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JMC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 1, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK ^{gm}MATLOCK/TYRUS ^{TC} COBB

SUBJECT: Letter to Eugene Rostow

Gene Rostow has sent you a copy of his article entitled, "The Next Step in Soviet-American Relations: Modus Vivendi or Peace?". Rostow is concerned about Soviet noncompliance with existing treaties and believes that it would be dangerous to seek agreements with the USSR. Specifically:

- o Rostow argues against Kissinger's call for secret negotiations to achieve specific agreements with the Soviets, since the USSR is likely to violate the agreements.
- o He criticizes the Kissinger/Nixon vision of a "pragmatic modus vivendi" with the USSR, arguing that there is no possible state of detente or peaceful coexistence between war and peace.
- o He alleges that Kissinger essentially advocates a division of the world into "spheres of influence," a concept that would mean our abdicating any interest in Eurasian policies.
- o Rostow notes that the Soviet practice of aggression and non-compliance with agreements could ultimately result in world politics being governed by "instincts of self-preservation rather than by the rule of law."

Rostow's admonitions are well taken, but he has created a strawman that few (including Kissinger) really advocate. Your reply stresses that there is no intention here to "stand by and be nibbled to death" as he fears.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Thank you letter to Rostow
- Tab II Letter and Article from Rostow
- Tab III Kissinger Article

2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1985

Dear Gene:

I greatly appreciate the advance copy of your comments on U.S.-Soviet relations. As you know, we have been wrestling with some of the fundamental problems you discussed, and I certainly share your concerns about the miserable record of the Soviets on compliance with past agreements. Like Stevenson, we too have no intention of standing by and being nibbled to death.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Eugene V. Rostow
National Defense University
Washington, D. C. 20319



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

July 11, 1985

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Jack Mallock 3
for ack &
comment
5907

JUL 22 1985 RCM HAS SEEN

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud,

I enclose an [redacted] [redacted] Henry's proposal
[redacted] Corleone. It summarizes a paper I presented at a symposium in
Brussels about a month ago. Henry's ideas were circulating widely in
Europe when we were there. My piece will be published shortly.

With high regard.

Yours, as ever,

Eugene V. Rostow
Visiting Research Professor of
Law and Diplomacy

10 July 1985

The Next Step in Soviet American
Relations: Modus Vivendi or Peace?

by

Eugene V. Rostow*

"For too long," Henry Kissinger has said (5 May 1985), "the Western democracies have flinched from facing the fundamental cause of tensions, the ground rules the Soviets have succeeded in imposing on the international system. Everything that has become Communist remains forever inviolate. Everything that is non-Communist is open to change: by pressure, by subversion, by guerrilla action, if necessary by terror. These ground rules if not resisted will inexorably shift the balance of power against the democracies."

Mr. Kissinger admirably defines the central dilemma of Western foreign policy. But the remedy he prescribes would make the crisis worse.

As Mr. Kissinger points out, the Soviet Union is pressing us to accept the singular thesis that it is above the law against aggression applicable to all other states. Soviet expansion achieved by aggression

*Senior Research Scholar at Yale University and Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University.

5

is changing the world balance of power. And the growing Soviet advantage in ground based ballistic nuclear missiles will soon make it impossible for the Western nations to resist Soviet aggression through the use of conventional forces. Facing these pressures, the West has flinched and is still flinching rather than confront the true character of Soviet policy. For the moment, the West is mesmerized, like a bird confronted by a snake.

As a result, Mr. Kissinger tells us, the international order is lurching towards a systemic breakdown like that of August, 1914. He concludes that unless the Soviet Union and the United States reach agreement soon on viable rules for peaceful coexistence, a major confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States is nearly inevitable -- a confrontation neither side could expect to control. The reason such an outcome is so likely, Mr. Kissinger believes, is that the existing ground rules for Soviet-American co-existence are both unacceptable and dangerous

Thus far, Mr. Kissinger is on solid ground. But the next stage of his argument jumps the track both of logic and of experience.

II

To eliminate the threat of an uncontrollable crisis in a nuclear setting, Mr. Kissinger recommends a secret Soviet-American negotiation to

6

achieve "specific agreements that define the true vital interests of each side and the permissible challenges to them. In the past", Mr. Kissinger writes, "such agreements have been confined to generalities that created the illusion of progress. Let us now work on a concrete and definite program."

Many thoughtful and informed experts agree with the judgment behind Mr. Kissinger's proposal, i.e., that we lack the power to require the Soviet Union to live within its legitimate borders like other states in accordance with the United Nations Charter. People of Mr. Kissinger's persuasion therefore seek a "pragmatic" modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, a spheres-of-influence agreement which would define a Soviet American relationship short of peace but less explosive than that of the last forty years. Mr. Nixon, for example, calls such a relationship "hard-headed detente."

The record of Soviet international behavior since the Bolshevik Revolution, and especially since 1945, make it painfully obvious that the advocates of a new Modus Vivendi agreement with the Soviet Union are pursuing a will o' the wisp. In the small, dangerous, interdependent, and volatile nuclear world of the late twentieth century, there is no possible state of "detente" half way between war and peace. the West can accept no definition for terms like "detente" or "peaceful co-existence" except that of peace itself.

1

The concept of peace involves much more than the absence of violence. Peace is a social and political condition characterized not simply by order but by order under law. By law in this context I mean the patterns of behavior deemed just by the society of nations, the mores of international society reflected in its generally accepted customs and in the guiding spirit of its law. International law in this sense has a long history going back to Roman times and beyond. Its decisive modern development has taken place since 1815. For the present stage of modern history, the concept of international order which all members of the state system have formally endorsed is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and especially in its prohibition of aggression. That rule and the other principles of the United Nations Charter reflect the conditions necessary to permit the peaceful cooperation of sovereign and independent states within an open international order. There can be no relaxation of tensions and no security among the nations until those rules are generally and reciprocally enforced.

Two classes of reasons compel this conclusion--reasons of experience and reasons of analysis.

III

The kinds of agreements Mr. Kissinger proposes have been made many times since the summit meetings at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. They have

8

always failed. Some were general in their language but many were extremely concrete and specific. For example, the Soviet-American agreement of October, 1962, negotiated by Governor Harriman, was crystal clear. In that agreement, the Soviet Union promised us that North Vietnam would withdraw its troops from Laos and respect the neutrality of that unhappy land. Many students of the wars in Indo-China believe that President Kennedy's failure to insist on the enforcement of the 1962 Laos agreement led straight to the Vietnam tragedy.

The Indo-Chinese Agreements of January and March, 1973, were comparably "concrete and definite", in Mr. Kissinger's phrase. They purported to provide a great power guaranty for the enforcement of the Laos Agreement of 1962 and for the rights of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people.

Similarly, the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement of May, 1972, not only promised Soviet-American cooperation in managing crises peacefully, but categorically assured us of Soviet support for efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

The Soviet Union breached the Middle Eastern feature of the 1972 agreement a month before it was signed by promising Sadat full support for the Yom Kippur War of 1973. And it treated all the other agreements mentioned above as scraps of paper before the ink of their signatures was

dry. A high ranking Soviet official referred to one of these agreements in my presence as a typical attempt by an American President to deceive American public opinion.

Nothing could have been more "concrete and definite" --or more important--than the assurance of free elections in Eastern Europe given us by the Soviet Union at Yalta and Potsdam. President Kennedy once told a Soviet interviewer that there could be no peace between the Soviet Union and the United States until those promises were carried out. But they have not been carried out.

One could list other agreements of the kind Mr. Kissinger recommends--the McCloy-Zorin agreement, for example, the Helsinki Final Act, the statements issued after summit meetings without number. They all had the same melancholy fate.

It is hard to imagine a reason why the Soviet Union should be more willing now than in the past to fulfill agreements of the kind Mr. Kissinger is proposing. The Soviets are still enlarging their lead over the West in all categories of military power. Despite political setbacks in Egypt and in China, they continue to gain politically in many important areas of the world. And they remain convinced that the future of world politics will be determined by the correlation of military forces.

IV

But there is a more fundamental reason why Mr. Kissinger's proposal is devoid of promise. There is no way in which the United States and the Soviet Union could define and agree to respect each others' national security interests until the Soviet Union gives up its dream of empire. Mr. Kissinger is trying to square the circle.

The most basic national security interest of the United States is to prevent any one power from controlling the full Eurasian land mass--a resevoir of power which the coastal and island states, including the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, could not hope to defeat.

But the manifest goal of Soviet foreign policy is to gain control of the Eurasian land mass--to achieve hegemony both in Europe and in Asia, and therefore to impose its will in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and many other parts of the world. The foreign policy objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be reconciled by negotiation, however secret and ingenious.

The United States has always been conscious of its geopolitical interest in opposing hegemonial power in Europe and in Asia. When Napoleon invaded Russia, Thomas Jefferson saw at once, despite his strong sympathies with France and with the French Revolution, that a French victory over Russia would endanger the United States. The same

11

perception led us to fight in the two World Wars of this century in order to prevent Germany from dominating Western Europe and Russia. And we helped organize NATO in 1949, and have participated in its activities ever since, to keep the Soviet Union from achieving the same end. The identical principle led us to fight in four Asian wars since 1898 and, more recently, to guarantee the security of Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan. Modern Japan is obviously a vital security interest of the United States exactly as Western Europe is, and for the same reason. Korea is important in itself and vital to the defense of Japan. Europe could be outflanked and neutralized from Soviet bases in the Middle East. We must oppose hegemonial power in Asia and the Middle East as well as in Europe. The world, after all, is round.

In trying to deal with the dynamic process of Soviet expansion, now extending to every corner of the globe, can any geographical areas be listed in advance as beyond the possible security concerns of the United States? In recent years we have perceived threats to our national interests in Central Africa, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Thailand as well as in Central America, Europe, and East Asia. In the context of the Soviet Union's flexible strategy of expansion, these perceptions were well-founded. As Alexander Hamilton pointed out in Number 23 of the Federalist, the circumstances which may threaten the safety of nations are infinitely varied. They cannot be defined in advance with

12

precision. We should avoid the temptation to try. Mr. Kissinger would violate Hamilton's wise and realistic advice.

The United States and most other nations of the world want an open state system of sovereign and independent states, conducting their affairs autonomously in accordance with the rules of international law. The Soviet Union is still pursuing the course of indefinite expansion achieved by aggression, a policy which can end only in dominion or disaster. The relation between the United States and the Soviet Union is therefore like that between Great Britain and the nations which bid for dominion between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries--Spain in the time of Philip II; France from the age of Louis XIV to that of Napoleon; and Germany in the first half of this century. Now, in a global state system which is no longer Euro-centered, the Soviet Union is seeking mastery with the aid of the nuclear weapon--more specifically, with the political aid of a visible and plausible first-strike capacity against the United States. Of necessity, the United States must be what Great Britain was for so long--the arbiter of the world balance of power. There is no other nation or combination of nations which could offset the Soviet nuclear arsenal and other aspects of Soviet military power as a paralyzing and neutralizing political force.

A Modus Vivendi of the kind Mr. Kissinger recommends would involve a narrowing of our present defense perimeter, perhaps a radical retreat.

At a minimum, it would result in an agreement through which the Soviet Union would promise to withdraw from the Western Hemisphere in exchange for the neutralization of Western Europe and Japan, and therefore the withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East and Southern Asia..

But we cannot retreat to a narrower perimeter of defense without allowing a catastrophic and nearly irreversible change in the world balance of power to take place. In the nuclear age, peace really is indivisible. The "Balkans" detonating the contemporary state system could be Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Korea, or Southern Africa as it once was Sarajevo, Manchuria, Abyssinia, and Spain. If the United States tries to retreat to isolation and neutrality, a Soviet dominated world system would emerge automatically. It is a fantasy to suppose that such a system would tolerate American individualism and American freedom.

V

If the foreign policy we have employed since 1946 has resulted in a great increase in the power and aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, and a corresponding decline in the security of the United States and the Western world more generally, what should be done to rectify the situation?

The only possible cure for the crisis, in my judgment, is to create or recreate the state system in whose stability and successful

14

functioning every state has an equal and inescapable interest--the state system posited by the United Nations Charter. Such an international order could only be based on a stable balance of world power. There are no shortcuts to this goal, no cheap substitutes for directly addressing the problem of Soviet aggression. Spheres of influence agreements, arms control agreements, economic carrots and sticks, and other half-measures are a snare and a delusion unless they are backed by arrangements of collective security to protect the balance of power. It is too late in the day to suggest one more "test" of Soviet intentions, as Mr. Kissinger does. Soviet intentions are perfectly clear. The leaders of the Soviet Union intend the natural consequences of their acts.

The United States and the coalitions it leads in the Atlantic, the Middle East, and the Pacific have more than enough power and potential power to accomplish the goal of peace. They must decide to do so while there is still time to do so by the methods of peace.

A first step to this end, after suitable consultations, would be to supplement President Truman's policy of containment, the cornerstone of Western foreign policy since 1947. Concretely, this would require President Reagan to inform Mr. Gorbachev that unless the Soviet Union gives up its policies of aggression the United States and its allies will have to reconsider their own commitment to the Charter rules.

The Soviet practice of aggression is eroding the political foundation for Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the basic organizing principle of the state system since the Congress of Vienna. In the Charter, the rule prohibits any international use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, save for purposes of individual or collective self-defense. As a rule of law and a political principle, this prohibition must be generally respected or it will not be respected at all. The state system cannot function under a double standard. Unless the Soviet Union gives up the practice of aggression, it cannot expect other states to regard Article 2(4) of the Charter as one of the Ten Commandments. Adlai Stevenson said a generation ago that we will not stand by and be nibbled to death. When he was Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig warned that continued Soviet violations of Article 2(4) would deprive the provision of all influence over the behavior of states. And Secretary of State Shultz commented in February, 1985, in a speech at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, that it was ridiculous for the Soviet Union to claim a right to send arms and men to fight against the authority of a state and then object if the United States did the same thing.

This is not a development the United States wants. On the contrary, such a development would violate every precept for which the United States has labored in world politics for two centuries. But it will come, inevitably, if world politics are governed by instincts of self-preservation rather than by the rule of law.

16

The step recommended here is not to be undertaken lightly. It would be worse than useless if it were considered to be a bluff. And it will not be easy or cheap to carry out. But it is the only course available to the United States and the West.

A policy to achieve peace cannot be fulfilled in a moment, or in six months. There is much damage to be overcome before it could become effective. But the most important component of social cohesion, as social philosophers in the tradition of Montesquieu and Ortega y Gasset have perceived, is not a shared past but a shared vision of the future. Lord Carrington recently warned that the greatest weakness of the Western alliances today is precisely that they lack a shared vision of the future and agreement on practical means for achieving it. Ortega concluded that Spain began to disintegrate after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in the sixteenth century, when Spain began its long retreat from the dream of a Empire. One can sense a comparable process of disintegration at work in the once confident coalition of states committed to the vision of an open state system, organized on the principle of equality among all states, and of respect for the rules of interstate cooperation which have developed from the seeds sown at the Congress of Vienna.

What is required is not another empty Modus Vivendi agreement with the Soviet Union, based on a partial Western acceptance of the rules the Soviet Union is attempting to impose on the state system, but a

determination to achieve peace itself. Such a program could be the compass of Western foreign and security policy, pointing towards the only goal which could assure the survival and triumph of Western civilization.

Charting a Course to ¹⁷³ the Summit

West Must Seek Durable Change

By Henry A. Kissinger

WASHINGTON

Now that a "get-acquainted summit" between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev appears probable during the U.N. General Assembly in the fall, it is not too early to ask what message and impression one hopes Gorbachev will take home to his colleagues.

So far there is no great cause for optimism. The Western democracies have repeated the stereotype practiced during three Soviet successions in three years. When the succession went to two old men it was claimed that advanced age means caution. Now that a younger man has taken over, his commitment to progressive and conciliatory ideas is taken for granted.

As for the Soviet leadership, its response has been equally stereotyped, if less psychiatrically inclined. It has put forward essentially the same clichés and the same old threats since the funeral of Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Nevertheless, common sense would suggest that the Soviet leadership must sooner or later undertake a reappraisal of its ossified foreign policy, not because its leaders have become particularly more peaceful but because circumstances

would seem to require it. But how far that reappraisal will be carried depends importantly on Western attitudes.

Among the most worrisome of those is the Western obsession with basing hopes for peace on the personality of the Soviet leader or on a personal relationship established at the summit. These hopes correspond to no Soviet reality. No Soviet general secretary, Stalin included, achieved unchallenged control in less than four years. Nor can a Soviet leader base a change of policy on so un-Marxist a consideration as his personal relationship with an American President without discrediting himself with his colleagues. The Soviet leadership is much more likely to consider the Western emphasis on the demeanor and dress of the Soviet leaders as a weakness that constitutes a strategic opportunity.

The best prospect for easing East-West tensions resides not in the unknown attitudes of Gorbachev but in the crisis of the Soviet governmental and economic structure.

But these very domestic preoccupations will make the Soviet leadership as eager for a respite as it will be reluctant

to add major foreign-policy changes. Their temptation must be to purchase that respite by a change of tone without real substance—a tendency to doubt reinforced by the sudden obsession with summit meetings from a conservative American Administration.

In short, wise Western statesmanship should seek to turn Soviet temptations for an atmospheric interlude into a durable change.

It is essential to convey two major themes: that a relaxation of tensions must include a political component, and that arms control must be something other than an attempt to deprive the West of its most advanced weapons.

For too long the Western democracies have flinched from facing the fundamental cause of tensions: the ground rules the Soviets have succeeded in imposing on the international system. Everything that has become communist remains forever inviolate. Everything that is non-communist is open to change: by pressure, by subversion, by guerrilla action, if necessary by terror. These ground rules if not resisted will inexorably shift the balance of power against the democracies.

The democracies have been reluctant to link political conduct and the control of arms because they are afraid to jeopardize their paramount objective of slowing the arms race; thereby in fact they endanger both. The use of Cuban proxy forces in Angola and Ethiopia, the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and of Cambodia by Soviet-armed Vietnamese forces, the accumulation of Soviet military equipment in rogue states like Libya, the Soviet military presence in Cuba, South Yemen and Vietnam, the intelligence support for guerrilla movements—all produce international tensions and dangers of miscalculation greater than the arms race as such.

Arms control, however important, is not a substitute for foreign policy. Moreover it would be nearly impossible to find a subject less suitable for a meeting of minds between heads of adversary governments after an interruption of the dialogue for over six years. The subject has become so esoteric that it fits Lord Palmerston's description of the Schleswig-Holstein question of the 19th Century: Only three people had ever understood it, he said. One was dead. The second was in a lunatic asylum. He was the third and he had forgotten it. Arms-control positions do not reflect an overall concept because they emerge from bureaucratic controversies and because there is no longer any intellectual theory outside of government to sustain them. Heads of state cannot cut through this fog in a single meeting: Their lack of sophistication on the subject may make matters worse.

So long as arsenals are based on multiple warheads (MIRVs) and defense is proscribed, no foreseeable scheme of arms control will reduce either side's capacity to inflict apocalyptic levels of civilian damage.

Only two alternative conceptions are available: confining missiles to single warheads—deMIRVing them—and strategic defense, the so-called "Star Wars." The former idea is not on the agenda of Geneva. The latter idea is under systematic attack: by traditional theorists of arms-control theory committed to assured civilian destruction, by allies eager to remove anything that the Soviets have declared an obstacle to arms control and by a Soviet propaganda strategy of intimidation, served by a military policy based on apocalyptic civilian damage. The convergence of these forces has managed to stigmatize strategic defense as "destabilizing" and as an obstacle to arms control before negotiations have even started. The Administration has retreated before this onslaught. It has put forward at least four different versions of strategic defense; it has justified strategic defense by invoking in the language of the peace movement its horror of nuclear war (on which, after all, deterrence theory will have to be based for the next decade whatever the fate of "Star Wars"). It has argued that "Star Wars" amounts to no more than research, leaving judgments as to feasibility and deployment for a period long after President Reagan's term.

In this manner the Administration may have tempted ever fiercer Soviet pressures. Research has always been permitted and has been carried out for a decade by both sides—indeed the Administration's budget is only about \$8 billion more than that proposed by President Carter. The emphasis on research has fostered the illusion that the European allies support strategic defense. In fact they "support" research partly as a platform from which to oppose deployment. Obviously the Western tendency is, for domestic political reasons, to settle for whatever the Soviets have defined as attainable.

It is therefore possible to foresee an outcome at Geneva that will reduce offensive weapons without impairing the capacity for civilian devastation, while the deployment of defensive weapons is deferred to an Administration bound to face much greater political pressures than the incumbent. And there is always the risk that Congress, in

the name of arms control, will emasculate strategic defense as it has the MX, and thereby saddle the United States with the worst aspect of every course of action.

The United States must thus chart a delicate course with a precipice on each side: Excessive truculence would split the United States from its allies; excessive enthusiasm for conciliation would contribute to Western escapism and remove Soviet incentives for a serious dialogue.

Though I would have favored a less impetuous approach to the summit, a Reagan-Gorbachev meeting could enable the United States to convey the scope and requirements of a genuine easing of tensions, provided the President is prepared to be precise.

The principal message from Reagan to Gorbachev should go something like this:

"Current political trends sooner or later risk a confrontation perhaps not sought by either side, through eruptions neither can control. Existing ground rules are both unacceptable and dangerous. The avoidance of a political dialogue risks reproducing the conditions that led to World War I—an accumulation of political tensions one of which gets out of hand because no one has thought of how to contain it. No one would benefit from such a war except the regions spared its cataclysmic devastation.

"There must be specific agreements that define the true vital interests of each side and the permissible challenges to them. In the past such agreements have been confined to generalities that created an illusion of progress. Let us now work on a concrete and definite program.

"As for arms control, the current

tendency is either to confirm existing weapons programs or reduce them cosmetically. You have also used the talks to seek to deny us the use of technologies in which we are ahead and which reduce your ability for nuclear blackmail. You must know that we will not be driven off a defensive deployment designed to reduce civilian casualties. But we are prepared to keep our deployment to the minimum compatible with dealing with the offensive threat. Thus you have it in your power to reduce the level of defensive forces by drastic mutual cuts in offensive forces. In order to take account of your expressed concern that strategic defense might lead to a surprise attack, we are proposing that both sides abolish multiple warheads over a period of 10 years while they are phasing in strategic defense.

"Let us set up a private channel out of the glare of publicity to define what kind of world we want in 10 to 15 years from now, both in the political and military field. As we make progress in this channel and through our foreign secretaries, we can meet periodically to review their work and issue instructions on the basis of it."

Such a message would confront the Politburo with its real choice. If the approach is rejected we will know that any relaxation is certain to be temporary. If it is accepted it may lead to a breakthrough.

In either case tensions will ease for a while. But we should not settle for an interlude. It would be a great pity if history were to record the current period as a major lost opportunity.

This is one of a series of articles that former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is writing for The Times.

Matlock Check

5840

24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 2, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Catholics
for Religious Freedom

Catholics for Religious Freedom have written the President regarding efforts to improve the life of Catholics and other religious groups in the Soviet Union (Tab II).

Anne Higgins suggests that since the response is so involved you or Bud sign the reply. I have prepared the letter for your signature (Tab I).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the reply to the Catholics for Religious Freedom (Tab I).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Letter for Signature
Tab II	Incoming Letter
Tab III	Draft Prepared by State
Tab IV	Anne Higgins Note

21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Dear Friends:

On behalf of President Reagan, thank you for your letter of June 14 regarding the plight of Catholics in the Soviet Union. We have read your letter and the attached paper with great interest and would like to respond to your thoughtful recommendations.

We agree with your assessment that the Soviet authorities have recently stepped up their persecution of Catholics and other religious believers in the Soviet Union. The recent convictions of Vasiliy Kobrin and Jonas Matulionis and the arrest of Iosif Terelya are three of the better known examples of this extremely disturbing trend. This crackdown appears to be motivated in part by Soviet fear of the growth of religious belief in the Soviet Union.

Our government has monitored this Soviet anti-religion campaign with mounting concern. Human rights issues have become an integral and permanent component of the U.S.-Soviet agenda, and we raise our human rights concerns, including our concerns over Soviet religious persecution, in virtually every high-level meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials. During the visit of Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitsky to this country in March, Secretary Shultz specifically raised our concerns about Soviet persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, as did many members of the Congress. In preparation for this visit, we presented members of Congress with detailed information on the human rights situation in the Ukraine, including specific case histories on individual prisoners of conscience.

Ambassador Richard Schifter, at the recently concluded Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, condemned the continuing Soviet refusal to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church. He also raised the cases of Uniate Fathers Kobrin, Terelya and Budzinskiy and those of Lithuanian Catholic Fathers Matulionis, Tamkevicius and Svarinskas. Additionally, in our Semi-Annual Helsinki Implementation Reports and in our annual country Human Rights Reports we continue to catalogue and condemn the Soviet persecution of its Catholic population. Both publicly and privately, we continue to make clear that Soviet human rights abuses, including the persecution of religious believers, are a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks.

In your letter you recommend that the State Department classify Soviet prisoners of conscience according to their ethnicity and religion. As I am sure you know, the United States Government is concerned about all victims of Soviet human rights abuses regardless of their ethnic background or religion. Nevertheless, in our public statements we are careful to indicate the ethnic background or religion of individual prisoners of conscience. For example, if we make a public statement regarding the arrest of a Lithuanian Catholic priest or a representation on his behalf, we refer to the individual specifically as a Lithuanian Catholic priest. We regard such classification as essential. On the other hand, the Department of State does not maintain or publish lists of Soviet political or religious prisoners per se. The only human rights related lists we do maintain which classify individuals by name and residence are our representation lists of persons denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union. These are special lists which we periodically present to Soviet authorities at high-level bilateral meetings.

We strongly agree with your recommendation regarding the value of generating grassroots support to balance our ongoing diplomatic efforts on behalf of Soviet Catholics. As you are no doubt aware, Jewish Americans have been particularly active and effective in promoting the cause of their brethren in the Soviet Union. The leadership of the Synagogue Council of America, the chief rabbinical umbrella association in this country, recently expressed to us their interest in working with other religious denominations whose co-religionists are persecuted in the Soviet Union. We think that this is an excellent idea which you might wish to pursue directly with the Synagogue Council.

Let me conclude by thanking you for your thoughtful and welcome suggestions. I want to assure you of the President's deep concern for the plight of Soviet Catholics and his resolve to work to alleviate it. If we can be of further assistance in this or any other matter, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Catholics for Religious
Freedom in Totalitarian
Nations
P. O. Box 33883
Washington, D.C. 20033-0883

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

5840

23

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8519804

Date JUL 23 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Catholics For Religious Freedom in
Totalitarian Nations
Date: June 14, 1985 Subject: Regarding efforts to improve life
of Catholics and other religious groups in the USSR.
WH Referral Dated: July 5, 1985 NSC ID# 326143
(if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- _____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- _____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- _____ Other.

Remarks:


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

8519804

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

JULY 5, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
ANNE HIGGINS

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 326143
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 14, 1985
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
CATHOLICS FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
TOTALITARIAN NATIONS
POST OFFICE BOX 33883
WASHINGTON DC 20033

SUBJECT: REGARDING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE LIFE OF
CATHOLICS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN THE
USSR

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

25

ID # 326143

CO165

Ag

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

8519804

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 85 10 17

Name of Correspondent: Mr. Mrs. Miss Catholics For Religious Freedom in Totalitarian Nations.

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Re: efforts to improve life of Catholics and other religious groups in the U.S.S.R.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
Higg Coker	ORIGINATOR	85 10 10	TR		85 10 1
✓ Dos	D	85 10 10	TR	Q	85 10 27
		1 1			1 1
		1 1			1 1
		1 1			1 1

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference. ext. 2590.

326143 ²⁴

CATHOLICS FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
IN TOTALITARIAN NATIONS

8519804

P.O. BOX 33883
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20033-0883

June 14, 1985

President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We have been observing with great interest the continuing arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. As concerned Catholic laymen, we urge the inclusion of the goals of recognizing and taking action to improve life for Catholics and other religious groups in the U.S.S.R. as one of the goals of any negotiations with the Soviets.

Enclosed is a paper, "The Condition of the Catholic Church in the U.S.S.R." which notes the marked increase in the number and intensity of Soviet attacks on the Catholic Church. Ironically the crackdown on religion in the Soviet Union confirms the extent to which religious freedom poses a strong -- and in many cases a growing -- threat to communist tyranny.

In addition to calling for the easing of restrictions of religious practices we would like to make the following recommendations:

1. Any diplomatic efforts by the U. S. government on behalf of Soviet Catholics must be supported by a grassroots publicity and lobbying effort. We pledge our wholehearted support to such an effort.
2. Public and private diplomatic efforts to help Soviet Catholics should focus on efforts to pressure the Soviet regime to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church and to remove restrictions on candidates for the two Catholic seminaries in Lithuania and Latvia.
3. The State Department should change the way it classifies its information on Soviet prisoners of conscience. It is currently classified according to the individual's name and republic only. It should also be classified according to his ethnicity and religion, since one, or the other, or both, is usually the real reason he has been imprisoned.

President of the United States
June 14, 1985
Page Two

4. Individual case histories should be presented to members of Congress and the Executive Branch. They should be invoked during international negotiations and meetings, so that the Soviet leadership knows that this issue is of great concern to the American people and its government.

Mr. President, as a VOA editorial noted, "Despite the constant assault on religion, it remains strong in the Soviet Union.... This strength is a sign that religion reflects a deep human need -- a human right which governments can deny, but can never crush."

We commend you for your vigorous leadership in promoting human rights around the world and look forward to working with you in this specific endeavor.

Sincerely,

William H. J. Fitzgerald

Leonard J. Kior

Edwin J. Furlong

Margaret B. Cardisla

Philip J. Kelly

Mark R. Puckett

Ann M. Stuart

Anna Helen Lee

Joan E. Donohue

Frank J. Terk

Genevieve Scanlon

Kathleen C. Odle, Jr.

Agnes B. Ward

T. P. Melody

John P. Mackey, Esq.

William F. Loom

Walter P. Kennedy

Richard V. Allen

THE CONDITION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE U.S.S.R.

In the last decade Western groups dedicated to human and religious rights have attempted to monitor the state of religious life in the Soviet Union. Their inquiries into the condition of the Catholic Church in the U.S.S.R. have uncovered evidence of a marked increase in the number and intensity of Soviet attacks on the Church. While deplorable, the amount of news reaching the West of active Soviet persecution of the Church does provide an ironic confirmation of the extent to which Catholicism still poses a strong and, in many cases, growing threat to Communist tyranny.

Lithuania and the Ukraine are the strongest Catholic areas in the U.S.S.R. In both population and in their degree of self-conscious religious unity, Catholics in these areas pose the greatest challenge to Soviet authority. Smaller numbers of Catholics live in Latvia, Moldavia (on the borders of Rumania), and among the ethnic Germans, Poles, and Hungarians isolated in diaspora in the Soviet Union. Reliable statistics on the number of Catholics in the Soviet Union are hard to obtain. Information about religious life, official persecution, and acts of dissent is fragmentary. We know Soviet hatred of the Church is unyielding. Nevertheless, the condition of Catholics under Soviet rule is not hopeless. In the Ukraine, even after years of repression, there are stirrings of religious dissent tied to the human rights movement and to Ukrainian nationalism. In Lithuania this interweaving of ethnic nationalism, human rights, and religious revival has grown remarkably in the past decade and reached almost to a "Polish" level of activism

and self-confidence. The following report emphasizes the condition of Catholicism in these two countries.

LITHUANIA

Though the Lithuanians were the last of the Baltic peoples to embrace Christianity, they eventually became the staunchest of Catholics. 75% of Lithuania's 3 1/2 million people are still practicing Catholics (vs. 85% in 1939). There are about 700 priests (vs. 1500 in 1939). In Lithuania, as in neighboring Poland, the Catholic Church holds a special place in the national consciousness.

The first known stirrings of organized Catholic dissent appeared during the Brezhnev regime. Petitions for religious freedom, one signed by some 17,000 persons, were sent to Moscow in 1970 and 1971. They produced a wave of repression culminating in the issuance of new regulations restricting Church authority and the arrest of three priests for teaching religion. But the campaign of mass petitions did not diminish and has become even more popular in recent years. In 1983 123,000 Lithuanians petitioned Yuri Andropov for the release of two imprisoned priests. However, attempts to deliver the petitions to Moscow were twice thwarted by authorities.¹

A more successful method of dissent has been the unofficial Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania. Since it was first circulated underground in March 1972, sixty-four issues have appeared, the most recent on October 7, 1984. (An English translation is prepared by Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid of New York City.) Although fourteen people have been arrested over the last ten years for distributing the Chronicle KGB efforts to stop publication have

been unsuccessful. Despite the increased crackdown on Soviet dissenters launched in the years since 1979, observers report that the Chronicle and as many as fifteen other Lithuanian samizdat periodicals have survived virtually unscathed thanks to Lithuanian readiness to organize demonstrations and mass protests when they are pushed too far.²

For instance, the October 7, 1984 Chronicle (English language publication date February 16, 1985) provides an amazing 70 pages of reports from Lithuania's dioceses citing Church-state disputes, mass protests, KGB raids and investigations, news about political prisoners, and the texts of sermons and petitions. Names of priests and laymen who have signed petitions are openly cited. Collaborationist priests and Communist officials who have issued threats against publicizing persecution are also identified by name. In 1982 the Communist Commissioner of Religious Affairs, Petras Anilionis, offered Lithuanian Catholics their own official newspaper if only the Chronicle were shut down. The offer received no response.

The Chronicle identifies in great detail the extent of Communist persecution. But even more impressive is the degree of Catholic resistance. It ranges from elementary school students and their parents who protested KGB pressures to report on the religious education activities of their local pastor to Bishop Julijonas Steponavicius who denied the authority of Commissioner Anilionis to interfere in Church affairs. The Chronicle reports: "Anilionis was worried that the bishop might report the conversation to the Chronicle. To this, Bishop Stepanovicius replied, "I'm going to tell everyone that you visited me, and what you warned me about.""³

Lithuania's hierarchy was severely persecuted during the Stalinist regime. In 1940 the nation's two archdioceses and four dioceses were served by three archbishops and nine bishops. Most of these were arrested and deported to Siberia. During the Khrushchev regime Rome appointed several bishops without Soviet permission. Bishop Steponavicius, consecrated in 1955, has never been permitted to administer his diocese, Vilnius. Bishop Vincentas Sladkevicius, consecrated in 1957, was under severe government restrictions until 1982 when his Vatican appointment to the diocese of Kaisiadorys was accepted by Soviet authorities. The 1982 appointments of Sladkevicius and Bishop Antanas Vaicus are attributable in part to the campaign of petitions and appeals directed at secular authorities by Lithuanian priests and faithful over the previous ten years.

The declining number of clergy has been eased in Lithuania by the government's decision to allow more candidates for the priesthood to enter the seminary in Kaunas. In 1982, eighteen new priests were ordained, the largest single group since 1963. But each year about twenty priests die. Although the Communist Commissioner of Religious Affairs has the final decision on admitting candidates to the seminary and undoubtedly tries to weed out individuals unlikely to cooperate with the state, the seminary has been able to turn out many priests loyal to the Church. That is remarkable considering that teaching is poor, morale is low due to infiltration and the presence of a number of unsuitable candidates, and the rector is a well known collaborator.

The success of the campaign to increase seminary enrollment is partly due to the existence of an unofficial seminary, which was started in 1972 after many suitable candidates were refused entry year after year. By 1980, fifteen

secretly ordained priests turned up in parishes "illegally." Authorities have threatened to prosecute priests for "impersonating the clergy" but were no doubt aware of how ridiculous this would make them look.⁴

Despite this evidence of successful resistance, the religious rights of Catholics are far from secure. The activities of the Soviet Union's only above-ground formal dissident group, Lithuania's Catholic Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Believers, have been severely restricted since 1983. On January 26, 1983, one of its founding members, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, was arrested. Another member, Father Sigitas Tamkevicius, was arrested at Svarinskas' trial in May 1983. Both were sentenced to 10 year terms. Since its founding in 1978 the Catholic Committee has sent over sixty documents to government and Church authorities defending not only the rights of Catholics but also of Russian Orthodox and other believers. The groups' members have been searched, harassed, privately and publicly warned, and placed under pressure to resign from the Committee.

It is illegal for priests and laymen to teach religion to children. Interrogation, threats, the denial of privileges, and non-admission to schools of higher education (all of which the Chronicle duly reports) are regular features of Communist persecution. Nonetheless, catechism has not been stopped. Lay women and nuns are very active in religious education. Though all convents and monasteries were disbanded in 1947 and their communities dispersed, religious orders were reorganized in the 1970s. There are now about 2400 nuns who are secularly employed but active in unofficial Church life.

The 1984 sentencing of an older married woman, Mrs. Jadvyga Bieliauskiene, demonstrates Soviet sensitivity to the teaching of children, especially when it includes lessons in Lithuanian history and literature. Mrs. Bieliauskiene, sentenced to four years strict regime camp and three years exile, was accused of organizing teenagers and staging plays with a nationalist content. Police have also broken up holiday retreats for teenagers organized by priests.

The Church has also been deprived of religious literature. Churches and clergy are allowed only one copy each of the Catholic Calendar-Directory, which is unavailable to the lay public. The publication of the missal has been delayed because paper provided by the Vatican was mysteriously damaged.

Catholic churches, shrines, and cemeteries continue to be vandalized. Communist officials have not stopped the desecration and they have invented bureaucratic excuses to prevent or delay restoration.

Still, the Catholic dissent movement seems to be growing in scope. Selective arrests will continue. But Soviet authorities are well aware that they cannot imprison signatories to petitions when their numbers exceed 100,000. As Father Svarinskas put it in 1978: "Everyone in Lithuania is a dissident. We don't have a few dissidents; we have a handful of collaborators."⁵

LATVIA

In 1983 the Vatican appointed Julijans Vaivods, Apostolic Administrator of Riga, Latvia, as the first resident cardinal of the Soviet Union. The appointment angered Lithuanians, who consider the Latvian Church too passive and, therefore, unworthy of the honor. However, Catholicism in Latvia

confronts several difficulties. It is the minority denomination among Latvians whose principal religion is Lutheranism. Moreover, ethnic Latvians comprise a much smaller proportion of the population of their own country due to the Soviets' success at population transfers. Nationalist feeling has not yet developed into even a loosely organized movement. (The same problems pertain to Estonia. Latvia's population is 2½ million; Estonia's 1½ million.)

Nonetheless, Cardinal Vaivods has been fairly successful in shepherding his flock. For historical reasons, the Catholic population of Latvia is widely scattered and Church leaders have had to pull together dispersed clusters of the faithful. Despite this and the shortage of priests, Cardinal Vaivods has managed to preserve the number of Catholic churches and retain the loyalty of believers.

It is thought that Pope John Paul II named Vaivods' the Soviet Union's first resident cardinal because of Vaivods' concern for ministering to the Soviet Catholics "in diaspora." The Catholic seminary in Riga, Latvia--the only other seminary in the U.S.S.R. outside Kaunas, Lithuania--accepts seminarians from outside the Baltic area and provides aid to scattered congregations as far away as Kazakhstan.⁶

UKRAINE

Ukraine is the second largest republic in the Soviet Union. Of its forty-six million inhabitants, thirty-six million are ethnic Ukrainians. Historically tied to Byzantium, the Ukrainian Church adhered to Eastern Orthodoxy following the schism of 1054. In 1596 the Church in the western part of Ukraine entered into a union with the Roman Church while retaining

the Eastern Rite. The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic or "Uniate" Church, as it is frequently called, numbered 14 million faithful at the end of World War II.

In 1946 the Church was banned and the entire hierarchy was arrested. A spurious synod made up of a few collaborationist priests and laymen nullified the 1596 union and "reunited" the Church to Russian Orthodoxy. Metropolitan Josyf Slipyi, Patriarch of the Ukrainian Church, was imprisoned for 18 years in Siberia. His release to the Vatican in 1963 was on condition that his public utterances and appearances be limited. He died in Rome September 7, 1984 at the age of 92.

While the Vatican's Ostpolitik placed some restrictions on him, Cardinal Slipyi attempted to unify and inspire Ukrainian Catholics abroad and, though the evidence is sparse, it seems in the Ukraine. He established a Ukrainian Catholic seminary in Rome to maintain the faith. The fact that the western Ukraine has borders with Poland appears to have made it possible to supply the Uniates with some religious literature. And the elevation of a Polish cardinal to the papacy has helped to revive religious and nationalist sentiment. There are now an estimated 300 priests who live and work as laymen but administer the sacraments, having been secretly ordained.⁷

The Ukrainian Catholic Church shares with Lithuanian Catholicism the same capacity for unifying nationalism and religion. But its insecure outlaw status and Soviet fears of nationalism in their second largest republic have made official government policies radically different. Demands for the legalization of the Uniate Church have been suppressed with vigor. But the evidence of increased repression seems to signify that the demands are growing stronger.

In the spring of 1981 churches were looted and closed in four villages and in twelve villages the faithful were attacked during Easter services. Two young priests from Lvov were sentenced to five year prison terms. In September 1982 The Action Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church was formed. Its Chairman, Iosyp Terelya, was soon arrested. By the beginning of 1984, the Action Group began publishing a samizdat journal called The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine. The Chronicle is not regularly translated into English, though efforts to do so are currently underway among Ukrainians in Canada.

While the Ukrainian Chronicle devotes considerable attention to repression of other religious believers and contains political articles of a non-religious nature, it provides essential basic information on the persecution of Ukrainian Catholics. The March 1984 Chronicle reports:

520 Ukrainian Catholics burned their passports and refused to have any dealings with the authorities. Considering the regime to be hostile to Christianity and evil in the eyes of God, they resolved to accept all the torments of the persecuted just to avoid having anything to do with atheists. For two months the authorities did not know what to do and how to act, but at the end of February (1984) the repressions begin.

The May 1984 Chronicle reports:

In Zakarpatska (Transcarpathian) oblast (province) alone, more than 290 persons have surrendered their passports. In Western Ukraine as a whole from 921 to 927 passports have been surrendered since January 2-3 of this year.

Remarking on this protest, Iosyp Terelya writes:

We are persecuted and deprived of our rights. They have taken everything from us: our Church and our educational institutions. We are constantly hounded; we exist for the state only as a work force in concentration camps. In this situation, of what use are Soviet passports to us? After all one needs no passport to be sent to a Soviet concentration camp.

Still, the renewed but underground activism of the Ukrainian Catholics is clear in a March 1984 Chronicle report:

Just over the period of the last three years, 81 priests have been ordained in the Carpathian region. Of this number, only 9 have a secondary-technical education; the rest all have a higher education. There is an underground three-year monastery school in Zakarpattya, where young men and women are taught the principles of Christian teachings.⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Any diplomatic efforts by the U.S. government on behalf of Soviet Catholics must be supported by a grassroots publicity and lobbying effort.
2. Public and diplomatic efforts to help Soviet Catholics should focus on efforts to pressure the Soviet regime to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church and to remove restrictions on candidates for the Lithuanian and Latvian seminaries.
3. The State Department should change the way it classifies its information on Soviet prisoners of conscience. It is currently classified according to the individual's name and republic only. This information should also be classified according to his ethnicity and religion since one, or the other, or both, is usually the real reason he has been imprisoned.
4. Individual case histories should be presented to members of Congress and the Executive Branch. They should be invoked during international negotiations and summit meetings, etc.

NOTES

1. Ginte Damusis, "Persecution of the Catholic Church in Lithuania," typescript of a paper presented to a Conference on Religious and Ethnic Oppression in the USSR, Arlington, Virginia, May 16, 1984, p.3.
2. Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union," Problems of Communism, November-December 1983, p.3.
3. Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, no.64, October 7, 1984 (American publication February 16, 1985), p.32
4. Damusis, op.cit., p.4.
5. Damusis, op.cit., p.8.
6. Damusis, op.cit., pp.4-5.
7. Betty G. Littel, "Life in Babylon: The Churches of Eastern Europe," RCDA: Religion in Communist Dominated Areas, nos.1-3, 1983, p.17.
8. Nadia Svitlychna, "Persecution of Believers in Ukraine" (typescript) Religion in Communist Dominated Areas, pp.11-13.

Department of State
Suggested Reply

~~Ladies and Gentlemen:~~
~~Dear Friends:~~

On behalf of President Reagan, ^{thank} you for your letter of June 14 regarding ~~the~~ ~~plight~~ of Catholics containing recommendations for easing the plight of Catholics

in the Soviet Union. We have read your letter and the attached paper with great interest and would like to respond to ~~the~~ your thoughts recommendations contained therein.

We agree with your assessment that the Soviet authorities have recently stepped up their persecution of Catholics and other religious believers in the Soviet Union. The recent convictions of Vasiliy Kobrin and Jonas Matulionis and the arrest of Iosif Terelya are three of the better known examples of this extremely disturbing trend. ~~Our analysts also agree~~ that ^{appears to be} this crackdown ^{is} motivated in part by Soviet fear of the growth of religious belief in the Soviet Union.

~~The United States~~ ^{Our} government has monitored this Soviet anti-religion campaign with mounting concern. Human rights ~~has~~ ^{issues have} become an integral and permanent component of the U.S.-Soviet agenda, and we raise our human rights concerns, including our concerns over Soviet religious persecution, in virtually every high-level meeting between U.S. and Soviet officials. During the visit of Ukrainian Communist Party First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitsky to this country in March, Secretary Shultz specifically raised our concerns about Soviet persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, as did many members of the Congress. In preparation for this visit we presented members

-2-

of Congress with detailed information on the human rights situation in ~~the~~^{the} Ukraine, including specific case histories on individual prisoners of conscience. ✓

Ambassador Richard Schifter, at the recently concluded Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting, condemned the continuing Soviet refusal to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church. He also raised the cases of Uniate Fathers Kobrin, Terelya and Budzinskiy and those of Lithuanian Catholic Fathers Matulionis, Tamkevicius and Svarinskas. Additionally, in our Semi-Annual Helsinki Implementation Reports and in our annual country Human Rights Reports we continue to catalogue and condemn the Soviet persecution of its Catholic population. Both publicly and privately, we continue to make clear that Soviet human rights abuses, including the persecution of religious believers, are a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks.

In your letter you recommend that the State Department classify Soviet prisoners of conscience according to their ethnicity and religion. As I am sure you ~~will appreciate~~^{know,} the United States Government is concerned about all victims of Soviet human rights abuses regardless of their ethnic background or religion. Nonetheless, in our public statements we are careful to indicate the ethnic background or religion of individual prisoners of conscience. For example, if we make a

public statement regarding the arrest of a Lithuanian Catholic priest or a representation on his behalf we refer to the individual specifically as a Lithuanian Catholic priest. We regard such classification as essential. On the other hand, the Department of State does not maintain or publish lists of Soviet political or religious prisoners per se. The only human rights related lists we do maintain which classify individuals by name and residence are our representation lists of persons denied permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union. These are special lists which we periodically present to Soviet authorities at high-level bilateral meetings.

We strongly agree with your recommendation regarding the value of generating grassroots support to balance our ongoing diplomatic efforts on behalf of Soviet Catholics. As you are no doubt aware, Jewish Americans have been particularly active and effective in promoting the cause of their brethren in the Soviet Union. The leadership of the Synagogue Council of America, the chief rabbinical umbrella association in this country, recently expressed to us their interest in working with other religious denominations whose co-religionists are persecuted in the Soviet Union. We think ^{that} this is an excellent idea which you might wish to pursue directly with the Synagogue Council.

42a

the President's

-4-

Let me conclude by thanking you for your thoughtful and welcome suggestions. I want to assure you of ~~our~~ deep concern for the plight of Soviet Catholics and ~~our~~ ^{his} resolve to work to alleviate it. If we can be of further assistance in this or any other matter, do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins

Handwritten mark

JM-4
B

5936

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

August 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Response to Resignation Letter of Rick Burt

David Chew has requested our comment on the attached. I have reviewed the proposed response to Burt who has submitted a letter of resignation. I concur with no changes in the text.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response block attached at Tab I to David Chew indicating that the NSC staff concurs with the text.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo to David Chew

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM **URGENT**

DATE: 8/5/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: TODAY

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO RESIGNATION LETTER OF RICK BURT

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
WRIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	ROLLINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FRIEDERSDORF	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Any objections?

RESPONSE: The NSC staff concurs with the attached response to the resignation letter of Rick Burt.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

48

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Rick:

I have received your letter of July 19, 1985 and I accept your resignation as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs.

You leave your position as Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs with a record of outstanding accomplishment. Thanks in large measure to your sound advice and excellent leadership, our NATO Alliance is stronger than ever, and we have developed and implemented an effective, long-term strategy for managing our relationship with the Soviet Union.

My decision to appoint you Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany is a demonstration of the confidence I have in you. There is no more important diplomatic assignment than the one on which you are about to embark.

While we also deeply regret Gahl's departure from the White House, Nancy and I wish you both all the very best in your new assignment.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard R. Burt
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

46

United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

July 19, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

I hereby tender my resignation as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. It has been a high honor to serve you and my country in this position. Under your steady leadership, the United States has once again become the defender of democracy and the beacon of freedom worldwide. Gahl and I look forward to continuing to serve you as I assume my new responsibilities as your Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Sincerely,



Richard Burt
Bureau of European and
Canadian Affairs

The Honorable
Ronald W. Reagan,
The White House,
Washington, D. C. 20500.

JM-C
47

6144

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Matlock

ACTION

August 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Request for Presidential Endorsement of the
"Goodwill Games"

Ted Turner, of TBS, has informed Pat Buchanan of an Olympic-style program which has been scheduled for 1986 in Moscow and 1990 in the U.S. Initiated by the Soviet Union, athletes from all major nations would be invited to participate in the "Goodwill Games." Tomorrow, TBS, Gostelradio, and the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Sports and Physical Culture, will simultaneously announce their sponsorship of the "Goodwill Games." Ted Turner has recommended that a Presidential statement in support of this event would create yet another opportunity to express the hopes for improved US-Soviet relations.

Given the turn of events at the past two Olympic games, where we have not competed with Soviet athletes, I would perceive this as an attempt to by-pass the Olympics and create a Soviet version of the Moscow games. Having reviewed the request, I would recommend against the release of a Presidential statement and any other involvement by the President. Bill Martin should notify Bob Ross, at TBS, of the decision by phone.

men Karna Small, *JL* John Lenczowski and *GRS* Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Martin to notify Bob Ross of the decision.

Approve *UM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo from Buchanan
- Tab II Letter from Ted Turner, July 29, 1985

48

6144

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN *PJB*

SUBJECT: Ted Turner Request

Ted Turner, my old boss, is asking for a Presidential endorsement of these "Goodwill Games" which look to me like a Soviet effort to bypass the Olympics, and create a 1986 version of the forgotten Moscow Olympics, with all the attendant publicity and propaganda they lost when President Carter walked out. My view is that we ought to steer clear of Captain Courageous' latest adventure.

They are asking me for an answer; I will tell them this requires staffing through NSC.

Please respond directly to Bob Ross at 202/293-0780.

Attachment

49

July 29, 1985
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: PJB

FROM: NANCY

SUBJECT: A call from Bob Ross
10:15 am

Bob Ross, General Counsel of Internal Broadcasting, called at Ted Turners request to relay the following to you:

1. On August 6 they will announce a major event -- it is an Olympic-style program with the Soviet Union to occur July 1986 in Moscow, and July 1990 in U.S.
2. Ted Turner or Bob Ross would like to brief you on this and then have you brief the President, and inquire if he would like to make any sort of statement about it.

Bob Ross's # is 293-0780.

5



BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.

1050 TECHWOOD DR., N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30318

R. E. TURNER
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

July 29, 1985

(404) 827-1717

Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
& Director of Communications
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Pat:

Recognizing your interest in U.S.-Soviet relations, I thought you might like to know about the recent efforts of Turner Broadcasting (TBS) to negotiate reciprocal television program agreements with television organizations in the Soviet Union.

In brief, TBS has arranged with the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Gostelradio) and others to exchange news, sports, and entertainment programming, and in some cases cooperatively produce such programming on a commercial basis. For example, pursuant to a Gostelradio-TBS agreement, TBS intends to distribute various entertainment and documentary television programs, such as its award winning "Portrait of America" series profiling the people and industry of the several states, for exhibition on Soviet television. TBS and Gostelradio are also arranging to co-produce a six-hour "Portrait of the Soviet Union" for exhibition by TBS in the U.S.

Note

CNN and Intervision, the Soviet bloc news cooperative, for another example, have agreed to the reciprocal exchange of news material. Entirely subject to CNN's editorial control, and analogous to CNN's reciprocal agreements with the Canadian Broadcasting Corp., the European Broadcasting Union, and TV Asahi in Japan, the Intervision news material will augment CNN's independent coverage of the Soviet Union and will provide the American public an opportunity to observe directly the nature of Soviet news coverage of world events.

Most significant, however, TBS, Gostelradio, and The USSR State Committee for Sports and Physical Culture (Sports Committee), will announce simultaneously in Moscow and New York City on August 6 at noon (Eastern Standard Time) that they have

Note

Patrick J. Buchanan
July 29, 1985
Page Two

agreed to co-sponsor an Olympic-style series of athletic games. To be called "The Goodwill Games", these events will be held in the off-Olympic years -- in Moscow in July 1986 and the U.S. in 1990.


The "Goodwill Games" will feature 4,000 to 5,000 world class athletes from all major nations, including a U.S. team of approximately 500 athletes, coaches, trainers and officials to be selected by the Athletics Congress of the U.S.A. Competition will include traditional Summer Olympic, and a few Winter Olympic, events. Televised worldwide by satellite, the games will provide the first opportunity for U.S. and Soviet athletes to participate in Olympic-level competition since the Montreal Olympic Games of 1976.

In a world too often characterized by distrust and hostility among nations, international television coverage of sporting events, like the proposed "Goodwill Games", represent an outstanding opportunity to reinforce our common humanity while directing normal competitive instincts into constructive channels. The overwhelming success of the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, despite the absence of many nations, is clear evidence of the beneficial and unifying capabilities of such events.

Pat, it seems to me that the announcement of the "Goodwill Games" on the 6th would provide an outstanding opportunity for the President to make a public statement on his hopes for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. For example, a short and simple statement on the beneficial effects to be derived from channeling international competition into constructive and cooperative pursuits, like the Goodwill Games athletic activities, might be appropriate. I'm very interested in your views, and hope that you could help us determine if this is something that might be suitable for the President. If so, CNN could provide a camera crew as necessary and appropriate.

If I can provide you with any additional information on these activities, please feel free to contact me directly (404-827-1827) or call Bob Ross in our Washington Office (202-293-0780). We will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Sincerely yours,



R. E. Turner

National Security Council
The White House

52

System # I

Package # 6144

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>staff</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Action: Matlock
Concur: Raymond
Sys I . Aug 8/5 CJB

Bill Martin -
This should be
stopped soonest
Note Pat Buchanan
wants to respond
directly. 7.