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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/8/2005

**File Folder** MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1985 (5/6)

**FOIA**

F06-114/3

**Box Number** 11

YARHI-MILO

1102

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7713	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	8/20/1985	B1
7722	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER MEETINGS WITH USSR <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	8/14/1985	B1
7714	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV LETTER ON NUCLEAR TESTING <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	8/20/1985	B1
7715	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER OF JULY 28, 1985 <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7723	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7724	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	8/14/1985	B1
7732	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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7733	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE GORBACHEV LETTER ON TESTING MORATORIUM <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7734	LETTER	GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE TESTING MORATORIUM <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	7/28/1985	B1
7716	CALENDAR	NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CALENDAR <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	8/19/1985	B1
7717	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7713 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	8/20/1985	B1
7735	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7722 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	8/14/1985	B1
7718	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE WHITE HOUSE COORDINATING GROUP ON GENEVA MEETING: STATUS REPORT <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	8/23/1985	B1
7719	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PAPERS ON USSR <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	8/23/1985	B1
7720	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE BACKGROUND READING ON USSR: INTERNAL PROBLEMS <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7736	PAPER	USSR: A SOCIETY IN TROUBLE <b>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</b>	6	ND	B1
7721	PAPER	DISSENT IN THE USSR <b>PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3</b>	11	ND	B1 B3
7737	PAPER	THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONALITY PROBLEM <b>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</b>	4	ND	B1

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 15, 1985

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

REQUEST: Official Working Visit by Soviet Foreign  
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

PURPOSE: To get acquainted with the new foreign  
minister; to discuss the agenda and  
preparations for the November Reagan-  
Gorbachev meeting.

BACKGROUND: In July 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze was  
promoted to full member of the ruling  
Politburo and was appointed the new Soviet  
Foreign Minister, replacing Gromyko who held  
the post since 1957. A meeting with  
Shevardnadze will provide the President with  
an opportunity to discuss issues with a  
representative of the "new Soviet  
leadership."

As the Foreign Minister will be accompanying  
Gorbachev to Paris during the first days of  
October, he must return to Moscow on the  
morning of September 28. Also, the Soviets  
have requested a meeting between Shultz and  
Shevardnadze on September 25 in New York.

DATE & TIME: September 27, 1985.  
DURATION: 2½ hours.

LOCATION: Oval Office.

PARTICIPANTS: List to be provided.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: 1. Pre-briefing.  
2. Meeting.  
3. Luncheon.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Press pool photo.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 14, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. <sup>JFM</sup>MATLOCK/PAULA J. <sup>PJ</sup>DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Presidential Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 27, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a Schedule Proposal from you to Fred Ryan regarding the upcoming Presidential meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo at Tab I.

Approve WMPG Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Schedule Proposal

*Mutlock 6276 3*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8/15/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE  
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*  
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Suzanne Massie

DATE: September 3, 1985

TIME: 9:45 am

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Background to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY  
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc:	K. Barun	A. Kingon	W. Martin
	P. Buchanan	J. Kuhn	
	D. Chew	C. McCain	
	T. Dawson	B. Oglesby	
	B. Elliott	E. Rollins	
	M. Friedersdorf	J. Rosebush	
	C. Fuller	R. Scouten	
	W. Henkel	R. Shaddick	
	E. Hickey	B. Shaddix	
	C. Hicks	L. Speakes	
	J. Hirshberg	WHCA Audio/Visual	
	G. Hodges	WHCA Operations	
	J. Hooley	Nell Yates	

*Matlock*

6276

4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

File

August 8, 1985

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *Buc*

REQUEST: Meeting with Suzanne Massie

PURPOSE: To discuss current US-Soviet relations  
in light of the upcoming meeting in November.

BACKGROUND: Ms. Massie is currently writing a book in  
Maine. She returns to the Soviet Union  
September 23 and would like to see the  
President before she leaves, to which the  
President has already agreed by phone.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: They have met on several occasions.

DATE & TIME: September 3 - 20  
DURATION: 30 - 60 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Robert C. McFarlane.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Open conversation.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

PROPOSED "PHOTO": White House Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

August 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK *Eise for*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Presidential Meeting With Suzanne Massie

Suzanne Massie, an author and authority on the Soviet Union, has written to the President regarding his recovery. As they are friends, the President in turn called Suzanne and they have agreed to meet before she goes back to the Soviet Union on September 23. He has asked Bud to follow up with regard to scheduling.

At Tab I is the schedule proposal recommending that the meeting be arranged before Suzanne departs for the Soviet Union. As the September calendar is now under discussion, this request must be submitted today.

*ERS* Steve Bestanovich concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Approve *lm*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Schedule Proposal to Ryan
- Tab A Letter From Massie, July 28, 1985

Deer Isle, Maine 04627  
July 28, 1985

PK

Dear Mr. President,

I know that you are and have been deluged with letters and I simply wanted to add my voice to the millions of Americans who prayed for you and are continuing to pray for your continued good health and strength.

Just now, I am on an isolated island in Maine living in the forest ten miles from the nearest town working on my book on Pavlovsk palace in Leningrad, I get news very rarely, I have no TV, no radio and get newspapers every ten days. It made me so happy to see the New York Times picture of you returning to the White House looking so cheerful and fit. How do you do it Superman? I know I couldn't. You are certainly an extraordinary example of American grit and courage for all of us.

So I just wanted to let you know that however isolated I am, I have thought of you so much these days and so have many, many people on Deer Isle. Stay better and get better and better and better. We need you.

With all best wishes,

*Suzanne Massie*  
Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

*Bud - I called her.  
She is going back to Russia  
Sept. 23rd - said she'd like very  
much to see me before she leaves.  
I told her I'd like that too & that  
I'd tell you about it. We get back from  
the island*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1985

August 6, 1985

FOR: JACK MATLOCK  
FROM: Wilma Hall *Wil*

Mr. McFarlane asked me to send the attached to you with a note to tell you that the President would like to meet with Suzanne Massie in early September. Pls take this request for action and staff accordingly.

Many thanks.

Dona,

Pls show attached to Bill Martin so he can add this to the scheduling hopper.

This is important to the President -- he likes Suzanne very much.

Thanks,

Wilma

E  
W

Suzanne Massie  
Deer Isle, Maine 04627

207/348-9953

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 16, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JF*

SUBJECT: Request to Participate in the AAAS Congressional Seminar to be held at Capitol Hill on September 10, 1985

I have been invited to participate in the upcoming Congressional Seminar sponsored by the American Association for Advancement of Science for Members of Congress. The seminar will be held at Capitol Hill on September 10, 1985, and is entitled "Preventing Nuclear War: Steps That Can Be Taken Now."

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my request to attend the AAAS Seminar.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

TAB A Letter of Invitation

*American Association  
for the Advancement of Science*

1776 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON, D. C., 20036

Phone: 407-4400 (Area Code 202) Cable Address: Advancesci, Washington, D. C.

July 17, 1985

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.  
Special Assistant for National  
Security Affairs  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Room 368  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Matlock:

I am writing to formally confirm your participation in the upcoming congressional seminar sponsored by the Committee on Science, Arms Control and National Security of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. As you know, the seminar is scheduled for September 10, 1985 and is entitled "Preventing Nuclear War: Steps That Can Be Taken Now."

Our previous seminars have been very useful in providing information on arms control issues to Members of Congress and their staff. The purpose of this seminar is to focus congressional attention on steps that could be taken now to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Your presentation "Possible Steps to Prevent Nuclear War: Managing East-West Tensions" will provide valuable insight to the Congress on how best to proceed.

The seminar will begin with a Members-only breakfast from 8:00 - 9:30 a.m. in Room S-207 of the Capitol. During this time you will have an opportunity to meet informally with Members, make a brief presentation (5-8 minutes), and respond to questions in an "off-the-record" session.

Following the breakfast, we will hold an open plenary session from 10:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. for Members, congressional staff and outside guests. During this time each panelist will take about fifteen minutes to make a formal presentation. After all panelists have given their remarks, the floor will be open to questions from the audience.

I have enclosed a copy of our working agenda for your information. Panelists will meet on the morning of September 10 at 7:45 a.m. in Room S-207 of the Capitol to go over the details of the seminar. I look forward to seeing you at that time.

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.  
National Security Council  
July 17, 1985  
Page Two

If you have any questions about the seminar or your presentation, please call me or Lorna Watson at (202) 326-6491. I look forward to our sessions on September 10.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

*Richard Scribner*

Richard A. Scribner  
Program Head, Committee on  
Science, Arms Control, and  
National Security

Enclosure

RAS/lp

PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR:  
STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN NOW

a seminar  
for Members of Congress and Congressional Staff

10 September 1985

Members-Only Breakfast:

8:00-9:30 a.m. (S-207, Capitol)

Open Plenary for Members and Staff:

10:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m. (Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building)

Washington, D.C.

Panel Members Include:

- o DAVID HAMBURG (Chairman of the Board of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and President of the Carnegie Corporation)  
-- Moderator
- o SIDNEY GRAYBEAL (Vice President, Systems Planning Corporation)  
"Bases of Action: U.S.-Soviet Consultations and Agreements"
- o BARRY BLECHMAN (President, Defense Forecasts Inc.)  
"Crisis and Accidental Nuclear War Prevention Centers: Prospects and Problems"
- o JACK MATLOCK (Special Assistant to the President for European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council)  
"Possible Steps to Prevent Nuclear War: Managing East-West Tensions"
- o JOSEPH NYE (Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University)  
"An Agenda for Action to Prevent Nuclear War"

For further details, call: Science, Arms Control,  
and National Security Program Office  
American Association for the Advancement of Science  
Washington, D.C. (202) 326-6491

Sponsored by  
The Committee on Science, Arms Control, and National Security  
of the  
American Association for the Advancement of Science

JMC  
12NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: Request to Travel to Geneva on September 12-18 to  
Participate in Preliminary Discussions with the  
Soviets in Preparation for the November Meeting

I plan to travel to Geneva as a member of the Special Mission Team to participate in the preliminary discussions with the Soviets in preparation for the meeting of President Reagan with Gorbachev. Transportation will be performed by U.S. Government carrier. Per diem costs to be paid by NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my request.

Approve RCM 8/21

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Travel Authorization

cc: Administrative Office



NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: August 19, 1985

13

- 1. TRAVELER'S NAME: MATLOCK, JACK F.
- 2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Geneva Meeting discussions with the Soviets  
Sept 12 - 18, 1985

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):  
WASHINGTON/GENEVA/WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE DATE 9/12 RETURN DATE 9/18  
TIME 8:00AM TIME 5:45PM

4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:  
GOV AIR  COMMERCIAL AIR  POV  RAIL  OTHER

5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:  
TRANSPORTATION  PER DIEM \$567 OTHER \$221 TOTAL TRIP COST \$798

6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC  OTHER

7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES  NO

9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements):  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0

11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: J. Matlock

13. APPROVALS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Suzanne Massie,  
September 3, 1985

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President regarding his meeting with Suzanne Massie. Given their friendship the talking points provided are brief.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	Letter from Suzanne Massie

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

DATE: September 3, 1985  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.  
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss U.S.-Soviet relations prior to Suzanne's return to the Soviet Union, and inquire on the progress of her new book.

II. BACKGROUND

In response to her letter of July 28, you phoned and agreed to see Suzanne prior to her departure for the Soviet Union. Suzanne is currently writing a book on the Pavlovsk Palace in Leningrad.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President (at his discretion)  
Chief of Staff Regan (at his discretion)  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Suzanne Massie  
Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN

Private meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Informal open discussion.

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

## Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points  
Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING

WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

THE OVAL OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

- You know the Russians so well. What do you think I should bear in mind most as I get ready for my meeting with Gorbachev?
  
- The Soviets still seem more interested in playing propaganda games than in getting down to serious negotiation. Is there anything we can do to influence them to get serious?
  
- What do you think Gorbachev wants out of our meeting?
  
- I wish you a good trip and look forward to hearing your impressions when you return.

TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
SUZANNE MASSIE- SEPTEMBER 3, 1985 AT 9:45 AM

-- YOU KNOW THE RUSSIANS SO WELL. WHAT DO  
YOU THINK I SHOULD BEAR IN MIND MOST AS I GET  
READY FOR MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV?

-- THE SOVIETS STILL SEEM MORE INTERESTED IN  
PLAYING PROPAGANDA GAMES THAN IN GETTING DOWN  
TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. IS THERE ANYTHING WE  
CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THEM TO GET SERIOUS?

2

-- WHAT DO YOU THINK GORBACHEV WANTS OUT OF  
OUR MEETING?

-- I WISH YOU A GOOD TRIP AND LOOK FORWARD  
TO HEARING YOUR IMPRESSIONS WHEN YOU RETURN.

Deer Isle, Maine 04627  
July 28, 1985

BC

Dear Mr. President,

I know that you are and have been deluged with letters and I simply wanted to add my voice to the millions of Americans who prayed for you and are continuing to pray for your continued good health and strength.

Just now, I am on an isolated island in Maine living in the forest ten miles from the nearest town working on my book on Pavlovsk palace in Leningrad, I get news very rarely, I have no TV, no radio and get newspapers every ten days. It made me so happy to see the New York Times picture of you returning to the White House looking so cheerful and fit. How do you do it Superman? I know I couldn't. You are certainly an extraordinary example of American grit and courage for all of us.

So I just wanted to let you know that however isolated I am, I have thought of you so much these days and so have many, many people on Deer Isle. Stay better and get better and better and better. We need you.

With all best wishes,

*Suzanne Massie*  
Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

*Bud - I called her.  
She is going back to Russia  
Sept. 23rd - said she'd like very  
much to see me before she leaves.  
I told her I'd like that too & that  
I'd tell you about it. We cut back down*

JM-C  
JFWOT  
A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 20, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Preparations for President's Meeting with Gorbachev

State has sent the Memorandum at Tab I which reports on a conversation with Soviet Charge Isakov regarding arrangements for the November meeting. The principal difference at this stage between our preferences and Soviet ones is that the Soviets still want to host their half of the meetings at their mission. We have made it clear that we will not use our mission and have urged the Soviets to take another look at the possibility of using a neutral site. Isakov indicated that the matter might be revisited when the advance teams meet jointly in Geneva September 16-17.

Attachment:

Tab I Platt-McFarlane Memorandum of August 14, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/3 #7713

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Declassify on: OADR

RECEIVED 15 AUG 85 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 14 AUG 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CJS NARA, Date 6/18/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR SEPT & NOV MTGS W/ SOVIETS IN GENEVA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 20 AUG 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

MANDEL

COBB

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# 8523974

LOG

NSCIFID

( B / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)



DECLASSIFIED

ES SENSITIVE 8523974  
United States Department of State



NLRR FD6-114/3 #7722  
BY CS NARA DATE 10/30/07

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II  
90853

August 14, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Preparations for the September and  
November Meetings with the Soviets

Following discussions with Bill Henkel, Mark Palmer called in Soviet Chargé Isakov today to continue the dialogue on arrangements for the meetings between the President and Gorbachev in November and the President's and Secretary Shultz' meetings with Shevardnadze in September. Isakov led off by saying that the Soviets agreed to the September 16-17 meeting of advance teams in Geneva. Palmer then noted our pleasure that both sides had agreed on small dinners on November 19 and 20; we would discuss at a later date which leader would host which dinner.

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- 2 -

Isakov asked if the President would be staying in a Swiss-provided chateau or the mission residence. Palmer noted he definitely would not be in our official residence for security reasons. Isakov then noted on a personal basis that perhaps it would be good for the advance teams to look at this question once again and make a decision in Geneva on where to hold the meetings.

In closing, Isakov commented that he would report the details of the US position to Moscow right away. He added that he was pleased to see that we were making good progress on the arrangements.

*Nicholas Platt*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 20, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev Letter on Nuclear Testing

Secretary Shultz has concurred in the text of the letter which was discussed with you earlier.

I am sending the text in final in order to preposition it, in case the soundings you have undertaken indicate that it should be sent.

*RL*  
Bob Linhard concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the attached Memorandum to the President, provided your soundings indicate that it would be desirable for him to offer private consultations with the Soviets on the nuclear testing issue.

Approve \_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR FD6-114/3 #7714 -  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11 -

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Reply to Gorbachev's Letter of July 28, 1985

Issue

Whether to sign a letter replying to Gorbachev's letter of July 28, 1985.

Facts

Gorbachev wrote you on July 28 to propose a moratorium on nuclear testing. We have rejected the Soviet proposal publicly, but you have not responded formally to the letter.

Discussion

Gorbachev's letter, while containing an unacceptable proposal, gives you an opening to see whether the Soviets are willing to conduct some informal consultations with the aim of identifying ways in which the interrelated issues of nuclear testing, verification, and offensive weapons reduction might be addressed. If the Soviets are genuinely interested in finding a way to make progress on the testing issue (which they may not be), the proposal for private talks could provide a way out of the current stalemate in resolving the critical verification problem. If Gorbachev refuses even to discuss the issue, then our public posture will subsequently be strengthened, since you will have made every effort to find a solution to the verification problems on a reasonable basis.

Recommendation

OK                      No

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

—                              —

Attachment:

Tab A              Letter to Gorbachev

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/3# 7715  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of July 28 addressed an issue of genuine importance and concern to both our countries -- nuclear testing. In previous exchanges with you and your predecessors I have sought to find ways to create the necessary conditions for progress on this issue. My latest proposals, conveyed in my letter of July 27, crossed with your letter of July 28, and I hope you have them under consideration.

I must confess that I learned of the immediate public announcement of your proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing with regret and some surprise. The announcement was made at a juncture and in a fashion which seemed more appropriate to propaganda use than as a basis for serious negotiation. Coming in the wake of an apparent acceleration and completion of the Soviet Union's own essential testing for 1985, such handling understandably raised doubts in my mind as to the seriousness of your proposal, and compelled us to respond as we did.

Our negative reaction to your moratorium announcement, however, does not imply that we question the significance of nuclear testing as an issue. I fully recognize the desirability of progress in this area, both for its own sake and for the stimulus it might provide to other arms control negotiations -- especially our negotiations in Geneva.

As is the case in the Geneva negotiations, I am convinced that meaningful progress on nuclear testing will ultimately depend on our ability to resolve two principal sets of issues: verification and nuclear weapons reduction. Any meaningful nuclear testing regime will require a degree of confidence in our monitoring abilities beyond

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NLRR E06-114/3 #7723

BY CH NARA DATE 10/30/07

that now available to either of our countries. It also seems self-evident that the testing issue can be resolved most easily in an environment of diminishing stocks of nuclear weapons.

Mr. General Secretary, if Soviet goals are as they have been described by Soviet spokesmen, it seems to me that they are not inconsistent with United States goals. Therefore, if we adopt a business-like approach toward working out the practical aspects of achieving these goals, we should be able to bridge our differences.

At the same time, it seems clear that the public debate in which our governments are currently engaged can hardly be expected to lead us to a mutually acceptable solution. In fact, public jockeying for propaganda advantage can only exacerbate mistrust regarding the intentions of the other side.

In order to explore the feasibility of making progress on this crucial issue, I would suggest that we each name a representative to meet privately and confidentially to discuss ways in which our differences might be bridged. If they are able to develop some promising ideas, these could be pursued formally by our Foreign Ministers when they meet next month.

I will appreciate your reaction to this suggestion. If it is agreeable to you, I believe it might help us find a way to narrow our differences on this important issue.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
The Kremlin  
Moscow

RECEIVED 14 AUG 85 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 14 AUG 85

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

28 JUL 85

DECLASSIFIED  
By CAS NARA, Date 6/11/02  
WFO 8588 Guidelines, August 28, 1997

KEYWORDS: USSR

NUCLEAR TESTING

HS

SUBJECT. PRES REPLY TO GORBACHEV LTR OF 28 JUL RE NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 20 AUG 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS \*\* STAFFED PER WFM. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE SEND ME COPY

OF 28 JULY GORBACHEV LTR -- BRIAN

REF# 8523870

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

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August 14, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Gorbachev

We have not replied formally to Gorbachev's July 28 letter to the President, which presaged Moscow's public announcement of a nuclear testing moratorium. Our public remarks have made our views quite clear, but we might use a reply to move the discussion of the testing issue in a more positive direction.

We have worked up the attached draft with Jack Matlock. In essence, it suggests private discussions between designated representatives to move the testing issue forward. It would explore Soviet willingness to meet our concerns on verification of testing limitations, especially in light of Gorbachev's August 13 TASS interview which notes the relationship among testing limits, verification, and reductions of nuclear arms.

Secretary Shultz has seen and approved this draft.

*Brockmeyer*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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NLRR E06-114/3 #7724

BY CW NARA DATE 10/31/07

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

Your letter of July 28 addressed an issue of genuine importance and concern to both our countries -- nuclear testing. In previous exchanges with you and your predecessors I have sought to find ways to create the necessary conditions for progress on this issue. My latest proposals conveyed in my letter of July 27, crossed with your letter of July 28, and I hope you have them under consideration.

I must confess that I learned of the immediate public announcement of your proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing with regret and some surprise. The announcement was made at a juncture and in a fashion which seemed more appropriate to propaganda use than as a basis for serious negotiation. Coming in the wake of an apparent acceleration and completion of the Soviet Union's own essential testing for 1985, such handling understandably raised doubts in my mind as to the seriousness of your proposal, and compelled us to respond as we did.

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BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

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Our negative reaction to your moratorium announcement, however, does not imply that we question the significance of nuclear testing as an issue. I fully recognize the desirability of progress in this area, both for its own sake and for the stimulus it might provide to other arms control negotiations -- especially our negotiations in Geneva.

As is the case in the Geneva negotiations, I am convinced that meaningful progress on nuclear testing will ultimately depend on our ability to resolve two principal sets of issues: verification and nuclear weapons reduction. Any meaningful nuclear testing regime will require a degree of confidence in our monitoring abilities beyond that now available to either of our countries. It also seems self-evident that the testing issue can be resolved most easily in an environment of diminishing stocks of nuclear weapons.

Mr. General Secretary, if Soviet goals are as they have been described by Soviet spokesmen, it seems to me that they are not inconsistent with United States goals. Therefore, if we adopt a businesslike approach toward working out the practical aspects of achieving these goals, we should be able to bridge our differences.

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- 3 -

At the same time, it seems clear that the public debate in which our governments are currently engaged can hardly be expected to lead us to a mutually acceptable solution. In fact, public jockeying for propaganda advantage can only exacerbate mistrust regarding the intentions of the other side.

In order to explore the feasibility of making progress on this crucial issue, I would suggest that we each name a representative to meet privately and confidentially to discuss ways in which our differences might be bridged. If they are able to develop some promising ideas, these could be pursued formally by our Foreign Ministers when they meet next month.

I will appreciate your reaction to this suggestion. If it is agreeable to you, I believe it might help us find a way to narrow our differences on this important issue.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter on Testing Moratorium

Soviet Charge Sokolov delivered to Ambassador Ridgway a letter from Gorbachev to the President this afternoon announcing a unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. According to the letter, which is attached, the moratorium is to last from August 6 to next January 1 and would be extended if the US "refrains from conducting nuclear explosions." The letter notes that this step will be announced publicly.

A Soviet announcement to begin a testing moratorium on the 40th Anniversary of Hiroshima and prior to the Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference had been widely expected. We are working appropriate press guidance in case the announcement is made today or early tomorrow, and are also considering how this affects our handling of our own nuclear testing initiative.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Gorbachev letter

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NLRR F06-114/3 # 7733BY CW DATE 11/30/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL:OADR

His Excellency

RONALD W. REAGAN

The President of the United States of America

July 28, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to inform you of the following.

Striving to promote cessation of the dangerous rivalry in building up nuclear arsenals and desiring to set a good example for other nuclear countries, the Soviet Union has taken a decision to cease unilaterally, starting August 6th, 1985, any nuclear explosions. Our moratorium is declared till January 1, 1986. However, it will continue to be in effect even longer if the United States, on its part, refrains from conducting nuclear explosions. All this will be contained in an official statement.

We hope, Mr. President, that the United States will duly appreciate this peace-loving step by the Soviet Union and will follow its example. A mutual Soviet-American moratorium would be an important contribution toward a healthier international situation and lessening the danger of war.

In taking this decision we proceeded, in particular, from our desire to promote a more favorable atmosphere in view of the forthcoming meeting between you and me in November as well.

I take this opportunity to wish you once again the speediest recovery.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7734

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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With SECRET Attachment

August 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*  
SUBJECT: National Security Affairs Calendar

Attached is the National Security Affairs Calendar for the coming months. If you have any corrections or changes please contact my office.

Attachment  
National Security Affairs Calendar

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With SECRET Attachment

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
*10/1/85*

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CALENDAR

Developments to Watch in the Coming Week

First Session of the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It, International Telecommunication Union, in Geneva, through September 13.

Secretary of Transportation Dole visits Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong through September 1.

Looking Ahead

- Aug 27-  
Sep 24            1985 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva.
- Aug 29            Visit of Australian Defense Minister Kim Beazley to Washington.
- Sep 9-11          Official Visit of Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlueter to Washington.
- Sep 10-  
Oct 18            Conference on Disarmament in Europe, in Stockholm.
- Sep 17            40th Session of the UN General Assembly convenes in New York City.
- Sep 19            Official Working Visit of Mozambique President Samora Moises Machel to Washington.
- Sep 19-20        U.S.-Japan Economic Sub-Cabinet Consultations in Washington.
- Sep 19-27        IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference in Vienna.
- Sep 23-  
Oct 3            Secretary of State Shultz attends the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York City.
- Sep 26-  
Oct 1            Visit of Oman Foreign Minister Yousef bin Alawi to Washington.

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BY CJ NARA DATE 10/30/07

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- 2 -

- Sep 26- Dec 5 MBFR Talks in Vienna.
- Sep 27 Visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid to Washington.
- Sep 30- Oct 1 NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting in Brussels.
- Oct 2-4 Conference on Atlantic Unity in Columbia, South Carolina. Lord Carrington is the keynote speaker.
- Oct 7-11 Official Visit of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to Washington (in U.S., October 3-14).
- Oct 9 Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) convenes in Geneva.
- Oct 9-10 Visit of Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden to Washington.
- Oct 9-10 Visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Washington.
- Oct 23-24 President Reagan visits New York City for the 40th anniversary ceremonies of the United Nations.
- Oct 29-30 Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.
- Nov 8-12 Private Visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to Washington.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 20, 1985

INFORMATION

**RCM HAS SEEN**

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Preparations for President's Meeting with Gorbachev

State has sent the Memorandum at Tab I which reports on a conversation with Soviet Charge Isakov regarding arrangements for the November meeting. The principal difference at this stage between our preferences and Soviet ones is that the Soviets still want to host their half of the meetings at their mission. We have made it clear that we will not use our mission and have urged the Soviets to take another look at the possibility of using a neutral site. Isakov indicated that the matter might be revisited when the advance teams meet jointly in Geneva September 16-17.

Attachment:

Tab I Platt-McFarlane Memorandum of August 14, 1985

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BY CIS NARA DATE 10/30/07

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NLRR FD-114/3 #7735

ES SENSITIVE 8523974

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07 United States Department of State



Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 14, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Preparations for the September and  
November Meetings with the Soviets

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- 2 -

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*Nicholas Platt*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY GS NARA DATE 10/30/07NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506SECRET

August 23, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JEM*SUBJECT: White House Coordinating Group on Geneva Meeting:  
Status Report

The Coordinating Group established by NSDD 183 has now held two meetings and will be meeting weekly from now to the meeting in November. As of now, the status of our work is as follows:

1) Schedule of Events: With input from the participating agencies we have developed a schedule of anticipated activities and events by week (Tab I). This will be revised weekly and will include events which are definitely scheduled, those which may be scheduled, and a notional idea of necessary Presidential activities. It will also include Soviet events and activities insofar as they can be anticipated in advance. This schedule will provide a quick reference of events which require preparation.

2) Public Diplomacy: Walt Raymond's office will take the leadership role in coordinating and integrating this effort with other public diplomacy efforts underway. When Bud Korengold reports, he will work closely with the public diplomacy staff at the NSC and orchestrate the pre-Geneva press operations in close liaison with Larry Speakes and Ed Djerejian. We have addressed the following four broad tasks:

a. Development of a public diplomacy concept paper: A subcommittee was established, chaired by Steve Steiner, to draft a concept paper on the basis of material submitted by USIA and State. We anticipate a final draft ready for your review September 4.

b. Development of a plan to implement that policy: When the concept paper is approved, the same committee, working with Bud Korengold, will develop specific actions and implementing measures to execute the concept plan.

c. Establishment of a mechanism to coordinate the work of existing public diplomacy groups: A public diplomacy subgroup, chaired by Steve Steiner and including representatives of the White House Press Office, State, USIA, NSC, and DOD, has been established to provide an interface with existing public diplomacy groups.

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d. Establishment of a mechanism for clearing statements, press guidance and VOA editorials: Agencies have been instructed to submit all proposed statements and talking points requiring clearance to Judyt Mandel, who will coordinate the clearance process within the NSC and with State (or other Departments as necessary).

3) Congressional Relations: A schedule of Congressional contacts with Soviets has been developed and included in the overall activity schedule. State has been tasked to arrange for appropriate briefings, calling upon other agencies and the NSC as appropriate for the subject matter and individuals involved. (The most important of these contacts in the next few weeks will be those by Senator Byrd's group, which has been promised a meeting with Gorbachev, and a visit here by a Supreme Soviet group in early September.)

In addition, Lynn Sachs will consult with EUR and H in State to determine whether the present mechanism for coordinating replies to Congressional correspondence is adequate in respect to subjects relating to the Geneva meeting, and will make recommendations in this regard next week.

4. Allied Briefings: State has been tasked to prepare a notional list of briefings which will be required before and after the meeting. The initial cut is included in the overall schedule at Tab I.

5. Arrangements: Henkel will lead an advance team visit to Geneva September 12-16, at which time joint meetings will be held with the Soviet team. We now have general agreement on the schedule of meetings and social events (though some particulars must still be nailed down), but there is as yet no final decision on the location of the meetings or regarding the President's residence. We hope that these matters can be decided following the next visit by the advance team.

6. Briefing material for President: I will work out with CIA and State a suggested briefing schedule for the President (in addition to the "papers on the Soviet Union" which are being handled separately), and will submit a suggested schedule next week. This will include some TV tapes and also suggestions for possible meetings with outside specialists.

Walter Raymond concurs.

Attachments:

TAB I      Schedule of Activities

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23 AUGUST 1985  
PAGE 01

PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA

September 1 - 7

September 8 - 14

September 15 - 21

Presidential and SecState Activities

Defense Issues

Senior Arms Control Group Meeting  
ASAT Testing Certification to Congress  
Goodby consultations in Moscow

NSC: Shevardnadze Strategy  
Joint Survey Team to Geneva

NSC: Geneva, NST Round III  
CDE Round Opens in Stockholm  
Meeting with NATO Military Committee  
Hotline Team in Moscow  
Action on FY86 DOD Authorization Bill

40th Session UNGA Convenes

Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks  
Meet with Packard Commission  
NSC: MBFR Talks  
Blue Ribbon Commission on DefMgmt  
US ASAT Test  
Alaska Sea Trials Begin  
NSC: DOE Nuclear Facilities  
Action on FY86 DOD Authorization Bill

Public Diplomacy

HUD Sec. Pierce to Moscow for Joint Commission on Housing

Congressional Delegations  
Sen Byrd to meet with Gorbachev

EPA Administrator meets in Washington with Soviet Counterpart.  
Soviet Parliamentarians in Washington

Consultations w/Allies and Others

Danish PM Schleuter to Washington

Bilaterals

US-Japanese-Soviet Air Controllers begin discussions of Pacific Safety implementation

Edgar Bronfman, World Jewish Congress to visit Moscow (tent)

US-Soviet Civair Discussions in Washington

US-Soviet experts meeting on East Asia in Moscow

USSR Acts

Babrak Karmal to visit Moscow  
Possible Qadhafi visit to Moscow

Demichev & Kapitsa visit to Japan  
Possible 7th Round of Sino-Soviet talks

Shevardnadze Speech at UNGA

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PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA

September 22- 28

September 29 - October 5

October 6 - 12

Presidential and SecState Activities

Shultz Meeting with Shevardnadze  
President meets with Shevardnadze

Defense Issues

Geneva: MBFR Talks  
Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks

Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks  
NSPG: International Nuclear Issues  
NSPG: SDI Review  
Continuing Resolution on Budget

SCC reconvenes in Geneva  
Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks

Public Diplomacy

Shultz speech at UNGA

Codel's

Codel Udall to visit Siberia  
and Moscow

Codel Markey to Moscow

House Subcommittee on Science &  
Technology to Moscow

Codel Pepper to visit Leningrad & Moscow

Consultations w/Allies and Others

Egyptian FM Maguid to Washington  
Spanish PM Gonzalez to Washington

President's letter to Allies  
following meeting w/Shevardnadze  
Weinberger to Australia & Japan

Australian FM Hayden to Washington  
SecGen NATO Carrington visit to President  
Israeli FM Shamir to Washington

Bilaterals

ICCUSA Meeting to Coordinate  
Exchange activities (tent)

USSR Acts

Possible visit to Moscow by  
PDRY President Hasani

Gorbachev to visit Paris

Gorbachev to visit Bulgaria for  
Warsaw Pact Summit (tent)

Possible visit to Moscow by  
Mengistu

Soviet Naval Visit to Caribbean

~~SECRET~~

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23 AUGUST 1985  
PAGE 03

GENEVA

October 13 - 19

October 20 - 26

October 27 - November 2

Presidential and SecState Activities

40th UNGA Anniversary Presidential Speech

Defense Issues

DOD Interim Restraint Report due  
Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks  
US-Soviet NPT talks in Washington

Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks

Geneva: Round III of N & S Talks  
NSC: Arms Control Agenda for Gorbachev  
NATO NPG Ministerial

Public Diplomacy

Codels

Consultations w/Allies and Others  
Vice President Bush to China  
Under Sec Armacost to Greece  
and Turkey

President to meet with some Allies at UN

Shultz meets with Canadian FM Clark

Bilaterals

CSCE Cultural Forum opens in  
Budapest  
US-Soviet expert meeting on  
Central America (tent)

Bilateral grain consultations in Washington

USSR Acts

End of Soviet INF moratorium

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45  
~~SECRET~~

23 AUGUST 1985  
PAGE 04

GENEVA

November 3 - 9

November 10 - 16

November 17 - 23

Presidential and SecState Activities

Briefing Lunch with Soviet  
Experts

NSC: Gorbachev Meeting  
Briefings of the President  
Pre-Gorbachev Meeting Radio Address

Meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva  
Travel to Geneva  
First Lady's Program

Defense Issues

Third Round of Geneva Talks Ends

Interim Restraint Report

Public Diplomacy

EPA Administrator Thomas in  
Moscow for Joint Commission of the  
Environment

Codets

Consultations w/Allies

Presidential letter to key Allies

Bilaterals

USSR ACTS

Revolution Day

~~SECRET~~

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~

August 23, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Papers on the Soviet Union

Attached at TABs A, B and C are three papers dealing with important internal problems in the Soviet Union. Two were drafted at State and one at the CIA. I believe that they are concise, accurate and readable.

The next group of papers will deal with the Soviet regime's instruments of control.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve \_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A "USSR: A Society in Trouble"  
 Tab B "Dissent in the USSR"  
 Tab C "The Soviet Union's Nationality Problem"

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Background Reading on the Soviet Union:  
Internal Problems

Though Gorbachev has been more active than his predecessors in pushing the Soviet foreign policy line in the media, his pre-occupation is probably with consolidating his own power and in tackling the burgeoning internal problems which afflict Soviet society and the communist system.

Attached are three papers which deal with the more important of these problems: the growing malaise in Soviet society, the significance of dissidence and religion, and the implications of having to rule an empire made up of many nationalities.

In reading the paper on Soviet nationalities, it is important to bear in mind that non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union are quite different from the ethnic groups in our own society. Most live in their ancestral territory and continue to speak languages other than Russian as their first tongue. There has been very little "melting pot" effect, although many speak or understand Russian as a second language. Almost all are proud of their own national language, culture and heritage and are determined to preserve it in the face of persistent pressures to become more Russian.

I believe these papers will give you some insight into some of the problems Gorbachev will have on his mind -- but will avoid mentioning -- when he meets with you in November. Certainly, he must take them into account as he makes foreign policy decisions.

Attachments:

- Tab A "USSR: A Society in Trouble"
- Tab B "Dissent in the USSR"
- Tab C "The Soviet Union's Nationality Problem"

Prepared by:  
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #7720

BY OW NARA DATE 10/30/07

BY Cid NARA DATE 10/30/07USSR: A SOCIETY IN TROUBLE

Western observers have always been struck by the peculiarly Russian combination of extraordinary political stability amidst appalling social conditions. In any other country, such conditions might be expected to breed constant revolution. In Russia, it took a century of political unrest, capped by four years of devastating war, to bring on the 1917 cataclysm. The authorities there have traditionally been able to maintain control, because they were dealing with a generally passive population. Economic development and the rise of mass education may have made the job more difficult in recent years, but the control mechanisms are as effective as ever. The enormous problems of Soviet society--problems now perhaps greater in extent than at any time in Russian history--still present the regime with an administrative challenge rather than a political one.

Among the intractable and potentially destabilizing social problems plaguing the Soviet scene are:

- rising rates of alcoholism among all major population groups;
- rising mortality rates among children and adult males;
- ever greater incidence of crime and corruption countrywide;
- an obvious decline in the availability and quality of basic public services and consumer goods; and
- a generalized sense that the Soviet regime is no longer capable of meeting the expectations it has generated in the population.

Some of these problems reflect particular cultural traditions; others are part and parcel of the Soviet system. Still others represent the unintended consequences of specific Moscow policies. Each one of them feeds on and reinforces every other, however. Together they have produced in the Soviet population a deep malaise, a sense that not only has something gone profoundly wrong in recent years but that there is little chance it will be put right any time soon.

Alcoholism

Drinking to excess is part of the Russian national tradition, but in recent years the rates of alcohol consumption have risen to unprecedented levels. Last year, Soviet statistics show that the

USSR's citizens spent 10 percent of their incomes on alcoholic beverages, and more than one in eight spent at least one night in a sobering-up station. The Soviet Union as a whole does not lead the world in alcoholism, but it is clearly among the leaders, and the domestic impact is worse than the statistics suggest. Alcoholism in the USSR is more concentrated, with the worst drinking confined to the Slavic regions--the Muslim nationalities have much lower, albeit rising, rates. The Slavic groups thus may have the highest rate of alcohol consumption in the world. Furthermore, the Slavic pattern is binge drinking, drinking to get drunk and lose consciousness. As a result, most of the alcohol consumed is high proof vodka rather than beer and wine.

The consequences both immediately and long term are staggering in terms of lowered industrial productivity and increased accidents at the workplace. Death rates among adult males have jumped, and their life expectancy has dropped. And because women are drinking more, alcoholism has also contributed to a substantial rise in infant mortality through premature births and malnutrition of some children. Such rates of alcohol consumption are expected to lead to other forms of social degeneration, if they persist.

The very blatancy of the problem has frequently led Russian governments, both Imperial and Soviet, to counterattack, but none has had any lasting success. Indeed, many of the campaigns against alcoholism have proven counterproductive; Gorbachev's current effort is unlikely to prove any different. Alcohol is after all very much part of the national tradition, and therefore extraordinarily difficult to root out. And Russians have always shown themselves adept at finding alternative sources of alcohol or resorting to home brew should official supplies be cut off. One classic Soviet novel features an apparently typical worker who will drink anything from lighter fluid to antifreeze when regular liquor is not available. Moreover, depriving Russians of alcohol--the chief form of recreation for many--could lead to domestic restlessness and would certainly reduce state income from vodka sales. These last calculations usually have been decisive with Russian officialdom over the years.

Demographic Disasters

Since the revolution, the USSR has suffered a series of well-known demographic disasters--the world wars, revolution, the Civil War, Stalin's collectivization--but by the 1970s their impact was generally smoothing out. Two new trends have appeared recently, however: a sharply higher rate of infant mortality and an increase in deaths among males in their prime working years. Both are unprecedented in size for modern societies during peacetime and call into question the Soviet claim that the USSR is an advanced modern country.

Soviet infant mortality, Western estimates suggest, has risen 30 to 50 percent over the last 15 years. It now stands at three times the rate in the United States and at a level equal to that of the most advanced third world countries. The situation is so embarrassing that the Soviets stopped publishing statistics on this question in 1975. (A recent crack in this ban--in a republic medical journal from Central Asia--states that mortality among children in Tajikistan has risen 38.3 percent since 1970, well within Western estimates.) These high rates reflect the large number of abortions used by Soviet women for birth control (currently six to nine abortions per woman), alcoholism and inadequate diet among pregnant mothers, poor medical services, pollution, and the poor quality of the baby formulas which must be used because most Soviet mothers are forced to return to work soon after giving birth. As a result, both the size and quality of future generations are affected; the next generation faces serious medical and educational problems; and observers have every reason to question Soviet claims that in the USSR "children are the only privileged class." The obvious cures nevertheless seem to be beyond the interests and resources of the Soviet government.

The rising death rates among adult males are equally striking. Over the last 15 years, the life expectancy of Soviet males at birth has apparently dropped to only 56 years, the sharpest decline in any modern society ever, and one that cuts into the working life of most Soviet men, thus reducing the size of the labor pool. The current high levels reflect industrial accidents, chronic diseases, inadequate diet and medical services, pollution, and alcohol consumption. The most recent increases, however, appear traceable to alcoholism alone, a pattern that gives special urgency to Gorbachev's campaign.

### Crime and Corruption

Crime of all kinds afflicts the Soviet Union, but corruption is a structural feature of the system, absolutely essential for its operation in its current form, since prices do not reconcile demand and supply for the goods and services that people want. Official prices are set artificially low for political reasons; shortages are endemic, so access to goods and services is determined by other means. Since many Soviet citizens have more money than access to goods, the cash is used to obtain things "on the side," a pattern which has led to the creation of an enormous second economy.

Furthermore, the planning process which encompasses virtually all spheres of activity encourages another form of corruption, both when targets are set and when efforts to meet them are made--be these targets the average grade of a particular school class or the levels of factory output. Every person seeks to make

his plan as easy to meet as possible in order to assure his bonus. As there is no impersonal market mechanism to set these plan targets, they are determined by other means, including corrupt ones. And since the authorities view plan fulfillment as more important than legal niceties, they tend to "overlook" illegalities which produce the results they want.

Finally, all Soviet citizens are conditioned to participate in ideological deception and self-deception, to say and do things they know to be false. Enormous cynicism results, a form of corruption more corrosive and less susceptible to correction than any other.

Every Soviet citizen is thus trapped either as a direct participant in corruption, or as an observer who must report what he sees or choose to remain silent about illegalities. All the alternatives contribute to public demoralization.

Little of this is likely to change. Prices set to clear the market would rise to levels that would make existing shortages even more blatant. Plans set by market forces would erode or destroy the role and power of the party. And if ideological deceptions were eliminated, the Soviet Union would cease to be the Soviet Union: no party leader is likely to want to commit suicide.

#### Declines in Public Services

The abysmal quality of goods and services available to the public in the USSR is legendary. The Soviet system has always underfulfilled plans for consumer goods; shortages are endemic and appear to have gone from bad to worse recently. Perhaps the clearest picture of the situation is provided by a single Soviet statistic: between 1979 and 1984, the number of hours spent by Soviet citizens to acquire consumer goods rose from 180 billion hours a year to 275 billion, 35 billion hours more than Soviet citizens spend at the workplace. Most of this extra time is spent by women waiting in line for basic foodstuffs. Indeed, Soviet sociologists report that Soviet women now spend 40 hours a week at the job and another 40 hours a week making purchases and doing the housework.

The remedy would require an enormous investment of funds and a willingness to change the system. Neither is in large supply in Moscow.

#### Unrealized Expectations

Perhaps the greatest problem, and certainly the one which has thrown the others into relief is the currently widening gap between popular expectations and the capacity of the regime to

meet them. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the Soviet people experienced a growth in real income averaging more than 3 percent annually. Soviet citizens could reasonably expect some upward mobility both for themselves and their children. And because of the special experience of World War II, they generally shared the values of the ruling elite and accepted the explanation that remaining difficulties were traceable to the war. Recent developments have called all this into question. The Soviet economy is stagnating. Opportunities for upward mobility are fewer, thus freezing existing class distinctions. Demographic developments have placed severe constraints on the regime's ability to push economic development as it has in the past by increasing labor inputs. And both mass and elite groups are acquiring a broader and more divergent set of values. Despite heavy jamming, nearly one Soviet adult in six now listens to foreign radio broadcasts at least once a week, and many are willing to discuss and criticize domestic Soviet policies now that the costs of doing so have declined.

The impact of economic stagnation is particularly great. For many Soviet citizens, it calls into question the implicit social contract established after the death of Stalin which linked popular support for the regime with the regime's ability to deliver the goods. Further, it has reduced the regime's ability to use material incentives to drive the workforce. As a result, the authorities are forced to rely more on ideological ones--typically less effective--and may be compelled to turn again to coercive ones in the future, even though the latter would probably be less productive now than they were in the past. This stagnation has also contributed to the expansion of blackmarketeering and other forms of corruption. Once again, the obvious remedies are either unwelcome or impossible, a fact that both Soviet citizens and their leaders recognize.

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Even taken together, these problems do not now threaten the stability of the Soviet system. Nor have they led to the crystallization of an active opposition. Instead, they have produced an alienated society, something which may prove more difficult for the regime to control than is the relatively small dissident movement. In the near future, the most obvious impact of these problems will be to force the regime to devote greater resources to its control mechanisms in order to insulate both itself and its goals from these popular attitudes. Over the longer haul, their impact may prompt a Soviet leader to seek major reforms, but at every point he will be frustrated by powerful groups which have a stake in the status quo, even though that status quo has locked Soviet society into a dissatisfied, cynical, and aimless present.



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Dissent in the USSR

Dissidents are individuals who publicly protest regime actions or express ideas that the regime finds contrary to its interests. They do not constitute an organized opposition seeking political power. Intellectual dissidents involved in the human rights movement challenge the regime in the realm of ideas but not in the realm of politics, at least not so far. Other forms of dissent--the emigration movement, religion--basically represent attempts to escape authority rather than to change the system.

Intellectual Dissent

Intellectual dissent began in the early 1960s, when Khrushchev's move toward destalinization gave rise to false expectations of a wider internal liberalization. Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 represented the victory of conservative reaction within the Soviet leadership; repression of dissent increased, especially intensifying after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Human rights dissent revived on a smaller scale in the mid-1970s, when detente and the signing of the CSCE Accords once again stimulated hopes that strictures on basic human rights would be relaxed. Instead, the Kremlin moved forcefully against the small groups that were attempting to publicize regime violations of the CSCE human rights provisions. Today the human rights movement is at a low ebb and Sakharov, its most prominent and articulate representative, is isolated in the provincial city of Gorky.

Although these human rights dissidents are well known in the West, they command little support in the USSR itself. Many people see them as a self-interested, unpatriotic lot that serve the purposes of Western intelligence services. The regime has had considerable success in exploiting popular anti-

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Semitic feelings as a weapon against the dissidents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] groups such as the CSCE monitoring group are commonly viewed as little more than devices for Jews wanting to leave the country. Sakharov is something of an exception. In some intellectual circles his confinement in Gorky is referred to as "Lenin in exile" and USIA interviewing of large numbers of Westerners who have had contact with Soviet cultural figures revealed that most Soviet artists admired him as a noble figure.

More influential than the human rights dissidents are a group of intellectual writers who have a strongly nationalist orientation. While taking care to avoid criticizing the regime directly, they call for a moral regeneration of Russia on the basis of traditional values and Russian Orthodoxy--much as Solzhenitsyn does. These nationalist writers reportedly have become cultural heroes who articulate the discontent of large numbers of people with the Soviet system as a whole.

Also influential are the growing number of cultural figures who have emigrated--such as the prominent writer Vladimov, who left in 1983, and the avant garde theater director Liubimov, who departed in 1984. Many intellectuals remaining in the USSR have become "inner emigres" who follow the affairs and writings of the emigre community with great interest through the medium of Western radio broadcasting. This has in effect created an alternative Russian cultural center that many Soviet intellectuals find more vigorous and appealing than the stultifying official Soviet culture. The renewal of jamming of Radio Liberty has reduced the access of Soviet intellectuals to news from the emigre community, but some broadcasting still gets through.

Soviet leaders appear keenly concerned that the ideas of the small group of active dissidents could have resonance within the intelligentsia as a


whole. Their public statements suggest they are worried about the political reliability of the intelligentsia, and [REDACTED] apprehension that the popularity of the nationalist writers could turn Russian national feeling into anti-regime channels. Above all, the leadership probably fears that conservative Russian nationalism appeals even to many elites—perhaps especially within the military—who are concerned that the party has become too effete and corrupt to rule the country effectively.

[REDACTED] some leaders fear that popular grievances over living conditions could converge with the protests of intellectual dissidents about human rights abuses. As early as 1977, for example, during a period of tight food supplies, [REDACTED] Soviet leaders were "acutely aware" of countrywide criticism of food shortages, and that the leadership feared easing restrictions on dissidents could abet a trend of criticism in the country and create an "explosive" climate. Since the late Brezhnev years,

[REDACTED] concern within the elite that unrest could become widespread. Events in Poland probably increased leadership sensitivities about the possibility of coordination between Soviet intellectual dissidents and worker dissidents—who since the late 1970s have made several attempts to organize unofficial trade unions. There has in fact been little such cooperation to date.

### Religion

By far the most dramatic development in Soviet dissent in recent years has been the extraordinary burgeoning of religion. The most important reason for this phenomenon seems to be simply that many citizens are seeking spiritual refuge from what they see as the drabness and moral emptiness of contemporary Soviet life. The growth of religion is of concern to Soviet authorities for several reasons:

- In many areas religion reinforces anti-Russian nationalism. In Lithuania and the western part of Ukraine, where probably a majority of the population is Catholic, the church has historically been associated with strivings for independence from Russia. Similarly, in Soviet Central Asia the Islamic religion has provided a rallying point for those resisting Russian domination--as, for example, during the Basmachi revolt of the 1920s, which took many years for the regime to suppress.
  
- Unlike intellectual dissent, religion has a mass base even in Russian areas. Protestant fundamentalism is growing in newly industrialized areas of the Russian republic, and Russian Orthodoxy is attracting adherents in the older cities of the Russian heartland.
  
- Increasingly, religion cuts across class and generational lines. Religion is growing among blue collar workers as well as among the educated classes. And, for the first time since 1917, religion is attracting large numbers of Russian youth. Andropov  complained in 1982 that many Soviet young people were turning to religion as a way of expressing dissent.
  
- Religion opens the door to external influences. The election of a Slavic Pope served as a stimulus to religious activity in the Western borderlands of the USSR, where the Catholic clergy has long maintained clandestine ties with the church hierarchy in Poland. The resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East, and the war in

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Afghanistan, have raised Muslim consciousness in Soviet Central Asia, leading to several incidents of unrest there.

Most religious believers in the USSR are members of "registered" or "official" churches who abide by the regime's strictures on religious activity--such as the ban on proselytizing and on religious instruction for children--in exchange for being allowed to worship in peace. Clergy for these churches must be approved by the regime and some of them serve as propagandists for regime policy--using their sermons to preach the party line regarding foreign policy, for example. The regime attempts to use these official churches to keep the activities of religious believers under close surveillance and supervision. It especially uses the official Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of imperialism, by giving it special privileges (more Bibles, more church buildings) to enable it to lure believers away from churches associated with anti-Russian nationalism.

Similarly, the regime exploits the visits of well-intentioned foreign religious leaders such as Billy Graham. Such visits assist the regime in publicizing the existence of "religious freedom" in the USSR. And, by allowing visiting ministers to preach at official churches but not to outlawed congregations, the regime enlists their tacit sanction for the official churches as the "legitimate" ones. Despite the fact that the regime attempts to use the official churches for its own purposes, however, the growing numbers worshipping in these churches testifies to the failure of Marxist ideology in competing with old-fashioned religion for the "hearts and minds" of the Soviet population.

More significantly, the number of unofficial congregations of all faiths appears to be increasing. Many of these groups have developed clandestine

communications networks that enable them to collect thousands of signatures on a country-wide basis for petitions, and regularly to publish illegal literature (samizdat).

- In Ukraine a semi-secret Catholic church organization [REDACTED] has as many as 350 priests conducting services illegally. Since the summer of 1984, ten issues of a new samizdat "Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church" have appeared.
  
- In Lithuania, a Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights has been active in petitioning for an end to repressive legislation against religion. The "Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church," which first appeared in 1972, remains one of the most vigorous samizdat journals in the country.
  
- The unregistered Protestant sects--especially the Baptists and Pentecostals--are attracting large numbers of rural, factory and white collar workers throughout the country. Many of these groups are zealous to the point of being fanatic in protesting such regime measures as "accidental" burnings of churches and forcible removals of children from parents' homes to prevent their receiving a religious upbringing. They respond to repression by engaging in mass civil disobedience --such as burning internal passports and resisting induction into the military. One isolated Far Eastern village is virtually at war with the regime. It has engaged in continuing protests for several years, including four community hunger strikes. Thousands of Pentecostals continue to apply for emigration visas



despite the regime's absolute refusal to grant them. With the assistance of some registered Baptist congregations, the unofficial Baptists publish three samizdat journals, one of which is printed in a thousand copies monthly.

-- [REDACTED] in Muslim areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus a fully developed underground religious structure exists. [REDACTED] illegal seminaries are educating mullahs who teach Islam to children in unofficial mosques. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] expressed concern that Soviet Central Asians are demanding more power for the Muslim clergy at the expense of the party.

Regime Repression

During the 1980s the regime has resorted to harsher repression of dissent than it has employed since Stalin's day. 1979 was a watershed year. With the invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet leaders became less concerned to avoid antagonizing Western leaders and public opinion. With the outbreak of unrest in Poland, they became more concerned to crack down on dissent inside the USSR itself.

In 1982 the regime tightened the screws even more. The intensification of repression coincided with the political ascendancy of Andropov, and there has been no let-up under Gorbachev. The crackdown on dissent is consistent with his overall effort to shore up discipline, reassert party control in various areas of life, increase ideological purity, and heighten vigilance against "alien" ideas. The current head of the KGB, Chebrikov, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been in the forefront of those taking a hard line against dissent. Chebrikov was previously head of the KGB

directorates responsible for internal security and has been actively involved in supervising repression of dissent. For example, he was responsible for handling the Solzhenitsyn case.

Since 1979 several new tactics have been employed: the arrest of dissidents on various false criminal rather than political charges; planting drugs and other incriminating evidence in the residences of dissidents to provide the basis for such charges; the resentencing on trumped-up charges of dissidents already serving terms to prevent their release on schedule; increased confinement in psychiatric hospitals; increased harassment of foreign contacts of dissidents and other actions designed to curtail dissident communication with foreigners, such as changing the legal code to broaden the definition of what constitutes a "state secret," which would make it easier to bring treason charges against dissidents who talk to foreigners; inducting dissidents into the military; increased use of violence both against political prisoners and against dissidents still "at large."

Regime brutality has intimidated many dissidents into a complete cessation of activity, but others have merely been driven underground. Some of these--seeing no prospect for change within the system, having no dreams for the future, and disillusioned about the effectiveness of Western support--are advocating more radical tactics of protest, such as the formation of opposition groups with political action programs. Last year several dissidents were arrested for setting up a Social Democratic Party that called for a multi-party democracy. Other dissidents report a "kamikaze" attitude among some embittered youth, a tendency to glorify personal sacrifices made for the sake of the cause. A spirit of despair and a readiness to become martyrs is even more pronounced in some Christian communities--especially the persecuted Pentecostals, Baptists and Ukrainian Catholics, who seem to take

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the view that they have "nothing to lose but their chains." At the same time, with the door to emigration all but closed for Soviet Jews, many of them have also become bolder and more active in pressing for cultural freedoms for Jews inside the USSR.

Over the past several years there have been a few reports of terrorist incidents in the USSR. There have also been a few reports that guns are now available on the black market in Tula, a center for the manufacture of small arms, and that this has been a source of concern within the KGB. In an environment of harsh repression, the possibility cannot be discounted that opposition to the regime might assume more violent forms—especially in areas such as Ukraine that have traditions of armed resistance to Russian rule.

Thus, the Gorbachev leadership confronts a dissident community that is small (except for the religious believers) and demoralized. But a new breed of dissident may be developing that is more hardened, more inclined to engage in extreme forms of protest, and in this sense perhaps more of a problem for the regime.

#### At the Summit

Soviet leaders probably really do believe that what they do inside their own country is none of our business. They certainly believe that the adversary's internal problems are fair game for propagandists, but probably take the view that injecting criticism of internal policy into high diplomacy is nothing more than a cheap political maneuver.

It is true that for a time in the 1970s, the Soviets were responsive to US overtures on behalf of dissidents, especially with regard to Jewish emigration. But the internal repercussions of detente policies have given many Soviet leaders second thoughts, creating a political climate that is not conducive to internal liberalization. Jewish emigration stirred up other

disaffected minorities who wanted to leave. The departure of prominent intellectuals to the West served as a magnet for those left behind. More generally, in the view of many Soviet officials, the increase in contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the 1970s had a negative effect on the attitudes and behavior of the population. [REDACTED] in 1982, for example, that middle and senior level party officials believed that the economic benefits of detente had been bought at a dangerous political price and that the USSR must now protect itself from being "swamped" by Western ideas by cutting back on social, cultural and political contact with the West.

The US sanctions following the invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland also had an effect on the psychology of Soviet officials. Gorbachev himself has seemed especially concerned to avoid becoming vulnerable to US pressure of any sort.

With these practical and psychological factors at work, Gorbachev will probably be extremely unreceptive to appeals on behalf of dissidents. The incentives would have to be powerful for him to consider "concessions" in this area. In any event, any major decision--such as a decision to allow Sakharov to return to Moscow--would probably require consultation with other Politburo members. The Politburo has been involved in past decisions about prominent dissidents and emigres--such as Rostropovich--and sometimes there has been disagreement within the leadership over how to handle particular cases.

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THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONALITY PROBLEM

The Soviet Union is the most ethnically diverse country in the world. It has more than 130 national groups each with its own language, culture and attitudes. Often these affect Moscow's ability to implement its domestic policies and at a minimum require the Soviet authorities to maintain a tighter control on the population than would otherwise be the case. These problems are compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union is the only major country in which the dominant nationality--in this case, the Russians--forms only a bare majority of the population and may soon become a minority. Up to now, Moscow has been able to cope with this situation through a combination of ideological and organizational measures and an often displayed willingness to use force against any opposition.

The Ethnic Mosaic

The USSR is a veritable ethnic museum housing more than 130 different, often exotic groups. They range from small reindeer-herding tribes in Siberia with no written language or independent political tradition to ancient Islamic civilizations in Central Asia to large, modern industrial societies in the Baltic region which were independent countries until World War II. While each is, of course, important to its members, most are politically irrelevant: The smallest 100 nationalities make up less than 2% of the total population. Indeed, their current prominence in the Soviet federal system reflects Moscow's long-term policy of divide-and-rule, of preventing the formation of large communities by sponsoring small ones. The larger nationalities that do matter can be divided into five major ethnographic groups:

(1). The Russians. Now forming 52% of the population, the Russians are the traditional core of the state. They dominate its central apparatus and military and determine both the political culture and official language of the country. They have paid a heavy economic price to maintain their dominance, enjoyed few benefits from their possessions, and are now in demographic decline. Indeed, sometime within the next decade, their low birthrates and high death rates when combined with the high birthrates among Central Asian Muslims will make them a minority in their own country. In an authoritarian political system, this shift will not have any immediate political consequences; but it has already had the psychological effect of giving many Russians a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the future.

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(2). Other Slavs. The Ukrainians (16% of the population) and Belorussians (4%) are culturally similar to the slavic Russians. When these three nationalities stand together--and it is an arrangement Moscow has long sought to promote--they form 72% of the total, a healthy majority unlikely to be challenged for several hundred years. But on many issues--including russification and economic development--these groups find themselves in conflict, a pattern that suggests any Slavic brotherhood may contain as much hostility as agreement.

(3). The Muslim Nationalities. Now forming 18% of the total population, the historically Islamic peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus are culturally, linguistically, and racially distinct from the slavic majority. In addition, they represent the fastest growing segment of the Soviet populace: In Turkmenistan, for example, one woman in six has at least 10 children. Because of their rapid growth, they form an increasing share of military draftees--now more than 30%--and of new entrants to the workforce--up to 50% by the mid-1990s.

(4). The Christian Caucasus. The ancient Christian nations of Georgia and Armenia together form 3% of the population. While each is culturally distinct and has enjoyed independence in the past, both are more than usually loyal to the Soviet system and enjoy special privileges. The Armenians see Moscow as their protector against Turkey, and both enjoy access to the large official and black markets of the USSR. Because of their churches and emigre communities abroad, both play a role in Soviet foreign policy. Perhaps for this reason, they both have been able to retain their distinctive alphabets--the only other nations who have are the Baltic states who were incorporated into the Soviet Union only at the end of World War II--and to defend many of their specific national traditions.

(5). The Baltic Republics. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the most passionately anti-Soviet and anti-Russian regions of the Soviet Union; but forming only 3% of the population, they have seldom been in a position to act on their feelings. As one Moscow official is reputed to have told a Baltic communist in the late 1940s, Soviet nationality policy in that region consists in having enough boxcars ready--a reference to the brutal mass deportations which followed the Soviet annexation in 1945. These three republics are the most European in the USSR and enjoy a standard of living far higher than the Russians do. At the same time, they feel profoundly threatened by the influx of slavs into their homelands and by the ongoing russification of their local institutions.

These nationalities, like most others, have their own Soviet-created national territories in which they have at least some cultural and political institutions in their native

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languages. Indeed, that is the essence of Soviet federalism. But nearly one Soviet in five--some 55 million people--lives outside his national home. The Russians have no real problem because there are Russian-language institutions virtually everywhere. For the other, however, native-language institutions do not exist outside their national territories; and many of them find themselves victims of discrimination and are being forcibly assimilated.

### The Major Problems

There are a number of major issues in which the multinational aspect of the population plays an especially important role.

Regional Development. Any movement of labor and capital in a large multinational state tends to become invested with ethnic meaning or to be limited by ethnic considerations. The Soviet Union is no exception. Central Asians in the Soviet "sunbelt," for example, are very reluctant to move to the industrial heartland which is located in the less hospitable north; and Russians are reluctant to send capital away from their own "rustbelt" to build factories in Central Asia--where most of the new labor is to be found. Consequently, Moscow is forced to choose between economically rational development strategies which would exacerbate ethnic feelings (be it by changing investment patterns or forcing movement of workers) and an ethnically responsive ones which result in slower economic growth.

Military Staffing. An increasing fraction of new draftees for the Soviet Army come from Central Asia, and many of them do not know Russian well. As a result, the Soviet military has been forced to spend an increasing amount of time teaching such recruits Russian, the language of command; and the Central Asian soldiers have their national sensitivities heightened by the experience. To date, the army has been able to cope; but Soviet generals often complain about the poor quality of soldiers they get from non-Russian areas. As the percentage of such soldiers rises, this problem too may become worse.

Russification. Every country needs a lingua franca, a language in which everyone can do business. In the Soviet Union, that language is for historical and political reasons Russian. For many nationalities, learning Russian poses no threat to national identity; indeed, it may even heighten it by bringing individuals into contact with other groups. In other cases, however, language is central to identity; and any suggestion that another language should be acquired is seen as a threat to national existence. In Georgia, for instance, people rioted at the mere suggestion that Russian should be

legally equal to Georgian in that republic. Clearly, some Soviet officials believe that learning Russian is the first step toward the assimilation of non-Russians into the Russian nation; but more and more they are recognizing that a knowledge of that language may have exactly the opposite effect.

Combatting Foreign Influence. The Soviet government has always tried to seal off its population from any foreign influence. For both geographic and political reasons, this effort has been least successful in the non-Russian periphery of the country. Central Asian Muslims are very much aware of what is going on elsewhere in the Muslim world; and the Baltic peoples look to Poland and the West more often than to Moscow. As a result, many Russian officials in Moscow view these groups as virtual Trojan horses for foreign influences, an attitude that reinforces what for many are natural prejudices.

Dissent in the Non-Russian Areas. Dissent there is very different from that at the center. It is generally hidden from foreign view. It has the potential for violent massive protest because it has deeper roots in the local population. And, under certain conditions, it may even enjoy a certain sympathy with and hence protection from local officials who may also oppose Moscow's line. As a result, Moscow's ability to suppress dissent is somewhat limited--especially in regions such as Georgia and Estonia where the local language is virtually inaccessible to Russians on the scene.

#### Prospects for the Future

The Soviet Union is likely to face increasing national problems in the future. Economic progress has meant that more Russians and non-Russians are coming into direct competition, often for the first time, while the recent slowing of economic growth means that there is a smaller pie to be divided among groups that are growing at very different rates. And the federal structures originally created to be symbolic of national rights are acquiring defenders and becoming ever more real. In the past, Moscow has been able to manage through a combination of guile and force. In the near term, that is likely to be enough. But over the longer haul, these nationality-based tensions may weaken the Soviet system or prompt its leaders to return to a more harshly coercive policy.

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