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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1985 (6/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1103

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7743	MEMO	CLYNE TO MATLOCK RE NITZE/KVITSINSKIY CONVERSATION, JULY 31, 1985, HELSINKI, FINLAND R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	8/23/1985	B1
7738	MEMO	SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY SERGEY ROGOV ON ARMS CONTROL AND UPCOMING SUMMIT D 4/13/2011 F06-114/3	2	8/26/1985	B1 B3
7739	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET PROBES FOR PRIVATE CONTACTS PAR 8/17/2011 M125/2	3	8/26/1985	B1
7744	MEMCON	NITZE/KVITSINSKIY CONVERSATION, JULY 31, 1985, HELSINKI, FINLAND R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	6	8/8/1985	B1
7740	MEMO	SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY SERGEY ROGOV ON ARMS CONTROL AND UPCOMING SUMMIT D 4/13/2011 F06-114/3; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554	4	ND	B1 B3
7741	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE BACKGROUND READING ON THE USSR: INTERNAL PROBLEMS R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	8/27/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7745	PAPER	USSR: A SOCIETY IN TROUBLE R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	6	ND	B1
7742	PAPER	DISSENT IN THE USSR PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3	10	ND	B1 B3
7746	PAPER	THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONALITY PROBLEM R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	5	ND	B1

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



August 23, 1985

File

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, NSC

SUBJECT: Nitze/Kvitsinskiy Conversation, July 31, 1985, Helsinki, Finland

Jack:

Attached is a copy of the memorandum of conversation which I mentioned to you on the phone today.

There are some additional points. Please give me a call after you have had a chance to read it. Although I would be happy to come over, telephone would probably suffice.

In my view -- shared by a great number of others -- a "private channel" is the "only" answer! (e.g., Nitze/Kvitsinskiy). Let's talk.

Best regards,

Norman G. Clyne, Jr.

Attachment:
As stated

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

NLRRF06-114/3 #7743

BY Civ NARA DATE 10/30/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Fred O'Green's Trip to the Soviet Union

Col. Barney Oldfield of Litton wrote the President regarding a Soviet invitation to Chairman Fred O'Green (Tab A). O'Green would be an official guest of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology. Oldfield gave notification of the trip in the event that you want to meet with O'Green before and after the visit. The dates have not yet been set, therefore we would leave the ball in their court.

At Tab I is your reply to Oldfield welcoming the opportunity for such a meeting. This could prove beneficial as we approach the November meeting.

Approve

Disapprove

JW
Jonathan Miller concurs.

Attachment:

Tab I Letter to Col. Barney Oldfield

Tab A Incoming Letter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Col. Oldfield:

The President asked me to respond to your letter of August 5 regarding Fred O'Green's invitation to visit the U.S.S.R.

I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with Mr. O'Green before his departure. Please have his secretary contact mine at (202) 456-2255 to work out a mutually convenient date and time.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Colonel Barney Oldfield
360 North Crescent Drive
Beverly Hills
California 90210



Litton

360 North Crescent Drive Beverly Hills California 90210 213 859 5905

Col. Barney Oldfield USAF (Ret.)
(Consultant)

→ Matlock Pls
prepare ECM
letter to Oldfield
offering a meeting
(Florence - Jeff)
Lobby

August 5, 1985

Dear President Ron:

Litton's Board Chairman Fred W. O'Green has been invited by Vice Chairman Dzhermen Gvishiani of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology to be an official guest of that agency and visit the Soviet Union. Our mutual friend, Academician Georgi A. Arbatov, has been the one who suggested it -- after it has been "laying there" for nearly two years as Arbatov told me the wind chill factor was going to be high for some time and it would not be productive. Now -- it apparently is, and as we know nothing like this happens without careful calculation, the invitation is perhaps a part of a "warming trend" along with your higher level summitry scheduled this fall. In all the previous visits we have had where Litton top figures were involved, the White House National Security Adviser has wanted to have conversations with the invited individual before and after the actual encounter session for any insights or attitudes which might be evident. As I don't know Robert McFarlane personally, I'm writing you for guidance as to whether this matters*. The time period we are shooting for is after September 15th, and hopefully before the first snow.

→ Bud - can you please handle this? Lobby

It will give me a chance to once again reaffirm what you told me to tell them -- that you don't eat your own young.

Best wishes always,

* if such a session would be possible, it would help.

President Ronald Reagan,
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JF407 1
Seyt-Channel

Matthew
Eyes Only
~~Secret~~/Sensitive

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CS 6/11/02

PRESERVATION COPY

7739

JFNOT

NOT FOR SYSTEM

8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

August 26, 1985

INFORMATION


MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JEM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Probes for Private Contacts


Soviet officials are still out there, seemingly passing "messages" that they want a special channel to work on arms control issues in particular. Two which have just come to my attention are the following:

*E.O. 13526
As Amended
Sec. 3.5 (A)*



SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-12512#-7739
BY RW NARA DATE 8/17/11



2. Kvitsinsky to Nitze in Helsinki: At Tab II is the memcon on the Nitze-Kvitsinsky dinner in Helsinki. Norm Clyne called me on secure to let me know that two relevant passages were omitted from the memcon which was distributed. They were reported only to Secretary Shultz, who intended to share with you on the West Coast. I don't know whether he managed to do so, but if not, the additional passages are the following:

a) In paragraph 13 (where Kvitsinsky asked about INF), the second sentence was omitted: "Nitze said that in his personal opinion a final settlement along the lines of 'Walk-in-the-Woods' might be possible." (NOTE: this may not be literal; it is from Norm's paraphrase.)

b) An entire paragraph was omitted which described an encounter which Clyne had with Kvitsinsky the next morning. Kvitsinsky saw Clyne in the Hotel Restaurant at breakfast and made a point of coming over and asking whether Nitze had really meant what he said about "Walk-in-the-Woods" the night before. Clyne told him that Nitze had made clear that he was expressing a personal opinion, but that he always chooses his words carefully. Kvitsinsky commented that the conversation the evening before had been most helpful and that he and Nitze should arrange to meet again.

Clyne commented that he wondered whether Paul should not go to Geneva for a few days early in the next round to be available in case Kvitsinsky had anything to convey. (It was not clear whether this is Nitze's idea, or merely Clyne's.)

COMMENT

Unless it would create unmanageable problems with the negotiators, I think it might not be a bad idea for Nitze to be available in Geneva for a few days after the third round begins next month.

Finally, regarding the McSweeney-Palmer "probe," we have no recent news since Palmer has been out of the country for the past couple of weeks. If anything comes up on that net, we should know early next week.

If you concur, I will plan to travel with Bill Henkel and his advance team to Geneva September 12-18, during which we will have joint meetings with the Soviet advance team. It is possible the Soviets would send someone who would seek a private conversation, and if you think I should go we probably should discuss in advance how to respond if there should be another probe at that time.

Attachment:


Tab II Memcon on Nitze-Kvitsinsky Dinner in Helsinki




August 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO:

Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Holmes
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Tower
Ambassador Glitman
Deputy Secretary Whitehead (Timbie)
Under Secretary Armacost (Courtney)

Other than Secretary Shultz, no other distribution
was made of attached Mem/Con.



Norman G. Clyne

Attachment:
Mem/Con - 7/31/85

~~SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

AS 6/11/02

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NLRR EA 0714/3 #7744

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07
~~SECRET~~

12
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520



August 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Nitze-Kvitsinskiy Dinner Conversation,
Helsinki, Finland, 31 July 1985

1. As Kvitsinskiy's guest, Ambassador Nitze had dinner with his former Soviet colleague at the Restaurant Tapiola Linnunrata, 31 July 1985. Norman Clyne from Nitze's staff and Pavel Palazhchenko on the Soviet side also attended. Below are the highlights of the substantive conversation during dinner.
2. Nitze noted that three possible types of outcomes for the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in November had been discussed that afternoon between Shultz and Shevardnadze. These were outcomes dealing (a) merely with the easy issues; (b) with somewhat more difficult issues; and (c) with the really substantive issues of security, particularly those involving the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. Nitze said it was his understanding that the Ministers had agreed that the third category of issues should receive paramount attention by both sides prior to the summit. Kvitsinskiy agreed; he said it was the Soviet view that, while this third category contained the issues most difficult to resolve, it nevertheless contained those issues whose resolution could make the summit an unqualified success. Kvitsinskiy asked Nitze's opinion as to how we should prepare for the third category of issues.
3. Nitze said the first thing would be to clarify definitions and concepts. For example, the Soviet definition of what it calls "space strike arms" is based on an unacceptable criterion of intent; that is, according to Gromyko (and Kvitsinskiy) those systems stationed in space created or developed for the purpose of attacking objects in space or on land, and those stationed on earth for the purpose of attacking objects in space. Kvitsinskiy pointed out that the President had stated that the purpose of the U.S. SDI program was to develop such arms. Nitze emphasized that statements of intent were not pertinent, whether one was speaking of offensive or of defensive arms. Rather, systems must be dealt with on the basis of objective judgment of their capabilities derived from observable characteristics. If one looks at the Soviet definition on the basis of capabilities, the Galosh system

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DECL. OADR

around Moscow as well as all ICBM systems would be included in the ban. This is not desired by either side. Nitze emphasized the need for precise agreement on what is to be included in the agreements between us and what is to be excluded. We will find it necessary to stay away from generalities such as the Soviet demand for a ban on "space strike arms" based on an ambiguous and misleading definition.

4. Changing the subject, Kvitsinskiy asked if the U.S. would live up to the ABM Treaty. Nitze replied that the U.S. would do so and had made that point clear in Geneva; the real question is whether the Soviet Union will do likewise. We need first to agree on what it means. For example:

(a) the meaning of "development" with regard to permitted research. Nitze said the negotiating record is clear on this subject. He cited the paper Harold Brown had given to Karpov explaining the U.S. view on the demarcation between research and development. Brown's paper was not contested by the Soviet side. Article V was drafted on the basis of the definition of "development" contained in Harold Brown's paper. Kvitsinskiy responded by citing Gerard Smith's testimony in which Kvitsinskiy contended Smith had described the demarcation between research and development in a different way; Smith had used the term "breadboard model" to describe the point beyond research which was included in development. Nitze contested that, saying that while Gerard Smith's testimony was not inconsistent with the Brown paper, Brown's paper, not Smith's, was basic to the negotiating record of the ABM Treaty. This paper pointed out that full scale development started with observable testing of a prototype model, that is, a piece of equipment of the type which would ultimately be deployed. In any event, it is unambiguous that neither side included unobservable research in banned development. This point was made clear not only by Brown's paper but also by Smith's testimony. In fact, Nitze pointed out, the Soviet side also confirmed its similar interpretation that research would be permitted by the ABM Treaty when former Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, explained to the Supreme Soviet that the Treaty imposed no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work toward defending the "national territory." Kvitsinskiy corrected Nitze, saying that Marshal Grechko made no mention of "national territory;" rather, he made reference to defending "the country" against nuclear missile attack. (Kvitsinskiy laughed heartily when he "corrected" Nitze). Nitze said it seemed ludicrous in the context of the ABM Treaty to draw a distinction between "the country" on the one hand and "national territory" on the other; one could not walk history back with some simple-minded joking distinction.

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(b) Returning to the Brown/Smith discussion, Kvitsinskiy insisted there was a distinction between Smith's definition of "development" and Brown's. Smith's testimony exempted only Department of Defense research and development line items 6.1 and 6.2, while Brown's would have the cut-off point be within 6.4, he referred to 6.4(a) and 6.4(b).

(c) Nitze brought up the Krasnoyarsk radar. He said that everyone on the U.S. side, in and out of Government, is convinced that this is a violation of the Treaty. Kvitsinskiy asserted that the U.S. radar at Thule, Greenland, violated the Treaty. Nitze emphasized that while the U.S. believes there is nothing here that is contrary to the ABM Treaty, the main point he was making was that the issues should be talked out frankly and settled -- not limiting the discussion to stereotype assertions such as those to which the Soviet side has limited itself.

(d) Nitze cited the Soviet laser program being conducted at Sary Shagan as an example of Soviet "SDI-type" research. Nitze said this is germane to the ABM Treaty and thus pertinent to the defense and space negotiations. He asked rhetorically why can't the Soviet side discuss its SDI-type programs; the U.S. is willing to do so and, in fact, has discussed its programs at Geneva in some detail. Kvitsinskiy responded that it (the Soviet laser) is not pertinent since it cannot damage a satellite. Nitze noted that in any event, it is permitted because it is at an agreed test range. Nitze maintained Kvitsinskiy had apparently missed the point; on any issue where there was not coincidence of views, it should be discussed frankly and resolved -- not swept under the rug by assertion of one side or the other. Kvitsinskiy then noted the testing of a U.S. laser on Maui (in connection with a recent space shuttle flight). He asked rhetorically if that laser could substitute for a radar and if Maui was part of the Kwajalein test range. Nitze replied that the U.S. would be willing to discuss the issue frankly and constructively.

5. Referring to the Geneva negotiations, Kvitsinskiy asked when the U.S. side was going to propose something concrete on space. Nitze replied with a question of his own: "Which should come first, working on what the Soviets want on space, or on what the U.S. wants on limiting offense?" Nitze said that the Soviet form of linkage is unacceptable; this amounts to preconditions. Preconditions need to be forgotten and replaced with constructive discussions of the issues.

6. Nitze continued by asking what specifically are the Soviets suggesting with respect to limitations on the offense. Kvitsinskiy said that the Soviet side cannot be more specific

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until and unless it knows the outcome for space. He added that the Soviet side had made a specific proposal in the recent round just completed. Nitze replied that with what the Soviet side had given at Geneva, one could only speculate on possible methods of aggregation consistent with what they had said, coupled with various applicable percentages. For example, as to the Soviet form of aggregation, Nitze asked what was to be included in the Soviet term "nuclear charges." This form of aggregation appeared to include gravity bombs and SRAMs. Nitze said Kvitsinskiy knew the long-held U.S. view on this issue; namely, that it was improper to constrain such bomber loadings without corresponding constraint on air defenses. Nitze went on to explain that the two sides had to work out specific and equitable counting rules to have an effective agreement. He emphasized the unacceptability of aggregations which equated "elephants with flies;" SS-18 RV's cannot be equated with gravity bombs.

7. By way of example, Nitze said that if one were to assume that counting rules had, in fact, been worked out, what could be made of the so-called Soviet "model" surfaced in Geneva? Continuing, Nitze said that low overall SNDV limitations could become meaningless or counter-productive at low levels of RVs, or even of "nuclear charges". Continuing his example, Nitze said that if one were to assume a base level of 10,000 "nuclear charges" with an agreed reduction of 40%, this would result in a ceiling of 6,000 such "charges" at the end of a given period. If one were then to combine this figure with the Soviet suggestion of a percentage limit on the number of "charges" in any one leg of the deterrent, and assume that this limit was 50%, then the Soviet side would be able to retain 3,000 highly capable RVs on its ICBM force. This is more than a sufficient number to launch a highly successful attack against the land-based portion of the U.S. retaliatory force. Without other compensating provisions, such an outcome would be insufficient to meet the needs of the U.S. side.

8. Nitze suggested that we should abandon all the propaganda play with numbers and get down to discussing a comprehensive and substantive end result. Nitze said the U.S. needs protection in an agreement against the Soviet capability for an effective strike against its land-based retaliatory forces; if that can be worked out, all kinds of things become possible.

9. Kvitsinskiy responded by saying that the U.S. was threatening Soviet land-based forces with Trident missiles. Nitze replied that the Trident I offers no such threat and the D-5 will not be along for some years. The point was, Nitze emphasized, that if the Soviets relieve the U.S. of the threat

to the survival of its land-based assets, the U.S. could comparably relieve the Soviet side of such a threat to its forces. The sides should talk constructively about this and resolve the issues necessary to a mutually acceptable agreement.

10. Continuing on sea-based systems, Kvitsinskiy insisted that SLCMs be banned. Nitze said that both sides were fully aware of the difficulties in verifying the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs and in verifying the range capabilities of given types of SLCMs. Kvitsinskiy said a complete ban would meet many of these problems. Nitze recalled a discussion with McClain, Director of the China Lake Naval Weapons Laboratory, who had put together a cruise missile capable of hitting a ship in the China Sea from Hainan Island with parts bought from a Montgomery Ward catalogue. SLCMs had become widely dispersed. The U.S. Navy was not going to let itself be without SLCMs when Argentina had them. Kvitsinskiy said: "But who gave the Argentines their SLCMs?" Nitze replied: "The French, but Col. Qaddafi and Castro got theirs from the Soviet Union."

11. Returning to the space issue, Kvitsinskiy asked: "What about space strike arms?" Nitze replied that if the ground-based threat is relieved, then the need for defenses diminishes. Accordingly, we should first agree to limit offenses to relieve the ground-based threat; then we can agree to appropriate limitations on defenses. Kvitsinskiy said that limitations should be made in the reverse order. Nitze said he would compromise: "Let's work toward both concurrently."

12. Kvitsinskiy alleged that some people on the U.S. side (otherwise not identified) in Geneva have said the sides can discuss establishing a ban on ASAT systems. Nitze replied that he had not heard of such. In any event, this would involve banning ABM and ICBM systems; therefore, the better course would be to discuss how we can make communications and other such satellites survivable.

13. Kvitsinskiy then asked about INF. Kvitsinskiy said the "walk-in-the-woods" formula was not acceptable to Moscow; it provided no compensation for British and French forces. Kvitsinskiy added that Nitze had once suggested indirect compensation for the British and French. (Kvitsinskiy, to support his argument that Nitze had suggested indirect compensation for the British and French, referred to a piece of paper Nitze had given him on November 19, 1983. That paper to which Kvitsinskiy referred consisted of points Nitze had been instructed by Washington to make. The paper does not

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-6-

make Kvitsinskiy's case but, in any event, the episode is reported fully in the attached telegram INF-739 (Geneva 0722). Nitze denied the allegation; he told Kvitsinskiy that the "walk-in-the-park" proposal included partial compensation but that was Kvitsinskiy's proposal. Nitze reminded Kvitsinskiy that he, Nitze, had never made an equal reductions proposal. Kvitsinskiy then said that it was Nitze who had made the computation concerning equal reductions of 572, resulting in 122 to 127 SS-20s for the Soviet side. Nitze accepted that; it was simple arithmetic after Kvitsinskiy had suggested he look at equal reductions of 572. Nitze reminded Kvitsinskiy that during their "walk-in-the-park" it was he, Kvitsinskiy, who said that the Soviet Government would accept equal reductions of 572 if the U.S. Government would propose such. Kvitsinskiy nodded and did not challenge the point. Continuing, Nitze said that in any event, the Soviet Union is not entitled to compensation for the British and French forces. Kvitsinskiy's only comment was to note the French had deployed another submarine; hence, the Soviet side was "now entitled to more than 122."

14. Kvitsinskiy said he would have to report to his superiors that Nitze had no proposal on space strike arms, no proposal on limiting ASATs, on limiting SLCMs or any proposals on offenses, generally. Nitze replied that his purpose during the evening had not been to make proposals. Rather, as he had said at the outset, he wanted to have a serious, frank discussion with Kvitsinskiy on how the two might work together to prepare for a substantive summit rather than an easier one. Kvitsinskiy replied, "We should talk further."

~~SECRET~~

Matlock
The President has seen 6687 *22*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Frank R

Churn

SECRET

August 27, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Background Reading on the Soviet Union:
Internal Problems

Though Gorbachev has been more active than his predecessors in pushing the Soviet foreign policy line in the media, his pre-occupation is probably with consolidating his own power and in tackling the burgeoning internal problems which afflict Soviet society and the communist system.

Attached are three papers which deal with the more important of these problems: the growing malaise in Soviet society, the significance of dissidence and religion, and the implications of having to rule an empire made up of many nationalities.

In reading the paper on Soviet nationalities, it is important to bear in mind that non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union are quite different from the ethnic groups in our own society. Most live in their ancestral territory and continue to speak languages other than Russian as their first tongue. There has been very little "melting pot" effect, although many speak or understand Russian as a second language. Almost all are proud of their own national language, culture and heritage and are determined to preserve it in the face of persistent pressures to become more Russian.

I believe these papers will give you some insight into some of the problems Gorbachev will have on his mind -- but will avoid mentioning -- when he meets with you in November. Certainly, he must take them into account as he makes foreign policy decisions.

Attachments:

Tab A "USSR: A Society in Trouble"
Tab B "Dissent in the USSR"
Tab C "The Soviet Union's Nationality Problem"

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

cc: Vice President

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR P 06-114/3 *rd 7741*

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07



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NLRR F06-114/3 # 7745

BY CV NARA DATE 10/30/07

24

USSR: A SOCIETY IN TROUBLE

Western observers have always been struck by the peculiarly Russian combination of extraordinary political stability amidst appalling social conditions. In any other country, such conditions might be expected to breed constant revolution. In Russia, it took a century of political unrest, capped by four years of devastating war, to bring on the 1917 cataclysm. The authorities there have traditionally been able to maintain control, because they were dealing with a generally passive population. Economic development and the rise of mass education may have made the job more difficult in recent years, but the control mechanisms are as effective as ever. The enormous problems of Soviet society--problems now perhaps greater in extent than at any time in Russian history--still present the regime with an administrative challenge rather than a political one.

Among the intractable and potentially destabilizing social problems plaguing the Soviet scene are:

- rising rates of alcoholism among all major population groups;
- rising mortality rates among children and adult males;
- ever greater incidence of crime and corruption countrywide;
- an obvious decline in the availability and quality of basic public services and consumer goods; and
- a generalized sense that the Soviet regime is no longer capable of meeting the expectations it has generated in the population.

Some of these problems reflect particular cultural traditions; others are part and parcel of the Soviet system. Still others represent the unintended consequences of specific Moscow policies. Each one of them feeds on and reinforces every other, however. Together they have produced in the Soviet population a deep malaise, a sense that not only has something gone profoundly wrong in recent years but that there is little chance it will be put right any time soon.

Alcoholism

Drinking to excess is part of the Russian national tradition, but in recent years the rates of alcohol consumption have risen to unprecedented levels. Last year, Soviet statistics show that the

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USSR's citizens spent 10 percent of their incomes on alcoholic beverages, and more than one in eight spent at least one night in a sobering-up station. The Soviet Union as a whole does not lead the world in alcoholism, but it is clearly among the leaders, and the domestic impact is worse than the statistics suggest. Alcoholism in the USSR is more concentrated, with the worst drinking confined to the Slavic regions--the Muslim nationalities have much lower, albeit rising, rates. The Slavic groups thus may have the highest rate of alcohol consumption in the world. Furthermore, the Slavic pattern is binge drinking, drinking to get drunk and lose consciousness. As a result, most of the alcohol consumed is high proof vodka rather than beer and wine.

The consequences both immediately and long term are staggering in terms of lowered industrial productivity and increased accidents at the workplace. Death rates among adult males have jumped, and their life expectancy has dropped. And because women are drinking more, alcoholism has also contributed to a substantial rise in infant mortality through premature births and malnutrition of some children. Such rates of alcohol consumption are expected to lead to other forms of social degeneration, if they persist.

The very blatancy of the problem has frequently led Russian governments, both Imperial and Soviet, to counterattack, but none has had any lasting success. Indeed, many of the campaigns against alcoholism have proven counterproductive; Gorbachev's current effort is unlikely to prove any different. Alcohol is after all very much part of the national tradition, and therefore extraordinarily difficult to root out. And Russians have always shown themselves adept at finding alternative sources of alcohol or resorting to home brew should official supplies be cut off. One classic Soviet novel features an apparently typical worker who will drink anything from lighter fluid to antifreeze when regular liquor is not available. Moreover, depriving Russians of alcohol--the chief form of recreation for many--could lead to domestic restlessness and would certainly reduce state income from vodka sales. These last calculations usually have been decisive with Russian officialdom over the years.

Demographic Disasters

Since the revolution, the USSR has suffered a series of well-known demographic disasters--the world wars, revolution, the Civil War, Stalin's collectivization--but by the 1970s their impact was generally smoothing out. Two new trends have appeared recently, however: a sharply higher rate of infant mortality and an increase in deaths among males in their prime working years. Both are unprecedented in size for modern societies during peacetime and call into question the Soviet claim that the USSR is an advanced modern country.

Soviet infant mortality, Western estimates suggest, has risen 30 to 50 percent over the last 15 years. It now stands at three times the rate in the United States and at a level equal to that of the most advanced third world countries. The situation is so embarrassing that the Soviets stopped publishing statistics on this question in 1975. (A recent crack in this ban--in a republic medical journal from Central Asia--states that mortality among children in Tajikistan has risen 38.3 percent since 1970, well within Western estimates.) These high rates reflect the large number of abortions used by Soviet women for birth control (currently six to nine abortions per woman), alcoholism and inadequate diet among pregnant mothers, poor medical services, pollution, and the poor quality of the baby formulas which must be used because most Soviet mothers are forced to return to work soon after giving birth. As a result, both the size and quality of future generations are affected; the next generation faces serious medical and educational problems; and observers have every reason to question Soviet claims that in the USSR "children are the only privileged class." The obvious cures nevertheless seem to be beyond the interests and resources of the Soviet government.

The rising death rates among adult males are equally striking. Over the last 15 years, the life expectancy of Soviet males at birth has apparently dropped to only 56 years, the sharpest decline in any modern society ever, and one that cuts into the working life of most Soviet men, thus reducing the size of the labor pool. The current high levels reflect industrial accidents, chronic diseases, inadequate diet and medical services, pollution, and alcohol consumption. The most recent increases, however, appear traceable to alcoholism alone, a pattern that gives special urgency to Gorbachev's campaign.

Crime and Corruption

Crime of all kinds afflicts the Soviet Union, but corruption is a structural feature of the system, absolutely essential for its operation in its current form, since prices do not reconcile demand and supply for the goods and services that people want. Official prices are set artificially low for political reasons; shortages are endemic, so access to goods and services is determined by other means. Since many Soviet citizens have more money than access to goods, the cash is used to obtain things "on the side," a pattern which has led to the creation of an enormous second economy.

Furthermore, the planning process which encompasses virtually all spheres of activity encourages another form of corruption, both when targets are set and when efforts to meet them are made--be these targets the average grade of a particular school class or the levels of factory output. Every person seeks to make

his plan as easy to meet as possible in order to assure his bonus. As there is no impersonal market mechanism to set these plan targets, they are determined by other means, including corrupt ones. And since the authorities view plan fulfillment as more important than legal niceties, they tend to "overlook" illegalities which produce the results they want.

Finally, all Soviet citizens are conditioned to participate in ideological deception and self-deception, to say and do things they know to be false. Enormous cynicism results, a form of corruption more corrosive and less susceptible to correction than any other.

Every Soviet citizen is thus trapped either as a direct participant in corruption, or as an observer who must report what he sees or choose to remain silent about illegalities. All the alternatives contribute to public demoralization.

Little of this is likely to change. Prices set to clear the market would rise to levels that would make existing shortages even more blatant. Plans set by market forces would erode or destroy the role and power of the party. And if ideological deceptions were eliminated, the Soviet Union would cease to be the Soviet Union: no party leader is likely to want to commit suicide.

Declines in Public Services

The abysmal quality of goods and services available to the public in the USSR is legendary. The Soviet system has always underfulfilled plans for consumer goods; shortages are endemic and appear to have gone from bad to worse recently. Perhaps the clearest picture of the situation is provided by a single Soviet statistic: between 1979 and 1984, the number of hours spent by Soviet citizens to acquire consumer goods rose from 180 billion hours a year to 275 billion, 35 billion hours more than Soviet citizens spend at the workplace. Most of this extra time is spent by women waiting in line for basic foodstuffs. Indeed, Soviet sociologists report that Soviet women now spend 40 hours a week at the job and another 40 hours a week making purchases and doing the housework.

The remedy would require an enormous investment of funds and a willingness to change the system. Neither is in large supply in Moscow.

Unrealized Expectations

Perhaps the greatest problem, and certainly the one which has thrown the others into relief is the currently widening gap between popular expectations and the capacity of the regime to

meet them. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the Soviet people experienced a growth in real income averaging more than 3 percent annually. Soviet citizens could reasonably expect some upward mobility both for themselves and their children. And because of the special experience of World War II, they generally shared the values of the ruling elite and accepted the explanation that remaining difficulties were traceable to the war. Recent developments have called all this into question. The Soviet economy is stagnating. Opportunities for upward mobility are fewer, thus freezing existing class distinctions. Demographic developments have placed severe constraints on the regime's ability to push economic development as it has in the past by increasing labor inputs. And both mass and elite groups are acquiring a broader and more divergent set of values. Despite heavy jamming, nearly one Soviet adult in six now listens to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week, and many are willing to discuss and criticize domestic Soviet policies now that the costs of doing so have declined.

The impact of economic stagnation is particularly great. For many Soviet citizens, it calls into question the implicit social contract established after the death of Stalin which linked popular support for the regime with the regime's ability to deliver the goods. Further, it has reduced the regime's ability to use material incentives to drive the workforce. As a result, the authorities are forced to rely more on ideological ones--typically less effective--and may be compelled to turn again to coercive ones in the future, even though the latter would probably be less productive now than they were in the past. This stagnation has also contributed to the expansion of blackmarketeering and other forms of corruption. Once again, the obvious remedies are either unwelcome or impossible, a fact that both Soviet citizens and their leaders recognize.

* * * * *

Even taken together, these problems do not now threaten the stability of the Soviet system. Nor have they led to the crystallization of an active opposition. Instead, they have produced an alienated society, something which may prove more difficult for the regime to control than is the relatively small dissident movement. In the near future, the most obvious impact of these problems will be to force the regime to devote greater resources to its control mechanisms in order to insulate both itself and its goals from these popular attitudes. Over the longer haul, their impact may prompt a Soviet leader to seek major reforms, but at every point he will be frustrated by powerful groups which have a stake in the status quo, even though that status quo has locked Soviet society into a dissatisfied, cynical, and aimless present.


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Dissent in the USSR

Dissidents are individuals who publicly protest regime actions or express ideas that the regime finds contrary to its interests. They do not constitute an organized opposition seeking political power. Intellectual dissidents involved in the human rights movement challenge the regime in the realm of ideas but not in the realm of politics, at least not so far. Other forms of dissent--the emigration movement, religion--basically represent attempts to escape authority rather than to change the system.

Intellectual Dissent

Intellectual dissent began in the early 1960s, when Khrushchev's move toward destalinization gave rise to false expectations of a wider internal liberalization. Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 represented the victory of conservative reaction within the Soviet leadership; repression of dissent increased, especially intensifying after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Human rights dissent revived on a smaller scale in the mid-1970s, when detente and the signing of the CSCE Accords once again stimulated hopes that strictures on basic human rights would be relaxed. Instead, the Kremlin moved forcefully against the small groups that were attempting to publicize regime violations of the CSCE human rights provisions. Today the human rights movement is at a low ebb and Sakharov, its most prominent and articulate representative, is isolated in the provincial city of Gorky.

Although these human rights dissidents are well known in the West, they command little support in the USSR itself. Many people see them as a self-interested, unpatriotic lot that serve the purposes of Western intelligence services. The regime has had considerable success in exploiting popular anti-

[REDACTED]

Semitic feelings as a weapon against the dissidents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] groups such as the CSCE monitoring group are commonly viewed as little more than devices for Jews wanting to leave the country. Sakharov is something of an exception. In some intellectual circles his confinement in Gorky is referred to as "Lenin in exile" and USIA interviewing of large numbers of Westerners who have had contact with Soviet cultural figures revealed that most Soviet artists admired him as a noble figure.

More influential than the human rights dissidents are a group of intellectual writers who have a strongly nationalist orientation. While taking care to avoid criticizing the regime directly, they call for a moral regeneration of Russia on the basis of traditional values and Russian Orthodoxy--much as Solzhenitsyn does. These nationalist writers reportedly have become cultural heroes who articulate the discontent of large numbers of people with the Soviet system as a whole.

Also influential are the growing number of cultural figures who have emigrated--such as the prominent writer Vladimov, who left in 1983, and the avant garde theater director Liubimov, who departed in 1984. Many intellectuals remaining in the USSR have become "inner emigres" who follow the affairs and writings of the emigre community with great interest through the medium of Western radio broadcasting. This has in effect created an alternative Russian cultural center that many Soviet intellectuals find more vigorous and appealing than the stultifying official Soviet culture. The renewal of jamming of Radio Liberty has reduced the access of Soviet intellectuals to news from the emigre community, but some broadcasting still gets through.

Soviet leaders appear keenly concerned that the ideas of the small group of active dissidents could have resonance within the intelligentsia as a

whole. Their public statements suggest they are worried about the political reliability of the intelligentsia, and [REDACTED] apprehension that the popularity of the nationalist writers could turn Russian national feeling into anti-regime channels. Above all, the leadership probably fears that conservative Russian nationalism appeals even to many elites—perhaps especially within the military—who are concerned that the party has become too effete and corrupt to rule the country effectively.

[REDACTED] some leaders fear that popular grievances over living conditions could converge with the protests of intellectual dissidents about human rights abuses. As early as 1977, for example, during a period of tight food supplies, [REDACTED] Soviet leaders were "acutely aware" of countrywide criticism of food shortages, and that the leadership feared easing restrictions on dissidents could abet a trend of criticism in the country and create an "explosive" climate. Since the late Brezhnev years, [REDACTED] concern within the elite that unrest could become widespread. Events in Poland probably increased leadership sensitivities about the possibility of coordination between Soviet intellectual dissidents and worker dissidents—who since the late 1970s have made several attempts to organize unofficial trade unions. There has in fact been little such cooperation to date.

Religion

By far the most dramatic development in Soviet dissent in recent years has been the extraordinary burgeoning of religion. The most important reason for this phenomenon seems to be simply that many citizens are seeking spiritual refuge from what they see as the drabness and moral emptiness of contemporary Soviet life. The growth of religion is of concern to Soviet authorities for several reasons:

- In many areas religion reinforces anti-Russian nationalism. In Lithuania and the western part of Ukraine, where probably a majority of the population is Catholic, the church has historically been associated with strivings for independence from Russia. Similarly, in Soviet Central Asia the Islamic religion has provided a rallying point for those resisting Russian domination--as, for example, during the Basmachi revolt of the 1920s, which took many years for the regime to suppress.

- Unlike intellectual dissent, religion has a mass base even in Russian areas. Protestant fundamentalism is growing in newly industrialized areas of the Russian republic, and Russian Orthodoxy is attracting adherents in the older cities of the Russian heartland.

- Increasingly, religion cuts across class and generational lines. Religion is growing among blue collar workers as well as among the educated classes. And, for the first time since 1917, religion is attracting large numbers of Russian youth. Andropov [REDACTED] complained in 1982 that many Soviet young people were turning to religion as a way of expressing dissent.

- Religion opens the door to external influences. The election of a Slavic Pope served as a stimulus to religious activity in the Western borderlands of the USSR, where the Catholic clergy has long maintained clandestine ties with the church hierarchy in Poland. The resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East, and the war in

Afghanistan, have raised Muslim consciousness in Soviet Central Asia, leading to several incidents of unrest there.

Most religious believers in the USSR are members of "registered" or "official" churches who abide by the regime's strictures on religious activity--such as the ban on proselytizing and on religious instruction for children--in exchange for being allowed to worship in peace. Clergy for these churches must be approved by the regime and some of them serve as propagandists for regime policy--using their sermons to preach the party line regarding foreign policy, for example. The regime attempts to use these official churches to keep the activities of religious believers under close surveillance and supervision. It especially uses the official Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of imperialism, by giving it special privileges (more Bibles, more church buildings) to enable it to lure believers away from churches associated with anti-Russian nationalism.

Similarly, the regime exploits the visits of well-intentioned foreign religious leaders such as Billy Graham. Such visits assist the regime in publicizing the existence of "religious freedom" in the USSR. And, by allowing visiting ministers to preach at official churches but not to outlawed congregations, the regime enlists their tacit sanction for the official churches as the "legitimate" ones. Despite the fact that the regime attempts to use the official churches for its own purposes, however, the growing numbers worshipping in these churches testifies to the failure of Marxist ideology in competing with old-fashioned religion for the "hearts and minds" of the Soviet population.

More significantly, the number of unofficial congregations of all faiths appears to be increasing. Many of these groups have developed clandestine

communications networks that enable them to collect thousands of signatures on a country-wide basis for petitions, and regularly to publish illegal literature (samizdat).

- In Ukraine a semi-secret Catholic church organization [REDACTED] has as many as 350 priests conducting services illegally. Since the summer of 1984, ten issues of a new samizdat "Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church" have appeared.

- In Lithuania, a Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights has been active in petitioning for an end to repressive legislation against religion. The "Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church," which first appeared in 1972, remains one of the most vigorous samizdat journals in the country.

- The unregistered Protestant sects--especially the Baptists and Pentecostals--are attracting large numbers of rural, factory and white collar workers throughout the country. Many of these groups are zealous to the point of being fanatic in protesting such regime measures as "accidental" burnings of churches and forcible removals of children from parents' homes to prevent their receiving a religious upbringing. They respond to repression by engaging in mass civil disobedience --such as burning internal passports and resisting induction into the military. One isolated Far Eastern village is virtually at war with the regime. It has engaged in continuing protests for several years, including four community hunger strikes. Thousands of Pentecostals continue to apply for emigration visas

despite the regime's absolute refusal to grant them. With the assistance of some registered Baptist congregations, the unofficial Baptists publish three samizdat journals, one of which is printed in a thousand copies monthly.

-- [REDACTED] in Muslim areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus a fully developed underground religious structure exists. [REDACTED] illegal seminaries are educating mullahs who teach Islam to children in unofficial mosques. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] expressed concern that Soviet Central Asians are demanding more power for the Muslim clergy at the expense of the party.

Regime Repression

During the 1980s the regime has resorted to harsher repression of dissent than it has employed since Stalin's day. 1979 was a watershed year. With the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet leaders became less concerned to avoid antagonizing Western leaders and public opinion. With the outbreak of unrest in Poland, they became more concerned to crack down on dissent inside the USSR itself.

In 1982 the regime tightened the screws even more. The intensification of repression coincided with the political ascendancy of Andropov, and there has been no let-up under Gorbachev. The crackdown on dissent is consistent with his overall effort to shore up discipline, reassert party control in various areas of life, increase ideological purity, and heighten vigilance against "alien" ideas. The current head of the KGB, Chebrikov, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been in the forefront of those taking a hard line against dissent. Chebrikov was previously head of the KGB

directorates responsible for internal security and has been actively involved in supervising repression of dissent. For example, he was responsible for handling the Solzhenitsyn case.

Since 1979 several new tactics have been employed: the arrest of dissidents on various false criminal rather than political charges; planting drugs and other incriminating evidence in the residences of dissidents to provide the basis for such charges; the resentencing on trumped-up charges of dissidents already serving terms to prevent their release on schedule; increased confinement in psychiatric hospitals; increased harassment of foreign contacts of dissidents and other actions designed to curtail dissident communication with foreigners, such as changing the legal code to broaden the definition of what constitutes a "state secret," which would make it easier to bring treason charges against dissidents who talk to foreigners; inducting dissidents into the military; increased use of violence both against political prisoners and against dissidents still "at large."

Regime brutality has intimidated many dissidents into a complete cessation of activity, but others have merely been driven underground. Some of these--seeing no prospect for change within the system, having no dreams for the future, and disillusioned about the effectiveness of Western support--are advocating more radical tactics of protest, such as the formation of opposition groups with political action programs. Last year several dissidents were arrested for setting up a Social Democratic Party that called for a multi-party democracy. Other dissidents report a "kamikaze" attitude among some embittered youth, a tendency to glorify personal sacrifices made for the sake of the cause. A spirit of despair and a readiness to become martyrs is even more pronounced in some Christian communities--especially the persecuted Pentecostals, Baptists and Ukrainian Catholics, who seem to take

the view that they have "nothing to lose but their chains." At the same time, with the door to emigration all but closed for Soviet Jews, many of them have also become bolder and more active in pressing for cultural freedoms for Jews inside the USSR.

Over the past several years there have been a few reports of terrorist incidents in the USSR. There have also been a few reports that guns are now available on the black market in Tula, a center for the manufacture of small arms, and that this has been a source of concern within the KGB. In an environment of harsh repression, the possibility cannot be discounted that opposition to the regime might assume more violent forms—especially in areas such as Ukraine that have traditions of armed resistance to Russian rule.

Thus, the Gorbachev leadership confronts a dissident community that is small (except for the religious believers) and demoralized. But a new breed of dissident may be developing that is more hardened, more inclined to engage in extreme forms of protest, and in this sense perhaps more of a problem for the regime.

At the Summit

Soviet leaders probably really do believe that what they do inside their own country is none of our business. They certainly believe that the adversary's internal problems are fair game for propagandists, but probably take the view that injecting criticism of internal policy into high diplomacy is nothing more than a cheap political maneuver.

It is true that for a time in the 1970s, the Soviets were responsive to US overtures on behalf of dissidents, especially with regard to Jewish emigration. But the internal repercussions of detente policies have given many Soviet leaders second thoughts, creating a political climate that is not conducive to internal liberalization. Jewish emigration stirred up other

disaffected minorities who wanted to leave. The departure of prominent intellectuals to the West served as a magnet for those left behind. More generally, in the view of many Soviet officials, the increase in contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the 1970s had a negative effect on the attitudes and behavior of the population. [REDACTED] in 1982, for example, that middle and senior level party officials believed that the economic benefits of detente had been bought at a dangerous political price and that the USSR must now protect itself from being "swamped" by Western ideas by cutting back on social, cultural and political contact with the West.

The US sanctions following the invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland also had an effect on the psychology of Soviet officials. Gorbachev himself has seemed especially concerned to avoid becoming vulnerable to US pressure of any sort.

With these practical and psychological factors at work, Gorbachev will probably be extremely unreceptive to appeals on behalf of dissidents. The incentives would have to be powerful for him to consider "concessions" in this area. In any event, any major decision--such as a decision to allow Sakharov to return to Moscow--would probably require consultation with other Politburo members. The Politburo has been involved in past decisions about prominent dissidents and emigres--such as Rostropovich--and sometimes there has been disagreement within the leadership over how to handle particular cases.



THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONALITY PROBLEM

The Soviet Union is the most ethnically diverse country in the world. It has more than 130 national groups each with its own language, culture and attitudes. Often these affect Moscow's ability to implement its domestic policies and at a minimum require the Soviet authorities to maintain a tighter control on the population than would otherwise be the case. These problems are compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union is the only major country in which the dominant nationality--in this case, the Russians--forms only a bare majority of the population and may soon become a minority. Up to now, Moscow has been able to cope with this situation through a combination of ideological and organizational measures and an often displayed willingness to use force against any opposition.

The Ethnic Mosaic

The USSR is a veritable ethnic museum housing more than 130 different, often exotic groups. They range from small reindeer-herding tribes in Siberia with no written language or independent political tradition to ancient Islamic civilizations in Central Asia to large, modern industrial societies in the Baltic region which were independent countries until World War II. While each is, of course, important to its members, most are politically irrelevant: The smallest 100 nationalities make up less than 2% of the total population. Indeed, their current prominence in the Soviet federal system reflects Moscow's long-term policy of divide-and-rule, of preventing the formation of large communities by sponsoring small ones. The larger nationalities that do matter can be divided into five major ethnographic groups:

(1). The Russians. Now forming 52% of the population, the Russians are the traditional core of the state. They dominate its central apparatus and military and determine both the political culture and official language of the country. They have paid a heavy economic price to maintain their dominance, enjoyed few benefits from their possessions, and are now in demographic decline. Indeed, sometime within the next decade, their low birthrates and high death rates when combined with the high birthrates among Central Asian Muslims will make them a minority in their own country. In an authoritarian political system, this shift will not have any immediate political consequences, but it has already had the psychological effect of giving many Russians a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the future.

(2). Other Slavs. The Ukrainians (16% of the population) and Belorussians (4%) are culturally similar to the Slavic Russians. When these three nationalities stand together--and it is an arrangement Moscow has long sought to promote--they form 72% of the total, a healthy majority unlikely to be challenged for several hundred years. But on many issues--including russification and economic development--these groups find themselves in conflict, a pattern that suggests any Slavic brotherhood may contain as much hostility as agreement.

(3). The Muslim Nationalities. Now forming 18% of the total population, the historically Islamic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus are culturally, linguistically, and racially distinct from the Slavic majority. In addition, they represent the fastest growing segment of the Soviet populace: In Turkmenistan, for example, one woman in six has at least 10 children. Because of their rapid growth, they form an increasing share of military draftees--now more than 30%--and of new entrants to the workforce--up to 50% by the mid-1990s.

(4). The Christian Caucasus. The ancient Christian nations of Georgia and Armenia together form 3% of the population. While each is culturally distinct and has enjoyed independence in the past, both are more than usually loyal to the Soviet system and enjoy special privileges. The Armenians see Moscow as their protector against Turkey, and both enjoy access to the large official and black markets of the USSR. Because of their churches and emigre communities abroad, both play a role in Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps for this reason, they both have been able to retain their distinctive alphabets--the only other nations who have are the Baltic states who were incorporated into the Soviet Union only at the end of World War II--and to defend many of their specific national traditions.

(5). The Baltic Republics. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the most passionately anti-Soviet and anti-Russian regions of the Soviet Union; but forming only 3% of the population, they have seldom been in a position to act on their feelings. As one Moscow official is reputed to have told a Baltic communist in the late 1940s, Soviet nationality policy in that region consists in having enough boxcars ready--a reference to the brutal mass deportations which followed the Soviet annexation in 1945. These three republics are the most European in the USSR and enjoy a standard of living far higher than the Russians do. At the same time, they feel profoundly threatened by the influx of Slavs into their homelands and by the ongoing russification of their local institutions.

These nationalities, like most others, have their own Soviet-created national territories in which they have at least some cultural and political institutions in their native

languages. Indeed, that is the essence of Soviet federalism. But nearly one Soviet in five--some 55 million people--lives outside his national home. The Russians have no real problem because there are Russian-language institutions virtually everywhere. For the other, however, native-language institutions do not exist outside their national territories; and many of them find themselves victims of discrimination and are being forcibly assimilated.

The Major Problems

There are a number of major issues in which the multinational aspect of the population plays an especially important role.

Regional Development. Any movement of labor and capital in a large multinational state tends to become invested with ethnic meaning or to be limited by ethnic considerations. The Soviet Union is no exception. Central Asians in the Soviet "sunbelt," for example, are very reluctant to move to the industrial heartland which is located in the less hospitable north; and Russians are reluctant to send capital away from their own "rustbelt" to build factories in Central Asia--where most of the new labor is to be found. Consequently, Moscow is forced to choose between economically rational development strategies which would exacerbate ethnic feelings (be it by changing investment patterns or forcing movement of workers) and an ethnically responsive ones which result in slower economic growth.

Military Staffing. An increasing fraction of new draftees for the Soviet Army come from Central Asia, and many of them do not know Russian well. As a result, the Soviet military has been forced to spend an increasing amount of time teaching such recruits Russian, the language of command; and the Central Asian soldiers have their national sensitivities heightened by the experience. To date, the army has been able to cope; but Soviet generals often complain about the poor quality of soldiers they get from non-Russian areas. As the percentage of such soldiers rises, this problem too may become worse.

Russification. Every country needs a lingua franca, a language in which everyone can do business. In the Soviet Union, that language is for historical and political reasons Russian. For many nationalities, learning Russian poses no threat to national identity; indeed, it may even heighten it by bringing individuals into contact with other groups. In other cases, however, language is central to identity; and any suggestion that another language should be acquired is seen as a threat to national existence. In Georgia, for instance, people rioted at the mere suggestion that Russian should be

legally equal to Georgian in that republic. Clearly, some Soviet officials believe that learning Russian is the first step toward the assimilation of non-Russians into the Russian nation; but more and more they are recognizing that a knowledge of that language may have exactly the opposite effect.


Combatting Foreign Influence. The Soviet government has always tried to seal off its population from any foreign influence. For both geographic and political reasons, this effort has been least successful in the non-Russian periphery of the country. Central Asian Muslims are very much aware of what is going on elsewhere in the Muslim world; and the Baltic peoples look to Poland and the West more often than to Moscow. As a result, many Russian officials in Moscow view these groups as virtual Trojan horses for foreign influences, an attitude that reinforces what for many are natural prejudices.

Dissent in the Non-Russian Areas. Dissent there is very different from that at the center. It is generally hidden from foreign view. It has the potential for violent massive protest because it has deeper roots in the local population. And, under certain conditions, it may even enjoy a certain sympathy with and hence protection from local officials who may also oppose Moscow's line. As a result, Moscow's ability to suppress dissent is somewhat limited--especially in regions such as Georgia and Estonia where the local language is virtually inaccessible to Russians on the scene.

Prospects for the Future

The Soviet Union is likely to face increasing national problems in the future. Economic progress has meant that more Russians and non-Russians are coming into direct competition, often for the first time, while the recent slowing of economic growth means that there is a smaller pie to be divided among groups that are growing at very different rates. And the federal structures originally created to be symbolic of national rights are acquiring defenders and becoming ever more real. In the past, Moscow has been able to manage through a combination of guile and force. In the near term, that is likely to be enough. But over the longer haul, these nationality-based tensions may weaken the Soviet system or prompt its leaders to return to a more harshly coercive policy.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Armand Hammer

Per your request, I have drafted a Presidential letter to Armand Hammer (Tab A). I have made inquiries regarding the report that he underwent surgery in July. Hammer's staff is doing their best to minimize this and avoid any publicity.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the Presidential letter for signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter to Hammer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Letter to Armand Hammer

Issue

Get well letter to Armand Hammer.

Facts

Armand Hammer underwent fairly serious prostate surgery in July. He is now recuperating.

Discussion

Your letter (Tab A) expresses your concern and wishes him a speedy recovery.

Recommendation

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	That you sign the letter to Armand Hammer.
_____	_____	

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Armand Hammer

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Armand:

I've just heard about your surgery in July, and am relieved to learn that your recovery has been rapid. That makes two of us!

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dr. Armand Hammer
Chairman
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
10889 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 1600
Los Angeles, California 90024

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6518

Matlock

File 50

August 30, 1985

MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

DATE: September 3, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

I. PURPOSE

To discuss U.S.-Soviet relations prior to Suzanne's return to the Soviet Union, and inquire on the progress of her new book.

II. BACKGROUND

In response to her letter of July 28, you phoned and agreed to see Suzanne prior to her departure for the Soviet Union. Suzanne is currently writing a book on the Pavlovsk Palace in Leningrad.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President (at his discretion)
Chief of Staff Regan (at his discretion)
Robert C. McFarlane
Suzanne Massie
Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN

Private meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Informal open discussion.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie, August 28, 1985
Tab C Letter from Suzanne Massie, July 10, 1985

cc: Vice President
Donald Regan

51

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING

WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

THE OVAL OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

- Thank you so much for your letters and for sharing your thoughts on your trip to the Soviet Union earlier this spring.

- You know the Russians so well. What do you think I should bear in mind most as I get ready for my meeting with Gorbachev?

- The Soviets still seem more interested in playing propaganda games than in getting down to serious negotiation. Is there anything we can do to influence them to get serious?

- What do you think Gorbachev wants out of our meeting?

- I wish you a good trip and look forward to hearing your impressions when you return.

52

Deer Isle, Maine 04627
August 10, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

You would have laughed had you seen my youngest daughter's face when she came in to get me as I was trying inexpertly to pound a forged iron lamp into a resistant log wall. " Mom," she said, a little ashen faced, "It's President Reagan!" I smiled and kept on pounding. " No," she said, " I'm not kidding. It is, really!"

It was indeed a wonderful unexpected surprise to hear your voice a few days ago, and how very kind it was of you to take the time to call me. Of course I hope you will make allowance for my being a bit startled, but I am sure that by now you are used to that effect you have on people.

What was best was to hear your voice so strong and well despite your recent operation. I was happy to hear that not only were you feeling better, but that you were even contemplating riding horseback!. Still, I hope that despite your extraordinarily rugged constitution and true grit, you will be careful.

As we discussed, I had a quite unusually productive trip to the Soviet Union this spring. I spent over two months there, returning only in mid-June, working on my book about the restoration of one of the palaces outside Leningrad. The saga of the Russian people's determination to rebuild their lost past despite the onslaughts of both Communism and Nazism is exciting -- a universal story that reflects on the marvelous capacity of human beings to dedicate themselves to ideals of spirituality and beauty despite all disasters.

While I was in the Soviet Union I was treated, as indeed I have always been treated by ordinary Russian citizens, with great hospitality and generosity. Because of the many and varied contacts I have built up there over so many years, I saw a broad spectrum of people both humble and mighty, and I believe I can say that few, if any foreigners, have recently been accorded such a broad arena of contact.

Quite unexpectedly, while I was in Leningrad, Mr. Gorbachev, to whom I had sent two of my books, responded with a cordial and personal message about my work. I have written him a letter of thanks and requested a meeting with him to discuss various matters pertaining to my new book.

Certainly there is a significant change in the atmosphere there at this time. Never, in the almost 20 years I have known the Soviet Union, have I seen anything quite like it. Of course it is far too soon to tell whether this movement and new expectations are only momentary or if they signify something more substantial and lasting. History dictates skepticism. I am still waiting to see whether Mr. Gorbachev is a patriot of his country or, as his predecessors have been, merely of the Party. Clearly the people long for a change. I heard a great deal of quite open griping. They have suffered so much and patiently endured for so long. It is time for a change, and I had no hesitation about telling that to every official I met and in no uncertain terms.


Given the Soviet propensity for often preferring to express themselves through private contacts, I was also treated to many hours of official conversation with varied spokesmen. Some of these were surprisingly candid, openly admitting problems and shortcomings and laying out an agenda. I kept precise notes of what was communicated to me by those spokesmen whom I knew were in a position to pass on official attitudes cleared at the highest levels. It is these commentaries which I think might be valuable to you at this time. If it could be useful to you, I would be happy to present some of these comments to you in a concise and organized form

and perhaps answer any specific questions you might have. If there any chance that your schedule might permit a brief meeting sometime during the first three weeks of September? I return to New York on September 3 and will be leaving for the Soviet Union on September 24 to continue my research as one of the scholars on our official exchange program with the Academy of Sciences, and will be returning only in early December.

And please let me say again that if, when I am in the Soviet Union I can do anything to help you, I would be happy and honored to serve you and our country with whatever talents and knowledge I have.

Just now, before I go back to the rigorous life in the USSR, I am reveling in these last golden days of summer. The Maine coast -- all jewel blue and green -- is splendid, one of the treasures of our magnificent country. I hope you will have a good rest in your beloved California. And thank you again for the deep pleasure you gave me by calling as you did.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan,

Sincerely,

Suzanne Massie

p.s. As for TASS. Don't take their rantings and ravings too seriously. The Russians don't. To their credit, they resolutely maintain a lively affection and respect for our country despite all the Big Lies that are thrown at them every day.

55
Deer Isle, Maine 04627

July 28, 1985

BR

Dear Mr. President,

I know that you are and have been deluged with letters and I simply wanted to add my voice to the millions of Americans who prayed for you and are continuing to pray for your continued good health and strength.

Just now, I am on an isolated island in Maine living in the forest ten miles from the nearest town working on my book on Pavlovsk palace in Leningrad, I get news very rarely, I have no TV, no radio and get newspapers every ten days. It made me so happy to see the New York Times picture of you returning to the White House looking so cheerful and fit. How do you do it Superman? I know I couldn't. You are certainly an extraordinary example of American grit and courage for all of us.

So I just wanted to let you know that however isolated I am, I have thought of you so much these days and so have many, many people on Deer Isle. Stay better and get better and better and better. We need you.

With all best wishes,


Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Bud - I called her.
She is going back to Russia
Sept. 23rd - said she'd like see
much to see us before she leaves.
I told her I'd like that too & that
11 a.m.

UNCLAS

56

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 12

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 530

DTG 310046

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # _____

RELEASER WHC

ROUTINE

RECORD # _____

FROM/LOCATION

THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1. _____

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER / SITTO# 306 / SANTA BARBARA CA / TOR: 310130Z

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Deliver ASAP

NSC 6518

Decision ~~at~~ Needed

85 AUG 30 P 9:31

CLASSIFICATION

57

6518
Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Second Letter from Suzanne Massie

Suzanne Massie has sent another letter to the President (Tab B) following their recent telephone conversation. I believe the briefing memorandum for their September 3 meeting should be revised to reflect their most recent correspondence. To update the action, I have made the necessary revisions to Tab I (briefing memo) and Tab A (talking points) which are attached.

JM
Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the revised memo at Tab I.

Approve *m*

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie, August 10, 1985
- Tab C Letter from Suzanne Massie, July 28, 1985

Unclas

8

RECEIVED

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES

6

IMMEDIATE

15 AUG 27 P 9: 26

SECURE FAX #

408

DTG

280035Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX #

RELEASER

LVB

ROUTINE

RECORD #

FROM/LOCATION

THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1. _____

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADMIRAL POINDEXTER / SITTO#260 / SANTA BARBARA CA / TOR: 280059Z AUG 85

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Sup pkg 6518
Meeting with Suzanne Massie

Unclas

CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 27, 1985

MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

DATE: September 3, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RM*I. PURPOSE

To discuss U.S.-Soviet relations prior to Suzanne's return to the Soviet Union, and inquire on the progress of her new book.

II. BACKGROUND

In response to her letter of July 28, you phoned and agreed to see Suzanne prior to her departure for the Soviet Union. Suzanne is currently writing a book on the Pavlovsk Palace in Leningrad.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President (at his discretion)
Chief of Staff Regan (at his discretion)
Robert C. McFarlane
Suzanne Massie
Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN

Private meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Informal open discussion.


Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie

cc: Vice President, Donald Regan

60!



ld

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING

WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

THE OVAL OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

- You know the Russians so well. What do you think I should bear in mind most as I get ready for my meeting with Gorbachev?

- The Soviets still seem more interested in playing propaganda games than in getting down to serious negotiation. Is there anything we can do to influence them to get serious?

- What do you think Gorbachev wants out of our meeting?

- I wish you a good trip and look forward to hearing your impressions when you return.

62



63

Deer Isle, Maine 04627
July 28, 1985

BR

Dear Mr. President,

I know that you are and have been deluged with letters and I simply wanted to add my voice to the millions of Americans who prayed for you and are continuing to pray for your continued good health and strength.

Just now, I am on an isolated island in Maine living in the forest ten miles from the nearest town working on my book on Pavlovsk palace in Leningrad, I get news very rarely, I have no TV, no radio and get newspapers every ten days. It made me so happy to see the New York Times picture of you returning to the White House looking so cheerful and fit. How do you do it Superman? I know I couldn't. You are certainly an extraordinary example of American grit and courage for all of us.

So I just wanted to let you know that however isolated I am, I have thought of you so much these days and so have many, many people on Deer Isle. Stay better and get better and better and better. We need you.

With all best wishes,

Suzanne Massie
Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

*Bud - I called her.
She is going back to Russia
Sept. 23rd - said she'd like very
much to see me before she leaves.
I told her I'd like that too & that
I'd go*

64

6518

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SIGNED

August 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Suzanne Massie,
September 3, 1985

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President regarding his meeting with Suzanne Massie. Given their friendship the talking points provided are brief.

JFM
Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie

National Security Council
The White House

Manning
nty

System # _____
Package # 6518

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>um</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*Please hand carry to
Regan's office Saturday. If no
one is there then let's get this
to his first thing Mon Tuesday. Will
Done 9/3/80 JPC*

National Security Council
The White House

284

System # I

80 AUG 29 P2: 21 Package # 6518
1946

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
William Martin	<u>2</u>	<u>um</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>m</u>	_____
William Martin	<u>4</u>	<u>um</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>W</u>
Situation Room	<u>5</u>	<u>WFC</u>	<u>docm to JMP</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: CRB 8/29
(Date/Time)

*To be documented to JMP when cleared by
RCM. Adm. Poindexter is holding the
first package for arrival of this add-on.
Meeting is Tuesday 9/3.*