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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/7/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JULY 1985 (7/8)

FOIA

F06-114/2

Box Number 10

YARHI-MILO

1008

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7572	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE: SUMMARY TALKING POINTS <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	7	7/24/1985	B1
7558	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE/POINDEXTER RE LETTER OF PROTEST <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/24/1985	B1
7560	LETTER	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LETTERS FROM SERGEI PETROV AND VLADIMIR FELTSMAN <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/24/1985	B1
7562	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTERS PRESIDENT FROM SOVIET ARTISTS <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/12/1985	B1
7563	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PETROV <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/2/1985	B1
7566	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC#7562 <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	7/12/1985	B1
7567	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7560 <i>R 10/1/2012 F2006-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7573	TALKING POINTS	GENEVA <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7568	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS MCFARLANE RE CONVERSATION WITH SHULTZ <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	7/26/1985	B1
7569	MEMO	MESSAGE SUGGESTED BY PALMER RE USSR <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7574	TALKING POINTS	CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS FOR CONTACT IN HELSINKI <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7570	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC#7569 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	2	ND	B1
7575	TALKING POINTS	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7574 <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	1	ND	B1
7571	PAPER	SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY: SOME COMMON TRAITS BY MATLOCK <i>R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2</i>	8	ND	B1

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7/26/85

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For RCM/JP

1. Channel + msg.

a. Rpt

b. Msg

c. Talking pts

2. Out of synch?
- Possibilities -

3. NSDD

Papers

Other activities for Pres in advance.

YOUR MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE: SUMMARY TALKING POINTS

INTRODUCTION

-- CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT. LOOK FORWARD TO DEVELOPING CANDID, COSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH YOU. PLEASE SEND BEST WISHES TO GROMYKO.

-- PRESIDENT BELIEVES OUR RELATIONS NEED NOT REMAIN STRAINED. PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN ALL AREAS.

-- OUR SPECIFIC GOAL NOW SHOULD BE TO PREPARE WELL FOR SUMMIT -- ADDRESS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AND NARROW DIFFERENCES.

-- GIVEN LIMITED TIME FOR TODAY'S MEETING, PROPOSE BRIEF OPENING COMMENTS FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSION OF INDIVIDUAL ISSUES. SHOULD RESERVE TIME AT END TO TALK ABOUT MODALITIES OF THE SUMMIT.

-- CAN PURSUE SPECIFICS THROUGH HARTMAN AND DOBRYNIN, AS WELL AS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON IN FALL. (OFFER FLOOR TO SHEVARDNADZE FOR HIS INITIAL TALK -- HE MAY SUGGEST THAT YOU GO FIRST.)

INITIAL PRESENTATION

-- PRESIDENT APPROACHING SUMMIT IN REALISTIC FASHION. HE SEES MEETING AS OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTH LEADERS TO GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER AND HOLD DISCUSSION COVERING ALL ISSUES IN RELATIONSHIP.

-- WE DO NOT REQUIRE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AT SUMMIT, BUT WE WILL BE READY TO SEIZE ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS IF THEY ARISE.

-- SEVERAL POSITIVE STEPS SINCE VIENNA MEETING: SUMMIT AGREEMENT, NEW SCC UNDERSTANDINGS, AGREEMENT TO REVIVE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION AND PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINT.

-- UNFORTUNATELY, OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS ON LARGER ISSUES REMAIN: AGGRESSIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN VARIOUS REGIONS, ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN; LACK OF PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL; BLEAK HUMAN RIGHTS PICTURE.

-- WE REMAIN ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES WHICH ENDANGER AMERICAN LIVES (I.E. NICHOLSON CASE AND OTHER TROUBLES WITH MLM, BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS, INFLAMMATORY PROPAGANDA AT TIME OF TWA HIJACKING, BUZZING OF AMERICANS IN BERING SEA).

-- DAMAGE THESE INCIDENTS CAN CAUSE SEEMS TO US TO FAR OUTWEIGH WHATEVER GAINS USSR MAY SEE. CONTINUING PROCLIVITY TO USE FORCE RATHER THAN DIPLOMACY, EITHER AS GOVERNMENT PREFERENCE OR LACK OF CONTROL OVER MILITARY, THREATENS POSITIVE WORK WE CAN DO.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

7572
F06-114/2 # 11608

BY LOT NARA DATE 11/21/07

SPECIFIC ISSUES

ARMS CONTROL - GENEVA TALKS

-- GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MAJOR ITEM AT NOVEMBER SUMMIT. WE BOTH SHOULD THINK HARD ABOUT HOW TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE TALKS.

-- U.S. COMMITTED TO PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN GENEVA. PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN U.S. NEGOTIATORS CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY ON ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES. HIS DIFFICULT DECISION ON INTERIM RESTRAINT ALSO REFLECTS THAT COMMITMENT.

-- YOU SHOULD NOW BEGIN TO MOVE ON BOTH SCORES -- GET DOWN TO SERIOUS BUSINESS IN GENEVA, AND RESOLVE U.S. COMPLIANCE CONCERNS.

-- PLEASED THAT SCC COMPLETED TWO AGREEMENTS, BUT MORE EFFORT IS NEEDED, PARTICULARLY TO RESOLVE KRASNOYARSK.

-- SOME STIRRINGS IN GENEVA IN LAST ROUND, BUT NO REAL PROGRESS:

-- ON SUBSTANCE, YOUR NEGOTIATORS SIMPLY REASSERT POSITIONS YOU KNOW ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO US, OR THEY WON'T GO INTO SPECIFICS EITHER ON OUR IDEAS OR EVEN YOUR OWN. SOME SLIGHT BREAK IN THE ICE IN START GROUP LAST ROUND, BUT WE CAN'T EVALUATE YOUR IDEAS WITHOUT DETAILS.

-- ON TACTICS, YOUR PEOPLE INSIST ON LINKAGES THAT BLOCK SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS. IT WAS AGREED IN JANUARY TO CONSIDER AND RESOLVE NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS ISSUES IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP. THIS DOES NOT MEAN TO PRECONDITION PROGRESS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS REDUCTIONS ON ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR POSITION ON SO-CALLED "SPACE-STRIKE" ARMS.

-- IN OTHER WORDS, NOT SURPRISING WE'RE FAR APART ON MANY ISSUES, BUT DISAPPOINTING YOUR NEGOTIATORS WON'T ENGAGE IN THE KIND OF GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT COULD NARROW DIFFERENCES. PARTICULARLY PUZZLED BY YOUR LACK OF INTEREST IN THE STATEMENT THAT BUD MCFARLANE AND I GAVE TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN.

-- ON START: THE END RESULT -- DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR ARMS -- IS WHAT COUNTS. WE'RE FLEXIBLE ON ACHIEVING THAT GOAL AND WILLING TO DISCUSS SOVIET ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS "MODEL" YOUR NEGOTIATORS DISCUSSED LAST ROUND FOR PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITS. IN RIGHT CONTEXT, THIS IDEA COULD BE A BRIDGE BETWEEN YOUR "MODEL" AND OUR IDEAS THAT WOULD BE WORTH EXPLORING. HOPE YOU WILL OFFER DETAILS ON NUMERICAL OUTCOMES SO WE CAN EVALUATE.

-- HAVE SEVERAL QUESTIONS WE NEED ANSWERED TO EVALUATE THIS IDEA:

-- THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS OF MISSILE WARHEADS AND SNDVS AND THEIR RESIDUAL LEVELS?

-- THE PERCENTAGE SUB-LIMITS YOU ENVISION?

-- WHETHER HEAVY ICBMs WOULD BE LIMITED AND REDUCED?

-- ON INF, IF YOUR NEGOTIATORS CAN'T ADVANCE NEW IDEAS FOR BALANCED OUTCOME, THEY SHOULD AT LEAST BEGIN TO EXPLORE THE U.S. POSITION, WHICH HAS BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY.

-- ON DEFENSE/SPACE, YOU HAVE MASSIVE SPACE/DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAM. WHY CONTINUE TO INSIST ON ONE-SIDED BAN ON U.S. RESEARCH, PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU HAVE IN THE PAST AGREED WITH US THAT BLANKET LIMITS ON RESEARCH ARE NEITHER VERIFIABLE NOR DESIRABLE? WOULD SEEM TO BE IN YOUR INTEREST TO BEGIN REAL DISCUSSION OF OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP AND HOW WE MIGHT STRENGTHEN STABILITY OF STRATEGIC BALANCE.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL

STOCKHOLM CDE:

-- CDE MEETING AN AREA FOR EARLY PROGRESS. WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOMETHING FOR THE SUMMIT.

-- SHOULD BEGIN DRAFTING CONCLUDING DOCUMENT WITH CONCRETE CBMs AND POLITICAL UNDERSTANDINGS ON NON-USE OF FORCE.

-- AMBASSADOR GOODBY'S SEPTEMBER VISIT TO MOSCOW IS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK IN DETAIL ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:

-- IN OUR VIENNA MEETING, I URGED GROMYKO TO AGREE TO CONSIDER THE TEXT OF A JOINT STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION TO BE ISSUED AT THE SUMMIT. IT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO AMB. PETROVSKIY IN APRIL BY AMB. DICK KENNEDY.

-- WE HAVE NOW GIVEN YOU A NEW DRAFT WHICH COULD BE ISSUED IN ADVANCE OF THE AUGUST 27 REVIEW CONFERENCE. ARE YOU PREPARED TO DO SO?

-- IF YOU AGREE, WE COULD BUILD ON THIS STATEMENT IN A SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE.

NUCLEAR TESTING:

-- HOPE YOU WILL TAKE UP PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO SEND A TEAM TO THE NEVADA TEST SITE TO MEASURE A NUCLEAR TEST.

-- PRESIDENT'S OFFER WAS UNILATERAL. BUT WE ARE ALSO PREPARED, AS WE HAVE INDICATED TO DOBRYNIN AND GROMYKO, FOR AN UNDERSTANDING INVOLVING RECIPROCAL CALIBRATION TESTS, WHICH COULD GO A LONG WAY TO LETTING US MOVE AHEAD ON RATIFICATION OF TTBT AND PNET.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS:

-- BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE TWO STEPS TOWARDS BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON CONCERNS ABOUT CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WANT TO REAFFIRM OFFER FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT U.S. TO VIEW DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES AND TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO A CW BAN. THIS COULD GIVE US BOTH A BETTER PICTURE OF EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF AN AGREEMENT.

-- WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS MORE FULLY CW PROLIFERATION, PARTICULARLY USE OF CW IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR, IN OUR VIEW THE MOST PRESSING CASE. WOULD SEND A TEAM TO MOSCOW IF YOU WISHED. MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING ON PROLIFERATION IN SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- REGIONAL TALKS ON MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN USEFUL IN CLARIFYING POSITIONS.

-- BELIEVE NEXT TALKS SHOULD BE ON EAST ASIA. [PREPARED TO HOLD IN Moscow ON first two weeks.] *in September* Wolfowitz will represent U.S.

-- BELIEVE SUCH DISCUSSIONS AT ALL LEVELS IMPORTANT TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS, PARTICULARLY AT TIMES OF CRISIS.

-- AT SAME TIME, DISAPPOINTED AT LACK OF SOVIET READINESS TO JOIN IN EFFORTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN.

AFGHANISTAN

-- FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM CONTINUES TO BE YOUR INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. TIME IS RIPE TO SOLVE PROBLEM.

-- HOPE YOU WILL TAKE NEW LOOK AT PROBLEM. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS GUARANTEES OF AN AFGHAN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TIMETABLE FOR ORDERLY TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

-- URGE YOU TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN UN TALKS.

-- PRESSURES ON PAKISTAN ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE; WE ARE COMMITTED TO PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

EAST ASIA

-- CONFIRMED AGAIN IN MY RECENT TRIP DYNAMISM OF ASIAN REGION.

-- IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION IS CENTRAL PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA; ASEAN PRINCIPLES OFFER BEST FORMULA FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION.

-- US STRONGLY OPPOSED TO SETTLEMENT RESTORING KHMER ROUGE CONTROL, BUT FREE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT PRODUCE THAT.

-- USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO CONVINCING VIETNAM THAT POLITICAL SETTLEMENT RESTORING INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL CAMBODIA IS IN THEIR INTEREST AS WELL.

-- IN NORTHEAST ASIA, FAVOR EFFORTS TO EXPAND DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO KOREAS, AND THINK DIRECT TALKS BEST WAY. ALSO READY FOR CROSS RECOGNITION.

HUMAN RIGHTS

-- HAVE NO DESIRE TO INTERFERE IN YOUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR FOR YOU TO CONTRAVENE YOUR LAWS.

-- HOWEVER, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS PART OF OUR DEFINITION OF SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. USSR DOES HAVE COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING FINAL ACT. HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD BE PART OF PREPARATORY WORK FOR SUMMIT, AND WILL IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE.

-- ESPECIALLY URGE YOU TO FOCUS ON CLEARING DECKS OF LONGSTANDING DIVIDED-SPOUSE AND DUAL-NATIONAL CASES, AS WELL AS MAKING HEADWAY ON JEWISH EMIGRATION.

-- MY SPEECH REFLECTS GREAT IMPORTANCE ALL AMERICANS ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE, ALSO MENTIONS CASES OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO US.

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- LITTLE PROSPECT FOR RESOLVING LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS SUCH AS MFN WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND EMIGRATION PRACTICES.

-- HOWEVER, SOME BILATERAL ISSUES WHERE EARLY PROGRESS POSSIBLE.

-- MAC BALDRIGE'S MAY VISIT TO MOSCOW MADE USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. URGE YOU TO GIVE U.S. FIRMS EQUAL ACCESS. IMPORTANT YOU FULFILL WHEAT PURCHASE OBLIGATIONS UNDER GRAIN AGREEMENT.

[-- HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON NORTH PACIFIC AIR SAFETY. AS SOON AS AGREEMENT IS FINALIZED, U.S. PREPARED TO DISCUSS RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL AIR SERVICE.]

-- BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK AT SUMMIT.

-- URGE YOU TO TAKE DECISIONS TO RESOLVE FINAL ISSUES IN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE SUMMIT: TV APPEARANCES IMPORTANT, EXHIBITS AT LEAST AT PREVIOUS LEVELS ESSENTIAL.

-- MAKING PROGRESS ON REINVIGORATING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. HAVE HAD JOINT MEETINGS ON TRADE/AGRICULTURE. AGRICULTURE SECRETARY BROCK, HOUSING SECRETARY PIERCE AND EPA ADMINISTRATOR THOMAS ARE TO GO TO MOSCOW IN AUGUST, SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER RESPECTIVELY.

-- PROPOSE ANOTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY DIFFERENCE TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY FALL.

Jack - This is
slightly out of
date. Ty Cobb
has latest.
mf

MODALITIES OF SUMMIT

-- SITES FOR THE MEETINGS SHOULD FOSTER OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES FOR THE SUMMIT -- LET OUR TWO LEADERS GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER IN AS RELAXED A SETTING AS POSSIBLE, AND TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CANDID DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES.

-- SWISS HAVE SUGGESTED, AND WE AGREE, THAT A NEUTRAL SITE WOULD BEST PROVIDE THIS KIND OF ATMOSPHERE.

-- OUR ADVANCE TEAM SAW SEVERAL PLACES SUGGESTED BY THE SWISS AND FOUND THEM IDEAL FOR THE MEETINGS. WE HOPE THEY'LL BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU.

-- SWISS HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO HOST A LARGE RECEPTION FOR BOTH DELEGATIONS ON NOVEMBER 20. AS FOR OTHER SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY HOST DINNERS FOR EACH OTHER ON THE EVENINGS OF NOVEMBER 19 AND 20. OUR PREFERENCE IS TO KEEP THESE AFFAIRS SMALL.

-- ALSO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THOSE WHO WILL BE CHARGED WITH LOGISTICAL PREPARATIONS ON BOTH SIDES TO GET TOGETHER AT AN EARLY DATE IN GENEVA. THIS MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE [DATE] IN [PLACE].

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90787
add-on

JM-C
8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 24, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: NSDD on Geneva Meeting

Attached at Tab A is a copy of the NSDD, incorporating your revisions, and at Tab I a memorandum to the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A National Security Decision Directive

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *GS* NARA, Date *6/12/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your November Meeting with Gorbachev

Issue

Whether to sign an NSDD giving instructions for preparing for your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November.

Facts

Preparation for a fruitful meeting and encouragement of realistic public expectations will require close coordination of preparations and a clear understanding within the bureaucracy of the purposes of the meeting.

Discussion

The NSDD at Tab I is designed to describe your view of the meeting and your goals, to ensure appropriate discipline among U.S. Government officials in commenting on it, and to establish a mechanism for coordinating the various strands of activity in U.S.-Soviet relations by means of a White House Coordinating Group.

Recommendation

That you sign the National Security Decision Directive at Tab A.

OK No

— —

Attachment:

Tab A National Security Decision Directive

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 6/12/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

National Security Decision
Directive Number

MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA (u)

As we prepare for my meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva November 19-20, it will be important for personnel of all agencies active in the sphere of U.S.-Soviet relations to understand clearly the context of the meeting and United States objectives. (u)

I invited the Soviet leader to a meeting as soon as he assumed his position, because I consider it important for the leaders of the two most powerful nations to know each other and to establish a dialogue which can assist us in managing a relationship which is inevitably adversarial but which must be conducted in a manner which improves stability in the world. (u)

Accordingly, the primary purpose of the meeting will be to establish personal contact and, if possible, to develop an agenda for negotiations to be undertaken in the future. The meeting will not be a substitute for negotiations in normal channels, nor is its aim the signing of formal agreements. It should rather be viewed as part of an ongoing process of dialogue with the Soviet leadership, which can give direction and momentum to our negotiating efforts. (u)

Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in various areas should continue to be conducted on their merits, and should neither be hastened nor delayed because of my upcoming meeting. While I do not preclude the possibility of signing or announcing possible agreements which may be reached during the intervening period in the normal course of negotiation, this is not the purpose of the meeting, and the planned meeting should under no circumstances be allowed to influence the United States negotiating position. (S)

Since historically public expectations for meetings between American and Soviet leaders have been inflated and have led to a damaging cycle of euphoria and then disillusionment, it will be important to convey to the public a realistic picture of the context in which my meeting will take place. In particular, nothing should be said to encourage the expectation that the meeting will result in a fundamental change in the nature of the

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Authority S. Tulley 887-1035, 5/17/91
BY [Signature], NARA, Date 6/18/02

U.S.-Soviet relationship, or in major agreements. This must be done, however, without denigrating the importance of the meeting or of kindling suspicions that the United States is not serious in its efforts to resolve problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. (S)

Given the importance of maintaining a clear and consistent treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations in our public statements and public diplomacy, it is imperative for all U.S. Government officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by my own statements and those approved by the Secretary of State or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. No other official is authorized to originate public statements regarding the Geneva meeting, or to provide comment in background briefings which goes beyond statements made publically by the White House or Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem desirable, they may be undertaken only following the written approval of either the Secretary of State or Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (S)

In this connection, I am compelled to note that our negotiating position continues to be undermined by unauthorized, and often inaccurate or distorted information provided to the public media by anonymous government officials. It will be particularly important in the months ahead to put a stop to this damaging practice, and I would remind every agency head that it is part of his executive responsibility to control access to sensitive information in a manner which insures its integrity from unauthorized disclosure. (S)

Issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union will continue to be staffed in the normal interagency process, culminating in the National Security Council or National Security Planning Group. (U)

To insure that the various strands of U.S.-Soviet relations are properly coordinated for presentation to these cabinet-level bodies, I hereby establish a White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting, with the following mandate:

1. To monitor and insure consistency of substantive preparations for the meeting in Geneva, except for those which come under the aegis of the Senior Arms Control Group. (S)
2. To coordinate policy guidance for public handling of issues related to the meeting in Geneva. (S)

3. To provide liaison with the White House Advance Office and other units responsible for arrangements and logistics in respect to substantive implications of arrangements for the meeting. ~~(S)~~

The White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting will operate under the Chairmanship of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock, and will include representatives designated by the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence and such other officials as the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. ~~(S)~~

JMC
13

~~SECRET~~

5854
ADD-ON

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

July 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE/JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Letter of Protest

As a result of the restricted IG held today (LTG Thompson, J-5; EUR/DAS Tom Niles; OSD/ISP Principal DAS Lou Michael), I have a clearer idea of just what occurred the night of July 13 and the subsequent events following that incident. In brief:

- July 13: Soviet truck pulls out of convoy, follows at high speed USMLM tour vehicle carrying COL Roland Lajoie. MLM vehicle pulls off road, Soviet truck attempts to brake, but rams into rear of our vehicle. COL Lajoie suffers bruised cheekbone. Soviet vehicle follows MLM track (spilled gasoline) back to mission house. COL Lajoie engages driver in heated argument.
- July 15: USMLM Deputy LTC Kelly protests verbally to Soviets, who agree to investigate. Soviet authorities reply that the incident was completely unwarranted. Admitted driver was at fault, but insisted the act was "not deliberate." Kelly replies that we were in a non-restricted area obeying standard guidelines for observation; charges this behavior typical of actions of undisciplined Soviet soldiers. Soviets reply that the incident was serious and that the soldiers would be punished.
- July 18: Soviets confirm that their investigation revealed that their troops were "completely at fault," but stressed that the incident was not deliberate. The "guilty parties" (presumably meaning others besides the driver) would be punished. The Soviet authorities stressed that this incident should not be allowed to impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, nor between the two forces in Berlin. They added that this made it more urgent than ever to move forward with the productive military-to-military staff talks. No formal apology was proffered. The Soviet authorities stressed that it was absolutely necessary that these discussions remain private; LTC Kelly readily agreed to protect the confidentiality of these discussions. As a personal aside, the senior Soviet officer asked LTC Kelly to "extend his personal condolences" to COL Lajoie.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2#7558

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

~~SECRET~~

14

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2

-- July 20: GEN Lawson summarizes above for GEN Vessey; report received at JCS on July 22. Includes GEN Lawson's recommendations on Letter of Protest.

COMMENT: There are many ramifications to this incident. It is still unclear why the President was never formally informed of the actual incident nor of our on-the-spot evaluation. Obviously, the military were reticent to forward any of this information, fearing that political authorities in DOD would quickly compromise the confidentiality of these discussions. In addition, the ineptness of the military reporting system and the multi-layered armed forces bureaucracy is readily apparent. OSD had an initial report as early as July 22, but failed to send it to us -- even though we repeatedly asked for information. The compromise of Lawson's message, as reflected in yesterday's media stories, probably reflected deliberate intentions to impact on Soviet-American relations. Most importantly, old hands cannot recall any instance of the Soviets being so forthcoming as they were in responding to this incident.

GEN Otis is slated to meet with his counterpart tomorrow to deliver the Letter of Protest, and to arrange at least one more military-to-military staff discussion. I have instructed DOD to send a more comprehensive report to the White House following that meeting, summarizing the entire incident. We will schedule another IG meeting early next week to assess the situation.


Jack Matlock concurs.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~Not Lock~~

JM-C 15
SFH07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1985

Dear Mr. Petrov:

Your letter of May 4 concerning the difficulty you have encountered in obtaining permission to join your wife in the United States moved me deeply. Surely all governments have an obligation to avoid practices which artificially separate spouses. I am aware that all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to this principle, and know that if this commitment were honored, you and your wife would have no difficulty living together in whichever country you choose.

I can assure you that your efforts to join your wife have my personal support. I know that our government officials and diplomatic representatives have made many appeals on your behalf. You can be confident that we will continue to do so, in the hope that we can persuade all governments to act in accord with the commitments they have assumed.

With my best wishes and hope that ~~that~~ you and your wife can soon be reunited.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Re do
7-30-85
Hja

Mr. Sergei Petrov
125445 Moscow
Belomorskaya 5,
Block 3, Apt. 385
Moscow



16

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 1985

Dear Mr. Feltsman:

Your letter of May 4 concerning your unsuccessful efforts to emigrate touched me deeply. I cannot understand why some governments are unwilling to honor their commitment in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to allow their citizens to depart for any country of their choosing. Refusal to abide by this solemn commitment is all the more incomprehensible when the individual is prevented from pursuing his professional activity in his original country.

I can assure you that we will continue to make clear our conviction that all responsible governments should abide by commitments they have made to respect fundamental human rights, as they have been defined in international documents. It is my fervent hope that your natural desire to continue your artistic activity and your request to settle elsewhere will receive your government's approval.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mr. Vladimir Feltsman
Moscow, USSR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOG-114/2 # 7560

BY KNL NARA DATE 10/1/12

7560

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has seen _____
5253a

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Received SS

1985 JUL 24 PM 2:05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 24, 1985

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Letters from Sergei Petrov and Vladimir Feltsman

You will recall that your son Ron gave you two letters which he obtained during his trip to Moscow. The first is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to an American citizen, who is attempting to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife in the United States. The second is from the pianist Vladimir Feltsman, who has no relatives in the United States but who has tried unsuccessfully to emigrate to Israel since 1979. Since the cases differ, I will describe the background of each separately.

Sergei Petrov:

Petrov married Virginia Johnson, who lives in Winston Salem, in 1981. Since that time he has been refused permission repeatedly to leave the Soviet Union. He most recently applied for exit permission in May of this year, and so far as the State Department is aware, has not yet received a reply to this latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also raised his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy-Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

George Shultz raised the question of the divided spouses at his July 3 meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President

Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We will continue pressing for resolution of all of them before your meeting with Gorbachev in November.

As for your own involvement in this process, I believe it might be helpful if you signed a personal letter to Petrov, in response to the letter Ron brought. If this letter were sent to him through the Soviet mail system, it would be seen by Soviet officials. The personal interest in his case which this would indicate could be helpful in encouraging the Soviets to shape up and do the right thing.

Vladimir Feltsman:

Feltsman is a pianist who has been seeking to emigrate to Israel since 1979. According to the State Department, he was last denied permission to leave the USSR in 1983, but may have filed another application since then. He is included on the State Department's representation list of those Soviets who have repeatedly been denied permission to emigrate to Israel. He is well known to the Embassy community in Moscow and has performed at Spaso House. He has been invited to perform in the U.S. -- at Avery Fisher Hall in New York and at the Kennedy Center here, but has been unable to obtain a Soviet passport even for temporary travel abroad. Helen Hayes, Yehudi Menuhin, Zubin Mehta and Dudley Moore have all been involved in efforts to help Feltsman.

Feltsman's case differs from Petrov's in that he does not have close relatives in the United States and -- formally at least -- has not applied to emigrate to the United States. Therefore, our "standing" to intervene in the case is more tenuous than it is in Petrov's case. Even the Helsinki Final Act does not apply in the strict sense since Israel is not a signatory.

Under the circumstances, I believe it would be adequate for the letter to be answered by a staffer who would assure Feltsman that we will continue efforts to encourage the Soviet authorities to allow emigration to Israel and will make representations regularly on his behalf. If, however, you prefer to sign a personal letter to him, this would do no harm and I have attached a suitable text at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

✓ RR

—

That you sign the letter at Tab A and either sign the one at Tab B or authorize a staffer to reply on your behalf.

Attachments:

- Tab A Letter to Petrov
- Tab B Letter to Feltsman

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

7562

19

MEMORANDUM

5253
add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Letters to President from Soviet Artists

I received the second letter ten days after getting the first; apparently it was stuck in the system somewhere. The two cases are different, so I will comment on them separately.

First Letter: Sergei Petrov

The first letter is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to Virginia Johnson of Winston Salem. They were married in February, 1981, and the Soviets have repeatedly refused Petrov's applications to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife. Petrov filed his most recent application in May of this year, and so far as State is aware, has not yet received an official reply to his latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also raised his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

Secretary Shultz raised the question of divided spouses at his July 3 meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We should continue pressing for resolution of all of them before the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 #7562

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

In addition, I believe it would help if the President signed a personal letter to Petrov, referring to Ron's meeting with him (if in fact they met), and expressing his personal interest in the case. If such a letter were sent to him through the international mails (either directly from here or by Petrov's wife), it would doubtless be intercepted by the Soviet authorities and could have a salutary effect.

Second Letter: Vladimir Feltsman


Feltsman is a pianist who has been seeking to emigrate to Israel since 1979. According to the State Department, he was last denied permission to leave the USSR in 1983, but may have filed another application since then. He is included on the State Department's representation list of those Soviets who have repeatedly been denied permission to emigrate to Israel. He is well known to the Embassy community in Moscow and has performed at Spaso House. He has been invited to perform in the U.S. -- at Avery Fisher Hall in New York and at the Kennedy Center here, but has been unable to obtain a Soviet passport even for temporary travel abroad. Helen Hayes, Yehudi Menuhin, Zubin Mehta and Dudley Moore have all been involved in efforts to help Feltsman.

Feltsman's case differs from Petrov's in that he does not have close relatives in the United States and -- formally at least -- has not applied to emigrate to the United States. Therefore, our "standing" to intervene in the case is more tenuous than it is in Petrov's case. Even the Helsinki Final Act does not apply in the strict sense since Israel is not a signatory.

Under the circumstances, I believe it would be adequate for the letter to be answered by a staffer who would assure Feltsman that we will continue efforts to encourage the Soviet authorities to allow emigration to Israel and will make representations regularly on his behalf. If, however, the President desires to sign a personal letter to him, this would do no harm and I have attached a suitable text at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you either explain the facts of these cases to the President or send him the memorandum at Tab I, with the recommendation that he sign the letter at Tab A, and either sign the one at Tab B or authorize a staffer to reply on his behalf.

Approve 

Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Petrov
- Tab B Letter to Feltsman
- Tab C Incoming Letters from Petrov and Feltsman

The President of the United States
The White House,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Amb. MATLOCK²¹

Advance

4 May, 1985

Dear Mr. President

My name is Sergei Petrov. I am a Russian, married to an American citizen Virginia Hurt Johnson. Since our wedding in February 1981, which took place in Moscow, my wife and I have been separated from each other. For four years the Soviet authorities refuse to let me join my wife in the United States.

We do not know why instead of helping us -- as they should according to Helsinki agreement -- the Soviet authorities continue to create obstacles which keep us apart. My wife is a law student; I am a free lance photographer, and we refuse to believe that our reunification is a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

All our attempts to find out the real reason for denying me exit permission to go to the United States have produced no results. The Soviet authorities either refuse to explain or limit their answer to one word: "undesireable".

In our desperate situation, my wife and I ask for your help and support. There is little hope that our problem will find a solution all by itself.

There are less than twenty divided families who are not being allowed to join their spouses in the United States. Their situation is not essentially different from ours. The number is too small to expect the Soviet authorities to be concerned with this problem. Our suffering means nothing to them. Historically, this country views its citizens as its property. The concept that people have inalienable rights is still foreign to the Russians.

For me, four years of struggle for my right to be with my wife in the United States, the country of our mutual choice, has been a deeply instructive, even valuable, experience. Being unable to accept certain positions of the Soviet government, I proved to be a bad Russian. That gives me hope that I may become good American.

Sincerely,

Sergei Petrov

Sergei Petrov

USSR
125445 Moscow,
Belomorskaya 5,
block 3, apt.385
tel. 458-31-71

my wife's address:
Ms. Virginia Hurt Johnson
9095 Reynolda Station
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
tel. (919) 724-5735

National Security Council
The White House

22



System # _____

85 JUN 24 A 9: 57 Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>2</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>1/3</u>	<u>WM</u>	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>PROPS</u> <u>note</u>
William Martin	<u>4</u>	<u>WM</u>	<u>10/30</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>Action:</u> <u>MA+LOR</u>	
Situation Room			


I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob - I don't recall seeing a propo on this. Do you? ~~WM~~ No, sorry.

Bud - I don't recall receiving a propo on this. Could you pl. provide instructions. Thanks. WM



23

The President of the United States
The White House,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

4 May, 1985

Dear Mr. President

My name is Vladimir Feltsman. I am a pianist. I won grand prizes in the International competitions in Prague (1967) and in Paris (1971). I performed with the major orchestras in the Soviet Union and abroad - in Europe and Japan. I made a number of discs. But as I continued to develop as an artist I found more and more difficult to cope with tight ideological control over my work and the absence of elementary artistic freedom.

In April 1979 I decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union but I was denied an exit permission.

All my concerts were cancelled, my records were removed from the stores, my radio and TV tapes were ordered to be destroyed. I ceased to exist as an artist.


For two years I was not allowed to play on public. Only after my interview with the "New York Times" in March 1981 I was allowed to perform inside the Soviet Union but not on the main stages.

As an artist I see no future for me in the Soviet Union. I am just a musician and music is all my life. When I am told I am not allowed to play it means I am not allowed to live.

All the requests made on my behalf by my colleges and friends were ignored by the Soviet authorities. My family and I ask for your help in our desperate situation.

Sincerely,

Vladimir Feltsman

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Vladimir Feltsman". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name. It features a long, sweeping underline that extends to the left and then curves back under the name.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 2, 1985

Jack was given letters I passed to [unclear] should [unclear] We should [unclear] at [unclear] the [unclear] send [unclear] find

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCCHARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Sergei Petrov

I just received this morning the letter you mentioned in your profs note yesterday.

The letter is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to Virginia Johnson of Winston Salem. They were married in February, 1981, and the Soviets have repeatedly refused Petrov's applications to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife. Petrov filed his most recent application in May of this year, and so far as State is aware, has not yet received an official reply to his latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also rased his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

I understand that Secretary Shultz will raise the question of the divided spouses at his next meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We also should continue pressing for resolution of all of them before the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November.

My suggestions would be the following:

1. That Secretary Shultz raise the problem of divided spouses in his meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, making the point that family reunification is a cardinal obligation of the Helsinki Final Act,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7563

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

25

and that prompt resolution of these cases would contribute to a successful meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki on the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. (I have already made this recommendation to State, and the point is in the Secretary's talking points.)

2. Beyond this, we should press consistently in diplomatic channels and in any private communications we may establish to have all these cases resolved before the Geneva meeting.

3. Finally, I believe it would help if the President signed a personal letter to Petrov, referring to Ron's meeting with him (if in fact they met), and expressing his personal interest in the case. If such a letter were sent to him through the international mails (either directly from here or by Petrov's wife), it would doubtless be intercepted by the Soviet authorities and could have a salutary effect.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you either explain the facts of the case to the President or send him the memorandum at Tab I, with the recommendation that he sign the letter at Tab A. (Once the letter is signed, it might be well to consult with Petrov's wife about the best way to have it delivered.)

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Petrov
- Tab B Incoming Letter from Petrov

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7566

5253
add-on

JY-c
JFM07
20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 12, 1985

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

NLRR F06-114/2 # 7566

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

BY KML NARA DATE 10/1/12

SUBJECT: Letters to President from Soviet Artists

I received the second letter ten days after getting the first; apparently it was stuck in the system somewhere. The two cases are different, so I will comment on them separately.

First Letter: Sergei Petrov

The first letter is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to Virginia Johnson of Winston Salem. They were married in February, 1981, and the Soviets have repeatedly refused Petrov's applications to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife. Petrov filed his most recent application in May of this year, and so far as State is aware, has not yet received an official reply to his latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also raised his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

Secretary Shultz raised the question of divided spouses at his July 3 meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We should continue pressing for resolution of all of them before the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

In addition, I believe it would help if the President signed a personal letter to Petrov, referring to Ron's meeting with him (if in fact they met), and expressing his personal interest in the case. If such a letter were sent to him through the international mails (either directly from here or by Petrov's wife), it would doubtless be intercepted by the Soviet authorities and could have a salutary effect.

Second Letter: Vladimir Feltsman

Feltsman is a pianist who has been seeking to emigrate to Israel since 1979. According to the State Department, he was last denied permission to leave the USSR in 1983, but may have filed another application since then. He is included on the State Department's representation list of those Soviets who have repeatedly been denied permission to emigrate to Israel. He is well known to the Embassy community in Moscow and has performed at Spaso House. He has been invited to perform in the U.S. -- at Avery Fisher Hall in New York and at the Kennedy Center here, but has been unable to obtain a Soviet passport even for temporary travel abroad. Helen Hayes, Yehudi Menuhin, Zubin Mehta and Dudley Moore have all been involved in efforts to help Feltsman.

Feltsman's case differs from Petrov's in that he does not have close relatives in the United States and -- formally at least -- has not applied to emigrate to the United States. Therefore, our "standing" to intervene in the case is more tenuous than it is in Petrov's case. Even the Helsinki Final Act does not apply in the strict sense since Israel is not a signatory.

Under the circumstances, I believe it would be adequate for the letter to be answered by a staffer who would assure Feltsman that we will continue efforts to encourage the Soviet authorities to allow emigration to Israel and will make representations regularly on his behalf. If, however, the President desires to sign a personal letter to him, this would do no harm and I have attached a suitable text at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you either explain the facts of these cases to the President or send him the memorandum at Tab I, with the recommendation that he sign the letter at Tab A, and either sign the one at Tab B or authorize a staffer to reply on his behalf.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Petrov
- Tab B Letter to Feltsman
- Tab C Incoming Letters from Petrov and Feltsman

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/Z # 7567

BY KMI NARA DATE 10/1/12ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letters from Sergei Petrov and Vladimir Feltsman

You will recall that your son Ron gave you two letters which he obtained during his trip to Moscow. The first is from Sergei Petrov, a Soviet citizen married to an American citizen, who is attempting to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join his wife in the United States. The second is from the pianist Vladimir Feltsman, who has no relatives in the United States but who has tried unsuccessfully to emigrate to Israel since 1979. Since the cases differ, I will describe the background of each separately.

Sergei Petrov:

Petrov married Virginia Johnson, who lives in Winston Salem, in 1981. Since that time he has been refused permission repeatedly to leave the Soviet Union. He most recently applied for exit permission in May of this year, and so far as the State Department is aware, has not yet received a reply to this latest application.

Petrov is one of twenty-two divided spouses on behalf of whose emigration Embassy Moscow and the State Department have made numerous representations. Speaker O'Neill also raised his case with Soviet authorities during his March trip.

The Soviets have never given an official reason for denying him exit permission (they rarely if ever do), but the impression at Embassy Moscow is that he is considered at one time earlier in his life to have had access to sensitive information.

We clearly should continue doing all we can, not only for Petrov but for the other divided spouses, some of whom have actually been waiting longer than he has, and one of whom (Yuri Balovlenkov) has been on a hunger strike carried to the point that his life was in danger.

George Shultz raised the question of the divided spouses at his July 3 meeting with Dobrynin, urging him to mount a special effort to start resolving these cases before the meeting in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

79

Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Final Act. We will continue pressing for resolution of all of them before your meeting with Gorbachev in November.

As for your own involvement in this process, I believe it might be helpful if you signed a personal letter to Petrov, in response to the letter Ron brought. If this letter were sent to him through the Soviet mail system, it would be seen by Soviet officials. The personal interest in his case which this would indicate could be helpful in encouraging the Soviets to shape up and do the right thing.

Vladimir Feltsman:

Feltsman is a pianist who has been seeking to emigrate to Israel since 1979. According to the State Department, he was last denied permission to leave the USSR in 1983, but may have filed another application since then. He is included on the State Department's representation list of those Soviets who have repeatedly been denied permission to emigrate to Israel. He is well known to the Embassy community in Moscow and has performed at Spaso House. He has been invited to perform in the U.S. -- at Avery Fisher Hall in New York and at the Kennedy Center here, but has been unable to obtain a Soviet passport even for temporary travel abroad. Helen Hayes, Yehudi Menuhin, Zubin Mehta and Dudley Moore have all been involved in efforts to help Feltsman.

Feltsman's case differs from Petrov's in that he does not have close relatives in the United States and -- formally at least -- has not applied to emigrate to the United States. Therefore, our "standing" to intervene in the case is more tenuous than it is in Petrov's case. Even the Helsinki Final Act does not apply in the strict sense since Israel is not a signatory.

Under the circumstances, I believe it would be adequate for the letter to be answered by a staffer who would assure Feltsman that we will continue efforts to encourage the Soviet authorities to allow emigration to Israel and will make representations regularly on his behalf. If, however, you prefer to sign a personal letter to him, this would do no harm and I have attached a suitable text at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

— — That you sign the letter at Tab A and either sign the one at Tab B or authorize a staffer to reply on your behalf.

- Attachments:
- Tab A Letter to Petrov
- Tab B Letter to Feltsman

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

30

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Petrov:

Your letter of May 4 concerning the difficulty you have encountered in obtaining permission to join your wife in the United States moved me deeply. Surely all governments have an obligation to avoid practices which artificially separate spouses. I am aware that all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are committed to this principle, and know that if this commitment were honored, you and your wife would have no difficulty living together in whichever country you choose.

I can assure you that your efforts to join your wife have my personal support. I know that our government officials and diplomatic representatives have made many appeals on your behalf. You can be confident that we will continue to do so, in the hope that we can persuade all governments to act in accord with the commitments they have assumed.

With my best wishes and hope that that you and your wife can soon be reunited.

Sincerely,

Mr. Sergei Petrov
125445 Moscow
Belomorskaya 5,
Block 3, Apt. 385
Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Feltsman:

Your letter of May 4 concerning your unsuccessful efforts to emigrate touched me deeply. I cannot understand why some governments are unwilling to honor their commitment in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to allow their citizens to depart for any country of their choosing. Refusal to abide by this solemn commitment is all the more incomprehensible when the individual is prevented from pursuing his professional activity in his original country.

I can assure you that we will continue to make clear our conviction that all responsible governments should abide by commitments they have made to respect fundamental human rights, as they have been defined in international documents. It is my fervent hope that your natural desire to continue your artistic activity and your request to settle elsewhere will receive your government's approval.

Sincerely,

Mr. Vladimir Feltsman
Moscow, USSR

The President of the United States
The White House,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Amb. MATLOCK

ADVANCE³²

4 May, 1985

Dear Mr. President

My name is Sergei Petrov. I am a Russian, married to an American citizen Virginia Hurt Johnson. Since our wedding in February 1981, which took place in Moscow, my wife and I have been separated from each other. For four years the Soviet authorities refuse to let me join my wife in the United States.

We do not know why instead of helping us -- as they should according to Helsinki agreement -- the Soviet authorities continue to create obstacles which keep us apart. My wife is a law student; I am a free lance photographer, and we refuse to believe that our reunification is a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

All our attempts to find out the real reason for denying me exit permission to go to the United States have produced no results. The Soviet authorities either refuse to explain or limit their answer to one word: "undesireable".

In our desperate situation, my wife and I ask for your help and support. There is little hope that our problem will find a solution all by itself.

There are less than twenty divided families who are not being allowed to join their spouses in the United States. Their situation is not essentially different from ours. The number is too small to expect the Soviet authorities to be concerned with this problem. Our suffering means nothing to them. Historically, this country views its citizens as its property. The concept that people have inalienable rights is still foreign to the Russians.

For me, four years of struggle for my right to be with my wife in the United States, the country of our mutual choice, has been a deeply instructive, even valuable, experience. Being unable to accept certain positions of the Soviet government, I proved to be a bad Russian. That gives me hope that I may become good American.

Sincerely,

Sergei Petrov

Sergei Petrov

USSR
125445 Moscow,
Belomorskaya 5,
block 3, apt.385
tel. 456-31-71

my wife's address:
Ms. Virginia Hurt Johnson
9095 Reynolda Station
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
tel. (919) 724-5735

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

85 JUN 24 A 9: 57 Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	2	P	
William Martin	1/3	WM	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	ly	PROPS note to 12/30
William Martin	4	WM	6/30
NSC Secretariat	6	Action: MAT LEX	
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
-----------------	------------	------------	--------------	-----------------------

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob - I don't recall seeing a props on this. Do you? WM No, sorry.

Bud - I don't recall receiving a props on this. Could you pls. provide instructions. Thanks. WM

34

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

85 JUN 24 A 9: 57 Package # _____



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>2</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
William Martin	<u>1/3</u>	<u>um</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>ly</u>	<u>PROPS</u> <u>note</u> <u>6/30</u>
William Martin	<u>4</u>	<u>um</u>	<u>6/30</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>Action:</u> <u>MATLOCK</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob - I dont recall seeing a props on this. Do you? ~~um~~ No, sorry.

Bud - I dont recall receiving a props on this. Could you plb. provide instructions. Thanks. um



35

The President of the United States
The White House,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

4 May, 1985

Dear Mr. President

My name is Vladimir Feltsman. I am a pianist. I won grand prizes in the International competitions in Prague (1967) and in Paris (1971). I performed with the major orchestras in the Soviet Union and abroad - in Europe and Japan. I made a number of discs. But as I continued to develop as an artist I found more and more difficult to cope with tight ideological control over my work and the absence of elementary artistic freedom.

In April 1979 I decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union but I was denied an exit permission.

All my concerts were cancelled, my records were removed from the stores, my radio and TV tapes were ordered to be destroyed. I ceased to exist as an artist.


For two years I was not allowed to play on public. Only after my interview with the "New York Times" in March 1981 I was allowed to perform inside the Soviet Union but not on the main stages.

As an artist I see no future for me in the Soviet Union. I am just a musician and music is all my life. When I am told I am not allowed to play it means I am not allowed to live.

All the requests made on my behalf by my colleges and friends were ignored by the Soviet authorities. My family and I ask for your help in our desperate situation.

Sincerely,

Vladimir Feltsman

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Vladimir Feltsman". The signature is written in dark ink and is underlined with a single horizontal stroke.

National Security Council
The White House

36

System # _____

85 JUN 24 A 9: 57 Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	2	P	
William Martin	1/3	WM	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	ly	PROPS note 5
William Martin	4	WM	1/30
NSC Secretariat	6	Action: MATLOR	
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob - I don't recall seeing a props on this. Do you? WM No, sorry.

Bud - I don't recall receiving a props on this. Could you plz. provide instructions. Thanks. WM

National Security Council
The White House

37



System # _____

85 JUN 24 A 9: 57 Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	2	P	
William Martin	1/3	WM	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	ly	PROPS notebook
William Martin	4	WM	1/30
NSC Secretariat	6	Action: MATLCK	
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

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
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All the requests made on my behalf by my colleges and friends were ignored by the Soviet authorities. My family and I ask for your help in our desperate situation.

Sincerely,

Vladimir Feltsman



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

39

EYES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

CAS 6/18/02

PRESERVATION COPY

*TC - please with clear with Henkel - 40
Jash*

-- LITTLE PROSPECT FOR RESOLVING LONGSTANDING PROBLEMS SUCH AS MFN WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND EMIGRATION PRACTICES.

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- WE BOTH AGREE THAT IN PREPARATION FOR MEETING BETWEEN OUR LEADERS WE NEED TO FOCUS HIGHEST-LEVEL ATTENTION ON CRITICAL AREAS AND CHART A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE.

-- AT SAME TIME IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS A MUTUAL DESIRE TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN A NUMBER OF MORE MODEST BILATERAL AREAS.

-- AS YOUR SIDE HAS SUGGESTED, IT WOULD BE GOOD TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE BEFORE NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- MAC BALDRIGE'S MAY VISIT TO MOSCOW MADE USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. URGE YOU TO GIVE U.S. FIRMS EQUAL ACCESS. IMPORTANT YOU FULFILL WHEAT PURCHASE OBLIGATIONS UNDER GRAIN AGREEMENT.

-- FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON NORTH PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT MAJOR LOST OPPORTUNITY. THIS IS JUST SORT OF ISSUE THAT CAN AND SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN PERIOD BEFORE SUMMIT. ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED, US IS READY TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL AIR SERVICE.

-- BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK AT GENEVA MEETING.

-- URGE YOU TO TAKE DECISIONS TO RESOLVE FINAL ISSUES IN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE SUMMIT: TV APPEARANCES IMPORTANT (USIA DIRECTOR WROTE TO ZAMYATIN BUT RECEIVED NO REPLY), EXHIBITS AT LEAST AT PREVIOUS LEVELS ESSENTIAL.

-- MAKING PROGRESS ON REINVIGORATING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. HAVE HAD JOINT MEETINGS ON TRADE/AGRICULTURE. AGRICULTURE SECRETARY BROCK, HOUSING SECRETARY PIERCE AND EPA ADMINISTRATOR THOMAS ARE TO GO TO MOSCOW IN AUGUST, SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER RESPECTIVELY.

-- PROPOSE ANOTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY DIFFERENCE TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY FALL.

MODALITIES OF NOVEMBER MEETING

-- SITES FOR THE MEETINGS SHOULD FOSTER OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES FOR THE SUMMIT -- LET OUR TWO LEADERS GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER IN AS RELAXED A SETTING AS POSSIBLE, AND TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CANDID DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES.

-- SWISS HAVE SUGGESTED, AND WE AGREE, THAT A NEUTRAL SITE WOULD BEST PROVIDE THIS KIND OF ATMOSPHERE.

-- OUR ADVANCE TEAM SAW SEVERAL PLACES SUGGESTED BY THE SWISS AND FOUND THEM IDEAL FOR THE MEETINGS. WE HOPE THEY'LL BE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU.

-- SWISS HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO HOST A LARGE RECEPTION FOR BOTH DELEGATIONS ON NOVEMBER 20. AS FOR OTHER SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY HOST DINNERS FOR EACH OTHER ON THE EVENINGS OF NOVEMBER 19 AND 20. OUR PREFERENCE IS TO KEEP THESE AFFAIRS SMALL. (14 asked, 12-20)

-- WE UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE ALSO HAD A TEAM IN GENEVA. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THE SWISS WOULD LIKE TO GET TOGETHER WITH BOTH SIDES AT AN EARLY DATE IN GENEVA. WE AGREE. THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 9 WOULD BE PARTICULARLY GOOD FOR US.

42

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2-47568
BY LDT NARA DATE 11/21/07

MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA TO: NSJFM --CPUA
17:58:48
To: NSJMP --CPUA

07/26/85

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Conversation with Sec Shultz

I just had a long talk with Secretary Shultz by secure phone in California. He is about to go into the Bohemian Grove and consequently will be out of pocket until Sunday.

I opened with the several Soviet issues taking first the backchannel matter. I described the two variants for responding developed by Jack and Mark Palmer explaining the differences (State wanting to prejudge or at least imply Shevardnadze's involvement; we preferring to leave the format to them without foreclosing anything). He agreed basically but did want to make one change to what I suggested to Jack. Jack's version states that we have received their proposal and are willing to engage and would welcome their views on how, when etc. I added a line to the effect that Secretary Shultz would head a delegation to Helsinki and that the Soviets could convey their preference as to format to either Mark or Jack. The Secretary would like to add his name so that now the message would state that Sec Shultz will head our delegation to Helsinki and that if the Soviets wish to do so, they may convey their ideas as to format to Shultz, Matlock or Palmer. I don't mind that.

We then discussed what I believe is a fundamental difference as to our approach to the meeting. In my view, State was taking the tack of saying up front to the Russians, "Look, a meeting will take place which ought to involve concrete agreements and that for that to happen we need to focus our attention on those pending negotiations where agreement appears possible." To me that opens us to being leveraged to make concessions because of our self-imposed deadline. I preferred the approach of saying that their leadership has changed; that warrants the setting of a foundation of viewpoints between our leadership centered upon exchanges, first at Helsinki but then followed by analogous dialogue between Reagan and Gorbachev on how each side views its international responsibilities and the threats to their individual and collective interests posed by the other side. This could devolve into a discussion of the several baskets of the relationship (Regional, bilateral, human rights and arms control) but in the context of summarizing how we view the issues and determining, if possible where priority attention ought to be focussed after the November meeting toward resolving some of the disagreements. In so doing, we might find in the wake of Helsinki that the Soviets come forward with positions which make possible agreement in a given area--or we might not. In my view, the President would surely live with either outcome. The Secretary said he agreed with my characterization!! Jack should therefore, work up the Helsinki talking points accordingly.

I then turned to the letters. The Secretary said that he had not seen Mark's draft and would not until at least Sunday but that he did not really see the

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need for a letter at all. I told him that I originally felt the same way but had been persuaded by Jack that it was in order 1. We have two unanswered letters from them; 2. With Shevardnadze appointed, and a date set for a RR-G meeting, it was reasonable for our President to state in a foundation letter how he saw our relations proceeding in the coming months--if for no other reason than to put the ball in their court; and 3. To give them something concrete to think about as they come to Helsinki and thereby make that meeting more worthwhile. Shultz acknowledged the merit of these points but said that he thought it just as defensible to answer the pending letters after the

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NLS F06-114/2#7569

BY NJI, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

44

Text of message suggested by Palmer:

Sec. Shultz and RCM have been informed of your message. They are prepared to consider a private channel to help with preparations for the Geneva meeting. They assume Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be kept informed. If Gen Sec is interested, please notify us how he wishes to proceed. U.S. contact points can be either JFM or MP. Can be contacted in Helsinki if there is desire to discuss arrangements.

In line with discussion with Sec. Shultz, but not show to him.

JFM Suggested Text:

President has been informed of message. He would welcome means of communicating privately regarding preparations for meeting in November. *Amer del will be in Hki for meetings with S.* If Gen Sec is interested, appreciate notification of how he wishes to proceed. Contact can be made with either ^{GS,} JFM or MP in Helsinki to discuss modalities.

Jack's comments:

1. Should be clearly stated that this is between the principals.
2. We should not attempt to define who is in loop on their side.
3. They will not be offended. They may well prefer not to acknowledge that Shev. is in loop, even if (as is virtually certain) they keep him informed.
4. Unless Shev. himself brings it up, it should not be mentioned to him. If Sovs are frank, they will not wish to acknowledge in any way officially what is going on.
5. If we proceed, we must have the most precise rules regarding who is witting and who not. The number of people on our side who know of the existence of the channel, must be held to absolute minimum.

(over)

CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS FOR CONTACT IN HELSINKI:

(if approached)

-- Willing to arrange.

-- Best if person fully familiar with thinking on own side is able to engage the other in frank discussion of issues.

-- Purpose not formal negotiation, but attempt to test and get reaction to ideas on both sides.

-- If certain approaches appear promising, there can be consultation on best modalities for translation into formal negotiation.

-- Strictly private and unofficial on both sides. But must be frank to be useful.

-- No direct reference outside designated channel to anything said in it.

-- Each side responsible for informing those officials on its side who need to know. Purpose is not to exclude anyone, but to insure privacy, confidentiality, and unofficial nature of these communications.

-- We flexible on arrangements. Can be in either country or in third country.

-- We are prepared to conduct in Russian without presence of interpreter if that facilitates arrangements on Soviet side and helps insure privacy.

-- Will take back any suggestions, either procedural or substantive, but have no instructions on the latter at this point, other than President's desire to address key issues seriously in an effort to find some avenues to solution.

-- If, however, interlocutor has any questions, observations or suggestions to convey, am prepared to take back and get answers or reaction.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/24 75 74
BY KDJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/2-7570

BY hvj, NARA, DATE 11/21/07

47

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5. If we proceed, we must have the most precise rules regarding who is witting and who not. The number of people on our side who know of the existence of the channel, must be

In line with discussion with Sec. Shultz, but not show to him.

48
Matter has already been discussed in State by (at very least) the following): Palmer, Ridgway, Whitehead, Charlie Hill and probably Armacost. The number of people involved is already greater than is desirable. Sec. Shultz must understand that it is imperative to designate 2 or at most 3 persons who will be in loop.

CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS FOR CONTACT IN HELSINKI: (if approached)

- Willing to arrange.
- Best if person fully familiar with thinking on own side is able to engage the other in frank discussion of issues.
- Purpose not formal negotiation, but attempt to test and get reaction to ideas on both sides.
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DECLASSIFIED
 NLS F06-714/2# 7575
 BY hjt NARA, DATE 11/21/07

Matlock



50
When Package comes
back from Pres give
original to Wilma to
put in Bud's notebook
per. note on routing
slip.

done BMM
7/29/85



National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

85 JUL 23 A 9: 03

System # I
Package # 5784

253 1893

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson	<u>1/3</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Paul Thompson	<u>6</u>		
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>7</u>		<u>A</u>
William Martin	<u>6A</u>	<u>um</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>		
Situation Room	<u>2</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>reds</u>

A: MATLOCK for reds based on Thompson's comments.

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Put TAB 2 on WH letter head and
TAB A has main types on several pages.

Done 5/2 7/23 ↑, Pat

National Security Council
The White House

256

RECEIVED

85 JUL 25 P 1: 29

System # I
Package # 5784

1897

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>2</u>	<u>um</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>X</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Paul Thompson	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>[initials]</u>
William Martin			<u>send copies</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>Regan</u>
Situation Room			

Pls send copies to VP

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Original to Bud's notebook (w/ Wilma) copies to Regan & VP. Px.
Also original with [initials] when back from Pres. m

The President has seen _____
5784

SV

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Received SS

1985 JUL 27 PM 4:02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 27, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Paper on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of studies we are doing on the Soviet Union. It deals with Soviet Russian psychology, and I believe you will find it of interest.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper on the Soviet Union

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President
Don Regan

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CVS* NARA, Date *6/18/02*

DECLASSIFIED
NLS Folio 114/247571
BY LAT NARA DATE 11/21/07

53

SOVIET RUSSIAN PSYCHOLOGY:
SOME COMMON TRAITS

Yes, they lie and cheat. And they can stonewall a negotiation when it seems in their interest to strike a deal. They have a sense of pride and "face" that makes the proverbial oriental variety pale in comparison. Yet, in private, with people he trusts, the Russian can be candid to a fault -- grovelling in his nation's inadequacies -- and so scrupulously honest that it can be irritating, as when he makes a big deal over having forgotten to return a borrowed pencil.

Do these contradictions stem from ideology and politics? To a degree, certainly. The lying, cheating and stonewalling, even the exaggerated sense of pride, often serve an obvious political or ideological purpose. But that is not the whole story, for these traits have deep roots in Russian culture and society.

Now when we talk about the "psychology" of a nation or ethnic group, we need to bear in mind that we are not talking about the psychology of every individual in that group. By no means every Russian, or every Soviet official, fits a stereotype. They exhibit as much individual variety as any other people. Yet there are certain psychological characteristics which are more common, and more characteristic, in one society than in another. What we are concerned with here are some which differ from those most common to Americans and explain in part frequently observed behavioral differences.

The "Truth": Reality or a Convenient Fiction?

Lying is endemic in every society. But societies differ in how the phenomenon is regarded. All societies I know of excuse it under certain circumstances. Who would reproach a wife who comforted her husband after he had delivered a dull after-dinner speech by telling him, "It was a very thoughtful talk, dear, and I'm sure those idiots who dozed off just had too much to drink before dinner?" We would call it a white lie; not the truth, but meant well.

The Russians have many more categories of the "excusable" lie than we typically do. There is, for example, the lie which is not so much meant to deceive as to salvage the pride of the liar. Most Russians would feel that it is a social faux pas to confront another person with an embarrassing fact, and that it is understandable if the other person denies the fact and concocts an alternate, fictional explanation, since he is only trying to save face, not to deceive. They even have a separate word for this sort of lie, to distinguish it from one made with deliberate intent to deceive.

In 1976, President Ford made a direct appeal to Brezhnev to turn off the microwave signals being directed at the American Embassy in Moscow. We then supplied the Soviets with the technical data we had that proved conclusively the existence of the microwave

radiation and even pinpointed the sources. Subsequently, Gromyko had the gall to state to our Ambassador in a face-to-face meeting that he could assure us, officially and on behalf of the Soviet Government, that no microwaves were being directed at our Embassy.

Gromyko, of course, knew that we knew he was lying, and that there was no way this "assurance" was going to diminish our confidence in the hard facts we had gathered with our own instruments. So why did he do it? I suspect that his reasoning went something like this: "They know very well that we will not admit to this. They are just trying to put us on the spot, and gain an advantage. We'll show them we are not so weak that they can push us around." (In fact, somewhat later the microwave signals were turned off, but without any admission that they ever existed.)

In addition to condoning lying to save face, Russians expect it from governments and official authorities. Lying for reasons of state is not so much excused as simply accepted as a fact of life. They know their own authorities lie to them, and assume that every other government does the same. This is why Russians have never understood why Watergate brought an end to Nixon's presidency. To them, the charges against President Nixon seemed so trivial -- a very mild form of what they assume all government officials do as a matter of course -- that they simply could not accept that these charges could have been the real reason for his resignation. (Given to conspiracy theories, most Russians seem convinced that Nixon was removed by an anti-Soviet cabal because he tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union.)

These typically Russian attitudes toward telling the truth are mingled with a much more purposeful and cynical view of the "truth" which the communist regime introduced. As a calculated instrument for establishing and maintaining control of the population, the communist authorities introduced an elaborate and pervasive system not merely to control information, but to shape the perception of reality by distorting and misrepresenting facts which tended to undermine the political line of the moment. Communist Party professionals were trained on the proposition that the truth is what the Party says it is at a given moment, and many of those who adapted to this requirement seem over time to lose the ability to distinguish between the Party line and reality. Psychologically, the Party line becomes reality for them. Professor Leszek Kolakowski, a former Polish Communist who broke with the regime some 20 years ago and now lives in England, has described this phenomenon as follows:

[The truth of Stalinist totalitarianism] consisted not simply in that virtually everything in the Soviet Union was either falsified or suppressed -- statistics, historical events, current events, names, maps, books (occasionally even Lenin's texts) -- but that the inhabitants of the country were trained to know what was politically "correct." In the functionaries' minds, the borderline between what is

"correct" and what is "true," as we normally understand this, seems really to have become blurred; by repeating the same absurdities time and again they themselves began to believe or half-believe them. The massive corruption of the language eventually produced people who are incapable of perceiving their own mendacity.

To a great extent this form of perception seems to survive, in spite of the fact that the omnipresence of ideology has been somewhat restricted recently. When Soviet leaders maintain that they have "liberated" Afghanistan, or that there are no political prisoners in the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that they mean what they say. To such an extent have they confounded linguistic ability that they are incapable of using any other word for a Soviet invasion than "liberation," and have no sense at all of the grotesque distance between language and reality. It takes a lot of courage, after all, to be entirely cynical; those who lie to themselves appear among us much more frequently than perfect cynics."

Whether it is a case of lying to themselves or of conditioned cynicism, the ability of many Russians (and not only communist officials) to change their version of the truth when so instructed by authority can be breathtaking to an outsider. When the "line" is changed abruptly, many seem to wipe the previous position from their consciousness and blithely assume it never existed. One encounters such habits even in the trivia of everyday life.

Once, while visiting Moscow some years ago, I had dinner in a restaurant with several other Russian speakers. The waitress apparently did not spot us as foreigners, and when we ordered extra bottles of mineral water (it was a sultry summer day) she simply said abruptly, "We're out." This was a little hard to believe, because while most foods are scarce, mineral water rarely is in Soviet restaurants. So we protested and pressed her for an explanation, and she repeated her denial several times and finally terminated the conversation with a curt, "We're out of it, and that's that."

As the waitress walked away from our table, she was intercepted by the maitre d' (who knew we were foreigners), and a few words were exchanged. A couple of minutes later, she appeared with two chilled bottles, which she placed on our table, offering no explanation. I observed naively, "Thanks, I thought you were out."

Her reply was instant and accusatory, "Of course we have mineral water. Why do you think we live worse than you?" It was as if her statement less than five minutes earlier had never been made, and my gentle reference to it was taken as an affront to her national pride. What right did I, a foreigner, have to think that such a simple commodity would be unavailable! And if I had

chosen to remind her of her previous statement, she doubtless would simply have denied ever having said it.

Ends and Means

Some of the attitudes described above are connected with another difference in the typical Russian and the typical American ethical system. By and large, Americans believe that good ends do not justify bad means. Most Russians feel that proper ends justify whatever means necessary.

An emigre Russian professor recently conducted a survey comparing Russian and American attitudes on this subject, placing it in a completely non-political context. He asked the same question to a sample group of persons born in the U.S. and to a group of recent emigres from the Soviet Union. The question was, "If you have a good friend who is having trouble passing a course at school, is it right for you to give him answers during an exam?" The great majority of Americans said it was not right; the Russians, by a comparable majority, said it was.

It is easy to see how this attitude can be exploited by the political authorities. If they can present the objective of a given action as a laudable one, their people are likely to accept whatever means are claimed necessary to achieve it.

The Soviet handling of the KAL shoot-down illustrates many of these factors. A deeply embarrassing incident, first denied, then -- when denial was no longer possible -- a concocted story meant to be exculpatory, particularly in the eyes of the Russian people. The authorities could rely on the Russian propensity to justify means to a "necessary" end if they could be convinced that KAL 007 was a "spy plane" which threatened their security. And the larger tragedy of it all is that most Russians probably believed the concoction, because to disbelieve it would mean that they, as a nation, are aggressive brutes with no respect for human life -- an image the direct opposite of the one the Russians have of themselves and the one the regime, with all its instruments of disinformation, cultivates.

Compromise and Principle

Americans tend to see the willingness to compromise as a value in and of itself. Russians, on the other hand, tend to view it as a fault and a sign of moral weakness. The morally "correct" behavior is to stand firm on your principles and either prevail or go down fighting.

This does not mean that Russians do not understand bargaining. Anyone who has haggled with the peasants in an open-air market or dealt with their grain purchasers can testify to their innate ability to negotiate a price. But if a principle is involved, that is another matter.

Of course, none of us likes to think that we ever compromise on our principles. The real difference between Russians and Americans is that the former impute a "principle" to a much broader category of issues than we would. The communist line is always described as a "principled" line. Counting British and French nuclear systems in any INF agreement is a matter of "principle." For a long time, paying more than 6% on borrowed funds was also one, with the result that the Soviets would knowingly pay a higher price than market on a contract so that the supplier could provide a lower nominal interest rate. In real terms, the lower rate was an illusion, and they knew it, but the "principle" itself was important enough to them to insist upon it.

The underlying Soviet attitude toward compromise explains in part some of their foreign policy blunders. They probably genuinely expected the rest of the world to see their withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations in 1983 as a noble defense of principle, even if it was a principle the outsiders did not agree with. They must have realized very quickly that it was an error but once they had taken the step, they had to readjust their "principles" before they could correct it. Thus the maneuvering in advance of the Geneva meeting last January, and the insistence at that time that the renewed negotiations be characterized as entirely new.

In actual practice, the Soviet attitude toward compromise is related more to its public presentation than to the act itself. Like the peasant woman in the market who wants to move her onions before she takes the train back to her village, Soviet leaders can be quite realistic in judging when it is in their interest to strike a deal and when they may be better off without one. If they are interested in a deal, however, they will wish to position themselves so that they can present it to their own people as a triumph of some principle. This partially explains their habit of seeking general agreements in principle before negotiating details. The agreement in principle, as it were, legitimizes the detailed bargaining which must follow and the result can be portrayed as a successful embodiment of the principle, rather than a craven compromise.

If, however, the Soviet leaders are unable to adjust their "principled" position to accommodate a deal, they may refuse to conclude the deal at all, even if it is in their interest. Immediately after the Trade Act of 1974 was passed with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, the Soviets very privately showed a willingness to reach a deal. They offered an emigration figure of at least 50,000 a year, but on condition that there would be no public acknowledgement that there was a deal. Everything fell apart when there were leaked stories in Washington about this; the Soviets drew back, refused further negotiation and have never since been persuaded to resume bargaining on the issue.

Pride, Face and Status

The Russians have only themselves to blame for the widespread criticism their actions evoke, and the fear and derision they inspire in outsiders. It is doubtless too much to expect them to understand this -- though some of their intellectuals do. Some criticism they can take -- but only in private. They usually do not mind the fear, because it is testimony to their importance and, furthermore, has important political uses. It is really the derision that sends them up the wall. And their skins are so thin on this subject, that they often see insult where none is intended.

Gorbachev's opening monologue to Baldrige in May provided several examples of this. "We recognize that you are a great country and have great achievements," he claimed, "but you ignore what we have achieved. You won't treat us as equals." Subsequently, he complained that even when they pay good hard cash for our grain, which we are anxious to sell, we make statements that they cannot feed their own people, while we never make such statements about Western Europe, which imports more food per capita than the Soviet Union.

Distorted and self-serving as Gorbachev's statements were, they probably represented genuine feelings. Underlying them is a deep inferiority complex bred of many factors: an awareness of their technological backwardness and lower living standards; a basic (though probably subconscious) sense of their political illegitimacy; a recognition that their system has failed to fulfill its promises to provide a better life for their people; and a feeling that they have been systematically denied their rightful recognition and "place in the sun."

Never mind that they have usually stimulated by their own actions and behavior the treatment which they resent. The fact is probably that their skins are thin precisely because they know in their hearts that the criticism, and much of the derision, is well founded. A Russian-speaking American diplomat who served in Moscow in the 1930's tells the following story. Despite the Stalinist atmosphere of the time, he managed to acquire a number of Russian friends, and at their meetings they would speak freely of many of their country's problems. Once, however, the diplomat was called on in a gathering which included foreigners to discuss the current situation, and he alluded gently to some of these problems. Afterwards, some of his Soviet acquaintances came up and told him with indignation, "We thought you were our friend!" He protested that he was, indeed, a friend and pointed out that he had said nothing which was not true. "Of course it's true." the Soviets replied. "But if you were our friend, you wouldn't tell the truth about us."

It is hard to imagine a Chinese or a Frenchman making a statement like that. But then, they have a rock-steady foundation of national and cultural self-confidence to rely on. The Russian psyche, in contrast, teeters on the sand of self-doubt.

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The Other Side of the Coin

Having said so much about contrasts in Russian and American attitudes, a word may be in order about some similarities. We are not poles apart in everything.

In private, and away from a politically-charged environment, a Russian is typically gracious and remarkably open -- if he likes you and considers you sincere. Five or ten minutes after a chance meeting -- say in a train compartment or on a park bench -- he is likely to tell you the story of his life and elicit yours, and respond with spontaneity and candor. In this respect Russians are much less reserved than most West Europeans, and are quick to notice that Americans have the same trait.

Nor do they allow the xenophobic strain in much of their thinking -- and much of the propaganda -- to affect personal ties with individuals. West Germans often are amazed by the warmth and hospitality shown them by Russians when they visit the Soviet Union, given Russian memories of World War II. Many Germans have told me that they are treated better in Leningrad than in Paris by the man on the street.

For all their sensitivity to criticism in public, Russians expect it in private, so long as it does not seem gratuitous or damaging to their sense of national dignity. In fact, the foreigner who tries to curry favor by praising everything Soviet earns only their contempt; such praise is considered insincere, and often patronizing and condescending to boot. (Of course, they like praise of those things they are genuinely proud of, such as their heroism in World War II, Shostakovich's music or Voznesensky's poetry, but not of the things they know very well do not merit praise.)

Their deepest contempt, however, is reserved for those foreigners who try to ingratiate themselves by running down their own country. This the Russians simply do not understand -- in their eyes the foreigner should stand up for his country just as a Russian would for his own -- and if he does not do so, he is considered morally defective. This attitude, of course, does not prevent them from using such persons for propaganda purposes, but Russians, official or otherwise, really have no respect for them.

This attitude applies in particular to members of communist parties in Western Europe and the U.S. In 1976 we sponsored a major exhibition on American life in Moscow to mark the Bicentennial of American Independence. It was an election year, and one section of the exhibit had a real voting machine and the Soviet visitors were encouraged to go in and cast a mock ballot. The slate used was taken from New York and the American Communist Party was on the ballot.

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Almost nobody voted the CP slate (if memory serves, there were perhaps three or four votes for the communists out of thousands cast). Almost all Soviet visitors voted for either Ford or Carter. Our American guides conducted a bit of exit polling at the exhibit, asking visitors how they had voted. Once in a while they would ask why the visitor had not voted for the communists. Sometimes that question only elicited a discreet shrug, but several Soviet visitors were brutally frank, making statements like, "If I were an American, do you think I'd vote for those clowns?" or "Do you think I want America to have a mess like we have here?" So much for Marxist "proletarian solidarity"!

Unfortunately, these appealing Russian traits of personal openness and candor are all too often submerged under the repressive lid of the police state. But when the regime tries to suppress these traits, it is moving against, rather than with, the Russian cultural tradition. Whenever the lid is slightly raised, the traditional behavior spurts forth, all the more vehemently for having been constrained.

* * * * *

The contradictory pull of the various urges, hang-ups and ideological imperatives at work in Soviet Russian minds and emotions tends to make Soviet behavior not only unpredictable to the outsider, but unpredictable for Russians themselves.

Michael Vozlensky, a former member of the Soviet elite who defected in the early 1970's and has written a classic work on the Soviet ruling class, commented recently that those who think the Soviet leaders operate in accord with a careful plan of action have it all wrong. "Everything is decided ad hoc," he maintained. "They don't know themselves what they are going to do next. But they will always claim that they had it in mind all along."

He may be right.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 22, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Papers on Soviet Union for the President

Attached at Tab A is the second in the series of papers I am preparing for the President. It deals with common traits of Soviet Russian psychology.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve *m*

Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Paper on Soviet Union for the President

Another very good paper.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

White House Guidelines, August 2, 1997
By *CJS* NARA, Date *6/10/02*


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 7-29-85

To: Bill Martin

Since this is
such an involved
response, could
you or Mr.
Mr. Farlane sign
instead of me



ANNE HIGGINS
Special Assistant to the
President and Director
of Correspondence
Room 94, x7610