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JET 4/8/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (8/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1009

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7605	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [2 - 5] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	4	ND	B1
7606	MEMO	RIDGWAY TO SHULTZ RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV----SITE SURVEY [6 - 9] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	4	7/23/1985	B1
7604	TELEGRAPH	REGIONAL DIALOGUE FROM MARK PALMER FOR PRESIDENT'S LETTER [17 - 17] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	1	ND	B1
7607	LETTER	REVISED DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [18 - 22] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	5	7/23/1985	B1
7608	MEMCON	RESIDENCE OF U.S. AMBASSADOR HELSINKI [23 - 43] R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2	21	7/31/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Eyes Only
8/85

~~SECRET~~

Matlock

Eyes Only

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

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OF CLASSIFIED

CAS 6/18/02

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

last week allowed

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery is proceeding rapidly. Actually, the ~~necessary cancellation of my public activities planned for this period~~ allows me more time than I otherwise would have had to concentrate my attention on substantive issues, including those which have been part of our dialogue.

I have given the most careful attention to your letters of June 10 and June 22. Obviously, our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us, and I believe that both of us will wish to pursue these matters in greater detail when we meet in November. Since we will be meeting before the end of the year, I will confine my comment at this time to a few observations which I hope may help us prepare for a constructive and productive meeting.

To be frank, my overall impression from your letters is that you have not yet seriously addressed many of the matters of deep concern to me which I have noted in our correspondence. ~~It is encouraging to have general assurances of the Soviet Union's benign intentions in various areas of our relationship, and I can assure you with utter sincerity that the United States in no way threatens the security of the Soviet Union. However, as you wisely note, "in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions."~~ If we are to narrow our differences and prepare the way for significant agreements, we must both be prepared to deal, in explicit and concrete terms, with the concerns of the other.

(7 sent?)

~~In regard to those issues you have raised with me, I have tried and will continue to try to explain the situation as we see it. If you feel you need more details to understand my view more fully, I will be pleased to supply them. At the same time I hope that you will give further study to those matters I have mentioned to you and will be prepared to deal with them in concrete fashion.~~

surprised

Reading your letter of March 10, I was ~~astounded~~ to note your allegation that the United States is developing "a new strategic weapon" to be deployed in space, as well as your statement that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons and your subsequent charge that the United States is developing space weapons "capable of performing purely offensive missions." Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets

on earth such as missile silos. Now I am not debating intentions here (even though our intent is clear to confine our research to the feasibility of defensive weapons), but am referring rather to hard scientific and technical facts as I understand them.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate concrete examples of what specific aspects of a program to investigate the feasibility of defense against missiles which have been launched could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable either of mass destruction on earth or of use in a disarming first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for our specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different from ours can hardly be expected to be persuasive to an impartial observer. As I see it, the only difference in our respective approaches to this research results from differences in our political systems. Ours requires us to debate every program in public; yours does not. Yet the research is in the same scientific areas, and I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted by the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us now finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons. We will not find a mutually acceptable solution by recourse to propaganda or refusal to enter into the concrete ~~bargaining~~ *negotiations* necessary to realize our mutual goal of setting the world on a course toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In respect to your letter of June 22, I can only say that it does not alleviate the concerns over compliance with past agreements which I described to you in my letter of June 10. I hope that the two of us and our representatives will find the way soon to address and resolve these concerns in specific fashion, since resolution of these questions is a key element in making progress on equitable arms reduction.

I am, of course, prepared to address your concerns as well, and have a suggestion which I believe ~~would~~ *(us is)* lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the test site in the United States, and

for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985, exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the Soviet Government says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices they deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure that there are no obstacles posed by the United States which would make acceptance difficult. I believe it will be a useful step if we can eliminate the concerns the Soviet side has expressed on this matter and initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

There are of course many other important issues on our agenda, and I am pleased that our Foreign Ministers will be

meeting in Helsinki, and subsequently in New York to address them. I also hope to have the opportunity to discuss them personally with Minister Shevardnadze when he is in the United States this fall.

I am looking forward to our meeting in Geneva and believe that we should aim to draw up a joint agenda for steps to be taken to improve the relationship of our countries. If we can also agree upon mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues between us, that would be most helpful. In the meantime, it may be that some headway can be made on several of the issues that divide us, and if so, I would certainly welcome it.

Nevertheless, I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured by the presence or absence of agreements to conclude, but rather by the degree to which it can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future.

I will continue to give serious thought to the considerations you have raised in our correspondence, and hope that you will do the same in respect to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,



Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S/S

JUL 23 1985

FILE COPY

SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Michael H. Armacost

FROM : EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway *LR*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Gorbachev -- Site Survey

Issue for Decision

On the basis of the July 19-22 site survey in Geneva, how to continue work on the arrangements for the President's meeting with Gorbachev.

Essential Factors

In the context of our objectives for the President's meeting with Gorbachev and the points you made to Dobrynin, an eight man team spent July 19-22 in Geneva consulting with the Swiss and examining potential sites for the meetings, Presidential residence, social events, staff and press headquarters and other elements of the November trip. Bill Henkel of the White House headed the team; Mark Palmer represented State and Ty Cobb represented the NSC. Henkel and Cobb are sending to Don Regan and Bud McFarlane the same recommendations as set forth in this memorandum.

Arrival Time and US-Swiss Bilateral

To give the President a period to adjust to the time change and to prepare for his November 19-20 (Tuesday and Wednesday) meetings with Gorbachev, the team believes he should arrive in Geneva on Saturday, November 16. (Henkel notes that Mrs. Reagan obviously will have a major role in such matters; he has confirmed that she intends to accompany the President.) The team also recommends that the President pay a brief call on Swiss President Furgler in Geneva on Monday, November 18--which would allow the Swiss to consider this an "official visit" in

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS E06-114/2#7606BY LAT NARA, DATE 11/21/07

the context of our bilateral relations (a "state visit" would require the President to travel to Bern which no one recommends). We also might consider the pros and cons of some sort of brief event on Sunday--to help offset press speculation that the President came early just to rest and to counter any event Gorbachev might stage on the eve of the meetings, i.e., a speech to the European Parliament, an arms control initiative. We would look for places that highlight the common US-Soviet commitment to democratic values, international peace and/or our humanitarian concerns. The President might or might not make a speech. For the present, we believe we should avoid getting locked into any event for that Sunday, keeping the President's options open.

Meeting Sites

The team examined a number of sites from the point of view of our objectives: to provide a setting in which the President would be comfortable, and which would maximize the chances of the two leaders getting to know one another. As you know, the meeting rooms in the U.S. Mission are sterile and not conducive to get acquainted meetings. (The team also went by the Soviet mission and found a large portrait of Lenin over the couch on which the two leaders would be photographed.) However, the Swiss Government showed the team three chateaux with the kind of ambiance that would encourage real communications. Each of them has elegant rooms with fireplaces that could provide a warm setting in what is likely to be the gray, cool weather of November. The rooms themselves reinforce the need to keep the numbers down on each side in the meetings to achieve the right atmosphere. In addition, each chateau is set in its own quite beautiful parkland with views of Lake Geneva which would make a walk by the leaders possible if the weather permits (we understand Gorbachev walks every day for up to 45 minutes) and/or make a joint appearance before the press easy to accomplish. The Swiss are prepared to arrange for one of these chateaux as a neutral site to which both leaders would come. We believe this offers considerable advantage over alternating between the two missions, i.e., struggle over which mission is first. Even if the Soviets ultimately insist on holding "their" meetings in the Soviet mission, we urge that our meetings take place in one of these chateaux.

Social Events

You mentioned to Dobrynin that each side probably would want to host a social event. The Swiss also would like to host an event. Assuming that the Soviets agree to morning and afternoon meetings on both days as you suggested, and assuming they were scheduled from around 10-12 and 2:30-5, we believe we should keep the lunch time free for consultations within each delegation to prepare for the afternoon session and for a brief rest. This leaves the evenings. We do not believe the two leaders should meet first at a social occasion, which eliminates the evening of November 18. Having very small US and Soviet-hosted dinners on November 19 and 20, and a brief, large Swiss-hosted reception for the entire delegation before the dinner on November 20 would seem to meet our objectives. The small dinners would give the leaders two additional periods for conversation with only their closest advisors present. (They also provide a more natural setting for Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Gorbachev to join in; more difficult in a working lunch.) And the large reception would allow everyone else to be included in some event. Also holding the Swiss event the last evening is preferable as there will be no substantive meetings to prepare for the next day--though there could be some sort of a departure event/ceremony, i.e., document signing, communique issuance.

Presidential Residence

The team also examined a number of possible residences for the President. As he would be in Geneva for five nights, and to maximize his comfort and privacy, we recommend that the President stay in a private house rather than the Intercontinental Hotel--which again will be our operational and press headquarters, and house you and other members of the delegation. The best residence is a chateau that President Eisenhower stayed in during the 1955 summit in Geneva. The team also looked at the Aga Khan's residence which Vice President Bush stayed in, but the Swiss would prefer we not go to the other side of Lake Geneva where it is located, and it may not convey the best political connotation in any case. Also the Eisenhower residence is close to the Intercontinental, US and Soviet Missions and other possible meeting sites--in fact it is one of the three chateaux we examined as a meeting site. We are carefully examining political complications with any of these sites.

9

Getting the Soviets on Board

In sum, the survey team believes the concept you outlined to Dobrynin is doable in terms of the facilities available in Geneva. The key will be getting the Soviets on board. The Swiss Government shares our desire to get the Soviets to focus on these issue now. They will see the Soviets early this week to raise the desirability of US and Soviet logistics advance teams meeting in Geneva at an early date and to stress their support for a Swiss-sponsored neutral meeting site. The team informed the Swiss that you had a preliminary discussion with Dobrynin and that we had urged the Soviets to be prepared to pursue this question when you see Shevardnadze in Helsinki. We believe that we will maximize our chances for getting the kind of meeting site we want if you indicate to Shevardnadze that it is a Swiss proposal and plan to write your talking points that way.

Recommendation

That you agree the President should arrive in Geneva two-three days prior to the meeting for an "official" visit to Switzerland and to prepare for the meeting with Gorbachev.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you support the Swiss suggestion for a "neutral" meeting site.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That we propose the U.S. and Soviets each host a small dinner; and that we accept the Swiss offer to hold a large reception.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Drafted:EUR:MPalmer
7/22/85 484

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10
DRAFT

PROPOSED SUMMARY SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT

OPTION A - FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1985

8:40 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to Marine One for boarding.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE

8:45 p.m. MARINE ONE departs The South Lawn en route Andrews Air Force Base.

Flight Time: 10 mins.

8:55 p.m. MARINE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE
CLOSED ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan deplane and proceed to Air Force One for boarding.

9:00 p.m. AIR FORCE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route
EST Geneva, Switzerland.

Flight Time: 7 hrs. 40 mins.
Time Change: + 6 hrs.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985

10:40 a.m. AIR FORCE ONE arrives Cointrin Airport, Geneva,
(4:40 p.m. EST) Switzerland.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE

Brief Arrival Ceremony (TBD)

11:00 a.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart Cointrin Airport en route residence (TBD).

Drive Time: 15 mins. (maximum)

11:15 a.m.* THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive residence and proceed to Suite.

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: LOCATION TBD
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CS NARA, Date 6/15/02

* Denotes approximate time

8:40 a.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to Marine One for boarding.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE

8:45 a.m. MARINE ONE departs The South Lawn en route Andrews Air Force Base.

Flight Time: 10 mins.

8:55 a.m. MARINE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE
CLOSED ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan deplane and proceed to Air Force One for boarding.

9:00 a.m. AIR FORCE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route
EST Geneva, Switzerland.

Flight Time: 7 hrs. 40 mins.
Time Change: + 6 hrs.

(440pm
EST)
10:40 p.m. AIR FORCE ONE arrives Cointrin Airport, Geneva,
Switzerland.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE

Brief Arrival Ceremony (TBD)

11:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart Cointrin Airport
en route residence (TBD).

Drive Time: 15 mins. (maximum)

11:15 p.m.* THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive residence and
proceed to Suite.

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: LOCATION TBD
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

* Denotes approximate time

07/23/85 4:00 p.m.

WASHINGTON WORK/BRIEFINGS/PRIVATE TIME

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1985

(T) Working Breakfast at residence.

(T) Courtesy call on President Furgler
(location TBD).

BRIEFINGS/WASHINGTON WORK

(T) Possible early p.m. event (location TBD).

PRIVATE TIME

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: LOCATION TBD
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985

9:00 a.m. Working Breakfast at residence.

9:30 a.m. Working Breakfast concludes.

9:45 a.m. THE PRESIDENT departs residence en route meeting site
(location TBD).

Drive Time: 15 mins. (maximum)

10:00 a.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives meeting site for bilateral
meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

12:00 p.m. Bilateral meeting concludes.

THE PRESIDENT proceeds to motorcade for boarding.

12:05 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs meeting site en route residence.

Drive Time: 15 mins.

12:20 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives residence and proceeds to Suite.

PRIVATE TIME (10 mins.)

12:30 p.m. Working lunch.

1:15 p.m. Working lunch concludes.

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (55 mins.)

2:10 p.m. THE PRESIDENT proceeds to motorcade for boarding.

07/23/85 4:00 p.m.

- 2:15 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs residence en route meeting site (location TBD).
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 2:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives meeting site for bilateral meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.
5:00 p.m. Bilateral meeting concludes.
THE PRESIDENT proceeds to motorcade for boarding.
- 5:05 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs meeting site en route residence.
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 5:20 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives residence and proceeds to Suite.
PRIVATE TIME (2 hrs. 10 mins.)
- 7:40 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to motorcade for boarding.
- 7:45 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart residence en route dinner site (location TBD).
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 8:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive dinner site for private dinner.
10:00 p.m. Private dinner concludes.
THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to motorcade for boarding.
- 10:05 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart dinner site en route residence.
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 10:20 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive residence and proceed to Suite.

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: LOCATION TBD
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

07/23/85 4:00 p.m.

9:00 a.m. Working Breakfast at residence.

9:30 a.m. Working Breakfast concludes.

9:45 a.m. THE PRESIDENT departs residence en route meeting site (location TBD).

Drive Time: 15 mins.

10:00 a.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives meeting site for bilateral meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

12:00 p.m. Bilateral meeting concludes.

THE PRESIDENT proceeds to motorcade for boarding.

12:05 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs meeting site en route residence.

Drive Time: 15 mins.

12:20 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives residence and proceeds to Suite.

PRIVATE TIME (10 mins.)

12:30 p.m. Working lunch.

1:15 p.m. Working lunch concludes.

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (55 mins.)

2:10 p.m. THE PRESIDENT proceeds to motorcade for boarding.

2:15 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs residence en route meeting site (location TBD).

Drive Time: 15 mins.

2:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives meeting site for bilateral meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

5:00 p.m. Bilateral meeting concludes.

THE PRESIDENT proceeds to motorcade for boarding.

5:05 p.m. THE PRESIDENT departs meeting site en route residence.

Drive Time: 15 mins.

5:20 p.m. THE PRESIDENT arrives residence and proceeds to Suite.

PRIVATE TIME (1 hr. 50 mins.)

7:10 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to motorcade for boarding.

07/23/85 4:00 p.m.

- 7:15 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart residence en route reception site (location TBD).
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 7:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive reception site for reception hosted by Swiss Government.
- 8:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to motorcade for boarding.
- 8:35 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart reception en route dinner site (location TBD).
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 8:50 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive dinner site for private dinner.
10:45 p.m. Private dinner concludes.
THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan proceed to motorcade for boarding.
- 10:50 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan depart dinner site en route residence.
Drive Time: 15 mins.
- 10:20 p.m. THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan arrive residence and proceed to Suite.

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: LOCATION TBD
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

EVENTS TBD

- 12:00 p.m.* AIR FORCE ONE departs Geneva, Switzerland en route
(T) Andrews Air Force Base.

Flight Time: 9 hrs.
Time Change: - 6 hrs.

* Denotes approximate time

07/23/85 4:00 p.m.

3:00 p.m.* AIR FORCE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.
EST

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE
CLOSED ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan deplane and proceed to Marine One for boarding.

3:05 p.m.* MARINE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route The White House.

Flight Time: 10 mins.

3:15 p.m.* MARINE ONE arrives The South Lawn.

OPEN PRESS COVERAGE

THE PRESIDENT and Mrs. Reagan deplane and proceed inside residence.

* Denotes approximate time

07/23/85 4:00 p.m.

This was dictated on the phone:

Telegraph on regional dialogue from Mark Palmer.

Regional dialogue for president's letter:

Let me turn to several other issues. During the past two months our experts have held talks with Southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think that tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. I want to reiterate my commitment to a process of regular exchanges on regional issues. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in all relations. As our experts indicated in their presentation, we continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General's effort to develop a negotiated solution and lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We believe a solution is possible which will protect the legitimate interest of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing and that of the Soviet Union to ensure its southern border is secure.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2 #7604
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

7/23/85

180

Revised Draft Letter to Gorbachev

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery is proceeding rapidly. I look forward to the opportunity to talk with you privately in Geneva November 19 and 20 about the serious issues that divide our two countries.

My approach to the Geneva meeting will be characterized by the same sense of realism and candor that has characterized my letters to you. I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured necessarily by the presence or absence of agreements, but rather by the degree to which our meeting can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future. And if, in the meantime, we can make headway on some of the issues that divide us and resolve some longstanding items under discussion, I would certainly welcome it.

I think we should use the time we have before November to look hard at our relationship. We should aim to draw up a joint agenda of practical steps we can take to resolve outstanding problems. I take it this is consistent with the approach Foreign Minister Shevardnadze outlined to Ambassador Hartman on July 22. I believe we should also seek to define mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues that divide us.

In this spirit, Secretary Shultz discussed a number of issues in his July 3 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, on which progress can be made if both sides are willing. Some of these issues are well known to you, but we think they deserve a fresh look. We would like to hear your views. I hope the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki July 31, at the ceremonies commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act, will be useful in carrying the exchange of views further. I also look forward to meeting at the White House this autumn with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, following his meeting with Secretary Shultz at the UN General Assembly.

I would like in this letter to review very briefly some of the key issues on which we should focus during the coming months. Clearly the central issues that we must address are the current negotiations in Geneva. We have tried to make every effort to promote progress in those talks -- to build up rather than tear down the current arms control regime. It was on this basis that I made my recent decision to continue our policy of not undercutting the SALT II agreement. From your comments on

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/247607

BY hjt, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

my decision and the Geneva talks in your letters of June 10 and June 22, it is clear that our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us.

Let me cite several examples. You alleged that the United States is developing "a new strategic weapon" to be deployed in space and that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons. You charged that the US is developing space weapons "capable of performing purely offensive missions." Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets on earth such as missile silos. This is not a question of intentions, but of hard scientific and technical facts.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate your giving me concrete examples of what specific aspects of our program could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable of mass destruction or a first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that no impartial observer would be persuaded by the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different. I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted on the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons. We will not find a solution by recourse to propaganda or by setting artificial preconditions to concrete bargaining. I think we should at least agree to allow our diplomats to get on with their work in the individual negotiating groups, when the talks resume in September.

In respect to your letter of June 22, I can only say that it does not alleviate the concerns over compliance with past agreements which I described to you in my letter of June 10. I hope that the two of us and our representatives will find the way soon to address and resolve these concerns in specific fashion, since resolution of these questions is a key element in making progress on equitable arms reduction.

As I expect you to address our concerns, I am, of course prepared to address yours as well. I have a suggestion which I believe can help lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States' test site, and for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985 exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the government of the Soviet Union says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices you deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure there are no obstacles from the U.S. side to its acceptance. I believe it would be a useful step, if in the months ahead we can initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Let me turn to several other issues. During the past two months our experts have held talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think the tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in our relations. As our experts indicated in their presentation, we continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General's efforts to develop a negotiated solution and lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. With regard to further regional experts' talks Secretary Shultz will be prepared in Helsinki to discuss scheduling an exchange on East Asian issues.

~~Beyond arms control and regional issues, I know that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have an opportunity to review those other elements of our bilateral relationship that might lend themselves to resolution before our meeting in Geneva. There is also, as you know, a set of humanitarian concerns. You have stated that these are an internal matter. We believe they are an issue, whose resolution you committed yourself to in the Helsinki Final Act. The desires of American citizens to be reunited with members of their families still in the Soviet Union or the desires of those who were born in the US or otherwise considered by us to be American citizens and who wish to live in our country are legitimate concerns. There are other types of cases whose resolution, as Secretary Shultz has pointed out, would not require a change in your laws or system. Surely, there must be a quiet way to work on some of these matters. In resolving these issues, we are prepared to respond to your concerns.~~

understand by the Soviet Union when it signed

involve resolution countries Apart from this entitled to

Neither these nor the other matters we have agreed to

insert

Mr. General Secretary, we have an important, historic opportunity to put our relationship on a sound footing, sustainable for the long term. Our agenda is full of proposals which, if realized, can form the substance of a more

22

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- 5 -

*you have raised in our
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constructive relationship. I will continue to give serious thought to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting in November, I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: JULY 31, 1985
Time: 2 - 5 p.m.
PLACE: RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, HELSINKI, FINLAND

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S SIDE

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Nitze
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer

Interpreter D. Zarechnak

SOVIET SIDE

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Ambassador Dobrynin
MFA Deputy Minister Komplektov
Ambassador Kvititsinskiy
Lt. General Detinov
MFA Press Spokesman Lomeiko
MFA Chief of Staff Chernishev
MFA Deputy Director Tarasenko
Translators: Pavel Palashchenko
Mr. Uspenskiy

Secretary Shultz introduced Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the system of simultaneous translation equipment, and noted that this was just an experiment. If it worked, fine, but if it didn't, he should feel free to say so. Shevardnadze agreed. He then said that for Georgians, women are very special. By including Ambassador Ridgway in our delegation we were trying to disarm him.

The Secretary said that he had what is alleged to be an old Georgian saying "May your feet bring luck to this house". He wanted to add the hope that Shevardnadze's presence would bring luck to all the efforts we are making to bring positive results to our countries. The Secretary went on to say that he had to rely on Ambassador Nitze as an historian -- but it is said that some SALT I negotiating sessions took place in the room they are meeting in, so that is a certain part of history.

The Secretary then said that he would like to welcome Mr. Shevardnadze on behalf of the United States. He wished to send his regards to President Gromyko. They have logged many hours across the table together and he believed they have a good working relationship. Sometimes their sessions had been stormy and sometimes productive, but they were able to maintain a relationship and the

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24

Secretary wanted to convey his warm regards and congratulations on his new position. Shevardnadze responded that Gromyko had always told him about the Secretary and their relationship. If there was to be any change, he could only hope that their meetings would be more productive. The Secretary said that he agreed and that they might establish more of a conversation.

Shevardnadze said that the way that he saw the meeting today was that they should proceed from the fact our two countries face a very responsible moment -- when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan will soon be meeting. This is awaited not only by our people but by the entire world. A lot depends on this meeting, including the political climate in the world. He would structure his comments as follows: First he would see how this meeting should be approached overall. Then he would look at certain components of it. Since there was not much time, he would try to use his prepared remarks.

The Secretary said that he fully agreed that our responsibilities are great. We must ensure that we do our work well so that the meeting of the two leaders can be as productive as possible.

Shevardnadze said that this is a meaningful time. The world expects us to have a constructive approach. We should strengthen the basis of peace and confidence.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the fact that an agreement had been reached for our leaders to meet was a positive element. The goal of the present meeting should be to delineate the general political and practical steps to be taken to prepare for the summit. Both sides needed to give a political impulse to our relations, and restraint should be exercised in our bilateral relations as well as in our international affairs in order not to make the situation more complicated and in order to provide for a good summit meeting. The main task of the summit would be to move forward on the essential issues between the two countries. The principal such area is the area of security. This is the question which determines our relations in practice, and this is the issue we should begin with.

If our two countries wish to end their confrontation and end the arms race, producing a more stable climate, they need to improve their relations. Avoiding or postponing the resolution of these issues is not possible, and to continue to have the type of confrontation that has existed in previous years is very dangerous. The "safety margin" has been eroded. For this reason it is necessary to get down to specific work on all aspects of our security relationship and not to waste time. The Soviet side would be ready to orient itself towards a constructive dialogue, and towards mutually acceptable solutions to a very wide range of issues. It hoped that the U.S. side was also prepared to do this. Our peoples expect that the talks will be productive. Our countries do not have the right to fail.

The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze intended now to go into specific areas. If so, perhaps the Secretary could do his general introductory points now. Shevardnadze said perhaps he should continue, but Dobrynin said no, to let the Secretary go ahead.

The Secretary said he agreed that we needed a work program and that it should be productive. As we see it, the meeting between our two leaders is kind of a high exclamation point in an ongoing process. We should do as much as we can beforehand, have as many results as possible. But the meeting should also be for agenda-setting, a kind of springboard. It should give a political impulse as Shevardnadze had said. President Reagan regards the relationship as leaving much room for improvement. He had asked the Secretary to say that the U.S. is ready to work at this; we are prepared to make agreements if they are in our own interest, and we assume that you feel the same way. Therefore, we need to define things which are in our mutual interest.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make one amendment to Shevardnadze's outline. While agreeing that security issues -- arms control and regional questions -- are essential, another essential element in the relationship involves the interplay of views in the realm of human rights. The Secretary referred to the points he had made to Shevardnadze at the Finnish dinner the previous night.

(At that time, the Secretary had told Shevardnadze that he had raised the names of individuals and made a strong point about human rights in his speech that day because the Final Act requires attention to this subject. He also wanted to be certain that Shevardnadze understood that these cases are very important to us, that movement on these cases is important. This is simply a fact of life. Having made this the centerpiece of his speech and having raised it again with Shevardnadze that night, he did not feel obliged to continue at great length in their meeting on Wednesday. But it was critical for Shevardnadze to understand the central role of human rights for Americans and for our relationship. Shevardnadze rejoined in a fairly friendly manner that when he came to the United States he could speak about black unemployment and that would embarrass the United States. The Secretary said so be it; Shevardnadze could do what he had to do. This was the gist of their conversation on Tuesday evening).

The Secretary said that human rights is a subject the President has in mind. Thinking of Shevardnadze's point about the need for a positive atmosphere, they could do things here which would help.

Shevardnadze said that if we are to talk seriously about human rights, we need to talk about the need to live in peace; the right to life itself is the most fundamental right of all. Thus, security issues are the core issues and avoiding them is not possible.

The Secretary said he agreed that there is a certain indivisibility of these issues

Shevardnadze then read a lengthy prepared text. He said that sometimes our views don't agree, but we need to find ways to reach agreement. Shevardnadze indicated that he wished to convey the Soviet approach to the issues, realizing that they did not always coincide with the U.S. approach, but a frank expression of the Soviet position was important for reaching future agreement.

U.S.S.R.-U.S. relations have a profound effect on international relations. The entire world is very worried that Soviet-American relations are at a very dangerous point. One might think that there are difficult issues which require time and effort to resolve. But, it is difficult to understand when there is refusal to take comparatively easy steps which could increase stability and trust. One such area is the question of no first use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union took an obligation before the whole world not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If the U.S. would also take such an obligation, many issues could be viewed differently. The same applies for adoption of CBM measures and the principle of non-use of military force. The U.S. should ratify the TTBT and PNE Treaties and resume negotiations on a CTB.

Shevardnadze said that he would like to stress the new initiative taken by General Secretary Gorbachev, i.e., the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions beginning on August 6 and lasting through January 1, 1986. The Soviet moratorium would continue to be in effect after that date if the U.S. were to agree to a similar moratorium beginning January 1.

The two sides could do much that was positive and should do so. Gorbachev had indicated in his message to President Reagan that the U.S. side should see this step as one which is aimed at the reduction of nuclear arms. It would be a good example for other countries and an important contribution to improving the international climate and decreasing the military danger. Such productive steps should be examined in preparing for the summit. The question of a freeze on nuclear weapons should also be examined in this context.

The pivotal issue in our relations is the question of security. The last round of negotiations in Geneva produced no movement on the U.S. part. The Soviet side felt that the U.S. was not willing to see and resolve issues in accordance with the agreement reached between Shultz and Gromyko in January. There had been many meetings, but no agreement. And this was not accidental since the practical steps being taken by the U.S. are leading to the creation of new space

attack weapons. Instead of reaching an agreement on the non-militarization of space, the U.S. side is proposing to create rules on how to militarize space, on how many and which weapons to have there. If the arms race is extended into space, the efforts to reduce nuclear arms will be futile, and the competition in the military area will become more dangerous in all its aspects.

Despite the U.S. explanation, the U.S. does not wish to have a mutual agreement, but closes all the doors which open such a possibility.

In the area of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, the U.S. was continuing to adhere to those principles which led to a dead end before. In the area of strategic arms, the U.S. delegates in Geneva proposed a solution which would not decrease them, but increase them as a result of deployment of long-range cruise missiles of all types. These weapons are new and very dangerous, often attack weapons.

The U.S. side has a similar approach with regard to medium-range nuclear weapons, i.e., it does not wish to have an agreement, but wishes to use the negotiations for other purposes. It is clear that U.S. medium-range missiles are an addition to the U.S. strategic arsenal. Their purpose is not only to upset the regional balance but to gain global superiority and a first-strike capability on the part of the U.S. and its allies. There are even those who speak of a decapitating strike.

This is particularly serious since it is joined with the U.S. concept of an anti-ballistic missile shield to cover U.S. territory. The U.S.S.R. makes its judgments not only on the basis of what is said in Geneva (although that, too, is significant), but also on the basis of statements by officials of the U.S. Administration, and especially on the basis of the practical steps taken by the U.S. in the military area. The Soviet conclusion is that the U.S. wants to accelerate the arms race. The U.S. "Star Wars" plan brings the world closer to a much less stable situation.

How should the Soviet Union respond to this? It will not simply disregard it, but will take the necessary steps to prevent being left at a disadvantage.

The Soviet side considers that security should be achieved not through military superiority but through honest resolution of the issues of nuclear and space arms on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union is not seeking unilateral advantage. Future generations would not forgive us for commencing a race in space arms. So long as space attack weapons still do not exist, it is easy to put a stop to such a race. The Soviet Union wants to have strategic equilibrium at a lower level.

28

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

-6-

Turning to medium-range nuclear weapons, Shevardnadze said that efforts should not be made by one side to outsmart the other. There is no possibility of doing this because of the great intellectual and technological capabilities of our countries. Our strategic weapons should be reduced, and channels should not be created to by-pass this. In considering medium-range nuclear weapons, not only the weapons of NATO, but also those of England and France must be taken into account, as should U.S. carrier-based aircraft, since they are an important part of the strategic balance. Neither side should have first-strike weapons near the borders of the other.

If there is agreement in Geneva, the Soviet side would be prepared to halt its deployment of SS-20s in Asia as long as there was no substantial change in the strategic situation in that area. The U.S.S.R. has also taken another constructive step, i.e., it has declared a moratorium until January on all counter-measures which it is taking in Europe. The U.S., however, was not following suit, and this was a shame, since this is an opportunity which should not be wasted.

The Soviet side has been told there are untested elements of flexibility in the U.S. position. But where are they? Do they really exist? On the basis of equality and equal security, there can be agreement on a significant reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides, and the Soviet Union is prepared to go quite far in this direction. The Soviet Union is in favor of genuinely radical reductions in nuclear weapons. The U.S. should think carefully about what we are offering.

Shevardnadze recalled the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on all types of nuclear weapons under negotiation in Geneva. The Soviet side has proposed such a moratorium as the beginning of the process of reduction and final elimination of nuclear arms. This would be the first step and within a month or two specific levels could be proposed, provided that space weapons were banned. Space should remain peaceful. It is regrettable that the U.S. side does not wish to respond on the essence of the proposal. The U.S. also does not wish to talk about the Soviet proposal of a separate moratorium on space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is clear that such partial measures would be easy to implement and would have a positive influence on everything else. The Soviet side considered that the proposals made by it in Geneva should be looked at anew by the U.S. side. Accusations which have been made regarding alleged Soviet intransigence or that there has been an absence of Soviet proposals are ill-founded.

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

29

~~SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE~~

-7-

The U.S. assertion that it is lagging behind the Soviet Union in nuclear arms is not correct. An objective approach needs to be taken. There needs to be a political will to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous military event.

There was a great deal to think about regarding areas of forward movement, and this would be important in preparing for the summit. The above complex of questions would be an important and perhaps the central issue at the summit. There are, of course, other items on the agenda.

The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a permanent fixture of the Soviet-American agenda. The sides have areas of mutual interest in this, and they recognize it. There are, however, also questions of concern which the Soviet side has transmitted to the U.S. side. There has been a preliminary exchange of views between the two sides on the possibility of a joint statement at the summit regarding the area of nuclear non-proliferation. On the whole, the Soviet Union is in favor of this, and the two sides need to work on how they should stress their commitment to it.

The NPT Review Conference will take place in about one month, and the Soviet side suggests that U.S. and Soviet representatives could get together after the conference, and, bearing the results of the conference in mind, could draft a text for examination by the leadership of the two countries. Whether this would be a separate statement or part of a larger concluding document could be decided later.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would like to say a few words about chemical weapons. At present our representatives in Geneva are talking to each other about this subject, and the Soviet side is in favor of stepping up the pace of their work. If the U.S. side agrees, instructions could be given to the delegates there to have consultations on all aspects of a chemical weapons convention. Such consultations would be useful. It would be very important to have a ban on chemical weapons. There are many complex sides to this issue, and experts need to get together to talk about it. Sometimes, talks are one thing, and practical political actions are another. Both sides must monitor the progress made in the area of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The U.S.S.R. is concerned about U.S. binary weapons. If the U.S. side prefers to have an agreement on chemical weapons, the Soviet side would be ready, and at the summit as well, to try to arrive at a common understanding on questions on which a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles would depend.

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Shevardnadze wished to say a few words about the CDE Conference in Stockholm. The Soviet side had recently heard from the U.S. side about the latter's readiness for constructive work on CBM's, security and disarmament. But the Soviet side was afraid that U.S. actions do not correspond to its words. At the conference, there is a desire to start concrete work on a draft final document, a desire to combine non-use of force as well as military technical measures. We hope the U.S. would be more constructive and would urge some its allies to be more constructive also. The time is ripe for this. All of the CDE participants could put together an outline of a concluding agreement. The U.S. could be assured that any positive change in the situation would be noticed by the Soviet side. The entire situation would be positively influenced by productive dialogue between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Soviet side believes we can make this an asset for the summit.

Shevardnadze wished to dwell briefly on the MBFR negotiations. It seemed that these negotiations were treated as an "unloved stepson" by the United States. The Soviet side was surprised that Secretary Shultz had indicated to Ambassador Dobrynin that there were no prospects of reaching an agreement on MBFR at the summit. The U.S.S.R. considers that consultations on this issue should continue. It considers that this is one of the issues that could be agreed between the sides without a great deal of effort, although at present the two sides do not have much to show for it. The Soviet side would like to ask the U.S. leadership to look again at its proposals concerning an initial reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces. The two countries could give a good example of increasing security and cooperation in Europe.

Shevardnadze said that he had spoken about the importance of European cooperation yesterday. The Soviet Union is in favor of continuing the CSCE process and doing so substantively. This has always been its position of principle and reflects the conviction that relaxation of tensions is important for all countries, and all countries should work towards it. Most of the CSCE participants take such an approach. The Helsinki Final Act was an expression of the good will of the participating states and their desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions and balance the interests of all concerned.

The past ten years of the Helsinki process have been uneven, and have not gone as well as first envisioned. The Helsinki process has been idling in place, and, what is more important, questions of European security have been left off to the side. What often happens is that questions of human rights are put to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in order to cover up the dangerous actions of the other side and to disclaim the other side's responsibility for not fulfilling its obligations under the CSCE.

Shevardnadze said he was astonished at Secretary Shultz' speech the preceeding day. The Soviet Union considers that such issues are its own internal affair. The Soviet side wonders why the U.S. made no mention of questions of security and cooperation in Europe, or mentioned them only in passing.

If we are to expect serious results from the summit, we should create a good environment for that meeting. What would happen if Shevardnadze would come to the U.S. and read a list of unemployed and homeless people, giving their names? He would not want to do this.

The sides should look to the future in a constructive vein. The next CSCE Review Meeting was scheduled to take place in Vienna in 1986. The main thing was to develop a positive experience in Europe.

The U.S.S.R. considered that the Cultural Forum to be held in Budapest this fall and the Human Contacts meeting in Bern in April should be conducted in a businesslike way, and that normal intergovernmental relations should not be replaced by other issues.

With regard to regional issues, if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. wished to improve their relations, they needed to see what could be done with regard to regional issues; a great deal depends on this. It is important to establish a dialogue and to look for points of convergence. There have already been meetings on the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Afghanistan. However, the Soviet side is waiting for a reply from the U.S. on arranging consultations on the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Central America. In such consultations, we would need to seek political solutions of differences through peaceful means. It is difficult to seek mutually acceptable measures if no restraint is shown in practice in the Middle East, Central America, and Southern Africa.

The Soviet side feels that there needs to be discussion of Central America. It has expressed to the U.S. leadership its concern over the policies and acts of the United States which lead to an increase of tension in relation to Nicaragua and Cuba. Such a policy on the part of the U.S. cannot but influence Soviet-American relations.

The last issue Shevardnadze wished to turn to was the issue of bilateral relations. He said that although there had been changes for the better in these relations recently, these changes were not yet tangible. It was the U.S. side that initiated the worsening of these relations and the Soviet side would expect it to take concrete steps to change this abnormal state of affairs. The Soviet side is prepared to work on the specific issues which it has described.

32

~~SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE~~

-10-

A package of issues exists in our relations. Agreement has now been reached in Tokyo with regard to flights in the North Pacific area, and the Soviet side believes, and the U.S. should agree, that this will lead to a discussion of renewal of the Air Transportation Agreement between the two countries. This can also effect the establishment of consulates general in Kiev and New York and the renewal of the Exchanges Agreement.

This, of course, did not exhaust all of the bilateral relations between the two countries, but resolution of these issues could lead to the resolution of other issues as well; for example, the Soviet side was waiting for a reply from the U.S. side about continuation of discussions on the Soviet-American maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. This could also be one of the areas for discussion at the summit.

Shevardnadze indicated that these were the types of questions which should be discussed by the two leaders at the summit. Both sides should work with each other in order to prepare thoroughly for it.

Shevardnadze concluded by joking that perhaps he had violated the rules for these meetings by talking so long.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze was not at all out of order, since they must take whatever time is needed. In fact, the Secretary may himself need even more time as he has got all of his own material to go through and in addition wanted to address Shevardnadze's points as well. Shevardnadze said that they didn't think all questions could be responded to today. These were complex matters and all he had wanted to do was give an outline. Also this was their first meeting.

The Secretary said that for him the simultaneous translation process had gone well. Shevardnadze should see how it works for him. Shevardnadze said that since the Secretary had endured it, he would too. The Secretary said no, that if it were not right for him, he should stop using it. Shevardnadze then said "as is convenient to you."

The Secretary said that he found much to agree with and much to disagree with in what Shevardnadze had said. He would try to sort this all out. First he would make a comment overall. On the Geneva meeting between the two leaders we were in broad accord with one exception (human rights.) He noted as a general set of things that the topics are exactly the sort of things that they should be trying to advance. So in general, we are in accord. He now wanted to take the issues one by one.

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But perhaps first one comment about the importance of being careful not to upset things, as Shevardnadze had said, and to take positive steps to enhance the prospects for the meeting between the two leaders. There are a number of activities that tend to inflame things. We have had some discussions of the Nicholson shooting. We need to handle such matters much better and we still have a long ways to go on this case. The other incident in the zone was handled quickly and well and is not an issue at this point. We had discussions of the Berlin Air Corridor. At the technical level some progress has been made. But nothing can blow up faster than Berlin. Some of your statements during the TWA hijacking were inflammatory. The U.S. finds the buzzing of our rigs in the Bering Sea unnecessary and an example of the type of thing where restraint is called for. As a general proposition, we are ready to work with the Soviet Union. We recognize that we have different systems and that we are competitive, but we don't want this competition to explode. We have no military or aggressive intentions. He wanted to assure Shevardnadze of this fact.

The Secretary then said that he wanted to turn to security issues, following the outline which Shevardnadze had made. He had a general comment which cut across this field. We don't feel there is much to be gained by broad declaratory statements that cannot be verified. That goes for big things like Geneva and lesser things as well. We need content and procedures to verify what has been established. We say this in the spirit of what it takes to build confidence and also with our Congress in mind. They have to ratify agreements and the first question they ask is how we can be sure to verify what is being carried out.

The Secretary then said he wanted to turn to nuclear testing. It would be a positive advance to put some controls over testing, but we have concerns with verification. This is precisely the problem we have with the 1974 and 1976 agreements (TTBT and PNET) which Shevardnadze had mentioned. He had discussed this with Ambassador Dobrynin and undoubtedly the Minister was also very familiar with it. There are things that can be done and in that spirit the President had made his proposal last year and again this weekend to advance verification. That is part of our problem with the Soviet moratorium as well. Beyond that, we are concerned with the moratorium because as we view it, the Soviet side has moved ahead with more modern weapons so they need testing less. In addition, we have the experience of the early 1960's when the Soviet Union had broken out of a moratorium with a big testing program. President Kennedy had then said we should never again be involved in a moratorium without the means of verification. For that matter, a freeze also presents problems of the same type.

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

By contrast, the President's proposal is operational and practical. It also recognizes the Soviet point that it is not a good practice to change agreements that have already been signed. This is not necessary. If you carry out the suggestion we have made, it will lead in a positive direction. The Secretary asked the members of his delegation whether he had left anything out. He noted that Nitze usually kicked him if there was a problem. Shevardnadze looked around to find Kvitsinskiy and said that he forbade Kvitsinskiy to interfere as he had been unable to reach an agreement.

The Secretary said that he would like to turn now to the Geneva issues which are of transcendent importance and should be addressed by our leaders. To the extent these matters can be advanced, they should be. Our negotiators are ready to give and take; they are there with good faith and good will. The President has shown his commitment by his decision on interim restraint. We have had two positive SCC agreements. But basically on substance in Geneva no special advance has been made. We think that this is not our fault, but yours. We pick up newspapers and find so-called new Soviet ideas. Congressmen go to Moscow and something is raised with them. But we get nothing in Geneva. The Union of Concerned Scientists gets a letter that some say provides a signal that research would not be banned; but when we ask, we are told that this is a misinterpretation and that research is included in the ban. Still we hear nothing in Geneva. We recognize that there is going to be some propaganda. Each side will be working with various groups.

But we feel we have sent competent negotiators to Geneva. Our people feel we have a professional crew. If the Union of Concerned Scientists or Congressman Solarz receive proposals, they are not in a position to evaluate them. When you go out like that, we don't take you seriously. There are three competent negotiators and you should take them seriously. We feel we haven't seen that. There was a bit more conversation in the second round, but it still wasn't great.

The Secretary continued that we feel the groups are related; this was agreed in Geneva. Each side gave its views. We felt that discussions in the three groups could go forward. If in one of the three groups there was progress, this could be brought forward and we could look at it. We don't think it is the right way to have nothing in the strategic and intermediate range groups if we are not in agreement in space/defense.

We need to get at it in Geneva. There is much to say, but we are not negotiating here. Let us make the people in Geneva earn their living, and make them work. We agree they need a political impulse if they are to get something accomplished. If there are stumbling blocks, then it is up to Shevardnadze and the Secretary to see what they can do. If there is still a problem, then the President and the General Secretary can kick rear ends. But we must clarify what the problems are.

3

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

-13-

The Secretary said he wanted to look at his notes on the comments that Shevardnadze had made here. He noted Shevardnadze's statement that we had other purposes in mind with arms control. The Secretary wanted to state that we don't have any other purposes; that we would like to see the negotiations succeed and we would like to see them result in radical reductions. Both sides have set as a goal no nuclear weapons. But we have to take a radical step to get there. We believe that if we take radical steps, if the United States and the Soviet Union move to much lower levels, we can then go together to the other nuclear states and say that they must join us if we are to proceed to zero nuclear weapons. This is how we should approach the French, British and Chinese.

In sum, the United States is preparing for the next round with great care. We are ready to make it a genuine and concrete round. Shevardnadze and he should tell the negotiators to produce something useful for the two leaders -- not half-baked, but something good. The Secretary went on that with regard to the President's SDI program, it has no offensive capabilities. The only potential nuclear explosion in space is from the Soviet ABM system around Moscow. The United States has no ABM system at all and no ASAT system at all. We are paralleling what you are doing; we are very impressed with what you are doing in defense. So we are for examining a concept in which stability is strengthened and the danger of a first strike lessened. This ought to be attractive to you and we want to discuss it with you. We find it interesting that Mr. Gromyko used to call for a more effective defense; he was right.

The Secretary said there was one other thing with regard to the ABM Treaty. We are very concerned with what we consider to be a violation. Krasnoyarsk is a problem in itself and a problem with regard to the ABM Treaty -- which, incidentally was also predicated on reductions in offensive arms. We also have a Congress which is deeply concerned about what appears to us to be a violation.

The Secretary, looking in Ambassador Ridgway's direction, said that during our last election campaign Vice President Bush got into trouble when he talked about "kicking ass"; but that is what we've got to do with our delegations.

With regard to non-proliferation, the Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze's comments that there is some convergence here. We could look at whether a statement on this would stand by itself or be part of a communique. We have given the Soviet side a draft and we are prepared to have Ambassador Kennedy work with his counterpart right after the Review Conference. So it is agreed by both sides that we will do that. We are disappointed that you did not want to

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

do this before the NPT Review Conference; in any case we will move in accordance with your suggestion. The Secretary had made reference a number of times to the fact that this has been a productive area for us. At the Review Conference itself we should stay away from polemics and the U.S. will conduct itself this way.

The Secretary continued that with regard to chemical weapons we agreed with the need to work on them. This could be the sleeper in the arms area. If possession and use escalate, and chemical weapons are much easier for countries to produce than nuclear weapons, this could be very bad. So we are ready to tell our representative in Geneva to step up activity. We note your statement about binaries. They are safe to store and have been developed only as a deterrent. We would like to do away with chemical weapons, but here again a major problem is verification. This is a very hard problem to solve.

We have two suggestions of an operational sort that don't solve the CW problem, but they help. We have advanced them before. One is an invitation for Soviet experts to visit the United States and discuss the technical aspects of destruction. This might help give the technical people a better view of the problem. This is not a big thing, but at the technical level it would be worthwhile. Our second suggestion is with regard to the Iran-Iraq war. There is no question chemical weapons have been used and there is a potential for major use. We are prepared to send a team to Moscow to see if we can do something about it. We don't know precisely what, but perhaps a joint demarche or some kind of statement in Geneva. So we agree that we need to work actively in Geneva and we have a couple of suggestions.

The Secretary then went on to CDE. He noted that the Soviet side has invited our negotiator to come to Moscow early in September. We have accepted. We agree that this is an area in which we can make progress. And we agree that the way to do this is to get into drafting. This highlights the issues and helps us to see what the guts are. What we are seeking to do is to make a combination of the idea of non-use of force with practical technical confidence building measures which give confidence to the idea of NUF and strengthen a sense of security in Europe. He noted that Shevardnadze had said CDE could become an asset in Geneva for the two leaders. The Secretary agreed and said that we should go ahead and try.

On MBFR the Secretary said we will work at it. People seem to make whole careers out of this, and even pass files on to their grandchildren. He noted that Shevardnadze had said we should make some headway. So let us scratch our heads and see what we can come up with.

On CSCE the Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had made some comments. We support the process. The Secretary had identified yesterday some of the benefits. One of them is that you get to meet people whom you don't normally see. He noted that Shevardnadze had commented that he found the Secretary's speech "astonishing" and that he rejected it and would make some comments when he comes to the United States. He should help himself. It would be easy to get such lists together as there are people who spend their time gathering such information freely. We are strong on self-criticism in the United States. If Shevardnadze has suggestions, we would be glad to have them.

But the things that the Secretary had mentioned are part of the CSCE process, like freedom of religion. He just wanted to say once again that, aside from the fact that each of us is responsible for internal decisions and each has his own laws, motion in these fields which affect deep human emotions would have a very positive effect on the atmosphere. Shevardnadze had said that he did not like certain aspects of the Secretary's speech; the Secretary could pick on parts of Shevardnadze's speech. At the press briefing yesterday, Roz Ridgway had put it well when she said "you gave your speech, and we gave ours."

Turning to regional questions, the Secretary said he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said about the usefulness of experts' talks. We can't say that we can point to any breakthroughs, but we have shared information; these talks do help make our views more clear and they help avoid miscalculations. So we consider it positive to do them. The Soviet side had suggested East Asian talks and we think this is a good idea. In your paper you have suggested holding them in Moscow, and we are prepared to do them there -- in the first two weeks of September, if that is agreeable. If the Soviet side will let us know about this period we can then find specific dates. We will send Paul Wolfowitz, who is Roz Ridgway's counterpart and an Asian expert to head our team. He and I traveled in Asia recently.

We also agree that talks on Central America would be useful after we have had the East Asian talks. We will find some time this fall to have those discussions. You mentioned concerns about Central America. We are very concerned about Nicaragua. We are seeing the establishment of a pattern of government that is not in line with what is happening in the rest of the hemisphere. We have incontrovertible evidence that they are interfering in other nations in the region. They are arming at a level beyond all others. You know our position. At the same time we would welcome your thoughts and we can have a discussion after the Asian experts meet.

38

The Secretary continued that in the East Asian area he had just returned and again had been impressed by the dynamism of countries from Korea to Japan and down through Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The big sore point in the region is the occupation by Vietnam of Kampuchea. We believe ASEAN's approach to solving this problem is correct and we support it. We oppose restoration of the Pol Pot regime and we feel that if free elections are conducted that would not be the result. Whatever the Soviet Union can do, and it has considerable influence with Vietnam, this would be a positive contribution. We have people who go to Hanoi quite a bit, so we have a first-hand experience. There is a sharp contrast with Thailand and other countries there. Hanoi is standing still with regard to economic development; isolation is bad for them, but this is the result of their actions in Kampuchea. On Korea, we favor dialogue and something is developing. We support the simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the United Nations. This might help them and us as well.

Afghanistan is a problem which cries out for resolution, the Secretary continued. We noticed that when Rajiv Gandhi visited the United States he seemed to have positive thoughts. All sorts of conditions have been laid down. But it is possible to state the matter simply in our view. There are three million refugees outside the country. There is a need to create conditions that would allow them to return within a framework acceptable to the Afghan people. This can't be done while Soviet troops are there. We have no interest in using this issue. We are prepared to do our part to help bring about a settlement. We have no interest in an Afghanistan hostile to the Soviet Union. We understand that it is as close to your borders as Nicaragua is to ours, so a non-aligned Afghanistan would be fine with us.

On bilateral matters, the Secretary continued, there are a number of things which are being worked on and should be pushed. The meeting Secretary Baldrige had in Moscow was positive. He was among those who have been received by Gorbachev and come back to say that he is a good interlocutor.

We are pleased that our representatives have been able to reach agreement in Tokyo on North Pacific air safety. We are anxious to see that implementing procedures are put in place. This has to do with straying aircraft so we can make this agreement operational. So we don't see any difficulty if we both put pressure on here and move ahead. On the assumption that this is going forward we are prepared to have talks on civil aviation. We understand that Pan American and Aeroflot have talked. We also understand that the agreement has lapsed. We suggest that we start early in September to discuss a new agreement and we are prepared to host talks in Washington. Any agreement should have equitable treatment of the companies, including traffic service.

39

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

-17-

Shevardnadze had mentioned consulates. The Secretary thought that if we could get going, this is among the things that we could get together before the Geneva meeting. But there are things that need to get done now. This is not just a question of an announcement. We need to have a good look at the buildings in Kiev. We are prepared to do this and do it simultaneously. We are ready to go.

The Secretary continued that on the exchanges agreement there are some remaining issues. He would just highlight TV appearances and exhibits at least at previous levels.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had mentioned talks on the demarcation line (Maritime Boundary Talks.) We agree that this is desirable and we are prepared for another round early in the fall -- say September or early October. We are prepared to hold the talks in Washington; we should set them up through diplomatic channels.

Shevardnadze had also mentioned other areas and the need to reinvigorate them. We have reached accord on an agricultural cooperation agreement. Secretary Block would be in Moscow in late August, Housing Secretary Pierce would be there in September, and Environment Administrator Thomas would be there in November. As a general matter we agree on the need to reinvigorate such bilateral agreements.

The Secretary said that he had one additional suggestion; that we move more aggressively to expand cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. We did have cooperation in this area. We continue to believe that a joint simulated space rescue mission would be a good idea. We are prepared to negotiate a new agreement to replace that which lapsed in 1982. It could cover areas like planetary exploration, life sciences and other area. He then gave Shevardnadze what he described as a "non-paper". He commented that he did not know whether the Soviets had such a bureaucratic term. When the Soviet side had time to consider it, we would be pleased to hear from them.

The Secretary then said he had some comments with regard to some arrangements for the meeting between the two leaders in November. The physical atmosphere makes a difference. We have a team in Geneva and understand that the Soviets also have one there. We don't know the Soviets' conclusions. The Swiss have suggested that we use one of their chateaux; they would make it available as a meeting site. They have told us that they are concerned about providing absolute security, so they want a place with some space from the road, an area not very populated where they can let the press in and out. From our point of view, it is important for the leaders to have a place where they can talk in a relaxed manner and perhaps take a walk in the

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

grounds. So, the Swiss suggestion makes sense to us. We would be happy to set a time fairly soon to have our two teams go there and make a selection. It is well to get this settled early so arrangements can go forward.

The Swiss also said they would like to host a fairly sizeable reception. As they are the host, we are inclined to accept. Of course, we need to decide this together. We think that November 20 would be a good evening for this reception. Beyond that we think we should not schedule anything during the lunchtimes so that each delegation will have the time to focus on business. But we are ready to see what informal dinners could be held. We would be pleased to host a dinner, and if you wanted to do so as well, that would be good. We believe that we should keep these quite small so that while we would have them informal, they would consist of the people involved in a direct way -- not necessarily just those in the meetings, but directly involved.

The Secretary said there were one or two aspects of a more personal nature which he would like to do separately with Shevardnadze and the two Ambassadors for a few minutes in the next room. But before doing that, he just wanted to note that Shevardnadze would be coming to New York and that would be a time to advance the issues. The Secretary and his wife also want to be sure that Mrs. Shevardnadze is entertained properly. So we need to get an idea with regard to dates. We know that General Secretary Gorbachev will be meeting with Mitterand October 2-5. This means that Shevardnadze would be leaving the United States before then. We need to focus on scheduling his meetings in the United States as soon as possible because the President's calendar is always very busy. He and Shevardnadze should meet first in New York, as is usual, and then he could come down to Washington to see the President.

The Secretary then asked how it had gone for Shevardnadze with the earplug. It had saved them one hour and twenty minutes. He found it o.k. Shevardnadze affirmed that the "experiment" worked well.

Shevardnadze continued that his overall impression was that a group of questions were emerging around which there could be positive solutions. He and the Secretary and the experts in various fields in preparation for the summit could begin practical work. He saw some positive elements. The very fact that the leaders would be meeting and a group of questions can be agreed upon -- maybe not the most important, but still serious issues -- this was good. So, we have a minimum program that can be achieved, but we should strive for a maximum program. We should come up with serious proposals for the summit. It seemed that destroying detente was not hard, but

41

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

-19-

recreating it would not be so easy. He wanted to say frankly that if SALT II had been ratified, matters would have proceeded more normally. But he would not rake up the past. We had had some bright moments, of which our wartime cooperation was an example.

The Secretary agreed, and said that this cooperation was for an objective of tremendous importance and we all should be grateful for the defeat of Hitler's Nazism. Shevardnadze said that he had just received a group of war veterans, including an American, and that we could learn from that generation. The Secretary noted that he had fought in that war (Shevardnadze interjected that he knew the Secretary had been in the war), in fact had been in the Pacific as a Marine. Marines felt that this was the highest calling. One of the most moving things that had happened to the Secretary was the time he spent in the war cemetery in Leningrad.

Shevardnadze commented that, therefore, there was a lot to borrow from history and also some things not to borrow. He had been struck by remarks of Richard Nixon about the possibility of using nuclear weapons having been explored against certain countries. We should go forward and remove the differences facing us today. The Secretary had raised some questions for which there was not time today. But on the Nicholson and Berlin Corridor questions, the Soviets have known official positions which he would not change. A lot depends on the group working in Geneva. Much depends on a successful outcome in Geneva. He could guarantee that they will push Kvitsinskiy. He has no where else to go; otherwise he will be unemployed. He had been told that the U.S. representatives were building a building there. But we must make serious preparations for progress in this round. There were wars that lasted ten years, thirty years, one hundred years, but there is no time now to postpone solutions. He had talked with Kvitsinskiy and their scientists. He was not an expert, but he is convinced that we are now in a state of rough parity, and above all in nuclear weapons. If we don't proceed on this basis, we will have serious trouble. If we accept that we have rough parity, then solutions will come. This is an issue of basic importance. You are in favor of verification; we are in favor of prohibition. Which problem is basic and which relates to superstructure? First let's agree on the problem and then do verification. Surely we can determine whether a side is exploding nuclear weapons with all of the scientific advances that we have.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised the ABM system around Moscow and Krasnoyarsk. There is nothing in the Soviet Union that violates the ABM agreement. The U.S. knows why we are building Krasnoyarsk. We declared formally and there will be no other declaration here. The Soviet side will not violate the principles of this agreement. He could give an example of a building in Greenland that is a violation. We should not go down this path.

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

-20-

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised Vietnam; he would not reply on the others. Perhaps it would not be diplomatic, but he must say that if the Vietnamese are not living a good life, the American hand was certainly there. If it had not been for the war, they would not be in this situation. So he did not think this was an appropriate statement. The Secretary interjected that he wanted the record to show that this was one point on which they did not agree.

Shevardnadze continued that it was nice that there is emerging a more normal tone in their discussion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is in favor of a political solution (the Secretary interjected "good"). The two states there should find a solution. Pakistan and Afghanistan. We should facilitate that process.

On verification, Shevardnadze said he recalled there was discussion of this in the tripartite talks that had taken place on a comprehensive test ban. So here is something to look at.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, there are a large set of questions before us. It is important concretely to determine our attitude. In Washington and in Moscow we need to study our positions, to study what has been stated here and to decide what to put to our leaders. We need to speed up this process. At the next session between the two of them, he and the Secretary can have a more concrete discussion of those things they are readying for the summit, and those things that are not quite ripe for settlement. The main thing was not to disappoint people. As for practical arrangements, he was not quite ready yet. The U.S. side knows the tradition -- today we host, then you host. Tehran had been the only exception. This can be discussed and explored. This is not too complex to resolve. He knew his General Secretary was looking forward to the meeting and that he was prepared to make his contribution. Shevardnadze said that he was so new himself that his own schedule was not quite ready. But he hoped in a week to be able to communicate to the Secretary. He thought this had been a useful and a frank meeting. If our representatives take less walks in the woods and work more, then the summit can proceed at a good level. He would like to say that he had thought a lot about his meeting with the Secretary in advance, about the Secretary's experience and the fact that he was a newcomer and inexperienced. So our meeting looked to be of an unequal nature. But then he had found out that you have experience, but we have the truth.

The Secretary said he would leave that comment lying there, but he had a few comments to make. First, our two leaders should have a good meeting. This was the main thing. They should have a useful and productive exchange. We need to do our preparations for this to happen. So, the two men are the main thing. Second, we have a lot of things that we are working on; surely we can get something

SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE

accomplished, other things ought to be done, and still others will perhaps be more difficult. We should not force the pace where this is not in our interest, but we should try if there is something positive to do. This is all for the good. In any case, the President will want to have a discussion of those issues. So, we should get done what we can get done. Third, we should try to get out of the meeting a sense of the future. We want it to be prospective to establish a perspective and an agenda for the future. So here the main thing is to chart a course and to give an impetus to further work.

The Secretary continued that we will have to say something to the press afterwards. He would comment briefly to the press and then Ambassadors Ridgway, Hartman, and Matlock would have a backgrounder but they would not provide detail. It would be useful to agree what words we will use to characterize the meeting. He thought of words like interesting, useful, frank, businesslike, and productive. We had tried an experiment with regard to simultaneous interpretation and it had worked. We had accomplished in three hours what it otherwise took us six hours to do. The meeting was productive in the sense that it advanced our planning for the November meeting; we identified things to work on. We discussed the full range of things before us; arms control, bilateral and regional issues, and we discussed human rights, since you challenged my speech. Shevardnadze turned to the members of his delegation and asked whether it wouldn't be desirable to agree on a common approach. He noted that this is the first stage in preparations for the summit, that this is the main aspect of their meeting, and that we should roll up our sleeves and make that meeting between our leaders productive.

The Secretary and Ambassador Hartman then took Shevardnadze and Dobrynin into an adjoining room. The Secretary noted that Mrs. Reagan plans to travel with the President to Geneva and hopes that Mrs. Gorbacheva will be coming. If Mrs. Gorbacheva is interested, Mrs. Reagan would like to plan some joint activities. Could the Soviets let us know how Mrs. Gorbacheva feels about this? The Secretary also suggested to Shevardnadze in the context of the Soviet desire to create the right climate for the Geneva meeting that it would be useful for them to moderate their propaganda approach. Shevardnadze noted that while the Soviets could control their side of that equation, he wondered whether the USG could reciprocate. He noted that he had just read an article that reported a sale of thousands of videogames to American children which had them carry out an attack on Moscow. But he agreed that this was an area we should look into.

The Secretary then escorted Shevardnadze out to his car.