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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1985 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1101

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7699	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7708	LETTER	SHULTZ TO SHEVARDNADZE RE HELSINKI <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	ND	B1
7700	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT REAGAN LETTER <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7709	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7710	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7709 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7711	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7709 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7712	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7708 <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	ND	B1
7701	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM BALDRIGE <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	8/12/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with re... contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1985 (4/6)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 11

YARHI-MILO

1101

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7702	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE BALDRIGE IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	ND	B1
7703	LETTER	BALDRIGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GORBACHEV MEETING	2	8/8/1985	B1
7704	COVER LETTER	KRAEMER/LINHARD TO MCFARLANE RE NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	2	8/13/1985	B1
7705	MEMO	US NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	3	8/13/1985	B1
7706	NSDD	NSDD 81 NEGOTIATION OF IMPROVED NUCLEAR TEST VERIFICATION MEASURES R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	2	2/7/1983	B1
7707	NSDD	NSDD 63 NEGOTIATION OF IMPROVED NUCLEAR TEST VERIFICATION MEASURES R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	2	10/28/1982	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

JHC

6325

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

File

ACTION

August 9, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: PAULA J. DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Presidential Proclamation of August 1985 as
Polish American Heritage Month/SJR-106

I have reviewed and revised the draft proclamation for Polish American Heritage Month, 1985. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Anne Higgins forwarding the proclamation with our changes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Anne Higgins at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Jack ^{JM} Matlock, Chris ^{CL} Lehman, and Ron ^{RS} Sable concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Higgins
- Tab A Proposed Proclamation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Presidential Proclamation of August 1985 as
Polish American Heritage Month/SJR-106

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed Proclamation -- as amended -- which designates August 1985 as "Polish American Heritage Month."

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Proclamation

POLISH AMERICAN HERITAGE MONTH, 1985

- - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Americans of Polish descent have made, and continue to make, enormous contributions to the culture, economy, and democratic political system of the United States. The names of Tadeusz Kosciuszko and Kazimierz Pulaski, heroes of the American Revolution, have left a lasting imprint upon our history. Highways, bridges, and towns dedicated to the preservation of their memory dot our countryside. The dedication of Polish Americans from all walks of life to the ideals of freedom and independence, which Kosciuszko and Pulaski fought for in America and in Poland, and which their worthy successors within the Solidarity movement are struggling for in Poland today, serves as a model for all Americans. That struggle remains alive today and two Polish leaders of international stature -- Pope John Paul II and Lech Walesa -- provide inspiring examples of moral leadership for all of us.

The first massive wave of

economic

Polish immigrants ~~first~~ came to America to flee the *political and* oppression thrust upon their homeland by the 19th century imperial powers of Eastern and Central Europe. While they came with few material possessions, they brought something much more important -- a deep faith in God and a determination to succeed in this land of opportunity. And succeed they did. They established churches, schools, and fraternal benefit societies. They worked hard in the mines, steel mills, and stockyards. They understood the importance of education, so that today, the children and grandchildren of the first immigrants can be found in America's leading businesses and educational institutions.

Yet despite finding success in America, Polish Americans continue to carry a special concern for the land of their heritage.

8/10/85

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CAS 6/18/02

EYES ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: RCM
FROM: JACK MATLOCK

Personal + notional

This is a draft that Ros and Allen Holmes worked out for Sec Shultz to look at. They do not yet have a reaction to it - but it is possible Shultz will talk to you about it.

I personally have no major problem with the positions taken, but am not sure that tactically this is the best means to broach the issues. It may be premature to go on record in writing with the authority of the SecState. I would be more comfortable if we could develop a better "feel" for what the Soviets are after in the testing area - and for this unofficial discussion could perhaps be helpful -
Jack

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DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NLRR F06-114/3 #7699

DECL: OADR

BY CU NARA DATE 10/30/67

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

8/9 Personal + notional

Mr. Minister:

It was a pleasure to meet you in Helsinki. As I reviewed the tone and substance of our meeting and carefully examined my notes, I am convinced that we both have a responsibility to do what we can to improve relations between our two governments. It is appropriate that we begin with the tasks facing us in the months ahead -- especially those relating to the forthcoming meeting in Geneva. I agree that the time has come for us to get down to practical work.

I have noted with interest your assessment during our exchange that the Geneva meeting could produce either a maximum or a minimum outcome. Questions of arms control are indeed central to our relationship. We should explore the possibilities of an optimum result here before we settle for a minimum result. I have thus been searching my mind for areas we might explore -- and perhaps ultimately raise with our leaders for their Geneva meeting. In this letter, I would like to broach in general terms some possibilities for your consideration.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

NLRR FOI 11413 #7708

BY CIV NARA DATE 10/30/07

1

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

With respect to the Geneva negotiations, I must be frank in stating that I see little prospect of movement between now and November if the Soviet side is not able to go further than it has thus far in discussing specific targets for deep reductions in strategic armaments. I realize we have different formulas for accomplishing this goal. But I am convinced the basis exists for our negotiators to have detailed discussions in the forthcoming round on offensive reductions.

In the context of agreement on the scope and framework for specific, major cuts in the number and destructive power of offensive launchers and warheads, it might be possible for the United States to respond positively in Geneva to General Secretary Gorbachev's call for a joint reaffirmation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Clearly this is only possible if the next round of arms control talks in Geneva gets down to specifics. It also should be clear that in making an affirmation on the ABM Treaty, we could not accept any interpretations of the Treaty which would ban laboratory and other forms of research. This would be a totally unwarranted alteration of the document we both signed. Nor would we be able to reaffirm the Treaty in a manner which ignored our conclusion that the Soviet Union is not in compliance with its provisions. Within these parameters, however, I believe there may be grounds for fruitful discussion.

Our leaders also should explore in Geneva the overall

8

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

compliance issue. As you are aware, the United States is currently assessing the record of Soviet compliance with existing agreements as it seeks to determine what its future policy should be in this area. As we proceed, evidence of progress in resolving such major concerns as the Krasnoyarsk radar and Soviet encryption of telemetry would have an important bearing on our considerations and could provide the basis for progress in November.

Recent initiatives by both our countries have also brought the issue of nuclear testing to the fore. It seems sensible that we should take advantage of this momentum to the extent we can to see if there are possibilities for achieving genuine progress in this field and accommodating both sides' concerns. In the past, the Soviet Union has shown interest in moving beyond the TBT to reduce testing thresholds to even lower levels. As you know, our consideration of next steps on nuclear testing has been strongly influenced by our belief that existing monitoring capabilities on both sides are inadequate to ensure compliance. If the Soviet Union were willing to cooperate seriously with us to satisfy our concerns in this area, I am convinced it would be possible for us to move forward in bringing testing under better control.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Specifically, we would propose that US and Soviet technical personnel exchange visits to our respective testing sites following the November meeting to develop means of monitoring nuclear tests with greater confidence than currently exists. Were their efforts as successful as we feel they will be, we would be prepared to submit the TTBT and PNET to the Senate for ratification. At the same time, we would be prepared to join the Soviet Union in an announcement that the two sides would enter negotiations to seek a reduced threshold test ban treaty at the lowest possible level consistent with verifiability and security. If such a scenario were acceptable to you, we might develop language in the weeks ahead to which our leaders might refer in Geneva.

Finally, as I noted in Helsinki, I believe possibilities may exist for formal cooperation in stopping the proliferation of chemical weapons. As you are probably aware, the United States last year barred the export of chemical warfare precursors to Iran and Iraq. We hope in the near future to have a more complete list of such precursors, and would be willing to share it with the Soviet Union in the interest of facilitating joint steps to deal with this serious and growing problem. If you

10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-5-

feel the idea has merit, we would be prepared to have experts meet with appropriate Soviet representatives in Geneva to work out language our leaders might use when they meet on controlling the availability of chemical weapon precursors.

I realize that these are complex issues which will require careful consideration by you and your associates. There may be some in Moscow who will call into question our motives, or who will portray our concerns over the key question of verification as either propaganda or attempts at intelligence collection. That, however, is not the case. Our concerns about adequate and reasonable verification are real. For this reason, I ask you to give serious attention to our most recent proposals to you designed to address the problem. With their resolution on a mutually acceptable basis, the way will be open for us to move in a constructive direction when our leaders meet -- and beyond.

We will, of course, have the opportunity to discuss these issues in New York. In the interim, as I have suggested, we will be able to pursue them in greater detail in Geneva and in diplomatic channels, along with the regional, bilateral and

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-6-

other substantive questions that we touched on in Helsinki.

Let me take the opportunity in closing to reiterate that I am looking forward to working closely with you in the period ahead.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

3969M

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

EYES ONLY

NLRR Feb-114/3 #7700

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

TO: RCM

TO GORBACHEV

FROM: Jack Matlock

Following our exchange of
Prof's notes last weekend (attached),
I drafted the attached letter.

Bob Linhard has some concerns
with the proposal in the next-to-
last paragraph regarding implica-
tions for interagency management.

Clearly, if the President sends
such a letter, we should have
clearly in mind how we would
implement the suggestion if it is
accepted. I think Nitze is admirably
qualified to handle the "probe" - but
don't know whether in fact he is
up to speed on the subject - or how
he would react to the idea.

~~Whoever~~ Whomever does it should
probably go with just one - or at
most two - assistants/motetakers,
and to be maximally useful, the
contact should be so arranged as to be
(cover)

Mr. General Secretary, if Soviet goals are as they have been
described by Soviet spokesmen, it seems to me that they are not
inconsistent with United States goals. Therefore, if we adopt a
businesslike approach toward working out the practical aspects of
achieving these goals, we should be able to bridge our
differences.

At the same time, it seems clear that the public debate in
which our governments are currently engaged can hardly be
expected to lead us to a mutually acceptable solution. In fact,
public jockeying for propoganda advantage can only exacerbate
mistrust regarding the intentions of the other side.

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a secret one — certainly from the press and also from the bureaucracy.

The object would be not to negotiate but to probe to see whether there is a ball park we both can play in if we go official — and to gain better insight in what the Soviets are really after. I doubt that they want an end to testing. They clearly want a propaganda issue. But aside from that, there may be other things on their agenda for which they would pay an acceptable price — and also allow us to keep the high ground in the public eye.

Jack

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-11413 #7709

BY ON NARA DATE 10/30/07

14

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of July 29 addressed an issue of genuine importance and concern to both our countries -- nuclear testing. In previous exchanges with you and your predecessors I have sought to find ways to create the necessary conditions for progress on this issue. My latest proposals, conveyed in my letter of July 28, crossed with your letter of July 29, and I hope you have them under consideration.

I must confess that I learned of the immediate public announcement of your proposal for a moratorium on nuclear testing with regret and some surprise. The announcement was made at a juncture and in a fashion which seemed more appropriate to propaganda use than ~~■~~ a basis for serious negotiation. Coming in the wake of an apparent acceleration of the Soviet Union's own testing program, such handling understandably raised doubts in my mind as to the seriousness of your proposal, and compelled us to respond as we did.

Our negative reaction to your moratorium announcement, however, does not imply that we question the significance of nuclear testing as an issue. I fully recognize the desirability of progress in this area, both for its own sake and for the stimulus it might provide to other arms control negotiations -- especially our negotiations in Geneva.

As is the case in the Geneva negotiations, I am convinced that meaningful progress on nuclear testing will ultimately depend on our ability to resolve two principal sets of issues: verification and nuclear weapons reduction. Any meaningful nuclear testing regime will require a degree of confidence in our monitoring abilities beyond that now available to either of our countries. It also seems self-evident that the testing issue can be resolved most easily in an environment of diminishing stocks of nuclear weapons.

Mr. General Secretary, if Soviet goals are as they have been described by Soviet spokesmen, it seems to me that they are not inconsistent with United States goals. Therefore, if we adopt a businesslike approach toward working out the practical aspects of achieving these goals, we should be able to bridge our differences.

At the same time, it seems clear that the public debate in which our governments are currently engaged can hardly be expected to lead us to a mutually acceptable solution. In fact, public jockeying for propaganda advantage can only exacerbate mistrust regarding the intentions of the other side.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

15

In order to explore the feasibility of making progress on this crucial issue, I would suggest that we each name a representative to meet privately, unofficially and confidentially to discuss ways in which our differences might be bridged. If they are able to develop some promising ideas, these could be pursued formally and officially by our Foreign Ministers when they meet next month.

I will appreciate your reaction to this suggestion. If it is agreeable to you, I believe it might help us find a way to narrow our differences on this important issue.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7710

BY GL NARADATE 10/30/07

16

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

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Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7711

18

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BY CJ NARA DATE 10/30/87

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of July 29 addressed an issue of genuine importance and concern to both our countries -- nuclear testing. In previous exchanges with you and your predecessors I have sought to find ways to create the necessary conditions for progress on this issue. My latest proposals, conveyed in my letter of July 28, crossed with your letter of July 29, and I hope you have them under consideration.

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Sincerely,

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

8/9 Approval + notional

Mr. Minister:

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 60-714/3 # 7H12

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

21

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

With respect to the Geneva negotiations, I must be frank in stating that I see little prospect of movement between now and November if the Soviet side is not able to go further than it has thus far in discussing specific targets for deep reductions in strategic armaments. I realize we have different formulas for accomplishing this goal. But I am convinced the basis exists for our negotiators to have detailed discussions in the forthcoming round on offensive reductions.

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Our leaders also should explore in Geneva the overall

22

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

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-6-

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Let me take the opportunity in closing to reiterate that I am looking forward to working closely with you in the period ahead.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz

3969M

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Second Letter from Suzanne Massie

Suzanne Massie has sent another letter to the President (Tab B) following their recent telephone conversation. I believe the briefing memorandum for their September 3 meeting should be revised to reflect their most recent correspondence. To update the action, I have made the necessary revisions to Tab I (briefing memo) and Tab A (talking points) which are attached.

Jonathan Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the revised memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie, August 10, 1985
- Tab C Letter from Suzanne Massie, July 28, 1985

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

DATE: September 3, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss U.S.-Soviet relations prior to Suzanne's return to the Soviet Union, and inquire on the progress of her new book.

II. BACKGROUND

In response to her letter of July 28, you phoned and agreed to see Suzanne prior to her departure for the Soviet Union. Suzanne is currently writing a book on the Pavlovsk Palace in Leningrad.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President (at his discretion)
Chief of Staff Regan (at his discretion)
Robert C. McFarlane
Suzanne Massie
Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN

Private meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Informal open discussion.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Attachment:

- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Letter from Suzanne Massie, August 28, 1985
- Tab C Letter from Suzanne Massie, July 10, 1985

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING

WITH SUZANNE MASSIE

THE OVAL OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1985

9:45 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.

- Thank you so much for your letters and for sharing your thoughts on your trip to the Soviet Union earlier this spring.

- You know the Russians so well. What do you think I should bear in mind most as I get ready for my meeting with Gorbachev?

- The Soviets still seem more interested in playing propaganda games than in getting down to serious negotiation. Is there anything we can do to influence them to get serious?

- What do you think Gorbachev wants out of our meeting?

- I wish you a good trip and look forward to hearing your impressions when you return.

TALKING POINTS

-- THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR LETTERS AND FOR SHARING YOUR THOUGHTS ON YOUR TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION EARLIER THIS SPRING.

-- YOU KNOW THE RUSSIANS SO WELL. WHAT DO YOU THINK I SHOULD BEAR IN MIND MOST AS I GET READY FOR MY MEETING WITH GORBACHEV?

-- THE SOVIETS STILL SEEM MORE INTERESTED IN PLAYING PROPAGANDA GAMES THAN IN GETTING DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THEM TO GET SERIOUS.

-- WHAT DO YOU THINK GORBACHEV WANTS OUT OF OUR MEETING?

-- I WISH YOU A GOOD TRIP AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING YOUR IMPRESSIONS WHEN YOU RETURN.

Deer Isle, Maine 04627
August 10, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

You would have laughed had you seen my youngest daughter's face when she came in to get me as I was trying inexpertly to pound a forged iron lamp into a resistant log wall. " Mom," she said, a little ashen faced, "It's President Reagan!" I smiled and kept on pounding. " No," she said, " I'm not kidding. It is, really!"

It was indeed a wonderful unexpected surprise to hear your voice a few days ago, and how very kind it was of you to take the time to call me. Of course I hope you will make allowance for my being a bit startled, but I am sure that by now you are used to that effect you have on people.

What was best was to hear your voice so strong and well despite your recent operation. I was happy to hear that not only were you feeling better, but that you were even contemplating riding horseback!. Still, I hope that despite your extraordinarily rugged constitution and true grit, you will be careful.

As we discussed, I had a quite unusually productive trip to the Soviet Union this spring. I spent over two months there, returning only in mid-June, working on my book about the restoration of one of the palaces outside Leningrad. The saga of the Russian people's determination to rebuild their lost past despite the onslaughts of both Communism and Nazism is exciting -- a universal story that reflects on the marvelous capacity of human beings to dedicate themselves to ideals of spirituality and beauty despite all disasters.

While I was in the Soviet Union I was treated, as indeed I have always been treated by ordinary Russian citizens, with great hospitality and generosity. Because of the many and varied contacts I have built up there over so many years, I saw a broad spectrum of people both humble and mighty, and I believe I can say that few, if any foreigners, have recently been accorded such a broad arena of contact.

Quite unexpectedly, while I was in Leningrad, Mr. Gorbachev, to whom I had sent two of my books, responded with a cordial and personal message about my work. I have written him a letter of thanks and requested a meeting with him to discuss various matters pertaining to my new book.

Certainly there is a significant change in the atmosphere there at this time. Never, in the almost 20 years I have known the Soviet Union, have I seen anything quite like it. Of course it is far too soon to tell whether this movement and new expectations are only momentary or if they signify something more substantial and lasting. History dictates skepticism. I am still waiting to see whether Mr. Gorbachev is a patriot of his country or, as his predecessors have been, merely of the Party. Clearly the people long for a change. I heard a great deal of quite open griping. They have suffered so much and patiently endured for so long. It is time for a change, and I had no hesitation about telling that to every official I met and in no uncertain terms.


Given the Soviet propensity for often preferring to express themselves through private contacts, I was also treated to many hours of official conversation with varied spokesmen. Some of these were surprisingly candid, openly admitting problems and shortcomings and laying out an agenda. I kept precise notes of what was communicated to me by those spokesmen whom I knew were in a position to pass on official attitudes cleared at the highest levels. It is these commentaries which I think might be valuable to you at this time. If it could be useful to you, I would be happy to present some of these comments to you in a concise and organized form

and perhaps answer any specific questions you might have. If there any chance that your schedule might permit a brief meeting sometime during the first three weeks of September? I return to New York on September 3 and will be leaving for the Soviet Union on September 24 to continue my research as one of the scholars on our official exchange program with the Academy of Sciences, and will be returning only in early December.

And please let me say again that if, when I am in the Soviet Union I can do anything to help you, I would be happy and honored to serve you and our country with whatever talents and knowledge I have.

Just now, before I go back to the rigorous life in the USSR, I am reveling in these last golden days of summer. The Maine coast -- all jewel blue and green -- is splendid, one of the treasures of our magnificent country. I hope you will have a good rest in your beloved California. And thank you again for the deep pleasure you gave me by calling as you did.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan,

Sincerely,

 Suzanne Massie

p.s. As for TASS. Don't take their rantings and ravings too seriously. The Russians don't. To their credit, they resolutely maintain a lively affection and respect for our country despite all the Big Lies that are thrown at them every day.

Deer Isle, Maine 04627

July 28, 1985

BC

Dear Mr. President,

I know that you are and have been deluged with letters and I simply wanted to add my voice to the millions of Americans who prayed for you and are continuing to pray for your continued good health and strength.

Just now, I am on an isolated island in Maine living in the forest ten miles from the nearest town working on my book on Pavlovsk palace in Leningrad, I get news very rarely, I have no TV, no radio and get newspapers every ten days. It made me so happy to see the New York Times picture of you returning to the White House looking so cheerful and fit. How do you do it Superman? I know I couldn't. You are certainly an extraordinary example of American grit and courage for all of us.

So I just wanted to let you know that however isolated I am, I have thought of you so much these days and so have many, many people on Deer Isle. Stay better and get better and better and better. We need you.

With all best wishes,

Suzanne Massie
Suzanne Massie

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

*Bud - I called her.
She is going back to Russia
Sept. 23rd - said she'd like very
much to see me before she leaves.
I told her I'd like that too & that
I'm on*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

August 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Malcolm Baldrige

Mac Baldrige has sent the President a letter which conveys his impressions of Gorbachev, based on his meeting in May.

I agree in general with Baldrige's points. However, I believe that the real dilemma facing Gorbachev is not whether to shift resources from the military to the civilian sector, but whether he can afford to provide a greater than normal increment to military allocations without endangering the already precarious health of the total economy.

Roger *R* Robinson concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to the President from Secretary of Commerce
Malcolm Baldrige

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7701

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Malcolm Baldrige's Impressions of Gorbachev

Mac Baldrige has written you to give his impressions of Gorbachev and his judgment of Gorbachev's current dilemma as he tries to find a way to revitalize the Soviet economy.

I believe Mac's points are well taken and would only observe that in my opinion Gorbachev is not contemplating shifting resources from the military to civilian sectors. He may, however, look for a way to avoid placing an even greater resource commitment to the military sector, since this could militate against his efforts to improve the health of the Soviet economy overall.

Attachment:

Tab A Malcolm Baldrige's Letter of August 8, 1985

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7702
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07

National Security Council
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>pls. staff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>for quick turnaround.</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

Letter referred to [Date/Time] by Chew.

Action: Jack Matlock

Comment: Roger Robinson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Matlock

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

August 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: SVEN ^{Srs}KRAEMER/ROBERT LINHARD 

SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy

In the context of considerations involving US policy on nuclear testing limitations, we have prepared a very brief summary of the Administration's major policy directives and initiatives on this subject (Tab A). Also attached are the complete texts of the major NSDD's referred to in the memo (Tab B) and the press/diplomatic guidance issued with your approval following the President's remarks to the press on August 5 (Tab C). You may find it useful to brief the memo at Tab A to the President, drawing upon the items at Tabs B and C as appropriate.

In addition to reviewing the attached items, we recommend that you review and approve as soon as possible the package on H.J. Res. 3, sent to you last week, which reflects latest language worked by agencies and NSC staff on US nuclear testing limitations policy. Agencies and Congress urgently need such an authorized text reflective of Administration policy.

It should be noted that in the experience of NSC staff (Kraemer), during the four and a half years of the Reagan Administration's broad range of arms control efforts, the interdepartmental controversies on US nuclear testing policies have been among the most heated. Only the CW-Article 10 issue and the compliance/verification issues have been comparable in the arms control area. Given the institutional positions and memories of the agencies involved and the bloody battles fought over the interdepartmental studies and NSDD texts, this suggest the need for special care in moving on this issue.

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NLRRF06-114/3#7704

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you review the brief summary memorandum on US nuclear testing limitations policy milestones at Tab A and that you consider briefing it to the President, drawing as appropriate on the materials at Tabs B and C.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you review and approve the proposed Administration statement on H.J. Res. 3 as contained in Action #6088, sent to you on August 7.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Brief Summary Memo
- Tab B Texts of Major NSDD's
- Tab C Press/Diplomatic Guidance

cc: Jack Matlock; Bill Wright (traveling)

US NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY

The following summarizes the Administration's policy during the past three years concerning nuclear testing limitations.

On the basis of comprehensive interdepartmental work formally tasked by the President in NSSD-7-82 (April 5, 1982) and a July 19, 1982 meeting of the National Security Council, the President issued National Security Decision Directive #51 (August 10, 1982), in which he set forth the following fundamental guidelines for his Administration concerning U.S. policy on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties:

"Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

"Nuclear testing is indispensable to a credible nuclear deterrent. The security of the United States and our Allies depends upon a nuclear deterrent and the need to maintain a reliable stockpile and robust technology base. At the same time, there are concerns regarding our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban, and even assuming Soviet compliance, there are reasons to believe that a Comprehensive Test Ban could create asymmetries in the Soviet Union's favor. Therefore, at this time the United States should neither attempt to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor resume negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom on a Comprehensive Test Ban. (S)

"U.S. policy continues to endorse a Comprehensive Test Ban as a long-term objective. This is to be achieved in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence building measures, improved verification capabilities that would justify confidence in Soviet compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban; and at a time when a nuclear deterrent is no longer as essential an element, as currently, for international security and stability. We will continue to discuss issues of verification and compliance in the nuclear test ban working group of the Committee on Disarmament. (S)

"Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties

"Our security requires that we not agree to an unverifiable treaty. Since we cannot at present effectively verify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, we should not, at this time, seek their ratification. While continuing observance of the 150-kiloton threshold of these treaties, we should, therefore, seek Soviet agreement to negotiate effective verification measures in new protocols to the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties. (S)

"Over the long term, high yield tests may be necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Should an urgent national security need for tests above 150 kilotons be identified in the future, appropriate recommendations should be forwarded to the President for decision. (S)"

In NSDD #51 the Interdepartmental Group on Nuclear Limitations Policy was directed to complete a study of specific negotiation proposals on verification procedures designed to improve our verification capabilities and to conduct an up-to-date net assessment of the effects of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) on the U.S./U.S.S.R. nuclear balance.

Following completion of the required interdepartmental work, NSDD #63 (October 28, 1982) and NSDD #81 (February 7, 1983) provided additional Presidential guidance on the U.S. approach to implementation of effective verification measures to include a detailed plan for verification of nuclear test yields by direct on-site measurement. During 1983 and 1984, the Soviet Union rejected repeated U.S. efforts to conduct bilateral discussions on this new U.S. initiative.

Following additional interdepartmental work, the President, in a September 18, 1984 address to the United Nations General Assembly, proposed that a way be found by which experts from the Soviet Union and the United States could visit the other nation's nuclear test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear tests and thus to help establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing. The Soviet Union rejected this U.S. initiative.

On June 29, 1985, the President's UN initiative was modified by an unconditional and unilateral invitation to have Soviet experts bring any instrumentation devices the Soviet Union deems necessary to measure the yield of a nuclear test at our Nevada test site. The President communicated this proposal in a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, but the Soviet Union has not responded positively to the U.S. initiative. Instead, the Soviets have proposed test moratoria, which impact asymmetrically and adversely upon U.S. nuclear deterrent forces and which do not resolve U.S. concerns about the inadequacy of verification and about Soviet noncompliance with existing test limitation agreements.

Serious U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance were reported by the President to the Congress in 1984 concerning the TTBT and in 1985 concerning both the TTBT and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Soviet actions with regard to the TTBT were judged to constitute violations of the LTBT and likely violations of the TTBT.

At the U.S./Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and in other diplomatic channels, the Soviet Union has failed to take corrective actions concerning such violations or to make progress on nuclear test verification issues. At the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, for example, the Soviet Union has not contributed productively to discussion of verification and compliance issues by the Conference's Nuclear Test Ban Working Group.

Prepared by: Sven Kraemer

NSDD #81

February 7, 1983

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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National Security Decision
Directive Number 81

February 7, 1983

NEGOTIATION OF IMPROVED NUCLEAR TEST
VERIFICATION MEASURES (C)

Effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaties are essential to the national security. The Interdepartmental Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy has completed a net assessment of the effects of the TTBT on U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance, and a detailed plan for verification of nuclear test yields by direct on-site measurement, as directed in NSDD-51 and NSDD-63. These studies are accepted, and are to provide the basis for our negotiating proposal. (S)

Steps necessary to commence negotiations with the Soviet Union, to incorporate the proposed verification measures in new protocols to the Treaties, should be initiated as follows:

- Inform the Congress of our intentions.
- As soon as possible, initiate discussions with our close Allies, and particularly the United Kingdom, to explain the nature of our proposal.
- After these actions have been completed, present a U.S. initiative to the Soviet Union informing them of our desire to seek improved verification for these two treaties. (S)

The Interdepartmental Group should prepare for negotiations by completing the following work:

- Prepare briefing material on the proposed verification measures, to include an explanation of the rationale for improved verification, for use with the Congress, Allies, and the public, as appropriate.
- Propose a delegation and draft proposed instructions.
- Continue with the technical work necessary to refine the proposed verification technique.

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BY PWS
NLR/FD6-11413#7706
NARA DATE 3/9/11

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In preparing for the negotiations, consideration should be given to suggesting to the Soviets joint trial experiments with direct verification techniques as a means of developing and validating suitable verification procedures. (S)

It should be understood that yield values used to trigger verification procedures are not to be interpreted as constraints on nuclear testing. (S)

On a related matter, the Interdepartmental Group should consider the merits of the recent JCS recommendation to renegotiate Article V of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty to provide for automatic termination in place of automatic renewal, and should forward its recommendations to the National Security Council. (S)

If new verification protocols are successfully negotiated, we intend, subject to national security requirements existing at that time (including decision on the Article V issue raised by the JCS), to seek Senate advice and consent to ratify the TTB and PNE treaties. (S)

Ronald Reagan

NSDD #63

October 28, 1982

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1982

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National Security Decision
Directive Number 63

BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION OF NUCLEAR TEST
VERIFICATION MEASURES (S)

This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-51. It provides additional guidance on the U.S. approach to implementation of effective verification measures in additional protocols to the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. (S)

Since we cannot at present effectively verify that the yields of underground nuclear explosions are consistent with the 150-kiloton limit imposed by the nuclear test limitation treaties, NSDD-51 directed that we should seek Soviet agreement to negotiate improved verification measures. It has been decided that the U.S. negotiating position should be based on the direct measurement of the yield of each nuclear explosion likely to appear by remote observation to exceed the 150-kiloton threshold. This would require that U.S. personnel observe the emplacement of U.S. hydrodynamic instruments within a few meters of the Soviet nuclear device prior to detonation and then measure the hydrodynamic shock wave from the explosion. (S)

Interdepartmental Group Work Program

To prepare a basis for entering negotiations with the USSR, the Interdepartmental Group on Nuclear Testing should complete a study addressing the following topics:

- Criteria for determining those nuclear explosions to which direct yield measurements need be applied (e.g., a 50 or 75 kiloton threshold in planned yield). (S)
- Preparation of a detailed U.S. proposal for verifying observance of the 150 kiloton limit by direct hydrodynamic measurement of test yields. (S)
- Background technical data needed to explain the rationale of each element of the U.S. proposal. (U)
- Estimates of effects on precision from test geometries, geologic properties of the test site, and possible spoofing efforts. (S)
- Operational plans for verifying Soviet yields, to include estimates of costs, personnel, and equipment availability. (S)

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BY RWS
NARRA DATE 3/8/11
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- Operational plans for dealing with Soviet personnel at the Nevada Test Site, including costs and U.S. personnel required. (S)
- Negotiating forum: location, personnel, and appropriate schedule. (U)
- Scenario for initiating negotiations, to include consultation with Congress and with Allies, and methods of approach to the USSR. (U)

This study should be forwarded to the National Security Council by December 10, 1982. (U)

In addition, the Interdepartmental Group should assure that the net assessment of the effects of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty on the United States / Soviet Union nuclear balance, directed by NSDD-51 for delivery to the National Security Council by December 10, 1982, includes an explanation of the rationale for improved test yield verification. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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NSDD #51

August 10, 1982

Authority
BY

DECLASSIFIED 3/18/96
NUM D. VAN TASSEL F89-1009
CDS, NARA, Date 6/18/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 10, 1982

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 51

U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY

As a result of the National Security Council meeting of July 19, 1982, on nuclear testing limitations, it has been decided that a Comprehensive Test Ban remains a long-term U.S. objective, but that in the near term, our priority efforts must be directed toward achieving effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties. (S)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Nuclear testing is indispensable to a credible nuclear deterrent. The security of the United States and our Allies depends upon a nuclear deterrent and the need to maintain a reliable stockpile and robust technology base. At the same time, there are concerns regarding our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban, and even assuming Soviet compliance, there are reasons to believe that a Comprehensive Test Ban could create asymmetries in the Soviet Union's favor. Therefore, at this time the United States should neither attempt to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nor resume negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom on a Comprehensive Test Ban. (S)

U.S. policy continues to endorse a Comprehensive Test Ban as a long-term objective. This is to be achieved in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence building measures, improved verification capabilities that would justify confidence in Soviet compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban; and at a time when a nuclear deterrent is no longer as essential an element, as currently, for international security and stability. We will continue to discuss issues of verification and compliance in the nuclear test ban working group of the Committee on Disarmament. (S)

Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties

Our security requires that we not agree to an unverifiable treaty. Since we cannot at present effectively verify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, we should not, at

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this time, seek their ratification. While continuing observance of the 150-kiloton threshold of these treaties, we should, therefore, seek Soviet agreement to negotiate effective verification measures in new protocols to the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties. (S)

Over the long term, high yield tests may be necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Should an urgent national security need for tests above 150 kilotons be identified in the future, appropriate recommendations should be forwarded to the President for decision. (S)

Interdepartmental Group Work Program

The Interdepartmental Group should complete a study of specific negotiation proposals on verification procedures designed to improve significantly our verification capabilities. This study should be forwarded to the National Security Council by October 1, 1982. (S)

The Interdepartmental Group should prepare an up-to-date net assessment of the effects of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty on the United States/Soviet Union nuclear balance. This assessment should be forwarded to the National Security Council by December 10, 1982. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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April 5, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 7-82,
U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy

The President has directed that the program for development of U.S. policy on nuclear testing be formalized by the issuance of NSSD 7-82, Subject: U.S. Policy on Nuclear Testing Limitations, for NSC consideration. Building on prior interagency work, this effort will prepare the Government to establish U.S. policy on nuclear testing limitations through submission of a draft National Security Decision Directive, with options as appropriate, for National Security Council consideration.

The attached National Security Study Directive (NSSD 7-82) provides the guidelines for the review.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William Clark

William P. Clark

cc: THE VICE PRESIDENT

Attachment

NSSD 7-82

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/18/02*

~~SECRET~~

Review April 5, 2002

Classified and Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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NSSD #7-82

April 5, 1982

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 5, 1982

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National Security Study
Directive Number 7-82

U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY

Introduction

The United States requires a well-defined policy on nuclear testing limitations issues, including the trilateral (U.S., U.S.S.R, and U.K.) negotiations of a CTBT (recessed in October, 1980), the bilateral Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 150 kiloton-yield nuclear testing limitation), and the companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET). The latter agreements have been signed but not ratified, and although the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have stated their adherence to the 150 kiloton limit, questions of Soviet compliance have arisen a number of times.

Objective of Review

To produce options for a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy to be considered by the National Security Council.

Scope

The review will build upon the work already accomplished by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) on Nuclear Testing. As a minimum, it will address the following topics:

- U.S. policy on a CTBT, including the issues of the trilateral negotiations and Alliance consultations.
- U.S. policy on the TTBT and PNET, to include the possibility of reopening negotiations on several issues. The purpose of renegotiation could be assessment and improvement of verification and compliance provisions, allowance for a few tests annually above the 150 kiloton threshold, and/or elimination of the commitment in Article I, paragraph 3, to continue negotiations towards a CTBT.

~~SECRET~~

Review April 5, 2002

Classified and Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: S. Tilley F88-686 1/17/92
BY: CWS, NARA, Date 6/18/02

SECRET

- Rationale and strategy for presentation of U.S. policy to our Allies. A classified version of such a presentation should explain to our Allies the necessity of nuclear testing to maintain our nuclear deterrent, issues of verification, and the relationship of nuclear testing limitations to other arms control efforts.
- Rationale and strategy for presentation of U.S. policy in international fora, such as the United Nations' Committee on Disarmament and the Second Special Session on Disarmament, and to the public. The rationale should relate nuclear testing limitations to our national security needs and programs and to our other arms control efforts.
- Any approach or alternative approaches to nuclear testing limitations recommended to the National Security Council should, as a minimum, permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability, relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union, to execute U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit their timely assessments of the approaches in terms of this criterion to the Interdepartmental Group for use in developing the proposed U.S. position, and will certify to the effect, upon military sufficiency, of any proposed limitations as part of the report submitted to the National Security Council.

Administration

Management of the NSSD 7-82 review will be the responsibility of the currently existing Nuclear Testing Interdepartmental Group, co-chaired by the Departments of State and Defense. The Group will submit its report not later than April 16, 1982 for National Security Council consideration.

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified Secret. Dissemination of this NSSD, subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis.

Ronald Reagan

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Tab C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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August 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Press Guidance

Attached please find press guidance on comments made by the President today about U.S. nuclear test limitations policy. This is to be used for interagency press guidance on Tuesday, as well as for transmission tonight by the Department of State to appropriate diplomatic posts.

William F. Martin

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

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NUCLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONS POLICY

Q: What did the President mean by his remarks that the US would be willing to enter into a permanent test moratorium with the Soviets? Is this a new initiative for a test ban treaty?

A: The President was not proposing any new initiative. The US has long supported the long-term objective of a test ban in the context of achieving deep and verifiable nuclear arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and the maintenance of an effective deterrent.

In his comments, the President pointed out major verification problems that currently exist and the fact that the Soviet Union is ahead of us in the development and modernization of nuclear weapons. It is the President's view that we must first resolve the verification difficulties, and that given the scope of the Soviet modernization programs and US restraint, US testing is necessary to assure the continued credibility and effectiveness of our own deterrent forces in the face of the unparalleled and unwarranted Soviet military buildup.

US concerns on these matters are heightened by the evidence of Soviet violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and by likely Soviet violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as by the pattern of Soviet violations of other arms control agreements. In this context, the President called attention to the Soviet violation of their nuclear testing moratorium during the Kennedy Administration,

a moratorium which they broke crudely in 1961 with some 40 tests, and which led President Kennedy to warn of the danger of uninspected and broken moratoria involving the Soviet Union. It was this serious concern about verification and Soviet noncompliance that inspired President Reagan's proposal to invite the Soviets to come to our testing site in Nevada to measure the yield of our tests. Such a step would promote the process of developing effective verification to help assure compliance with any nuclear test limitations agreements. We hope that the Soviets will finally choose to say yes to this important US initiative.

Finally, the President made clear in his remarks that the most important fact to focus on in nuclear arms control should be that of getting down to the serious business of, once and for all, reducing the number of nuclear weapons, thereby also providing a genuine incentive to cut back the level of nuclear testing and hopefully eventually leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons themselves.

We must be reminded of the fact that the basic necessity for our testing derives from the massive modernization and buildup of Soviet offensive nuclear forces. The focal point of our efforts should be the arms reductions talks in Geneva. Our negotiators have been given much flexibility to achieve meaningful agreements. We urge the Soviet to match our serious efforts.