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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1985 (2/6)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1011

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7616	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV RE SENATOR BYRD VISIT <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	8/6/1985	B1
7609	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTER TO GORBACHEV <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7617	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7616 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7610	TALKING POINTS	TALKING POINTS RE TRIP TO USSR <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7611	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS PEARSSON AND MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH SENATOR BYRD <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	8/1/1985	B1
7612	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SWM BREAKFAST, AUGUST 7, 1985: THE REAGAN- GORBACHEV MEETING <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	1	8/6/1985	B1
7613	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ- SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN HELSINKI <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	8/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON AUGUST 1985 (2/6)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1011

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7614	PAPER	RUSSIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD: THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW BY MATLOCK <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	8	ND	B1
7615	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MCSWEENEY "CONTACT" AND SHCHARANSKY <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	8/7/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506ACTION

August 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK ^{Elise} _{for}

SUBJECT:

S.J. Res. 161 Regarding Soviet Jewry

David Chew has requested NSC recommendations on the attached. We have reviewed the OMB memorandum on S.J. Res. 161 concerning the release of Soviet Jewry. We have no further comments on this legislation.

^{Jc}
Jock Covey concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response block attached at Tab I to David Chew indicating that the NSC staff has no further comments.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to David Chew

(Handwritten initials)

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8/5/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9:00 a.m. 8/6/85

SUBJECT: Enrolled Resolution S.J.Res. 161 - To appeal for the release of Soviet Jewry

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
WRIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> P SS	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRIEDERSDORF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please give your recommendations to my office by 9:00 a.m. Tuesday, August 6th. Thanks.

RESPONSE: The NSC Staff concurs with the Attached legislation.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

3

AUG 5 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Enrolled Resolution S.J.Res. 161 - To appeal for the
release of Soviet Jewry
Sponsors - Senator Dole (R) Kansas and 63 others

Last Day for Action

August 12, 1985 - Monday

Purpose

Appeals for the release of Soviet Jewry.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget	Approval
Department of State	No objection (informally)
National Security Council	No objection (informally)

Discussion

S.J.Res. 161 calls on the Soviet Union to: (1) release Anatoly Scharansky, Yosef Begun and other Prisoners of Conscience and allow them to leave the Soviet Union; (2) issue exit permits to known refuseniks such as Ida Nudel; (3) allow those Jews who want to emigrate to Israel or to join relatives to leave this year; and (4) pledge that during the next three years all who have requested exit permits will be able to leave the Soviet Union.

S.J.Res. 161 was based on support for your recent statements concerning freedom for Soviet Jewry.

S.J.Res. 161 passed both Houses of the Congress by voice vote.

James M. Frey
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

Stella's Chron

1. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NSC/S

ID 8506004

2. NSC SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED 30 JUL 85 17

TO MARTIN

FROM FREY, J

DOCDATE 30 JUL 85

KEYWORDS. USSR HUMAN RIGHTS

ENROLLED BILLS

SUBJECT. SJR-161 RE RELEASE OF SOVIET JEWRY

ACTION: MEMO MARTIN TO PETERSON DUE: 02 AUG 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~SABLE~~
matlock

SESTANOVICH

STEINER

ROBINSON

RAYMOND

LEHMAN, C

CANNISTRARO

LENCZOWSKI

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (PS)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

<i>Matlock</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>8/01</i>	<i>Action transferred</i>		
<i>Jm</i>		<i>8/2</i>	<i>Concurrence passed to OMB by phone</i>		

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

5
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D. C. 20503

7/30/85

ENROLLED BILL REQUEST

In accordance with OMB Circular No. A-19, your written views and recommendation for Presidential action are requested on the following enrolled bill(s) (facsimile(s) attached):

SJRes 161

Please consult section 10 of OMB Circular A-19, pages 12-14, for instructions regarding the preparation of enrolled bill letters and the procedures to be followed on enrolled bills.

Within **TWO DAYS** (including holidays but excluding Sundays) after receipt of this request, your reply (original and one copy) should be delivered **VIA SPECIAL MESSENGER** to Mrs. Julia Yuille, Room 7201, New Executive Office Building.

Your cooperation in meeting this deadline is needed to provide maximum time for Presidential action on the enrolled bill(s).

James M. Frey
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

ATTENTION: W. Robert Pearson
National Security Council

Ninety-ninth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

*Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, the third day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and eighty-five*

Joint Resolution

To appeal for the release of Soviet Jewry.

Whereas President Reagan recently stated that "Soviet Jewry suffers from persecution, intimidation, and imprisonment within Soviet borders";

Whereas President Reagan stated further that "We will never relinquish our hope for their freedom and we will never cease to work for it," and that "If the Soviet Union truly wants peace, truly wants friendship, then let them release Anatoly Scharansky and free Soviet Jewry.": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in support of the President's position, the Congress calls on the Soviet Union, as an initial gesture—

(1) to release immediately Anatoly Scharansky, Yosef Begun, and all other Prisoners of Conscience, and allow them to leave the Soviet Union;

(2) to issue immediately exit permits to the many known long term "Refuseniks" such as Ida Nudel and Vladimir Slepak; and

(3) to allow those thousands of Jews who wish to emigrate to join their relatives abroad, or to be repatriated to their historic homeland, to leave this year and pledge that such cases shall be dealt with expeditiously and in a humanitarian way during the next three years, thus enabling those who have requested exit permits to leave.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

*Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

August 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK ^{Elise}

SUBJECT:

H. Con. Res. 181: Changes to Provisions in
H.R. 2068

As requested by OMB, I have reviewed H. Con. Res. 181 which changes several provisions in the reported version of H.R. 2068. Comments are attached

Judyt Mandel and Chris Lehman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Ronald Peterson giving NSC approval of H. Con. Res. 181.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Peterson

Tab A Incoming

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: H. Con. Res. 181

The NSC Staff has reviewed H. Con. Res. 181 changing provisions in H.S. 2068. While we concur with the attached State Authorization Bill (Sec. 155), with respect to Section 151 we would note that implementation of the provision would be most difficult, in view of the fact that the extent of the practice could not be openly verified by the UN Secretariat.

Attachment
Tab A Incoming OMB Memorandum



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

August 5, 1985

6209
SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
Arms Control Disarmament Agency
Department of Defense - Windus - 697-1305 (6)
National Security Council
Department of State - Berkenbile - 632-0430 (25)
Department of Justice - Perkins - 633-2113 (17)
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: H.Con.Res. 181 which changes a number of provisions
in the conference reported version of H.R. 2068.
(Note: Those agencies that have already submitted
final enrolled views letters need to advise us if the
changes made in H.Con.Res. 181 will affect your
comments or recommendations.)

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
10:00 a.m., Tuesday, August 6, 1985.

Questions should be referred to SueThau/TraceyLawler (395-7300),
the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: J. Barie
J. Eisenhour

Ninety-ninth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-five

Concurrent Resolution

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That, in the enrollment of the bill (H.R. 2068) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Board for International Broadcasting, and for other purposes, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall make the following corrections:

(1) At the end of title I of the bill, after section 154, insert the following new section:

"SEC. 155. SOVIET AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST BEHAVIOR.

"Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall prepare and transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, an unclassified report on the advisability of establishing a permanent office in the Department of State to study Soviet and international Communist behavior that violates the concepts of national sovereignty and peace between nations. In conducting the study required by this section, the Secretary may make use of suitably qualified journalists and scholars."

(2) In the table of contents contained in section 1(b), after the item relating to section 154, insert the following new item:

"Sec. 155. Soviet and international Communist behavior."

(3) In section 812(c), strike out "The President should submit" and insert in lieu thereof "The President shall submit".

(4) In section 813(b), strike out "It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General should" and insert in lieu thereof "The Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall" and strike out "should transmit" and insert in lieu thereof "shall transmit".

(5) In section 151, amend subsection (c) to read as follows:

"(c) REDUCTION IN CONTRIBUTION IF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS NOT MADE.—If the Secretary of State determines pursuant to subsection (b) that substantial progress has not been made in correcting this practice, the United States shall thereafter reduce the amount of its annual assessed contribution to the United Nations by the amount of that contribution which is the United States proportionate share of the salaries of those international civil servants employed by the

H. Con. Res. 181—2

United Nations who are returning any portion of their salaries to their respective governments.”.

Attest:

Clerk of the House of Representatives.

Attest:

Secretary of the Senate.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-#7616

BY NET, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

File - 12
~~Pres - Gen. Corre.~~
JMC 6107

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Handwritten~~

August 6, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am very pleased that Senator Robert Byrd, Minority Leader of the United States Senate, is leading a delegation of distinguished senators to your country.

As we prepare for our meeting in Geneva in November, it will be helpful to both of us if we can broaden and deepen the dialogue between our two countries. The visit by Senator Byrd's delegation will provide a good opportunity for you and your officials to exchange views with key members of the Legislative Branch of our government, and this exchange can assist us both in developing a deeper understanding of our respective points of view.

Let me assure you once again that I look forward to our meeting, which I hope can serve to put the relations between our countries on a more constructive course. I will be consulting with Senator Byrd and his colleagues upon their return in order to take account of their experience and advice as I make my preparations.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Signed by
Per. 13
JMC

6107

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

August 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Senator Byrd: August 6, 1985

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President concerning Tuesday's meeting with Senator Byrd. Per your note, I have prepared the Presidential letter (Tab I) for Senator Byrd to carry to the Soviet Union, and the talkers (Tab II) for the President's meeting with Senator Byrd tomorrow.

The talking points have been given to M. B. Oglesby directly for inclusion in the meeting memo which is being prepared. Oglesby has been advised that the letter is to be processed through the NSC.

ML
N
Chris Lehman and Ron Sable concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the letter at Tab I to the President in the meeting with Senator Byrd to be held August 6.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A Letter to Gorbachev
- Tab II Talking Points
- Tab III Profs Note, August 1, 1985

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *6/18/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6107

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7609

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev

Issue

Letter to Gorbachev for delivery by Senator Byrd (Tab A).

Facts

Senator Byrd is heading a delegation which will visit the Soviet Union for an exchange of views. He would like to take the letter from your meeting tomorrow for delivery upon arrival in Moscow.

Discussion

Your letter (Tab A) expresses your commitment to work with the Soviets for the resolution of problems. It also serves as an introduction for the visiting delegation.

Recommendation

OK No

— — That you sign the letter to Gorbachev, for delivery by Senator Byrd.

Attachment:

Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am very pleased that Senator Robert Byrd, Minority Leader of the United States Senate, is leading a delegation of distinguished senators to your country.

As we prepare for our meeting in Geneva in November, it will be helpful to both of us if we can broaden and deepen the dialogue between our two countries. The visit by Senator Byrd's delegation will provide a good opportunity for you and your officials to exchange views with key members of the Legislative Branch of our government, and this exchange can assist us both in developing a deeper understanding of our respective points of view.

Let me assure you once again that I look forward to our meeting, which I hope can serve to put the relations between our countries on a more constructive course. I will be consulting with Senator Byrd and his colleagues upon their return in order to take account of their experience and advice as I make my preparations.

Sincerely yours,

(S)

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOI-114/2-7617
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

16

TALKING POINTS

- Glad you're going to Moscow. Believe we need to improve communication.

- Tell Mr. Gorbachev that I'm looking forward to our meeting and will do all I can to make it productive. I would hope we can set a joint agenda for the future and set out an agreed approach for solving some of the key issues.

- I hope you'll also make it clear to the Soviets you talk to the importance all of us attach to compliance, verification and human rights. The Soviets are balking in all these areas.

- In human rights, make it clear that we don't insist on formal deals, if that gives them problems. We're not asking them to change their laws. But we do have a right to expect them to carry out the obligations they assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.

- I know you'll be in close touch with our Embassy while you are there. They are fully informed on the status of the various issues that may come up and can answer any questions that might arise.

- Look forward to hearing from you when you get back.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7610
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

From: NSWRP --CPUA
To: NSGVE --CPUA

Date and time 08/01/85 16:40:18

6107

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON

Subject: Meeting with Sen Byrd

Please task SYS I, action Matlock, concur Lehman/Sable, info Cobb. Due COB 8/1. (Note deadline may slide if Scheduling confirms that meeting is next week, not 8/2, but provide 8/1 deadline since meeting may take place tomorrow.) Note task is for talking points and letter to be provided to Friedersdorf. Sable/Lehman should confirm that event is Friedersdorf's and his shop will prepare memo for the President. Thanks.

*** Forwarding note from NSRCM --CPUA 08/01/85 16:17 ***
To: NSWRP --CPUA

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Sen Byrd

The President called Sen Byrd today and used our talking points. The Sen pressed on any message he could carry. The President said he would provide a "greeting" but Byrd pressed for a meeting with the President. The President agreed. I expect it will take place tomorrow or next week. Max is setting it up. Please ask Jack Matlock to prepare talking points and a letter. They ought to be general in character, introducing the delegation, stating that they visit at a time where we have committed ourselves to the resolution of problems and that we will look forward to working with the Soviet side to establish a stable basis for the long term relationship centered on reciprocity, restraint, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

cc: NSJMP	--CPUA	NSWFM	--CPUA
NSDRF	--CPUA	NSJFM	--CPUA
NSCL	--CPUA	NSRKS	--CPUA
NSWGH	--CPUA	NSFEG	--CPUA
NSDFP	--CPUA	NSPBT	--CPUA
NSKWZ	--CPUA		

cc: NSWFM	--CPUA	NSWRP	--CPUA
NSPBT	--CPUA	NSCL	--CPUA
NSRKS	--CPUA	NSDFP	--CPUA
NSCEC	--CPUA	NSCMB	--CPUA
NSJJY	--CPUA	NSJMD	--CPUA
NSJLC	--CPUA		

DECLASSIFIED

NLS EO6-114/2#7611

BY KAT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

Laron

7612

~~SECRET~~

6250

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Matlock
brief / up
NSDD gone plan
& all agreed

SECRET

INFORMATION

August 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: SWM Breakfast, August 7, 1985: The Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

Defense put this item on the agenda. It will give Shultz an opportunity to report on his meeting with Shevardnadze.

If appropriate, you may wish to reiterate the President's view of the meeting and the public stance necessary as we proceed with preparations.

If the President has signed the NSDD--or will do so shortly--the Breakfast might provide an opportunity to brief Shultz and Weinberger on it, and to get an indication from them of their desires regarding representation. The following talking points might be used if you decide to discuss the NSDD:

- The President has signed [is likely to issue soon] an NSDD on preparations for his meeting with Gorbachev.
- It will be most important to maintain a stance in our public statements consistent with the approach it lays out.
- We also must redouble efforts to prevent leaks of our negotiating positions.
- We will be setting up a White House coordinating group to keep track of activities in various areas. Staffing out negotiating positions and the like will continue in the established interagency process.
- We'd like for State, Defense and CIA to name representatives to participate in the coordinating committee. Let us know as soon as possible whom you want to participate so we can get the group organized.

[NOTE: I assume that the representatives from State will be Ridgway, Holmes and Palmer, but do not know whom Weinberger wants to send.]

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7612

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY KNL NARA DATE 10/1/12

~~SECRET~~

TO MCFARLANE FROM BUSH, G

RECEIVED 09 AUG 85
DOC DATE 06 AUG 85

19-20
JH C

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1995

By CS NARA, Date 6/18/02

KEYWORDS: USSR MCO WALLOP, MALCOLM

SUBJECT: NOTE TO MCFARLANE FM BUSH RE CONVERSATION W/ SEN WALLOP / SALT
GUIDELINES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 14 AUG 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

COBB

HALL

THOMPSON

Liuhanof

CLOSE OUT.

No further action required.

PI)

8/13/85

COMMENTS

RLF# LOG NSCIFID (DR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



Kay Zerwick

From NSC/S

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6357

Harold-

This does go to

Maltson + Cobb.

Kay

WASHINGTON, D.C.

→ *Malcolm Wallop*
6357
22
Date August 6, 1985 *Cobb*

TO: BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT *CB*

RE: Conversation with Senator
Malcolm Wallop

Senator Wallop is worried that the November decision date on continuing to live within the Salt guidelines will approach, and that both the public and Congress will not be prepared should we have to cease complying with the guidelines.

He suggests op-ed pieces to show what Soviets have done -- violations, etc.

He further suggests briefings of Congress stressing importance of Soviets moving to comply, etc.

This is just for your information.

cc: Max Friedersdorf
Craig Fuller
Jennifer Fitzgerald

MATLOCK 23
SYSTEM II
90839
JMC
Chron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

August 7, 1985

INFORMATION

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting in Helsinki

Attached at Tab I is the Memorandum of Conversation of Secretary Shultz's meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki July 31. You may want to peruse it quickly to get a feel for the presentational style employed by Shevardnadze, which is more businesslike and less polemical than Gromyko's, but which -- in Helsinki at least -- hewed closely to traditional Soviet positions.

For the most part, both sides refrained from making totally new proposals. (The one exception was our proposal to renew negotiations on a space cooperation agreement.) Shultz did agree, however, to proceed with further concrete steps in two areas. Regarding the CDE in Stockholm, he agreed that the negotiators could proceed to work on a draft document in the next round (p. 14). As for regional consultations, he proposed a meeting on East and Southeast Asia in September and indicated that we would arrange for talks on Central America subsequently (p. 15).

In general, Shevardnadze's presentation was consistent with the run-down we received from Horowitz, although some of the specific points (and all the implicit threats) were omitted. Regarding the outcome of the Geneva meeting, he referred to the group of bilateral agreements plus something on CDE and non-proliferation as a "minimal" result, but urged us to strive for a "maximum" outcome (i.e., including something on the central issues).

Attachment:

Tab I -- Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#7613
BY LET, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

JM-C 24

6202

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

August 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Youth Exchange: Caucasus Trek '85

The attached letter from Lynne Joiner and Jim Arnold (Tab II) has been forwarded for NSC action. As co-sponsors, Joiner and Arnold are calling our attention to a US-Soviet joint team which has explored the Caucasus Mountain Region. In addition, the co-sponsors have offered to show the video documentary of this trip to the two leaders at the November meeting. As this would not be possible, we have drafted a response which I would recommend for White House signature.

Attached is a memo to Sally Kelley which forwards the draft reply to be signed out.

Steve *SRS* Sestanovich concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to Sally Kelley forwarding the reply to Joiner for White House signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Sally Kelley
- Tab A reply to Joiner
- Tab II Letter from Joiner and Arnold, July 7, 1985

25

6202

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter Reply to Lynne Joiner

The NSC has drafted a White House response to a request which was forwarded by Secretary Heckler. Attached is the cleared reply for signature.

Attachment
Tab A Response to Joiner

cc: Alfred Kingon

Dear Ms. Joiner:

Secretary Heckler has forwarded to us your letter of July 7 on the Caucasus Trek '85. We appreciate your offer to show a videotape of the expedition at the November meeting. Given the schedule, however, this would be difficult to arrange. The President is aware of your joint venture and commends the participants for their goodwill project.

Sincerely,

Ms. Lynne Joiner
Pacific Gateway Productions
728 Wisconsin
San Francisco, CA 94107

6202 27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

Date: 8/5/85 Number: 316972CA Due By:

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Activity -- Possible White House Involvement

	Action	FYI		Action	FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CEA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vice President	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CEQ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
State	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OSTP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Defense	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justice	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Commerce	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mc Farlane	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Svahn	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HHS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Chew (For WH Staffing)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HUD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Energy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Chief of Staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Executive Secretary for:		
UN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	DPC	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	EPC	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GSA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EPA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NASA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OPM	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
VA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SBA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

The attached material is forwarded for your appropriate action.

RETURN TO:

Alfred H. Kingon
Cabinet Secretary
456-2823
(Ground Floor, West Wing)

Don Clarey
 Larry Herbolzheimer
 Ed Stucky

Associate Director
Office of Cabinet Affairs
456-2800 (Room 430, OEOB)

28

July 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO: Don Clarey
Associate Director
Office of Cabinet Affairs

RE: Letter on U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Activity --
Possible White House Involvement

Earlier this month the Secretary received a letter from Pacific Gateway Productions concerning a joint U.S.-Soviet activity involving a group of young Americans (age 17-21) who will explore the Caucasus Mountain Region and attempt to climb Europe's highest peak, Mount Elbrus, with a group of young Soviets.

The MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour has already commissioned to produce a special report on the Caucasus and apparently negotiations are underway with PBS and Ted Turner's group for distribution of an hour documentary.

They have asked the Secretary for potential interest on the part of the White House in this endeavor and I forward the materials to you to seek an opinion. Please let me know how I might followup.

Donald L. Rheem II
Special Assistant to the Secretary

Attachments

Lynne Joiner

Pacific Gateway Productions
728 Wisconsin
San Francisco Ca 94107
415 648-1710

July 7, 1985

Secretary Margaret Heckler
Health & Human Services Dept.
Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Margaret,

It has been almost ten years since we teamed up to make "Flowers From Horseback" about your Congressional delegation's visit to China. We are finally going to work together again on another exciting project that we want you to know about, because it is our own independent effort.

In a few days we leave for the Soviet Union to document the unique adventure of a joint team of young Americans and Soviets (aged 17-21) who will explore the Caucasus mountain region and attempt to climb Europe's highest peak, Mt. Elbrus (18,841'). We've enclosed a brief outline about our project, "The Challenge of the Caucasus" and a news release about the youth trek.

The MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour has already commissioned us to produce a special short report on the Caucasus. We are still in negotiations with PBS and Ted Turner's group for distribution of our hour documentary.


We have gained support from Sony, Nike, and other corporations which are supplying everything from videotape to hiking boots. Your own department's President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sport has given us special Presidential merit pins to award to both the young Americans and Soviets at the end of their trek together!


It is our dream that President Reagan himself be made aware of our project. We hope and believe this kind of goodwill adventure and documentary could contribute to setting the right mood at his Geneva summit with Soviet leader Gorbachev. We would like to offer to premiere the video documentary for an evening's entertainment for the two leaders in November. We believe our project offers the best opportunity to visually demonstrate how US-Soviet cooperation can achieve positive, mutually beneficial goals since the Apollo-Soyuz space mission of 1975. We also see it as a tribute to the UN's International Youth Year.

We would deeply appreciate any assistance you could give in bringing our project and our offer to the attention of the White House. We return on August 8th and will contact you on how best to proceed.

Please give our best personal regards to your daughter Belinda who shared our earlier China adventure and let her know what we're up to now.

Best regards,


Lynne Joiner
Pacific Gateway


Jim Arnold
Arnold-Levin Productions

US - USSR Youth Exchange Program

- Advisory Board
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- Joan M Steffy
- Cari Zachrisson

NEWS RELEASE

For Release after July 1, 1985

Contact: Laurie Ostendorff
(415) 346-4234

Joint US-USSR Youth Team to Climb Europe's Highest Peak

San Francisco -- Ten young Americans aged 17 to 21 will join 10 Soviets of the same age in a precedent-setting wilderness trek through the Caucasus Mountains of the USSR this summer.

The adventure begins July 14 when the American team leaves New York to join its Soviet counterpart for a 26-day trek (July 14 to August 8) which will demand the ultimate in physical and mental stamina. The trekkers will explore the rugged Caucasus Mountains, located between the Black and Caspian Seas. The Caucasus have been a crossroads of the world since the time of the ancient Greeks, who called the region "the end of the earth".

The joint venture celebrates United Nations International Youth Year and is an effort to foster cooperation and understanding between young citizens of the two superpower nations. The climax of Caucasus Trek '85 will be an attempt to reach the summit of Europe's highest peak, Mt. Elbrus (altitude 18,841 feet). The ten-hour climb to the top requires ice axes and crampons to conquer packed snow fields. High winds, variable weather conditions, and the constant threat of altitude sickness add to the challenge.

As a gesture of friendship, the trekkers will plant California redwood seedlings in the USSR, and each of the Soviet and American team members will receive awards from the US President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sport.

"This summer, American and Soviet kids will be working as a team and depending upon each other for survival in order to achieve a common goal", says Cynthia Lazaroff, Executive Director of the US-USSR Youth Exchange

(continued on reverse)

3103 Washington Street, San Francisco, CA 94115
(415) 346-4234

Program. "Maybe individual cooperation in overcoming natural barriers can provide a metaphor for our two countries to come together to break down the unnatural ones between us." The San Francisco-based US-USSR Youth Exchange Program, a non-profit, non-governmental project affiliated with the Tides Foundation, is devoted to building better relations between the United States and Soviet Union through communication and collaboration in youth programs. The US-USSR Youth Exchange Program organized Caucasus Trek '85 in cooperation with the Soviet Sports Committee and Mountain Travel.

Lazaroff has selected ten outstanding young men and women for the trek. They represent a cross-section of America (California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Minnesota and New York), and were selected for their excellent physical fitness and commitments to working for improved Soviet-American relations. They will share their Caucasus experiences in schools and local communities upon their return home. Three of the trekkers are members of the California Conservation Corps (CCC), a State service program that trains young people in conservation and emergency work projects. Another participant was recently elected the first black student body president of his high school. The Mayor of Roseville, Minnesota helped raise support for the local community's team member, and contributions from the Princeton University President's fund and other alumni scholarship sources helped support a Princeton student's participation in the trek.

Caucasus Trek '85 will be the subject of a television documentary produced by Lynne Joiner of Pacific Gateway Productions. She will also produce a special report on the Caucasus for the MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour. A video program on the trek will be made available to schools and youth organizations. Support for the trek and television project has been provided by a number of individuals and corporations, including: Sony Corporation of America, Swissair, Nike Inc., Coleman Company, 3M Company, W. L. Gore and Associates (Goretex), Sierra Designs, and Mountain Travel.

Lynne Joiner

Pacific Gateway Productions
728 Wisconsin
San Francisco Ca 94107
415 648-1710

"THE CHALLENGE OF THE CAUCASUS"

PRODUCTION SUMMARY AND SHOOTING OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

Something very special will happen this summer for a group of young Americans and Soviets, aged 17-21.

For the first time ever, the Soviet Sports Committee through the Director of its International Mountaineering Camps has agreed to arrange for ten young Soviets to join with ten young Americans from the US-USSR Youth Exchange Program for a joint backpacking trek through the rugged Caucasus Mountains. The climax of their adventure together will be an attempt to reach the summit of Europe's highest peak, Mt. Elbrus (18,841').

Caucasus Trek '85 will demand the physical survival skills and psychological challenge of an Outward Bound wilderness experience. It will also demand a special effort for understanding and cooperation between people who have been trained to think of each other's country as "the enemy".

It is for these reasons that we believe our television special about this unique adventure will be significant. "The Challenge of the Caucasus" will feature:

- a. The thrilling adventure of exploring a remote region unknown to most Americans, but known to the ancient Greeks as "the end of the earth"
- b. The revealing interaction of young Soviets and Americans who must overcome both physical and psychological barriers as they face situations where trust and cooperation are necessary for survival
- c. The symbolic quest for more positive US-USSR relations

"The Challenge of the Caucasus" will celebrate the true spirit of the United Nations current "International Youth Year" and will represent the kind of U.S.-Soviet cooperation that made the historic Apollo-Soyuz space mission possible almost exactly ten years ago.

BACKGROUND

Most Americans assume the Alps are the highest mountains of Europe, but there are twelve peaks in the Caucasus higher than the Alps' Mont Blanc (which is "only" 15,780' high). Ever since the time of the ancient Greeks, the Caucasus have been the barrier separating Europe and Asia and a key crossroad of cultures. Many invaders have passed through the Caucasus on their way to conquest. The Arabs called it "The Mountain of Languages". The Romans needed 130 interpreters to deal with what author Fitzroy Maclean describes as "a kaleidoscopic jumble of races and nations, languages, religions and civilizations such as exists nowhere else in the world".

In the summer of 1984, Cynthia Lazaroff, Executive Director of the US-USSR Youth Exchange, pioneered this Caucasus Trek adventure project. She led eight young Americans to the Caucasus. Although the Soviets were unwilling to fully commit to her ambitious joint trek plan at that time, the authorities did allow the Americans to join with seventy students from a local mountaineering school for a series of overnight camping and hiking experiences.

As a result of this successful experiment, the Soviets have agreed to the more ambitious trek plans for Caucasus Trek '85. The experiences of last summer provide us with an invaluable base of information about what we will most likely encounter during our upcoming adventure in the Caucasus. This has been most helpful in the planning of our television special.

OUTLINE

JULY 16-17: SIGHTSEEING IN MOSCOW

We expect to film the young Americans as they visit major landmarks of Moscow, including: the Kremlin, Red Square, and St. Basil's Church. We will also film their visits to an outdoor market and places like Moscow University in the Lenin Hills.

JULY 18-22: BAKSAN VALLEY BASE CAMP/PREPARATIONS FOR SVANETIA

The base camp for our Caucasus adventure will be a ten-story hotel set in a beautiful Alpine valley which is open to mountaineers from around the world. This "base camp" even boasts a rooftop disco where pirated Michael Jackson music set the beat last year. We expect to film activities at the hotel, including the dance floor action, spontaneous soccer and frisbee games among the international guests, as well as the colorful local outdoor market which features shish kabob stands and stalls selling homemade sweaters.

The Soviets will assign mountain guides and a doctor to the group of American trekkers. Each hiker will undergo a physical exam by a team of

Soviet doctors to determine physical fitness for the punishing climb over 13,000 foot high mountain passes into the hidden and remote region known as Svanetia and the ascent of Mt. Elbrus. We expect to film these medical procedures and the "check-out" climb which all trekkers must pass. This mountaineering test will take several days and provide the setting for the first encounter of the young American and Soviet trekkers.

We also expect to interview Dr. Boris Donnikov. Last year Dr. Donnikov accompanied the American trekkers in the Caucasus. When one of the young Americans suffered from snowblindness, this 29-year-old Soviet doctor (who likes to wear madras shirts and strum a guitar when he isn't working) wrapped the boy's head in improvised bandages and carried him on his back for four tense hours to safety. Thanks to his care and treatment, the American regained his sight within 36 hours.

JULY 23-29 TREK TO SVANETIA

"Svanetia" means "place of refuge". Over the centuries it has harbored many refugees fleeing either invasion or the authorities. Svanetians are simple, but fiercely loyal people who to this day live in what author Jeremy Schmidt describes as a "society ruled by vendetta". The region was only conquered at the end of the 19th century by the Russian Empire after 160 years of continuous warfare (Leo Tolstoy was one of czarist Russia's many soldiers who fought in the Caucasus).

The trekkers will hike into the chief town of the region, Mestia, whose homes feature sixty foot high stone towers traditionally used when under siege as places of refuge and defense. Interviewing some of the local people about their proud heritage of independence will give us insight into this unknown land. We hope to film the Svanetians in their homes, churches, and even the local mineral bath.

During the seven-day round-trip to Svanetia, the trekkers will pass over two very high mountain passes, ford rushing rivers, and cross glacial ice crevices. If last year sets any precedent, we expect Dr. Boris Donnikov to be kept very busy bandaging blisters during his morning office hours held in his pup tent.

The trekkers will most likely meet other hikers at campsites along the way. Last year these spontaneous mountain meetings generated some of the group's best experiences. Often the Americans were invited to share meals with other Russian groups. We expect to film these unexpected encounters, including the evening campsite sing-a-longs and serious talks which flickering campfires seem to encourage among campers everywhere.

AUG. 1 - AUG. 4: ASCENT OF MT. ELBRUS

After resting from the Svanetia trip, the trekkers will prepare for their ultimate challenge of the Caucasus, Mt. Elbrus (18,841'). The

camera crew will follow their preparations and will interview many of the participants about their feelings, fears, and concerns in confronting not only Europe's highest peak, but also themselves and their own motivations.

A chairlift and gondola will take the team part of the way up the glaciers of Mt. Elbrus. They will hike several hours to the Pruitt Refuge (13,800'), an uninsulated metal-sided building built to shelter hikers from the elements as they prepare for the final ascent of the mountain. The trekkers will spend a day getting used to the higher altitude.

The actual ascent of Mt. Elbrus begins at one o'clock in the morning, probably following a sleepless night of anticipation and camaraderie. Although the climb is not considered technically difficult, the changeable weather and wind conditions plus the danger of altitude sickness will add an element of drama to this climactic event. The camera crew will capture the moment as crampons are fixed upon hiking boots and ice axes are set in motion for the final climb. Note that because of changeable conditions several days are set aside for the ascent. If conditions are right, it can actually be made in one long day.

AUG. 5-6

Whether or not the trekkers reach their ultimate goal of the summit of Mt. Elbrus, their attempt will have been worth the effort. Their joint effort will serve as a visual metaphor for the struggle to achieve peaceful coexistence in our nuclear age.

After three weeks together, the young Soviets and Americans will have established some common ground through sharing the hardships and joyous adventures of being on the trail together.

On the evening before their final departure from the Baksan Valley, the International Mountaineering Camp will hold a banquet to honor the American and Soviet team. During the speeches and many toasts of champagne and vodka, gifts will be exchanged, including badges of merit to all participants from the U.S. President's Commission on Physical Fitness and Health.

On the last morning the camera's sensitive eye will record the poignant farewells of this small band of Americans and Soviets who together faced "The Challenge of the Caucasus".

matlock

JMC 36

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6191

SIGNED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

August 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: Papers on Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is the third in the series of papers we are doing for the President. It completes the first group, which deals with sources of Soviet behavior.

The next group will deal with the overall theme "The Soviet Union From the Inside," and I hope to have the first few ready before the President leaves for California.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A "Russia's Place in the World:
 The View From Moscow"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CSS NARA, Date 6/18/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen

8/9/85
31

Received 8/8

1985 AUG -8 PM 5:40

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6191

August 8, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RM*

SUBJECT: Paper on the Soviet Russian View of the World

Attached at Tab A is the third in a series of papers we have prepared as background reading on the Soviet Union. It deals with the Soviet and Russian view of their place in the world and follows on the two you have already seen on the nature of the Soviet Union and Soviet psychology.

Taken together, these three papers are intended to set forth key factors which operate as sources of Soviet behavior. The next group of papers will describe how the Soviet system operates on the inside.

Recommendation

OK

No

SR

That you read the paper at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A "Russia's Place in the World:
The View from Moscow"

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President
Don Regan

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

NARA, Date

6/10/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cas

BY LOT NARA DATE 11/21/07RUSSIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD:THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Russia has a long tradition of contradictory self images. For two centuries visions of Moscow as the seat of universal truth have clashed with perceptions of Russia's technical and economic backwardness. But it made a big difference whether Russians were looking west, to Europe and the United States, or south and east, to the Islamic World, China and Japan. The attitude toward the West was deeply ambivalent, with urges to emulate and "catch up" conflicting with those to declare themselves superior and to prevent the penetration of Western influences. Toward the East, however, there was less ambivalence; relations were viewed as fundamentally hostile and Russia was considered an agent of Christian, Western civilization, holding at bay threatening hordes. The injection of communist ideology with the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution brought important changes in policy, and added new contradictions, but the underlying popular attitudes toward the world outside the Soviet Union persisted.

LOOKING WEST

Russian intellectual history in the nineteenth century was in large part a conflict between "Slavophiles" and "Westernizers." The Slavophiles had a romanticized view of the Russian nation as the carrier of religious orthodoxy, profound spirituality and universal morality. The Westernizers decried Russia's backwardness, and saw emulation of western science, technology, economics and political reform as the cure for it.

The revolution which brought Lenin's Bolsheviks to power in 1917 was in a sense the ultimate victory of the most radical heirs of the Westernizers' tradition. It did not, however, put an end to conflicts of self images. The old ones persisted in transmuted forms, and new ones arose.

On the one hand the Bolsheviks saw themselves as the vanguard of the inevitable world proletarian revolution envisioned by Marx as the prelude to a communist society. On the other, they were keenly aware of Russia's backwardness. It was only after a bitter debate that Lenin won agreement to a separate peace with Germany. Many Bolsheviks wanted to turn World War I into a revolutionary campaign. They felt that a revolution in backward Russia would have no meaning if it did not immediately kindle revolution in the advanced countries of Europe.

Stalin later sought to deal with the paradox of Russia's backwardness and pretention to world leadership by arguing that building "socialism" in one country was a necessary step to pave the way for world revolution. Nevertheless, Soviet propagandists

still had to juggle conflicting self images of the USSR: boasting that the Soviet Union was an example for the world in abolishing unemployment while trumpeting Stalin's call to catch up with America.

Impact of World War II: Glory in the Ashes

The Soviet Union came perilously close to defeat when Hitler invaded, suffered heavy human and economic losses in the war, but in the end emerged as a victor. Soviet propaganda strives to keep fresh -- even passionate -- the story of patriotism, sacrifice and ultimate victory. Psychologically, World War II is a much more recent event in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States. It left its own discordant self images.

One legacy is an abiding fear of war. The populace gets jittery in periods of tension. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and again during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 we heard that rural stores ran out of matches, kerosene and soap as peasant women hoarded in fear of war. Soviet leaders play to this popular concern over peace; their habit of repeatedly seeking declaratory statements of peaceful intent is one part of this.

The other legacy was a new pride that the USSR had at last graduated into the ranks of the great powers and had new and far greater influence on world affairs. Communist officials in particular take pride in the fact that the Soviet Union has moved from an outcast power on the fringes of European geopolitics in the 1920's to one of the world's two acknowledged superpowers, and see this as perhaps their most important and lasting achievement.

The Parvenu Superpower

The short leap from the darkest days of World War II to sputnik and strategic parity with the United States must have been a heady experience for Soviet leaders. It created a new self image of the USSR as one of the world's two most powerful countries. But at the same time, it sharpened the contradictions in Soviet views of the U.S.

The idea that the USSR could be the equal of the U.S. took on new meaning. When Khrushchev renewed Stalin's theme of catching up with America economically, the notion had a new plausibility. After all, the Soviet Union had achieved a major first in space. Leninism postulated enmity between "socialist" Russia and the most advanced capitalist country of the world. But it also assumed communism would be built upon the foundation of the best that capitalism had developed. America's productivity and consumer goods were, in effect, the vision of the good life to come. Catching up with the U.S. was thus a powerful theme for

Khrushchev's Soviet audience, conditioned as it was (despite heavy propaganda to the contrary) to see America as the land of milk and honey and the embodiment of most of its aspirations. But it was again a clear admission of the shortfalls of the Soviet economy, an admission that Gorbachev implicitly reverts to today when he appeals for better economic performance and alludes to a serious lag in adopting new technology.

Eastern Europe: A Special Case

Perhaps because the margin between defeat and victory in World War II was so narrow, the Soviets have long been troubled lest their gains from the war prove transitory. The effort to freeze the postwar status quo on the Soviet side of the dividing line they imposed on Europe has run like a red thread through virtually all of Soviet diplomacy on European issues for forty years. The instrumentalities have varied enormously -- the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the MBFR negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe have all been vehicles for it. But the purpose has all been the same -- to write a public law of Europe which in the absence of a peace treaty formally ending World War II would make permanent the East-West division of Europe and provide implicit recognition of the Soviet right to take whatever steps it deemed necessary to perpetuate its domination of countries on "its" side of the line.

Entirely aside from the ideological reasons the Soviet political leadership advances to "justify" its interventions in Eastern Europe (the Brezhnev doctrine), Soviet efforts to dominate Eastern Europe find broad support from the man and woman on the street. Their attitude seems to be that Eastern Europe is made up of small nations prone to "make trouble" if given the chance. Since they might be used by a larger power to threaten Russia (as Russians are convinced they have been in the past), they must be kept in line. Furthermore, Russians are keenly aware that the East Europeans have a higher standard of living than they do, and this they resent.

When Solidarity was at its height in Poland in 1981, the aspirations of the Polish workers attracted little support among the Russian working people. One heard relatively mild and self-deprecating comments like, "The problem with the Poles is that they want to work like Russians and live like Americans," but more often the comments were bitter, like "If the Poles think they can refuse to work and then expect us to feed them, they've got another think coming." And many Russians are convinced that East Europeans live better than they do because of Soviet assistance and subsidies. "They all have their hands in our pockets," is not an unusual comment in Moscow. Deep down, Russian workers may also be ashamed of the evidence that Poles, Hungarians and even Czechs at times will rise up and fight for their interests while they Russians rarely have the guts to do so.

The popular Soviet feeling that East Europeans are likely to make trouble if left to their own devices means that, whenever the Soviet leaders decide that various forms of intervention are necessary to maintain their position in Eastern Europe, most Russians can be expected to agree.

LOOKING EAST AND SOUTH

When Russians turn their gaze south to the Islamic World and India, or east to China and Japan, they never experience a desire to emulate or "catch up," which is such a prominent aspect of their attitude toward the West. For Russians, their subjugation by the Mongols in the twelfth century, and the "Tatar yoke" which persisted for more than two centuries and cut them off from Western Europe during one of its most creative periods, is still a relevant historical experience. The experience and its "lessons" are drummed into every schoolchild, and books and films continue to be issued which tell of Russia's erstwhile degradation and subsequent redemption through relentless struggle. Along with subsequent invasions -- by Swedes, Poles, French and Germans -- the Mongol domination is used to explain and excuse Russia's economic and technological backwardness, and to bolster the feeling that everything must be sacrificed to a powerful military establishment.

Whatever disabilities the Mongols inflicted on Russia, the damage has long since been avenged and the tables turned on the Asian peoples bordering the Russian land. Nevertheless, the Asian is still considered a potential threat, and the Russian populace has never totally freed itself from the nightmare image of Asian hordes sweeping across the "motherland."

This residual fear should not be exaggerated. It does not (despite the claims of some apologists) totally explain the Soviet preoccupation with military strength. Russians know very well that the Chinese cannot really threaten them in the immediate future. But they do worry -- and probably rightly so -- about what would happen if they faced a modernized and militarily powerful China, still smarting from the imperial Russian seizure of lands once under its sway.

What is equally relevant to current Russian attitudes is that their fear has also been mingled with loathing. To put it bluntly, most Russians are racists underneath. They consider themselves "Europeans," implicitly measure themselves against European standards, and have never thought that they had anything to learn from the East. To a Russian -- even a relatively sophisticated intellectual -- there is no greater insult than to call Russia an "oriental despotism." "Despotism" they might accept, but "oriental" never.

Communist Ideology and Geopolitical Opportunism

The persistence of racist attitudes, a mingling of fear and contempt, and the absence of cultural affinity did not prevent the communist regime from embarking on a policy of exploiting social and political grievances in the underdeveloped world. If the "imperialist powers" of the developed West were too strong to take on directly, their power could perhaps be sapped by undermining their control of their empires, and their predominant influence in weakened countries like China.

During the 1920's and 1930's, these efforts were carried out primarily through the Communist International, which was totally under Stalin's control. While the effort to foment revolution in undeveloped countries had no basis in Marx's original concept -- which was that the revolution would occur only after an economy had gone through its "capitalist stage" -- it flowed easily from Lenin's theory of imperialism and the Bolshevik attempt to skip the capitalist stage in Russia. The effort, therefore, combined ideological and geopolitical aims.

After World War II, as Soviet power grew, attention was shifted to dealing with rising nationalists, even if they were not communists, and with newly independent governments which might be induced to take an anti-Western stance. If the opportunity to deal with established governments seemed sufficiently promising, the Soviets did not hesitate to abandon the local communists when they were repressed by the regime the Soviets were courting.

Soviet experience since the war must have taught them two important lessons -- neither of which they can admit openly, but both of which are implicit in their actions. The first lesson was that communist ideology in itself was not sufficient to ensure Soviet control -- Tito and Mao broke with the Soviet Union and split the world communist movement. The second was that the most powerful instrument of influence the Soviets possessed in dealing with the Third World was its ability to supply arms to revolutionary movements and the wherewithal and ideology of repression to those leaders whose power was threatened from inside their countries. The ideology thus became a mere handmaiden to force, which was applied in a totally opportunistic fashion.

Despite all their efforts to penetrate countries in the Third World, and all the crocodile tears shed in their propaganda about the lot of the poor and oppressed, one thing both communist officials and ordinary Russians lack is a real interest in the fate of these countries, and real empathy for their problems and cultural values. It is difficult to imagine, for example, the Russian population getting particularly exercised over the famine in Ethiopia, even if it were given all the facts. Life is tough enough at home to worry much about the misfortunes of others, particularly if their skins are dark.

SUPERPOWER DILEMMAS

From the standpoint of the Soviet leaders, the USSR's superpower status is both their most tangible achievement and the source of some of their greatest problems. It is apparent to them that this status rests on one factor alone -- military strength -- since the USSR is not an economic superpower, and its ideological prescriptions for satisfying human needs have been discredited both at home and increasingly throughout the world.

While the people are largely passive in regard to foreign policy formulation and play none of the direct role that publics do in democracies, their views are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to deeply-held popular views risks damaging public morale, which is already quite low, and provides ammunition for potential rival factions in the party.

The Russian people doubtless take satisfaction in their country's superpower status, both because it bolsters their national pride and because they see it as insurance against another war on their own soil. The regime, however, must be careful to avoid leaving the impression that its policies risk war. The leaders are probably acutely aware that there would be little public support for direct military action distant from Soviet borders. Covert supplies of military equipment, training and advisors and also support of surrogate troops is sustainable. These actions carry limited risk of direct confrontation with the U.S. and can be conducted largely without the knowledge of the Soviet population. But it is hard to imagine a Soviet leadership deciding to try to defend Cuba or Nicaragua or Angola with its own forces.

Another persistent trait of Soviet interaction with the outside world has been the absence of experience with and propensity for what we call alliance management. The U.S.S.R. has no real alliances, only countries under its control or those used for discrete temporary goals. Even in World War II, when the alliance with the western powers was a matter of life and death, Stalin never treated it as a true alliance, but only as a very limited marriage of convenience to be terminated as soon as the war was won. (The Russian people, in contrast, looked at it differently, and their experience of and gratitude for the wartime alliance has served to undercut massive anti-western propaganda ever since.)

Soviet unwillingness or inability to understand and respect the interests of smaller and weaker countries and to develop with them mutually beneficial long-term policies limits the potential of Soviet diplomacy. In the short term, the Soviet leaders can reap the benefits of a "divide and conquer" policy, since they put most of their efforts on exploiting bilateral relationships to their own benefit. This enhances their ability to disrupt and undermine international structures and efforts which leave them

on the sidelines. Witness, for example, their ability to derail efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East by providing support to forces in the area which oppose a settlement.

In the long run, however, the sheer opportunism of Soviet policies tends to stimulate local resistance to Soviet influence, and a turn of the political wheel in a given country can result in the sudden expulsion of Soviet representatives -- as occurred, for example, in Sadat's Egypt. But this long-term vulnerability only reinforces the Soviet proclivity to seek domination of other countries rather than relations based on mutual respect. The Soviets are totally incapable of maintaining with other countries the sort of relationship we have with Canada and Mexico, and their inability to do so creates serious problems both for them and for the entire world. To gain some sense of the Soviet dilemma as most Russians perceive it, we need only imagine the problems we would face if we felt we had to occupy our neighbors and impose puppet regimes on them in order to be secure and to play our destined role in the world.

* * * * *

These Soviet and Russian attitudes toward the outside world pose many problems for American policy. Though the Russian populace tends to see Soviet policies and actions as defensive, its underlying fears and sense of wounded national pride is exploited by the communist regime's cynical manipulation. The fact is that the Soviets define their "security" in terms which amount to absolute insecurity for everyone else. It makes little difference to a Pole or an Afghan that Russians feel they have to dominate them to be secure; for them the end result is the same as it would be if the avowed Soviet rationale were imperial conquest. It is important, therefore, never to accept the Soviet argument that their aggressive actions are justified by legitimate security concerns, and to do all we can to make clear to the Soviet people that such policies undermine their security in the long run rather than bolstering it.

Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Union is a superpower only in military terms creates its own set of problems. Attempts to extend Soviet influence by military means must be countered, but it would be an illusion to think the Soviet leaders can be persuaded to forswear such means, since they are the only means at their disposal to demonstrate their status and "rights" as a superpower. The Soviet Union is non-competitive in a peaceful world, and its leaders know it. Therefore, they can be dissuaded from applying or threatening force in given situations only by being convinced either that their efforts are doomed to failure, or that they would run unacceptable risks such as a dangerous military confrontation with the United States or a political defeat damaging to their prestige.

Fortunately, other elements in the typically Russian view of the world make our problem more manageable. There is little if any public support for Soviet military involvement far from their borders, particularly if justified solely on ideological grounds. And countries which receive large numbers of Soviet "advisors" quickly develop a virulent antipathy, since most Russians simply do not deal with Asians, Africans and East Europeans with the respect they reserve for West Europeans and Americans. Whenever the perceived need for Soviet arms diminishes, the Soviets are usually given the boot, provided they have not managed to establish military control over the country.

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Matlock

EYES ONLY

SECRET / SENSITIVE

Mr. McFarlane

~~See for info~~

~~Y~~

To JACK MATLOCK

Claremont
file
Aug 7,
1945

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MD 41
RCM
Aug. 7, 1985

TO: RCM

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: McSweeney "Contact" and
Shcheransky

1. Palmer has informed me that McSweeney called him to say that our message did not get through to his contact until Tuesday of last week - too late to arrange anything for Helsinki. However, McSweeney said his contacts were "very pleased" and would be contacting us.
2. I also understand that Vogel has informed us that the Soviets are interested in an exchange of Shcheransky for a Paraguayan CP leader and a Soviet in W. German hands. State has checked with the Paraguayan Gov't, which disclaims any knowledge of the whereabouts of the CP leader mentioned. We plan to go back to Vogel and see if someone else might be specified.
(To my knowledge this is the 1st time the Soviets have shown concrete interest in discussing an exchange for Shcheransky.)
Vogel said, by the way, that if the exchange goes thru, it had to be well

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NLS Feb-11/7 #7615

BY ADJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

before November, since Gorbachev did not want it linked in the public mind with his meeting with the President.

[You may have been informed of the second item, but I wanted to make sure you are au courant.]

Jack