complained that even when they pay good hard cash for our grain, which we are anxious to sell, we make statements that they cannot feed their own people, while we never make such statements about Western Europe, which imports more food per capita than the Soviet Union.

Distorted and self-serving as Gorbachev's statements were, they probably represented genuine feelings. Underlying them is a deep inferiority complex bred of many factors: an awareness of their technological backwardness and lower living standards; a basic (though probably subconscious) sense of their political illegitimacy; a recognition that their system has failed to fulfill its promises to provide a better life for their people; and a feeling that they have been systematically denied their rightful recognition and "place in the sun."

Never mind that they have usually stimulated by their own actions and behavior the treatment which they resent. The fact is probably that their skins are thin precisely because they know in their hearts that the criticism, and much of the derision, is well founded. A Russian-speaking American diplomat who served in Moscow in the 1930's tells the following story. Despite the Stalinist atmosphere of the time, he managed to acquire a number of Russian friends, and at their meetings they would speak freely of many of their country's problems. Once, however, the diplomat was called on in a gathering which included foreigners to discuss the current situation, and he alluded gently to some of these problems. Afterwards, some of his Soviet acquaintances came up and told him with indignation, "We thought you were our friend!" He protested that he was, indeed, a friend and pointed out that he had said nothing which was not true. "Of course it's true." the Soviets replied. "But if you were our friend, you wouldn't tell the truth about us."

It is hard to imagine a Chinese or a Frenchman making a statement like that. But then, they have a rock-steady foundation of national and cultural self-confidence to rely on. The Russian psyche, in contrast, teeters on the sand of self-doubt.

The Other Side of the Coin

Having said so much about contrasts in Russian and American attitudes, a word may be in order about some similarities. We are not poles apart in everything.

In private, and away from a politically-charged environment, a Russian is typically gracious and remarkably open -- if he likes you and considers you sincere. Five or ten minutes after a chance meeting -- say in a train compartment or on a park bench -- he is likely to tell you the story of his life and elicit yours, and respond with spontaneity and candor. In this respect Russians are much less reserved than most West Europeans, and are quick to notice that Americans have the same trait.

Nor do they allow the xenophobic strain in much of their thinking -- and much of the propaganda -- to affect personal ties with individuals. West Germans often are amazed by the warmth and hospitality shown them by Russians when they visit the Soviet Union, given Russian memories of World War II. Many Germans have told me that they are treated better in Leningrad than in Paris by the man on the street.

For all their sensitivity to criticism in public, Russians expect it in private, so long as it does not seem gratuitous or damaging to their sense of national dignity. In fact, the foreigner who tries to curry favor by praising everything Soviet earns only their contempt; such praise is considered insincere, and often patronizing and condescending to boot. (Of course, they like praise of those things they are genuinely proud of, such as their heroism in World War II, Shostakovich's music or Voznesensky's poetry, but not of the things they know very well do not merit praise.)

Their deepest contempt, however, is reserved for those foreigners who try to ingratiate themselves by running down their own country. This the Russians simply do not understand -- in their eyes the foreigner should stand up for his country just as a Russian would for his own -- and if he does not do so, he is considered morally defective. This attitude, of course, does not prevent them from using such persons for propaganda purposes, but Russians, official or otherwise, really have no respect for them.

This attitude applies in particular to members of communist parties in Western Europe and the U.S. In 1976 we sponsored a major exhibition on American life in Moscow to mark the Bicentennial of American Independence. It was an election year, and one section of the exhibit had a real voting machine and the Soviet visitors were encouraged to go in and cast a mock ballot. The slate used was taken from New York and the American Communist Party was on the ballot.

Almost nobody voted the CP slate (if memory serves, there were perhaps three of four votes for the communists out of thousands cast). Almost all Soviet visitors voted for either Ford or Carter. Our American guides conducted a bit of exit polling at the exhibit, asking visitors how they had voted. Once in a while they would ask why the visitor had not voted for the communists. Sometimes that question only elicited a discreet shrug, but several Soviet visitors were brutally frank, making statements like, "If I were an American, do you think I'd vote for those clowns?" or "Do you think I want America to have a mess like we have here?" So much for Marxist "proletarian solidarity"!

Unfortunately, these appealing Russian traits of personal openness and candor are all too often submerged under the repressive lid of the police state. But when the regime tries to suppress these traits, it is moving against, rather than with, the Russian cultural tradition. Whenever the lid is slightly raised, the traditional behavior spurts forth, all the more vehemently for having been constrained.

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The contradictory pull of the various urges, hang-ups and ideological imperatives at work in Soviet Russian minds and emotions tends to make Soviet behavior not only unpredictable to the outsider, but unpredictable for Russians themselves.

Michael Vozlensky, a former member of the Soviet elite who defected in the early 1970's and has written a classic work on the Soviet ruling class, commented recently that those who think the Soviet leaders operate in accord with a careful plan of action have it all wrong. "Everything is decided ad hoc," he maintained. "They don't know themselves what they are going to do next. But they will always claim that they had it in mind all along."

He may be right.

Prepared by:
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RUSSIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD:

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Russia has a long tradition of contradictory self images. For two centuries visions of Moscow as the seat of universal truth have clashed with perceptions of Russia's technical and economic backwardness. But it made a big difference whether Russians were looking west, to Europe and the United States, or south and east, to the Islamic World, China and Japan. The attitude toward the West was deeply ambivalent, with urges to emulate and "catch up" conflicting with those to declare themselves superior and to prevent the penetration of Western influences. Toward the East, however, there was less ambivalence; relations were viewed as fundamentally hostile and Russia was considered an agent of Christian, Western civilization, holding at bay threatening hordes. The injection of communist ideology with the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution brought important changes in policy, and added new contradictions, but the underlying popular attitudes toward the world outside the Soviet Union persisted.

LOOKING WEST

Russian intellectual history in the nineteenth century was in large part a conflict between "Slavophiles" and "Westernizers." The Slavophiles had a romanticized view of the Russian nation as the carrier of religious orthodoxy, profound spirituality and universal morality. The Westernizers decried Russia's backwardness, and saw emulation of western science, technology, economics and political reform as the cure for it.

The revolution which brought Lenin's Bolsheviks to power in 1917 was in a sense the ultimate victory of the most radical heirs of the Westernizers' tradition. It did not, however, put an end to conflicts of self images. The old ones persisted in transmuted forms, and new ones arose.

On the one hand the Bolsheviks saw themselves as the vanguard of the inevitable world proletarian revolution envisioned by Marx as the prelude to a communist society. On the other, they were keenly aware of Russia's backwardness. It was only after a bitter debate that Lenin won agreement to a separate peace with Germany. Many Bolsheviks wanted to turn World War I into a revolutionary campaign. They felt that a revolution in backward Russia would have no meaning if it did not immediately kindle revolution in the advanced countries of Europe.

Stalin later sought to deal with the paradox of Russia's backwardness and pretention to world leadership by arguing that building "socialism" in one country was a necessary step to pave the way for world revolution. Nevertheless, Soviet propagandists

still had to juggle conflicting self images of the USSR: boasting that the Soviet Union was an example for the world in abolishing unemployment while trumpeting Stalin's call to catch up with America.

Impact of World War II: Glory in the Ashes

The Soviet Union came perilously close to defeat when Hitler invaded, suffered heavy human and economic losses in the war, but in the end emerged as a victor. Soviet propaganda strives to keep fresh -- even passionate -- the story of patriotism, sacrifice and ultimate victory. Psychologically, World War II is a much more recent event in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States. It left its own discordant self images.

One legacy is an abiding fear of war. The populace gets jittery in periods of tension. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and again during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 we heard that rural stores ran out of matches, kerosene and soap as peasant women hoarded in fear of war. Soviet leaders play to this popular concern over peace; their habit of repeatedly seeking declaratory statements of peaceful intent is one part of this.

The other legacy was a new pride that the USSR had at last graduated into the ranks of the great powers and had new and far greater influence on world affairs. Communist officials in particular take pride in the fact that the Soviet Union has moved from an outcast power on the fringes of European geopolitics in the 1920's to one of the world's two acknowledged superpowers, and see this as perhaps their most important and lasting achievement.

The Parvenu Superpower

The short leap from the darkest days of World War II to sputnik and strategic parity with the United States must have been a heady experience for Soviet leaders. It created a new self image of the USSR as one of the world's two most powerful countries. But at the same time, it sharpened the contradictions in Soviet views of the U.S.

The idea that the USSR could be the equal of the U.S. took on new meaning. When Khrushchev renewed Stalin's theme of catching up with America economically, the notion had a new plausibility. After all, the Soviet Union had achieved a major first in space. Leninism postulated enmity between "socialist" Russia and the most advanced capitalist country of the world. But it also assumed communism would be built upon the foundation of the best that capitalism had developed. America's productivity and consumer goods were, in effect, the vision of the good life to come. Catching up with the U.S. was thus a powerful theme for

Khrushchev's Soviet audience, conditioned as it was (despite heavy propaganda to the contrary) to see America as the land of milk and honey and the embodiment of most of its aspirations. But it was again a clear admission of the shortfalls of the Soviet economy, an admission that Gorbachev implicitly reverts to today when he appeals for better economic performance and alludes to a serious lag in adopting new technology.

Eastern Europe: A Special Case

Perhaps because the margin between defeat and victory in World War II was so narrow, the Soviets have long been troubled lest their gains from the war prove transitory. The effort to freeze the postwar status quo on the Soviet side of the dividing line they imposed on Europe has run like a red thread through virtually all of Soviet diplomacy on European issues for forty years. The instrumentalities have varied enormously -- the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the MBFR negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe have all been vehicles for it. But the purpose has all been the same -- to write a public law of Europe which in the absence of a peace treaty formally ending World War II would make permanent the East-West division of Europe and provide implicit recognition of the Soviet right to take whatever steps it deemed necessary to perpetuate its domination of countries on "its" side of the line.

Entirely aside from the ideological reasons the Soviet political leadership advances to "justify" its interventions in Eastern Europe (the Brezhnev doctrine), Soviet efforts to dominate Eastern Europe find broad support from the man and woman on the street. Their attitude seems to be that Eastern Europe is made up of small nations prone to "make trouble" if given the chance. Since they might be used by a larger power to threaten Russia (as Russians are convinced they have been in the past), they must be kept in line. Furthermore, Russians are keenly aware that the East Europeans have a higher standard of living than they do, and this they resent.

When Solidarity was at its height in Poland in 1981, the aspirations of the Polish workers attracted little support among the Russian working people. One heard relatively mild and self-deprecating comments like, "The problem with the Poles is that they want to work like Russians and live like Americans," but more often the comments were bitter, like "If the Poles think they can refuse to work and then expect us to feed them, they've got another think coming." And many Russians are convinced that East Europeans live better than they do because of Soviet assistance and subsidies. "They all have their hands in our pockets," is not an unusual comment in Moscow. Deep down, Russian workers may also be ashamed of the evidence that Poles, Hungarians and even Czechs at times will rise up and fight for their interests while they Russians rarely have the guts to do so.

The popular Soviet feeling that East Europeans are likely to make trouble if left to their own devices means that, whenever the Soviet leaders decide that various forms of intervention are necessary to maintain their position in Eastern Europe, most Russians can be expected to agree.

LOOKING EAST AND SOUTH

When Russians turn their gaze south to the Islamic World and India, or east to China and Japan, they never experience a desire to emulate or "catch up," which is such a prominent aspect of their attitude toward the West. For Russians, their subjugation by the Mongols in the twelfth century, and the "Tatar yoke" which persisted for more than two centuries and cut them off from Western Europe during one of its most creative periods, is still a relevant historical experience. The experience and its "lessons" are drummed into every schoolchild, and books and films continue to be issued which tell of Russia's erstwhile degradation and subsequent redemption through relentless struggle. Along with subsequent invasions -- by Swedes, Poles, French and Germans -- the Mongol domination is used to explain and excuse Russia's economic and technological backwardness, and to bolster the feeling that everything must be sacrificed to a powerful military establishment.

Whatever disabilities the Mongols inflicted on Russia, the damage has long since been avenged and the tables turned on the Asian peoples bordering the Russian land. Nevertheless, the Asian is still considered a potential threat, and the Russian populace has never totally freed itself from the nightmare image of Asian hordes sweeping across the "motherland."

This residual fear should not be exaggerated. It does not (despite the claims of some apologists) totally explain the Soviet preoccupation with military strength. Russians know very well that the Chinese cannot really threaten them in the immediate future. But they do worry -- and probably rightly so -- about what would happen if they faced a modernized and militarily powerful China, still smarting from the imperial Russian seizure of lands once under its sway.

What is equally relevant to current Russian attitudes is that their fear has also been mingled with loathing. To put it bluntly, most Russians are racists underneath. They consider themselves "Europeans," implicitly measure themselves against European standards, and have never thought that they had anything to learn from the East. To a Russian -- even a relatively sophisticated intellectual -- there is no greater insult than to call Russia an "oriental despotism." "Despotism" they might accept, but "oriental" never.

Communist Ideology and Geopolitical Opportunism

The persistence of racist attitudes, a mingling of fear and contempt, and the absence of cultural affinity did not prevent the communist regime from embarking on a policy of exploiting social and political grievances in the underdeveloped world. If the "imperialist powers" of the developed West were too strong to take on directly, their power could perhaps be sapped by undermining their control of their empires, and their predominant influence in weakened countries like China.

During the 1920's and 1930's, these efforts were carried out primarily through the Communist International, which was totally under Stalin's control. While the effort to foment revolution in undeveloped countries had no basis in Marx's original concept -- which was that the revolution would occur only after an economy had gone through its "capitalist stage" -- it flowed easily from Lenin's theory of imperialism and the Bolshevik attempt to skip the capitalist stage in Russia. The effort, therefore, combined ideological and geopolitical aims.

After World War II, as Soviet power grew, attention was shifted to dealing with rising nationalists, even if they were not communists, and with newly independent governments which might be induced to take an anti-Western stance. If the opportunity to deal with established governments seemed sufficiently promising, the Soviets did not hesitate to abandon the local communists when they were repressed by the regime the Soviets were courting.

Soviet experience since the war must have taught them two important lessons -- neither of which they can admit openly, but both of which are implicit in their actions. The first lesson was that communist ideology in itself was not sufficient to ensure Soviet control -- Tito and Mao broke with the Soviet Union and split the world communist movement. The second was that the most powerful instrument of influence the Soviets possessed in dealing with the Third World was its ability to supply arms to revolutionary movements and the wherewithal and ideology of repression to those leaders whose power was threatened from inside their countries. The ideology thus became a mere handmaiden to force, which was applied in a totally opportunistic fashion.

Despite all their efforts to penetrate countries in the Third World, and all the crocodile tears shed in their propaganda about the lot of the poor and oppressed, one thing both communist officials and ordinary Russians lack is a real interest in the fate of these countries, and real empathy for their problems and cultural values. It is difficult to imagine, for example, the Russian population getting particularly exercised over the famine in Ethiopia, even if it were given all the facts. Life is tough enough at home to worry much about the misfortunes of others, particularly if their skins are dark.

SUPERPOWER DILEMMAS

From the standpoint of the Soviet leaders, the USSR's superpower status is both their most tangible achievement and the source of some of their greatest problems. It is apparent to them that this status rests on one factor alone -- military strength -- since the USSR is not an economic superpower, and its ideological prescriptions for satisfying human needs have been discredited both at home and increasingly throughout the world.

While the people are largely passive in regard to foreign policy formulation and play none of the direct role that publics do in democracies, their views are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to deeply-held popular views risks damaging public morale, which is already quite low, and provides ammunition for potential rival factions in the party.

The Russian people doubtless take satisfaction in their country's superpower status, both because it bolsters their national pride and because they see it as insurance against another war on their own soil. The regime, however, must be careful to avoid leaving the impression that its policies risk war. The leaders are probably acutely aware that there would be little public support for direct military action distant from Soviet borders. Covert supplies of military equipment, training and advisors and also support of surrogate troops is sustainable. These actions carry limited risk of direct confrontation with the U.S. and can be conducted largely without the knowledge of the Soviet population. But it is hard to imagine a Soviet leadership deciding to try to defend Cuba or Nicaragua or Angola with its own forces.

Another persistent trait of Soviet interaction with the outside world has been the absence of experience with and propensity for what we call alliance management. The U.S.S.R. has no real alliances, only countries under its control or those used for discrete temporary goals. Even in World War II, when the alliance with the western powers was a matter of life and death, Stalin never treated it as a true alliance, but only as a very limited marriage of convenience to be terminated as soon as the war was won. (The Russian people, in contrast, looked at it differently, and their experience of and gratitude for the wartime alliance has served to undercut massive anti-western propaganda ever since.)

Soviet unwillingness or inability to understand and respect the interests of smaller and weaker countries and to develop with them mutually beneficial long-term policies limits the potential of Soviet diplomacy. In the short term, the Soviet leaders can reap the benefits of a "divide and conquer" policy, since they put most of their efforts on exploiting bilateral relationships to their own benefit. This enhances their ability to disrupt and undermine international structures and efforts which leave them

on the sidelines. Witness, for example, their ability to derail efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East by providing support to forces in the area which oppose a settlement.

In the long run, however, the sheer opportunism of Soviet policies tends to stimulate local resistance to Soviet influence, and a turn of the political wheel in a given country can result in the sudden expulsion of Soviet representatives -- as occurred, for example, in Sadat's Egypt. But this long-term vulnerability only reinforces the Soviet proclivity to seek domination of other countries rather than relations based on mutual respect. The Soviets are totally incapable of maintaining with other countries the sort of relationship we have with Canada and Mexico, and their inability to do so creates serious problems both for them and for the entire world. To gain some sense of the Soviet dilemma as most Russians perceive it, we need only imagine the problems we would face if we felt we had to occupy our neighbors and impose puppet regimes on them in order to be secure and to play our destined role in the world.

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These Soviet and Russian attitudes toward the outside world pose many problems for American policy. Though the Russian populace tends to see Soviet policies and actions as defensive, its underlying fears and sense of wounded national pride is exploited by the communist regime's cynical manipulation. The fact is that the Soviets define their "security" in terms which amount to absolute insecurity for everyone else. It makes little difference to a Pole or an Afghan that Russians feel they have to dominate them to be secure; for them the end result is the same as it would be if the avowed Soviet rationale were imperial conquest. It is important, therefore, never to accept the Soviet argument that their aggressive actions are justified by legitimate security concerns, and to do all we can to make clear to the Soviet people that such policies undermine their security in the long run rather than bolstering it.

Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Union is a superpower only in military terms creates its own set of problems. Attempts to extend Soviet influence by military means must be countered, but it would be an illusion to think the Soviet leaders can be persuaded to forswear such means, since they are the only means at their disposal to demonstrate their status and "rights" as a superpower. The Soviet Union is non-competitive in a peaceful world, and its leaders know it. Therefore, they can be dissuaded from applying or threatening force in given situations only by being convinced either that their efforts are doomed to failure, or that they would run unacceptable risks such as a dangerous military confrontation with the United States or a political defeat damaging to their prestige.

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Fortunately, other elements in the typically Russian view of the world make our problem more manageable. There is little if any public support for Soviet military involvement far from their borders, particularly if justified solely on ideological grounds. And countries which receive large numbers of Soviet "advisors" quickly develop a virulent antipathy, since most Russians simply do not deal with Asians, Africans and East Europeans with the respect they reserve for West Europeans and Americans. Whenever the perceived need for Soviet arms diminishes, the Soviets are usually given the boot, provided they have not managed to establish military control over the country.

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USSR: A SOCIETY IN TROUBLE

Western observers have always been struck by the peculiarly Russian combination of extraordinary political stability amidst appalling social conditions. In any other country, such conditions might be expected to breed constant revolution. In Russia, it took a century of political unrest, capped by four years of devastating war, to bring on the 1917 cataclysm. The authorities there have traditionally been able to maintain control, because they were dealing with a generally passive population. Economic development and the rise of mass education may have made the job more difficult in recent years, but the control mechanisms are as effective as ever. The enormous problems of Soviet society--problems now perhaps greater in extent than at any time in Russian history--still present the regime with an administrative challenge rather than a political one.

Among the intractable and potentially destabilizing social problems plaguing the Soviet scene are:

- rising rates of alcoholism among all major population groups;
- rising mortality rates among children and adult males;
- ever greater incidence of crime and corruption countrywide;
- an obvious decline in the availability and quality of basic public services and consumer goods; and
- a generalized sense that the Soviet regime is no longer capable of meeting the expectations it has generated in the population.

Some of these problems reflect particular cultural traditions; others are part and parcel of the Soviet system. Still others represent the unintended consequences of specific Moscow policies. Each one of them feeds on and reinforces every other, however. Together they have produced in the Soviet population a deep malaise, a sense that not only has something gone profoundly wrong in recent years but that there is little chance it will be put right any time soon.

Alcoholism

Drinking to excess is part of the Russian national tradition, but in recent years the rates of alcohol consumption have risen to unprecedented levels. Last year, Soviet statistics show that the

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USSR's citizens spent 10 percent of their incomes on alcoholic beverages, and more than one in eight spent at least one night in a sobering-up station. The Soviet Union as a whole does not lead the world in alcoholism, but it is clearly among the leaders, and the domestic impact is worse than the statistics suggest. Alcoholism in the USSR is more concentrated, with the worst drinking confined to the Slavic regions--the Muslim nationalities have much lower, albeit rising, rates. The Slavic groups thus may have the highest rate of alcohol consumption in the world. Furthermore, the Slavic pattern is binge drinking, drinking to get drunk and lose consciousness. As a result, most of the alcohol consumed is high proof vodka rather than beer and wine.

The consequences both immediately and long term are staggering in terms of lowered industrial productivity and increased accidents at the workplace. Death rates among adult males have jumped, and their life expectancy has dropped. And because women are drinking more, alcoholism has also contributed to a substantial rise in infant mortality through premature births and malnutrition of some children. Such rates of alcohol consumption are expected to lead to other forms of social degeneration, if they persist.

The very blatancy of the problem has frequently led Russian governments, both Imperial and Soviet, to counterattack, but none has had any lasting success. Indeed, many of the campaigns against alcoholism have proven counterproductive; Gorbachev's current effort is unlikely to prove any different. Alcohol is after all very much part of the national tradition, and therefore extraordinarily difficult to root out. And Russians have always shown themselves adept at finding alternative sources of alcohol or resorting to home brew should official supplies be cut off. One classic Soviet novel features an apparently typical worker who will drink anything from lighter fluid to antifreeze when regular liquor is not available. Moreover, depriving Russians of alcohol--the chief form of recreation for many--could lead to domestic restlessness and would certainly reduce state income from vodka sales. These last calculations usually have been decisive with Russian officialdom over the years.

Demographic Disasters

Since the revolution, the USSR has suffered a series of well-known demographic disasters--the world wars, revolution, the Civil War, Stalin's collectivization--but by the 1970s their impact was generally smoothing out. Two new trends have appeared recently, however: a sharply higher rate of infant mortality and an increase in deaths among males in their prime working years. Both are unprecedented in size for modern societies during peacetime and call into question the Soviet claim that the USSR is an advanced modern country.

Soviet infant mortality, Western estimates suggest, has risen 30 to 50 percent over the last 15 years. It now stands at three times the rate in the United States and at a level equal to that of the most advanced third world countries. The situation is so embarrassing that the Soviets stopped publishing statistics on this question in 1975. (A recent crack in this ban--in a republic medical journal from Central Asia--states that mortality among children in Tajikistan has risen 38.3 percent since 1970, well within Western estimates.) These high rates reflect the large number of abortions used by Soviet women for birth control (currently six to nine abortions per woman), alcoholism and inadequate diet among pregnant mothers, poor medical services, pollution, and the poor quality of the baby formulas which must be used because most Soviet mothers are forced to return to work soon after giving birth. As a result, both the size and quality of future generations are affected; the next generation faces serious medical and educational problems; and observers have every reason to question Soviet claims that in the USSR "children are the only privileged class." The obvious cures nevertheless seem to be beyond the interests and resources of the Soviet government.

The rising death rates among adult males are equally striking. Over the last 15 years, the life expectancy of Soviet males at birth has apparently dropped to only 56 years, the sharpest decline in any modern society ever, and one that cuts into the working life of most Soviet men, thus reducing the size of the labor pool. The current high levels reflect industrial accidents, chronic diseases, inadequate diet and medical services, pollution, and alcohol consumption. The most recent increases, however, appear traceable to alcoholism alone, a pattern that gives special urgency to Gorbachev's campaign.

Crime and Corruption

Crime of all kinds afflicts the Soviet Union, but corruption is a structural feature of the system, absolutely essential for its operation in its current form, since prices do not reconcile demand and supply for the goods and services that people want. Official prices are set artificially low for political reasons; shortages are endemic, so access to goods and services is determined by other means. Since many Soviet citizens have more money than access to goods, the cash is used to obtain things "on the side," a pattern which has led to the creation of an enormous second economy.

Furthermore, the planning process which encompasses virtually all spheres of activity encourages another form of corruption, both when targets are set and when efforts to meet them are made--be these targets the average grade of a particular school class or the levels of factory output. Every person seeks to make

his plan as easy to meet as possible in order to assure his bonus. As there is no impersonal market mechanism to set these plan targets, they are determined by other means, including corrupt ones. And since the authorities view plan fulfillment as more important than legal niceties, they tend to "overlook" illegalities which produce the results they want.

Finally, all Soviet citizens are conditioned to participate in ideological deception and self-deception, to say and do things they know to be false. Enormous cynicism results, a form of corruption more corrosive and less susceptible to correction than any other.

Every Soviet citizen is thus trapped either as a direct participant in corruption, or as an observer who must report what he sees or choose to remain silent about illegalities. All the alternatives contribute to public demoralization.

Little of this is likely to change. Prices set to clear the market would rise to levels that would make existing shortages even more blatant. Plans set by market forces would erode or destroy the role and power of the party. And if ideological deceptions were eliminated, the Soviet Union would cease to be the Soviet Union: no party leader is likely to want to commit suicide.

Declines in Public Services

The abysmal quality of goods and services available to the public in the USSR is legendary. The Soviet system has always underfulfilled plans for consumer goods; shortages are endemic and appear to have gone from bad to worse recently. Perhaps the clearest picture of the situation is provided by a single Soviet statistic: between 1979 and 1984, the number of hours spent by Soviet citizens to acquire consumer goods rose from 180 billion hours a year to 275 billion, 35 billion hours more than Soviet citizens spend at the workplace. Most of this extra time is spent by women waiting in line for basic foodstuffs. Indeed, Soviet sociologists report that Soviet women now spend 40 hours a week at the job and another 40 hours a week making purchases and doing the housework.

The remedy would require an enormous investment of funds and a willingness to change the system. Neither is in large supply in Moscow.

Unrealized Expectations

Perhaps the greatest problem, and certainly the one which has thrown the others into relief is the currently widening gap between popular expectations and the capacity of the regime to

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meet them. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the Soviet people experienced a growth in real income averaging more than 3 percent annually. Soviet citizens could reasonably expect some upward mobility both for themselves and their children. And because of the special experience of World War II, they generally shared the values of the ruling elite and accepted the explanation that remaining difficulties were traceable to the war. Recent developments have called all this into question. The Soviet economy is stagnating. Opportunities for upward mobility are fewer, thus freezing existing class distinctions. Demographic developments have placed severe constraints on the regime's ability to push economic development as it has in the past by increasing labor inputs. And both mass and elite groups are acquiring a broader and more divergent set of values. Despite heavy jamming, nearly one Soviet adult in six now listens to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week, and many are willing to discuss and criticize domestic Soviet policies now that the costs of doing so have declined.

The impact of economic stagnation is particularly great. For many Soviet citizens, it calls into question the implicit social contract established after the death of Stalin which linked popular support for the regime with the regime's ability to deliver the goods. Further, it has reduced the regime's ability to use material incentives to drive the workforce. As a result, the authorities are forced to rely more on ideological ones--typically less effective--and may be compelled to turn again to coercive ones in the future, even though the latter would probably be less productive now than they were in the past. This stagnation has also contributed to the expansion of blackmarketeering and other forms of corruption. Once again, the obvious remedies are either unwelcome or impossible, a fact that both Soviet citizens and their leaders recognize.

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Even taken together, these problems do not now threaten the stability of the Soviet system. Nor have they led to the crystallization of an active opposition. Instead, they have produced an alienated society, something which may prove more difficult for the regime to control than is the relatively small dissident movement. In the near future, the most obvious impact of these problems will be to force the regime to devote greater resources to its control mechanisms in order to insulate both itself and its goals from these popular attitudes. Over the longer haul, their impact may prompt a Soviet leader to seek major reforms, but at every point he will be frustrated by powerful groups which have a stake in the status quo, even though that status quo has locked Soviet society into a dissatisfied, cynical, and aimless present.

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Dissent in the USSR

Dissidents are individuals who publicly protest regime actions or express ideas that the regime finds contrary to its interests. They do not constitute an organized opposition seeking political power. Intellectual dissidents involved in the human rights movement challenge the regime in the realm of ideas but not in the realm of politics, at least not so far. Other forms of dissent--the emigration movement, religion--basically represent attempts to escape authority rather than to change the system.

Intellectual Dissent

Intellectual dissent began in the early 1960s, when Khrushchev's move toward destalinization gave rise to false expectations of a wider internal liberalization. Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 represented the victory of conservative reaction within the Soviet leadership; repression of dissent increased, especially intensifying after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Human rights dissent revived on a smaller scale in the mid-1970s, when detente and the signing of the CSCE Accords once again stimulated hopes that strictures on basic human rights would be relaxed. Instead, the Kremlin moved forcefully against the small groups that were attempting to publicize regime violations of the CSCE human rights provisions. Today the human rights movement is at a low ebb and Sakharov, its most prominent and articulate representative, is isolated in the provincial city of Gorky.

Although these human rights dissidents are well known in the West, they command little support in the USSR itself. Many people see them as a self-interested, unpatriotic lot that serve the purposes of Western intelligence services. The regime has had considerable success in exploiting popular anti-

Semitic feelings as a weapon against the dissidents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] groups such as the CSCE monitoring group are commonly viewed as little more than devices for Jews wanting to leave the country. Sakharov is something of an exception. In some intellectual circles his confinement in Gorky is referred to as "Lenin in exile" and USIA interviewing of large numbers of Westerners who have had contact with Soviet cultural figures revealed that most Soviet artists admired him as a noble figure.

More influential than the human rights dissidents are a group of intellectual writers who have a strongly nationalist orientation. While taking care to avoid criticizing the regime directly, they call for a moral regeneration of Russia on the basis of traditional values and Russian Orthodoxy--much as Solzhenitsyn does. These nationalist writers reportedly have become cultural heroes who articulate the discontent of large numbers of people with the Soviet system as a whole.

Also influential are the growing number of cultural figures who have emigrated--such as the prominent writer Vladimov, who left in 1983, and the avant garde theater director Liubimov, who departed in 1984. Many intellectuals remaining in the USSR have become "inner emigres" who follow the affairs and writings of the emigre community with great interest through the medium of Western radio broadcasting. This has in effect created an alternative Russian cultural center that many Soviet intellectuals find more vigorous and appealing than the stultifying official Soviet culture. The renewal of jamming of Radio Liberty has reduced the access of Soviet intellectuals to news from the emigre community, but some broadcasting still gets through.

Soviet leaders appear keenly concerned that the ideas of the small group of active dissidents could have resonance within the intelligentsia as a

whole. Their public statements suggest they are worried about the political reliability of the intelligentsia, and [REDACTED] apprehension that the popularity of the nationalist writers could turn Russian national feeling into anti-regime channels. Above all, the leadership probably fears that conservative Russian nationalism appeals even to many elites—perhaps especially within the military—who are concerned that the party has become too effete and corrupt to rule the country effectively.

[REDACTED] some leaders fear that popular grievances over living conditions could converge with the protests of intellectual dissidents about human rights abuses. As early as 1977, for example, during a period of tight food supplies, [REDACTED] Soviet leaders were "acutely aware" of countrywide criticism of food shortages, and that the leadership feared easing restrictions on dissidents could abet a trend of criticism in the country and create an "explosive" climate. Since the late Brezhnev years, [REDACTED] concern within the elite that unrest could become widespread. Events in Poland probably increased leadership sensitivities about the possibility of coordination between Soviet intellectual dissidents and worker dissidents—who since the late 1970s have made several attempts to organize unofficial trade unions. There has in fact been little such cooperation to date.

Religion

By far the most dramatic development in Soviet dissent in recent years has been the extraordinary burgeoning of religion. The most important reason for this phenomenon seems to be simply that many citizens are seeking spiritual refuge from what they see as the drabness and moral emptiness of contemporary Soviet life. The growth of religion is of concern to Soviet authorities for several reasons:

- In many areas religion reinforces anti-Russian nationalism. In Lithuania and the western part of Ukraine, where probably a majority of the population is Catholic, the church has historically been associated with strivings for independence from Russia. Similarly, in Soviet Central Asia the Islamic religion has provided a rallying point for those resisting Russian domination--as, for example, during the Basmachi revolt of the 1920s, which took many years for the regime to suppress.

- Unlike intellectual dissent, religion has a mass base even in Russian areas. Protestant fundamentalism is growing in newly industrialized areas of the Russian republic, and Russian Orthodoxy is attracting adherents in the older cities of the Russian heartland.

- Increasingly, religion cuts across class and generational lines. Religion is growing among blue collar workers as well as among the educated classes. And, for the first time since 1917, religion is attracting large numbers of Russian youth. Andropov [REDACTED] complained in 1982 that many Soviet young people were turning to religion as a way of expressing dissent.

- Religion opens the door to external influences. The election of a Slavic Pope served as a stimulus to religious activity in the Western borderlands of the USSR, where the Catholic clergy has long maintained clandestine ties with the church hierarchy in Poland. The resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East, and the war in

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Afghanistan, have raised Muslim consciousness in Soviet Central Asia, leading to several incidents of unrest there.

Most religious believers in the USSR are members of "registered" or "official" churches who abide by the regime's strictures on religious activity--such as the ban on proselytizing and on religious instruction for children--in exchange for being allowed to worship in peace. Clergy for these churches must be approved by the regime and some of them serve as propagandists for regime policy--using their sermons to preach the party line regarding foreign policy, for example. The regime attempts to use these official churches to keep the activities of religious believers under close surveillance and supervision. It especially uses the official Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of imperialism, by giving it special privileges (more Bibles, more church buildings) to enable it to lure believers away from churches associated with anti-Russian nationalism.

Similarly, the regime exploits the visits of well-intentioned foreign religious leaders such as Billy Graham. Such visits assist the regime in publicizing the existence of "religious freedom" in the USSR. And, by allowing visiting ministers to preach at official churches but not to outlawed congregations, the regime enlists their tacit sanction for the official churches as the "legitimate" ones. Despite the fact that the regime attempts to use the official churches for its own purposes, however, the growing numbers worshipping in these churches testifies to the failure of Marxist ideology in competing with old-fashioned religion for the "hearts and minds" of the Soviet population.

More significantly, the number of unofficial congregations of all faiths appears to be increasing. Many of these groups have developed clandestine

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communications networks that enable them to collect thousands of signatures on a country-wide basis for petitions, and regularly to publish illegal literature (samizdat).

- In Ukraine a semi-secret Catholic church organization [REDACTED] has as many as 350 priests conducting services illegally. Since the summer of 1984, ten issues of a new samizdat "Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church" have appeared.

- In Lithuania, a Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights has been active in petitioning for an end to repressive legislation against religion. The "Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church," which first appeared in 1972, remains one of the most vigorous samizdat journals in the country.

- The unregistered Protestant sects--especially the Baptists and Pentecostals--are attracting large numbers of rural, factory and white collar workers throughout the country. Many of these groups are zealous to the point of being fanatic in protesting such regime measures as "accidental" burnings of churches and forcible removals of children from parents' homes to prevent their receiving a religious upbringing. They respond to repression by engaging in mass civil disobedience --such as burning internal passports and resisting induction into the military. One isolated Far Eastern village is virtually at war with the regime. It has engaged in continuing protests for several years, including four community hunger strikes. Thousands of Pentecostals continue to apply for emigration visas

despite the regime's absolute refusal to grant them. With the assistance of some registered Baptist congregations, the unofficial Baptists publish three samizdat journals, one of which is printed in a thousand copies monthly.

-- [REDACTED] in Muslim areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus a fully developed underground religious structure exists. [REDACTED] illegal seminaries are educating mullahs who teach Islam to children in unofficial mosques. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] expressed concern that Soviet Central Asians are demanding more power for the Muslim clergy at the expense of the party.

Regime Repression

During the 1980s the regime has resorted to harsher repression of dissent than it has employed since Stalin's day. 1979 was a watershed year. With the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet leaders became less concerned to avoid antagonizing Western leaders and public opinion. With the outbreak of unrest in Poland, they became more concerned to crack down on dissent inside the USSR itself.

In 1982 the regime tightened the screws even more. The intensification of repression coincided with the political ascendancy of Andropov, and there has been no let-up under Gorbachev. The crackdown on dissent is consistent with his overall effort to shore up discipline, reassert party control in various areas of life, increase ideological purity, and heighten vigilance against "alien" ideas. The current head of the KGB, Chebrikov, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been in the forefront of those taking a hard line against dissent. Chebrikov was previously head of the KGB

directorates responsible for internal security and has been actively involved in supervising repression of dissent. For example, he was responsible for handling the Solzhenitsyn case.

Since 1979 several new tactics have been employed: the arrest of dissidents on various false criminal rather than political charges; planting drugs and other incriminating evidence in the residences of dissidents to provide the basis for such charges; the resentencing on trumped-up charges of dissidents already serving terms to prevent their release on schedule; increased confinement in psychiatric hospitals; increased harassment of foreign contacts of dissidents and other actions designed to curtail dissident communication with foreigners, such as changing the legal code to broaden the definition of what constitutes a "state secret," which would make it easier to bring treason charges against dissidents who talk to foreigners; inducting dissidents into the military; increased use of violence both against political prisoners and against dissidents still "at large."

Regime brutality has intimidated many dissidents into a complete cessation of activity, but others have merely been driven underground. Some of these--seeing no prospect for change within the system, having no dreams for the future, and disillusioned about the effectiveness of Western support--are advocating more radical tactics of protest, such as the formation of opposition groups with political action programs. Last year several dissidents were arrested for setting up a Social Democratic Party that called for a multi-party democracy. Other dissidents report a "kamikaze" attitude among some embittered youth, a tendency to glorify personal sacrifices made for the sake of the cause. A spirit of despair and a readiness to become martyrs is even more pronounced in some Christian communities--especially the persecuted Pentecostals, Baptists and Ukrainian Catholics, who seem to take

the view that they have "nothing to lose but their chains." At the same time, with the door to emigration all but closed for Soviet Jews, many of them have also become bolder and more active in pressing for cultural freedoms for Jews inside the USSR.

Over the past several years there have been a few reports of terrorist incidents in the USSR. There have also been a few reports that guns are now available on the black market in Tula, a center for the manufacture of small arms, and that this has been a source of concern within the KGB. In an environment of harsh repression, the possibility cannot be discounted that opposition to the regime might assume more violent forms—especially in areas such as Ukraine that have traditions of armed resistance to Russian rule.

Thus, the Gorbachev leadership confronts a dissident community that is small (except for the religious believers) and demoralized. But a new breed of dissident may be developing that is more hardened, more inclined to engage in extreme forms of protest, and in this sense perhaps more of a problem for the regime.

At the Summit

Soviet leaders probably really do believe that what they do inside their own country is none of our business. They certainly believe that the adversary's internal problems are fair game for propagandists, but probably take the view that injecting criticism of internal policy into high diplomacy is nothing more than a cheap political maneuver.

It is true that for a time in the 1970s, the Soviets were responsive to US overtures on behalf of dissidents, especially with regard to Jewish emigration. But the internal repercussions of detente policies have given many Soviet leaders second thoughts, creating a political climate that is not conducive to internal liberalization. Jewish emigration stirred up other

disaffected minorities who wanted to leave. The departure of prominent intellectuals to the West served as a magnet for those left behind. More generally, in the view of many Soviet officials, the increase in contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the 1970s had a negative effect on the attitudes and behavior of the population. [REDACTED] in 1982, for example, that middle and senior level party officials believed that the economic benefits of detente had been bought at a dangerous political price and that the USSR must now protect itself from being "swamped" by Western ideas by cutting back on social, cultural and political contact with the West.

The US sanctions following the invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland also had an effect on the psychology of Soviet officials. Gorbachev himself has seemed especially concerned to avoid becoming vulnerable to US pressure of any sort.

With these practical and psychological factors at work, Gorbachev will probably be extremely unreceptive to appeals on behalf of dissidents. The incentives would have to be powerful for him to consider "concessions" in this area. In any event, any major decision--such as a decision to allow Sakharov to return to Moscow--would probably require consultation with other Politburo members. The Politburo has been involved in past decisions about prominent dissidents and emigres--such as Rostropovich--and sometimes there has been disagreement within the leadership over how to handle particular cases.

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BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONALITY PROBLEM

The Soviet Union is the most ethnically diverse country in the world. It has more than 130 national groups each with its own language, culture and attitudes. Often these affect Moscow's ability to implement its domestic policies and at a minimum require the Soviet authorities to maintain a tighter control on the population than would otherwise be the case. These problems are compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union is the only major country in which the dominant nationality--in this case, the Russians--forms only a bare majority of the population and may soon become a minority. Up to now, Moscow has been able to cope with this situation through a combination of ideological and organizational measures and an often displayed willingness to use force against any opposition.

The Ethnic Mosaic

The USSR is a veritable ethnic museum housing more than 130 different, often exotic groups. They range from small reindeer-herding tribes in Siberia with no written language or independent political tradition to ancient Islamic civilizations in Central Asia to large, modern industrial societies in the Baltic region which were independent countries until World War II. While each is, of course, important to its members, most are politically irrelevant: The smallest 100 nationalities make up less than 2% of the total population. Indeed, their current prominence in the Soviet federal system reflects Moscow's long-term policy of divide-and-rule, of preventing the formation of large communities by sponsoring small ones. The larger nationalities that do matter can be divided into five major ethnographic groups:

(1). The Russians. Now forming 52% of the population, the Russians are the traditional core of the state. They dominate its central apparatus and military and determine both the political culture and official language of the country. They have paid a heavy economic price to maintain their dominance, enjoyed few benefits from their possessions, and are now in demographic decline. Indeed, sometime within the next decade, their low birthrates and high death rates when combined with the high birthrates among Central Asian Muslims will make them a minority in their own country. In an authoritarian political system, this shift will not have any immediate political consequences; but it has already had the psychological effect of giving many Russians a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the future.

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(2). Other Slavs. The Ukrainians (16% of the population) and Belorussians (4%) are culturally similar to the slavic Russians. When these three nationalities stand together--and it is an arrangement Moscow has long sought to promote--they form 72% of the total, a healthy majority unlikely to be challenged for several hundred years. But on many issues--including russification and economic development--these groups find themselves in conflict, a pattern that suggests any Slavic brotherhood may contain as much hostility as agreement.

(3). The Muslim Nationalities. Now forming 18% of the total population, the historically Islamic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus are culturally, linguistically, and racially distinct from the slavic majority. In addition, they represent the fastest growing segment of the Soviet populace: In Turkmenistan, for example, one woman in six has at least 10 children. Because of their rapid growth, they form an increasing share of military draftees--now more than 30%--and of new entrants to the workforce--up to 50% by the mid-1990s.

(4). The Christian Caucasus. The ancient Christian nations of Georgia and Armenia together form 3% of the population. While each is culturally distinct and has enjoyed independence in the past, both are more than usually loyal to the Soviet system and enjoy special privileges. The Armenians see Moscow as their protector against Turkey, and both enjoy access to the large official and black markets of the USSR. Because of their churches and emigre communities abroad, both play a role in Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps for this reason, they both have been able to retain their distinctive alphabets--the only other nations who have are the Baltic states who were incorporated into the Soviet Union only at the end of World War II--and to defend many of their specific national traditions.

(5). The Baltic Republics. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the most passionately anti-Soviet and anti-Russian regions of the Soviet Union; but forming only 3% of the population, they have seldom been in a position to act on their feelings. As one Moscow official is reputed to have told a Baltic communist in the late 1940s, Soviet nationality policy in that region consists in having enough boxcars ready--a reference to the brutal mass deportations which followed the Soviet annexation in 1945. These three republics are the most European in the USSR and enjoy a standard of living far higher than the Russians do. At the same time, they feel profoundly threatened by the influx of slavs into their homelands and by the ongoing russification of their local institutions.

These nationalities, like most others, have their own Soviet-created national territories in which they have at least some cultural and political institutions in their native

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languages. Indeed, that is the essence of Soviet federalism. But nearly one Soviet in five--some 55 million people--lives outside his national home. The Russians have no real problem because there are Russian-language institutions virtually everywhere. For the other, however, native-language institutions do not exist outside their national territories; and many of them find themselves victims of discrimination and are being forcibly assimilated.

The Major Problems

There are a number of major issues in which the multinational aspect of the population plays an especially important role.

Regional Development. Any movement of labor and capital in a large multinational state tends to become invested with ethnic meaning or to be limited by ethnic considerations. The Soviet Union is no exception. Central Asians in the Soviet "sunbelt," for example, are very reluctant to move to the industrial heartland which is located in the less hospitable north; and Russians are reluctant to send capital away from their own "rustbelt" to build factories in Central Asia--where most of the new labor is to be found. Consequently, Moscow is forced to choose between economically rational development strategies which would exacerbate ethnic feelings (be it by changing investment patterns or forcing movement of workers) and an ethnically responsive ones which result in slower economic growth.

Military Staffing. An increasing fraction of new draftees for the Soviet Army come from Central Asia, and many of them do not know Russian well. As a result, the Soviet military has been forced to spend an increasing amount of time teaching such recruits Russian, the language of command; and the Central Asian soldiers have their national sensitivities heightened by the experience. To date, the army has been able to cope; but Soviet generals often complain about the poor quality of soldiers they get from non-Russian areas. As the percentage of such soldiers rises, this problem too may become worse.

Russification. Every country needs a lingua franca, a language in which everyone can do business. In the Soviet Union, that language is for historical and political reasons Russian. For many nationalities, learning Russian poses no threat to national identity; indeed, it may even heighten it by bringing individuals into contact with other groups. In other cases, however, language is central to identity; and any suggestion that another language should be acquired is seen as a threat to national existence. In Georgia, for instance, people rioted at the mere suggestion that Russian should be

legally equal to Georgian in that republic. Clearly, some Soviet officials believe that learning Russian is the first step toward the assimilation of non-Russians into the Russian nation; but more and more they are recognizing that a knowledge of that language may have exactly the opposite effect.

Combatting Foreign Influence. The Soviet government has always tried to seal off its population from any foreign influence. For both geographic and political reasons, this effort has been least successful in the non-Russian periphery of the country. Central Asian Muslims are very much aware of what is going on elsewhere in the Muslim world; and the Baltic peoples look to Poland and the West more often than to Moscow. As a result, many Russian officials in Moscow view these groups as virtual Trojan horses for foreign influences, an attitude that reinforces what for many are natural prejudices.

Dissent in the Non-Russian Areas. Dissent there is very different from that at the center. It is generally hidden from foreign view. It has the potential for violent massive protest because it has deeper roots in the local population. And, under certain conditions, it may even enjoy a certain sympathy with and hence protection from local officials who may also oppose Moscow's line. As a result, Moscow's ability to suppress dissent is somewhat limited--especially in regions such as Georgia and Estonia where the local language is virtually inaccessible to Russians on the scene.

Prospects for the Future

The Soviet Union is likely to face increasing national problems in the future. Economic progress has meant that more Russians and non-Russians are coming into direct competition, often for the first time, while the recent slowing of economic growth means that there is a smaller pie to be divided among groups that are growing at very different rates. And the federal structures originally created to be symbolic of national rights are acquiring defenders and becoming ever more real. In the past, Moscow has been able to manage through a combination of guile and force. In the near term, that is likely to be enough. But over the longer haul, these nationality-based tensions may weaken the Soviet system or prompt its leaders to return to a more harshly coercive policy.

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